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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION.,
PLAINTIFF - RESPONDENT,

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership.,
DEFENDANT - APPELLANT
And
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation, and
DOES 1 through 5
DEFENDANTS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 40168-2012

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
RAMSDEN & LYONS
Christopher D Gabbert
700 Northwest Blvd
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83816-1336

LA WREN CE G WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O.Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
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Date: 9/13/2012

First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County

Time: 07:50 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 11

User: VIGIL

Case: CV-2010-0010095 Current Judge: Charles W. Hosack
Idaho Transportation Board vs. H J Grathol, etal.

Idaho Transportation Board vs.HJ Grathol, Sterling Savings Bank, John 1-5 Does
Date

Code

User

11/19/2010

NGOC

BIELEC

New Case Filed - Other Claims

BIELEC

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type
Lansing L. Haynes
not listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: state Receipt number: 0049859
Dated: 11/19/2010 Amount: $.00 (Cash) For:
Idaho Transporation Board (plaintiff)

NOTC

BIELEC

Notice Of Appointment Of Special Deputy
Attorneys General

Lansing L. Haynes

LISP

BIELEC

Lis Pendens

Lansing L. Haynes

SUMI
SUMI

BIELEC

Summons lssued---HJ Grathol

Lansing L. Haynes

BIELEC

Summons lssued---Sterling Savings Bank

Lansing L. Haynes

BIELEC

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Lansing L. Haynes
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Holland & Hart Receipt number: 0050344 Dated:
11/23/2010 Amount: $7.00 (Check)

ROSENBUSCH

Affidavit Of Service/Sterling Savings Bank via S.J Lansing L. Haynes
Tharp, CT Corporation System/11-24-10

BIELEC

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
Lansing L. Haynes
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Dennis M
Davis Receipt number: 0052128 Dated:
12/8/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Sterling
Savings Bank (defendant)

NOAP

HUFFMAN

Notice Of Appearance-Dennis M Davis obo
Sterling Savings Bank

Lansing L. Haynes

12/9/2010

ACKS

BAXLEY

Acceptance Of Service On Behalf Of HJ Grathol
by Douglas S Marfice attorney

Lansing L. Haynes

12/20/2010

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/30/2010 11 :00
AM) Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted Tollefson

Lansing L. Haynes

12/21/2010

MEMO

CRUMPACKER

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order
Granting Possession of Real Property

Lansing L. Haynes

MOTN

CRUMPACKER

Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real
Property

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTC

SREED

Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Sterling Savings Lansing L. Haynes

11/23/2010

11/30/2010

AFSV

12/8/2010

12/22/2010

Judge
Lansing L. Haynes

Bank
CVDI

SREED

Civil Disposition entered for: Sterling Savings
Bank, Defendant; Idaho Transporation Board,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 12/22/201 O

Lansing L. Haynes

12/23/2010

ANSW

SREED

Defendant HJ Grathol's Answer to Complaint Douglas Marfice 080 Defendant Grathol

Lansing L. Haynes

12/27/2010

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/13/2011 03:30
PM) Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted Tollefson

Lansing L. Haynes

SREED

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Marfice,
Douglas S. (attorney for Grathol, f:i J) Receipt
number: 0053960 Dated: 12/27/2010 Amount:
$58.00 {Check) For: Grathol, H J (defendant)

Lansing L. Haynes

CRUMPACKER

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

NOHG
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1/10/2011

MOTN

HUFFMAN

Motion to Shorten Time

Lansing L. Haynes

NOHG

HUFFMAN

Notice Of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Christopher D Gabbert in Support of
Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for
Order Granting Possession of Real Property

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of
Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for
Order Granting Possession of Real Property

Lansing L. Haynes

MISC

CRUMPACKER Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for
Order Granting Possession of Real Property

Lansing L. Haynes

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/21/2011 01 :30
PM) Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted Tollefson

Lansing L. Haynes

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/13/2011
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Pit's Motion for
Possession, Ted Tollefson

Lansing L. Haynes

SVERDSTEN

Notice of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

BRIE

LISONBEE

Reply Brief In Support Of Motion For Order
Granting Possession Of Real Property

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

LISONBEE

Affidavit Of Jason Minzghor In Support Of Motion Lansing L. Haynes
For Order Granting Possession Of Real Property

FILE

LEU

************New File #2 Created*****************

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

LISONBEE

Affidavit Of Karl D Vogt In Support of Motion For
Order Granting Possession Of Real Property

Lansing L. Haynes

DCHH

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/21/2011
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: KERI VEARE
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted
Tollefson

Lansing L. Haynes

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
03/02/2011 03:30 PM)

Lansing L. Haynes

1/11/2011

..
1/18/2011

1/21/2011

SVERDSTEN

Notice of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

1/27/2011

ORDR

LEU

Certificate

Lansing L. Haynes

1/28/2011

ORDR

BAXLEY

Order Granting Possession Of Real Property

Lansing L. Haynes

VICTORIN

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal
to Supreme Court Paid by: Ramsden/Lyons
Receipt number: 0004088 Dated: 2/1/2011
Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Grathol, H J
(defendant)

Lansing L. Haynes

BNDC

VICTORIN

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 4090 Dated
2/1/2011 for 100.00)

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTC

BIELEC

Notice Of Appeal

Lansing L. Haynes

2/2/2011

NTSV

BIELEC

Notice Of Service/Christopher D Gabbert for HJ
GRATHOL 2/2/11

Lansing L. Haynes

2/9/2011

NOTC

RICKARD

Plaintiff's Notice Of Tender Of Funds

Lansing L. Haynes
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2/9/2011

BNDC

RICKARD

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 5447 Dated
2/9/2011 for 571000.00)

Lansing L. Haynes

2/10/2011

NOTC

BIELEC

Notice Of Transcript Lodged

Lansing L. Haynes

2/23/2011

APPL

BIELEC

Application To Partially Withdraw Funds

Lansing L. Haynes

2/24/2011

RSCN

BIELEC

Plaintiffs Response To Court's Notice Of Status
Conference For Scheduling And Planning

Lansing L. Haynes

2/28/2011

HRVC

JOKELA

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
03/02/2011 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated - Per
Buck

Lansing L. Haynes

MOTN

BIELEC

Defendant HJ Grathol's Motion For A Jury Trial

Lansing L. Haynes

RSCN

BIELEC

Response to Status Conference Notice---Douglas Lansing L. Haynes
Marfice

3/2/2011

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/22/2011 03:30
PM) Motion for Jury Trial, Gabbert

Lansing L. Haynes

3/3/2011

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/22/2011
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for Jury
Trial, Gabbert

Lansing L. Haynes

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/31/2011 03:00
PM) Motion for Jury Trial, Status Conference,
Gabbert

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTH

ROSENBUSCH Notice Of Hearing/Status Conference

NOTC

ROSENBUSCH Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendant HJ
Lansing L. Haynes
Grathol's Application to Partially Withdraw Funds

ANHR

ROSENBUSCH Amended Notice Of Hearing/Status Conference

ORDR

CLEVELAND

Order Approving Application to Partially Withdraw Lansing L. Haynes

CVDI

CLEVELAND

Civil Disposition entered for: Does, John 1-5,
Defendant; Grathol, H J, Defendant; Sterling
Savings Bank, Defendant; Idaho Transportation
Board, Plaintiff. Filing date: 3/4/2011

Lansing L. Haynes

FJDE

CLEVELAND

Judgment

Lansing L. Haynes

3/14/2011

BNDV

LEU

Bond Converted (Transaction number 518 dated Lansing L. Haynes
3/14/2011 amount 456,800.00)

3/24/2011

BRIE

ROSEN BUSCH ITD's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Grathol's

3/4/2011

Lansing L. Haynes

Lansing L. Haynes

Lansing L. Haynes

Motion for Jury Trial

3/31/2011

4/5/2011

AFIS

ROSENBUSCH Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of ITD's Brief Lansing L. Haynes
in Opposition to Defendant Grathol's Motion for
Jury Trial

HRHD

ROHRBACH

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/31/2011
03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion for Jury Trial,
Status Confeience, Gabbert

Lansing L. Haynes

DCHH

ROHRBACH

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laurie Johnson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

Lansing L. Haynes

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled
01/17/2012 09:00 AM) 10 DAYS

Lansing L. Haynes
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4/18/2011

NTSD

5/12/2011

FILE

SVERDSTEN
ROSEN BUSCH
BAXLEY

5/13/2011
5/17/2011

NTSD
NTSD

6/13/2011

RECT

6/22/2011

RECT

7/8/2011

NTSD

4/5/2011

7/18/2011

ROSENBUSCH
ROSEN BUSCH
CRUMPACKER
RICKARD
CRUMPACKER
HUFFMAN

Judge
Notice of Trial

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

Lansing L. Haynes

*******************New File #3
Created****************

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice of Service of Discovery Requests

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice of Service of Discovery Responses

Lansing L. Haynes

Receipt Of Clerks Record

Lansing L. Haynes

Receipt Of Clerk's Record

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice Of Service Of Discovery

Lansing L. Haynes

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of
Lansing L. Haynes
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid
by: Holland & Hart Receipt number: 0030086
Dated: 7/18/2011 Amount: $9.00 (Check)

7/21/2011

NOTC

ZOOK

Plaintiff ITD's Notice of Disclosure of advancing
Experts

Lansing L. Haynes

8/2/2011

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 10/19/2011 03:30 PM) Ted Tollefson

Lansing L. Haynes

8/22/2011

NOTC
NTSV
HRSC

CRUMPACKER
ZOOK
SVERDSTEN

Notice of compliance

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice Of Service

Lansing L. Haynes

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
10/19/2011 03:30 PM) Marfice

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

CLEVELAND

Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Compel

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

CLEVELAND

Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of
Motion to Compel

Lansing L. Haynes

MOTN

CLEVELAND

Motion to Compel

Lansing L. Haynes

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes
scheduled on 10/19/2011 03:30 PM: Hearing
Vacated (by Naomi) Ted Tollefson

NOHG
NTSD
MOTN

LEU

Notice Of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

LEU

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

Lansing L. Haynes

VIGIL

Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Lansing L. Haynes
Alternatively, to Compel Disclosures

BRIE

VIGIL

Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion to Exclude
Expert Testimony or, Alternatively, to Compel
Expert Disclosures

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

VIGIL

Affidavit of Mark V. York in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or,
Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures

Lansing L. Haynes

9/26/2011

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/19/2011 03:30
PM) Motion to Exclude, Tolefson

Lansing L. Haynes

BAXLEY
KEMPER

Notice Of Hearing on 10/19/11 at 3:30 pm

Lansing L. Haynes

9/29/2011

NOHG
NTSD

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

Lansing L. Haynes

8/29/2011

9/14/2011

9/15/2011
9/20/2011
9/23/2011
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10/3/2011

NTSV

BAXLEY

Notice Of Service

Lansing L. Haynes

10/7/2011

NTSD

BAXLEY

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

Lansing L. Haynes

10/12/2011

MISC

BAXLEY

Plaintiff ITD's Response To Defendant JH
Grathol's Motion To Compel

Lansing L. Haynes

AFIS

BAXLEY

Affidavit Of Mary V York In Support of Plaintiff
ITD's Response To Defendant JH Grathol's
Motion To Compel

Lansing L. Haynes

10/18/2011

STIP

BAXLEY

Stipulation For Extension Of Time For Plaintiffs
Rebuttal Experts Witness Disclosures And For
"Acarrequi Offer"

Lansing L. Haynes

10/19/2011

NOTC

VIGIL

Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Compel and
Motion to Exclude Testimony and Request to
Vacate Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Lansing L. Haynes
10/19/2011 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
to Exclude, Tolefson

DCHH

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled
Lansing L. Haynes
on 10/19/2011 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: LAURIE JOHNSON
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Marfice

10/21/2011

NTSV

BAXLEY

Notice Of Service

Lansing L. Haynes

10/25/2011

NOTO

BAXLEY

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum Of Stanley
Moe on 11 /15/11 at 9:30 am

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTO

BAXLEY

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum Of Jason
Minzghor on 11 /15/11 at 1:30 pm

Lansing L. Haynes

10/26/2011

ORDR

SVERDSTEN

Order Granting Defendant HJ Grathol's Motion to Lansing L. Haynes
Compel

10/27/2011

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled
scheduled on 01/17/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated 10 DAVS

Lansing L. Haynes

SVERDSTEN

Order Assigning Sr. District Judge Hosack for
Trial Purposes Only

John T. Mitchell

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
11/08/2011 08:30 AM) IN CHAMBERS
CONFERENCE CALL

Charles W. Hosack

11/2/2011

HRSC

Judge

SVERDSTEN

Notice of Hearing

Charles W. Hosack

11/4/2011

NTSV

BAXLEY

Notice Of Service

Lansing L. Haynes

11/7/2011

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
11/10/2011 11 :00 AM) IN CHAMBERS
TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE. PARTIES WILL
CALL INTO A PHONE NUMBER.

Lansing L. Haynes
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11/7/2011

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Judge
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 11/08/2011 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated IN
CHAMBERS CONFERENCE CALL - CLERK
WILL INITIATE THE CALL: DOUG MARFICE
664-5818, MARY YORK 208-342-5000, TIM

Charles W. Hosack

THOMAS 208-334-8803
11/10/2011

11/14/2011
11/15/2011

AMENDED Notice of Hearing

HRHD

SVERDSTEN
ROHRBACH

HRSC

ROHRBACH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/08/2012 10:00
AM) All motions.

Charles W. Hosack

HRSC

ROHRBACH

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled
03/05/2012 09:00 AM) 8 days.

Charles W. Hosack

NLTR
NTSD

Notice of Lodging Transcript

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice of Hearing

Charles W. Hosack

ORDR
NTSD
NOTR

VIGIL
BAXLEY
ROHRBACH
ROHRBACH
GAVIN
GAVIN

NOTR

11/16/2011

12/6/2011

12/19/2011

12/27/2011
1/6/2012

1/9/2012

Charles W. Hosack

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Charles W. Hosack
on 11/10/2011 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held IN
CHAMBERS TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE.
PARTIES WILL CALL INTO A PHONE NUMBER
WHICH WILL BE SUPPLIED.

Amended Pretrial Order

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

Lansing L. Haynes

Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Jason
Minzghor

Lansing L. Haynes

GAVIN

Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Stanley
Moe

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTR

GAVIN

Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Dewitt
M. Skip Sherwood

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTR

GAVIN

Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Alan
Johnson

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTR

GAVIN

Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Geoffrey Lansing L. Haynes
B. Reeslund

FILE

******************New File #4 Created************** Lansing L. Haynes

NOTC

BAXLEY
BAXLEY

NTSV
MNLI
PBRF
MNSJ
AFIS

CRUMPACKER
BAXLEY
BAXLEY
BAXLEY
BAXLEY

Notice Of Service

Lansing L. Haynes

Plaintiff ITD's Motion In Limine

Lansing L. Haynes

BRIE

LEU

Plaintiff ITD's Brief In Support Of Motion For
Summary Judgment

Lansing L. Haynes

FILE

BAXLEY

***************New File #5 Created****************

Lansing L. Haynes
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1/10/2012

NOHG

LEU

Notice Of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

1/17/2012

NTSV

CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service

Lansing L. Haynes

1/20/2012

MISC

VICTORIN

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

VICTORIN

Affidavit of Christopher Gabbert in Support of
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion in
Limine

Lansing L. Haynes

MISC

VICTORIN

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion in
Limine

Lansing L. Haynes

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/08/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated All
motions.

Charles W. Hosack

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 02/02/2012 10:00 AM)

Charles W. Hosack

1/24/2012

ANHR

SREED

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

1/27/2012

BRIE

BAXLEY

ITD's Reply Brief In Support Of Motion in Limine

Lansing L. Haynes

PBRF

CRUMPACKER Plaintiff's ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment

Lansing L. Haynes

1/28/2012

FILE

LEU

New File Created---#6---CREATED

Charles W. Hosack

2/2/2012

DCHH

BURRINGTON

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon and
Joann Schaller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Over 100 pages

Lansing L. Haynes

HRHD

BURRINGTON

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Charles W. Hosack
scheduled on 02/02/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing
Held

HRSC

BURRINGTON

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
02/10/2012 11 :00 AM)

Charles W. Hosack

BURRINGTON

Notice of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

BURRINGTON

Notice of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

1/23/2012

2/3/2012

2/8/2012

BURRINGTON

Email Sent Date: 02/02/2012 04:36 pm To:
firm@ramsdenlyons.com No Files Attached.

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
02/13/2012 11 :00 AM)

Charles W. Hosack

HRVC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 02/10/2012 11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Charles W. Hosack

SVERDSTEN

AMENDED Notice of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

ORDR

SVERDSTEN

Order RE: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

Lansing L. Haynes

ORDR

SVERDSTEN

Order RE: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment

Lansing L. Haynes

ADMR

CLAUSEN

Administrative assignment of Judge Charles W.
Hosack

John T. Mitchell

CLAUSEN

Order Assigning District Judge Hosack

John T. Mitchell
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2/10/2012

DFWL

HODGE

Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Expert
Witness Disclosure

Charles W. Hosack

NOTC

ROHRBACH

Notice of Filing Original Transcript (from J
Schaller from 2-2-12 hrg)

Charles W. Hosack

MISC

ROHRBACH

Transcript - Motion for Summary Judgment

Charles W. Hosack

HRHD

MOLLETT

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 02/13/2012 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held

Charles W. Hosack

NOTR

CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Lodged

Charles W. Hosack

2/15/2012

NOTR

BAXLEY

Notice Of Transcript Delivery - Certificate Of
Witness - Deponent Alan Johnson

Charles W. Hosack

2/16/2012

ORDR

VIGIL

Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance
Damages

Charles W. Hosack

2/21/2012

NTSD

CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

Charles W. Hosack

2/27/2012

PBRF

CRUMPACKER Plaintiff's ITD Trial Brief

Charles W. Hosack

PLWL

CRUMPACKER Plaintiff's ITD Trial Witness List

Charles W. Hosack

PLTX

VIGIL

Charles W. Hosack

NOTR

CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Delivery TV

Charles W. Hosack

NOTR

CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Delivery BT

Charles W. Hosack

DFWL

CRUMPACKER Defendant HJ Grathols Witness List

Charles W. Hosack

DEFX

CRUMPACKER Defendant HJ Grathols List Of Exhibits

Charles W. Hosack

DBRF

CRUMPACKER Defendant HJ Grathols Trial Bench Brief

Charles W. Hosack

MOTN

HODGE

ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses not
Timely Disclosed

BRIE

HODGE

Brief in Support of ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Charles W. Hosack
Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed

FILE

BAXLEY

*********New File #7 EXPANDO
Created*************
(Aff'd Of Mary York w/Exhibits)

AFIS

BAXLEY

Affidavit Of Mary York In Support Of ITD's Motion Charles W. Hosack
To Exclude Expert Witnesses Not Timely
Disclosed (EXPANDO #7)

3/5/2012

CTST

MOLLETT

Court Trial Started

Charles W. Hosack

3/6/2012

ORDR

MOLLETT

Order RE: Plaintiff ITD's Motion To Exclude
Expert Witnesses Niot Timely Disclosed

Charles W. Hosack

3/9/2012

DCHH

MOLLETT

Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled
scheduled on 03/05/2012 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Anita Self
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 960 8 Day court trial

Charles W. Hosack

3/12/2012

NOTR

ROBBINS

Notice Of Transcript Delivery

Charles W. Hosack

3/23/2012

BRIE

ROBBINS

Plaintiff ITD's Post Trial Brief

Charles W. Hosack

BRIE

ROBBINS

Defendant HJ Grathol's Post Trial Brief

Charles W. Hosack
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2/28/2012

2/29/2012

3/1/2012
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Plaintiff ITD's Trial Exhibit List

Charles W. Hosack

Charles W. Hosack
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User: VIGIL

Case: CV-2010-0010095 Current Judge: Charles W. Hosack
Idaho Transportation Board vs. H J Grathol, etal.

Idaho Transportation Board vs. HJ Grathol, Sterling Savings Bank, John 1-5 Does
Date

Code

User

3/29/2012

AFFD

ZOOK

Affidavit of Christopher D Gabbert in Support of
Motion to Enlarge Time

Charles W. Hosack

MOTN

ZOOK

Motion to Enlarge Time

Charles W. Hosack

3/30/2012

ORDR

MOLLETT

Order To Enlarge Time

Charles W. Hosack

4/1/2012

FILE

ROBBINS

New File Created ****8****

Charles W. Hosack

4/6/2012

MISC

ROBBINS

Plaintiff ITD's Response to Defendant's Post Trial Charles W. Hosack
Brief

MISC

ROBBINS

Plaintiff ITD's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Charles W. Hosack

MISC

ROBBINS

Defendant's (Proposed) Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Charles W. Hosack

BRIE

ROBBINS

Defendant HJ Grathol's Reply to Plaintiff's Post
Trial Brief

Charles W. Hosack

LARSEN

Email Sent Date: 05/25/2012 08:36 am To:
dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com;
tim.thomas@itd.idaho.gov;
MYork@hollandhart.com;
cgabbert@ramsdenlyons.com;
tstollefson@hollandhart.com and
ntpratt@hollandhart.com File Attached:
CV10-10095 1TB vs HJ Grathol.pdf

ORDR

LARSEN

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision And Order For Charles W. Hosack
Judgment

CVDI

VIGIL

Civil Disposition entered for: Does, John 1-5,
Defendant; Grathol, H J, Defendant; Sterling
Savings Bank, Defendant; Idaho Transportation
Board, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/4/2012

Charles W. Hosack

FJDE

VIGIL

Judgment

Charles W. Hosack

STAT

VIGIL

Case status changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Charles W. Hosack

6/6/2012

OPIN

ZOOK

Opinion Filed

Charles W. Hosack

6/17/2012

FILE

BAXLEY

****************New File #9 Created***************** Charles W. Hosack

6/18/2012

MOTN

BAXLEY

ITD's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs

Charles W. Hosack

BRIE

BAXLEY

ITD's Brief In Support Of Motion For Attorney
Fees And Costs

Charles W. Hosack

AFIS

BAXLEY

Affidavit Of Mary V York In Support Of ITD's
Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs

Charles W. Hosack

BNDC

LEU

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 25721 Dated
6/20/2012 for 140813.58)

Charles W. Hosack

11.lf""IT("

Pi.A("(" f"\ V

Plaintiff's Second Notice of Tender of Funds and
Satisfaction of Judgment

Charies W. Hosack

BNDV

VIGIL

Bond Converted (Transaction number 1429
dated 6/21/2012 amount 114,200.00)

Charles W. Hosack

BNDV

VIGIL

Bond Converted (Transaction number 1430
dated 6/21/2012 amount 140,813.58)

Charles W. Hosack

5/25/2012

6/4/2012

6/20/2012

'""", ,_,

6/21/2012

IYIV"-'\J I

Judge
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Date
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6/26/2012

FJDE

VICTORIN

6/27/2012

FILE

CRUMPACKER New File Created***1 0****

Charles W. Hosack

7/2/2012

REMT

LEU

Remittitur

Charles W. Hosack

MOTN

MCNEIL

Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and
Objection to Plaintiff's Application for Attorney
Fees and Costs

Charles W. Hosack

MEMO

MCNEIL

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Disallow Costs and Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Charles W. Hosack

AFFD

MCNEIL

Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert Re: Attorney's Charles W. Hosack
Fees and Costs

AFFD

MCNEIL

Affidavit of John F. Magnuson in Opposition to
Attorney's Fees

Charles W. Hosack

AFFD

MCNEIL

Affidavit of Joel P. Hazel in Opposition to
Attorney's Fees

Charles W. Hosack

7/12/2012

HRSC

SVERDSTEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/29/2012 10:00
AM) Costs and Fees

Charles W. Hosack

7/13/2012

APSC

VIGIL

Appealed To The Supreme Court (Filed by JH
Grathol)

Charles W. Hosack

VIGIL

Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Charles W. Hosack
to Supreme Court Paid by: Marfice, Douglas S.
(attorney for Grathol, H J) Receipt number:
0028772 Dated: 7/13/2012 Amount: $109.00
(Check) For: Grathol, HJ (defendant)

BNDC

VIGIL

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 28774 Dated
7/13/2012 for 100.00)

Charles W. Hosack

BNDC

VIGIL

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 28776 Dated
7/13/2012 for435.75)

Charles W. Hosack

7/18/2012

MISC

ZOOK

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal / Certified Mail to
Supreme Court/ 7010 3090 000 2054 8049

Charles W. Hosack

7/23/2012

RTSV

ZOOK

Return Of Service/ Idaho Supreme Court 7/20/12 Charles W. Hosack

7/24/2012

ORDR

VIGIL

Order Augmenting Appeal (Supreme Court
Order)

Charles W. Hosack

7/26/2012

NOTC

ZOOK

AMENDED Notice of Appeal

Charles W. Hosack

7/27/2012

MISC

VIGIL

Request for Additional Transcript and Record on
Appeal

Charles W. Hosack

7/31/2012

NOHG

CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing

8/3/2012

MISC

ZOOK

AMENDED Request for Additional Transcript and Charles W. Hosack
Record on Appeal

8/14/2012

NLTR

VIGIL

Notice of Lodging Transcript (47 Pages-JoAnn
Schaller)

Charles W. Hosack

BNDV

VIGIL

Bond Converted (Transaction number 1768
dated 8/14/2012 amount 152.75)

Charles W. Hosack

PBRF

CRUMPACKER ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for
Attorney Fees & Costs

8/22/2012

Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation

Charles W. Hosack

Charles W. Hosack

Charles W. Hosack
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8/22/2012

NLTR

VIGIL

Notice of Lodging Transcript (Byrl Cinnamon)

9/10/2012

ORDR

SVERDSTEN

Charles W. Hosack
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Plaintiff ITD's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees

JDMT

SVERDSTEN

Final Judgment (Costs and Attorney's Fees)

Charles W. Hosack

Charles W. Hosack
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

STATE OF IOAHO
~ss
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI,
FILED:t..i~i ~ LI \J ~

\J

2011 FEB - I PH 2= 51

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Fee Category: L(4)
Fee: $101.00

Defendants/Appellants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, an executive department of
state government and its board.

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol appeals against the above-named

Plaintiff to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order Granting Possession of Real Property
to Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Board, entered in the above-entitled action on the 21 st day of

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

ORIGINAL
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-----January, 2011, Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes presiding and certified as final pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(b) as contemplated by Idaho Code 7-721(2).
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant
to Rule 1l(a) I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of issues on appeal.
(A)

Does the Complaint meet the requirements ofldaho Code § 7-707?

(B)

1) Can the Idaho Transportation Board's power of eminent domain be
delegated?
2) If so, did the Idaho Transportation Board properly delegate the power
of eminent domain through board policy?

(C)

Does the Complaint conflict with the Order of Condemnation?

(D)

Were the Complaint and Order of Condemnation approved by the Board
of Transportation?

(E)

Did the Plaintiff make a good faith effort to acquire all property
implicated in the construction prior to requesting possession by the
district court?

4.

A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the

following portions of the reporter's transcript in electronic format: Transcript of Hearing on
Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property, January 21, 2011 at 1:30
p.m.
5.

The Plaintiff/Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1.A.R.:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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(a)

Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property;

(b)

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Order
Granting Possession of Real Property;

(c)

Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting
Possession of Real Property;

(d)

Affidavit of Alan Johnson m support of Defendant's Response to
Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property;

(e)

Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in support of Defendant's Response
to Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property;

(f)

Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Order Granting
Possession of Real Property;

(g)

Affidavit of Jason Minzghor in Support of Motion for Order Granting
Possession of Real Property; and

(h)

Affidavit of Karl .Vogt in Support of Motion for Order Granting
Possession of Real Property; and

6.

The appellant requests that Defendant's demonstrative exhibits (3) submitted to

the Court at the hearing held on January 21, 2011 to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
7.

No order has been entered in this matter sealing all or any part of the record or

transcript.
8.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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(c)

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid;

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to I.A.R. 20.

DATED this 1st day of February, 2011.
RAMSDE~ & LYONS, LLP
.,/

opher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of February, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

X USMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

>< US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

Keri Veare
Coeur d'Alene Reporting
401 E. Front Ave., Ste. 215
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

X USMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Christopher D. Gabbert

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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CDA Reporting
'

TA".E ,}, :LJ,1Ji0
~ SS
O'JHiY OF KOOTENAI/
tl ED:

Court Reporters
Serving Idaho & Washington
208. 765.3666 (JD) - 509. 703.6600 (WA)

Fax 208.676.8903
Toll Free 888.894.CDAR
office@cdareporting.com
www .cdareporting.com

Bank ofAmerica Building
?O I l FER I O AM 7: 'l(jl Front Avenue, Suite 215
· · · ··
dfilAlene, Idaho 83814

eLtt\°0lW .

I

O[PtP v

February 9, 2011
Clerk of the Courts
Idaho Supreme Court Building
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
Re: State of Idaho, Idaho Trans. Board vs. HJ Grathol, et al
Docket #38511 1/21/2011 Motion Hearing
Dear Clerk of the Courts:
DOCKET NO. 38511
(State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board,
(
( Plaintiff/Respondent,
( vs.
(
(HJ Grathol, et al,
(
( Defendant/Appellant.
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on February 9, 2011, I lodged an original
transcript, totaling 70 pages, and three copies, for the above-referenced
appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of Kootenai in the First
Jud·cial District.

Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible
Depositions - Court - Conference Room - E-Transcript - Video - Rea/time Hookup
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095

JUDGMENT

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

This matter came on for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Possession of
Real Property, on January 21, 2011, and for the reasons stated in the Court's Order Granting
Possession of Real Property dated January 21, 2011, the Court finds that Plaintiff Idaho
Transportation Board is entitled to judgment of possession.

II
II

JUDGMENT- I
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TIIEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADruDGED AND DECREED, and this
does order, adjudge and decree, that the Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Possession of
Real Property is granted and this shall be a final order and determination of the rights of the
parties as to the Plaintiff's claim to possession of the real property described in the Plaintiff's
Complaint.

DATED this 2 8 day ofFebruary, 2011.

District Court Judge

RULE 54(b) Certificate

With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order, it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there
is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does
hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution
may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this~ day ofFebruary, 2011.

District Court Judge

JUDGMENT-2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.

_!1_
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1 hereby certify that on the
day offeerttary, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
______>fund Delivered
-~- F
Faacc~simile (208) 334-4498

~o-lR

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
,,...<:/..
_Jland Delivered
~- JY
_V_FF~acsimile (208) 343-8869

Douglas S. Marfice
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~ Facsimile (208) 664-5884

JUDGMENT-3
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STATE OF U:WiO

~lY OF KOOTeW

LAWRENCEG.WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

}SS

2orr HAR 24 AH fO: 37
CLERK D!STRJCT COURT

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586}
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

.!t1AtJ~,J1
M'L
OEPOfi
/ • -- ===--.
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8803
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HARTLLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CVl0-1009S

ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT GRATHOL'S
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANT GRATBOL'S
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL- I
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board (''ITD") submits this response to
Defendant HJ Gtathol's ("Grathol'') Motion for a Jury Trial.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Grathol's motion should be denied for the following reasons. First, Grathol failed to
request a jury trial in its Answer, which is the standard practice in Idaho. Grathol then failed to
request a jury trial within the 14-day period after filing its Answer, which is the grace period and
a final cutoff established by Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Then, instead of
seeking relief prior to the expiration of the Rule 38(b) deadline, Grathol waited more than two
months after filing its Answer to request a jury trial. Thus, Grathol' s request is clearly time
barred, and Grathol has waived its right to request a jury trial. Failure "to serve a demand as
required by [the] rule," results in a waiver of its right to a trial by jury. Idaho R Civ. P. 38(d).

Second, Grathol has offered no legitimate basis for invoking the Court's discretion under
Rule 39(b) to be excused from its untimely jury request. Instead, having no legitimate excuse,
Gtathol tries to blame its failure to make a timely jury demand on the fact that ITO filed a
motion in December of 2010. That argument is baseless and unworthy of serious consideration.

Third, Grathol attempts to shift its burden to excuse its delay onto ITD to show prejudice
if the motion is granted. This attempt by Grathol is contrary to Idaho law and would require the

reversal of Idaho Supreme Court eases placing the burden squarely on the moving party to
excuse delay in requesting a jury.

Fourth. Grathol has no constitutional right to a jury trial in this condemnation case, and
its suggestion otherwise is squarely refuted by long-standing Idaho eminent domain law. State

ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940. 943. 500 P.2d 841, 844 (1972) ("Because eminent
domain authority arises from an inherent sovereignty of the state to take property for its own use,

ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRATHOL'S
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL- 2
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such proceeding do not come within the scope of Idaho Const. art, 1, § 7, pertaining to trial by
jury."); Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046, 1050 (1909) ("It has been

generally held by the American courts that, in the absence of a specific constitutional provision
granting the right of trial by jury in proceedings for condemnation, such right does not exist as a
constitutional right.").
Orathol' s request for jury trial is time barred and, for the reasons stated above, ITO
respectfully requests that the Court deny Grathol' s motion for jury trial.
II.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

ITD filed this action November 19, 2010. See Complaint and Summons (Nov. 19, 2010).
Gtathol accepted service on December 3, 2010 and filed its Answer on December 22, 2010.
Grathol did not demand a jury trial in its Answer, nor did it file any such demand within 14 days
after filing its Answer, as required by Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Grathol's first request for a jury trial was made in its Motion for Jury Trial filed on February 25,
2011-more than two months after filing its Answer and more than a month and a half after the
deadline imposed by the rules had passed.

ill.
A.

DISCUSSION

Grathol's Motion For Jury Trial Is Untimely Pursuant To Rule 38(b) Of The Idaho
Rules Of Civil Procedure, And It Has Waived Its Right To Request A Jury Trial.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedwe regarding a demand for a jury trial are straight-

forward. Rule 38(b) states, in relevant part:

(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue
triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a
demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of
the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of
the last pleading directed to such issue.

ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRAmovs
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Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(b). If a party fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 38(b) and files its
jury demand more than 14 days after its Answer, that party waives the right to a trial by jury.

"The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by
Rule S(d) constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury." Idaho R. Civ, P. 38{d) (emphasis
added), This result is well recognized and enforced by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g.,

Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,396, 111 P.3d 73, 81 (2005)
("According to I.R.C.P. 38(b), a party must demand a jury trial on an issue 'not later than
fourteen ( 14) days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue.' If a party fails to
demand a jury trial within this timeframe, the right to a jury trial is waived."); Farmers Nat.

Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 71,878 P.2d 762, 770 (1994) e'[T]he failure to make a timely
demand under I.R.C.P. 38(b) constituted a waiver of the right").

Under Rule 38(b), Grathol was required to request a jury trial within 14 days of filing its
Answer on December 22, 2010. That time period ended on January S, 2011. Grathol failed to
make a timely request for jury trial. Furthermore, Grathol waited nearly two months after
missing the deadline before filing a motion on February 25, 2011 to request a jury trial.
Grathol' s request for a jury trial is clearly time barred, and its failure to make a timely request
"constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury." Idaho R. Civ, P. 38(d). Accordingly,
Grathol 's motion should be denied.

B.

Grathol Has The Burden Of Justifying Its Failure To Comply With Rule 38(b) And
Its Delay In Brinpng Its Motion For Jury Trial.
Under limited circumst.ances, Rule 39(b) gives courts discretion to grant a jury trial.

Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(b), The Idaho Supreme Court handed down considerable guidance on the
proper use of this discretion in Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,
111 P.3d 73 (2005), In Hayden Lak2, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of an
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untimely jury trial request as a proper exercise of the collrt's discretion under Rule 39(b). Id. at
398, 111 P.3d at 83.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly exercised its
discretion in denying a jury trial where the requesting party failed to explain why it did not make

a timely jury demand. Id. The Court cited with approval Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265,
647 P.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1982), in which the right to jury trial was declared to be waived "as a
matter of right" when made 62 days after the filing of the answer. In Viehweg, the Court of
Appeals concluded that,
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) requires a party seeking a jury
trial, on an issue triable by jury, to make a demand within ten days 1
after service of last pleading directed to such an issue. In this case,
Thompson bad ten days from the date of serving his answer to
demand a jury trial, He waited sixty-two days. Rule 38(d)
provides th.at failure to make a timely demand constitutes a waiver
of trial by jury. We hold that Thompson waived trial by jury, as a
matter of right, in this case.
Id at 269, 647 P.2d at 315 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). The Court of

Appeals further held that the district court had properly exercised its discretion by denying
defendant's motion for a jury trial because the defendant failed to provide a legitimate reason
why he waited 62 days to demand a jury trial. Id. ("the record discloses no showing by

Thompson of his reason for failing to make a timely demand for a jury trial.").
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hayden Lake, the Court of Appeals in Viehweg

"focused on the fact that the defendant made no showing as to why bis jury demand was
untimely in the first place[]" and properly refused to grant a motion for a jury trial under Rule

The prior version of Rule 38(b) required demand for a jury trial to be made within ten (10)
days. Rule was amended in 1994 to provide for fourteen (14) days.
l
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39(b). Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 398, 111 P.3d at 83 (citing Viehweg, 103 Idaho at 269, 647
P.2dat319).

The Supreme Court in Hayden Lake also analyzed its prior decision in City ofPocatello

v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370,679 P.2d 647 (1984). InAnderton, the Supreme Court also upheld a
district court's decision to deny an untimely jury trial demand, and again focused on the fact that
the party requesting the jury trial must provide a legitimate reason to explain its failure to file a
timely jury demand. Id. at 373, 679 P.2d at 650 (because no reasons had been given that would
excuse the delay '"we find no abuse of discretion in denying the request.").
Based on these cases, the Court in Hayden Lake again concluded that where the
requesting party "fails to explain why it did not demand a jury trial" a belated request is properly
denied under Rule 39(b). Id. at 398, 111 P.3d at 83 (where plaintiff "fail[ed] to explain why it
did not demand a jury trial in the first complaint it filed in January 2000. The district court did
not abuse its discretion,") (emphasis added).
Thus, Idaho law is clear. A jury demand must be timely made. If it is not, the right is
waived. In detennining whether to exercise discretion under Rule 39(b), courts scrutinize the
explanation-or lack thereof-as to why ajury trial was not timely requested.
Under the rulings in Hayden Lake, Anderton, and Viehweg, Grathol's request for a jury
trial should be denied. Grathol failed to make a timely jury demand and therefore waived its

right. Grathol also failed to give a valid reason why it waited nearly two months after the
deadline to demand a jury trial.

c.

Grathol Is Not Entitled To Relief Under Rule 39(b) Because It Bas Failed To Meet
Its Burden And Explain Why It Failed To Timely Request A Jury Trial.
In its motion, Grathol fails to cite any case law to support its assertion that it is entitled to

a jury trial after having waived that right. Instead, Grathol implicitly suggests that ITD is
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somehow to blame for its missed deadline. Additionally, Grathol intimates that ITD bears the
burden of showing prejudice as a result of Grathol' s failure to comply with Rule 39(b), and if
ITO cannot make such a showing, then the Court should grant Grathol's motion. Grathol's
assertions are contrary to Idaho law and would reverse the Idaho Supreme Court cases placing
the burden squarely on the party seeking to have its delay excused.
As clearly established in Hayden Lake, Anderton, and Viehweg, the party asking the court
to exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b) and excuse delay in making a jury demand bears the
burden of explaining why it failed to timely request a jury trial. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 398,
111 P.3d at 83; Anderton, 106 Idaho at 373, 679 P.2d at 650; Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho at
269,647 P.2d at 315. In each case, the requesting party was unable to provide an adequate

explanation as to why it missed the deadline required by Rule 38(b) and, as a result, the district
court properly denied the late jury trial request under Rule 39(b). Id. Thus, Grathol has the
burden of showing a legitimate reason for its untimely jury request. Since it has failed to do so,
its motion should be denied.

Grathol's only attempt at an explanation as to why it should be excused from the deadline
imposed by Rule 38 is to suggest that it was unable to respond to ITD's Motion for Order
Granting Possession of Real Property while it was also finalizing its Answer to ITD's Complaint.
GTathol' s Motion for Jury Trial, at 2. At the core of Grathol' s explanation for its untimely jury
request is a suggestion that ITO created a situation that prevented Grathol from complying with
the deadline established for a jury demand in Rule 38(b). Grathol's assertion is unavailing for
several reasons.

First, OrathoP s contention that it was unable to complete its Answer due on
December 22 because of a motion that ITD filed the day before, on December 21st, cannot be
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taken seriously, Grathol had the full time period afforded under the rules for answering the
Complaint. Its response to ITD's motion was not due for several weeks after the due date for
Grathol's answer.

Second, Grathol' s excuse has even less merit when examined under the specific facts of
the case. Counsel for ITD provided Grathol' s attorneys with a copy of the Complaint and
Summons at a very early date. See York Aff., Ex. A (November 17, 2010 letter from counsel for
ITD to counsel for Grathol providing a copy of the Complaint before it was filed and providing
Grathol 1 s counsel with specific notice as to when ITD would file). Grathol then gained even
more time to prepare its Answer when ITD, as a courtesy to Grathol, refrained from having a
process server serve Grathol, but instead sought to work with Grathol' s counsel to accept service
for Grathol. ITD worked with counsel for two weeks on acceptance of service and finally on

December 3, 2010-two weeks after ITD filed its Complaint-counsel for Grathol submitted an
executed Acceptance of Service. In total, with the advanced notice of filing and the period of
time permitted by ITO to obtain Grathol's acceptance of service, Grathol had considerably more
time than the twenty (20) days permitted under the rules to prepare its Answer and assess
whether to demand a jury trial Thus, Grathol's assertion that it was unable demand a jury trial
because of a motion that was filed thirty-four (34) days after they received a copy of the
Complaint, particularly where Grathol's response to the motion would not be due for weeks after
filing its Answer, in no way justifies or excuses Gtathol' s untimely request for a jury trial.
If Grathol truly felt that it did not have enough time to decide whether to demand a jury
trial prior to filing its Answer on December 22nd, Rule 38(b) gave Grathol an additional 14 days _
after that date to request a jury trial. If Grathol still could not decide to request a jury trial even
within that additional two-week period, Grathol could and should have moved for an extension
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of time or other appropriate motion prior to the expiration of the deadline. Gtathol has no excuse
for waiting until February 25, 2011 to make a request for a jury trial.
Grathol at no time made any request for an extension of time to answer the Complaint,
nor did it indicate that it would have any difficulty meeting its deadline for filing an AJJ.swer or
requesting a jury trial, Grathol cannot now seek to excuse its delay with an after·the-fact claim
that it was not able to prepare its Answer properly.
Third, despite Grathol' s suggestion that the fact that Im filed a motion in late December

rendered Grathol incapable of making a jury demand in its Answer, Grathol still did not raise the

issue until February 25th, nearly two months after the deadline had passed. See Viehweg v.
Thompson, 103 Idaho 265,269,647 P.2d 311,315 (Ct. App. 1982) (denying untimely request for
jury trial under Rule 39(b) when it was filed 62 days after defendant's answer was filed).

Fourth, Grathol cannot legitimately claim that it was unaware of the missed jury demand
deadline or that it acted promptly to remedy the situation. On February 7, 2011, counsel for ITD
submitted to Grathol a proposed stipulation for scheduling order, which clearly stated that the
matter would be a Court Trial because "no timely demand for a jury trial has been made under
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure," Affidavit of Mary V. York, Ex. B,, 3 ("The case is to be
tried as a Court Trial, as no timely demand for a jury trial has been made under the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.") (emphasis included in original). Despite the clear notice provided by ITO
that the right to a jury trial had been waived, Grathol still waited 18 days-a period of time

longer than that permitted under Rule 38(b)-before filing its motion. Again, Grathol provides
no explanation as to why it waited more than two months after filing its Answer to request a jury
trial, and its belated request is barred by Rule 38(b), Rule 39(b), and the Supreme Court cases

enforcing the rules.
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In summary, Grathol has failed to offer any proper basis to explain or excuse its failure to

comply with Rule 38(b) or its delay in waiting 65 days after filing its Answer to request a jury.
Because Grathol has not, and cannot, provide a legitimate explanation of why it failed to timely

request a jury trial, it is barred from discretionary relief under Rule 39(b) by Hayden Lake,
Anderton, and Viehweg. With Grathol having waived its right to a jury trial, the Court, in the
proper exercise of its discretion, should deny Grathol' s untimely motion for jury trial under
Rule 39(b).
D.

No Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial In A Condemnation Case Exists In Idaho,
And Grathol's Unsupported Argument To The Contrary Is A Misrepresentation Of
Idaho Law.
Contrary to Grathol' s repeated assertions, the "right to a jury determination" in an

eminent domain case is nQ! a "fundamental right guaranteed protection by Idaho's constitution."
Grathol wrote:

Further the matters at issue involving the taking of private property
by a public entity, and the right to a jury determination on the
value of that taking is a fundamental right guaranteed protection by
Idaho's constitution. Idaho Constitution, Artie.le I, Section 14,
Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial, at 3,
Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution makes no reference to a "fundamental
right" to a jury trial in an eminent domain proceeding. Article I, Section 14 instead lays out the
fundamental right of the condemnor to condemn property for the public good, The full text of

Article I, Section 14 states:
§ 14. Right of eminent domain
The necessary use of lands for the construction of
reservoirs or storage basins, for the purpose of irrigation, or for
rights of way for the construction of canals, ditches, flumes or
pipes, to convey water to the place of use for any useful, beneficial
or necessary purpose, or for drainage; or for the drainage of mines,
or the working thereof, by means of roads, railroads, tramways,
ITD'S BRIEF 1N OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRATBOL'S
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL-10

30 of 1617

MAR.24.2011 8:37AM

NO.2118

P. 12

cuts, tunnels, shafts, hoisting works, dumps, or other necessary
means to their complete development, or any other use necessary
to the complete development of the material resources of the state,
or the preservation of the health of its inhabitants, is hereby
declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and
control of the state.
Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a
just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by
law, shall be paid therefor.
Idaho Const, art. I,§ 14.
The Constitution makes no reference to a right to a jury trial in an eminent domain case,
and Grathol' s numerous statements that it is "constitutionally entitled to a jury trial'' or that there

is a "fundamental right" that is guaranteed by Idaho's Constitution is simply untrue.
In Idaho, there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in an eminent domain proceeding.

The Idaho Supreme Court bas long held that,
It has been generally held by the American courts that, in the
absence of a specific constitutional provision granting the right of
trial by jury in proceedings for condemnation, such right does not
exist as a constitutional right.

PortneufIrrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046, 1050 (1909) (citations omitted).
Under Idaho law, "[b]ecause eminent domain authority arises from an inherent sovereignty of the
state to take property for its own use, such proceeding do not come within the scope of Idaho
Const. Art. 1, § 7, pertaining to trial by jury." State ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940,
943,500 P.2d 841,844 (1972) (citing Portneuflrrig. Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. at
1050).
Article 1, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that ''the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate," references the right of a jury trial as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the Idaho Constitution and therefore does not guarantee to citizens the right to trial
by jury in a condemnation proceeding. Id. "Historically, eminent domain action was ex parte
ITD'S BRIEF 1N OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRATBOL'S
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and inquisitorial in the common law and has not been regarded as a civil remedy.'' Id. (citing

Nichols on Eminent Domain,§§ 1.1-1.44 (3d rev. ed.)). Therefore, "[b]ecause eminent domain
authority arises from an inherent sovereignty of the state to take property for its own use, such
proceeding do not come within the scope ofldaho Const. Art. 1, § 7, pertaining to trial by jury."

Id. See also Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. at 1049 ("The constitutional guaranty of the right to
trial by jury is clearly a guaranty of the right that existed at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution - that right was the common-law right."). Thus, the law in Idaho is clear and wellestablished that "[t]he right of trial by jury, or even of appeal, is not a constitutional right given
him in such a case, but is a favor granted him by the lawamaking power." Budge, 16 Idaho l 16,

100 P. at 1050. See also City of Pocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372-373, 679 P.2d 647,
649-650 (1984) (concluding that a waiver of a jury trial in an eminent domain proceeding under
Rule 38(b) did not violate the Idaho Constitution).
Therefore, Grathol' s argument that a jury trial in an eminent domain case is a

"fundamental right" or is guaranteed by the Constitution is squarely refuted by Idaho law and the
text of Article I, Section 14.

IV. CONCLUSION
Grathol seeks relief from its failure to follow the rules. However, Grathol has failed to
provide any legitimate explanation of why it did not timely request a jury trial in its Answer, or
why it failed to request a jury within the additional 14 days after the Answer provided by Rule
38(b), or why it waited 65 days after the Answer to make its request. Accordingly, Orathol has
waived its right to a jury trial and its untimely request should be denied.
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24_"h.y of March, 2011.

HOLLAND&. HART LLP
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
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correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marlice, Esq. Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
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700 Northwest Blvd.
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Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707·1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8803
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V, York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8 869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
VS,

Case No, CVl0-10095

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK
IN SUPPORT OF ITD'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
GRATHOL'S MOTION FOR
JURYTRIAL

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
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Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am

licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.
2.

I am counsel of record for Plaintiff State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Board

("ITD'') in the above-captioned matter, and I make this affidavit in support ofITD's Brief in
Opposition to Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial.
3.

Attached are true and correct copies of the following documents.

4.

Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of a November 17, 2010 letter from me to counsel

for Gtathol which provides a copy of the Complaint before it was filed, and which provides
specific notice as to when ITD would file its Complaint.

5.

Attached as Exhibit B is a proposed Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning which

I submitted to Grathol's counsel on February 7, 2011.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this 21st day of March, 2011.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 21st day of March, 2011.

NdtaryPublie for Idaho
My Commission Expires

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V, YORK lN SUPPORT OF ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT GRATBOL'S MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL-2

36 of 1617

NO.2119

MAR. 24. 2011 8: 38AM

P. 4/22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'l;{~y

I hereby certify that on this
of March) 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Douglas S. M1u-fice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D

D
D
1ZJ

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax) (208) 664-5884

5061992_1.DOC

AFFIDAVIT OF MAR\' V. YORK IN SUPPORT OF ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSmON TO
DEFENDANT GRATHOL'S MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL- 3

37 of 1617

NO. 2119

MAR. 24. 2011 8: 38AM

P. 5/2 2

EXHIBIT A

38 of 1617

NO. 2119

MAR. 24. 2011 8: 38AM

HOLLAND&HART~ ~

P. 6/22

Maryv. York
Phone (208) 342-SOOO
Fax (208) 343-8869
mvorl<@hollandhart.com

November 17, 2010
VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL
Douglas S. Marfice., Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Re:

U.S.- 9S Condemnation; "GrathQl" Parcel.No. 19

Dear Doug:
I am. writing in :response to your email message froll) Friday, November 12, 2010.
I appreciate the information you provided and will endeavor to respond to each of the
issues you niised. For ease, of:teference, I will respond to your comments in the order
set forth in your message~

I appreciate the clarification on the status of the ~urrent title holder of the
property. ITD has held off filing the condemnation action until we heard back from you
on this issue. Now that we. ha.ve confirmation that the current title holder is HJ Grathol,
we will be filing the condemnation this week, I have attached for your reference a copy
of the complaint that will be fi)ed. We. discussed a couple of weeks ago that you would
be willing to accept service on behalf of HJ Grathol. Please let me know as soon as
possible if that is not the case, and we will have service made by a process server.
The next issue raised is your clients' apparent dissatisfaction with the length
of time involved in the Project and their perception that ITD has been less than
straightforward with them in negotiations. To be clear, ITD has not engaged in any
improper de1ay as to the Project and has not given your clients "the run around/, With
your experience in condemnation matters, you certainly understand the work ed detail
involved in planning and designing a project of this size and scope. The time involved
here is a direct result of the complicated nature1 and the size and scope of the Project.
ITD has been diligent in its efforts and has taken its responsibility to the public and
landowners very seriously. ITD disagrees with the contention that the acquisition of the
Gratbol property is a umoving target,,, To tbe contrary, the property required for the
Project (16,314 acres) and the design of the Project as it relates to the Grathol property
have remained unchanged since ITD's initial negotiation contacts with your clients and
ITD,s appraisal of the. property.

Holland&Har1 u,
P~o~e (2081 !42-SOOO Pa• 12.08194W869 -.hollandflart,eani
101 SOU1h GlpitQI BQulevald s~r111400 Boise, IC! 83702 Mailing Addreu P.O.eox 25"27 8olse.lO 83701-2527
Asoen 8aulder
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Douglas S. Ma:rfice, Esq.
November 17, 2010
Page 2

As support for the claim that ITD's U.S. 95 Project is a "moving target," you
reference the extension of Sylvan Road. For purposes of clarification_, the extension of
Sylvan Road is a separate project by the Lakes Highway District and is not part of
ITD~s U.S. 95 Project. While the Sylvan Ro.ad extension could benefit the traveling
public as a frontage road to U.S. 95, it is not pa.rt of rro~s Project, and the property that
could be used for the extension road is not pa.rt of this condemnation nor is i,t on the
Project plans.
The issue over the extension of Sylvan Road has only been raised because the
Lakes Highway Dbtrict wants the roadway extended, and ITD has agreed to construct
the extension road for property owners who agree to dedicate the property to the
Highway District. If a land-owner decides not to dedicate lands needed for the roadway,
then it will not be constructed. Based on your email, it appears that your clients do not
desire to have the Sylvan Road extension built. Th'erefore~ we Will consider the issue
closed. However, in response to the comment that your clients cannot see how the
Sylvan Road extension would help them, it is worth noting that they relied on the.
extension of Sylvan Road in their development plan submitted to the County as part of
their rezone application.
The next issue- raised in your email is the prospect that one of your clients may

....... seel<to-"force··aiea.Iignment" of U.S. 95. Given the amount oftime and money spent in
the planning. design, and location of the Project, that effort by your clients would be
futile. You also acknowledge that suc.h a result •~is unlikely," I am sure you are aware
that courts give substantial deference to an agency's design and site selection of a
public project. This is particularly true with respect to the present Project, given the
extensive and detailed planning and design for the location of this Project, and the
substantial review, public comment, and enviro:n.mental permitting process that this
Project has gone through.
For these reasons, we again request that your clients stipulate to possession.
While ITD will eventually acquire fee title to the portions of the property required for
the Project, it does not need fee title at this point in time for the "land swap" referenced
in your message. Possession will suffice- for the time b·eing. Additionally, as you
know, the grant of possession by a landowner is one of the elements that a court will
consider in its determining whether attorney fees should be awarded to the property
owner in a condemnation action. In addition, no reason exists for the court to deny
possession in this case, particularly given th1 amount of detailed planning, money,. and
effort that !TD has invested in this Project to date.
As to your clients' concern about this process dragging on in the event they grant
possession, I can a.s.sure you that ITD i-s committed to moving forward with the
condemnation expeditiously. As evidence of ITD's commitment to moving this matter
forward, we intend to file 1TD' s complaint this week,
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Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
November 17, 2010
Page 3

Lastly, your message conv~ a settlement offer in the amouut of $2.8 million,
with the caveats described. I have presented the offer to my clients and have been:

instructed to decline the offer. A$ we understand the offer, it is a discounted proposal
from the $3 .5 million value that your clients believe is due as a result of the taking of a
portion of their property and damages caused to the remainder. The $3.5 million figure
is based primarily on the sales identified in your letter of October 2 7, 2010 and the
alleged damages that may be caused to the remaindert including potential damages
resulting from the extension of Sylvan Road. As explained above~ the Sylvan Road
extension is not part of the acquisition and, based upon your representation that your
clients will not be dedicating any land to the Lakes Highway District, will not be
constructed by ITD. We have reviewed the sales referenced in your October 27th letter,
and respectfully disagree that the sales support the valuation figure advocated by your
clients. The sales include properties located within the cities of Coeur d'Alene and
Sandpoint, properties in far superior locations, sales with incorrect information~ and a
sale that was actually a settlement that included amounts for improvements in addition
to the land value. While we have yet to see any specific analysis of these sales by your
clients' appraiser, Skip Sherwood, at this point, we do not agree that the referenced
sales support the valuation advocated by youl' clients.
Despite the present disagreement over values~ which is typical in condemnation
cases, we hope that the parties oan continue to work toward a resolution of this matter.
To that end, please feel free to contact me with any concerns your clients may have
during the construction process or any other matter.
Additionally, please let me know as soon as possible whether you will accept
service and whether yom clients will stipulate to possession. If not, we will move
forward with service of process and the setting of a possession hearing. In the
meantime> if you have- any questions or would like 10 discuss these issues in more
detail, please do not hesitate to contact me.

MVY:st
Attachment
49d!JSQ_I.DOC
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LAWRENCEG. W~SDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. .OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
.
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Depamnent
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, I&iho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-881S
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V, York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527 .
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF ID.AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

COMPLAINT

vs.

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERUNG SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,

Defendants.
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Plain~ Idaho Transportation Department ("ITO''), by and through its attorneys, hereby

files its Complaint in this matter against the above-named·Defendants, and complains and alleges
as follows:

PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENlJE
1.

IID, is a civil administmtive de,Partmerat of govemment of the State of Idaho, and

Darrell V. Manning, Jan Vassar, Gary Blick, R. James Coleman, Jerry Whitehead, Neil Miller,
and Lee Gagner are the duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportation Board of the
State. ofidaho.

2.

ITO;. pursuant to the laws of the State ofidaho, has the power of eminent domain.

3.

rm, by this action., seekg to take and condemn certain real property owned by

Defendants (referred to as ''the Property") for an authorized public purpose, namely, the highway
project of widening and improvmg ofU.S. Highway 95 south of State Highway 52 to north of
the community of Sagle (referred to as "the Ptoject"). The particular segment of the Project for
which Defendants' property is required is U.S. 9S Gatwood to Sagle - Athol Stage, Kootenai

County,. Idaho, ITD Project Ne, A009(791), Key No, 9791.
4,

Defendant HJ Oratho~ a California general partnership, is the owner or the

reputed owner of the Property sought to be condemned by ITO pursuant to the Warranty Deed
dated October 1S, 2009 and recorded November 11, 2009 as Insttutnent No. 2239116000 in the

official records of Kootenai County, Idaho.
S.

Defendant Sterling Savings Banlc, as successor in interest by merger to First Bank

Northwest, a Washington corporation, has an interest in the Property pursuant to a Deed of Trust,
Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated February 14, 2007 and
recorded on February 20, 2007 as Instrument No, 2083893000 in the official records of Kootenai
County, Idaho.
COMPLAINT-2

43 of 1617

NO. 2119

MAR. 24. 2011 8: 39AM

6.

P. 11/22

Defendants, Does 1 through S, based upon information and belie( were at all

times relevant to this action individwtls or entities who have or may have an interest in or to the
Property or lessees or tenants of the Property. Their existence and names are at present unkno\\n
to ITO. Any such persons are joined as. unknown individuals or entities who have or may have
an interest in or to the Property. or lessees or tenants in possession of any or all of the Property
and are referenced herein for convenience by the fictitious designations of'Does l tbrough S. If
the existence of any such unknown owners, lessees, tenants or claimants, if there be any, should
be discovered during the pendency of this action, lTD will move to add them as named parties.
1.

The Property, which is the subject ofthis action, is located at or near the

northeasterly comer of U.S. Highway 95 and St.ate Highway 54 in Kootenai County, Idaho.
8.

The cowt has jurisdiction and venue over this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-

706.

COUNTI
EMINENT DOMAIN
8,

ITD has the power of eminent domain, pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho,

including but not limited to, Idaho Code §§ 7w701.
9.

ITD is lawfully empowered to locate, design, construct, reconstruct, alter, extend,

repair and maintam state highways or usooiated facilities at any place within the State of Idaho,
and has the power and duty to acquire the i;tecessary land and property for rights-of'~way,

turnouts, :fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or
otherwise. It is the duty of ITD, among other things, to establish, construct improve and
maintain a system of state highways within the State of Idaho, and that ITD has, pursuant to the
laws of the State ofldaho, the power of eminent domain.
10.

ITO. by this actioDt seeks to take and condemn fee title to the Property belonging

to Defendants.

COMPLAINT- 3
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The Property sought to be taken and condemned by ITO is for a public use that is

authoru:ed by law. Namely, the Property is to be used for a highway right-ofMway to locate,
design, construct, reconstruct, alter. extend, repair, and ma;nt.A.in state highways and associated
facilities; the state highways are part of the e.sta.blished highway system of the State of Idaho and
is to be used for travel by the general public; the Project that is to be constructed on the Property
is for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public, and it will be designated as a
public highway or related facility.
12.

The Property sought to be taken and condemned by ITO is necessary for the

authorized public uses, and.the location and sUl'Vey of the highway and related facilities was
made by and under the direction ofITD and has been and is located in a manner which is most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
13.

ITO by and through its proper officers and representatives, prior to the

commencement of this action, sought in good faith to purchase from Defendants the Property
necessazy for the public use described above and to settle with Defendants for dama,ges caused

by the taking of the Property.
14.

ITO has been unable to make any reasonable bargain for or to negotiate a

settlement with Defendants for the purchase of the Property, and Defendants have refused, and
continue to refuse, to grant the Property to ITO for the fair market value of the Property sought
to be taken and damages resulting from the taking.
15.

:For these reasons, it is necessary for !TD to condemn Defendants' Property in fee

simple absolute.
16.

The Property sought to be taken and condemned is now surveyed, located and

shown upon the official plat ofU.S.-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, Project No. A009, Key
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No. 9791 Highway SUIVey Project Plans located on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation
Department in Kootenai County, State bf Idaho, and is described as follows:
r .RGAL DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY

[See Exhibit A-attached hereto,]

17.

The right-of-way plans showing a map of the Project route, the beginning and

ending termini of the Project, which is at M.P. 448.00 (South Limit) and M.P. 449.83, St.ation
No, 1014+25.0S (North Limit), Defendants, property and the Property to be taken is attached
hereto as Exhibit B, and by th.is refetence made a part hereof as if set out in full herein.
18.

The general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be taken

and condemned is shown upon the official project plans? which are located at the Idaho

Department of Transportation Departmetrt,. District One Office in Kootenai County~ State of

Idaho.
19.

The Idaho Transportation Board has detennined that the Property is necessary for

the above-described Project and has issued an Order of Condemnation. A true and correct copy
of the Idaho Transportation Board's Order of Condemnation is attached hereto as Exhibit C, and
by this reference made a part hereof as if set out in full herein.
WHEREFORE, !TD prays for judgmebt that the rights to the Property herein described
be taken and condemned in fee simple absolute and that all rights of access be taken as shown on

Exhibit B and as described on Exlnoit C; that just compensation be ascertained and awarded; that
a final order of eondemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be· entered as provided

by law; and that such other and further relief as may be lawful and proper.
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DATED this_ day of November, 2010.

By _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

HOLLAND & HART LLP
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
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From:

Mary York

Sent:

Monday, February 07, 2011 1:04 PM

To:

'l":hri~ ~Rbhert'

Cc:

'Shannon James'; 'Doug Marfice'; 'Tim Thomas'

RE: ITD v. Grathol
Attachments: 5024601_1.DOC

Subject:

Chris,

I followed up with my client and was advised that they will permit the use of the property by the woodcutting
operation you reference below until May 1, 2011. On May 2nd, the operations will need to be terminated and
removed from the property. ITD needs to have a clear right-of-way by that date. Any property, equipment, etc.
remaining on the property as of May 2nd will become the property of ITD.
Next, In response to your proposed stipulation, the language looks good except we need to have included in the
stipulation the requirement that the written undertaking be "executed by two (2) or more sufficient sureties" and
that they will be bound to ITD for the payment of the sums to the extent that the amount withdrawn exceeds the
amount of the final award. (IC§ 7-721(7)). I can make the changes from this end If you prefer.
And finally, I've attached a proposed stipulation for scheduling order for your review. Please let me know if it
looks acceptable, and if so, please sign and return and I can coordinate filing the stipulation.
Please feel free to call If you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues In more detail.
Regards,

MVY

Mary v. York
Holland & Hart LLP

Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building
101 s. Capitol Blvd.
Boise, ID 83702
Phone (208) 342•5000
Fax (208) 343 .. 8869
E.. mait: myark@hollandhart.com

J

HOLLAND&HAR.T.w J

CONFIDENTIAUTY NOTICE: Tliie meuege is conllden!la1 and may bt p~vllaged. lFyou believe that this email h11 been senl lo you
In error, please reply to the isender that you received the meaaage in erTOt; then plaaae dele!e this e-n,all. Thar,k you.

olsclalrner of Elec:tro1'1c: Transaction; This communicetion doe& nat reffeot an lntenttol\ by !ho eender or the sendef"e c:tlenl IO ccncluOI a
transaotlon or make any 11graement by eleotionlc meana. Nothing conteined herein ahall constitute an electronlc signature or a
contl'ICf under any law, rule or reguleUon appllo11ble to elacll'onlc tranaatlion&.

From: Chris Gabbert [mallto:cgabbert@ram5den1vons.com]
Sent: Friday, February 04, 2.01110:56 AM
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To: Mary York
Cc: Shannon James; Doug Marflce

subject: ITO v. Grathol
Dear Mary,

In follow up to our telephone conversation last week, attached please find a draft stipulation for release
of the funds to be deposited with the Court, You indicated that ITD wlll be depositing the funds directly with the
Court, per the order and is willing to stipulate to the withdrawal. Please review this draft stipulation and let me
know If It is acceptable.

Addltlonally, have vou received a response from your client as to the use of the property by the

woodcutting operation after possession rs taken?
Sincerely,

Christopher D. Gabbert
Attorney
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Aleno1 ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
~ ,r.3m!denly.011u.run

This e-mall is for the sole use of the intended reclplent(s) and contains Information belonglng to Ramsden & Lyons, which Is
confldentlal and/or legallv prlvlleged, If you are not the Intended recipient. you are hereby notified that anv disclosure.
copyln& distribution or taking of any action In reliance on the contents of this e-mall lnforrnatlon Is strictly prohibited. If
you have received this e-mail In erro,, plea$e immediately notify the sender by reply e-mall and destroy all copies of the
ortslnal messase.
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GE;NERAL
ST ATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (!SB #3586)
ni.>1'111+-tr Attn.,.,.,-=,~, ~ .. nor<>l

...,,,..,.t""'"°'"'°'J

.1.a. .. i,v.a.,1,,1,""'J

""'.L

W,1,,W.1

Chief, Civil Litigation Division

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportatio11 Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimil~: (208) 334-4498
Mary V, York (!SB #5020)

Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVI0-10095

STIPULATION FOR
SCHEDULING AND
PLANNING

HJ GRATHOL, a California general

partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through

s,

Defendants.
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flaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") and Defe!}dant HJ
Grathol, hereby stipulate to the entry of an Order establishing the pre-trial scheduling
of this matter as follows:
1.

The parties hereby stipulate to the following preferences for trial dates:
a,

Week of Monday, March 5, 2012.

b.

Week of Monday, March 12, 2012

c.

Week of Monday, March 19, 2012,

c.

Week of Monday, April 2, 2012.

The Court's clerk will confirm dates with counsel if preferences cannot be met. A
pretrial conference will be scheduled 10 to 21 days prior to trial.
2,

Parties estimate the case will take 12 dan to try. It is anticipated to take this

amount of time because the case is expected to be highly fact-specific and involve
extensive expert testimony.
3.

The case is to be tried as a Court Trial, as no timely demand for a jury trial has

been made under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

Parties further stipulate to the following scheduling deadlines:
a.

The last day to file amendments to any pleading, or to join any additional
parties shall be 120 days prior to trial.

b.

Plaintiff !TD shall disclose its advancing expert witnesses and opinions to
be offered at trial 180 days prior to trial.

c.

Defendant HJ Grathol shall disclose its responsive expert witnesses and
opinions to be offered used at trial by 150 days prior to trial.

d.

All rebuttal expert witnesses and opinions to be offered at trial shall be
disclosed by 90 days prior to trial.
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All expert witness disclosures shall be in accordance with I~aho Rule o·f

Civil Procedure 26(b )( 4).

f.

Depositions of expert witnesses shall be completed no later than forty-

five (4S) days prior to trial.
g.

This disclosure cutoff does not absolve the parties of the duty to timely
identify experts and their opinions in response to written discovery
requests.
The discovery cutoff shall be 60 days prior to trial. This discovery

h.

cutoff is the last day to initiate written discovery. Aside from depositions
of expert witnesses, all depositions shall be completed by the discovery
cutoff.
1.

, .

All summary judgment motions shall be filed and heard no later than 60

days prior to trial.
4,

The parties reserve the right to amend this stipulation by agreement of all parties,
subject to Court approval, and each party reserves the right to seek amendment
hereof by Court order. Any party may request a further status conference for any
purpose at any time.

DATED this_ day of February, 2011.

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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DATED this_ day of February, 2011.
·

HOLLAND & BART LLP

Mary V. York, of the firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportatio11 Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this_ day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
+1-.
...
1.1.l,V

,f,. 11,..,.,; ... n-•
.LVJ..LVYf,U,.1f;1

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.

Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd,
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816~1336

~

D
D
D

D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

of HOLLAND & HART

LI.I'
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
I
ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTK
324 W. GARDEN A VENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000

)
) Case No: CV-2010-0010095
)
)
)
) NOTICE OF TRIAL
)
)

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, ETAL.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for:
Court Trial Scheduled Tuesday, January 17, 2012 at 09:00 AM
lODAYS
Judge:
Lansing L. Haynes
Additional Presiding Judges: Benjamin R. Simpson; Charles W. Hosack; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Fred
M. Gibler; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, III; George D. Carey.
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Tuesday, April 05, 2011.
MARY V. YORK
P. 0. BOX 2527
BOISE, ID 83701-2527

M Mailed
L''\

[ ] Hand Delivered

[ ] Faxed

J. TIM THOMAS, DEP ATTY GENERAL
P. 0. BOX 7129
BOISE, ID 83707-1129

[~ailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

[ ] Faxed

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE
PO BOX 1336
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336

!XJ,_ Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

[ ] Faxed

Dated: Tuesday, April 05, 2011
Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk Of The District Court
By:

Notice of Trial

Suzi Sverdsten, Deputy Clerk
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UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER

In order to assist with the trial of this matter IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1.

DISCOVERY:

All written discovery shall be initiated so that timely responses shall be completed
thirty-five (35) days before trial. The last day for taking any discovery depositions shall
be twenty-one (21) days before trial.

2.

EXPERT WITNESSES:

Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before trial, Plaintiff(s) shall
disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later than one hundred fifty (150) days
before, Defendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Rebuttal witnesses
shall be disclosed by all parties not later than ninety (90) days before trial.

Such

disclosure shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i). Notice of compliance shall be contemporaneously filed with the
Court.

3.

PRETRIAL MOTIONS:

Motions for summary judgment shall be timely filed so as to be heard not later
than ninety (90) days before trial. (NOTICE: DUE TO COURT CONGESTION IT IS
ADVISABLE TO CONTACT THE COURT FOR SCHEDULING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONS AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO HEARING.)

Motions in

limine concerning designated witnesses and exhibits shall be submitted in writing at lease
seven (7) days before trial. The last day for hearing all other pretrial motions including
other motions in limine shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial.

4.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary judgment a
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, of each of the material
facts as to which the moving party contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any

UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER
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party opposing the motion shall, not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the
motion for summary judgment and the statement of facts, serve and file a separate
concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all material facts
as to which it is contended there exist genuine issues necessary to be litigated.
h1 detern1ining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may asstm1e that the
facts as claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except
and to the extend that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by
a statement filed in opposition to the motion.

5.

DISCOVERY DISPUTES:

Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertain any discovery motion,
except those brought by a person appearing prose and those brought pursuant to 1.R.C.P.
26(c) by a person who is not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the
Court, at the time of filing the motion, a statement showing that the lawyer making the
motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing counsel on the
matters set forth in the motion. The motion shall not refer the Court to other documents
in the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is in issue, the
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient
answer, followed by each party's contentions, separately stated.

6.

EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS:

Exhibit lists and copies of exhibits shall be prepared and exchanged between
parties at least fourteen (14) days before trial. The original exhibits and exhibit lists
should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Using the attached form, each party
shall prepare a list of exhibits, it expects to offer. Two copies of the exhibit list are to be
filed with the Clerk, and a copy is to be provided to opposing parties. Exhibits should be
listed in the order that the party anticipates they will be offered. Exhibit labels can be
obtained from the Court Clerk. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits before trial.
After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be made.
Plaintiffs exhibits should be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits should
be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the date of

UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER
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the trial should also be placed on each of the exhibit labels. It is expected that each party
will have a copy of all exhibits to be used at trial.

7.
Witness lists shall be prepared and exchanged between parties and filed with the
Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial. Each party shall provide opposing parties
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copies of each list
of witnesses. Witnesses should be listed in the order they are anticipated to be called.

8.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, IF JURY TRIAL REQUESTED:

Jury instructions shall be prepared and exchanged between the parties and filed
with the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial.

The Court has prepared stock

instructions; copies may be obtained from the Court. The parties shall meet in good faith
to agree on a statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the Court with
the other proposed instructions. In the absence of agreement, each party shall submit
their own statement of claims instruction.

All instructions shall be prepared in

accordance with I.R.C.P. 5l(a).

9.

BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA:

In addition to any original brief or memorandum filed with the Clerk of Court, a
copy shall be provided to the Court. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not
contained in the Idaho Reports, a copy of each case or authority cited shall be attached to
the Court's copy of the brief or memorandum.

10.

TRIAL BRIEFS:

Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the parties and filed with
the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial.
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11.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

If the trial is to the Court, each party shall at least seven (7) days prior to trial file

with the opposing parties and the Court, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Supporting their position.

12.

MODIFICATION:

This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the parties upon entry of an
order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may, upon motion and for good
cause shown, seek leave of Court modifying the terms of this order, upon such terms and
conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may request a pretrial conference pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 16(i).

13.

SANCTIONS FOR NONCONFORMANCE:

Failure to timely comply in all respects with the provisions of this order shall
subject non-complying parties to sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 16(i), which may
include:
(a)

An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or

oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting such party from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(b)

An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further

proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(c)

In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an

order threatening as a contempt of Court the failure to comply;
(d)

In lieu or in addition to any other sanction, the Judge shall require

the party or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless
the Judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any vacation or continuation of the trial date
shall not change or alter any of the discovery or disclosure dates established by the initial

trial setting. Any party may, upon motion and for good cause shown, request that the
discovery and disclosure dates be altered on vacation or continuance of the trial date.

Lansing L~aynes, :district Judge
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THEABOVE-ENTITLED'COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 15 th day of April, 2011, that Defendant HJ
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Answers and Responses to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, together with
a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile and/or depositing the same in the

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 1
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United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid.

DATED this 15 th day of April, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of April, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2

\/us Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

~SMail
__ Overnight Mail
,Hand Delivered
_V_ FF~acsimile (208) 343-8869
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 12th day of May, 2011, that Defendant HJ
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, together with a copy of this Notice, upon
counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho,

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERYREQt.QR-tG
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postage pre-paid.

DATED this 12th day of May, 2011.

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

¥

ouglas S. Marfice, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1th day of May, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

_£_us

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

.£us Mail

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 2

_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 3rd day of May, 2011, that Defendant HJ
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Supplemental Answers and
Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents,
together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile and/or depositing the

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 1
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same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid.
DATED this 16th day ofMay, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:~~~
Dou~Marffoe,fthefirm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of May, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

v"US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2

68 of 1617

m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General

Idah() Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V.. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
IO 1 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, .Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attomeys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

CaseNo. CVI0-10095

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY

vs.

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Was~on
corporation; and DOES 1 through S,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY -1
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

16:51 07/08/11 GMT-07 Pg 03-04

Pursuant to the Idaho .Rules of Civil P?Qeedw-e, notice is hereby given by the

undersigned counsel that a copy ofITD's Response to HJ Orathol's First set of Responses to
Defendant HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to
Plaintiff: along with a copy of this Notice, was served upon the attorneys listed on the attached
Certificate of Service on July 8, 2011, by facsimile and overnight UPS.

DATED this 8th day of July, 2011.

HOLLAND & HART LLP
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys Ge~
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2
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STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 3344498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Steve C. Bowman (ISB #4404)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342·5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,

vs,

0

Case No. CVl0-10095

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF
DISCLOSURE OF ADVANCING
EXPERTS

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership,
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOBS 1 through 5,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF ADVANCING EXPERTS -1
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JUl.21.2011

1:32PM

NO. 2885

P. 3/4

Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Department hereby gives notice that it has disclosed its
advancing expert witnesses Mr. Jason Minzghor, P.E. and Mr. Stanley D. Moe, MAI, RM on the
date set forth below, in accordance with the Court's scheduling order of April 5,2011, Rule
26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure! and an agreed·upon extension of time between
the parties.
DATED this 21st day of July, 2011.

HOLLAND & HART LLP
MaryV. York
Steve C. Bowman
Ted s, Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF ADVANCING EXPERTS - 2
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JUl..21.2011

1:33PM

NO. 2885

P. 4/4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of July 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5169293_1.DOC

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF ADVANCING EXPERTS - 3
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order entered
in this matter that on April 5, 2011, Defendant HJ GRATHOL, by and through their attorney
ofrecord, Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, disclosed their expert witnesses.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:D~~nn

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE - I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of August, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box,2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Aland Delivered
_\T_ FPa,csimile (208) 343-8869

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE - 2
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GIDIBRAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN OSB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief: Civil Litigation Division
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-881S
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
10 I South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVI0-10095

NOTICE OF SERVICE

vs.

HJ ORATHOL, a Californi,- general partnership;

STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF SERVICE· 1
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m:Naor, T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

P\JJ'SUallt to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the

undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production to Defendant HJ Oratbol, along with a copy of this Notice, was served via facsimile
upon the attorneys listed on the attached Certificate of Service on August 29, 2011.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2011.

HOLLAND & HART LLP
MaryV. York

Ted S. Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attomeys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE. OF SERVICE - i
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 29th day of August, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

D
D
IZ!

D
D

U.S.Mail

Hand Deiivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5220934_1.00C
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095

MOTION TO COMPEL

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden

& Lyons, LLP, and respectfully moves this Court pursuant to Rule 37(a), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure for an Order compelling Plaintiff, State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Board to fully
and completely respond to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents dated
May 12, 2011, to which Plaintiff has submitted incomplete and insufficient responses and
objections thereto.

MOTION TO COMPEL - I

ORIGINAL
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This motion is supported by the pleadings filed herein and the Affidavits of Christopher
D. Gabbert and Alan Johnson filed herewith. In making this motion, counsel represents to the
Court that he has made written requests to Plaintiffs counsel seeking to obtain discovery
responses. Despite endeavoring in good faith to reach an agreement on this matter, counsei has
been unable to obtain the information sought.
Defendant requests attorney fees and expenses for services incurred as the result of
Plaintiffs failure to answer said Interrogatories and respond to said Requests for Production of
Documents.
The sufficiency of the responses to the following Interrogatories and Requests for
Production necessitates that Defendant file its motion to compel.

Pursuant to the Court's

Uniform Pretrial Order, Section 5, the following Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents are brought before this Court:

INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

In the Affidavit of Jason Minzghor in Support of

Motion or Order Granting Possession of Real Property Plaintiff states in Paragraph 16 that the
Sylvan/Roberts Road extension is a separate and distinct project from the US-95 Garwood to
Sagle Project. Please identify and describe what "project" the Sylvan/Roberts Road extension
is a part of. In providing this response please include a project description, funding sources,
contractors and expected dates for beginning and completion of the "project" pursuant to which
Sylvan/Roberts Road extension is a part.
ANSWER:

ITO objects to Interrogatory No. 10 on the grounds that it is

misleading and is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence and is
beyond the scope of permissible discovery. Whether a future project requires the

MOTION TO COMPEL - 2
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acquisition of additional property from the Defendant has no bearing on the amount of
just compensation due to Defendant in this litigation. Subject to and without waiving
any objections, there currently is no project pending to construct Sylvan/Roberts Road
on Defendants property.

Defendant's position:

The Interrogatory was not limited to projects located on

Defendant's property, but instead sought information regarding identification of the project to
which the Sylvan/Roberts road expansion pertains, its funding sources and other identifying
information. The expansion and construction of the Sylvan Road directly impacts the value
of Plaintiffs taking in this litigation and is certainly within the scope of discoverable
information. Further, Plaintiffs agent, Jason Minzghor, was disclosed as an expert witness
and specifically addressed the Sylvan Road construction issues as his area of expertise,
including the identification of current agreements to construct such road to directly benefit
Defendant's neighbors. Plaintiffs agent testifies that the Sylvan Road/Roberts Road is a
"separate and distinct project" yet the Board refuses to disclose any details about such
project or development making it impossible to determine the impact on Defendant's
valuation.
Plaintiffs position: That there is no project to develop Sylvan Road, and if there were
it is not within the scope of discovery in this litigation.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

In the Affidavit of Jason Minzghor in Support of

Motion or Order Granting Possession of Real Property Plaintiff states in Paragraph 11 that
Grathol's

neighbors

have

expressed

an

interest

in

having

Sylvan/Roberts

Road

extended/improved across their properties and decided to dedicate portions of their property to

MOTION TO COMPEL - 3

81 of 1617

such purpose. Please identify which neighbors have expressed such interest and the substance
of such communications to or from Plaintiff regarding the same. In providing this response,
please include the substance of any and all conversations Plaintiff has had with these property
owners, identify any and all writings memorializing such negotiations and agreements and
provide the dates such discussions and agreements occurred.
ANSWER:

ITD objects to Interrogatory No. 11. Please see Response to

Interrogatory No. 10. Further, ITD objects that discussions with the Defendant's
neighbors have no bearing on the amount of just compensation due to Defendant in this
litigation.
Defendant's position: This Interrogatory is in follow up to verified statements made
by Plaintiffs agent in his affidavits to the Court about the existence of agreements and
communications for the development of Sylvan Road. The development of this road will
directly affect the valuation of Defendant's property and Plaintiff has considered the matter
of enough import to include it in its agent's testimony, yet refuses to divulge any further
details about such arrangements. As with Interrogatory No. 10, such evidence is within the
scope of permissible discover to identify the details, schedule and discussions of such
construction and plans for the same.
Plaintiffs position: That any such discussions are outside of the scope of discovery
for this litigation.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: If any of the individuals identified in
Interrogatory No. 11 have signed a stipulation for possession or have settled with Plaintiff,
please provide a copy of the stipulation or settlement agreement.

MOTION TO COMPEL - 4
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ANSWER: ITD objects to Request for Production No. 20 for the same grounds it
objected to Interrogatory No. 11.

Parties' positions: See above.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27: Please produce any and all documents,

memorandums and/or notes and correspondence exchanged between Plaintiff and any other
public entity concerning or discussing the extension and/or construction of Sylvan Road.
Please include in your response to this Request for Production any final agreements or
concessions wherein such discussions were held.
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11
Parties' positions: See above.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28: Please produce a copy of any and all Joint

Exercise of Power Agreements by and between Plaintiff and any other public entity concerning
either the construction of the Project or the extension and/or construction of Sylvan Road.
Please include in your response to this Request for Production minutes of any and all public
meetings wherein a final action authorizing the execution of such agreements took place.
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11
Parties' positions: See above.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29:

Please produce any and all budgets,

estimates of costs and appropriation materials including line item budget requests indicating a
cost estimate for construction and improvement of Sylvan Road.
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11
Parties' positions: See above.

MOTION TO COMPEL - 5
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30:

Please produce copies of any

communications, notes, memoranda, agreements or communications by and between Plaintiff,
any other public entity and any individuals identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 11
above.
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11
Parties' positions: See above.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce any and all soil testing
documentation as it relates to the Subject Property including, but not limited to, the location of
the soil testing and soil log information.
RESPONSE: ITD objects to Request for Production No. 7 on the grounds that it is
vague and overbroad and its terms are subject to differing interpretations. The request does not
specify a time frame regarding a soil testing and soil log information. Nor are the terms "soil
testing" and "soil log" defined.
Subject to and without waiving any objections, please see attached documents including
but not limited to IID-HJGRATHOL000926-004050.
Defendant's position:

On or about January 15, 2010, Plaintiff was granted limited

permission by Defendant to enter the Subject Property to conduct soil testing and drill test logs
and pits. On or about February 16, 2010, Plaintiff through its agent, American Geotechnics
conducted testing on the Subject Property of the composition of the underlying soils. Some
draft preliminary data of these tests were provided to Defendant by the Board. Grathol
requested copies of the final results and associated reports generated by American Geotechnics,
but none was provided. Plaintiffs production of materials ITD-HJGRATHOL000926-004050

MOTION TO COMPEL - 6
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does not contain any reference to the testing performed on the Subject Property, the results of
such testing or the final report generated by American Geotechnics.
Plaintiffs position: Plaintiff failed to respond to this request for production.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: Please produce a copy of any and all
documents upon which Plaintiff has estimated an amount and valuation for gravel that will be
extracted from the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: ITD objects to Request for Production No. 23 on the grounds that it is
vague, ambiguous and that the terms used are undefined and subject to differing interpretations.
Gravel is made not extracted.
Defendant's position: Plaintiff conducted specific soil testing with the permission of
Defendant Grathol on the Subject Property to determine suitability for construction,
composition of soils and minerals and gravel production/extraction. The documents produced
by Plaintiff fail to reference such testing or include the final results of tests, the exact locations
of the tests performed or the final report and/or analysis provided by American Geotechnics in
connection with their allowed exploration of the Subject Property.
Plaintiffs position: Plaintiff objected on the grounds that it does not understand what
"gravel" means. It further failed to address these deficiencies in subsequent correspondence in
follow up to its lack of response.
Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Board has steadfastly refused to provide any records
related to the construction of Sylvan Road claiming that it is not at issue in this litigation, is not
relevant and outside of the scope of permissible discovery. Subsequent to this response,
Defendant's agent, Alan Johnson, requested the same information via a public records request
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to Idaho Transportation Department on August 3, 2011. On August 8, 2011, the Idaho
Transportation Department denied the public records request claiming that the records are
related to ongoing litigation and thus are not subject to disclosure.
Plaintiff claims that the materials sought are simultaneously related to and not related to
this litigation and thereby are not subject to disclosure or production. The inconsistent and
inapposite treatment of this material demonstrates that the Plaintiff and the Idaho
Transportation Department are playing games with Defendant Grathol's property interests.
Plaintiff cannot have it both ways.

Such gamesmanship should not be countenanced and

Defendant has exhausted all available means to acquiring said materials absent assistance from
this Court.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

I}~day of September, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, L

·stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method mdicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

~ S Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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STATE Of IOAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI/ SS
FILED=
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
(208) 664-5818
Telephone:
(208) 664-5884
Facsimile:
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

. 2011 SEP 14 AN fO: 00

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN JOHNSON
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO COMPEL

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through

5,
Defendants.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss.
)
County of O;Z.ftµr;,g,
I, Alan Johnson, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge.

2.

I am employed by Hughes Investments, a California general partnership as

Senior Vice President of Development and a partner of HJ Bayview Gateway LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, the managing partner of HJ Grathol, a California general
partnership and I am also the Project Coordinator for the development of this Property and
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am appointed by the managing partner.

3.

HJ Grathol is an affiliate of Hughes Investments and owns the real property

that is the subject of this condemnation proceeding.

4.

On August 3, 2011, I made a public records request to the Idaho Transportation

Department seeking, inter alia, the following public records pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-338:
(a)

Copies of any and all records, including but not limited to correspondence,
notes, documents and electronic communications in the possession of Idaho
Transportation Department concerning, referencing, describing or related to
Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho.

(b)

Copies of any and all correspondence by and between Idaho Transportation
Department and Lakes Highway District concerning, referencing, describing or
related to Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho. Please include in
this response copies of any agreements, including joint exercise of powers
agreements executed by these public entities.

(c)

Copies of any and all budgets, estimates of costs and appropriation materials
including line item budget requests indicating a cost estimate for any
improvement of Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho.

A true and correct copy of the Public Records Request is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

5.

On August 8, 2011, the Idaho Transportation Department denied the public

records request claiming that the records are not subject to disclosure as they are related to
ongoing litigation. A true and correct copy of Idaho Transportation Department's response is
attached hereto as Exhibit B.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me before this /?'1Jay of September, 2011.

{M4tv s. 13f4nv

Notaiy Public f o r - - - - - , - - - - - Residing at: (a,.V{ rJ?1 &f±
My Commission expires: Ve:/_,,. !}.. '.'.3 ,-Jp(.3
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the~ day of September, 2011, I served a true and conect
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below7addressed to the following:

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Maii
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_
Facsimile (208) 334-4498

/ US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

AFFIDA VJT OF ALAN JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL - 3

90 of 1617

HJGRATHOL
Post Office Box 999
Coeur d'Alene, ID 38316
(208) 818-0836

f IL£ COPY

August 3, 2011

Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State St.,
PO Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129
FAX - (208) 334-3858
Re:

Public Records Request

Dear Sir,
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-338 please find this public records request for the
following information. I am requesting under Idaho's Public Records Law, records in the
possession of this agency or its agents.
Specifically, I request the following:
(a)

Records from 2009 through today's date (August 3, 2011) showing the total
current amount of costs and attorneys fees paid by Idaho Transportation
Department to Holland & Hart, LLP, as attorneys in connection with Kootenai
County Case No. CVI0-10095, Idaho Court of Appeals Case No. 38511-2011
and ITD Project No. A009(791), Key No. 09791, Parcel 19, ITD PID
0044775.

(b)

Copies of any and all records, including but not limited to correspondence,
notes, documents and electronic communications in the possession of Idaho
Transportation Department concerning, referencing, describing or related to
Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho.

( c)

Copies of any and all c01Tespondence by and between Idaho Transportation
Department and Lakes Highway District concerning, referencing, describing
or related to Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho. Please include in
this response copies of any agreements, including joint exercise of powers
agreements executed by these public entities.

EXHIBITA
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( d)

Copies of any and all budgets, estimates of costs and appropriation materials
including line item budget requests indicating a cost estimate for any
improvement of Sylvan Road. , located in Kootenai County Idaho.

I would like this information emailed to me at ajohnson@hughcsinv.com.
If my request for records is denied in whole or in part, please state the exact statutory
reason for the denial. Please notify me in advance if necessary under Idaho law to assess a
fee for this records request.
Thank you for your time and prompt response.

Sincerely,

AJ:ab

A
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IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

P.O. Box 7129
Boise ID 83707-1129
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(208) 334-8000
itd.idaho.gov
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Alan Johnson
HJ Grathol
PO Box 999
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
RE:

Public Records Request of August 3, 2011

Dear Mr. Johnson:
The Idaho Transportation Department received your request for public records on
August 3, 2011. Please be advised the records you are requesting are related to an
ongoing case in litigation. In accordance with Idaho Code Section 9-343 and Idaho
Public Records Law Manual, when a public agency is a party to the proceeding they are
governed by rules of discovery.
Sincerely,

Jeff Stratten
Office of Communications Manager
JS:lh
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STATE OF lDAHO
'SS
COUNTY Of KOOTENAI{

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

. FILED:

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER
D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO COMPEL

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Kootenai )
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am an attorney of record for the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and

therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL - l
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2.

On May 12, 2011, I served written Interrogatories and Requests for Production

of Documents on Plaintiff.
3.

On or about July 8, 2011, I received Plaintiff's Answers to said Interrogatories

and Responses to said Requests for Production of Documents and general objections.
4.

On July 21, 2011, I corresponded to Plaintiff's counsel to discuss the discovery

responses received seeking to resolve the deficiencies and objections raised in Plaintiff's
responses. A true and correct copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

On or about July 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed its Disclosure of Advancing Experts,

identifying Jason Minzghor as an expert witness in this matter.
6.

One area of Mr. Minzghor's identified expertise is Sylvan/Roberts Road at pp. 8

- 9 of Plaintiff's Disclosure of Advancing Experts. Mr. Minzghor specifically states that ITD
has agreed to construct Sylvan Road extensions on neighboring properties as a frontage road
and that the extension is a separate and distinct project. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and
correct copy of a portion of Plaintiff's Disclosure ofAdvancing Experts.
7.

On July 29, 2011, Plaintiff's counsel responded to my request, denying that there

is any project to construct Sylvan Road, and further stating that the matters sought by way of
discovery related to Sylvan Road are outside of the scope of litigation. A true and correct copy
of Plaintiff's response is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
8.

On or about January 15, 2010, I executed a Grant of Entry Agreement allowing

Plaintiff or its agents to access the Subject Property to conduct geotechnical exploration and
testing.

A true and correct copy of my correspondence to Plaintiff's agents, and their

acceptance of the terms of such permission is attached hereto as Exhibit D.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL - 2
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9.

On or about April 2, 2010 I received via email a copy of preliminary boring logs

from American Geotechnics in relation to the initial testing performed on the Subject Property.
Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of said correspondence as Exhibit E.

/

SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this

\1) day of September, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9

I hereby certify that on the \
day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

/US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

~US Mai·1
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
-~lCHAEL E. RAMSDEN•
MARC A. LYONS•

P.O. BOX 1336

DOUGLASS. MARFICE'

COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336

STREET ADDRESS:
700 NORTHWEST BLVD.

MICHAEL A. EALY'
COEUR D'ALENE. ID 83814

TERRANCE R. HARRIS'
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT

TELEPHONE:

THERON J.DESMET

(208) 664-5818

ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO

FACSIMILE: (208) 664·5884
E-MAIL: firm@ramsdenlyons.com

WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL

WEBSITE:

• LICENSED IN WASHIN"GTON

www.ramsdenlyons.com

July 21, 2011
Via facsimile (208) 343-8869

MaryV. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Bolse, ID 83701
Re:

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol, et al.
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095

Dear Mary,
I am in receipt of ITD's responses to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production to Plaintiff dated July 8, 2011. I have reviewed the responses and
note that your client has objected to many of our client's discovery requests. However, I feel
that your client's objections are not well founded, especially with regards to the following
requests:

1.
2.
3.
4.

)

Interrogatory No. 10;
Interrogatory No. 11;
Request for Production Nos. 20, 30; and
Request for Production Nos. 27, 28, 29

Interrogatory Nos. 10 and 11 and Requests for Production Nos. 27, 28 and 29 seek
information and documentation pertaining to the status, plans, development and
configuration of Sylvan Road as discussed by and between the Idaho Department of
Transportation and other public entities. Sylvan Road was testified to by- ITD's agent (see,
Affidavit of Jason Mingzghor) as an "existing project." Since Sylvan Road crosses the
Grathol property and will eventually be the frontage road, it is certainly relevant to a final
determination on the value of our client's remnant parcels. Your repeated objections that
information about Sylvan Road is beyond the scope of permissible discovery are not well
founded. The expansion and development of additional property belonging to our client on
the same parcel of land is certainly within the scope of permissible discovery. for a valuation
on damages. Further any such objections have been waived because they were not timely
made under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Mary V. York
July 21, 2011
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Additionally, as you well know the very Order of Condemnation at issue in this case
contains a specific paragraph dealing with ITD's " ... process of extending Sylvan Road to tie
into Roberts Road," in association with this Project. That makes Sylvan Road and ITD's
plans and communications about it not just discovery relevant, but directly relevant.
Similarly, Interrogatory No. 11 and Request for Production Nos. 20 and 30 seek
discovery of additional information testified to by ITD's agent in his affidavit regarding
existing discussions with our client's neighbors regarding the expansion and dedication of
Sylvan Road. The objection that such information "has no bearing" on the amount of just
compensation due Defendant is assumedly an objection based on relevancy, but is otherwise
still discoverable pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26. The information certainly has bearing on the issue
of damages and the impact of ITD's actions in this condemnation and is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Additionally, as above, any
objections now raised to these discovery requests have been waived as untimely.
Despite the large volume of information your client produced via CD, there appears to
be information that ITD has either decided to withhold or which was not properly copied
onto the electronic format you provided. Of note, in folder number 2, titled "ROW Diaries
and Plans" there is a subfolder titled "Correspondence" which is empty. I assume that this
material was inadvertently omitted from ITD's response because I find it difficult to believe
that IID has not generated any emails, letters or correspondence related to the Subject
Property. Additionally, certain documents and data that we requested were not provided.
That information includes soil testing information, grading and elevation plans, and
correspondence/agreements with other public entities relative to Sylvan Road extension
plans. (See, Request for Production Nos. 7, 23, 27, 28, 29 and 30).
Please note that this is an attempt to meet and confer in order to obtain discovery
without court action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). If you wish to discuss these matters
further, please contact me immediately. Otherwise, I will expect full responses to these
discovery requests in (10) ten days. Thank you for your attention to this · atter.

Christopher D. Gabbert
CDG/sj

...... fr
"age
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The U.S. 95 Project was public knowledge and the construction plans for the Project
crossing over the Grathol property were available prior to the date that Grathol purchased the
subject Property. Grathol acknowledged and touted the benefits of the Project in its application
to the county planning and zoning commission to change the zoning of the property to
commercial. The county granted the application in light of the Project's creation of commercial
potential on and in the vicinity of the Grathol property.

5.

Sylvan/Roberts Road:

Contrary to the Grathol' s claim, ITD is not condemning any portion of the Grathol
property in order to construct an extension of the Sylvan/Roberts Road as part of the US-95
Garwood to Sagle Project. JTO's Complaint does not seek to condemn any property from
Grathol for construction of any such extension. The only property being acquired by ITO in this
case is property needed for the realignment of US-95 and the construction of the Highway 54
Interchange.
Grathol has apparently been confused by negotiations among ITD, Lakes Highway
District, and other property owners in the area regarding the potential extension of
Sylvan/Roberts Road. Specifically, Grathol's neighbors expressed an interest in having
Sylvan/Roberts Road extended across their properties. Because of the benefits of the extended
road, those neighbors decided to dedicate portions of their property to the Lakes Highway
District and ITO agreed to construct the Sylvan Road extension for those landowners. The

construction of extensions of the Sylvan/Roberts Road will act as a frontage road for these
property owners, who view it to be beneficial to them as additional access to their property.

In August 2010, representatives ofITD, including Mr. Minzghor, had a meeting with the
owners of the Grathol property and their attorneys. At this August 20 l Omeeting, ITD had
discussions with the owners of the Grathol property that were separate and distinct from the

PLAINTIFF ITD'S DISCLOSURE OF ADVANCING EXPERTS - 8
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negotiations over the portion of the Grathol property needed for the US-95 Garwood to Sagle
Project At that meeting, ITD stated that it would also be willing to extend Sylvan/Roberts Road
across the Grathol property if they elected to dedicate the property for that extension.
Unlike their neighbors, Grathol elected not to have the Sylvan/Roberts Road extended
across their property. Therefore, ITD is not constructing any extension of the Sylvan/Roberts
Road on the Grathol property, and ITD does not need and is not condemning any property from
Grathol for any such extension. The only property that ITO seeks to acquire from Grathol is a
portion of the Grathol property needed solely and specifically for realignment of US-95 and the
construction of the Highway 54 interchange.

The Sylvan/Roberts Road extension is a separate and distinct project and is not part of the
US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project - Athol Segment. Construction of an extension of
Sylvan/Roberts Road is not necessary or required for the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project. In
short, ITD is not condemning any portion of Grathol's property for an extension of
Sylvan/Roberts Road in this eminent domain proceeding.

B.

Data and Other Information Considered in Forming Testimony:

Mr. Minzghor has relied on the follO\ving data and documents in this matter:
Planning documents related to the Project.
Environmental documents related to the Project.
Project design, right-of-way, and construction plans.
Personal inspection of the site of the Project and the Grathol property.
Applicable federal, state, and local regulations and specifications.
Planning and zoning documents.
Engineering standards and guidelines.

C.

Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summarv of or Support for Testimony:

Mr. Minzghor may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his
testimony:
Planning documents related to the Project.
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MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

myork@hollandhart.com

July 29, 2011
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVlO~ 10095
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 38511-2011

DearClnis:
We received your letter of July 21, 2011 regarding ITD's responses to Defendant's
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production dated July 8, 2011. In your
July 21, 2011 letter you requested a response within ten (10) days - July 31, 2011 - which
is a Sunday. Before turning to the substance of your letter, we must first address two
misrepresentations in your July 21, 2011 letter.
First, your letter seems to allege that our discovery responses were untimely.
This is incorrect. We obtained extensions from Mr. Marfice, and therefore our responses
were timely.
Second, your letter misquotes the January 18, 2011 Affidavit of Jason Minzghor,
the ITD District 1 Project Development Engineer, Your letter quotes Mr. Minzghor's
affidavit as saying that the construction of Sylvan Road is an "existing project."
Mr. Minzghor's affidavit does not say that, particularly as to the Grathol property.
Rather, Mr. Minzghor makes very clear that ITD is not condemning any portion of the
Grathol property in order to construct Sylvan Road.
10.
Contrary to the claim in Grathol's brief in opposition to
the motion for possession of the property, ITD is not
condemning any portion of the Grathol property in order to
construct an extension of the Sylvan/Roberts Road as part of
the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project. ITD's Complaint does
not seek to condemn any property from Grathol for
construction of any such extension.
17.
In this eminent domain proceeding, ITD is not
condemning any portion of Grathol's property for an extension
of Sylvan/Roberts Road.

Holland&HarhtJ>
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise.ID 83702 MalUng Address P.0.Box2527 Boise.ID 83701-2527
Aspen Bouldet Carson City Colorado Springs Denver 0enve,Tech Centet Billings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole Las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Santa Fe Washington, D.C. 0
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Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
July 29, 2011
Page 2

As to the substance of your letter, you noted that the "Correspondence" folder on
the CD of documents produced to you was empty. We apologize. The bates numbered
documents ITD-HJGRATHOL000252-269 were inadvertently not copied onto the CD.
Therefore, enclosed please find a CD which includes those inadvertently omitted
documents.
Your July 21, 2011 letter also notes that you did not receive responses to
interrogatories and requests for production related to Sylvan Road. You argue that
because ITD had discussed extending Sylvan Road across Grathol's property and the
administrative order of condemnation references Sylvan Road that any and all documents
related to Sylvan Road are discoverable. You further argue that "[t]he expansion and
development of additional property belonging to our client on the same parcel of land is
certainly within the scope of permissible discovery for a valuation on damages."
On January 21, 2011, the Court held a hearing on ITD's motion for possession.
At that hearing, ITD presented extensive testimony that ITD was not condemning any of
Grathol's property for the construction of Sylvan Road. At the conclusion of that hearing,
Judge Haynes ruled that the order of condemnation did not provide for the taking of
Grathol's property for Sylvan Road and that Sylvan Road is not the subject of the taking
before the Court. Judge Haynes ruled:
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court's
opinion does not provide for the taking of the defendanes
property for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts
Road. The contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to
link to Roberts Road is certainly mentioned in the order of
condemnation, but more importantly, the complaint does not
contemplate the extension of that road, and that is not the
subject of the taking that is before this court. The Idaho
Department of Transportation has offered to expand those roads
through Grathol's property -- rather, the Sylvan Road
expansion through Grathol's property, but that offer has been
declined by the defendant and this has been testified to amply
before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition.
January 21, 2011, Hearing Tr. 61:2-16.
On January 27, 2011, Judge Haynes entered an Order which granted ITD possession
of the real property described in the Complaint. As the exhibits to the Complaint clearly
illustrate, ITD is not condemning any of Grathol's property for the construction of Sylvan
Road.
Further on July 21, 2011, ITD disclosed its Advancing Experts. In that disclosure,
Mr. Minzghor again stated that "ITD is not condemning any portion of Grathol's property
for an extension of Sylvan/Roberts Road in this eminent domain proceeding.',
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Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
July 29, 2011
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The only remaining issue in this litigation is the amount of just compensation owed
to Grathol for the property that is being condemned and any severance damages that are
claimed to result from that taking. Grathol cannot be compensated in any way for property
that is not being condemned. Therefore, any information or documents reiating to Syivan
Road are wholly irrelevant to the sole issue to be tried in this case.
Your clients elected to forego a valuable benefit of having Sylvan Road extended
with all construction costs borne by ITD. That decision closed the issue of a possible
extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property. Therefore, none of the information
or documents referenced in your letter is relevant or discoverable.

Alyyou~

If you would like to discuss this matter further, please feel free to contact me.

Mmy~k
offioe,I~Ha
Enclosure
MVY:ntp
5191489_1.DOC
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.January 15, 2010

Justin Wuest
Idaho Transportation Dept. - District l
600 West Prai1ie Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Re:

US-95, Garwood to Sagle (Atlzol Stage), .A,fP 448 00 to 449.80, Project No .
.11009(791), Ke_1 1 No 09791, G,>anf'of E1ibj1,HJ G,;athol, Pai·cel No. 53N03W10-5000
::, . -

Dear Justin:
In follow up to our te1ephone conversation and our meeting with our clients, we
discussed the Idaho Transportation Department's ("ITD") Grant of Entry Agreement to
access the "HJ Grathol" property for data collection. Our clients have authorized lTD access
to their property upon two conditions. First, our c1ients would request that lTD provide them
a minimum of four ( 4) working days notice for entry and testing on the property, in the event
that our clients desire to have a representative present for observation. Second, ITD will
need to provide its proof of insurance coverage for its activities on our client's property, to
cover any losses, damages, harm or casualty to ITD's personnel or property that should occur
by reason of lTD's activities on the property This is easiest achieved by ITD simply
indemnifying our clients for these losses, should they occur.
Enclosed, please find an executed copy of the Grant of Entry Agreement with the
conditions of entry noted. Additionally, please sign and return a copy of this con·espondence
as assurance that ITD has sufficient insurance coverage and indemnifies our clients for losses
or damages which could occur by reasons of ITD's use of our client's property. Our clients
recognize the possible need for ITD to remove some tr~es in order to access and conduct its
testing activities
the· renioval ·of those trees is excluded· fio11i ITD' indemnification. -_

atid

s

I::.. ·:,·

104 of 1617

Justin Wuest
January 15, 2010

Pagel
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.

I aclmowledge the terms and conditions of the Grant of Entry Agreement and the
Idaho Transportation Department agrees to the conditions therein

~~-

~ Justin Wuest
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Shannon James
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:

Chris Gabbert [cgabbert@ramsdenlyons.com]
Monday, April 05, 2010 9:38 AM
Doug Marfice; Shannon James
FW: US 95/Hwy 54 boring logs
09B-G1939 DRAFT Logs_ r1 ISSUED 4-2-10.pdf

From: Stanley Crawforth [mailto:s crawforth@americangeotechnics.com]
Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 9:53 AM
To: Chris Gabbert
Subject: RE: US 95/Hwy 54 boring logs
Attached are the boring logs. The final report is about 6 weeks away.
Please thank the property owner for the access.

Stanley G. Crawforth, PE
American Geotechnics
5260 Chinden Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83714
Office: (208) 658-8700
Cell:
(801) 400-4004
Fax:
(208) 658-8703

,..e_.•.,

www.AmericanGeotechnics.com

AMEIIC.A.H

..:- ..... ~ .:.J

TECHMICS
From: Chris Gabbert [mailto:cgabbert@ramsdenlyons.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2010 4:02 PM
To: Stanley Crawforth
Subject: US 95/Hwy 54 boring logs
Stan,
In follow up to our conversation, please forward copies of the test pit and geotechnical logs for the site
evaluation conducted on the Athol property. We appreciate your assistance in this matter. If you have any questions,
please let me know.
Thanks,

Christopher D. Gabbert
Attorney
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
1
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P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
www .ramsdenlyons.com
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, which is
confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying,
distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly prohibited. If you have received
this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by rep!y e-mai! and destroy all copies of the original message.

_1;;___
Page !'k.ot Z-
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STATE OF IDAHO
1
COUNTY OF KOOTEHAl>SS
1

FILED:

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

.

20 '1 SF.P l S AH ta: If

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JlJDIClt\L DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

NOTICE OF HEARING
Date: October 19, 2011

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Time: 3 :30 p.m. (PST)
Place: Kootenai County District Court

Defendants.

TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

AND TO:

ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Wednesday, the 19 th day of October, 2011 at

3:30 p.m. (PST), of said day, Defendant HJ Grathol will bring on its Motion to Compel,
before the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes.

NOTICE OF HEARING - l
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DATED this 14th day of September, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

topher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7ssed

I hereby certify that on the 14th day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and
to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
(208) 664-5884
Facsimile:
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant lU Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

lU GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 19th day of September, 2011, that Defendant
lU Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons,
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers
and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 1
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same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

~J.:s.~

Douglas s.fMarfice, Ofth Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and./sed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2
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OR\ G\ i'~AL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

2011 Sf? 23 AH IQ: 44

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVI0-10095

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY
OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO
COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO
COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 1
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel
ofrecord, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or,
Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures. ITD requests an order from the Court excluding
the exoert testimonv of two exoert witnesses identified bv Defendant. HJ G-rathol ("G-rathol")
...
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Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Grathol has failed to comply with the expert disclosure
requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order entered on April 5, 2011 and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Grathol has also failed to respond to ITD discovery requests that specifically ask for
the opinions and supporting information of all of Grathol's experts. Accordingly, testimony by
these experts should be excluded.
As a result of Grathol' s failure to disclose its expert opinions, ITD has been prejudiced
because it cannot determine what rebuttal experts it will need, and it cannot prepare rebuttal
expert reports, prepare for the depositions of Grathol's experts, prepare for trial, or engage in
settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is unable under these circumstances to make a proper
pretrial offer in accordance with the requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi,
105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1987) and subsequent, related cases.
In the alternative, ITD moves this Court to compel Grathol to comply with the Pretrial
Order requiring disclosure of expert opinions and the basis of those opinions, which are also the
subjects oflTD's discovery requests served on February 2, 2011. If the Motion to Compel is
granted, ITD will necessarily need an extension of time to disclose rebuttal experts and reports,
and therefore requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order accordingly and continue the trial
in this matter.
Counsel has made repeated efforts to reach an agreement with opposing counsel on the
issue of Grathol's expert disclosures and despite those efforts, no agreement could be reached.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO
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Therefore, if successful, ITD also requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred
in bringing this motion.
ITD' s motion is supported by a brief and by the Affidavit of Mary V. York also filed on

this date.
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO
COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D
D
D
~

U.S. Maii
Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 664-5884
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5234465 _ l .DOC
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QR\G\NAL
STATE OF IDAHO
.1 C
COUNTY OF KOOTENAttS,.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

FILED:

2011 SEP 23 AM IQ: 44

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

0 l~o 00171 '>(( I

UEPiJTY
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,

Case No. CVI0-10095

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE
EXPERT TESTIMONY OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL
EXPERT DISCLOSURES

Defendants.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this brief in support of its Motion to exclude the
expert testimony of certain experts identified by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"). Grathol has
failed to comply with the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order and has failed to respond
properly to discovery requests propounded by ITD. ITD has suffered and will continue to suffer
prejudice without the required expert disclosures in that it ITD is unable to identify rebuttal
experts needed for trial, and cannot prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for the depositions of
Grathol's experts, prepare for trial, or engage in settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is
unable under these circumstances to make a proper pretrial offer in accordance with the
requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P .2d 1067
(1987) and subsequent, related cases.
Grathol claims that it is not required to disclose the opinions or basis of opinions of these
experts under the "actor-viewer" exception noted in the Committee Notes of Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Grathol's attempted justification for its refusal to disclose
expert opinions and supporting information is not supported by the facts or applicable law. The
stated subject matters upon which these experts will offer opinion testimony fall squarely within
the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, even if it is
determined that the testimony of these experts' testimony is exempted from the Idaho Rule, the
experts' opinions and the basis and facts supporting those opinions were specifically requested in
ITD's discovery and Grathol has refused to produce the requested information. Additionally,
Grathol has ignored the Court's Pretrial Order and has sought to place limitations on the Court's
requirement for the disclosure of Grathol's experts that are not contained in the Order. Finally,

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 2
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even in one were to accept Grathol's argument regarding application of the "actor-viewer"
exception under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal case law, Grathol still could not
hide its experts' opinions. On the contrary, the federal rules require "actor-viewer" experts to
disclose "a SUtT11-nai7 of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions is purely an attempt to
hide the ball and deny ITD the ability to properly prepare for trial. The exclusion of expert
testimony is the typical sanction for a party's failure to comply with Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and should be applied here.
Alternatively, ITD requests the Court enter an Order compelling Grathol to submit
adequate and sufficient expert disclosures as required by the Court's Order and as requested by
ITD in its discovery requests. Additionally, because ITD is unable to identify rebuttal experts,
prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for expert depositions, or make an appropriate pretrial

Acarrequi offer, ITD also requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order to extend the time for
ITD to disclose rebuttal experts and expert reports, and vacate and continue the trial date in this
matter. If the testimony of Grathol's experts is not excluded, then the extension oftime and
continuance of the trial date is the only remedy that will prevent unfair prejudice to ITD by
requiring Grathol to disclose the opinions of its experts, and thereafter providing sufficient time
for ITD to prepare for the depositions of Grathol' s experts and to indentify rebuttal experts and
submit rebuttal expert reports. This remedy is also necessary to give ITD an adequate
opportunity to evaluate the opinions of Grathol' s experts and present a fair and reasonable

Acarrequi offer to Grathol. The continuance is also necessary to provide a fair opportunity for
ITD to prepare its case for trial.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR,
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II.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established the pretrial deadlines for the
parties' expert disclosures. Pretrial Order, at, 2. Under the terms of the Order, ITD was
required to disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011. Id. Grathol was then required to file
its responsive experts on August 19, 2011. Id. And then the parties would file any rebuttal
experts on October 19, 2011. Id. The Order did not place any limitations on which experts or
types of experts were required to be disclosed and, with respect to the substance of the
information to be provided for each parties' respective experts, the expert disclosures were to
"consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Id.
On August 19, 2011, Grathol filed its Expert Witness Disclosure in which it identified
three expert witnesses who were expected to be called to testify at the trial of this matter, Dewitt
"Skip" Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Affidavit of Mary V. York, Ex. H
(Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosures). With respect to Mr. Sherwood's expert testimony,
Grathol stated that "[h]e will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be
provided to Plaintiff upon completion." York Aff., Ex.Hat 2. Despite the specific reference to
Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report, Grathol did not produced Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. 1
With respect to Grathol's expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol
merely outlined in broad terms the general subject matter of the anticipated testimony. Grathol's
disclosures did not provide any of the "opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefore," as required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it "consist

1 On

September 19, 2011, counsel for Grathol faxed a letter to ITD's counsel in which it stated
that it was belatedly producing Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. The fax did not contain a copy
of the appraisal report or the supplement discovery responses being provided by Grathol. ITD
just received Grathol's discovery responses, which included a copy of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal
report on September 21, 2011.
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR,
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of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)," as required
by the Court's Pretrial Order. Grathol's expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Reeslund stated
that:
Mr. Reeslund will give opmion testimony as to the
development plans for the Property, testimony as to its potential
uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations
on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land
use planning/entitlement, construction planning activities; efforts
and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and
development of the Property; planning and design work associated
with the property; and the effects of the condemnation on the
development of the remaining property.
York Aff. ,, 11-18, Ex. H. Grathol's expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Johnson is similar,
stating that:
Mr. Johnson will give opm1on testimony as to the
acquisition, ownership and development plans for the Property,
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the
condemnation), the values of the Property remaining after
condemnation and before and after construction and
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses
associated with the purchase, holding and development of the
Property; planning and design work associated with the property;
marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation;
and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property.
York Aff., Ex. H. Grathol failed to provide any actual opinions to be offered by either expert;
there is no detail as to the experts' value opinions, condemnation impact opinions, or
condemnation damages opinions. Furthermore, there is no information about the basis, reasons
or support for the experts' opinions.
Upon receiving Grathol's expert disclosures, on August 24, 2011, counsel for ITD
notified Grathol's counsel that its expert disclosures were deficient in that they did not comply
with the Court's Pretrial Order, the disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, or with ITD's discovery requests and the corresponding supplementation
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requirements of the Rules. York Aff., Ex. I (August 24, 2011 Letter from counsel for ITD to
counsel for Grathol). ITD's August 24th letter requested that Grathol provide full and complete
disclosures. Id
Counsel for Grathol responded to ITD's August 24th letter by stating that it believed that
the disclosures did in fact comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and contained all of the
information required by Rule 26(b)(4). York Aff., Ex. J (August 29, 2011 Letter from counsel
for Grathol to counsel for ITD). While not expressly stating the underlying reasoning behind its
refusal to provide the requested opinions and supporting information in its August 29th letter,
Grathol's assertion that its disclosure complied with the Court's Pretrial Order and Rule 26(b)(4)
is based upon its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are "actor-viewer" experts and
are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. In support of its assertion, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, but provided no argument or analysis to support its cited reference. Grathol
had made a similar statement in its original responses to ITD's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents. York Aff., Ex. D (Grathol's Ans. and Resp. to Plfs First
Set oflnterrogs. and Req. for Prod. of Doc.) at 5-6. ITD's Interrogatory and Grathol's Answer
stated the following:

Interrogatory No. 2:
For each expert witness identified in
response to Interrogatory No. 1, please provide the subject matter
upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the
reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions,
the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and
data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANSWER:
Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion
testimony in this matter, including testimony concerning the plan,
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design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs project across
or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony
concerning valuation of the property. The witnesses offering
opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the following:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geoff Reeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)

Mark Johnson

(8)

Jeff Bond

(9)

Donald Smock

(10)

Paul Daugharty

(11)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger

As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover
the testimony of such persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114
(West 1995).
(1)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA

(2)

Ed Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the
Answers to these Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have
been completed. Therefore, the remainder of the information
requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when
formal appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above
Interrogatory will be contained within those appraisal reports.

Id
On September 9, 2011, counsel for ITD held a conference call with counsel for Grathol
as a formal "meet and confer" conference on the issue of Grathol' s deficient expert disclosure, as
well as other discovery matters. York Aff., at ,, 18-19. During the conference, counsel for ITD
made reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with counsel for Grathol on the issue of Grathol' s
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deficient expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. Id. At the close of conference,
counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the expert issues the following week. Id.
Grathol's counsel did not respond within the stated time frame, but a week later, on
September 19, 2011, Grathol' s counsel sent a letter again refusing to disclose the expert opinions
of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. York Aff., at~ 19 and Ex. M. In its September 19th letter,
Grathol once again reiterated its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were "actorviewer" experts and therefore not subject to the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order or
Rule 26(b)(4). Id. Notably, Grathol's letter did not explain why it was unable to provide the
experts' opinions and supporting information in response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2, which
asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons
therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions,
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based." See, id.
ITD's counsel responded on September 20, 2011 and stated its express disagreement with
Grathol's arguments and conclusions. York Aff., Ex. N. The September 20th letter from ITD's
counsel also notified Grathol that it would be filing a motion to exclude the testimony of Mr.
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson testimony or, alternatively, to compel the disclosure of their opinions
and supporting information. Id.

Ill.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Testimony of Grathol's Experts Should be Excluded Because Grathol
Has Failed to Comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, and ITD's Discovery Requests.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow ITD to obtain "discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
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other party[.]" Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). With respect to expert witnesses, Rule 26(b)(4)
provides that a party may discover, by interrogatory and/or deposition, a complete statement of
the opposing party's expert's opinions and the reasons for those opinions. Id. at 26(b)(4).
The exclusion of evidence is the recognized sanction for a party's failure to comply with
Rule 26, including the duty to seasonably supplement responses to discovery requests.
"Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion of the proffered
evidence." Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 90, 813 P.2d 897, 900 (1991).
Additionally, courts have broad authority to compel obedience with its orders and may impose
sanctions upon a party who fails to comply with its orders, including a party who fails to serve
timely responses to discovery. Idaho Code§ 1-1603(4); Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135
Idaho 495,499, 20 P.3d 679,683 (2000); Ashby v. Western Council, Lumber Production and
Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686, 791 P.2d 435,436 (1990). See also Idaho R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2)(B) (providing that where a party fails to obey an order of the Court to provide
discovery, the Court may enter an order "refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence."). "Moreover, while trial courts are given broad discretion in ruling on
pretrial discovery matters, reversible error has been found in allowing testimony where Rule 26
has not been complied with." Radmer, 120 Idaho at 90, 813 P.2d at 900 (citing Smith v. Ford
Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1980)).

In the present case, in addition to the requirements imposed by Rule 26(b)(4), the Court's
Pretrial Order required that expert disclosures "shall consist of at least the information required
to be disclosed pursuant to LR. C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Pretrial Order, at 2. The Order made no

exception for alleged "actor-viewer" experts. Further, ITD propounded discovery requests on
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Grathol in which it sought "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert
and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for
the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as well as all
information referenced in and required by Ruie 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Ruies of Civii
Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A, Interrogatory No. 2.
Grathol failed to comply with or satisfy the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order
and Rule 26(b)(4) because it did not include a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and Mr.
Johnson's expert opinions or the reasons for those opinions in its expert disclosures. Moreover,
Grathol failed to respond to ITD's discovery requests and provide a complete statement of these
experts' opinions and the underlying substance, reasons and basis for those opinions. See York
Aff., Exs. H through M, and 1117-19. Accordingly, the recognized sanction for Grathol's
disregard of the Court's Order and the discovery requirements of Rule 26 is to exclude the
testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson.

B.

The Expert Testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Fall Directly
Within the Scope of Rule 26(b)(4) and Should Have Been Disclosed In
Accordance with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Requirements of
Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure.

Grathol's explanation of why it refuses to produce the expert opinions of Mr. Reeslund
and Mr. Johnson is that these experts "are not 'expert witnesses' in the traditional sense of a Rule
26(b)(A)(i) disclosure." York Aff., Ex. M. According to Grathol, these individuals "fall within
the 'actor/viewer exception'" of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because their
testimony is based upon knowledge and information not acquired in preparation for litigation and
they are "actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject matter of this
litigation." Id In support of its argument, Grathol cites to the Committee Notes of the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b)(4).
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Grathol' s argument has no merit because Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are identified as
experts who will be offering expert testimony that was obtained or created in anticipation of
litigation. Specifically, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson have both been identified as offering
expert testimony on the very issues reiating to the present condemnation action. Grathoi
identified Mr. Reeslund as providing expert testimony on issue of the value of the subject
property before and after the condemnation, the limitations on uses of the remaining property
after the condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the development of the

remaining property. York Aff., Ex. H. Similarly, Mr. Johnson is identified as providing expert
testimony as to ITD's acquisition of a portion of the subject property, the value of the property
before and after the condemnation, the values of the Property remaining after condemnation and
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities, marketing efforts
of the property prior to and after condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the
remaining Property. Id.
Each of these identified areas of expert testimony are directly related to and, in fact, arise
out of or in direct response to the current lawsuit. An opinion about this condemnation action
could not have been formed in the absence of this condemnation action. Such opinions
necessarily arise from and are directly related to this suit. Therefore, Grathol cannot sustain its
claim that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson created their opinions prior to or independent of this
action. The identified subject areas of expert testimony for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson fall
directly within the bounds of Rule 26(b)(4) and should have been disclosed by Grathol on
August 19, 2011. Grathol's failure to do so violated the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the testimony should be excluded.
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C.

Grathol's Suggested Justification for Its Refusal to Produce the Expert
Opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Is Contrary to Idaho Law.

Grathol's contention that it is not required to disclose the expert opinions of Mr.
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson expert fails under Idaho law, which requires Mr. Reeslund's and Mr.
Johnson's expert opinions to be disclosed under Idaho's discovery rules. In fact, the assertions
made by Grathol are nearly identical to those that were rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in

Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2002).
In Clark, the district court excluded the testimony of a treating physician who was not
timely disclosed. Id. at 344, 48 P .3d at 673. On appeal, plaintiff argued that he was not required
to produce the expert's opinions because the expert's opinions and knowledge were not acquired
or developed in anticipation of litigation and therefore were not subject to the requirements of
Rule 26(b)(4). Id. at 345, 48 P.3d at 674. The Court of Appeals soundly rejected plaintiffs
argument, stating that "although Clark is correct that a treating physician's knowledge that was
not developed for purposes oflitigation is not subject to Rule 26(b)(4), the conclusion that he
then draws-that such testimony is entirely sheltered from discovery-draws no support from
the language of the rule or the remaining discovery rules." Id. The Court of Appeals quoted the
federal decision of Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Miss. 1986) and its statement that
"[t]here is simply no reason to hold that non-26(b)(4) trial experts may not be discovered by way
of the same interrogatories as 26(b)(4) trial experts." Id. at 346, 48 P.3d at 675 (quoting Lee v.

Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104, 108 (N.D. Miss. 1986)). According to the Lee decision, "[t]his result
flows from precedent as well as logic and common sense." Id.
The Court of Appeals in Clark concluded that Rule 26(b)(4) "provides no justification for
[plaintiffs] failure to respond to [defendant's] interrogatories seeking disclosure of all of
[plaintiffs treating physician's] opinions that [plaintiff] wished to present at trial." Id. And it
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upheld the exclusion of the treating physician's testimony as not being timely produced and for
plaintiffs failure to seasonably supplement its responses to discovery requests as required by
Rule 26(e)(4). Id. at 347, 48 P.3d at 676.
Applying Clark to the present case, the same result should follow. While ITD does not
concede that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are not subject to Rule 26(b)(4) and the Court's
Pretrial Order, the ruling in Clark makes clear that Grathol is still subject to ITD's discovery
requests, which specifically asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by
the expert and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and
reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as
well as all information referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A., Interrogatory No. 2.
Grathol has offered no explanation as to why it continues to refuse to answer ITD's
discovery requests or why it has failed to comply with Rule 26(e)(4) and supplement its initial
responses that failed to provide the requested information. Indeed, given that Grathol states that
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are prepared to testify at deposition, at which time ITD can ask
these experts about their opinions, Grathol obviously knows these opinions and is required under
Rule 26(e)(4) to supplement its responses and provide that information. Grathol has refused to
answer ITD's discovery and has refused to comply with Idaho's discovery rules, including the
rule requiring Grathol to supplement its discovery responses.
Grathol' s continued and strenuous efforts to hide the opinions of its experts violates the
very purpose of the discovery rules and their efforts should not be rewarded. Like the court in

Clark, the Court should exclude the testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson for Grathol's
failure to comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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D.

Even if Grathol's Actor-Viewer Argument is Accepted and the Federal Rules
are Applied, Grathol Would Still be Required to Disclose the Opinions of
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson.

In support of its argument that it is not required to provide the expert opinions of
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol cites to the Notes of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26, Subdivision (b)(4). The Committee Notes referenced by Grathol state that "[i]t should be
noted that the subdivision [Rule 26(b)(4)] does not address itself to the expert whose information
was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with
respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit." See
Comments to 1970 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(4).
The federal rule that formed the context for the Committee Notes differs from Idaho Rule
26 in that the federal rule distinguishes between those experts who are required to produce a
report and those who are not. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(b) with Idaho R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4). Under the federal version of the rule, an expert is required to produce a report that
contains a complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for the opinions "if the
witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one
whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony." Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(b). However, even if an expert, such as an actor-viewer expert, is not required to
produce a report, he is still required to disclose the subject matter on which the witness is
expected to present evidence and "a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is
expected to testify." Id.; Nagle v. Mink, 2011 WL 3861435, *2-3 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2011)
(experts not required to disclose reports under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) are required to disclose
"(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, 703 or 705 and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is
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expected to testify."). Additionally, if that expert's opinion testimony goes beyond the facts
known to him as an actor-viewer, the expert is then required to comply with the disclosure
requirements of Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B). See e.g., Zarecki v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
9i4 F.Supp. i566, i573 (N.D. Iil. 1966) (concluding that the substance of expert's testimony
went beyond personal observations and experience and therefore should have been disclosed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule); Wreath
v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that to once an testifying

physician develops additional specific opinion testimony beyond the facts made known to him
during the course of care and treatment of the patient, he becomes subject to the provisions of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule).
The actor-viewer expert may be excused under Federal Rule 26 from preparing a formal
report. However, no rule excuses them from being required to disclose opinions under Rule 26,
court scheduling orders, or interrogatories and requests for production. Thus, if one accepts
Grathol's argument, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson may not be required to prepare a report
under the Federal Rules, they are certainly required to disclose a "summary of the facts and
opinions" to which they would testify at trial. And to the extent their testimony went beyond the
facts known to them as an actor-viewer, then Grathol would be required to comply with the
additional requirements of Federal Rule 26(b )(2)(B).

E.

The Court's Pretrial Order does not Excuse Any Particular Type of Expert
from Disclosure.

The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures,
and it does not excuse any particular type of expert from the requirements of the Order. Pretrial
Order, at ,-r 2. The Court's Order specifically requires that Defendants "shall disclose all experts
to be called at trial" no later than 150 days before trial. Id (emphasis added). The Order makes
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no qualification, limitation or exception to the type of experts that are required to be disclosed.

Id. With respect to the information that must be disclosed, the Order states that "such disclosure
shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)."
Id. (emphasis added). Grathol should be required to comply with the provisions of the Order.
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were identified as experts and they have been disclosed
by Grathol as individuals who will be offering expert opinion testimony at trial. York Aff.,
Ex. H. As the Court well knows, witnesses are limited to testifying as to facts within their
personal knowledge. Under certain circumstances, a witness may go beyond that and testify as
to opinions they have formed on matters relevant to the case. To offer these opinions, the
witness must qualify as an expert based on their specialized training, education, or experience.
Here, as in most cases, and in accordance with Rule 26, the Court's Pretrial Order requires all
experts to disclose all opinions and the basis of those opinions by certain specified dates. The
Court's Order does not exempt any experts of any kind from this requirement.
Moreover, to the extent that Grathol contends that these individuals are experts whose
opinions were not developed in anticipation of litigation, their opinions and the basis therefore
must have already been formed prior to the commencement of this case. In that case, Grathol
should have immediately disclosed Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's opinions in response to
ITD's discovery in April. At a minimum, Grathol was under a duty to supplement its discovery
under Rule 26(e)(4) long before now. Grathol's failure to do so is not supportable or justified
and should result in the exclusion of their testimony.
F.

ITD Will Be Prejudiced by Grathol's Failure to Disclose Its Experts'
Opinions and Supporting Information.

Grathol refusal to provide expert opinions and supporting information results in
substantial unfair prejudice to ITD. Without sufficient disclosures, ITD cannot determine what
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rebuttal experts it will need at trial. ITD cannot prepare and serve its rebuttal opinions in
response to the opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson because Grathol has not produced any
substantive information about these experts' opinions or the basis for them. ITD has no
information about their opinion as to either the before or after value of the property, what
opinions they are going to offer as to the limitations on the use of the subject property after the
condemnation, or their conclusions as to the effects of the condemnation on the development of
the property. In short, ITD has nothing to rebut because Grathol has refused to provide any
opinions from these experts.
Additionally, ITD is not able to adequately prepare for the depositions of these experts
without an undue and unnecessary expenditure of time and expense. ITD should not have to, nor
is it required to, go into an expert deposition without an adequate disclosure of the experts'
opinions and the reasons and basis for them. The Rules have been structured to require complete
disclosures of an expert's opinions to prevent such inequities. As stated by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Clark v. Klein,
In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a
prohibition against discovery of information held by expert
witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that discovery has
been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert
witness requires advance preparation.... Similarly, effective
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the
narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery
normally produces are frustrated.

Id., 137 Idaho 154, 157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes,
Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P.). "The purpose of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient
pretrial fact gathering." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). "It
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follows, therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to encourage or reward those whose
conduct is inconsistent with that purpose." Id.
Additionally, ITD is prejudiced by Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions
because ITD wiil be unable to evaluate the opinions and properly prepare a fair and appropriate
pretrial offer as required by Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d
1067 (1987) and succeeding cases. Under Acarrequi, ITD as the condemnor is required to make
a timely pretrial offer of settlement of at least 90% of the ultimate jury verdict and no later than
90 days before trial. Id. at 876-78, 673 P.2d at 1070-72. This offer serves as the basis for
determining awards of costs and attorney fees in condemnation actions. In cases involving large
sums, such as the present case, the amount of costs and fees can be considerable. ITD is simply
unable to assess these witnesses' opinions as to the fair market value of the property, before or
after the condemnation, or their opinions on damages suffered by the remaining property after
the condemnation. Consequently, ITD is unable to assess or determine an appropriate offer of
settlement under Acarrequi, due solely to Grathol's unjustified refusal to disclose the opinions of
individuals who will offer expert testimony at trial.
The prejudice faced by ITD has been addressed by Idaho appellate courts. In the case of

Clark v. Raty, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he potential for prejudice to the
opposing party from the admission of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is particularly
acute with respect to expert testimony." Clark, 137 Idaho at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. The Idaho
Supreme Court echoed this concern when it noted that in cases involving expert witnesses,
advance preparation is necessary and pretrial discovery is fundamental. Klein, 137 Idaho 154,
157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002). Because of Grathol's failure to disclose its experts'
opinions or the underlying basis for the opinions, in compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order,
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Rule 26(b)(4), and ITD's discovery requests, ITD is unable to adequately prepare its case for
trial. Accordingly, the expert testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson should be excluded.
This sanction is particularly appropriate given Grathol's repeated willful failure and refusal to
provide any of the opinions from these experts, as required by the Court's Pretrial Order and the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

G.

In the Alternative, ITD Requests that the Court Compel Full Disclosure of
Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's Expert Opinions and the Supporting
Information and Modify the Pretrial Order.

Alternatively, if the expert testimony of these individuals is not excluded, ITD requests
that the opinions and basis for those opinions be compelled to be disclosed, and that the Court's
scheduling order be modified to extend ITD' s deadline to serve rebuttal reports and to continue
the trial of this matter in order to avoid prejudice to ITD. The extension of time and continuance
of the trial date is necessary to allow time for ITD to receive the expert opinions and supporting
information of Grathol' s experts, to prepare for the expert depositions, and to complete its own
expert rebuttal reports. The additional time is also needed to afford ITD a fair opportunity to
present a reasonable Acarrequi offer to Grathol. This remedy is also needed to provide ITD with
a fair opportunity to for trial.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Grathol has identified expert witnesses who will testify and offer opinions at trial, but it
has refused to provide the opinions or the basis for the opinions-despite the Court's Pretrial
Order, the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and ITD's outstanding discovery
requests. Without the disclosure of these experts' opinions, ITD will be substantially and
unfairly prejudiced. Accordingly, the testimony by these experts should be excluded at trial. In
the alternative, Grathol should be compelled to disclose the opinions of their experts and the
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basis for them, and the trial should be vacated and the Pretrial Order should be amended to give
ITD adequate time to identify and disclose rebuttal experts.
ITD further requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of
Grathol's failure to compiy with the Court's Pretrial Order and to answer its discovery requests.
DATED this 21st day of September, 2011.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

MARY V. YORK, first being duly sworn on oath, states and affirms as follows:
1.

I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and a1n

duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.
2.

I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho

Transportation Board ("ITD") in this matter, and I make this affidavit in support ofITD's
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures.
3.

On February 2, 2011, ITD served its First Set oflnterrogatories and Requests for

Production to Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol"). Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, Grathol' s deadline for responding to ITD' s discovery was March 7, 2011.
Attached as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of ITD's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production.
4.

With respect to expert witnesses, ITD propounded the following discovery

request:

interrogatory No. 2:

For each expert witness identified in
response to Interrogatory No. 1, please provide the subject matter
upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the
reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions,
the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and
data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ex. A at 8.
5.

Grathol failed to produce its responses to ITD's discovery requests. On

March 22, 2011, Grathol requested an extension of time. ITD granted Grathol's request and
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gave it until April 5, 2011 to respond to the discovery requests. Attached as "Exhibit B" is a true
and correct copy of an email correspondence between counsel for ITD and counsel for Grathol.
6.

Grathol failed to meet the April 5th deadline. In response, counsel for ITD sought

to "meet and confer" with counsel for Grathol, both by phone and in writing, in Oider to obtain
Grathol's responses to the outstanding discovery. ITD informed Grathol that it needed to
produce its responses to ITD's discovery requests by April 5, 2011, otherwise ITD would file a
motion to compel the responses. Attached as "Exhibit C" is a true and correct copy of the
April 13,2011 correspondence from counsel for ITD to counsel for Grathol.
7.

On April 15, 2011, Grathol produced its answers and responses to ITD's

discovery requests. However, the requests were deficient and failed to adequately respond to
ITD's requests. Attached as "Exhibit D" is a true and correct copy of Grathol's Answers and
Responses to ITD's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. In
response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2 regarding Grathol's expert witnesses, Grathol responded
as follows:
ANSWER:
Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion
testimony in this matter, including testimony concerning the plan,
design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs project across
or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony
concerning valuation of the property. The witnesses offering
opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the following:

(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geoff Reeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)

Mark Johnson

(8)

Jeff Bond
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(9)

Donald Smock

(10) Paul Daugharty
(11) Brett Terrell
(12) Mike Winger
As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the
testimony of such persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes
of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 (West
1995).
(1)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA

(2)

Ed Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the
Answers to these Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have
been completed. Therefore, the remainder of the information
requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when
formal appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above
Interrogatory will be contained within those appraisal reports.
8.

In addition, Grathol stated in its discovery responses that it would make certain

documents available for review by ITD. To follow up on Grathol's statement, counsel for ITD
requested that Grathol copy the responsive documents and send them by mail for ITD's
counsel's review.
9.

Grathol provided the referenced documents by mail on May 16, 2011. Attached

as "Exhibit E" is a true and correct copy of the May 16, 2011 correspondence from counsel for
Grathol to counsel for ITD.
10.

Also on May 16, 2011, Grathol provided ITD with a supplemental response to

ITD' s discovery request. That response consisted of a single document. Attached as "Exhibit F"
is a true and correct copy of Grathol's Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
11.

On July 22, 2011, counsel for ITD notified Grathol's counsel of concerns

regarding the number of expert witnesses disclosed and how that disclosure was inconsistent
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with representations made to the Court regarding the number of experts Grathol intended to call
at trial. The letter also pointed out the continued deficiencies in Grathol's discovery responses
and identified the specific responses that were inadequate and failed to properly respond to ITD's
requests. Attached as "Exhibit G" is a true and correct copy of the July 22, 2011 correspondence
from counsel for ITD to counsel for Grathol.
12.

On August 19, 2011, ITD received Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosures. In its

disclosures, Grathol stated that its expert witness, Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood would "testify in
accordance with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon completion."
Expert Witness Disclosure at 2. Yet, Grathol failed to produce any appraisal report by
Mr. Sherwood. Attached as "Exhibit H" is a true and correct copy of the Grathol' s Expert
Witness Disclosure.
13.

In its Expert Witness Disclosure, Grathol also identified two additional expert

witnesses, Geoffrey B. Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Grathol's disclosures consisted of a general
listing of the subject matters upon which these experts would be testifying. They failed to
disclose any "statement of the opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore," as
required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Grathol failed to
disclose a "statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the
substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying
facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information referenced in and
required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure," as requested in ITD's
discovery. See ITD's First Set of Discovery Requests at Ex. A, supra.
14.

Counsel for ITD sought to "meet and confer" with Grathol on the deficiencies in

its expert disclosures in a letter dated August 24, 2011. Attached as "Exhibit I" is a true and
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correct copy of the August 24, 2011 correspondence from counsel for ITD to counsel for
Grathol.
15.

Grathol's response to the discovery deficiencies identified by ITD is a letter dated

August 29, 2011. Attached as "Exhibit J" is a true a.11d correct copy of the August 29, 2011
correspondence from counsel for Grathol to counsel for ITD.
16.

On September 1, 2011, in yet another attempt to obtain the opinions of Grathol' s

experts, ITD noticed the depositions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, two of the experts
identified by Grathol. ITD set the depositions in order to obtain information regarding their
experts opinions and the basis for their opinions in sufficient time before ITD's deadline for its
rebuttal experts, which is set for October 19, 2011. Attached as "Exhibit K" is a true and correct
copy of the September 1, 2011 correspondence from counsel for ITD to counsel for Grathol.
17.

On September 6, 2011, counsel for Grathol informed counsel for ITD that

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund would not be available for depositions on September 12 or 13.
Instead counsel for Grathol proposed additional dates for the depositions, which were either too
close to ITD's deadline for rebuttal witnesses or well after the deadline. Attached as "Exhibit L"
is a true and correct copy of the September 6, 2011 correspondence received from counsel for
Grathol.
18.

Additionally, the deposition dates proposed by Grathol were unworkable because

of Grathol' s insistence on withholding its expert opinions and would not produce the opinions
prior to the depositions. On September 9, 2011, a conference call was held with counsel for
Grathol in order to "meet and confer" on the deficiencies in Grathol' s expert disclosures and on
the discovery issues identified in ITD's July 22, 2011 letter (Ex. G). Additionally, discussions
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were had regarding the depositions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson and counsel for ITD
requested that the experts' opinions be produced by Grathol in advance of the depositions.
19.

During the call, counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the issues

raised during the call and that he would get back to me the following week. Counsel for Grathol
did not respond during that next week.
20.

On September 19, 2011, counsel for Grathol once again refused to disclose the

expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. Attached as "Exhibit M" is a true and correct
copy of the September 19, 2011 correspondence received from counsel for Grathol.
21.

On September 20, 2011, counsel for ITD responded to Grathol's September 19th

letter and its refusal to disclose its expert opinions and notified counsel that ITD would be filing
its motion to exclude and motion to compel. Attached as "Exhibit N" is a true and correct copy
of the September 20, 2011 correspondence sent to counsel for Grathol.
22.

Counsel has made reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with opposing counsel

on the issue of Grathol' s expert disclosures and despite those efforts, no agreement could be
reached.
Dated this 21st day of September, 2011.

N~tary Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires

IJ.5--zq_. Zo II/
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D
D
D
~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 664-5884
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5235003_2.DOC
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LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-886.9
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVl0-10095

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL

HJ GRATIIOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board by and through their attorneys of
record and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby serves its First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Defendant HJ Grathol and requests
Defendant to answer all interrogatories and produce all documents for inspection and/or copying,
in accordance with the Instructions and Definitions set forth below within thirty (30) days from
the date of service of this discovery, unless otherwise provided by Court order or the parties'
mutual agreement.

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING INTERROGATORIES
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the interrogatories set forth
below are. to be answered within thirty (30) days of service~ fully and separately in writing, tmder
oath, and in accordance with the above-cited rules. When responding in written form to any
interrogatory, please give the number of the interrogatory before providing the specific response.
Answers to these interrogatories must include not only information in your personal
knowledge and possession, but also any and all information available to you, including
information in the possession of any of your agents, attorneys, or employees. If you cannot
answer any of the following Interrogatories in full, a_ft:er exercising due diligence to secure the
information to do so, so state, and answer to the extent possible, specifying your inability to
answer the remainder and stating whatever information or knowledge you have concerning the
tmanswered portions. If a claim of privilege is made as to any such information, you must
specify the basis for the claim of privilege and describe the information claimed to be privileged.

If any document identified in an answer to an interrogatory was, but is no longer in your
possession, custody or control, or was known to you but is no longer in existence, describe what
disposition was made of it or what became of it. No document requested to be identified or
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produced herein can be destroyed or disposed of by virtue of a record retention program or for
any other reason.
The interrogatories are intended to be continuing in nature and to require the addition of
supplemental information and documents in the future to the fullest extent provided by Rule
26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the interrogatories, you
acquire any information respective thereto, you are requested to file and serve supplemental
responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This
request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(e).
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, you are requested, within
thirty (30) days of the date this document was served upon you, to present for inspection and

copying the documents and things requested below at the offices of Holland & Hart LLP, Suite
1400, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 S. Capitol Blvd., Boise, Idaho. As an alternative to producing
documents for inspection and copying, accurate, legible and complete copies of requested
documents may be attached to your answers and responses to t.liese discovery requests and
served within the same time period. Please clearly identify the request for production to which
each document or group of documents you provide is responsive.
Your response must include and be based not only on documents and things in your
personal possession, but also on any and all documents and things available to you, including
those in the possession of any of your agents, representatives, attorneys, or employees. If any
document requested to be identified in the following interrogatories, or asked to be produced in
the requests for production, was but no longer is in your possession or subject to your control, or
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in existence, state whether it is (1) missing or lost, (2) has been destroyed, (3) has been
transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily, to others, or (4) otherwise disposed of; and in each
instance, please explain the circumstances surrounding the authorization of such disposition
thereof, and state the date or approximate date thereof.
With respect to each document as herein denied which is required to be identified by
these interrogatories or produced in the requests for production and which you presently contend
you are not required to disclose because of any alleged "privilege" (which you are not presently
prepared to waive), in lieu of the document identification called for above, please identify each
such "privileged" document as follows: (1) give the date of each such document; (2) identify
each individual who was present when it was prepared; (3) identify each individual to whom a
copy was sent; (4) identify each individual who has seen it; (5) identify each individual who has
custody of it; (6) identify each and every document which refers to, discusses, analyzes or
comments upon it, in whole or in part, or which contain any or all of its contents; and (7) state
the nature of the privilege asserted, (i.e., attorney-client, work-product, etc.).
The document requests set forth below are intended to be continuing in nature and to
require the addition of supplemental information and documents in the future to llie follest extent
provided by Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the
requests for documents, you acquire any information respective thereto, file and serve
supplemental responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. This request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule
of Civil Proc·edure 26(e).
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DEFINITIONS
The following definitions shall apply to these discovery requests:
1.

"Plaintiff' means the above-named Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board

("Board").
2.

"Defendant" means the above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, a California general

partnership, its representatives, employees, agents, or other person(s) acting for or on behalf of
HJ Grathol.

3.

"You," "your," or "yours," means the above.-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, its

representatives, employees, agents, or other person(s) acting for or on behalf of HJ Grathol

4.

"Subject Property'' means the property owned by Defendant which is the subject of the

present condemnation action. The "Subject Property" is more completely described in Plaintiff's
Complaint.
5.

"Identify" when used with respect to a natural person requires that you provide the

following information with respect to the person:

6.

a.

Full name;

b.

Last known business address;

c.

Last known residence address;

d.

Last known business telephone number;

e.

Last known home telephone number and

f.

Name of employer or business with whom the person was associated and
the person's title and position at the time relevant to the identification.

"Identify" when used with respect to a person that is not a natural person means, to the

extent applicable, to provide the same information required as though the entity were a natural
person [see Definition 5(a) through S(f) above], and also provide the additional information
regarding a description of the nature of the entity (e.g., partnership, corporation, limited liability
company, etc.).
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7.

"Identify" when used with respect to a document, item or thing means to provide the

following information relating to such document, item or thing:

8.

a.

A general description thereof;

b.

Date it was written or created;

c.

Name and present or last known address of the person or persons who
wrote or created it;

d.

Name and present or last known address of the person to whom it was
sent;

e.

Name and present address of the custodian thereof; and

f.

Whether you have a copy; duplicate, reproduction, photostat, photograph,
sample or exemplar thereof.

"Identify" when used with resp~ot to Appraisals and/or Appraisal Reports means to

provide the following information relating to such document, item or thing:

9.

a.

The name, address, and company of each appraiser;

b.

The date the appraiser was engaged and the date of each appraisal;

c.

The reason for the appraisal and who retained the appraiser to perform the
appraisal;

d.

The fair market value of the entire property;

e.

The fair market value of the property being taken for the public project;

f.

The amount of damages to the remainder property caused by the taking;

g.

The methodology for computing the fair market value of the entire
property, the property taken, and the damages to the remainde:r property;

h.

If a written appraisal report was made, the name and address of the
custodian of the report;

"Describe" shall mean to set forth all facts that exhaust your information, knowledge, and

belief with respect to the subject matter of the discovery request.
10.

"Document" or "documents" shall mean the original, all copies and drafts of papers and

writings of every kind, description ai.-id form, and all mechanical, magnetic media, and electronic
recordings, records, writings and data of every kind, description and form, and all photographs of
every kind, and including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following:
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correspondence, notes, e-mails, memoranda, reports, notebooks, binders, drawings, studies,
analyses, drafts, diaries, intra- or inter-office communications, memoranda, reports, canceled
checks, minutes, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, telegrams, typewritten and handwritten notes,
letters, telegrams, instructions, work assignments, messages (including reports, notes and
memoranda of telephone conversations and conferences), telephone statements, calendar and
diary entries, desk calendars, appointment books, job or transaction files, books of account,
ledgers, bank statements, promissory notes, invoices, charge slips, working papers, lab books,
lab notes, lab journals or notebooks, evaluation or appraisal reports, pleadings, transcripts of
testimony or other docwnents filed or prepared in connection with any court or agency or other
proceeding, deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts, agreements, assignments, instrwnents,
charges, opinions, official statements, prospectuses, appraisals, feasibility studies, trusts, releases
of claims, charters, certificates, licenses, leases, invoices, computer printouts or programs,
summaries, audio, video or sound recordings, cassette tapes, video recorded, electronic or laser
recorded, or photographed information. Documents are to be taken as including all attachments,
enclosures and other documents that are attached to, relate to or refer to such documents.
The above definition of "Docun1ent" or ''Documents" shall also faclude any
"Electronically Stored Information."
11.

"Electronically Stored Information;' means information made, maintained, retained,

stored, or archived by computer or electronic means in any medium, including but not limited to
word processing documents, email, email attachments, databases, spreadsheets, writings,
drawings, graphs, photographs, sound recordings, images, data, and data compilations.
Electronically Stored Information shall include prior versions or drafts of information, as defined
above, as well as all attachments, and shall include information stored on personal digital
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assistants, cell phones, smart phones, Blackberries, personal laptop computers, hard drives,
portable hard drives, and other similar devices.
12.

The words "relate to" or "relating to" shall be deemed to mean and include the following

terms: regards, describes, involves, compares, correlates, mentions, connected to, refers to,
pertains to, contradicts, or compromises.
13.

The words "and" and "and/or'' and "or" shall each he deemed to refer to both their

conjunctive and disjunctive meanings, being construed as necessary to bring within the scope of
the discovery request all information and documents which would otherwise be construed as
being outside the request. ·
14.

The word "any" shall mean "each and every'' and "all" as well as "any one," and "all"

shall mean "any and all."
15.

The term "date of take" shall mean November 19, 2010, the date the initial Complaint

and Summons in this matter was filed.

INTERROGATORIES
Interrov;atorv No. 1:

Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or

expert witness at t.lie trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is
expected to testify.

Interrogatory No. 2:

For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory

No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the
substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying
facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information referenced in and
required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Interrogatory No. 3:

(Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just

compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to
which you believe Defendant is entitled. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which may
or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change.
Interrogatory No. 4:

(Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every

fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of just
compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taking of a portion the Subject
Property. Include in.your answer each and every fact and document that describes, shows, or
evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is entitled.
Interrogatory No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value-Before Take) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the taking of a
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein.
Interrogatory No. 6: (Opinion of fair market value -After Take) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a portion
oft.he Subject Property as oft.lie "date of take" as t.11at term is defined herein.
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses'
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from the
taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is ''yes", describe the
amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and all facts
and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied upon, as a
basis for that opinion.
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Interrogatory No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for the
real property, the buildings, the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property.
Include in your answer any all special terms or conditions related to your purchase of the Subject
Property.

Interrogatory No. 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any
portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by
you or on yom: behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined above)
each appraisal.

Interrogatory No.10: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in
the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so,
please state the following:
a The amount of annual income received;

b. Every source of income for each year;
c. The amount received each year from each source of income.

Interrogatory No. ll: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please.state whether in
your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project
enhancement or project influence (also referred to as project blight), and if so, please provide a
full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert(s) reached his
or her conclusion and all facts, information and data used or relied upon to support t.1-iat
conclusion.
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Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or
entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien,
adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify (as defined
above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest.

Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the
"date of take" or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any third
party applied to the applic~ble planning and zoning department for the development or
improvement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction permit
on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify. (as defined above) each and every
application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or employed by
your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the Subject Property.

Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell.

Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Conta..miri..ation) As of the "date of take,'' were
you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and identify
the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or damage
occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, a.rid whether the
contamination or damage has been eradicated.
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Interrogatory No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any, to
Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identify of any and all officers, managers or
other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please also include any
involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications for zoning changes,
annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed improvements to the Subject
Property.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Request for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used,
referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above.
Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action, including Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4 )(A) experts.
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce. copies of all documents relied upon by
any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion
relating to the Subject Property.
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other document
that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited to, the appraisal
reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each appraiser or valuation
witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter.
Request for Production No. 5: For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to
call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all appraisal
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reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a ten-mile radius
of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5) years.
Request for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents, objects or

things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this
matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or other
documents. If final exhibits have not been completed, please attach drafts, if available.
Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which

relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis,
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that Defendant
intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the triai of this matter.
Request for Production No. 8: Please produce copies of all documents,

correspondence, and Electronically Stored Information created, produced, received or sent by
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property.
Request for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or

employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, includi..r1g but not limited
to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property (or any aspect or
portion thereof).
Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any and all documents,

correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and
any expert retained by you in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the ta.king of a portion of the
Subject Property by Plaintiff.
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Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents,
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and
Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property
by Plaintiff.

Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents,
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and
any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, (such as the City of Athol, Kootenai Cowity, and
the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject Property~ the
present lawsuit and/or the taking ofa portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. This document
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take"
and up to the present."

Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of
the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years.

Request for Production No.14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all
documents relatiflg to your purchase of the Subject Property.

Request for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental
agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration paid
for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document request
shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take" and up
to the present.

Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for Development or Improvement)
Please produce each and every application for development, improvement, rezoning, annexation,
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or construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during the period of five (5)
years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date.
Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all

pleadings, claims, or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements,
descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens, or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of the
''date of take," and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date.
Request for Production No. 18: (Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive

Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens, interests, claims, easements,
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and for
the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date.
Request for Production No. 19: (Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy of

each and every document relating in any way to environmental contamination, hazardous waste
contamination, water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or
petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years immediately
prior to the "date of take" up to the present date.
Reouest for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and

unrecorded surveys that have been performed upon the Subject Property, and, if more than one
survey has been performed, please produce the most recently performed recorded survey.
Request for Production No. 21: (Water, Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of

any and all documents related to any application to provide the Subject Property with water,
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the current
availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property.
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Request for Production No. 22: Please produce any and all documents and

correspondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the
development or development planning of the Subject Property.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2011.

Deputy Atta ey Ge '
Idaho Tr ' sportation Department
HOLLAND & HART LLP
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL - 16
160 of 1617

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

~

D
D
D
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Gratho!

4958313_1.00C
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From:

Doug Marfice [dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com]

Sent:

Tuesday, March 22, 2011 2:21 PM

To:

Mary York

Subject: RE: ITD v HJ Grathol
Mary;
Thank you for your courtesies. I will certainly have you the discovery by April 5 and will try to get it to you sooner.
I think we're on the same page now re: wood cutting/salvage operations. Sorry for the confusion on that. The
tenant who uses the property to stage, cut and store firewood (my understanding is that he brings in wood to cut
and doesn't harvest anything onsite) has been notified of the need to vacate by May 1. We don't anticipate any
problems there. The other (unrelated) individual (whose name escapes me at the moment) is simply a free-lance
logger looking to salvage merchantable timber. I think he's been contacting multiple property owners along 95. I
assumed that ITD would probably prefer to not have to deal with that part of the work itself, but since the property
is no longer our client's, I wanted to be sure it was ok to let this fellow go to work.

Douglas S. Marfice
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-5818 - phone
(208) 664-5884 - fax

www.ramsdenlyons.com
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are
not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly
prohibited. If you have received the e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.

From: Mary York [mailto:MYork@hollandhart.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 201112:19 PM
To: 'Doug Marfice'
Cc: Ted Tollefson
Subject: RE: ITD V HJ Grathol
Doug,
Thank you for the follow up. Our letter requested that you get us the discovery responses by March 25th. If that
is not going to work, can you get us the responses by April 5th.
On the salvage issue, I talked to Chris about the issue at the beginning of February and told him that ITD was
agreeable to permitting your client (or its agents) conduct salvage operations and/or wood cutting operations on
the property. I sent him an email on the issue on Feb. 7th, which I also cdd to you. That email, as well as his
email to me is below. When Chris raised the issue, I had originally thought that his reference to a "wood cutting
operation" meant the wood salvage operation that you raised during our negotiations for possession. With that
thought in mind, I had obtained approval from ITD for those operations to go forward. He then clarified that he
meant a wood cutting operation, as opposed to salvage operation. And again, ITD okayed that operation as well.
In addition to our emails, we also talked about the issue by phone on Feb. 11th where i reconfirmed that iTD did
not have a problem with either of these operations on the property.
BUT - the important caveat on these operations (as I noted in my email to Chris below) is that the operations may
continue only until May 1st - by which time all operations must cease and the property must be cleared. On May
2nd the property must be cleared and ITD must have an unobstructed right-of-way. I will reiterate that any
property, equipment, etc. that remains on the property as of May 2nd will become property of ITD and will be
· cleared.
Let me know if you have any questions.

3/23/2011
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Regards,
MVY

Mary V. York
Holland & Hart LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building
101 S. Capitol Blvd.
Boise, ID 83702
Phone(208)342-S000
Fax(208)343-8869
E-mail: myork@hollandhart.com

HOLLAND&HART...

#J

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message is confidential and may be privileged. If you believe that this email has been sent to you in

error, please reply to the sender that you received the message in error; then please delete this e-mail. Thank you.

Disclaimer of Electronic Transaction: This communication does not reflect an intention by the sender or the sender's client to conduct a
transaction or make any agreement by electronic means. Nothing contained herein shall constitute an electronic signature or a contract
under any law, rule or regulation applicable to electronic transactions.

Here is the prior email:

From: Mary York
Sent: Monday, February 07, 20111:04 PM
To: 'Chris Gabbert'
Cc: 'Shannon James'; 'Doug Marfice'; 'Tim Thomas'
Subject: RE: ITD v. Grathol
Chris,
I followed up with my client and was advised that they will permit the use of the property by the woodcutting
operation you reference below until May 1, 2011. On May 2nd, the operations will need to be terminated and
removed from the property. ITD needs to have a clear right-of-way by that date. Any property, equipment, etc.
remaining on the property as of May 2nd will become the property of ITD.
Next, in response to your proposed stipulation, the language looks good except we need to have included in the
stipulation the requirement that the written undertaking be "executed by two (2) or more sufficient sureties" and
that they will be bound to ITD for the payment of the sums to the extent that the amount withdrawn exceeds the
amount of the final award. (IC§ 7-721 (7)). I can make the changes from this end if you prefer.
And finally, I've attached a proposed stipulation for scheduling order for your review. Please let me know if it
looks acceptable, and if so, please sign and return and I can coordinate filing the stipulation.
Please feel free to call if you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues in more detail.
Regards,

MVY
Mary V. York
Holland & Hart LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building
101 s. Capitol Blvd.
Boise, ID 83702
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869
E-mail: myork@hollandhart.com
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error, please reply to the sender that you received the message in error; then please delete this e-mail. Thank you.

Disclaimer of Electronic Transaction: This communication does not reflect an intention by the sender or the sender's client to conduct a
transaction or make any agreement by electronic means. Nothing contained herein shall constitute an electronic signature or a contract
under any law, rule or regulation applicable to electronic transactions.

From: Chris Gabbert [mailto:cgabbert@ramsdenlyons.com]

Sent: Friday, February 04, 201110:56 AM
To: Mary York

Cc: Shannon James; Doug Marfice

Subject: ITD v. Grathol

Dear Mary,
In follow up to our telephone conversation last week, attached please find a draft stipulation for
release of the funds to be deposited with the Court. You indicated that ITD will be depositing the funds
directly with the Court, per the order and is willing to stipulate to the withdrawal. Please review this
draft stipulation and let me know if it is acceptable.
Additionally, have you received a response from your client as to the use of the property by the
woodcutting operation after possession is taken?
Sincerely,
Christopher D. Gabbert
Attorney
Ramsden&· Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
www.ramsdenlyons.com
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, which is
confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly prohibited. If
you have received this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the
original message.

From: Doug Marfice [mailto:dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com]

Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 201111:12 AM
To: Mary York

Subject: ITD v HJ Grathol
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Mary;
I wanted to let you know that I'm working on the discovery responses in the above matter, but it's just taking me
longer than it should. I'll do my best to get those to you as soon as I can. I apologize for the delay.
On an unrelated note, we had some dialogue previously about the salvage timber on the area of the property
involved in the take. There's an entrepreneurial gentlemen who has been soliciting property owners, including
Hughes, for the right to harvest timber off the right of way properties. Can you advise whether ITD would have any
objection to our clients allowing this? I don't think there is much timber value there, but I haven't heard one way or
the other. Thank you.

Douglas S. Ma,fice
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-5818 - phone
(208) 664-5884 - fax

www.ramsdenlyons.com
This e•mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are
not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly
prohibited. If you have received the e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.

3/23/2011

165 of 1617

HOLLAND&HART,

"J

MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

myork@hollandhart.com

April 13, 2011

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095

Dear Doug:
I am writing in another effort to "meet and confer" to try to resolve the failure
of your client to respond to ITD 's discovery requests served on February 2, 2011 ~
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 6(e)(l), 33 and 34, the responses and any
· objections to the requests were due March 7th. After your discovery responses were
not forthcoming, we discussed the issue with you. On March 22nd you sent us an
email apologizing for the delay in providing us with discovery responses. I responded
the same day and informed you that if you could not get us discovery responses by
Margh25th, then. w~ wo:µld a99~pt di$cov~i-y l::espo11$es by April 5th.
It is now April 13, 2011 and we still have not received any discovery responses
from your client. Under the circumstances, we are forced into the position of preparing
a motion to compel. We will file the motion and notice of hearing this Friday,
April 15th, unless we receive full and complete responses before then.
Given the failure to respond wlthin the time required, all objections to the
discovery have been waived. Therefore, if we receive responses by Friday but
objections to the discovery are posed, we will proceed with the motion. Also, given the
substantial delay in answering the discovery, if the responses are incomplete or evasive,
we will proceed with the motion.
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If you would like to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact
me.
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-:5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attomeys for Defendant HJ Grathol
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICl' OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 1HE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TIIB STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plainti~
VS.

ID GRAIBOL, a California general
partnership; SIBRLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington coxporation; and DOES 1 through

Case No.-CV-10_-10095

DEFENDANTHJGRATHOVS
ANSWERS.AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
JNTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCU1\1ENTS

5,

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows:

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatozy No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or
ex.pert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is

jjii!jiiiiliilllll--~

expected to testify,
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ANSWER: Defendant has not yet detennined with certainty who they may call as
either expert or lay witness in this matter. Discovery is ongoing and any or all of the
individuals identified through discovery who possess relevant information may be called.
The substance of all expected trial testimony will be developed during the course of

discovery in this case. However, it is anticipated that Defendant may call any of the
following individuals as trial witnesses and those witnesses may testify as to facts known and
opinions held, as generally summarized below:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

GeoffReeslund

These persons may give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development
plans for the Subject :Property; opinion testimony as to its use(s), its value (before and after
the condemnation), the value of the Defendant's property remaining after condemnation and
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and
expenses associated with the purchase, holdi.-r1g and development of the propert-J; planning

and design work associated with the property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and
after condemnation; and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining property.
(4)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood

{5)

Ed Morse

(6)

Dee Jamison

(7)

Scott Taylor

(8)

Brent Heleker
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These persons may give testimony, including opinion testimony as to the value of the
Subject Property, pre-condemnation and post-condemnation, including impacts to the value

occasioned by this condemnation, and other matters within their knowledge or expertise.
(9)

Ron Harvey, Idaho Transportation Department

(10)

Yvonne Dingman, Idaho Transportation Department

(11)

Karl Vogt, counsel, Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals may be called to testify as to their .knowledge, infonnation, and
actions relative to seeking acquisition of a portion of Defendant's property.
(12)

Darrell Manning, Chairman, Idaho Transportation Board

(13)

James Coleman, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(14)

Janice Vassar, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(15)

Jerry Whitehead, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(16)

Gary Blick, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(17)

Nejl Miller, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(18)

Lee Gagner. Member, I~lio Transpor..ation Board

(19)

Sue Higgins, Secretary Idaho Transportation Board

(20)

Brian W. Ness, Director, Idaho Transportation Department

(21)

Pam Lowe, former Director, Idaho Transportation Department

(22)

Jesse W. Smith, Jr., Right of Way Manager, Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals. or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge,
information and actions relative to approval of the project which precipitated the need to
condemn Defendant's property; future plans for construction of the US 95 improvements
through and adjacent to Defendant's property and other matters within their knowledge.
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James Coleman, named above, may also testify on behalf of Coleman Engineering regarding
the planning, design, and function of a proposed on-site sewage system and related
infrastructure serving Defendant's property.
(23)

Tom E, Cole, Chief Engineer, Idaho Transportation Department

(24)

Tamara R. Jauregui, Management Assistant, Idaho Transportation Department

(25)

Duane L. Zimmennan, P .L.S

(26}

Jason Minzghor, Idaho Transportation Department

(27)

Justin Wuest, Idaho Transportation Department

{28)

Jerry Wilson, P~E., Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge,

infonnation and actions relative to the design and construction of the highway improvements
across and adjacent to Defendant's property.
(29)

Ross Blanchard, Federal Highway Administration, Idaho Division

{30}

Rod Twete, Commissioner. Lakes Highway District

rin
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{32)

Marv Lekstrum, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District

(33)

Joe Wuest, Road Supervisor, Lakes Highway District

{34)

Eric W. Shanley, P.E., Lakes Highway District
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These individuals may be called to testify as to communications and interactions with
the Idaho Transportation Department relative to acquisition and/or improvements of frontage
road(s) and access on State Highway 54 in the vicinity of Defendant's property and the
necessity, plan or expectations of bisecting Defendant's property with a frontage road.
(35)

David Evans and Associates, Inc,, including Greg Holder, P.E., Michael Kosa,
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and/or Bill Stark.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this response in accordance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's Pretrial Order.
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory

No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify,
a complete statement of all opinions to_ be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, ·

the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter,
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation
of the property. Th~ witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the
following:
V·J

fl\

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geo.ffReeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)

Mark Johnson

(8)

JeffBond

(9)

Donald Smock
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(10)

PaulDaugharty

(11)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger

P. 7

As an actor/viewer "expertt Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such

persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).

{1)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA

(2)

Ed Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these
futerrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore. the remainder
of the infonnation requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal
appraisal reports are prepared, the infonnation in the above Interrogatory will be contained
within those appraisal reports.
Interrogat01y No. 3:

(Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just

compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to
which you believe Defendant is entitle~. Do not simply reference an appraisal reportJ which

may or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change.
ANSWER:

Defendant does not know at this time the precise amount of just

compensation which will be advocated at trial, Defendant may offer a value assessment at

the trial in this matter including, but not necessarily limited to, the Defendant's past and
intended future use and development of the properly as well as the opinions derived from

comparative market analysis undertaken by the Defendant for purposes of valuing the Subject
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Property, The basis of computation of the Defendantls
opinion of the value of the Subject
,
Property is s.et forth gene.rally in the letter of Jwie 28, 2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD
and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York, Holland and Hart.
Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every

fact, and describe each and every document., which supports your opinion of the amount of
just compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the trucing of a portion the

Subject Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and document that describes,
shows, or evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is
entitled.
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased., is overbroad, ambiguous and unreasonably
burdensome. Further~ as phrased it seeks matters that are subject to attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product doctrine, and otherwise not discoverable under Idaho Rule of Civll
:Procedure 26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the precise
amount of just compensation which will be advocated at trial as discovery and evaluation is
still underway. However, it is anticipated that Defendant ~ill offer value opinions based
upon more appropriate comparable property sales which will establish a value of the portion
'•

condemned in a range of .$3.00 to $5,00 per square foot for the part taken and severance
damages for the remainder. Among the facts supporting this valuation are the comparable
property sales described in the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York.
Interrogatozy No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Take) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the talcing of a
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date oftake'1 as that tennis defined herein.
ANSWER:

It is Defendantis opinion that the fair market value of the Subject
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Property being taken before the talce, was not less than $1,420,000.00 -up to approximately
$3,500,000.00 in its high.est and best use. The basis of computation of the Defendant's
opinion of the value of the Subject Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28,
2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary
Yorlc.
Interrogatozy No 6: (Opinion of fair market value - After Take) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a
portion of the Subject Property as of ihe "date of take" as that term is defined herein.

ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is vague and ambiguous. Further, the
question as phrased seeks matters that are potentially subject to attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product, and the privileges afforded under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the value of the property

after the take because of the ongoing uncertainty as to time of construction, completion of
construction and ancillary severance damages occasioned by the construction and by project

influence/stigma.
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses'

opinion, including your own opinion1 as to whether any severance damage will result from
the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff, If the response is ''yes'') describe

the amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and
all facts and documents used or relied upon1 including the comparable sales used or relied

upon, as a basis for that opinion.
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages wlll result. Defendant does
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of
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Plaintiff's actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance damages may not be fully known until after the

project is completed or at least construction is initiated.

Interrogatm.y No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and
state the total amount paid for the Subject Properly and identify the specific amounts paid for

the real property, the buildings, ·the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property.
Include in your answer any all special tenns or conditions related to your purchase of the
Subject Property,

ANSWER: Plaintiff already has the information requested in this Interrogatory as it
was included in Plaintiff's own appraisal data and acquisition packet. Defendant9s acquired
the Subject Property in a distress sale circumstance in 2008 for the total purchase price of
$1,450,000.00. Defendant does not know what is referred to as "any all special terms or

conditio.ns ... n and as such car.not mear.ingf.tlly ~mswer this portion oft.1i~ Interrogatory.
Interrogatory No, 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any
portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by
you or on your behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined

above) each. appraisal.
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant has evaluated the property value on its own behalf and
with the assistance of consultants, including licensed real estate broker(s), certified, general
appraiser(s), and land use planner(s)/consultant(s).
Interrogatory No. 10: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in
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the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so,
please state the following:
a,

The amount of annual income received;

b.

Every source of income for each year;

c.

The ammmt received each year from each source of income.

ANSWER: A portion of the property has been leased on an annual basis to Shane

Smith d/b/a Blacksmith Farms since its .acquisition. The rent derived from that use of the
.

.

property is .$400.00 per month or $4,800.00 per year.
Interrogatozy No. 11: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please state whether
in your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project

enhancement or project influence {also referred to as project blight), and if so, please provide
a full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert(s) reached
his or her conclusion and all facts, infonna.tion and data used or relied upon to support that
conclusion.
ANS\VER! It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject Property has nqt experienced
and will not experience project enhancement. It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject

:Property has suffered "project influence" or "blight'' as those tenns are commonly used.
Defendant does not fully know at this time the amount of damage it has suffered by reason of
project influence or project blight and it is not possible to fully assess that element of damage
until the project has been completed or to even make an educated estimate until construction
is at least commenced and a completion date can be calculated.
Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or
entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien,
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adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify (as
defined above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use~ or

other interest.
ANSWER: Yes, Black Smith Fanns leased a portion of the property on a month-tomonth basis since its acquisition. .See, Response to Interrogatory No. 10, above.
Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the

"date of take,, or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any
third party applied to the applicable planning and zoning department for the development oiimprovement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction
permit on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined above) each and

every application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or
employed by your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the
Subject Property.

ANSWER: Subsequent to acquiring the Subject Property in 2008, Defendant, through

-

its development agent> applied to Kootenai County to rezone the property from "Ruraj" to the
"Commercial" zone classification. The rezone was approved on or about November 20,
2008. Geoff Reeslund has been employed and retained to assist in the development and
improvement of the Subject Property, including application and submittals for zone change
and proposed subdivision of the property.
Defendant has also retained Coleman Engineering for professional services in the

design and development of sewer and wastewater treatment system to serve the Subject

Property and its anticipated development buyers/tenants. Defendant has also contracted with
and retained CLC Associates, Inc.

as

land use planners and architects to assist in the
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development of plans, schematics, and uses of the Subject Property. Defendant has also
contracted with and retained Intermountain Transportation Solutions to assist in analysis of
development plans and to conduct a Traffic Impact Study in order to facilitate development
proposals for the Subject Property. Defendant has also contracted with and retained Allwest
Testing & Engineering, LLC as project geotechnical engineers to analyze the soils and gravel
of the Subject Property for development feasibility study purposes.
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the ndate of take," and for the
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If sol please list and identify (as defined
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell.
. ANSWER: Yes. Defendant has actively marketed the property to prospective "end
users,>' both purchasers and tenants, to ascertain highest and best use options for development
of the property both with and without the anticipated project influences.

No fonnal

purchase/sale offers have been memorialized.
Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Contamination) As of the "date oftake,u w~re
you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and
identify the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or
damage occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, and whether
the contamination or damage has been eradicated.
ANSWER: Please see, Defendant's Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (April
14, 2008) and the Phase II Assessment Correction Completion Certificate (May 6, 2008),
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copies of which are available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents
during regular business hours, upon reasonable request.
lnterrogatozy No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any,
to Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identity of any and all officers,
managers or other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please
also include any involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications
for zoning changes, annexation into the city of· Athol, development or other proposed
improvements to the Subject Property.
ANSWER: D~fendant HJ Grathol is a Califomia general partnership which holds title
to the Subject Property. Hughes Investments, also a California general partnership is the

development agent for HJ Grathol on this property. Alan Johnson is employed by Hughes
Investments as Senior Vice President of Development and is a partner for development
purposes with Hughes lnvestments. Additional infonnation responsive to this Interrogatory

has been requested and will be supplemented.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Reg_uest for Production No. 1:

Please produce all documents identified, used,

referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above.

RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voluminous documents responsive to these
Requests for Production and will make them available for inspection and/or copying to
Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon reasonable request.

Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action1 including Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) experts.
DEPENDANT HJ GRATIIOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSBS TO PLAINTIPF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 13
180 of 1617

Apr.15. 2011 12:34PM

No. 2502

P. 15

RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production is overbroad and beyond the

scope of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). See also, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. At this time,
Defendant bas not determined which experts it anticipates utilizing at trial, and discovery is
not permitted as to specially retained experts.
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce copies of all documents relied upon by

any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion
relating to the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: See) Answer to Interrogatory No. 2.

Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited
to, the appraisal reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each
appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial
of this matter.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no appraisai reports responsive to this request, but
.information relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be fowid
in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and

Mary York referenced herein.
Resiuestfor Production No. 5! For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to
calJ to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all
appraisal reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a
ten-mile radius of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5)
years.
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RESPONSE: Defendant does not have any discoverable documents responsive to this
request.
Request for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents, objects or
things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this
matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or
other documents. If final exhibits have not been completed, please attach drafts, if available.
RESPONSE: Defendant has not yet determined what exhibits it Will offer at trial but
will produce such exhibits consistent with the Court's Pretrial Order.

Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which
relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis,
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that
Defendant intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request -for Production seeks materials whieh may be
protected by the attomey-cllent privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 8:

Please produce copies of all documents,

correspondence, and Electronically Stored Infotmation created, produced, received or sent by
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: Objection, This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this. discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
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(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Reguest for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or
employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, including but not

limited to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property (or any
aspect or portion thereof).
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.
.

.

Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any ·and all docwnents,

colTeSpondence, communications) notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you
and any expert retained by you j.n relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion
of the Subject Property by Plaintiff.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be

protected by the attomey-client privilege ·and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.

(See, Response to :Request for Production No. 1, above,)
Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents,

correspondence, communications. notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you
and Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taldng of a portion of the Subject
Property by Plaintiff.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding

thisJ discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been comolied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)
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Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents,
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you
and any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, {such as the City of Athol, Kootenai
County, and the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject
PropertyJ the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by
Plaintiff. This document request shall_ relate to all such documents for a period of five (5)
years prior to the ''date of take" ~d up to the present.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding

this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy

of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value
of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.

Request for Production No. 14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all
documents relating to your purchase of the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.

(See, Response to Request for Production No. I, above,)
Request for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental
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agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration
paid for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of

talce" and up to the present.
RESPONSE: Defendant has one document responsive to this Request for Production
which is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular
business hours, upon reasonable request.
Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for ·nevelopment or Improvement)
Please produce each and every application for development, improvement, rezoning,
annexation, ot construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during· the
period of five (5) years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be

protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Nolwithstan~ng
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all
pleadings, claimsj or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements,
descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens~ or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of
the "date of take/' and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the
present date.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request

for Production other than the title insurance policy acquired at the time Defendant purchased

the property, A copy of the same is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff
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and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon r(:asonable request.
Request for Production No. 18:

(Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive

Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens, interests, claims, easements,
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and
for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date.
RESPONSE= Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.
Request for Production No. 19: ·(Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy_
of each aud every document relating in any way to environmental contamination, hazardous

waste contamination, water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks,
or petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years
immediately prior to the ''date of take,, up to the present date.

RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.

(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and
unrecorded surveys that have been performed upon the Subject Property, and, if more than
one survey has been performed, please produce the most recently perfonned recorded survey.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be

protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)
DEFENDANT HJ GRATIIOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTJPP'S FIRST SEf OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Of DOCUMENTS - 19
186 of 1617

No. 2502

Apr.15. 2011 12:35PM

P. 21

Request for Production No. 21: (Water, Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of
any and all documents related to any ap1;>lication to provide the Subject Property with water,
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the
current availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above,)

Request for Production No. 22:

Please produce any and all documents and

coITC.llpondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the
development or development planning of the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attomey-cllent privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
thi~ di~coverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.

(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

DATED this I Slh day of April, 2011.
RAMSDEN &LYONS, LLP

By.

~kif~

DouglS, Marfice, -OftheFinn
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

DEFENDANT HJ ORATIIOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIR.ST SET OF INTERROGATOlUES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS· 20

187 of 1617

VERIFICATION

STATEOFCALIFORNIA )
) ss.
County of
Orange
)

Alan Johnson

, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

lt[ t2VtJl:fhb \ ,

Defendant, in the aboveI am the managing member of
entitled action; I have read Defendant HJ Grahtol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents thereof,
and I state the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of May, 20llby Alan Johns0~,
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who
appeared before me.

Notary Public for the State of California
Residing at Irvine, California
Commission Expires Dec. 23, 2013
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAELE. RAMSDEN•
MARC A. LYONS•

P.O. BOX 1336

DOUGLASS, MARFICE•

COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336

STREET ADDRESS:
700 NORTHWEST BLVD.

MICHAEL A. EALY•
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

TE"RRANCE R. HARRIS•
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT
THERON

J.

DE SMET

Tl!LEPHONI!: (208) 664-5818

ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO

FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884
E-MAIL: firm@ramsdenlyons.com

WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL

Wl!BSITI!:

• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON

www.ramsdenlyons.com

May 16, 2011

MaryV. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701

Re:

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol, et al.

Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095
Dear Ms. York:
Enclosed please find a CD containing documents (which have been Bates stamped)
responsive to Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production ofDocuments in the above-referenced matter.

If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us.

oz;;;Y· -

crJames,
/sj

Enclosqre

EXHIBIT

I

£
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ORIGf NAL
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF TI-IE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO

Case No. CV-10-10095

TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plainnff:
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through

5,

DEFENDANTHJGRATHOUS
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS
AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows:
INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatocy No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any,
to Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identity of any and all officers,
managers or other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please
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also include any involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications
for zoning changes, annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed
improvements to the Subject Property.
ANSWER: Defendant ID Grathol is a California general partnership which holds title
to the Subject Property. Hughes Investments, also a California general partnership is the
development agent for ID Grathol on this property. Alan Johnson is employed by Hughes
Investments as Senior Vice President of Development and is a partner for development
purposes with Hughes Investments. See, attached flow chart for HJ Grathol.
DATED this 16th day of May, 201 I.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

~,it2S--~ •

Douglas Marfice, O~irrn
Attorneys for Defendant ID Grathol
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss.
County of 01vrt,1..::>(qb
)

Alan Johnson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am the Senior Vice President of the managing general partner, HJ Bayview Gateway,
LLC, of HJ Grathol, Defendant, in the above-entitled action; I have read Defendant HJ
Grahtol's Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents thereof, and I state the same to be
true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
By: HJ Grathol, a California general partnership
By: HJ Bayview Gateway, LLC,
managing general partner

Its: Senior Vice President

SUDSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of May, 201lby Alan Johnson, proved
to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person before me.

Notary Public for the State of California
Residing at Irvine, California
Commission Expires Dec. 23, 2013

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAJNTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 3
193 of 1617

·---

----------------- ---------

----

---

~~

-·--·--·---·--------------- -·-

-

8070 HJ GRATHOL

a California general
partnership,
CO# 8070, Bank 70

El N 27-1369018

95% HJ Bayview
Gateway, LLC,

5% Gracal Corporation,

a Delaware limited
liability company,

a California corporation,
CO# 8060, Bank 186

CO# 8080, Bank 80

EIN 13-6183726

EIN 27-1368953

General Partner

General Partner

7
4.21% Marilyn A.

3.l.6% Geoffrey B.

living Trust,

Johnson,

Gutwill,

Reeslund,

Limited Partner

Limited Partner

Limited Partner

Limited Partner
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MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

myork@hollandhart.com

July 22, 2011
VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
· Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVI0-10095

Dear Doug:
This purpose of this letter is to meet and confer on deficiencies we see in
Defendant HJ Grathol' s responses to ITD' s First Set of Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents (the "April 15th discovery responses") and to address issues
that have arisen regarding the responses. We hope to resolve these issues with you
informally, without having to resort to a motion to compel.
First, the April 15th discovery responses are in direct conflict with the
representations that Mr. Gabbert made to Judge Haynes at the March 31, 2011 status
al\_<l scheduling conference. Specifically, Mr. Gabbert represented at the scheduling
conference that HJ Grathol would call, at most, two or three expert witnesses. This
conformed with our earlier conversations with you. Judge Haynes entered a scheduling
order and set a 10-day trial based on the representations that HJ Grathol would only call
two or three expert witnesses.
However, the April 15th discovery response list fourteen (14) potential expert
witnesses. See Response to Interrogatory No. 2. Regardless whether these witnesses
are designated "actor/view experts" or "valuation experts" these witnesses will be
providing expert testimony - which requires substantial additional time both at trial and
in discovery.
After we received the April 15th discovery response, I spoke with Chris Gabbert
about this and he indicated that he would speak to you about the number of witnesses
HJ Grathol intended to call at trial. If the number of experts is going to be greater than
the two or three represented to the Court, then the scheduling order will have to be
revised, the period of time for discovery extended, the trial will have to be moved to a
iaier date, and additionai triai days wiii have to be reserved.

EXHIBIT

Holland & Hart LLP
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O. Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527

I

of 1617
Aspen Boulder Carson City Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center Billings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Santa Fe195
Washington,
D.C. 0

HOLLAND&HART- ~

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
July 22, 2011
Page 2

If you only intend to call two or three witnesses to provide expert testimony,
regardless of whether they are "actor/viewer experts" or "valuation experts" please
identify which experts you actually intend to call so that, if possible, we can keep the
current trial date and schedule.

Second, your response to Interrogatory No. 8 indi9ated that you could not
describe any special terms or conditions of HJ Grathol's purchase of the Subject
Property in 2008. You responded that the Subject Property was purchased in 2008 in a
distress sale, but did not describe any of the terms of the purchase. Additionally, ITD
does not have the information regarding the specific terms of your client's purchase of
the Subject Property. The documents provided (00648-00768) detail a purchase of the
Subject Property by Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation: It does not provide
documents regarding HJ Grathal's acquisition of the Subject Property. Please provide
documentation or an explanation how HJ Grathol acquired the Subject Property from
Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation. We are also entitled to know all terms of
the sale to and acquisition by HJ Grathol. Therefore, we request that you please
provide all terms and conditions of HJ Grathol's 2008 purchase of the Subject Property.
Third, your response to Interrogatory No. 9 represented that there were
appraisals done on the Subject Property. However, your response to Interrogatory
No. 9 failed to identify (as defined in the definition section) each of those appraisals.
Please indentify each of those appraisals and provide them pursuant to Request for
Production No. I.
Fourth, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 stated that HJ Grathol received
offers to purchase the Subject Property in the five {5) years prior to the date of take.
However, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 failed to identify any of those offers.
Please fully respond to Interrogatory No. 14 by identifying, as that term is defined, each
and every offer to purchase or sell the Subject Property within the five (5) years prior to
the date of take. Please also provide any relevant documents pursuant to Request for
Production No. I.
Fifth, your response to Interrogatory No. 16 references that "additional
information" regarding HJ Grathol's relationship to Hughes Investment has "been
requested and will be supplemented." Please provide us with that supplemental
information.
~1·vtb
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"discoverable" appraisal reports prepared by your expert witnesses regarding properties
in the vicinity of the Subject Property. Please clarify whether or not appraisals
responsive to Request for Production No. 5 exist. Ifappraisals exist, they are
discoverable.
.I.
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Seventh, response to Request for Production No. 9 also states there are no
"discoverable" expert compensation agreements. We ask that you please produce all of
these agreements or explain how they are not "discoverable."
Eighth, your response to Request for Production No. 13 indicated that you had no
"discoverable" documents regarding the value of the Subject Property. Thus, it is our
understanding that no documents responsive to Request for Production No. 13 exist because if they did exist these documents would be discoverable. Please confirm that
your response to Request for Production No. 13 is that there are no "financial
statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of the Subject Property
has been set forth during the last five (5) years."
Ninth, please provide an explanation regarding your responses to Request for
Production Nos. 14 and 16. Specifically, please explain how documents relating to the
purchase of the Subject Property or applications for development are protected by the
attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. For example, is it your response
that the Subject Property was acquired for the purposes of this litigation?
Tenth, please provide us with any new or supplemental documents or information
responsive to our First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production.
We look forward to resolving the above- referenced issues with you. It is our
hope that we can resolve these discovery deficiencies without having to resort to a
motion to compel. Therefore, we request that you please provide us with full and
complete responses as outlined above by August 5, 2011 or we will be forced to turn to
the Court for assistance. Thank you for your consideration.

MVY:st
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Gmthol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S

EXPERTWITNESSDXSCLOSURE

vs.

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial
Order and discloses the following experts intended to be called at the trial of the above-

referenced matter:
1)

Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood
Cornerstone Property Advisors
1311 N. Washington, Ste. C
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 321-2000

EXHIBIT
DEFENDANT HJ ORATHOL'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE - l
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Statement of Testimony:

Mr. Sherwood is a real estate appraiser licensed in the states of Idaho and Washington.
He will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon
completion. Mr. Sherwood will testify generally as follows:
The subject property is was transferred to Gracal Corporation on May 22, 2008 from

North Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited liability corporation on May 22, 2008 and
subsequently from Gracal Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California general prutnership on
October 15, 2009. According to the broker who sold the site in May 2008, the sale price was
$1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property from a local lender for
a far higher amount and the seller was highly motivated due to financial problems. At the
time of the sale the property was zoned residential. Cun-ent mvners have paid for a rezone of
the site, engineering for site development plans, approval of city water to the site. and work

for an onsite sewage system.
County records indicate the property is identified under three parcel numbers: A0000-010-6350, 53N03Wl06100, and 53N03Wl05000. Assessed values for each of the
parcels for 2010 are as follows:

AO000O 106350
53N03W106100
53N03W105000

Land $58,500
Land $79,395
Land $150,469

Improvement $59,944

The prope1ty is located on the NE Comer of Highway 95 and Highway 54 in Athol,
Idaho and contains approximateiy 56.8 acres. In the county assessor 1s records, parcel
53N03Wl05000 is indicated as a 63.24 acre parcel, which appears to be an e1rnr based on all
the other data reviewed on this site. Parcel A00000106350 has .419 acres and includes a
small commercial building, but it is also the SW corner of the site at the intersection of the
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highways and therefore considered an important part of the entire property. The subject
property is cun·ently zoned Commercial by the Kootenai County Planning Department and

this zoning was obtained by the current owners since their purchase of the property in 2008.
The site is approximately 16 miles n011h of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8 miles
east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of Sandpoint. The
intersection currently consists of a convenience store on the SW corner, a restaurant/bar on
the NW comer, vacant land on the SE comer, and the subject along with some othe1·
commercial uses on the NE comer along Highway 95. Although site is contiguous at this
time, the new interchange planned at this location show Sylvan Road being extended north
through the subject site when the interchange is built, splitting the subject site,
Major attractions in the immediate area include Farragut State Park to the east of this
location and Silve1wood Amusement Park two miles south of this location. Lake Pend
Oreille is accessible via public and commercial launch facilities at Bayview, Farragut, or
Sandpoint. Sandpoint is also the location of Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski arna in the

Inland Northwest.
The site has approximately 750 feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090 feet
along Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points, Access is also available along Highway 95
as all three parcels include frontage along the highway, There is another property containing
1.58 acres that is located north of the corner parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along
Highway 95 as well. Water to the site is avaiiabie from the City of Athoi and according to
the owner's representative, Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on development
of a modular waste treatment plant to meet needs for onsite sewage. Other site utilities
include natural gas from Avista, electric from Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from
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Verizon. The site is generally level and at grade with both highways. The site is bounded by
Howard Road to the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this time, but these
trees have no marketable timber value.
Market conditions for Kootenai County were similar to other areas in the Inland
Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as well as appreciation rates from
2002 through 2006. The number of residential units sold in 2002 through the Coeur d'Alene
MLS was 2,958 and that number peaked at 5,035 units in 2005 declining to 2,821 units in
2006.

The average sale price through these same years was $138,908 in 2002 and it

increased to $271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a four year period. In 2007 and 2008
the number of units sold continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with the average sale price
dropping to $269,120. In 2009 the total number of units sold increased to 2,216 with the

average price dropping to $209,415. One of the reasons for the large drop in 2009 was a tax
c1·edit for first time homebuyers, and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower price

properties,

2010 has continued to see fewer residential sales with prices continuing to

decline; however, there has been continued commercial development in Kootenai County in
the past two years. Two Wal-Mart Supercenters have been built in addition to a ne,x.1 Super 1
Foods store and a Love's Travel Plaza being built. In addition the Highway 95 co1Tidor has
seen the construction of a U.S. District Court Facility and a 55,000 square foot Western
States Cat facility in Hayden.
The highest and best use of the subject property is the ideal use of vacant land or an
improved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be legally permitted,

physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally productive. The subject is a large
tract of vacant commercially zoned land (with the exception of a small commercial building)
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on a (I lighted" intersection of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger than

typically utilized for a "big box" retail user which can range from approximately 10 to 30

acres in size. Silverwood Amusement Park south of the subject occupies a large site
including parking. This is a unique use that has grown over the past 20+ years and recently
an application has been made by Silverwood to rezone an additional 90+ acres to the south of
its existing facilities. Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues, convenience
issues will no doubt spur residents to patronize locally situated commercial establishments.
The comer location and zoning of the subject suggest commercial uses that can take
advantage of the traffic flow at this location that presently exists on Highway 95. I
understand from the owner's representative that they were in negotiation with URM for a sale
of a portion of the site for a Super One Grocery store. Mike Winger of URM confinned that
he had been involved in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that
was delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a new WINCO
in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of Hayden the likelihood of a new

grocery store at the subject site is less probable due to new competition that was not there
when negotiations were going on with Hughes, but that changing economic conditions have
not eliminated this possibility. Other potential uses include a travel plaza/truck stop, "big
box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R', or "D & B" (local farm/ranch supply
stores), motel, and a convenience store; however, in my opinion only about½ of the subject
site wouid be utiiized for these uses. The balai1Ce of the site might include some self storage,
residential uses, or perhaps some type of light industrial use.

C,m-ent plans for the subject site included a new freeway interchange. The taking in
this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 acres leaving remnants on both sides
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of the new interchange. Remnants on the west side of the new interchange include the .419
comer parcel and a 3.87 acre parcel fronting the old Highway 95, On the east side of the new
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36.61 acres. The property enjoyed
access from both highways in the before situation and I understand that in the after will only

have limited access from Highway 54, Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which
bounds it to the east. As discussed earlier in this report, the planned Sylvan Road extension
will bisect the site effectively changing the original highest and best use analysis of the site.
With the site bisected, only the 8.85 acres to the east of the new interchange and west of

Sylvan Road in addition to the 3.87 acres on the NW corner of the site, and the .419 acre site
on the SW comer will be available fol' development out of the original west half of the site.
There will also likely be a condemnation of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it does
not currently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also unknown at this time which
may also be an additional item of reimbursement to the owners of the property ifldaho DOT
makes them pay for the road improvements.
I researched various large commercial tract sales in the Spokane, Tri Cities. Coeur
d'Alene, and Moses Lake areas and am familiar with prices for sales in these areas for users
such as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes, Albertson's, Costco, Sam's
Club, and Wal-Ma1t. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection in most cases for locations as
is a benefit for customers to access stores easier. Freeway interchanges are often locations of
retail deveJopment, but generally these developments usually occur in higher density
residential areas.
As a lighted intersection with commercial zoning, I viewed the site as being

developed in two phases. With the site containing approximately 57 acres prior to the taking,
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I considered that approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 30 acre site would likely fit several anchors
such as grocery stol'es or other "big box'' retail users. The 30 acres would also likely
accommodate other pad users such as banks, fast food uses, or convenience store uses in
addition to some additional "inlineu retail uses associated with the big box users. Big box
users often pay $4 to as high as $9 per square foot for sites as in the recent WINCO purchase
in Coeur d'Alene. The subject location is inferior to most of the comparables discussed in
this repo1t in that it is located in a more remote area and it doesn't presently enjoy the same
demographics; however, the lighted intersection of two state highways offers excellent
exposure for commercial uses and as tl'affic increases this location will become the "go to"
location between Haden and Sandpoint.
In the after scenario, the 16.31 acre take will leave three parcels; an 8.85 acre parcel
on the east side of the new interchange, a 3.87 acre parcel on the west side, and the .419 acre
parcel in the SW corner of the site. The balance of the site will be east of the newly planned
Sylvan Road. Access to these sites will be limited to the old Highway 95 for the 3.87 acre
parcel and Highway 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.85 acre parcel. Estimating values in the
after situation will be contingent upon when the project is completed. Upon completion the
property will likely develop differently that in the before situation and although the property
on the east side of the freeway is still large enough to accommodate some big box retail uses,
but not stores as large as Wal-Mart, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the completion of

this project projecting values into the future is extremely difficult.
I have considered the following comparable sales:
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Idaho Comparables
1. 1601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene~ Sale Price $3,528,360- Sale Date 8/09
Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $9.00
Comments: This was a former gravel pit site that was sold for a new WINCO
Grocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for the purchasers and granted
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access, The site included all
utilities. This property would be considered superior to the subject for location and
size.
2. Seltice Way and I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale Date 11/06
Size 235 AC-Price Per Foot $2.00
Comments: Foursquare Properties, developers, bought this site which consisted of
numerous parcels from two other developers and Cabela,s committed to purchase 40
acres for a new store at the same time frame. Although the site had utilities, the
developers paid to build all the interior streets and provide access to the Cabela's
parcel. Since the purchase another parcel has been sold for a new Wal-Marc which
recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and would be considered at
a lower rate for size~ but a superior rate for location. The purchasers paid for bringing
utilities to the site as well as significant costs for grading on the property to
accommodate the new building sites and roads.

3. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls - Sale Price $2,936,161- Sale Date 11/06
Size 13.5 AC (588)060 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.00
Comments: This sale is in the City of Post Falls and utilities were available. It was
purchased with the intention of retail development. This is the SE corner of the
intersection. This sale is a smaller parcel than the subject which would indicate a
lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for location at a lighted intersection)
but also a superior location demographically, although the subject has higher traffic
counts.
·

4, Highway 41 & Praide Post Falls - Sale Price $6,591,591 - Sale Date 10/07
Size 50.44 AC (2,197,197 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $3.00
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Station
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post
Falls. The site was not zoned for commercial development, but the purchaser was
confident that they could develop the site. This is an excellent comparable for the
subject in terms of overall size and a simila1· location at a lighted intersection, but a
superior location demographically. The property has no sewer which likely may need
to be purchased from the City of Post Falls.
5. Highway 95 & Garwood Road-Sale Price $1.017,200-Sale Date 7/08
Size 4.41 AC (192,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30
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sale price was confirmed with the attorney for the property owner and he relayed that
it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like the subject and it
is the next "lighted" intersection south of the subject on Highway 95. This
intersection is with a county road versus another state highway like the subject. The
site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher value and it is also a
superior location being closer to Coeur di Alene. I understand this sale was negotiated
under the threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not
represent true market value for this reason.

6. Ramsey & Appleway- Sale Price $7,800,000 - Sale Date 11/07
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $10.53
This sale was confim1ed with the owner who sold the property to the Coeur d, Alene
Tribe. The site is near comparable 1 and considered superior to the subject in that it is
a smaller parcel and located in a better location.

7. Highway 95 & Sagle Road- Sale Price $3,400,000-Sale Date 3/08
Size 29 AC (1,263,249 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $2.69
This sale was confirmed with the broker who sold the property. The site was zoned
for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the sale relayed
that the property is currently for sale as 5 lots. This parcel does not have access to
Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like the subject. This is
an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size and it would be considered
slightly superior for location being closer to Sandpoint~ but inferior as it does not have
a lighted intersection and it does not have access to Highway 95.
Washington Comparables

8. 9527 N Nevada-Sale Price $4i813,685 - Sale Date 7/07
Size i8.7i AC (815,100 sq ft)-Price Pet Foot $5.91
This was the site of a new WINCO in Spokane that has been built and it included
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a highel' value and also
a superior location.
9. 21801 E Country Vista- Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/05
Size 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $5.00
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90 that
has been built onsite, This site is smaller indicating a higher value and also a superior
location.
10. 4315 E Sprague - Sale Price $7,559,686 - Sale Date 9/06
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $7.55
This is a Wal-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that has not yet been built.
The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn 1t have
sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific Railroad
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and required extensive work for development. The site is somewhat similar in size,
but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to COSTCO.
Sales of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard to
econornic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as they reflect prices for
big box retail uses.

VALUE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with commercial

zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the values of the comparable sales
with p~·imary emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 as they are on the same highway and located
north and south of the subject Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was

given more weight like comparables 5 and 7. I also considered the sizes and locations of the
other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject. I also considered the purchase
price of the subject as well as the motivation of the seller when the property was sold for
$1,450,000, but as mentioned earlier, the seller was distressed and the site was not
commercially zoned at the time of the sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot

the majority of tho value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site. Based
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have had a value in the
range of $2.25 per foot or $2,940,300.

VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION

In the after situation, the west 30 acres will be bisected by the taking. This taking will
result in the loss of 16.41 acres leaving an after value estimate as follows:
Value Before
Take
After Value

= $2,940,300
= $1,598,543
= $1,344,457
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There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some commercial
developments, but there will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.87, and .419 acres. These remaining
parcels can accommodate various uses, but the chances of a.l'ly big box retail use on the west
30 acre site a1·e gone. With the planned Sylvan Road forming a boundary for the remaining
property the remaining property is also bisected,
Until a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value for the remaining
parcels due the unknowns of the anticipated project.
Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as published
by

IDrs

website, an assumption can be made that the best case scenario for project

construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming this construction date is accurate, the
project might be completed in the spring of 2012.

If the planned construction date is later,

the completion date will be moved farther into the future. In my opinion, no potential user of
the remaining property would have any interest in using any of the remaining parcels until
they know for certain when the project will be completed. Assuming the completion can be
completed as forecast above in the spring of 2012, the value of the land would need to be
discounted from the present date.

The discount is applicable as no one would pay for

something today that they can't receive until a future date, This same principal applies to
valuing a subdivision that is slated to be developed in the future or the purchase of an income

stream like a real estate contract.
In attempting to value the remaining parcels, I have made the assumption that they

will have a similar value to the before scenario at $2.25 per square foot. I have also assumed
that they will be available for use upon completion of the new freeway at the earliest in the
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spring of 2012 and the latest in the spring of 2013. This results in a discount time frame of
1.5 to 2.5 years from the date of valuation, Using this scenario, the future value of the

remaining parceis of $1,344,457 ,vould be discounted to a present value.
The discount rate is basically a rate of return that someone is looking for on a given
investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates of safe investments,

market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we are dealing with undeveloped land in
uncertain economic times. For this reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization
rates in the cu1Tent market and utilized a rate of 10%. The higher rate used to discount the
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns concerning this project including the
unlmown timing of the project being finished, issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road
being built, the cost of who will be responsible for the cost of Sylvan Road, and the need for
condemnation of the l'ight of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the
anticipated after value of $1,344,457 yielded the following present values for 1.5 to 2.5 years:
1.5 years
2,5 years

= $1,165,354

= $1,059,413

Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded value
estimates were completed as follows;
Before Value
After Present Value 1.5 years
After Present Value 2.5 years
Difference Rounded

= $2,940,300

=$1,165,000
= $1,060,000

= $1,775,000 - $1,880,000

This difference in value does not address the value of the Sylvan Road, cost of
constructfon of Sylvan Road, or loss of access to Highway 54 which are all potential
additional items of compensation.
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Data and Other Information Considered in F om1ing Testimony:

The data, documents, and information relied on by Mr. Sherwood in fonnulating his
opinions are:

Planning documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning docwnents;
Kootenai County Assessor's records;
Property records and documents for the property and comparable properties; and
MLS sales data and comparable sales information from personal interviews with
transaction participants/agents
C.

Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Suppo1t_for Testimony:

Mr. Sherwood may use the documents and infmmation identified in his appraisal report
to summarize, illustrate, or support his testimony. He may also use some or all of the following:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Kootenai County Assessor's records;
Property records and documents for the property and comparable properties; and
lv1LS sales data and comparable sales info1mation

D.

Qualifications of Mr. Sherwood:

The qualifications of Mr. Sherwood are set forth in his curriculum vitae, attached
hereto.
E.

Compensation Paid to Mr. Sherwood:

:tvlr. Sherwood was paid a flat fee for his appraisal research/evaluation, He will be paid
his standard hourly rate of$175.00 per hour for research and testimony.
F.

Publications Authored by Mr. Sherwood in the Past Ten Years: None.
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List of Other Cases in Which Mr. Shenvood has Testified as an Expeit:

WSDOTvs. McKinley
City ofSpokane vs. Frost
WSDOT vs. Costich
Schade vs. American West Bank
City ofCheney vs. Showies
WSDOTvs, Swanson
Avista vs. Ashland Estates
Jergens vs. Jergens
Curry vs, Lenhertz
Stevens County vs. Taylor
Stevens County vs. Nelson
Zunino vs. Rejewski
Raynor vs. IPEC
WSDOTvs. Douglass
City ofSpokane vs. Vonholt
Peltier, et al vs. Markley, et al
Martin Estate
Sinchuck vs. Casteal
WSDOTvs. Miller
Idaho DOT vs. Romine
WSDOT vs. Wittkop[
Benton County vs. Ross
WSDOTvs. Coffield
Koch et al vs. Shields
Lindell vs. Lindell
Bell vs. McDaniel
Yon vs. Gibbs
Walter vs. Malott
Colley vs. Steelman Duff
WSDOTvs. Smith
Purvis vs. Purvis
SRM vs. Barnes & Noble

Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition & Testify
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Testify
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify.
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition and Testify
Deposition
Deposition and Testify
Testify
Deposition and Testify

Testify
Testify
Deposition
Deposition
Testify
Deposition

2)

Geoffrey B. Reeslund1 AJA
Vice President, Director of Design and Construction
Hughes Investments> LLC
Clo Ramsden & Lyons, LLP

A.

Statement ofNature of Testimony:

Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the development plans for the Property,
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations
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on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land use planning/entitlement,
construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and
development of the Property; pianning and design work associated with the propert'J; and the
effects of the condemnation on the development of the remaining Property.

B.

Data and Other Infonnation Considered in Forming Testimony:

Mr. Reeslund has relied on the following data and documents in this matter:
· Planning documents related to the Property;
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Engineering standards and guidelines; and
Property records and documents
C.

Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Support for Testimony:

Mr. Reeslund may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his
testimony:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Engineering standal'ds and guidelines; and
Property records and documents

D.

Qualifications of Mr. Reeslund:

Mr. Reeslund is a graduate of the University of Southern Califomia, where he earned
Bachelors and Masters Degrees in Architecture. A registered Al·chitect since 1977, for over
21 years Geoff worked for SGPA Architecture and Planning, one of the foremost
retail/commercial architectural firms in the countl'y. A Principal with SGPA since 1986, he
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provided leadership in the planning, design and entitlement processing of over 200
· community, specialty, regional and ente1tainment centers throughout California and other
Western states, including nine projects for Hughes.

In addition, he served as SGPA's

Southern California Marketing Director from 1993 to 1997, helping to expand their presence
and Client b~se in the region.
As Director of Design and Construction at Hughes Investments, Mr. Reeslund
oversees all aspects of project planning, design, governmental approvals, and construction.
He assembles and manages the project consultant teams, works closely with tenants and their
consultants, and coordinates the construction process to a successful completion.
Mr. Reeslund is a member of the American Institute of Architects, and is actively
involved in the International Council of Shopping Centers.
E.

Compensation Paid to Mr. Reeslund;

Mr. Reeslund is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC.

His only compensation is his

regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is

being paid for his testimony.
F.

Publications Authored by Mr. Reeslund in the Past Ten Years; None.

G.

List of Other Cases in Which Mr. Reeslund has Testified as an Expert: None.

3)

Alan Johnson
Senior Vice President, Development

Hughes Investments, LLC
C/o Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
A.

Statement of Testimony:

Mr. Johnson will give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development plans
for the Property, testimony as to its uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the
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values of the Property remaining after condemnation and before and after construction and
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase,
holding and development of the Property; planning and design work associated with the

property; marketing efforts of the propel'ty prior to and after condemnation; and the effects of
the condemnation on the remaining Property.

B.

Data and Other Info1mation Considered in Forming Testimony:

Mr. Johnson has relied on the following data and documents in this matter:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Engineering standards and guidelines; and
Property records and documents
C.

Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Support for Testimo~:

Mr. Johnson may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his
testimony:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Engineering standards and guidelines; and
Property records and documents
D.

Qualifications of Mr. Johnson:

Mr. Johnson attended Mount Royal College in his native Calgary, Canada and
graduated from the University of Oklahoma in Norman, Oklahoma. After graduation in
1983, he joined Coldwell Banker now CB Richard Ellis, as a retail specialist, transferring to
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In 1989 Mr. Johnson was hired by Hughes

Investments as Vice President - Leasing. After nine years with Hughes Investments, Mr.
Johnson joined The Irvine Company as Director of Leasing and concentrated on the

development and leasing of several ground-up projects including The Market Place - Irvine,
Northpark Plaza, Quail Hill, Trabuco Grove, Oakcreek Village, Irvine Spectrum Pavilion,
Newport Coast, The Bluffs and several other projects throughout Irvine and Newport Beach.

Mr. Johnson completed transactions and fom1ed relationships with Albertsons, Sav-on Drugs,
Lowe's, Target, Kohl's, Office Depot, Ralph's, Ethan Allen, Vons, Sears and many other
national tenants.

In September of 2003 Mr. Johnson left The Irvine Company to serve as Senior Vice
President, Development with Hughes Investments. Mr. Johnson is responsible for all phases
of acquisition and development of shopping centers throughout California, Utah, Washington
and Idaho. Mr. Johnson is a member of ICSC and has attained his Senior Cel'tified Leasing
Specialist "SCLS" credential.

E.

Comgensation Paid to Mr. Johnson:

Mr. Johnson is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC. His only compensation is his
regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is
· being paid for his testimony.
F.

Publications Authored by Mr. Johnson in the Past Ten Years: None.

G.

List of Other Cases in Which Mr. Johnson has Testified as an Expert: None.

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE- 18
215 of 1617

Aug. 19. 2011

4)

4:13PM

No. 4332

P. 20/25

As an actor/viewer ''expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of

persons, such as Reeslund and Johnson. See, U.S,C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory

Cow_rnittee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 (West 1995),
5)

Reservation.

Defendant reserves the right to call additional expe1t witnesses, including fact and
expert witnesses, identified through discovery by Defendant. Defendant also reserves the
right to call any expert disclosed by Plaintiff through those certain expert disclosures filed by
Plaintiff pursuant to the Comt's Uniform Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendant further reserves the right to supplement this response in a timely
manner and upon proper motion to identify rebuttal expert witnesses should the same be

necessary in light of Plaintiff's disclosures both through discove1y and Plaintiffs expert
disclosures.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

~

D~~ce,ci;Finn
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19111 day of August, 2011, I served a true and correct, copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

MaryV, York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
vemight Mail
and Delivered
Facsimile (208) 334-4498
US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
~land Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHERWOOD
APPRAISER .QUALIFICATIONS
EDUCATION
Bachelor of Science Degree - Educatfon - University of Mont. - i 970
Navigator Flight Training - USAF 1971
30 Semester Hours - Masters Degree- Guidance & Counseling
1973 - 1975 Central Michigan University & Chapman College
Residentia] Appraisal - 1978 -Amerjcan-Institut.e of RE Appraisers
Real Estate Law - 1978- Rockwell Institute
Fundamentals of Real Estate Investment and Taxation - 1980 - CCIM
Course 101 - National Association of Realtors
Fundamentals of Real Estate Appraisal - 1997 - Mykut RE School
USPAP 1991,1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007
.
IRS 1OJI ·Exchanges & Chftritable Trusts - 1993 - NW Closing
Commercial Real ·Estate Tax Update - 1994 - WA Assn. RE
Marshall Swift Cost Analysis - 199$ -Appraisal Inst.
Multifamily Appraisals - 1999 ~ McKissock Data
Regression Ailalysis - 1999 - -McKissock Data
Income Capitalization - 2002 - McKissock Data
Disclosures and Disclaimers -2005 - McKissock Data
Red Flags Property Inspection Guide - 2005 - Mykut RE School
Emiironmental Issues in Real Estate Practice- 2005 - Mykut RE
Valuation of Detrimental· Conditions in RE- 2007 - Appraisal Inst.
BUSINESS HISTORY
1971 - 1977 Navi gator & Instmctor USAF
1977 - 1979 Real Estate Sales, Crane & Ward Realtors, Spokane, WA
1980 - 1984 Real Estate Sales, Wolff & Walker Realtors, Spokane
1984 - 2005- Real Estate Appraising & Sales, Byrd RE Grp. LLC
2005 - Present - Cornerstone Property Advjsors, Spokane, WA
1977 - 1981 ·Mortgage &-Finance Committee, Spokane Brd. of RE
1986 - Member of Commercial Multiple Listing Committee
1986 - Instructor. for Metropolitan Mortgage - Financial Analysis
1977 - P~esent- M~mber Spokane Assn. of Realtors
1976--1994 - Officer Wash. Air National Guard, Retired Lt. Colonel
2005 - Instructor - Lannan-Education Services - Eau Claire, WI
1997 -Licensed General Appraiser, WA# 1100412
2004-Licensed General Appraiser, ID #CGA 1125
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DEWIITM. ' 1SKIP" SHERWOOD
(Appraiser Qualifications Continued)

SAMPLES OF APPRAISAL ASSIGNMENTS
OU/"'\ /-.--"1 """"nl-_.,~ _,..,-~,l, ---.....-.o...--4-:.Bn ~-.-. "''n....;....._ .. -Yi' 1or.Ao....-r

. l ~ V \_.l\;;'11 \;;\IUUv VVYH\,A~J p.1vp1,,,n1vo £.VI YO.UV\.l~ lvUUv•~

Non-conforming properties for various lenders
Estate Appraisals - Commercial, Land, & Residential
Internal Revenue Appraisals -All Types
Feasibility Analysis for -Real Estate Investors
Insurance Company Valuations -All Types

Condemnation Appraisals;_ All Types
Qualified as ·an Expert Witness - Superior Court of WA- Counties of
Spokane; Adams, Grant, & Pend Oreille~. Su_perior Court of ID Bonner County
PARTIAL LIST OF APPRAISAL CLIENTS
Allied Insurance Company, Spokane Washington
American States Insurance, Indianapolis, Indiana
American West Bank, Spokane, Washington
Burlington Northern Santa Fee Railroad
Central Pre-Mix, Spokane, Washington
City of Cheney, Washington
City of Fairfield, Washington

Farmers Insurance Group
Farmers and Merchants Bank, Spokane, Washington
General'Electric Coiporation, Kent, Washington
GJobal Credit UnionJ Spokane, Washington
Kaiser.Aluminum; Spokane,· Washington
Marsh Insurance, Spokane, ·Washington
Prudential Insurance Company) San Francisco, California
SAFECO: Insurance,. Seattle, Washington
Spokane County· Washington
Tomlinson Black Realtors, -Spokane, Washington
Unigard Insurance, Spokane, Washington
US Bank, Spokane,. Washington
United States ·Marshals Service
Wheatland Bank, Spokane, Washington
Numerous Attorneys & Accountants
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MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fc1x (208) 343,8869
myork@hollandhart.com

August 24, 201 l

Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and
E-,mail: fim@,ramsdenlyons.com
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Nc>rthwest Blvd.
Coeurd'Alene,Idaho 83814
Re:

ITD v. HJ Gratbol, et al.
First Judicial District Court; Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095

Dear Doug:
This letter constitutes our efforts to "meet and confer" regarding the deficiencies in
your Expert Witness Disclosure received August 19, 2011, prior to seeking intervention by the
Court.
First, your expert disclosures do not comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, nor do they
comply with discQvery requirements. Under Idaho case law and the Court's order, expert
opinions and the. bases of the. opinions ~ust be disclosed, whether formed for litigation or not.
The Pretrial Order states:

2.

EXPERT WITNESSES:
Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before trial,
Plantiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not
later than one hundrecJ fifty (1S()) days before, Defendalit(s)
shall disclose all experts to be called at trbd. Rebuttal
witnesses shall be disclosed by all parties not later than ninety
(90) days before trial. Such disclo~ure shall consist of at least
the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P.
26(b)(4)(i). Notice of compliance shall be contemporaneously
filed with the Court.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b )( 4)(i} requires, among other things, the expert to
disclos.e a "complete statement of all opinions to be expressed ~nd the basis and reasons
therefore." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(i) states the following:
(4) Trial preparation--Experts. Discovery of facts known and
opinions held by experts 1 expected to testify, otherwise

EXHIBIT

j
Holland &Hart u.,,

r

Phone [208] 342:·S.OOO Fax [WSJ 343:8869 www.hollandhart.com

101 South Capitol Boulevard Sufte 1400 Boise.JD 83702 Mailing Address P.O.Box 2527 Boise,ID 83701-2527
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNBYS AT LAW
MICHAliL li. IIAMSD£N•

P.O. BO,C tl!U

MARC A. LYONS"

DOIi GLASS. MARPICI!"

COliUR D'ALENE, 10 83816-1336

STRl:'.l!T AD DR.l!SS:
7 00 NO RT·H.WEST BLVO,

MICH.Ali!. A. £ALY"
CDl!UR D'ALl!N£. II> 63814

Ti!llRANCB R. HARRIS•
CHll.lS'1'0PllllR D, CADDERT
TH BRON J. Dt SMET

TKLBl'HDN1l, (2118) 664-.SOJO

ALL AT'TORNliVS l;IC6NS£ll IN IOAIIO

FACSIMILE; {2011) 66'4·$1184
&-MAIS.: nrn1@r&n1.rd.,nlyons,co·m

WILLIAM F, IIOYD, 01' COUNSBL

• LICl!tl'SllO IN WASIIINOTON

W!!BSITI!: ,.,..,.,_tatru4~Alfons.c·om

August 29. 2011

Viaf(lcsimile (208) 343-8869
MatyV. York
Holland & Hal't, LLP
P .0. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol, et al.
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095

Dear Mary,
We have reviewed your correspondence dated July 22, 2011 taking exception to
Defendant Grathol's discovery responses and the letter of August 24, 2011 over your
signature concerning the expert witness disclosure we filed and served August 19, 2011. I
will address the points in the ordel' pl'esented in your letters:
I) Expert witnesses. Grathol's recent expert witness disclosures should have addressed
your concerns as to the identity of our anticipated testifying opinion witnesses. The
disclosure filed on August 19, 201 I complies with the Pretrial Order and contains all
of the information required by Rule 26(b)(4)(i), Referring specifically to the August
241h letter (signed by Mr. Tollefson on your behalf), nothing in the Pretrial Order or
the State Court Rules requires a testifying expert to prepare a formal, written repo1t,
''Full and complete disclosures as required by the Court's Order ...•, were1 in fact,
made lo the expert witness disclosu1·e. Nevertheless, Skip Sherwood is p1·epat'ing· a
report, the contents of which will comport to the disclosure and will be pl'Ovided to
you once it is completed.
2) Interrogatory No. 8. - We have produced the documents describing the purchase of
the subject property and all te1·ms related thereto. It appears that you are more
precisely seeking information regarding the ownership of the property by HJ Grathol,
instead of the acquisition of the property by Hughes Investments. As such, your
inquiry focuses on the relationship between the two entities, which have been
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Mary V. York
August 29, 2011
Page2

described in our answer to Interrogatory No. 16, and a supplemental answer dated
May 16, 2011. If this response does not adequately address the information you are
seeking please let us know.
3) Interrogatory No. 9. - The- property has been fully evaluated by Skip Sherwood and
his opinions and the basis for bis opinions were included in Defendant's Expert
Witness Disclosure, Because Mr. She1wood is the only retained valuation expert we
anticipate calling to testify, his opinions and the basis for them are the only facts
discoverable. Appraisals, if any, prepare b-y non·testifying expert witnesses and
consultants are not discoverable.

4) Interrogatory No. 14. - .Your interrogatory was compound. It asked whether
defendant made any offers to sell m: received any offers to buy the property. Grathol
reSponded to th~ 1·equest indicating that it has not received any formal, written offers
for the purchase of the StJbject Property (other than ITD's "offer'} It has, however,
marketed the property for sale or lease as the answer described. Please make an effort
to read the subject discove1y before complaining about the adequacy of the response.
5) Inten·ogatozy No. 16. - Additional information responsive to this l'equest was
provided to your office on May 16, 2011 1 via Defendant HJ Orathol's Supplemental
Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents, Please make an effort to read the discovery before.
including the supplemental r~sponses, befote complaining about the adequacy of the
response.
6) Request for Production No. 5. - Discoverable info1mation responsive to this Request
for Production was set forth in Defehdant's Expert Witness Disclosure. To the extent
that Defendants specifically retained or consulted with other experts who are not
expected to testify, such jnfonnation is precluded from discovery by application of
IRCP 26(b)(4)(B). To the extent the Defendant's anticipated testifying expert has
appraised other properties; those docQments are not discoverable in this case.
7) Request for Production No. 9. - lnfonnation re$ponsive to this request was included
in Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, including compensation to be paid for
testimony by the expe1t. Any other compensation agreements with experrs not
expected to testify are precluded from discovery by application ofIRCP 26(b)(4)(B).
8) Request for Production No, 13. -There are no discoverable documents responsive to
this Request.
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9) Request for Productions Nos, 14 and 16, -As stated, the materials responsive to this
req~est may contain attomey-clie,i.t privileged materials, if they contained internal
privileged discussions of the legal implications involved with acquisition,
development and or/zoning changes. Notwithstanding the stated objection, all
responsive matel'ials were provided.

Please review these responses and let me know if there is anything else.

CDG/sj
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Ted S. Tollefson
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

tstollefson@hollandhart.com

September 1, 2011
Via Fax: 208-664-5884

Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 38511-2011

Dear Chris:
Enclosed please find deposition notices for both Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson.
Given the lack of information provided in your expert disclosure, it is necessary that we
depose these two expert witnesses so that we may be able to provide rebuttal reports as
required by Judge Haynes' pretrial order.
We have set the depositions for the 12th and the 13th of September in Coeur d'
Alene. Please advise if these dates are impossible for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. We
can move the deposition dates if necessary, but they need to happen quickly so we can
attempt to comply with Judge Haynes' pretrial order.
Please contact us with any questions.

#

Ted S. Tollef:
of Holland & Hart u.P
Enclosures
TST:ntp
5223921_1.DOC
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September 6, 2011

Via facsimile {208) 343-8869
Ted S. Tollefson
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box2527
Bois·e, l]) 8.3701

Re!

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol et al.
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095

Dear Ted!

We are in receipt of your correspondence dated September 1, 201 l and the
accompanying Notice's of Deposition Duces Tecum for Alan Johnson and GeoffReeslund.
These wel'e unilaterally scheduled for September 12th and 131b in Coeur d'Alene. Idaho. Both
persons are owners of the Defende.nt entity and, as such, the duces tecum aspect of the
deposition Notices are subject to the timing requirements of Rule 34.
Neither Mr. Johnson nor Mr. Reeslund is available on such short noU-ce to a-nend
these depositions. Because the deposition Notices do not comply wlth Idaho's Rules of Civil
Procedu~. we will not be able to produce any documents at the time and place noted.
Mr. Reeslund is available on October S, 6, 25 or 26 as an alternative. Mr. Johnson
has additional availability. Please provide your availability and we will work to
accommodate your schedules,

CDO/sj
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHABL B. RAMSDBN'
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MARC A. LYONS•
DOUGLASS, MARPICI!•
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tOl!UR O'AI.ENE.10 tlJBH

TIIAAANCI! R. HAlllllS"
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THl!RONI.DESMET

TBLBPtlONB: (208) ISH•S818
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WILLIAM I'- BOYP, 01' COUl'.ISEL

• LlCllNSl!D IN WASHINCTOII

Wl!BSITI!: www.ram1,d'enlyon~.oom

September 19, 2011
Viafacsimile (208) 343-8869

Letter Only
MaryV. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box:2527
Boise> ID ·83701

Re:

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol, et al.
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095

Dear Mary,
This correspondence is in follow up to our telephone conversation on Friday.
September 9, 2011, regarding various ongoing discovery issues. I will attempt to address our
discussion in the order presented to the best of my recollection.

. 1. Ongoing Discovery:
First, enclosed herewith please find Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery
Responses. Included with these responses is a copy of the recently completed appraisal
report of Dewitt Sherwood. The contents of the report are entirely consistent with the Expert
Witness Disclosure previously filed. This report should alleviate your client's concerns with
respect to Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, dated August 19. 2011. We stand on our
position that IRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) does not require such a report to be created. Further.
contrary to Mr. Tollefson's letter of August 24, 2011 the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order did
not require that such a report be created or disclosed by the expert witness deadline. Instead,
the· Pretrial Order simply requires disclosure of the information listed in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)
which we have done. Nonetheless, Mr, Sherwood had completed a report, which you now
liave a copy of.
1
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Second, I included in Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery Responses some
additional information in light of our discussions. I included a supplemental response to
Inte1Togatory No, 8 pertaining to the cash purchase of the property and a reference to the
Phase I Environmental Site Assessment and Phase II Completion Certificate which were
previously produced. There are no other terms or conditions related to the purchase of the
property. I also supplemented our Response to Interrogatory No. 9 that there were no
appraisals performed on the Subject Property when our client acquired it The supplemental
response to Interrogatory No. 14 describes marketing discussions and inquiries about the
property. Again, I reiterated that no offers were made/received.
With respect to Request for Production No. 5, (appraisals performed by Mr.
Sherwood during the previous five years). Defendant stands· on its prior response that it does
not have any documents responsive to this request To the extent such documents exist, they
would likely either be in the possession of Mr. Sherwood or the persons who commissioned
them and subject to the ownership interests of whatever client or entity employed Mr.
Sherwood to conduct them, Howeverl Defendant does not own or have in its possession
such materials, therefore, canlt produce them.

With respect to Request for Production No. 13, we will supplement this request with
additional materials, as necessary. As to Request for Production Nos, 14 and 16, there are no
additional materials responsive to this request.
2. Johnson and Reeslund as Opinion Witnesses:

Defendant disclosed "Mr. Johnson and Mr. R.eeslund as "expert witnesses" morder to
comply with the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order. However, these individuals are not '~expert
witnesses,, in the traditional sense of a Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) disclosure. They fall within the
''actor/viewer exception" possessing information not acquired in preparation for litigation,
but instead are actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject
matter of this litigation- specifically the history, development, construction and value ofthe
subject property. See, Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b){4).
These "experts" are to be treated as ordinary witnesses1 and as such, Mr, Tollefson's
assertions that our Disclosure with respect to these individuals fails to comply with Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(i) is without merit, Out of an abundance of caution. these individuals were
identified because they will testify as to tlieir opinions concerning the Subject Property,
including their opinions of its potential· developability and its value before and after
condemnation. These opinions might constitute what is traditionally thought of as uexpert' 1
testimony because their opinions are based upon specialized .knowledge, experience and
expertise, but that fact alone does not subject them to Rule 26(b)(4(A)(i) considerations.
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You indicated that you desire to depose Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund and we
provided their availability to do so on October 51\ 61\ 25 th and 26th • With respect to your
request that all of their opinions be disclosed to you, that information may be discovered
through their depqsitions which you are entitled to talce, Their opinions will be based on
their observations and familiarity with the property, their experience and history in
commercial developments and on the documentary materials previously produced and
disclosed to you.
We do not agree that your request for infonnation concerning other (unrelated)
projects with which our clients have been involved are either relevant or discoverable, but in
the interest of avoiding any further arguments, we will produce that infonnation to you and
are compiling the supplemental information.

Pl.ease let us know when you would like to take these depositio
your consideration.

hristopher D. Gabbert
CDG/sj
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Maryv. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343.-8869
myork@hollandhart.com

September 20, 2011
VIA FACSIMILE
(208) 664-5884

Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et aL
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVI0-10095
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No.38511.:2011

Dear Chris:
We received your letter from yesterday afternoon regarding the parties' continuing dispute
over HJ Grath.ol' s expert disclosures and other discovery issues. Since your faxed letter did not
include the appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood or Grathol' s supplemental discovery responses, we
are unable to respond to the sufficiency of the information provided. We will review and respond
to those documents once they are received.
With respect to the expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund~ it appears from
your letter that the discovery responses being produced do not contain the opinions of these
experts. Your explanation for the reason why the opinions are not being produced does not excuse
the withholding of these individual's expert opinions.
The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures,
stating that "such disclosure shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." It does not excuse any particular type of expert from the
requirements of the Order. Instead, it specifically requires that the expert disclosures shall include
at least the information required llllder Rule 26(b)(4). In ordet for any witness to offer opinion
testimony, the opinions must be disclosed in advance- as required by the Court's scheduling order
and the Idaho Rules.
Additionally, despite your contention that these individuals are "actor/viewer'' exper-1.S
and are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)-a contention with which
ITD disagrees-ITD has specifically requested in discovery a complete statement of these
individuals' opinions, the substance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions, and
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. ITD's First Set of Discovery, at
Interrogatory 2. Regardless of how these individuals are characterized, Grathol is still required to
Holland&Hartu.,
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869

EXHIBIT
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HOLLAND&HART".~

comply with the Idaho Rnles of Civil Procedure and to provide supplemental responses to
discovery. IRCP 26(e)(1 )(B). Moreover~ to the extent that any of these individual's opinions were
developed in anticipation oflitigation, those opinions are subject to disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4).
We renew our request that Grathol comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and also
supplement its discovery responses to provide a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and
Mr. Johnson's opinions, the sµbstance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions,
and the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. We intend to proceed with
a motion to exclude these experts from testifying or, in the alternative, to compel the disclosure of
their opinions.
If you would like to discuss this matter further, please feel free to contact me.
'fe

tnily yours, _

Mary . ork
ofHo 1 d&

·

LLP

MVY:st
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F\LED:

LAWRENCEG.WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

<\\~ 4/

7011 SfP 26 PH 2: 03

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-881S
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Banlc Pl~
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-S000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVI0-1O095

NOTICE OF liEARIN~

vs.

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washinmon
corporation; and DOES I through S,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF HIARING -1
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT the hearing on Plaintiff Idaho Transportation
Board's ("ITD") Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert
Disclosures is set for Wednesday, October 19, 2011, at 3:30 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, or
as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, before the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes, located at
324 W. Garden Ave. Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816.
DATED this 26th day of September, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of September 2011, I caused to be served a true and
cattect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d' Alenei ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

D
D
IZI
0
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5242358_I .DOC
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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CLERK DISTRICT COURT
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DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COTJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

HJ GR.ATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 28 th day of September, 2011, that Defendant
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons,
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Answers and Responses to
Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, together with a copy of
this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile and/or depositing the same in the United

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - I

ORIGINAL
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States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid.

DATED this 28 th day of September, 2011.

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

a:,,tL '?5:: theinn
~

Doug~Nfarfice, Of
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28 th day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Vus

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

/US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2
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STATE Of IUt:iJiu
} cc.:
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI •.A,
FlLED:

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN

ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: 2rnu...a%~,u.__
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV10~10095
NOTICE OF SERVICE

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES l through S,

Defendants.

NOUCE OF SERVICE -1
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's First Supplemental Responses to Defendant
HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff,

along with a copy of this Notice, was served via U.S. Mail upon the attorneys listed on the
attached Certificate of Service on October 3, 2011.
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

B

ed S. To efs , or the firm
MaryV. Yo , of the firm
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF SERVICE • 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
f"l.-Mstn-1..e•
'I"\ t"'....,.LL-_. ~~
._,llh •uj-"il ~ J.', V"UUIJU-, .C.l:iY,,

Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

~

0

D
D
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 6th day of October, 2011, that Defendant HJ
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Christopher D. Gabbert of the firm Ramsden & Lyons,
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Third Supplemental Answers
and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - I

ORIGINAL
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same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid.

DATED this 6th day of October, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

· topher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

~

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & ILA.RT, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2
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LAWRENCEG.WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney Generai
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise> Idaho 83 707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza

l O1 South Capitol Boulevatd
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208)342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CVI 0-10095

P~TIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
MOTION TO COMPEL

HJ ORATHOL, a California gen~ral partnership;.
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporatiQn~. and DOES 1 through S,_
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATBOL'S MOTION TO
COMPEL-1
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ltD') submits this response to
Defendant HJ Grathol's ("Grathol") Motion to Compel.

l.

INTRODUCTION

Grathol has filed a Motion to Compel the production of documents and information
related to the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road. Orathol 's Motion to Compel should be
denied because the Court has already ruled that !TD is l)Ot condemning any property for
Sylvan/Roberts Road and ITD is not construeting Sylvan/Roberts Road across the Grathol
Property. Therefore, in continuing to pursue discovery based on Sylvan/Roberts Road, Grathol
is defying the Court's ruling striking that issue from the case.
Information related to Sylvan/Roberts Roaq is irrelevant and outside the scope of the sole
issue to be tried in this matter - the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property lTD

is condemning for the US 9S Project and severance damages, if any~ to the remaining property
resulting from the condelilnation of that property. Grathol is barred by law from recovering or
attempting to recover compensation for properly not being taken or severance damages arising
from property not being taken. Therefore, Grathol's motion to compel responses to discovery
relating to its claim based on Sylvan/Roberts Road should be denied.
Giatho) 's motion also seeks to compel the production of documents related to soil testing
performed on Grathol's property. This issue has been resolved between the parties. Once
Grathol clarified the information sought in its discovery requests, ITO produced the requested
information on October 3, 2011.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION
TO
.
COMPEL-2
.
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Il.
A.

FACTS

Grathol Requests Information Regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road Despite The Fact
That ITD Is Not Condemning Any Portion Of Gnthol'• Property For
Sylvan/Roberts Road.
On May 12, 2011 Grathol propounded discovery in which it sought information relating

to Sylvan/Roberts Road. Defendant HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Plaintiff ITD ("GrathQl 's First Set of Discovery"). On July 8, 2011
ITD served its responses in which it produced 4799 pages of documents. ("Discovery
Response'').
As part of its Discovery Response, IID objected to Orathol's discovery requests telating
to Sylvan/Roberts Road (Interrogatories Nos. 10 and 11 and Requests for Productions Nos. 20,
27, 28, 29 and 30). JTD's objection is based on the Court's ruling defining the scope of the
talcing and holding that ITD is not taking any of Graihors property for Sylvan/Roberts Road.
Specifically, in granting ITD possession of the property being condemned for the US 95 Project,
the Court ruled that ITD is not condemning any of Grathol's property for the construction of
Sylvan/Roberts Road and ITD is not constructing Sylvan/Roberts Road across Grathol's

property. These findings and the Court's ruling are ~sed on the Complaint and administrative
Order of Condemnation, as well as affidavits submitted by ITD engineers and the sworn
testimony of the ITD Project Engineer at the possession hearing. See Transcript of Hearing on
ITD's.Motion for Possession ofReal'Pro.perty-("Possessfon Hearing Tr.j 1 at 61:2·25.
Specifically, the Court ruled~ in part:
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court '.s
the Possession Hearmg·transcript is attached as Exhibit A to the
Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of Plaintiff's. lTD' s Response to Defendant HJ GratholJ s
Motion to Compel ('York Aff.").
1 The relevant exceipt from
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opinion does not provide for the taking of the defendant's property
for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The
contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts
Road is certainty mentioned in the order of condemnation, but
mote importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the
extension of that road, and that is not the subject of the taking that
is before this court. The Idaho Department Transportation has
offered to expand those roads through Grathol' s property -· rather~
the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified
to amply before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition.

of

This court finds; then, that plaintiffs' complaint to comply
The complaint itself: the
controlling portions of that complaint, does not show a taking of
defendants' property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into
Roberts Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the Gra,thol
property; therefore, this court finds that the scope of the proposed
taking is adequately defined in the complaint itself.
with Idaho code section 7-707.

Possession Hearing Ti. at 61 :2-25. Further, the Court's Order Granting Possession of Real
Property granted ITD. possession of the property described in Exhibit A to the Complaint, which
consists only of the property needed for the US 95 Project and does not include any for
construction of any portion of Sylvan/Roberts Road.
Based upon and consistent with the Co\lrt's rulings, ITD objected to Interrogatories Nos.
10 and 11, as well as Requests for Productions Nos. 20, 27, 281 29 and 30 on the grounds that
since ITD is not acquiring any of Grathol's property for the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road
and the sole issue for trial in this case is the amount of just compensation to which Grathol is
entitled as a result of the property that is being taken, Otathol's requests were contrary to the

·Court's ruling. irrelevant, and beyond the -scope of permissible disco.very.
Grathol. responded to ITD's· objections in a letter of July 21, 2011, in which it argued that
"[t]he ·expansion and development of additional property belonging to our client on the same
parcel ofland is certainly within the scope ofpermi$$ible discovery for a valuation on damages."
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Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Motion to Compel (''Gabbert Aff."), Ex. A. In
a response letter dated July 29, 2011 ITD corrected several errors in Grathol's July 21, 2011
letter and also reiterated that, in accordance with the Court's order, ITO is not condemning any
of Grathol's property for Sylvan/Roberts Road and requests for infonnation related to that road is
irrelevant and beyond the scope of the case as defined by the facts and the ruling of the Cowt.
Gabbert AfI., Ex. C.
After ITD's letter, on August 3,2011, Grathol filed a public records request with Im and
requested, among other things, the attorney fees incurred by ITO in this condemnation action and
appeal, and documents related to Sylvan/Roberts Road. Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of

Motion to Compel ("Johnson Aff."), Ex. A. The Office of Communications Manager of ITD
denied the request based on Idaho Code § 9-343, which fQrbids the use of public records requests
to "supplement, augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures" in a civil proceeding, and
the fact that Grathol' s request was clearly related to the present condemnation action. Id., Ex. B;

J.C. §9-343.
B.

ITD Complied with Gratbol's Discovery Requests Regard~g Soil Test Logs.
In addition to seeking information regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road, Grathol also sought

discovery of ~il testing and soil log information and gravel estimates and value for the property.
See Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 23. As part oflTD's July 8, 2011 Discovery Response,
ITD obj~ed to Gtathors Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 23 on the grounds that the
requests were ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations. York Aff.,, 5. Nevertheless.
ITO produced more tha,n 3000 pages of environmental documents which ITO believed were
responsive to Orathol's request. See Response to Request for Production No. 7; York Aff.,.1 S.
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In a July 21, 2011 letter, Grathol requested additional information relating to Requests for
Production Nos. 7 and 23. Grathol stated,

Additionally, certain documents and data that were requested were
not provided. That information includes soil testing infonnation,
grading and elevation plans, and correspondence/agreements wi'1t
other public entities relative to Sylvan Road Extension plans. (See,
Requests for Production Nos. 7, 23, 27, 28 29, and 30).
Gabbert Aff., Ex. A.
During a meet-and-confer telephone conference, Grathol's counsel later explained its
broad request and stated that that it was looking for the results of soil testing done on its
property. York Aff., 17. Grathol also provided additional detail regarding its requests as part of
its Motion to Compel. See Motion to Compel at 6-7. Once Grathol had clarified what it was

seeking in its request, ITO researched. the issue and found that American Geotechnics had done
testing on Grathol's property as part of the US 95 Project. See York Aff., 'u'il 7, 8. On October 3,
2011, ITD provided Grathol with the report prepared by American Geotechnics. York Aff. 1 9.

Ill.
A.

ARGUMENT

Grathol is Only Elititled To Pursue Discovery That Is Reasonably Calculated To
Lead To Admissible Evidence.
In accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Grathol may obtain discovery

regarding any matter, not privileged, "which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Grathol is also entitled to information if it appeais

·"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Idaho R. Civ. P.

26(bX1).
In Villa Highlands1 UC v. Western Community 111$. Co., 148 Idaho 598,609,226 P.3d

540, 551 (2010), the ld~o Supreme Court ~held a trial court's denial of a motion to compel on
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the grounds that the information sought was outside the scope of the issues remaining for trial.

Id at 609,226 P.3d at 551. Here, Grathol is only entitled to compensation for prQperty that is
being taken and damages resulting from the taking of that property, and that property alone. No
property is being taken for the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road. Therefore, information

relating to Sylvan/Roberts road is irrelevant and Gtathol's continued pursuit of this issue is
contrary to the Court's ruling in the case. Accordingly, Grathol's motion should be denied.
B.

The Only Remaining Issue For Trial Is The Amout Of Just Compensation To Be
Paid For The Property Condemned For The US 95 Projed.

In an eminent domain proceeding, the Court determines the scope of the taking and the
nature of the property interest taken. Once the trial court has made these findings, the sole

remaining issue left for trial is for the jury to decide the amount of just compensation for the
value of the property taken and severance damages, if any, caused by that taking~ City of

Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 853 P.2d 596 (Ct. App., 1993) (citing Tibbs v. City of

Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667~ 670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979)).
Here, the Court has alread.y determined the scope of the taking and has concluded that the
taking is limited to property needed by ITD for the Athol lnterchange for the US 95 Project, as
described in ITD's Complaint. Possession Tr. 61:23-25 ("therefore, this court fmds that the
.scope of the proposed talcing is adequately defined in the complaint itself."). Thus, the only
remaining i~sue is the amount ofjust compensation owed to Grathol for that talcing- that is, the
taking ofthe property defined in the Complaint, and not any property relating to Sylvan/Roberts

Road.
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The subject matter of this action and the issues to be tried are limited to a
determination of just compensation for the property taken and sevennce
damages to the remainder caused by the taking.

Consistent with the express provisions ofldaho's Constitution and case law,
compensation may be had only for property that is ''taken." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14; Moon v.

North Idaho FarmersAss'n, 140 Idaho 536, 541-542, 96 P.3d 637, 642-643(2004) (citing
Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 717, 781, 53 P.3d 828,832 (2002); Powell v.
McKt1lvey, 56 Idaho 291,307, 53 P.2d 626, 632-33 (1935)).
ldaho' s eminent domain statutes specifically provide that a landowner is entitled to
~ e s only for property taken. I.C. § 7-711. Section 7-711 states, in relevant part:

7-711. Assessment of damages.- The co~ jury or referee must
hear such legal tt$timony as· may be offered by any of the parties
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
1.
The value of the property sought to be
eondemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty,
and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; if it
consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. For purposes
of ascertaining the value of the property, the minimum atnount for
damages shall be the greater of the assessed value for property tax
JlwPOSCS unless the court, jury or referee fmds the property has
been altered substantially, or the plaintiffs highest prelitigation
appraisal.

I.C. § 7-711 (emphasis added). If only part of the property is talc.en then the landowner is also
entitled to <hunages to the remainder which were caused by the taking of a portion of the
property and the construction of the project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. I.C. § 7711(2). Idaho Code§ 7-711(2), states in relevant part:
2.
If the property sought to- be condemned constitutes only
a part of a larger parc~l: (a) the damages which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance
from the portion sought- to be condemned, and the construction of
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the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;
I.C. § 7-711 (2). Thus, once it is established that a taking has occurred and the scope of that
taking, then only remaining issue is the amount of just compensation for that taking.

2.

The scope of the taking has been fully determined in this case, and there is lio
taking of Gnthol's property for Sylvan/Roberts Road.

This Court has concluded that based upon the Complaint, the administrative Ordet of
Condemnation, testimony at length from ITD Project Engineer Mr. Jason Minzghor, and the
complete record in this case, that ITD is not condemning any of Grathol 's property for
Sylvan/Roberts Road and IID is not constructing Sylvan/Roberts Road across Grathol's
property. Possession Hearing Tr. at 61 :2-25; see also January 27, 2011 Order Granting
Possession of Real Property. The. scope of the taking in this case has already been established.
Possession Tr. 61 :23-25 ("therefore, this court finds that the scope of the proposed talcing is
adequately defined in the complaint itself.''). This Court ruled, in part:
The order of condemnation does not provide or in. this court's
opinion does not provide for the taking of the defendant's property
for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The
contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts
Road is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but
more importantly, the complaint does oot contemplate the
extension of that road, and that is l)Ot the sµbject of the taking that
is before this court. The Idaho Department of Transportation has
offered to expand those roads through Grathol's property - rather~
the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified
to amply before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition.

This court finds, then, that plaintiff's' complaint to comply
with Idaho code section 7-707. The complaint itsel( the
controlling portions of that complaint, does not show ·a taking of
defendants' property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into Roberts
Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the Oratbol
property; therefore, this court finds that the scope of the proposed
taking is adequately defined in the complaint it$Clf.
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Possession Hearing Tr. at 61 :2-25. Therefore, since a taking has been established and the scope
of that taking has been determined, the sole issue left to be decided is just compensation for the
property taken - that is, for the acquisition of property for the Athol Interchange on U.S. 95.
Grathol's Motion to Compel regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road has been brought in disregard of the
Court's order. To the extent the Motion represents an attempt to re-litigate the issue, it is
improper, particularly since Grathol bas pursued an interlocutory appeal of the Court's ruling.
3.

Information related to property not being taken is not discoverable because
no compemation can be recovered for property not taken.

Grathol's requests for documents regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road are not relevant to illlY
issue left in the case. The one issue remaining issue for trial is just compensation, and no
compensation can be recovered for property that has not been condemned. Nor are Grathol 's
discovery requests reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. As addressed above,
Grathol mayonly obtain infonnation "which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action" or discovery "reasonably" calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Since no compensation can be recovered for property not
taken, discovery concerning property not taken is not relevant to the issue of just compensation
at trial.

In its Motion to Compel, Grathol argues that it is also entitled to the details of
negotiations and cQrrespondence regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road as it relates to other property
owners. As the Court found, Gratbol refused ITD'·s offer to constr11ct Sylvan/Roberts Road

across its. property. However, other property owners approached. ITO and requested that ITD
construct the road across their property so that they CQuld have another means of acc·ess to the
public road system. As demonstrated at the hearing on 1he Motion for Possession,
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Sylvan/Roberts Road does not need to extend across the Grathol property in order for other
property owners to make use of the road across their property. According, Grathol bas not and
can.not explain how documents relating to negotiations with o1her property owners, who have
requested that Sylvan/Roberts Road be extended across their properties, are discoverable in
determining just compensation for the property being condemned by ITD on the Grathol
property.
Grathol also argues that the reference to Sylvan/Roberts Road in Jason Minzghor's expert
disclosure makes discovery on this issue permissible. Jason Minzghor"s expert disclosure makes
clear that he is prepared to testify regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road only in the event that Grathol

is permitted t() continue to pursue an issue that the Court has struck from the case, and to clear up
Grathol's continued confusion on this issue. Mr. Minzghor's expert disclosure st.ates:
Grathol bas apparently been confused by negotiations among ITD,
Ll}kes Highwlly District, and. other property owners in the area
regarding the potential extension of Sylvan/Roberts Road.
Specifically, Grathol's .neighbors expressed an interest in having
Sylvan/Roberts Road extended across their properties. Because of
the benefits of the extended road, those neighbors decided to
dedicate portions of their property to the Lakes Highway District
and ITD agreed to construct the Sylvan Road extension for those
landowners. The construction of extensions of the Sylvan/Roberts
Road will act as a frontage road for these property owners, wbo
view it to be beneficial to th~ as additional access to their
property.
July 21, 2011 Di.sclosure of Advancing Experts; Gabbert Aff. Ex. B. Grathol3 s c.onfusion and
ITD's continued attempts to correct this confusion do not make these docwnents discoverable.

Further, Grathol argues that Sylvan/Roberts Road information is either discoverable or
should have been produced in response to Grathol's public records.request. Grathol's ·public
records request wp properly denied ·because ·it was improper given the fact this litigation
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between the parties is pending. See I.C. § 9-343. Grathol argues that because this information
was not discoverable in litigation on grounds of relevance then it should have been produced
pursuant to the public records request because it was not relevant to the litigation. This argument
is spurious because it is simply an attempt to avoid and do anl&end-run'' around the discovery
rules in pending litigation. lil aciditio~ Grathol fails to not cite any statute, rule or case in
support of this argument.

Moreover, Orathol's argument fails when the applicable statutes and rules are examined.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(bXl) provides that a party may only obtain discovery which is
"relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). As
described above, information related Sylvan/Roberts Road is not relevant to the subject matter
involved in this pending action, and on that basis, ~thol's request is not permissible under the
Idaho discovery procedures.
Because Grathol was unable to get this non-relevant information as part of discovery,
Grathol filed a public records request seeking to get what it was not entitled to Uilder Idaho's
discovery rules. Johnson Aff. Ex. A. This tactic is expressly forbidden by Idaho Code§ 9-343.
Idaho Code § 9-343 prohibits a party in litigation to attempt to "supplement, augment, substitute
or supplant discovery proceedings." LC. § 9-343(3). Idaho Code§ 9-343(3) states:
(3) Nothing contained in $edions 9-337 through 9-348, Idaho
Code, shall limit the availability of do.cuments and records for

discovery in the normal coune of judicial or administrative
adjudicatory proceedings, subject t9 the ~w and rules of
evidence and of diseo"Very governing such proceedings.
Additionally, in any criminal appeal or post-conviction civil action,
sections 9-33S through 9-348, Idaho Code, shall not make
available the contents of prosecution case _tiles where such material
has previqusly been provided to the defendant nor shall sections
9-335 through 9-348, Idaho Code, be available to supplement,
augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures in any
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other federal, civil or administrative proceeding.
I.C. § 9-343(3) (emphasis added). This statute contemplates that parties to a civil litigation must
avail themselves of the discovery rules and limitations in the civil litigation and cannot expand
discovery by use of the public records statutes. See I.C. § 9-343(3). Since Gratbol is party in a
civil litigation and was seeking to supplement or augment what it was not entitled to in
discovery, Gtathol's public records request was properly denied under Idaho Code§ 9-3412
C.

ITO Provided the American Geoteehnic Soil Report.
Grathol served discovery requests seeking documents related to soil testing and soil log

information and gravel estimates and value for the pro~. See Requests for Production Nos. 7
and 23; York Aff,, 4. In response to Orathol's discovery requests regarding "soil logs" and
"gravel," ITO objected that the terms were vague, ambiguous and subject to differing
interpretations. York Aff, 1 5.
Grathol' s counsel later explained it was looking for the results of soil testing done on its

property during a telephone meet-and-confer. York A:ff., 17. Grathol also pl'Qvided additional
detail regarding its rtquests as part of its Motion to Compel. See Motion to Compel at 6- 7; York
Aff., 1 8. When Grathol filed its Motion to Compel, Grathol explained that it was looking for the
results of soil testing done on its pro~rty by American Geotechnics. Id With this infonnation,
ITD was able to find the report done by American Geotechnics regarding its soil testing
performed as part of the US 9S Project. See York Aff, ml 8-9. Thi$ report was provided to
There can be no question that Grathol' s p\lblic records requ-=st was an attempt ~gment
discovery in a civil litigation because it asked for the amount of attorney fees and costs lTD had
paid um connection with Kootenai County Case No. CVl 0-10095, Idaho Court of Appeals Case
No. 38511-2011 and ITD Project No; A009(791), Key No. 09791, Parcel 19, ITD PID 0044775.~'
Johnson Aff. Ex. A.
2
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Grathol on October 3, 2-011. York Aff. ,9. As a result, ITO has complied with these requests
and this issue is now moot.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Grathol filed a Motion to Compel the production of documents and infonnation related to
the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road -On Grathol's property and the property of others. The
sole remaining issue in this eminent domain case is the compensation owed for the property
taken. Because no compensation can be recovered for Sylvan/Roberts Road and because none of
Grathol's property is being taken for Sylvan/Jtoberts Road, any documents related to
Sylvan/Roberts Road are irrelevant to and beyond the scope of the issue of just compensation in
this case, which is the sole remaining i~e left for trial.
Grathol also sought to compel the production documents related to soil testing on
Orathol' s property. Once Grathol clarified its discovery requests regarding the soil testing
report, 11D produced the American Geotechnics testing report on October 3, 2011.
DATED this 12th day of October. 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney· General
Idaho Transportation Department

PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HJ GRAmOL'S MOTION TO
COMPEL-14

254 of 1617

m:Ted 5. Tollefson 1'o:Judge Haynes (12084461188)

17:4510/12/11GMT-07 Pg 17-26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thi.s 12th day of October 2011, I ca-used to be served a true and
correct copy Qf the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D

D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

~

Fax

D

E-mail
Overnight UPS

D

(208) ~64-5884

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

£~
5257625;... I.OOCX
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LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney Genera!
Chief: Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
~puty Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson ([SB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LL,P
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
IO I South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile.: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;

CaseNo. CVI0-10095

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
ITD'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
MOTION TO COMPEL

STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES I through S,

Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA )

I, Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
I.

I am a partner in the Boise office of the law flffll of Holland & Hart LLP, and I am

licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. I make this affidavit based on my personal
knowledge and to the best of my infonnation and belief.
2.

I represent Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") in this

matter, and make this affidavit in support of ITD 1 s Response to Defendant HJ Grathol's Motion
to Compel.
3.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of page 61 of the official

transcript ofthe hearing on ITO' s Motion for Order for Possession of Real Property held on
January 21, 2011.
4.

On May 12, 2011, Gratbol served discovery requests seeking documents related

to soil testing and soil log information and gravel estimates and value for the property.

5.

In response to Grathol's requests, ITO objected on the grounds that the terms "soil

logs,, and "graver' used by Grathol were vague, ~biguous and subject to differing
interpretations. However, subject to its objections ITO produced more than 3,000 documents,
which included dQCuments it believed were responsive to G.rathors request See ITD's
Responses to Defendant HJ Grathol' s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents to Plaintiff.
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On July 21, 2011, Orathol responded to ITD's discovery responses stating that it

did not receive the requested infonnation regarding the soils testing information. See Affidavit
of Christopher Gabbert in Support ofGrathol's Motion to Compel, Ex. A Grathol stated that it

was looking for information that included ".soil testing information, grading and elevation plans,
and correspondence/agreements with other public entities relative to Sylvan Road extension
plans. Id. Despite the additional information contained in Grathol' s letter, ITD continued to
believe that it had produced all relevant discoverable information responsive to Grathol's
request.
7.

In a meet and confer conversation, counsel for Grathol provided fµrtber

explanation as to what it was seeking in its discovery requests and indicated that it wanted the
:results of soils testing performed on the Grathol Property. Upon receiving this additional

infonnation, I sought to obtain the information from ITO.
8.

However, before I was able produce the infonnation, on September 19, 2011

Grathol filed its Motion to Compel. Orathol 's motion provided for the first time the specific
details of the information it was requesting. Upon receiving this information,.! followed up with
ITO and obtained the information requested in Grathol's motion.

9.

IID produced the Geotechnics Report to Grathol on October 3, 2011. Attached

as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Notice of Service filed by ITD pursuant to which it
produced to Orathol the requested infonnation.
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Dated this 12th day of October, 2011.

~r;ott.
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 12th day of October, 2011.

I hereby certify that on this 12th day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfic.e, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

D

0
!ZI

D
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant

5254268_1.DOC
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Page 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
--oOo-THE ST~TE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSP-ORTATION B-OARD,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)
)
)

)

)

vs.

) case No. cv~10-10095

HJ GRATHOL, a California
general partnership; STERLING
SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,

)

)
)

)
)
)'
)

______________
Defendants/Appellants.

)
)

MOTION HEARING
AT:

Ko.otenai County Courthouse
Coeur d'Alene, I4aho

ON:

January 21, 2011, 1:34 p.m.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lansing L. Haynes

APPEAR~CES :
F::>r

the Plaintiff:
TED TOLLEFSON
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
Boise, Idaho 13102

F::>r the Defendant:

DOUGLASS. MARFICE
CHRISTOPHER D, GABBERT
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
Coeur d'Alene, I_qabp 83814
Reported By:

Ke.ri Veare, CSR 675, CDA Reporting
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State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Boa,d v. HJ Grathcl, et al

January 21, 2011

C:V-10-10095

Page 61
1

in Idaho code section 40-315, subs~ctio'ti 1,

2

subsection B.

3

provide or in this cou.rt' s opinion does not provide for

4

the taking of the defendant's property for the expansion

5

of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road.

6

of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts Road

7

is certainly mentioned in the order of condemn.ation, but

8

more i:nportantly, the complaint does not contemplate the

9

extension of that road, and that is not the subject of

10
11

The

ordez:: o.f condemnation does not

The contemplation

the taking that is before this court.
The Idaho Department of Transportation has

12

offered to expand those roads through Grathol's

13

property -- rather, the Sylvan Road expansion through

14

Grathol's property, but that offer has been declined by

15

the defendant and this has been testified to amply

16

before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition.

17

This c:ourt finds, then, that plaintiffs'

18

complaint to comply with Idaho code sectio.n 7-707.

19

complaint itself, the controlling portions of that

20

complaint, does not show a taking <>'f defendants'

21

property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into Roberts

22

Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the G.rathol

23

property; therefore·, this court. finds that the scope of

24

the proposed taking is adequa·tely defined in the

25

complaint itself.

The
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's First Supplemental Responses t.o Defendant
HJ Orathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plainlifl:

along with a copy of this Notice, was served via U.S. Mail upon the attorneys listed on the
attached Certificate of $ervice on October 3, 2011.
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

ed S. To di

, or the fi.rm

MaryV. Yo ofthefirm
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff'
Idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTD'ICATE or SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of October, 2()11, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
11nug!as S Marfii:-.ej Rqq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP

700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax~ 208-664-S884

~

B
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail

Overnight UPS

Attorney~for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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c:~-T.

18. 2011 4:06PM
Oct. 18, 2011 9:30AM

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STA TE OF IDAl-:10
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J, TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Dep'Uty Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)

Ted S. Tollefson (!SB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.0. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000

Facsimile:

(208) 343-8869

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tim FIRST Jlf.DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THB STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

HJ GRATHOL, a Califo.rnia general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK)
a. Washington corporation; and DOES I
through S,

Case No. CVI0-10095
STIPULATION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME FOR

PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL
EXPERTS WITNESS
DISCLOSURES AND FOR
"ACARREQUJ OFFER"

Defendants.
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NO. 34 77 P. 3/5
No. 5307 P. 3

O~·T.18.2011 4:07PM
0ct . 18. 2011 i : 31 AM

Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, ldallo Transportation Board ("ITD") and Defendant
HJ Grathol (''Grathol") (hereinafter referred to collectively as the ccparties~1), by and

through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

The parties agree to extend the deadline for ITD to identify rebuttal expert

witnesses and serve their disclosures of opinions to be offered at trial from October 19,
2011 to November 21, 2011, and request the Court to enter an Order accordingly. The
Courtss Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretl'ial Order will otherwise remain unchanged.
a.

The Court's Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretrial Order provides
that all parties are to disclose rebuttal expert witnesses no later
than ninety days (90) before trial. The trial in this matter is
scheduled to begin on January 17, 2012, which would require that

rebuttal expert witness be c]jsclosed no later than October 19, 2011.
b.

The parties agree to a. one-month extension for ITD to disclose
rebuttal expe11: witnesses and opinions, which would extend ITO' s
deadline to November 21, 2011.

2.

The parties also agree to eitend by one month the date by which ITD may

submit an of.fer of settlement in accordance with Ada Counly Highway District v.
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and succeeding cases and other
relevant provisions of Idaho law. Under this extension, ITD's i'Acarrequi" Offer will
be due no later than November 21. 2011 and Grathol m.ay not assert any argument that

an "Acarregui" offer made on or before Noveniber 21, 2011 is untimely.
3.

Grathol agrees that all opinions of its experts Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood,

Alan Johnson, and Geoff Reeslund have been disclosed,
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTlli'F'S REBUTTAL266 of 1617
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR "A.CARREQUI OFFER" • 2

I

N0.3477 P. 4/5
No. 5307 P. 4/5

o:T.18.2011 4:07PM
Oct. 18. 2011 9:37AM

4.

ITD agrees to withdraw Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony

or, Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures, currently pending before the Court and
scheduled for hearing on October 19J 2.011.

S.

The parties respectfully submit that good cause exists for this Stipulation

and that this Stipulation is not intended to impact other existing deadlines in this case.
DATED this 16 day of October, 2011.

RAMSD:SN & LYONS, LLP

Attorneys for laintiff
Idaho Transpottation Department

STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL267 of 1617
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR 1'ACA.RREQUI OFFER,, 3
M

NO. 34 77 P. 5/5
No. 5307 P. 5/5

on. 1s. 2011 4:07PM
Oct. 18. 2011 9: 37AM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l hereby certify that on this .11...'fl.tay of October, 2011, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the foiiowing:

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.

P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83816-1336

0

~D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

Fax

E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5258823_2.DOC
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COUNTY OF K(),JTEN.~

V'-'

~

LAWRENCB 0. WASDEN

ATTORNEY GENERAL

?01 l on \8 PM 3: 36

STATE OP IDAHO

CU:RI< DISTR!GT COURT

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3S86)
Deputy Atto~y General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

f.iEPi,:i-·-----·
~
· -----

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attomey General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
MaiyV. York(ISB #S020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HARTLLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capilol Boulevard
P.O. Box2S27
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869

Attomeys for Plaintiff

IN TBE DISTRICT COtJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTatCT OF THE
STATE OF mAHo, IN AND FOR TBE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THB STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CaseNo. cv10.. 1009s
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF
M0110N TO COMPEL AND
MOTION TO EXCLUDE

TESTIMONY AND ·REQlJEST TO
H1 ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
SrERLING SAVlNGS BANK. a Washington
corporation; and DOES l through S,

VACATE BEARING

Defendants.

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION TO
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND UQUEST TO VACATE IIEAIUNG • l
269 of 1617

Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITO"), by and through its
attorneys ofrecord, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby provides notice of the withdrawal of its Motion
to Compel and Motion to Exclude Testimony. The parties have resolved the issues presented in
ITD's Motion and through a separate and contemporaneous filing will file with the Court a
Stipulation for Extension of Time for Plaintiff's Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosures and for

"Acarrequi Offer." Where Ito's Motion is withdrawn., there is no need to hold the hearing on
ITD's Motion, which is currently set to be heard on Wednesday, October 19, 2011. ITO
therefore requests that the Court vacate such hearing.
WHEREFORE, ITO respectfully requests that this Court approve the withdrawal of
ITD's Motion to Compel and Motion to Exclude Testimony without prejudice and vacate the
hearing set for October 19, 2011.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.

MaryYor

Special
Attome for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION TO
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND REQUEST TO VACATE HEARING - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D
~

D
D

I

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 664-5884
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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} ,
STATE: Or IOAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS

~~40C\

LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

ZOii OCT 21 AH IQ: 27

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.o. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334·8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
MaryV. York(ISB #S020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HARTLLP

Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attomeys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F1RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVl0-10095

NOTICE OF SERVICE

vs.

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1
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NO. 3493

P. 3/4

Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Defendant HJ Grathol~ along with a copy of this Notice, was served
via facsimile upon the attorneys listed on the attached Certificate of Service on October 21,
2011.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2011.

HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S, Marfice, Esq.

Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

D

U.S. Mail

[81

Hand Deiivered
Fax 208-664-5884
E-mail

D

D

D

Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES
TECUM OF STANLEY MOE
Date: November 15, 2011
Time: 9:30 a.m. (PST)
Place: Ramsden & Lyons, LLP

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFFS

AND TO:

PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL OF RECORD - JOHN MAGNUSON

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Coastal Community Bank will
take testimony on oral examination of STANLEY MOE before a court reporter and notary
public commencing on Tuesday, November 15, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. (PDT) and continuing
thereafter from day to day until such time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at
the offices of Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, 700 Northwest Blvd., Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, at which

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF STANLEY MOE· I

ORIGINAL
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time and place you are notified to appear and take such part in the examination as you may
deem proper. This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The deponent is requested to bring with and produce the following:
1.

All documents you relied upon in formulating your expert opinion(s) in this

2.

Your entire file in the matter of The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board

matter.

v. HJ Grathol, including, but not limited to, all documents, correspondence, reports,
memoranda, notes, photographs, drawings, diagrams, and files, and all drafts and versions of
the same which are connected with or relate to the above captioned case and the matter at issue.
3.

All documents substantiating or otherwise relating to any and all assumptions

made by you in formulating your opinions in this case.
4.

All reports, summaries, memoranda, notes, correspondence, drawings, diagrams,

plans, site plans, site proposals, or other documents provided to or reviewed by you, which
were prepared by or on behalf of State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board or Idaho
Transportation Department, or its attorneys regarding the above captioned litigation.
5.

All correspondence and/or documents, including emails, between you and the

State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board, or Idaho Transportation Department, its employees
or attorneys or any other expert witness or consultant in this matter related to this action.
6.

All correspondence and/or documents, including e-mails, authored or received

by you related to this action.
7.

Copies of any and all of your written opinions, including all drafts and revisions

of the same relating to this action.

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF STANLEY MOE - 2
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8.

All literature and publications you have reviewed in connection with this action

and upon or about which you may testify at trial.
9.

All photographs, of the HJ Grathol property in your possession.

10.

All other documents not specifically referred to herein which you use or reiied

upon in formulating your opinions in this case.
11.

Copies of any and all exhibits which you may use at the trial of this matter,

including those in draft form.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS,

. is pher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
:Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_·_ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_·_ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

on James
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

2011 OCT 25 PM I: 4 l
C~ DISTRICT COURT
OEP~J

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES
TECUM OF JASON MINZGHOR
Date: November 15, 2011
Time: 1:30 p.m. (PST)
Place: Ramsden & Lyons, LLP

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

ANDTO:

PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL OF RECORD-MARY YORK

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant HJ Grathol will take testimony
on oral examination of JASON MINZGHOR before a court reporter and notary public
commencing on Tuesday, November 15, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. (PST) and continuing thereafter
from day to day until such time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices
of Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, 700 Northwest Blvd., Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, at which time and
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place you are notified to appear and take such part in the examination as you may deem proper.
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are further notified that you are requested, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedures 30(b)(l), 30(b)(5), 34(a), 45(a), and 45(d)(l) to have present at the time of
the taking of your deposition, the following documents and tangible things described below:
1.

All documents you relied upon in formulating your expert opinion(s) in this

2.

Your entire file in the matter of The State if Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board

matter.

v. HJ Grathol, including, but not limited to, all documents, correspondence, reports,
memoranda, notes, photographs, drawings, diagrams, and files, and all drafts and versions of
the same which are connected with or relate to the above captioned case and the matter at issue.
3.

All documents substantiating or otherwise relating to any and all assumptions

made by you in formulating your opinions in this case.
4.

All reports, summaries, memoranda, notes, correspondence, drawings, diagrams,

plans, site plans, site proposals, or other documents provided to or reviewed by you, which
were prepared by or on behalf of State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board or Idaho
Transportation Department or its attorneys regarding the above captioned litigation.
5.

All correspondence and/or documents, including emails, between you and any

other expert witness or consultant in this matter related to this action.
6.

All correspondence and/or documents, including e-mails, authored or received

by you related to this action.
7.

Copies of any and all of your written opinions, including all drafts and revisions

of the same relating to this action.
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8.

All literature and publications you have reviewed in connection with this action

and upon or about which you may testify at trial.
9.

All photographs, of the HJ Grathol property in your possession.

10.

All other documents not specifically referred to herein which you use or reiied

upon in formulating your opinions in this case.
11.

Copies of any and all exhibits which you may use at the trial of this matter,

including those in draft form.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2011.
RAMSDEN&LY

,,..

S,LLP

Byb:" ' - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - Christopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
_,!Hand Delivered
_-V_ FF:acsimile (208) 343-8869
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

t

i~

uG TENAI ;iS

2011 OCT 26 AM 8: 31

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO
COMPEL

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS
BANK, a Washington corporation; and
DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

This matter came on for hearing before me, the undersigned Judge of the aboveentitled Court, on the 19th day of October, 2011, in Coeur d'Alene, upon the motion of
Defendant HJ Grathol, for an order compelling discovery made pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, dated September 13, 201.

Counsel for Defendant HJ

Grathol, Christopher D. Gabbert and counsel for Plaintiff the State of Idaho, Idaho
Transportation Board, Mary York was present.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO COMPEL- 1
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The briefs of the parties were considered, oral argument was heard, and good cause
appearing therefore,
NOW, THEREFORE it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff shall, on or before November
4, 2011 answer fully and completely, under oath, each part of Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, and
20, and Request for Production Nos. 27, 28, 29 and 30 set forth in HJ Grathol's
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents dated May 12, 2011.

DATED this~ day of October, 2011.

JrnWo~ili-~ ili'ii?

District Court Judge

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO COMPEL - 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the~ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Maii
Hand Delivered
~acsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 343-8869

Douglas S. Marfice
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

-4

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~ Facsimile (208) 664-5884

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO COMPEL- 3

283 of 1617

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
H J GRA THOL, ET AL.

)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0010095

UKJJEK ASSlliNlNli SK. UlSTKlCl' J lJUliE
CHARLES HOSACK FOR TRIAL PURPOSES ONLY

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Charles Hosack, Sr. District Judge of the First Judicial District of
the State ofldaho, is hereby administratively assigned to take jurisdiction of the above entitled action for trial purposes
only.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of Kootenai County shall cause a copy of this
Order to be mailed to counsel for each of the parties, or if either of the parties are represented prose, directly to the prose
litigant.

DATED:

Thursday, October 27, 2011

ohn T. Mitchell, Administrative District Judge

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows:

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE
PO BOX 1336
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336

[/4-axed

[ ] Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

MARYV. YORK
P. 0. BOX 2527
BOIS]:, ID 83701-2527

[ ] Faxed

[ 1 Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

-r:-n- iP~t.J -58'8'-f

a

V~Y.. - :l.(Jf· ~ L/ 8- ~3'~,

~'PIA.• \ . . . ~ ~

\l~Vl(,;i.., -:r. o.

J.17rn 1homa5
C--N-_ J, of~ ~3l/--LJc../1?
,~1~\

Dated:

I

By:

ORDER ASSIGNING SR. DISTRICT JUDGE
CHARLES HOSACK FOR TRIAL PURPOSES ONLY
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FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE f\li' IDAHO
\ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTl
.I
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD

)

)
)
)
)

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, ETAL.

Case No: CV-2010-0010095
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for:
Status Conference
Tuesday, November 08, 2011
IN CHAMBERS CONFERENCE CALL
Charles W. Hosack
Judge:
Courtroom:

08:30 AM PST

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on November 2nd, 2011.

Plaintifrs Counsel:

MaryV. York
P. 0. Box 2527
Boise ID 83701-2527
Mailed

Defendant's Counsel:

Hand Delivered

~axed (208) 343-8869

Douglas S. Marfice
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336
Mailed

Hand Delivered

kaxed (208) 664-5884

Dated:

Wednesday, November 02, 2011
Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk Of The District Court

By:

Suzi Sverdsten, Deputy Clerk

CV Notice Of Hearing
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m:Naoml l. Pratt ·{o:Clerk (12084461188)

15:1511/04/11GMT-07 Pg 02-04

LAWR.ENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

20!! NOV -4 PM 2: 17
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

~/V11.A
I

r-

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile:

(208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy AttOJ:'D.eys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Banlc Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVI0-10095

NOTICE OF SERVICE

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, aCalifornia general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Wamingtoil
corparation; and DOES 1 through 5,.

Defendants.

NOTICE OF SERVICE -1
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m:Naoml :;, Prafi To:Clerk(12084461188)

15:15 11/04/11 GMT-07 Pg 03-04

Pum,mnt to the Ida,ho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the

undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Responses to Defendant
HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff,

along with a copy of this Notice, was served upon the attorneys listed on the attached Certificate
of Service, in the manner indicated, on November 4, 2011.
DATED this 4th day of November 2011.

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2
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15: 15 11 /04/11 GMT-07 Pg 04-04

m:Naomi ·;. Prat\. To:Clerk (12084461188)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day ofNovember, 2011, I cau~ to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing.by the method indicated below, and addressed t<> the following:

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered.
Fax
E.:mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

528S400_1.DOC
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FIRST !'"r1lICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF lDAHO
II
~D FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEl'
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000

)
)
)
)
)

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, ETAL.

Case No: CV-2010-0010095
AMENDED
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for:
Status Conference
Thursday, November 10, 2011
11 :00 AM PST
IN CHAMBERS TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE. PARTIES WILL CALL INTO A PHONE NUMBER
WHICH WILL BE SUPPLIED.
Judge:
Charles W. Hosack
Courtroom:

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on November 7th, 2011.

Plaintifrs Counsel:

J. Tim Thomas, Deputy Attorney General
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise ID 83707-1129
Hand Delivered
Mailed
MaryV. York
P. 0. Box 2527
Boise ID 83701-2527
Mailed
Hand Delivered

Defendant's Counsel:

~xed (208) 334-4498

Kaxed

(208) 343-8869

Douglas S. Marfice
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336
Mailed
Hand Delivered

~xed (208) 664-5884

Dated:

Monday, November 07, 2011
Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk Of The District Court

By:

Suzi Sverdsten, Deputy Clerk

AMENDED CV Notice Of Hearing
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~bt11~FO~D~~8TENA l ~ SS
f'1LEO:

2011 NOV 14 PH 6: 06
CLERK OISTR\C . COURl
KOOTENAI COUNTY CASE NO.:

CV 2010-10095

'

\)

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
H.J. GRATHOL, a California general
partnership, et al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on November 15, 2011,
I lodged the original transcript of the Defendant's Motion to
Compel hearing heard on October 19, 2011, consisting of 22 pages,
for the above-referenced case with the District Court Clerk of
the County of Kootenai in the First Judicial District.

Official Court Reporter for Judge Haynes

First Judicial District
Coeur d'Alene, ID
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072

2011

~mv

I 5 AH g: 47

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

~f

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-10-10095

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 14th day of November, 2011, that Defendant
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons,
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Second Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, together with a copy of this Notice,
upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile.
DATED this 14th day ofNovember, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

~ (2, s;. Y11-~LDou¥ss.liar?e, 6fth~
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day ofNovember, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Maii
ft:{and Delivered
_-----V--_ "R
Fa·csimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_'_ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

HOLLAL'JD & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 2
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STATE OF IDAHO
)
County of Kootenai
. ) SS
FILED
/ /- I & - f f

"3:

AT
ID O'clock____.,£_M
CLERK, DISTRICT COURT
/)

~

LA_

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
BOARD,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV2010-10095

)

Plaintiff(s),
vs.
H J BRATHOL, ETAL,
Defendant(s).

)
)
)
)
)
)

AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER

Pursuant to IRCP 16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
A court trial for eight (8) days will commence at the Kootenai County
Courthouse at 9:00 a.m., March 5, 2012.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Pretrial Order is hereby amended as follows:
1.

PRETRIAL MOTIONS:

All Pretrial Motions or Motions for Summary

Judgment shall be timely filed so as to be heard on February 8, 2012, at 10:00 a. m. The
motions and supporting briefs must be filed on or before January 6, 2012; response briefs

AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER: 1
CV 2010-10095
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must be filed by January 20, 2012; and any reply briefs by January 27, 2012.

2.

EXPERT WITNESSES: Not later than December 19, 2011, plaintiff(s) shall

disclose all expert rebuttal witnesses to be called at trial. Such disclosure shall consist of

any opinions to which the expert is expected to testify.

The disclosure shall be

contemporaneously filed with the Court.
DATED this

I,·

. ,· .· /

day of November, 2011.

CHARLES W. HOSACK,ISTRICT JUDGE

AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER: 2
CV 2010-10095
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing have been mailed, postage
/fo day of November, 2011, to:
prepaid, facsimile, or sent by interoffice mail, this
Plaintiff's Counsel: J. Tim Thomas, Deputy Attorney Geneial (fax 208-334-4498) ~
Plaintiff's Counsel: Mary V. York (fax 208-343-8869) ¾
Defendant's Counsel: Douglas S. Marfice (fax 208-664-5884) ~
--Y9~

CLIFFORD T. HAYES
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By_~~---~~---Deputy Clerk

AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER: 3
CV 2010-10095
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FIRST :f(J])ICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE f\1<' IDAHO
\ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTI
.I
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000
FILED II/ l(c /2011 AT 3: rDp M
ST ATE OF IDAHO, COUNT OF KOOTENAI
CLERK OF THE DISTRI
COURT

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD

)
)
)

vs.

SS

Case No: CV-2010-0010095

NOTICE OF HEARING
HJ GRA THOL, ETAL.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Motion
All motions.
Judge:
Courtroom:

Wednesday, February 08, 2012 at 10:00 AM
Charles W. Hosack

Court Trial Scheduled
8 days.
Judge:
Charles W. Hosack
Courtroom:

Monday, March 05, 2012 at 09:00 AM

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Thursday, November 10, 2011.

Plaintiff's Counsel:

Defendant's Counsel:

J. Tim Thomas, Dep Atty General
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise ID 83707-1129
Mailed
Hand Delivered

}(_]Faxed (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York
P. 0. Box 2527
Boise ID 83701-2527
Mailed
Hand Delivered

[~Faxed (208) 343-8869

Douglas S. Marfice
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336
Mailed
Hand Delivered

p<)Faxed (208) 664-5884

Dated: Thursday, November If.;, , 2011
Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk Of The District Court
By:

Shari Rohrbach, Deputy Clerk

CV- Multiple Notice of Hearing
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

STATE OF IDAHO
l
CQUNTY OF KOOTENAlf SS
FILED:

2011 DEC -6 AH ,0; 07
CLERK_DISTRICT COURT

'C?ba/Y?~~OEPtlTY

~

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COLlRT OF THE FIRST JUDICLt\L DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 5th day of December, 2011, that Defendant
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons,
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses to
Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, together with a copy of this
Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the same in the United States Mail, Coeur

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - I
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d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid.

DATED this 5th day of December, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

ad'v.. $'

~/

Df

,

Douglas. Marfice,
Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and a7ssed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

16:3112/19/11GMT-07 Pg 03-05

'"'LOI I OEC 19 PM 3: 4flJ1
ci,{
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civii Litigation Division

n'f#J 6~
-- -

'

I

IJi
•

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile:

(208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Steve C. Bowman (ISB #4404)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
IO 1 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box' 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701~2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

CaseNo. CVl0-10095

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF
DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL
EXPERTS

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF lffl'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF RED.UTTAL EXPERTS- I
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m:Naor- 1 T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

16:31 12/19/11 GMT-07 Pg 04-05

Plaintiff Idaho Ti'ansportation Department hereby gives notice that it has disclosed its
rebuttal expert witnesses Jason Minzghor, Stan Moe, Carole Richardson, Ken Geibel, Kevin

Picanco, Jeff Key, Larry Pynes, George Hedley, and Dennis Reinstein on the date set forth
below, in accordance with the Court's scheduling orders of April 5, 2011 and November 16,

20661, and Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of December, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

B

S.
efs
r the finn
Mary V. Y r of the firm
Special Deputy Attorneys General

'f.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
ldaho Transportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS- 2
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m:Naol"li T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of December 2011, I caused to be s.erved a true a,nd
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D

~

l8l

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail

Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

S347S20_1

PLAINTIFF ITO'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS- 3

301 of 1617

=m:Naoml T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188)

15:3812/27/11GMT-07 Pg 03-05

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

•ffl.}ss·
.
~ 31/7Jµo
Fl.ED:

ATIORNBY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

2111 DEC 27 PM 2: 36

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy AttQmey General
Chief, Civil. Litigation Division

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB-#5923)
Deputy Attc,mey General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ldahe> 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-881S
Facsimile:

(208) 334-4498

Mary V. Yd.rk (ISB #S020)
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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), files this brief in support of
its motion for summary judgment. ITO has moved for summary judgment to dismiss improper
claims for compensation or damages by Defendant HJ Grathoi ("Grathoi") in this condemnation
case. The claims are barred by law and should be dismissed on swnmary judgment. In support

of this motion, ITD has also filed the Affidavit of Mary V. York with the documents and
portions of the record cited in this brief attached.
Il.

SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR MOTION

The issue of whether a taldng has occurred in connection with a particular claim for just
compensation and whether a claim for compensation is permitted by law are legal questions for
the Court to decide. The following is a summary of improper claims by Grathol has made in this
case and the legal principles that bar them.
A.

Sylvan Road.

" of land for construction of
Grathol continues to seek compensation for the alleged taking
Sylvan Road. However, the record is clear and the Court has already ruled that ITD is not
condemning any property for Sylvan Road and is not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's
property, Therefore, this claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.

B.

Construction Delay.

Grathol seeks to recover money damages based on what it characterizes as "delay" on the
part of ITD in constructing the US-95 Project. The law is clear that a condemnee may not
recover damages for alleaed delay in the construction of a public project. Moreover, Gtathol has
no factual basis to claim that ITO has failed to meet a construction schedule constituting
"construction delay" that would support this claim,

PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-3

311 of 1617

JAN. 6. 2012

C.

4:58PM

NO. 3883

P. 9

Visibility.

Grathol seeks to recover severance dam.ages based, in part, on a claim that its proposed
commercial development will be less visible by cars traveling on US-95 after the Project. Idaho
does not recognize claims for "loss of visibility.'' idaho law holds that no property owner is
entitled to a particular pattern or flow of traffic past its property. Therefore, no property owner is
entitled to a particular level of visibility by passing automobile traffic. For example, no talcing
would occur ifITD moved US-95 away from the Grathol property entirely, resulting in no traffic
on US-95 running past the Grathol property. The law does not permit a property owner to
recover either for a loss of traffic or a loss of visibility from traffic. Courts have repeatedly
struck down claims for loss of visibility in condemnation cases.

D.

Access.

Grathol seeks compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of access to its property
after constructi~n of the US-95 Project. The Grathol property is bare land. Grathol is planning a
commercial development on the property. It is undisputed that Gtathol did not have any
commercial access or any permits for commercial access to the property before the US-9S
Project. Therefore, ITO has not "taken" any commercial access to the property. Moreover,
Idaho law does not permit compensation for a taking of access unless all access to the public
road system has been lost or 11destroyed," The record shows that Gtathol will be pennitted
accesses in the "after" condition.

E.

Lost Profits.

Grathol seeks to recover as much as $7 million in lost profits in this case. Idaho law bars
recovery oflost profits except when made under Idaho's eminent domain statute authorizing
"business damages." Idaho Code§ 7-711(2). Grathol does not qualify under§ 7-711(2) because
it has not operated a business on the site for 5 years. No business exists on the site. It is bare
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land. Grathol also did not file an administrative claim for business damages within 90 days of
service of the complaint, which is a mandatory prerequisite under § 7-711(2). Lastly, Idaho law
bars claims for lost profits based on new businesses because such claims are inherently
speculative.

F.

GraveL

Grathol seeks to recover compensation for the value of gravel it believes is located on the
property and which Grathol alleges ITD can use for the US-95 Project. This claim fails as a
matter of law and should be dismissed. !TD is buying the condemned property lock, stock, and
barrel - including any gravel or anything else of value that may or may not be under the
property. Grathol cannot recover the fair market value of the property and an additional amount
for gravel. Secondly, Grathol has no idea whether there is any usable gravel under the property
or not, how much there is, or what it is worth. It has simply made a demand for $300,000.00.

Lastly, ITO cannot remove the substructure on the property and then construct a freeway
overpass on it. If any substructure is removed, it would have to be replaced with like material or
better, and then re-compacted. Consequently, it would be far more expensive to remove gravel,
then buy new gravel, truck the new gravel to the site, :fill, and then compact the new gravel to
restore the site, than it would be to simply use gravel from a supplier.

G.

Severance Damages For Impacts On Development Plan.

Grathol knew about the US-95 Project before it bought the property. Even though it
knew the US-9S Project would be built, Grathol developed a "before" development plan after
buying the property and now seeks to recover severance damages for the Project's impacts on its
"before" plan. The law does not permit one to buy a piece of property with knowledge of a
public project, plan a commercial development for the site, and then claim severance damages to

that plan when the public project is built. Moreover, the law assumes that the purchase price
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paid by the new property owner reflects the parties' understanding of the value of the property in

light of the impacts of the impending public project.

ID.

A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The ITD Project.

The Idaho Transportation Department is engaged in a project to widen and improve a
section of US-95 between the communities of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the Project").
In 2002, ITD initiated a comprehensive study of US-95 between Garwood and Sagle. Affidavit
of Jason Minzghor ("Minzgbor Aff. "), 1 4 (filed Jan. 18, 2011 ). The study determined that US95 should be redesigned and expanded to improve public safety and enable the highway to
accommodate increasing traffic volumes. Id.
Due to the size of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into seven
segments. Id, at 16. The Grathol property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, !TD
Project No. A009(791 ), Key No. 9791. Id. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 1. 8
miles ofUS-95 from a two-lane, unrestricted access highway to a four-lane divided and accesscontrolled highway. Id., at 17. The Athol Segment will also construct an interchange with
Highway 54 just outside of the town of Athol. Id.

B.

The Grathol Property,

The Grathol property is located in Kootenai County, outside the town of Athol, at the
northeast comer of present US-95 and Highway 54. Before the Project, the total area of the
Grathol property was 56.81 acres. The property condemned, shown in Exhibit B to the
Complaint, is 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.496 acres after the taking. Compl., Ex. B.
A metes and bounds legal description of the 16.314 acres condemned in the Complaint is
attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. Id, Ex. A.
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The construction plan sheets for the US-95 Project specific to the Grathol property are
attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint. Id, Ex. B. These plan sheets identify and define the
taking on the Grathol property and the US-95 highway improvements to be constructed on the
Grathol property. These plan sheets also identify and define the property proposed for
condemnation in the administrative order of condelllrultion. Id., Ex. C to Complaint (Admin.
Ord. of Condemn., at 1,112, 3).
The following is an enlarged view of the primary construction plan sheet contained in
Exhibit B of the Complaint. It shows the Grathol property outlined in green, with the
condemned property shaded in yellow. It also shows the construction that will occur on the
condemned property in the area shaded in yellow.
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Below the area shaded in yellow is the location where Sylvan Road would have been
constructed by ITD if Grathol had agreed to dedicate the land for that purpose, The diagram also
shows Roberts Road to the right (north) of the Orathol property and the connection of Roberts
Road with Williams Lane (far right), which provides the additional access to the road system
sought and obtained by Grathol's neighbors to the north.
Both the administrative order of condemnation and the Complaint use the construction
plans to identify and define the property to be condemned from Orathol. As the construction
plans plainly show, ITD is not condemning any of the Grathol property for construction of
Sylvan Road. The only property being condemned is shown in yellow and the only improvement
being constructed is US-95, also shown in yellow. It is undisputed that that the Complaint does
not condemn any property for Sylvan Road. It is also undisputed that the administrative order
did not identify any land to be condemned for Sylvan Road.

C.

Procedural History.

After approving the US-95 Project, its route, and the properties to be acquired, ITD began
the process of design, right-of-way acquisition, and contract bidding. After good-faith attempts
to reach agreement with Grathol for the purchase of its property were unsuccessful, ITO initiated

the administrative process to prepare for condemnation of the property. On November 17, 2010,
the Idaho Transportation Board issued its Order of Condemnation. ITD filed this condemnation
action on November 19, 20 l 0. No change in the construction plans or the land to be condemned
from Grathol occurred in the two days between the administrative order of condemnation by the
Board and the Complaint filed in this case.
On December 21, 2010, ITO filed a Motion for Possession of the Grathol property.

Grathol opposed the motion, in part, on the grounds that ITD was secretly intending to condemn
land for Sylvan Road in this case. Grathol was apparently confused by the fact that ITD had
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agreed to construct Sylvan Road to the north of the Grathol property because those property
owners agreed to dedicate the land for that purpose. That same offer was made to Grathol, who
declined. Consequently, ITD advised Grathol that Sylvan Road would not be extended across its
property.
On January 21, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion for
possession. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court held that ITO was not condemning any
land for Sylvan Road and was not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Hearing
Transcript ("Tr.''), at 61:2-16 (York Aff., Ex. 1). On January 27, 2011, the Court entered a
written order granting ITD's Motion for Possession, finding that ITD had the power of eminent
domain and had complied with Idaho's condemnation statutes. On March 4, 2011, the Court
entered a Judgment on its order granting possession, and Grathol appealed the judgment to the
Idaho Supreme Court.
On November 16, 2011, the Court entered an Amended Pretrial Order setting a trial date

of March S, 2012 and ordering that all pretrial motions are to be filed on or before January 6,
2012.
IV.

A.

ARGUMENT

Grathol's Attempt To Recover Compensation For An Alleged Taking Of
Land For Sylvan Road Should Be Dismissed.

Despite the Court's ruling that ITD has not condemned any land for Sylvan Road and is
not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol' s property, Grathol continues to seek compensation
for a talcing of land for Sylvan Road. This claim should be dismissed on summary judgment
because the Court has already ruled that ITD is not condemning land for Sylvan Road. This
r1Jling is supported by the undisputed facts in the record and no contrary evidence exists.
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The Court has ruled that ITD is not condemning any property for
Sylvan Road in this case.

ITO filed a motion for possession of the property condemned in this matter, consisting of
16.314 acres of property to be used for reconstruction and improvement of US-95. The Court
held an evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion and the scope of the taking in this case on January
21, 2011. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court rejected Grathol's argument that ITO was
also condemning property from Grathol for the extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol
property. Tr. at 61:2-25 (YorkAff., Ex. 1). As held by the Court:
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court's
opinion does not pro"ide for the taking of the defendant's property
for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The
contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts
Road is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but
more importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the
extension ofthat road, and that is not the subject ofthe taking that
is before this court. The Idaho Department of Transportation has
offered to expand those roads through Grathol's property-- rather,
the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified
to amply before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition.

Id., at 61:2-16 (emphasis added), The Court further concluded that "[t]he complaint itself, the
controlling portions of that complaint, does not show a taking of defendant's property for the
expansion of Syl"an Road into Roberts Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the
Grathol property; therefore this court finds that the scope of the proposed taking is adequately
defined in the complaint itself.'' Tr. at 61 :18-2S.

2.

The Court's ruling is fully supported by the record and no contrary
facts exist.

The Court's finding and decision are amply supported in the record, and no contrary facts
or evidence exists or has been offered by Orathol. The construction plans for the US-95 Project
do not call for construction of Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Id., at 12:13-13:16. The
Project plans show that the property condemned from Orathol is beina used exclusively for the
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US-95 Project. Id., at 31:7-22; 33:12-34:l. See also Ex. B to Complaint (project plan sheets for
construction of the US-95 Project on the Grathol property).
Jason Minzghor, P.E., is the District 1 Project Development Engineer for ITD. As the
District 1 Project Development Engineer, Mr. Minzghor is responsibie for managing and
administering the planning and design of state highway projects in District 1. The US-95 Project
is in District 1, making Mr. Minzghor the engineer with primary responsibility for the planning
and design of the Project. Mr. Minzghor submitted an affidavit in support of ITD' s motion for
possession. His affidavit makes clear that ITD is not condemning any portion of Grathol's
property for the construction of a Sylvan Road extension.
10.
Contrary to the claim in Gra'tb.ol's brief in opposition to the
motion for possession of the property, ITD is not condemning any
portion of the Grathol property in order to construct an extension
of the Sylvan/Roberts Road as part of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle
Project. ITD's Complaint does not seek to condemn any property
from Gtathol for construction of any such extension. The only
property being acquired by ITD in this case is property ne~ed for
tb.e realignment of US-9S and the construction of the Highway 54
interchange.

*

*

*

17.
In this eminent domain proceeding, ITD is not condemning
any portion of Grathol' s property for an extension of
Sylvan/Roberts Road.
Minzghor Aff., 11 10, 17 (filed Jan. 18, 2011). Gtathol has not presented any testimony or any
factual evidence to the contrary.

At the January 21, 2011 evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion for possession, Mr.
Minzghor testified unequivocally that ITD is not condemning any property from Grathol for
Sylvan Road. See Tr. at 11: 1-8; 13:9-16; 20:1-25; 21:1-24; 33:1-25; 34: l :23 (York Aff., Ex. 1),
For example, Mr. Minzghor testified as follows,
Q.

As pan of these project plans, is there any property being condemned for the
expansion of Sylvan Road?
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No, sir.
Q.
Is the construction or condemnation of property of Sylvan Road necessary to
complete this project?
A.

A.

No.

Id., at 11: 1-8.
Mr. Minzghor also testified that nothing in the administrative order of condemnation calls
for the condemnation of any property for Sylvan Road.
Q. Mr. Marfice also had you read a section on page 2, 4(e) (of the administrative order
of condemnation]. If you could go back to look at that. And it~- to summarize, it says

that "In association with the project, the Idaho Transportation Department is in the
process of extending Sylvan Road to tie into Roberts Road." At some point in time - or
excuse me, at one point in time it was contemplated that there may be some sort of
connection?
A. Correct.

Q. But there's no plans for that now?
A. No.

Q, Anything that Mr. Mar.flee has raised up there that require you or ITD or the project
to construct Sylvan Road?
A. No.

Q, Anything that Mr. Mar:tice has said require ITD to construct Sylvan Road in any
particular manner or designation?
A. No.

Id., at 34:2-20.

ITD also bas no plans to construct Sylvan Road across the Orathol property in the future.

Id., at 33:2-23. Since Sylvan Road is a local street, and not a state highway, if Sylvan Road is
ever extended across the Orathol property in the future, it would be constructed by some other
entity such as Lakes Highway District. It is not being constructed by ITD as part of the US-95

Project
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The Court's findings and conclusions that ITD is not condemning any property fo1
Sylvan Road, and is only condemning the property identified in the Complaint, are fully
supported by the record. No contrary facts exist.

3.

Grathol's motive for seeking condemnation for Sylvan Road is to
improperly shift the required costs of its development to the public.

Gtathol 's eagerness to have its land condemned for Sylvan Road begs the question why? According to Gtathol, "Defendant is an entity versed in the development and construction
of commercial retail projects for profit. Defendant acquired the subject property, accomplished a
zone change and has been actively engaged in pursuit of a development plan for the property."
Grathol Resp. to Mot. for Poss., at 2 (filed Jan. 11, 2011).
In Idaho, cities and counties generally require developers of residential and commercial
developments to construct the roads within the developments, and then dedicate those roads to
the public with the plat. See, e.g. 1 I.C. § S0-1309 (requiring owners of new developments to
"make a dedication of all public streets and rights-of~way shown on said plat"). The Grathol
property is in Kootenai County. Kootenai County has adopted specific ordinances requiring
dedications of roads within new developments.
Section 9-9-2 of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances regulating commercial zones
requires that every "Commercial Lot shall have direct access from a public road." See York

Aff,, Ex. 2 at 2). Thus, every individual lot within the 40~acre commercial development
proposed by Gtathol will, by law, have to have access from a public road. Similarly, Section 10·
3-l(B)(4)(e) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances (identifying the services and
infrastructure that the developer must construct to serve a commercial subdivision) requires "
[p]ublicly~maintained road access to each lot, as approved by the Highway District." See id, at

p. 33 of Ordinance. Section 10-3-1(0)(2) requires the interior roads constructed by the
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developer to meet highway district or ITD standards. "Road rights-of-way shall meet the
requirements of the Highway District or, if applicable, ITD." Id., at p. 35 of Ordinance. Section
10-3-1 (D)(2) further makes clear that the developer will be required to dedicate the fully
constructed roads within the development to the county or local highway district: "Except for
gated communities and common driveways approved by the Board [of county commissioners],
roads and associated rights-of-way shall be dedicated to the applicable highway agency." Id.
(brackets and emphasis added).
In summary, in order for Grathol to proceed with commercial development of its

property, Kootenai County will require Grathol to construct internal roads within its
development that meet highway district standards1 so that each commercial lot will have the
required direct access from a public road. To make the interior roads "public," Kootenai County
will require Grathol to dedicate the internal roads within its development to the local highway
district.
Therefore, Grathol's motive for trying to force ITD to condemn land for Sylvan Road is
obvious. Under Kootenai County's ordinances, Grathol will be required to construct the road at
its expense and dedicate the road and the land to the county highway district as a condition of
approval for commercial development of its property. By making the claim regarding Sylvan
Road in this case, Grathol is trying to shift costs of its commercial development onto the public
that should rightfully and legally be borne by Grathol, the commercial developer. Regardless of
its motive, Grathol cannot force ITD to condemn property for a local street or property that ITD

does not need for a state highway project.
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Grathol's claim for damages based on Sylvan Road fails as a matter of
law.

In Idaho, a civil complaint of condemnation defines the nature and scope of the take.
Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ud P'shp, 148 Idaho 718,727,228 P.3d 985,994 (2010); Ada
County Hwy. Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,891, 26 P.3d 1225, 1228 (Ct, App. 2001) (holding
that the condemnation complaint controlled the scope of the take).

Here, the Complaint identified and attached the Project plans as Exhibit B. The Project
plans define the take as 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.496 acres after the t.aking.
Nowhere in the Complaint or Project plans is there any suggestion that ITD is condemning any
portion of the Grathol property for Sylvan Road,
Grathol admits this fact. Indeed, Grathol agrees that ITD's Complaint and the legal
description and project plans "show that (ITD] intends on condemning a 16.314 acre portion of
Defendant's property." Gtathol Resp. to Mot. for Poss., at 11 (filed Jan. 10, 2011). Grathol
further acknowledges that "the only evidence of Sylvan Road across Defendant's property is
Plaintiff's imposition of a dotted line indicated some future route of Sylvan Road on Exhibit C
[to ITD's Complaint].' 1 Id, at 12 (brackets added).
Additionally, Grathol's Vice President of Development, Alan Johnson, testified during
his deposition that the legal description and project right-of-way plans, which are attached as
Exhibits A and B to ITD's Complamt, do not include any property for the extension of Sylvan
Road across the Grathol Property. Johnson Dep., at 92: 17-93:15 (Ex. 3 to the York Aff.). Geoff
Reeslund, Grathol Is Vice President and Director of Design and Construction, testified that he
reviewed the construction plans attached as Exhibit B to ITD' s Complaint and stated that he did
not see any indication that ITD had taken property for the construction of Sylvan Road.
Reeslund Dep., at 29:4-22 (York Aff., Ex. 4). Orathol has retained Skip Sherwood as an
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appraiser in this case. Mr. Sherwood testified that it is his understanding that the extension of
Sylvan Road is not part of this condemnation case. Sherwood Dep., at 193:10-13 (York Aff.,

Ex. 5). Mr. Sherwood testified that the extension of Sylvan Road is not included in the legal
description attached to ITD's complaint, nor is it included on the right-of-way plans. Id., at
193:23-194:15. Despite their acknowledgements that ITO is not condemning property for an
extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property, Grathol continues to seek compensation
for a taking for Sylvan Road.
The Court has ruled that ITD is not condemning land from Grathol for Sylvan Road. The
uncontroverted facts show that ITD is not condemning land for Sylvan Road. Grathol has
admitted that neither the Complaint nor the construction plans for the US~95 Project condemn
land for Sylvan Road. Grathol cannot force ITD to condemn property, nor can it recover
compensation for a roadway that ITD is not building and is not needed for the US-95 Project.
Based on the foregoing, ITO requests that the Court enter summary judgment dismissing
Gtathol' s claim for compensation based on an alleged taking of land for Sylvan Road.
B.

Grathol Cannot Recover Damages Based On Its Allegation Of Delay In
Construction Of The US-95 Project.

Grathol has made an improper claim for compensation based on alleged delay in the
construction of the US-95 Project. Specifically, Alan Johnson, Grathol's Vice President of
Development, has claimed that Grathol is entitled to $9471000.00 for the "reduction in value for
the remainina property while waiting for the completion of construction.'' Orathol's Third Supp.
Resp. to Discovery, at 11 (York Aff., Ex. 6).
Grathol's claim for compensation based on an alleged delay in construction ofUS-95
fails as a matter oflaw for the following reasons. First, the claim is contrary to the Idaho
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Constitution and established case law by the Idaho Supreme Court. Second, the alleged delay
does not constitute a "taking" of property and, therefore, no compensation is owed.

1.

Claims for compensation for construction delay in condemnation
cases are barred by Idaho law.

In Idaho, the law is clear that "before an owner is entitled to compensation for a violation
of Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution, his property must be 'taken' and not merely

'damaged."' Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,541, 96 P.3d 637,642 (2004)
(holding that damage caused by sensitivity to post-harvest burning did not amount to
compensable taking of property because grass burning constituted interruption but less than a
"complete" deprivation of use).
In Idaho, the landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and
that the property right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218,596 P.2d 75, 90
(1978). No Idaho statute or case supports the proposition that Grathol has a protected property
right to have the US-95 Project constructed on a schedule or by a date desired by Grathol.
In addition, a landowner cannot recover damages where there is "no indication that the

condition is permanent." Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781-82, S3 P.3d 828,
832-33 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387
(1992)). Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Moon that "the mere interruption of the use
of one's property, as it is less than a permanent (complete) deprivation, does not mandate
compensation." Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96 P.3d at 643. See also 4 NICHOLS ONEMINENT
DOMAIN § 13, 19 ("Under the prevailing rule, the profits a business owner has been deprived of

by reason of the interruption of operations by the condemnation are not compensable.").

By its nature, an alleged ''delay" in construction is not permanent. The US-9S Project is
being built and will be completed, Anything less than a permanent deprivation of property does
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not amount to a compensable taking. Covington, 137 Idaho at 781, 53 P.3d at 832; Moon, 140
Idaho at S42, 96 P.3d at 643. See also 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 10.02(3), n.61
(Matthew Bender, 3rd ed.) (citing cases).

In Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 {1978), the Idaho
Supreme Court denied a claim based on construction delay in the course of a public project, and
highlighted the policy reasons behind the rule that a landowner cannot recover damages for
construction delay, In Just's, a business owner brought an action against a contractor who had
been hired by the City ofldaho Falls to complete a large scale public works project which
included removal and replacement of portions of the City's streets, sidewalks, and water and
sewer lines. Id. at 463, 583 P.2d at 998. Among other claims, the business owner sought
recovery of business damages associated with project delays and annoyances that occurred
during construction. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of damages
for the business owner on the project delays. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005. The Supreme Court
reasoned that "[t)his plaintiff is surely not the only person who may have suffered some
pecuniary losses as a result of the downtown renovation project" but '·could conceivably include
not only all the other business in the area, but also their suppliers, creditors, and so forth, ad
infinitium." Id Thus, the court reversed the award of damages because such a holding ''would

unduly burden any construction in a business area." Id.
In summary, claims in condemnation cases for compensation based on construction delay

are barred by the Idaho Constitution and case law from the Idaho Supreme Court.
2,

Other jurisdictions also bar recovery for construction delay in
condemnation cases,

Other states are in accord. See, e.g., Frank v. Government of City ofMorristown, 294
S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn. Ct App. 2008) (reiterating the rule that "[d]amages resulting from
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inconvenience during construction are not recoverable in a condemnation action"); Hurst v.

Starr, 607 N.E.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) C'intetference of temporary duration
during construction of an improvement... are not permanent in nature as they do not last beyond

the completion of the project and have no effect on the market value of the property before the
improvement was commenced and no effect upon the market value of the residue after the
improvement was completed''; State v. Baken Park Enters., 257 N.W.2d 448, 449-50 (S.D.
1977) ("losses incurred by property owner in the way of loss of income ·and profits ... together

with other inconveniences attendant upon the work in progress, are not compensable items of
damage resulting from a construction project.").
3.

In Idaho, just compensation is measured as of the date of issuance of
the summons in the condemnation case. This statutory mandate bars
recovery for compensation based on allegations of construction delay.

In Idaho, the date of valuation for purposes of determining just compensation is set by
statute. Idaho Code § 7-712 requires that the value of the property taken in a condemnation
action and the severance damages that will accrue to the remaining property are to be determined
as of "the date of the summons." The statute specifically requires that the property's "actual
value, at that date, shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, and
the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where
such damages are allowed[.]" Id. See also State ex rel, Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,449,
546 P.2d 399,404 (1976). The statute permits no discretion on this issue. Rather, the language
of the provision speaks in mandatory terms, requirins that the value of the property as of the date
of summons "shall be the measure of compensation." Id
If the proper date of valuation is not applied, the validity of the valuation analysis is
compromised. As stated in Niehols on Eminent Domain, "[i]t is critical that the appraisal
performed by both parties reflect the legal date of-valuation." 5-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
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DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011). A party's "[fjailure to appraise according to the correct date of value

may give rise to a motion to strike the appraisal, or the reversal of the entire verdict."

5-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011)
The fact that the date of valuation bars claims for construction delay is reflected in the
case law. For example, in Oakland County Bd of County Road Comm 'rs v. JBD Rochester,
LLC, 718 N.W,2d 845, 846-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), a highway district sought to exclude any

"appraisals of defendants' property that took into consideration a posttaking road construction
delay caused by congressional funding problems." 718 N.W.2d at 846. The trial court permitted
introduction of the post-taking road construction delay. Id On appeal, the Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that "[t]he trial court erred in admitting appraisals of
defendants' property that took into consideration the posttaking road construction delay because
the claimed severance damages were not caused by the taking." Id. at 848.
The court explained that "the proper measure of dam.ages in a case involving a partial
talcing consists of the fair market value of the property taken, plus severance damages to the
remaining property if applicable." Id. at 847. Relying on Michigan Supreme Court precedent,
the Oakland County Court emphasized that evidence of post-taking construction delay was
"irrelevant to the just compensation calculation ... because just compensation must be calculated
on the basis of the market value of the property on the date of the taking''-not an indiscriminate
future date as was advocated by the defendants. Oakland County, 718 N.W.2d at 847 (emphasis
added) (quoting Mich. Dept. ofTransp.

11.

Haggerty Corridor Partners Ltd P'shp, 700N.W.2d

380,387 (Mich. 2005)).
Likewise, the court held that post-taking construction delay could not be considered as
part of any severance damage calculation to the remainder because the delay damages were not
"attributable to the taking." Id The court explained that the "[d]efendants placed an
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unwarranted reliance on the expectation that the road project would be completed" where
"[d]elays caused by lack of funding occur with some regularity." Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
Ultimately, the court found that that any project delay was unrelated to the taking and because
the "defendants were not deprived of value inherent in the land," they couid not recover
damages. Id
Similarly, in Idaho, no taking occurs in connection with a claim for compensation where
the landowner has not been deprived of all economic use or value of its property. See Covington
v. Jefferson County, 137 ldaho at 781, 53 P.3d at 832; Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass}n, 140
Idaho at 541, 96 P.3d at 642 (no taking occurs absent a "complete" deprivation of use). The
planned US-95 Project has not deprived Grathol of all use of the property nor has it deprived the
property of all economic value. In fact, Grathol has already developed site plans for construction

of a commercial development in the "after" condition. (York Aff., Ex. 7.)
4.

Grathol's claim for compensation based on construction delay fails
factually.

As previously noted, planning for the US-95 Project began in 2002. Grathol purchased
the property in May 2008. Grathol' s Third Supp. Resp. to Discovery, at 4 (York Aff., Ex.6);

Johnson Dep., at 25: 19-21 ('I ork Aff., Ex. 3); Exhibit 44 to Johnson Dep. (York Aff., Ex. 8).
Grathol's stated intention for the property was "to develop it into a commercial retail
center/hospitality project." (York Aff., Ex, 6, at 4.)
OTathol first learned about the property in January 2008. Johnson Dep., at 25:22-25
(York Aff., Ex. 3), At that time, the listing for the property by the Multiple Listing Service

provided notice to any prospective purchaser that a highway interchange was planned to be
constructed on the property, Johnson Dep., Ex. 43 (York Aff., Ex. 9). Specifically, the listing
for the property stated that "preliminary drawings show future off-ramps and frontage road for
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[highway] 95 through this property.'' Id The listing notice also advised that the purchaser
should ''check with [the] Department of Transportation to verify" the details regarding the
interchange. Id.

Mr. Geoff Reeslund also confirmed that Grathol was aware of the Project before it
purchased the Property. Reeslund Dep., at 22:13-23:4; 65:19-24 (YorkAff., Ex. 4).
A.

We were aware that there were plans by ITD to potentially realign and
improve the freeway.

Q.

And did you know about this prior to purchasing the property?

A.

Yes.

Id., at 22:25-23:4.
Additionally, Grathol rnet with representatives oflTD before it purchased the property
and were shown the preliminary plans for the Project. Johnson Dep., at31:20-32:13; 36:7-14
(York Aff., Ex. 3); Reeslund Dep., 87:8~88:7 (York Aff., Ex. 4). Through its meetings with ITD
and its review of the preliminary projeci plans, Grathol knew about the Project and had
knowledge of details of the Project. Id.
Given the fact that planning had begun on the US-95 Project in 2002, and construction
had not started when Grathol bought the property in 2008, with knowledge of the Project,

Grathol cannot now complain about "delay'' in the completion of the Project. The Project had
already been in planning and development for 6 years when Grathol bought the property. Since
construction of the Project had not even begun when Grathol bought the property, it cannot now ·
claim that it is entitled to compensation for a delay in construction, This conclusion is further
bolstered by the fact that ITD had not even filed its condemnation suit to acquire a portion of the
Grathol property when Grathol bought the property. Under these facts, Grathol has no basis to
claim compensation for construction delay.
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Alan Johnson, vice president of Grathol, states that Gratbol is entitled to $947,000.00 for
construction delay. However, be provides no foundation and no verifiable methodology to
support this claim. See Grathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Discovery, at 11 (York Aff., Ex. 6).
ITD's rebuttal expert, Dennis Reinstein, CPA, highlights the deficiencies in this "construction
delay" claim.
Mr. Reinstein notes that Alan Johnson's methodology is inherently flawed, does not
adhere to any accepted practices or methodology, and is unverifiable. Reinstein Rebuttal Report,
at 2 (York Aff., Ex. 10). Mr. Johnson's claim also fails to state or consider whether market
demand existed for a commercial development at this site at the time of the taking and does not
identify any tenants that were lost or had even given any indication of a desire to locate to this

site. Id.
The delay claim does not cite any independent source or verified information to support
the amount of$947,000.00. Id. at 4-5. The claim also fails to account for the fact that Grathol
was aware of the project before it bought the property, Id. The claim also fails to properly

account for market fluctuations (including the steep economic decline that began in 2008) or the
difficulties in obtaining commercial financing after the crash in 2008.
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that the Court enter summary judgment dismissing
Gtathol's claim for compensation based on alleged delay in construction of the US-95 Project.
C.

Grathol Cannot Recover Damages for Loss of Visibility.

Grathoi seeks to reeover compensation based on a claim that the remainder of its property
will be less visible from US~-95 after construction of the Project. This claim is barred by Idaho
law and should be dismissed on summary judgment
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Idaho law.

A "right of visibility" or "right to be seen" is not a recognized property right in Idaho.
Neither the legislature nor any Idaho cases have recognized a compensable property interest in

"visibility" or a "right to be seen" from a roadway. Nor have any Idaho cases held that uioss of
visibility'' from a roadway is compensable in eminent domain or inverse condemnation cases.
Consequently, Grathol cannot establish that its claim for loss of visibility is based on a valid or
protected property right recognized in Idaho.
Idaho courts have repeatedly held that a property owner does not have a right to any

particular flow or pattern of traffic or a right to have direct access to or from a particular
direction oftraffic. State ex ,el. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,447, 546 P.2d 399,402 (1976);

James v. State, 88 Idaho 172, 178, 397 P.2d 766, 770 (1964) (citing Villages ofEden & Hazelton
v. Idaho Bd. ofHwy. Dirs., 83 Idaho S54, 556,367 P.2d 294,301 (1961)). Thus, where
construction of a road improvement project results in a less convenient or more circuitous route,
no compensable taking occurs. James, 88 Idaho at 177-78, 397 P.2d at 770.

This principle has been upheld repeatedly by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brown
v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 42-3, 855 P.2d 876, 879-80; Bastian, 97 ldaho at 447, 546
P.2d at 402; Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 742 P.2d 397; Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53

P.2d 626 (1936). In each of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court held that rights of property
owners abutting a street or highway do not encompass a right to any particular access from any
particular road, from any particular direction, or a right of any particular pattern or flow of
traffic. See Brown, 124 Idaho at 41-44, 85S P.2d at 879-81 (analyzing Bastian, Me"itt, and

Powell), In addition, the Supreme Court has held that mere inconvenience to the public of
having to drive a greater distance or a more circuitous route to reach the landowners' property
does not constitute a takina, Id. at 44, 855 P.2d at 881.
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Based on these principles, ITD could re-route US-9S entirely so that no traffic travels
past the Grathol property at all. Or ITO could restrict US-9S so that most traffic travels
elsewhere. Under either scenario, no taking would occur as a matter of law. In addition under
9

either scenario, the complete or partial diversion ofttaffic away from Grathol's property wouid
also necessarily result in a complete or partial loss of visibility of the property by that traffic.
Since no compensation can be had for a change in traffic flow or pattern under Idaho law, no
compensation can be had for loss of visibility.

2.

If no recovery can be had for changes in traffic flow, no recovery can
be bad for changes in visibility caused by changes in traffic flow.

The issue of visibility is necessarily and inextricably intertWined with traffic flow. See,

e.g., Dept. ofTransp. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 1S9 P.3d 111, 113 (Colo. 2007) ("We hold
that because a landowner has no continued right to traffic passing by its property, the landowner
likewise has no right in the continued motorist visibility of its property"); State v. Schmidt 805
9

S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. 1991), rev'd 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993) ("Just as a landowner has
no vested interest in the volume or route of passersby, he has no right to insist that his premises
be visible to them."); State ex. rel. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Com 'n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457,

468-69 (Mo. App. 1987) (in partial taking case, "any claim as to damages for 'public view' or
visibility is 'inextricably related' to a property right in the traffic, [and) the decisions have
consistently refused to 'accord to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic."'),
Because Grathol has no right to a particular pattern of traffic flow, it necessarily has no
right to compensation based on loss of visibility of its property by passing traffic.

·--

3.

Courts have repeatedly denied claims for loss of visibility.

Case law shows that claims in condemnation cases for compensation based on an alleged
loss of visibility have been repeatedly rejected across the country. In Dept. ofTransp. v. Marilyn
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Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d 111 (Colo. 2007), the Colorado Department of Transportation
constructed a light rail line as part of a project to expand and improve Interstate 25 in the
metropolitan Denver area. Id. at 112. As part of the construction of the light rail line, COOT
filed a condemnation action to take a narrow strip of land, 650 feet long, from Marilyn Hickey

Ministries. Id. The property was located next to a major interchange on I-25, at Orchard Road,

Id. CDOT constructed a concrete retaining wall on the condemned property to support an
overpass for Orchard Road. Id. The property owner complained that the retaining wall blocked
the view of the property by passing motorists on 1-25, and sought $1.9 million for the loss of
visibility alone. Id. The trial court granted CDOT's motion in limine to exclude testimony on
loss of visibility. Id. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed that ruling. Id. at 113. The case
then went to the Supreme Court of Colorado:
We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals
erred in ruling that the landowner, part of whose property is being
taken by eminent domain for a state transportation project, may
recover damages for the impainnent of passing motorists' view of
the remainder of the landowner's property. We reverse the court of
appeals and hold that motorists ' visibility ofproperty is not a
compensable right under the Colorado Constitution,

Id. at 112 (emphasis added). In reversing the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court held
as follows:
Generally, freeway visibility is analyzed as an access claim and
condemnees have been found to have no right to visibility . , . We
hold that because a landowner has no continued right to traffic
passing its property, the landowner likewise has no riab,t in the
continued motorist visibility of its property from a transit corridor.

Id. at 113 (eitations omitted). The court cited one of its earlier decisions, Troiano v. Colo. Dept.
ofHwys., 463 P.2d 448, 45S (Colo. 1969), where it concluded that "'[w]ith the majority view

holding that a property owner has no right to have the traveling public pass bis property,
logically it would be inconsistent to say that a property owner has a right to have the traveling
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public afforded a clear view of his property."' Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d at 144
(quoting Troiano, 463 P.2d at 455). This is precisely in accord with Idaho law and should be
. applied to Grathol's loss of visibility claim in this case.
The Supreme Court of Colorado further held:
[A] public transit corridor like 1-25 is an always evolving multimodal point of access to a city's transportation infrastructure. The
state's police power enables continued modifications to its public
transportation systems and the "[r)ight of access is subject to
reasonable control and limitation," Troiano, 463 P.2d at 451,456.
"[L]ogically it would be inconsistent'' to recogni2e a right to
visibility but no right to have the traveling public pass one's
property. Id. at 455. Under Troiano, there is simply no inherent
property right to continued traffic or visibility along the 1-25 transit
corridor.

Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d at 114~15. The retaining wall in Marilyn Hickey Ministries
was built on the property condemned from the property owner, and the visibility claim was
denied,

As additional rationale for the rule, the Colorado Supreme Court explained:
(W]hile the original construction ofI--25 may have provided a
benefit of motorist visibility looking toward the [landowner's]
property, this benefit was constructed with taxpayer funding as part
of a major public works project. A motorist's view of the
[landowner's property] was an artificially created condition,
established in an exercise of the state's police power, which does
not inhere in the compensable value of the [landowner's] property.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted long ago that '4when a benefit is
conferred upon a landowner, the value of which he does not pay
for, he takes it upon the implied condition that he shall not be paid
for it when it is taken away." Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17,
18, 31 N.E. 702, 703 (1892),

Id. at 116, Here, Grathol puzposefully purchased property near US-95 for the commercial
benefits of proximity to the highway. Grathol did not pay for those benefits. The highway was
constructed at public expense. Grathol cannot now claim that it should be compensated when
changes are made to the highway, again at public expense.
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In City o/Wichita v. McDonald's Corp., 971 P.2d 1189 (Kan. 1999), the city

reconstructed U.S. Highway 54 (also known as Kellogg Street) through the City of Wichita. Id.
at 1192. Wal·Mart owned and operated a Sam's Club at the comer of Kellogg and Dugan
Streets. Id. As part of the project, the city condemned two strips of land along two edges of the
Sam's Club property. Id. at 1193. The construction project closed the intersection of Dugan and
Kellogg, causing Kellogg/U.S. Highway 54 to "fly-over" Dugan Street, and the grade of the
reconstructed highway rose by 21 feet above the previous grade. Id. In addition, the frontage
roads alongside the highway were converted to one-way roads, one of which provided primary
access to Sam's Club. Id. IfITD had taken similar action in this case, it would have closed the
intersection of US-9S and Highway 54 entirely, and made Highway 54 a one-way road.
The court in City of Wichita detailed the tortuous route that motorists had to take after the
project to reach Sam's Club. Id. at 1192-93. The court also set forth the facts showing that the
visibility of Sam's Club and its signs was now blocked from both directions on the freeway and
from the on and off ramps at the nearest interchanges from Dugan Street. Visibility fi:om the
freeway was blocked both by the substantial elevation in the grade of the freeway and by the
concrete structures supporting the freeway "fly-over" Dugan Street Id.
Wal-Mart argued that it was entitled to compensation for loss of access, restricted access,
and loss of visibility. Id. at 1193. Finding that the Sam's Club property had "reasonable" access
after the project, the trial court excluded expert testimony offered by Wal-Mart on these claims
on the grounds that "it takes into account, and is based on, access, -view, convenience, and/or
productivity [which] bear no relation to the valuation of the taking and is not admissible." Id. at
1194. When it received a compensation award far less than that advocated by its excluded
experts, Wal-Mart appealed,
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas first distinguished between a "right of access"

and "regulation of traffic flow." Specifically, the court explained that a "right of access" is
''traditionally defined as an abutting landowner's common-law right of access from the
landowner's property to abutting public roads." Id.

at

1197. Whereas "'[r]eguiation of traffic

flow"' or 'circuity of access' ... is an entirely separate concept. An abutting property owner has
no right to the continuation of traffic flow from nearby highways to the owner's property." Id.
Although certain of the accesses to Sam's Club were now on a one-way street that had
previously been a two-way street, and the one-way street no longer connected to the freeway
near Sam's Club, both the trial court and the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that no access had
been taken as a matter of law, since the property still had "reasonable" access. Id. at 1198.
Toe court then addressed the following question: "Did the district court err by ruling
Wal-Mart's expert witnesses could not consider impairment of access and view, inconvenience,
change of grade, and interference with the productive use of the subject property in assessing
damages under K.S.A. 26-513(d)?" The court flatly concluded ''No." Id. at 1192. As to the
specific issue of "loss of visibility,'' the Supreme Court of Kansas held:
Wal-Mart also claims damages for loss of view, essentially arguing
that because Kellogg is now a raised freeway, motorists cannot see
Sam's from certain vantage points. Wal-Mart's claim finds no
support as a common-law easement of view. The easement of
view or "ancient lights" doctrine protected landowners from
neighbors who would erect structures blocking light or air from the
landowner. Kansas has never adopted the doctrine. See Anderson
v. Bloomheart, 101 Kan. 691, 692, 168 P. 900 (1917). Wal~Mart's
claim also finds no support as a ('right to be seen." A "right to be
seen" claim for damages (for example the advertising value of a
location) is generally denied. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain
§ 14A.03[4] (3d ed. rev. 1998).

City of Wichita, 911 P.3d at 1198. The City of Wichita case is squarely on point, and the
circumstances faced by Wal-Mart were far more severe than those faced by Grathol. Here,
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neither access to US-95 or State Highway 54 is being closed, nor is Highway 54 being turned
into a one-way street. Furthermore, because US-95 is being improved to a divided highway,
with freeway exits no closer than 5 miles apart, traffic entering and exiting the freeway will be
concentrated at the freeway interchanges, which will fwmel even more traffic to the Grathol site.
In State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), the court held that the
landowner whose property was partially condemned could put on evidence of circuity of travel,
diversion of traffic, loss of visibility, and construction interference. The court held that these
elements were compensable in detennining severance damages, i.e., the diminution in the market
value of the remainder after the condemnation. Id. at 29, 35. The Texas Supreme Court
interceded and specifically reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the trial
court excluding the evidence, holding that these elements or items could not be offered or
considered in determining severance damages, State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex.
1993). The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that these alleged damages did not result from the
taking of the condemnee's property, but rather from the state's new use of its right·of-way, id. at
777, which is precisely the case here. The court held that the "effect" of the state's
condemnation on the remainder of the landowner's property is the taking of a small strip of
property, not the consequences of the state's reconstruction of a highway. Id. The court further
held that "diversion of traffic, inconvenience of access, impaired visibility of ground-level
buildings, and disruption of constn1ction activities ... are, by their nature, a consequence of the
change in Highway 183 shared by the entire area through which it runs." Id. at 781.
Texas courts have continued to follow these well established principles. See State v.

Munday Enterprises, 868 S.W.2d 319, 320-21 (Tex. 1994) (no compensation is allowed for
diversion of traffic, increased circuity of travel, or lessened visibility); State v. Priesmeyer, 867
S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("Priesmeyer is not entitled to recover for damages
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relating to visibility loss, diversion of traffic, circuity of travel and construction inconvenience to
his remainder property.").
Other cases are in accord. See State, Dept. ofTransp. v. Suit City ofAventura, 774 So. 2d
9, 13-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (owners of shopping center compiained that increased
elevation of roadway following partial taking would impair visibility of the shopping center;
court held that Florida law does not allow compensation for loss of visibility); State ex. rel.

Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Com'n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457, 468-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (in
partial taking case, "any claim as to damages for 'public view' or visibility is 'inextricably
related' to a property right in the traffic, [and] the decisions have consistently refused to 'accord
to

property owners any right in the continuation of traffic.'"); Grossman Investments v. State by

Humphrey, 571 N.W.2d 47, 50-52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (state closed landowner's direct access
to interstate highway, reconstructed highway blocked visibility of property, and increase in
height or grade of highway blocked visibility; court held that no taking of access occWTed where
property continued to have reasonable access, albeit substantially less convenient; court further
held that ''[t]his court has never recognized a right to be seen frolll an abutting highway, and we
decline to create such a right in this case. Accordingly, appellants are not entitled to
compensation for their loss of view"); 224 Troup Realty, Inc. v. State, 88 A.D.2d 773,744,451
N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (in case involving partial taking by condemnation,
court held that "loss of visibility of the property to passing motorists" cannot be used as a basis

for damages).
These rules are not new. They are long-standing and well-established. For example, in

State Hwy. Com'n v. Lavasek, 385 P.2d 361 (New Mexico 1963), the Supreme Court of New
Mexico held:

PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JlJDGMENT-31

339 of 1617

JAN. 6. 2012 5:02PM

NO. 3883

P. 37

An easement of the right of view in an abutting property owner
would create a burden on the servient tenement, the highway. An

abutter's rights in a highway are subordinate to the paramount right
of the public in the highway and of the public authority to so
construct a highway as to sexve the best use by the public. The
state may construct a highway in any manner not inconsistent with
or prejudicial to its use for highway purposes and the mere
disturbance of the visibility of an abutter's property from the
highway by such construction or reconstruction does not give rise
to a compensable damage in the abutter.

Id. at 364. (internal citation omitted). See also In re Appropriation ofEasement for Highway
Purposes (Preston v. Weiler), 194 N.E.2d 440, 444-46 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (interference with
visibility of owners' land due to change in street grade did not constitute a taking and did not
warrant compensation) (rev'd on other grounds 191 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio 1963)); National Biscuit

Co. v. New York 211 N.Y.S.2d 435,436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (compensation award
improperly included compensation for loss of visibility of business by users of abutting street,
and condemnee' s experts improperly testified as to loss of visibility from roadway).
4.

Grathol's claim of loss of visibility is not supported by the facts.

GeoffReeslund, Grathol's Vice President and Director of Design and Construction,
testified that the Project will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant buildings and
signage on the Grathol property. Reeslund Dep. at 18~19 (Ex. 4 to York Aff.). Yet Mr.
Reeslund conceded that he has not conducted any study to substantiate his opinion and is not
aware of any study that supports his opinion. Id, at 19-20.
Engineers with David Evans and Associates ("DEA") investigated Grathol's claim of loss
of visibility and determined, by engineering cross-sections of the US-9S Project and the
remainjng Grathol property, that the OTathol site will continue to be visible from the new US-95.

Report by DEA, at 8 (York Aff., Ex. 11 ).
Cross-sections depicting the proposed freeway and interchange
location and elevation relative to the Grathol site are shown on
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Figure 12. The cross-sections indicate that site and structures on
the Grathol site should be visible from the new US95 freeway.

Id. See also Figure 12 of DEA Report (York Aff., Ex. 12).
In summary, Grathol's claim ofloss of visibility is barred by Idaho law, and this type of
claim has been repeatedly rejected by courts in condemnation cases across the country. The
claim also fails factually, and should be dismissed on summary judgment.

D.

Grathol's Claim For Compensation Based On Loss Or Impairment Of
Access Is Barred As A Matter Of Law.
1.

Grathol's claim is contrary to undisputed facts.

Grathol seeks to recover compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of access to the
property as a result of the taking. Grathol bought the property as bare land. It plans a
commercial development on the property. It contends that "the configuration and location of the
land taken for the highway reconfiguration use severely impacts the viability for developing the
resultant sites by eliminating or drastically limiting the ability to provide effective access points
critical to successful commercial development." (York Aff., Ex. 6, at 11.)
Thus, for purposes of clarity, Grathol is not alleging that ITD has condemned existing,
permitted commercial accesses to the property. Rather, Grathol contends that the US-95 Project
eliminates or limits "the ability to provide effective access points critical to successful
commercial development. Id.
Alan Johnson, vice president of Grathol, states that "[e]asy access [in the before
condition] is provided by 4 deeded access points at or near the intersection." Id. at 5 (brackets
added). Mr. Johnson's statement is incorrect and misleading. First, there m:e only three "deeded
access points" and none of these can be used for "commercial" access.
The three deeded access points were created by warranty deed, recorded in Kootenai
County records as Instrument No. 504394. Reeslund Dep. 23:17~26:8 (YorkAff., Ex. 4). See
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also Warranty Deed (York Aff., Ex. 13). The warranty deed from ITD to a prior owner of the
Grathol property granted permission for three driveway approaches to the Grathol property from
Highway 54. However, the deed states that the accesses may only be used "as farm and
residential approaches." Id. Therefore, none of these three approaches are permitted to be used
to provide commercial access to the Grathol property. Id.
It is undisputed that none of the three deeded access approaches were ever built DEA
Report, at 7 (York Aff., Ex. 11). It is also undisputed that Gtathol had the property re-zoned to
"commercial" after it bought the property, and it plans to build a commercial development on the
site. Therefore, because the three deeded access points can only be used for "fann and
residential purposes" and could not be used to provide "commercial" access to the Grathol
property, Grathol cannot base a claim for loss or restriction of commercial access on them.
It is also undisputed that neither Grathol nor its predecessors have ever submitted an
application for commercial access and deeded commercial access does not currently exist on the
property. Johnson Dep., at 79-81 (York Aff., Ex. 3). Grathol also concedes that none of the
three deeded access are authorized to be used for commercial access. Reeslund Dep., at 38
("The project is not developed commercially yet, so no [commercial] access exists") (York Aff.,
Ex. 4).

Mr. Reeslund conceded that ITD is not condemning any commercial access right in this
case:
Q.
So let me see if I understand this con-ect. And please
correct me if I misunderstand what you're saying. You 're claiming
that access to the parcel will be limited because of the project, not
because JTD is taking any cu"ently existing accesses to Old
Highway 95, but rather because they are putting in cul~de·sacs on
Old Highway 95?
A.

That's con-ect.
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What commercial accesses cU1Tently exist on the property?

The project is not developed commercially yet, so no
access exists.
A.

Id, at 37-38 (YorkAff., Ex. 4) (emphasis added).
Grathol claims they have access to US-95 via an existing approach near the intersection
of State Highway 54 and US-95. However, Grathol does not have a permit or deed for this
access. In addition, physical access to the majority of the Gtathol property is not possible from
that approach. The Grathol property consists of two parcels: one small parcel at the comer of
State Highway 54 and US-9S, and a much larger parcel north and east of the small parcel. The
way the two parcels are configured, there is insufficient connection between the two parcels for a
commercial approach and driveway access to be constructed between the two. See York Aff.,
Ex. 14 As explained by Jason Minzghor, District 1 Project Development Engineer for ITO, no
right of access to US-95 exists at that location and no physical means of access is possible.
A physical approach to the Gtathol Property to Highway 54 exists

near the intersection with Highway 54 and US-95. The approach is
not permitted or approved and it impermissibly encroaches upon
ITD's right-of-way. Thus, it is an illegal approach.
The Grathol property does not have any deeded, permitted, or
approved approaches or rights of access to US-9S. Also, the
Grathol property has no physical access to US-95. Neither Orathol
nor any prior owner has requested an encroachment permit for a
commercial approach to US-95.
Minzghor Rebuttal Report, at 3-4 (York Aff., Ex. 15) (emphasis added).
For purposes of clarification. a "driveway" is the physical construction of a traveled way
across private property to a public road, An "approach" is also a physical feature located at the
intersection between private property and the public right-of-way. A "right of access" is the
right to have an "approach" onto the public road. It is not a physical feature.
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In summary, Grathol had no deeded commercial access right to either state Highway 54
or US-95 in the before condition. Grathol has conceded that ITO is not closing or taking any
commercial access right or any existing commercial approach. Consequently, Grathol cannot
sustain a claim for compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of commercial access.
2.

Whether a taking of access has occurred is properly decided on
summary judgment.

The court has full authority to detennine as a matter of law whether a taking of access has
occurred. Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 ldaho 322,325, 17 P.3d 266,269 (2000)
(granting summary judgment and concluding that landowner's loss of parking and right to access
did not constitute a taldng under Idaho's eminent domain laws); Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124
Idaho 39, 44, 855 P.2d 876, 881 (1993) (affirming summary judgment that, as a matter oflaw,
the State's limitation of access did not constitute a taking); Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 14445, 742 P.2d 397, 399-400 (1987) (reversing trial court's denial of summary judgment and
holding that no talcing had occurred where there was no destruction of vebicular access and
remaining access was reasonable). In Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75, (1978), the
Idaho Supreme Court discussed this issue at length, and specifically held that it is proper for a
district court to decide on summary judgment whether a taking has occurred as a result of an
alleged loss or limitation of access. Id. at 214-23, 596 P.2d at 86R95.

3,

Grathol's claim for compensation based on alleged loss of access is
barred by Idaho law.

Articie I, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides that private property may be taken
for public use. Idaho Const., art. I,§ 14. When the government seeks to acquire private
property, it is required to pay just compensation for the taldng. Id; Covington, 13 7 Idaho at 780,
53 P.3d at 831; see also U.S. Const. amend V (providing that no person shall "be deprived of
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken fox
public use, without just compensation").

Before a court may address the question of just compensation, it must first determine
whether a "taking" has occurred for which compensation is owed. See Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho
at 210-11,

596 P.2d at 82-3 (Bakes, J.• concU1Ting specially). Where no taking has occurred, no

compensation is owed.
Idaho law holds that a compensable taking of access occurs only when access to the
property is destroyed and no reasonable access remains. Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 14S,
742 P.2d 397,400 (finding that ''there having been no destruction of vehicular access to the
Dan.downer's] property, and the remaining vehicular access being reasonable, there was no
tal<lng of the (landowner's) property which would entitle him to compensation.").

In Merritt, the Idaho Transportation Department engaged in a project to improve an
interchange in Caldwell. Id. at 142, 742 P.2d at 397. Prior to construction, Merritt had direct
access to his property from North 10th Avenue via an 18-foot wide curb cut and indirect access
via an alley that bordered his property. Id In addition to these two approaches, Merritt also had
access to his property through two additional curb cuts. Id
ITD imposed access control measures restricting the number and locations of accesses to
properties within the project boundaries. Id. The purpose of the access control measures was to
"reduce traffic congestion and promote safety near interchanges." Id. Pursuant to the access

control requirements, ITD eliminated Merritt's 18~foot curb cut, preventing any access from

North 10th Avenue, and it constrl.lcted a fence along the Merritt property bloc.king one entrance
to the alley way.

Id at 143, 742 P.2d at 398.

Merritt complained that the access limitations constituted a taking of property entitling
him to damages. Id The district court agreed with Merritt and denied ITD 1 s motion for

PLAINTJFF ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-37

345 of 1617

JAN, 6. 2012 5:02PM

NO. 3883

P. 43

summary judgment in which it argued that the limitation of access was not a talcing, but a
regulation for the health, safety and welfare of the public. Id The district court concluded that
ITD's limitation of access and the physical components of the project that limited access resulted
in a compensable talcing of property. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that ''there
having been no destruction of vehicular access to the Merritt property, and the remaining
vehicular access being reasonable, there was no taking of Merritt's property which would entitle

him to compensation." Id. at 145, 742 P.2d at 400. The Supreme Court made this decision
despite the fact that the primary commercial access to the property bad been closed entirely,
thereby frustrating the owner's plans to construct a gas station on the property. Id. at 143-45,
742 P.2d at 398-400. In addition, one end of the remaining alley access had been closed. Id.
Similarly, in Johnston v. Boise Cityi 87 Idaho 44,390 P.2d291 (1964), the Idaho
Supreme Court upheld limitations on access as a proper exercise of police powers where the
landovmers still had access to their property from a public street. Id. at 52·53, 390 P.2d at 29596 (citing Foster s, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,212, 118 P.2d 721 (1941)).
1

In the case at hand, Grathol must apply for commercial access permits in order to obtain
commercial access to its property. Engineers with DEA have analyzed access in the before and
after condition and are confident that the Grathol property will have good access in the after
condition. DEA Report, at 17 (York Aff., Ex. 11 ).

Orathol had no commercial access to either State Highway 54 or US-9S in the "before"
condition. Thus, ITD has not taken or restricted any right of access or any actual physical

commercial access from Gratbol. In the absence of a taking, no claim for compensation for loss
of access can be sustained as a matter of law.
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In certain, limited circumstances, the state's regulation of access may constitute a taking.

Weaver v. Village ofBancroft, 92 Idaho 189,193,439 P.2d 697, 701 (1968); Hughes v. State of

Idaho, 80 Idaho 286, 295-96, 328 P.2d 397,402 (1958); Village o/Sandpointv. Doyle, 14 Idaho
749, 95 P. 945, 948 (1908). See Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho at 144, 742 P.2d at 399 (discussing

these exceptional cases). In each of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that all
vehicular access to the property had been "destroyed/ and therefore the property owner had a
"right to regain access to the public road or to be compensated for the taking of access." Id.; see

also Weaver, 92 Idaho at 193,439 P.2d at 701; Hughes, 80 Idaho at 295·96, 328 P.2d at 402;
Doyle, 14 Idaho at758-60, 95 P. at947--48.
Accordingly, if all rights of access to a public road are destroyed- meaning that the

property is left without any means ofingress or egress to any public street or road - a
compensable taking of property has occurred. Merritt, 113 Idaho at 144, 742 P.2d at 399. See

also Brown, 124 Idaho at 43, 85S P.2d at 880 (where there is "no destruction of vehicular access"
and the remaining vehicular access is reasonable, then there is no taking and no compensation

owed).
Applying these principles to the facts set forth above, no compensable taking of access
has occurred. Gtathol has never applied for or been denied a commercial access to its property.
No commercial access right or physical commercial access has been taken. Therefore, Grathol' s
claim for compensation based on an alleged taking or restriction of access should be dismissed
on summary judgment.

E.

Grathol Cannot Recover Lost Profits.

Grathol' s vice president, Alan Johnson, has formulated a claim for lost profits in excess
of $7 million in this case. He states that Grathol is entitled to recover this amount in addition to,
separate and apart from, just compensation for the market value of the property.
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Q.
Okay. So do you anticipate testifying that this project -- or
excuse me - that ITD s condemnation and construction will cost
you approximately $7,177,000 in profits?
1

A.

Yes.

Q.
And that number is based upon iost profits, not based upon
the value of the land. Correct?
A.

That is correct.

Johnson Dep., at 112-13 (York Aff., Ex. 3).
Mr. Johnson has admitted that Grathol's $7,177,000 claim is merely one "potential"

amount of damages, and that ascertaining the "potential" profit loss depends on different factors.

Id. at 113-14. ITD's rebuttal expert, Dennis Reinstein, CPA, has shown that the claim is not
based on any recognized or accepted practices or methodologies and has no supported or
verifiable figures. (See York Aff., Ex. 10).
Idaho law bars Grathol' s attempt to recover lost profits in this condemnation case. In
addition, Idaho law bars recovery of lost profits by new businesses, particularly one that has not

been con~cted and is not in business.
1.

Idaho common Jaw bars recovery of lost profits in condemnation

cases.
Orathol cannot recover for its purported "lost profits" because such damages are not
recoverable in condemnation cases. See State v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 448, 546 P.2d 399, 403
(1976); cf. James v. Stare, 88 Idaho 172,178,397 P.2d 776, 770 (1964) (''[d]amages for
depreciation in value of abutting landowners' property, by reason of business loss, occasioned by

the change in route and traffic flow brought about by the construction of new highways are not
compensable").

LongRstanding Idaho case law makes clear that, under the common law, a separate
monetary award is not recoverable for lost profits, going concern, good will or other
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characterizations of business damages in condemnation cases. See State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho
45, 54, 286 P,2d 1112, 1117 (195 5) ("going concern1' in a case of partial taking was allowed to
be considered only as a factor in ascertaining the value of the property); State v. Halverson, 86

Idaho 242, 247-48, 384 P.2d 480, 483-84 (1963) (in a total taking, the court reaffirmed Idaho law
that lost profits are ''not an element of damages" but "may" constitute a/actor in the overall fair
market value); State v. Bastian, 91 Idaho 444,448, 546 P.2d 399,403 (1976) (in a partial taking,
lost business profits "are not compensable as such in eminent domain actions," but ''may" be a

factor in determining fair market value or "the severance damages to the remainder'i.
In the case at hand, Gtathol has no business and no profits to consider in any fair market
valuation of the property. In addition, Idaho law will not permit a condemnee to recover both the
fair market value of the condemned property and a $7 million award for "lost profits."

2.

Grathol's claim for lost profits is barred by Idaho's business damage
statute.

Grathol cannot recover lost profits or business damages because it does not and cannot
meet the statutory requirements of Idaho's business damage statute, See Idaho Code § 7-711 (2).

See also City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006) (addressing statutory
requirements).
To the extent business damages are available in Idaho condemnation cases such
compensation is governed exclusively by statute. See Seubert, 142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at
1122 (2006) ("The right to receive business damages .. , resulting from a taking ofland is strictly

a statutory right, .. .') (quoting 29A C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN§ 150 (2004)); Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 675 (1923) ("Injury to a business carried on upon lands taken for
public use ,.. does not constitute an element of just compensation, in the absence of a statute
expressly allowing it"); United States ex. rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v, Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282
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(1943) ("absent a statutory mandate the sovereign must pay for only what it takes, not for
opportunities which the owner may lose.").

In 2000, the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 7-711 to allow for business
damage awards, but only in the limited circumstances set forth in the statue. See Idaho Code § 7•

711 (2), In particular, Idaho Code § 7-711 (2)(b) allows recovery of business damages under the
statute only if the business has been operating on the condemned property for at least S years. Id.
Moreover, the business owner must substantiate any business damages claim. See Idaho
Code§§ 7.;711(2)(b)(iii), (iv). To substantiate its claim, the statute requires the business to
submit copies of business records "for the five (5) years preceding [the take] which are
attributable to the business operation on the property to be acquired and other records relied upon
by the business owner that substantiate the business claim." Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(iv), These

records include tax records, balance sheets and profit and loss statements. Id
In addition, the statute requires that the qualifying business first file an administrative

claim. "If the business owner intends to claim business damages under this subsection, the
owner, as defendant, must submit a written business damage claim to the plaintiff within ninety
(90) days after service of the summons and complaint for condemnation." Idaho Code§ 7711(2)(i). Here, the Summons and Complaint were filed on November 19, 2010 and Grathol
accepted service on December 3, 2010. Therefore, Grathol was required to serve any business
damage claim within 90 days, or by March 3, 2011. No claim was served. In fact, ITD had no
notice of a claim for iost profits until Grathol mentioned it in discovery responses served in
October of 2011. The claim was not supported by any documentation.
Here, it is undisputed that Grathol does not satisfy the statutory requirements to make a
business damages claim under Idaho Code § 7-711. No business is located on the property, and
Gtathol cannot meet the requirement of S years of operation on the condemned property.
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Moreover, Grathol has not substantiated the claim by providing business records, including tax
records, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements, and other documents necessary to
substantiate the claim. Lastly, Grathol did not first serve an administrative claim, and did not do
so within the statutory time limit, both of which are mandatory prerequisites to a claim. for
business damages in a condemnation case.
For these reasons, Grathol's claim for lost profits or business damages fails as a matter of
law and should be dismissed,

3.

Grathol's lost profits are based on conjecture and speculation and are
not recoverable under Idaho law.

In Idaho, the law is clear that lost profits are not recoverable for speculative and abstract
future damages. See, e.g., Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.,
133 Idaho 249, 257, 985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999) (explaining that "lost profits and future earnings
must be shown with a reasonable certainty" and that "[d]amage awards based upon speculation
and conjecture will not be allowed."); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 761, S19 P.2d 421,
430 (1974) (same). See also Circle C Ranch v. Jayo, 104 Idaho 3S3, 356, 659 P.2d 107, 110
(1983) (affuming trial court's holding that claim for lost profits "failed as being speculative"
where evidence produced at trial tended to show that plaintiff's ability to secure two prospective
temporary permits was too speculative).
Moreover, longstanding Idaho law holds that ''(p)respective profits contemplated to be
derived.from a business which is not yet established, but one merely in contemplation, are too

uncertain and speculative to form a basis for recovery." C.R. Crowley Inc. v. Soelberg, 81
1

Idaho 480,486,346 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1959) (emphasis added) (applying rule to deny damage
claim for future crop loss); Riy,.d/isbaker1 95 Idaho 7S2, 761,519 P.2d 421,430 (1974) (applying
rule to deny damage claim for future farm operations). See also Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196,
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200, 279 P.2d 1064, 1065-66 (1955) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim for "anticipated profits" because
at most they alleged "loss of anticipated possible profits to be derived from a business not yet in
being but only contemplated to be established'' which was simply ''too uncertain and
speculative" to establish a prima facie case of damage) (emphasis added}.

As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, the question is whether the plaintiff "has
proven the damages for lost profits with reasonable certainty'' and "an established earning
record" is relevant to proving dalllages with any "reasonable certainty." Clark v. Int 11Harvester
Co., 99 Idaho 326,346,581 P.2d 784, 804 (1978). See also Lamb v. Robinson, 101 Idaho 703,

705, 620 P.2d 276, 278 (1980) (explaining that "the existence of damages must be taken out of
the realm of speculation'') (citations omitted).
Here, Grathol' s claim for anticipated lost business profits is premised on a commercial
development that has not been built and has never operated or generated any profits. Gratbol' s
claim for lost business profits is inherently speculative and too uncertain to support a claim for
recovery.
For all of these reasons, G:rathol' s claim for lost profits necessarily fails as a matter of
law and should be dismissed.
F.

Grathol Cannot Recover Compensatiou For Gravel That May Be Under The
Condemned Property,

Grathol seeks to recover $300,000.00 for the value of gravel it believes is located on the
property and which Grathol alleges ITD can use for the US-95 Project. This claim fails as a
matter of law and should be dismissed.
ITD is buying the condemned the entire property in its entirety, including any gravel or

anytJ1ing else of value that may or may not be under the property. Grathol cannot recover the

fair market value of the property and an additional amount for gravel.
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In making this claim, Orathol has admitted that it has no idea whether there is any usable
gravel under the property, how much there is, or what it is worth. It has simply pulled out a
dollar figure and demanded that it be paid. Geoff Reeslund testified that:
We felt, from information that we had about the property out there,
that there was significant amount of gravel contained in the soil
and that there may be a value to ITD in mining that for base rock
for the freeway construction, as opposed to purchasing it
somewhere else and trucking it to the site.
Reeslund Dep., at 134 (York Aff., Ex. 4). He cannot point to any study or any analysis of either
the quality, quantity, or monetary value of any gravel under the portion of property being
condemned from Grathol. Therefore, Grathol has no basis or support for its claim for
$300,000.00.
Next, ITD cannot remove the substructure on the property and then construct a freeway
overpass on it. If any substructure were removed, it would have to be replaced with like or better
material. Consequently, it would be far more expensive to remove gravel from the site and then
buy other gravel and bring it back in as fill, than it would be to simply use gravel from a supplier.

See Rebuttal Report of Jason Minzghor (York Aff., Ex. 15).
As explained by Jason Minzghor:

First, no soils or materials testing conducted by or on behalf of
ITD shows any quantity or quality of gravel that may be located on
the property condemned from Grathol Also, Grathol has not
provided any reports showing whether usable gravel is located on
the property or the quantity or quality of usable materials. No
support or documentation has been provided to assign or
substantiate any dollar figure to any alleged amount of usable
material on the subject property.
Second, ITD is constructing an elevated interchange with on and
off ramps on and adjacent to the condemned property. The
subsurface material in this area must be left in place to provide
sub-grade support for the infrastructure to be constructed on the
property. If the contractor were to remove subsurface material on
the property, it would then have to replace that material with likePLAINTIFF ITO'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .mDGMENT- 45
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kind fill material with the same support characteristics. In short, it
would make no sense to remove material simply to have to replace
it.

Third, the contract for the Project provides that ITD will not pay
the contractor for rock excavation that is made below the top of
sub-grade. This means that if the contractor were to remove any
material below sub-grade, it would be required to incur the
associated costs, as well as the costs to replace with similar type
and grade of fill material.

Id. at 4.
Lastly, the property has been rezoned as "commercial." Kootenai County's zoning
ordinance prohibits gravel mining in commercial zones. Reinstein Rebuttal at 5 ("Grathol's
rezoning of the property has now precluded mining of any gravel from the Site'1 (York Aff.,
Ex. 10).
Based on the foregoing, Grathol' s claim for compensation for gravel should be dismissed

as a matter of law.

G.

Grathol Cannot Claim Severance Damages For Impacts On Its Hypothetical
Development Plan Because It Had Knowledge Of The Project When It
Bought The Property.

Grathol cannot recover severance damages where it is undisputed that Orathol had
knowledge of the Project before buying the property. Planning for the US-95 Project began in
2002. Grathol purchased the property in May 2008. Gtathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Discovery1
at 4 (York Aff., Ex. 6); Johnson Dep.; at 25:19-21 (York Aff., Ex. 3); Exhibit 44 to Johnson Dep.
(York Aff., Ex. 8). Grathol's stated intention for the property is ''to develop it into a commercial
retail center/hospitality project." (York Aff., Ex. 61 at 4.)
Gtathol first learned about the property in January 2008. Johnson Dep., at 25:22-25
(York Aff., Ex. 3). At that time, the listing for the property by the Multiple Listing Service
provided notice to any prospective purchaser that a highway interchange was planned to be
constructed on the property, Johnson Dep., Ex. 43 (York Aff., Ex. 9). Specifically, the listing
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for the property stated that "preliminary drawings show future off-ramps and frontage road for
[highway] 9S through this property. 11 Id. The listing notice also advised that the purchaser

should "check with [the] Department of Transportation to verify" the details regarding the
interchange. Id
Mr. GeoffReeslund also confirmed that Grathol was aware of the Project before it
purchased the Property. Reeslund Dep., at 22:13-23:4; 65:19·24 (York Aft, Ex. 4).
A.

We were aware that there were plans by ITD to potentially realign and
improve the freeway.

Q.

And did you know about this prior to purchasing the property?

A.

Yes.

Id., at22:2S-23:4.
Additionally, Grathol met with representatives of ITD before it purchased the property
and were shown the preliminary plans for the Project. Johnson Dep., at 31 :20-32:13; 36:7-14;
(York Aff., Ex. 3); Reeslund Dep., at 87:8-88:7 (York Aff,i Ex. 4). Through its meetings with
ITD and its review of the preliminary project plans, Grathol knew about the Project and had
details about the Project. Id
Grathol starting working on its application to change the zoning of the property before it
actually purchased the property. Reeslund Dep., at 91:5-19; 189:13-19 (YorkAff., Ex. 4).
Grathol submitted its rezone application to Kootenai County on May 30, 2008-just two days
after it completed the purchase of the property on May 28th. Reeslund Dep., Ex. 16 (York Aff.,
Ex. 16). Grathol's rezone application acknowledged the U.S. 95 Project and included the Project
as one of the reasons why a zoning chanae was warranted for the property. Id. The application
stated that "I-95 is soon to begin improvement to full freeway status, and will be realigned to
cross this property, providing on and off.ramps at the Hwy S4 intersection." Id. at A-3.
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Under Idaho Code § 7-711 a landowner may be entitled "to severance damages when the
taking results in separate parcels of land." C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Hwy Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140,

75 P.3d 194 (2003). "However, where a landowner purchases with notice of the intended taking,
he may not claim severance damages in a condemnation proceeding." United States v. 99. 66

Acres ofLand, 970 F.2d 651, 6S7 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Mattox, 37S F.2d 461,
463-64 (4th Cir. 1967)).
The Ninth Circuit's decision in 99. 66 Acres ofLand is directly on point. In 99. 66 Acres

ofLand, a landowner appealed a condemnation decision, "contending that the district court erred
in excluding valuation and damages testimony" including severance damages. 970 F.2d at 653.

Factually, the district court detemrined there was evidence that the landowner was aware of and
had in fact contacted the condemning governmental agency prior to the sale seeking information

about the governmental water project. Id at 653-54. The Ninth Circuit affinned the district
court,s decision excluding any severance damage testimony because the landowner "had notice
that the water project would likely run through the property before purchasing the option on the
property." Id. at 657 (emphasis added), The Ninth Circuit held that "where a landowner
purchases with notice" of a condition or event affecting the value of the property he may not
claim damages for loss of value. Id
Similarly, in United States v. 173S N. Lynn Street, 676 F.Supp.693 (E.D. Va. 1987), the
court held that:
A purchaser who knows that the government's perspective partial

taking will damage the residue and reduce its value will
presumably ensure that this prospect is reflective in a reduction of
the purchase price. If so, to award severance damaaes to such a
knowing purchaser is to award double compensation for the same
harm, once in the form of the reduced purchase price ai,.d then
again, in the award of severance damages.

Id. at 699.
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After buying the property, Grathol drafted a site plan for a commercial development. It
now points to hypothetical development plan and says that it cannot build what is on the site plan
because ITD is making changes to US~9S. It is undisputed that Grathol was well aware of the
Project before it purchased the property and had knowledge of details about the Project, Grathol
should not now be allowed to claim severance damages to a hypothetical development plan that
was drafted with knowledge that would be impacted by the US-95 Project.
In addition, IDJI2d Instruction 7. 14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's

particular plan for development and use of the property only for the purposes ofdetermining uses

for which the property is adaptable." IDJI2d 7.14. In other words, Grathol cannot seek damages
by pointing to an un-built site plan and claiming ccwe cannot build this here now," or "this

building will have to be smaller," and ask that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such
alleged "losses" or "severance" damages.
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that all claims for severance damages based on or
tied to alleged adverse impacts on draft commercial development plans be dismissed.
I II

Ill
I II

Ill
Ill
iii
I II
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, ITD respectfully requests that the Court grant ITD's motion
for summary judgment and dismiss the claims by Grathol addressed above.
DATED this 6th day of January, 2012.
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD'') hereby moves the Court
for an order instructing Defendant HJ Gtathol ("Grathol"), its counsel, representatives, and
witnesses to refrain from giving any testimony, presenting any evidence, or making any
argument based on the subjects identified below, either directly or indirectly, during its opening
statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statement, or at any other

time during the trial of this matter.
Specifically, the following subjects and references should be excluded from testimony,
evidence, and argument at trial:
1. Valuation opinions of Grathol's experts Skip Sherwood ("Sherwood") and Alan
Johnson ("Johnson") that violate Idaho law and fail to apply the statutory date of
valuation as required by Idaho Code§ 7-721.
2. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation methodology
relating to the "larger parcel'' analysis of the Orathol property.
3. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments made to
comparable sales.

4. Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being taken
as part of this condemnation action.
5. Evidence of Sherwood's Sale No. S, which is a transaction between a condemning
authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and not a valid
comparable sale.
ITD's motion is made on the grounds that the matters identified above are inadmissible
for any purpose and have no bearing on the sole issue to be tried - the amount of just
compensation to be paid to Grathol for the taking of their property. Accordingly, ITD
respectfully requests the Court grants its motion.
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!TD' s motion is supported by ITD' s Brief in support of its Motion In Limine and the
Affidavit of Mary V. York, which will be filed with ITD's Motion, as well as the pleadings and
documents on file with the Court in the matter.
DATED this 6th day of fanuary, 2012.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a condemnation action brought by Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation
Department ("ITO"), to acquire certain real property owned by Defendant, HJ Grathol
("Grathol"), as part ofITD's highway project ("the Project") to widen and improve U.S.
Highway 9S C'US-95") between the communities of Garwood and Sagle. The Grathol property
is a 56.8 acre parcel of land located in Kootenai County, just outside the city limits of Athol at

the intersection of US-95 and State Highway 54 (the "Property"). ITD requires 16.314 acres of
land for the Project, which will leave Grathol with a 40.496-aere remainder property, consisting
of two small parcels on the west side of the take area (3.829 acres and 0.419 acres) and a larger
remainder parcel on the west side (36.248 acres). The case is scheduled for a bench trial to begin
March 5, 2012. The sole issue to be determined at trial is the amount of just compensation owed
to Gtathol for the taking of a portion ofits Property.
Based upon the expert disclosures, ex.pert depositions, and discovery responses produced
by Grathol, it is anticipated that Grathol will seek to offer evidence, testimony and argument at
trial that is improper and inadmissible. Accordingly, ITD files this Brief in Support of its Motion
in Limine and seeks an Order from the Court instructing Orathol, its counsel, representatives,

and witnesses, to refrain from giving any testimony, presenting any evidence, or making any
argument based on the inadmissible evidence. ITD' s motion is also supported by the Affidavit
of Mary V. York ("York Aff.") filed with its motion,
Specifically, ITD asks that the Court exclude testimony, evidence, and argument at trial

on the following subjects:
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1. Valuation opinions of Orathol' s experts M. Dewitt "Skip'' Sherwood
("Sherwood") and Alan Johnson ("Johnson") that violate Idaho law and fail to
apply the statutory date of valuation as required by Idaho Code § 7-721.

2. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation methodology
relating to the "larger parcel" analysis of the Grathol Property.
3. Vaiuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments made to
comparable sales.

4. Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being taken
as part of this condemnation action.

5. Evidence of Sherwood's Sale No. S, which is a transaction between a condemning
authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and an improper and
invalid comparable sale.
These subjects are improper and inadmissible for the reasons discussed below and should
be excluded.
II. ARGUMENT

A.

The Court Has Broad Discretion To Exclude Evidence Through Motions In
Limine.
Motions in limine seek an advance ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Warren

v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83 P.3d 773, 779 (2003). Such motions are recognized by Idaho
courts as an important tool in litigation and trial preparation. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho
560,563, 733 P.2d 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1986),partially overruled on other grounds, 114 Idaho
107, 753 P.2d 1253 (1987), Motions in llmine are encouraged because the trial court's pretrial
rulings enable both sides to make strategic decisions before trial concerning the content and the
order of evidence to be presented. Id (citing E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 52 (3d ed.
15>84)). A trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence and rulini
on motions in limine. Appel v. Page, 13S Idaho 133, 13S, 15 P.3d 1141, 1143 (2000).

----------

--

-
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The Valuation Opinions of Skip Sherwood And Alan Johnson Are Inadmissible
Because They Failed To Apply The Appropriate Date Of Valuation As Required By
Idaho Law.

ITO requests that the Court enter an order excluding the opinions of Sherwood and
Johnson on the grounds they applied the wrong "date of valuation" in violation of!daho Code§
7·712 and basic principles of eminent dam.am law. By applying valuation dates other than the

date mandated by § 7-712, each of their value conclusions violate Idaho law and the
requirements of Idaho's eminent domain laws. Accordingly, their opinions axe inadmissible.

In Idaho, the date of valuation for pwposes of defining just compensation is mandated by
statute. See I.C. § 7-712. Idaho Code§ 7-712 requires that the value of the property taken in a

condemnation action and the severance damages that will accrue to the remaining property are to
be determined as of "the date of the summons." Id The statute specifically requires that the
property's "actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be
actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected,
in all cases where such damages are allowed[.]" ld.; 1 see State ex rel. Moore 11. Bastian, 97

Idaho 444,449,546 P.2d 399,404 (1976); State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 21-22,

454 P.2d 56, 58-59 (1969). There is no discretion permitted by the statute, rather the language of
the provision uses mandatory terms that require that the value of the property as of the date of
summons "shall be the measure of compensation." Id.

full text of Idaho Code§ 7-712 provides, "For the ptup0se of assessing compensation and
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the summons, and its
actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually
taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affec~ in all
cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last section. No improvements put
upon the property subsequent to the date of the service of summons shall be included in the
assessment of compensation or damages. The compensation and damaaes awarded shall draw
lawful interest from the date of the summons."
1 The

··---- - · · · - . ----··
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Idaho's statutory requirement that the date of value be the date of summons is clearly
reflected in Idaho's Civil Jury Instructions. See IDJI2d 7.05, 7.05.1, 7,05.5, 7.07, 7.16, 7.18,

7.20. Most plainly, Idaho's jury instructions provide that "just compensation means the fair
market value of the property taken measured as of _ _ _ [date]." IDJI2d 7.05.2 Subsection
7. OS .1 states "just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, including all
permanent improvements thereon, measured as of _ _ _ _ [date]." IDJI2d 7.05.1.
For partial ta.kings, as in the present case, Idaho's jury instructions provide that "just
compensation means the fair market value of the property t:aken including all permanent
improvements thereon, together with any direct damages suffered by the defendant, all measured
as of _ _ _ _ [date].'' 1Dn2d 7.0S.5. Further, the con1ments to instruction 7.05.5 leaves no
question that the property is to be valued as of the date of summons, as required by Idaho Code §
7-712. The comments state that "in a direct condemnation action, the date inserted in the
instruction will be the date of issuance of the summons -J.C.§ 7~712." Comments to IDJI2d
7.05.5.
Moreover, other Idaho jury instructions are similarly unambiguous in their requirement of
a date-of~summons valuation date. See, e.g., IDJl2d 7.07 (fair market value determination to be

assessed as of date of summons, as required by§ 7-712); IDJl2d 7.16 Oust compensation to be
determined based upon before-and-after valuation, measured as of date of summons); IDJI2d
7.18 (proper methodology for determining just compensation, measured as of the date of

summons); IDJI2d 7.20 (improvements made on property after date of summons should not be
considered).

2 IDJI2d 7.05

applies to total takings, but the requirement that the property be valued as of the
date of summons is identical to the other provisions relating to partial takings. See e.g., IDJI2d
7.0S.S.
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If the proper date of valuation is not applied, the validity of the expert's valuation

analysis is necessarily compromised. As stated by the pre-entinent authority on eminent domain
law, Nichols on Eminent Domain, "[i]t is critical that the appraisal performed by both parties
reflect the legal date of valuation." 5-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011). A
party's "(fjailure to appraise according to the correct date of value may give rise to a motion to
strike the appraisal, or the reversal of the entire verdict." Id

Jurisdictions across the nations are unifo.nnly in accord. See, e.g., Heldenbrandv.

Executive Council ofIowa, For Use and Benefit ofState, 218 N.W.2d 628,637 (Iowa 1974)
(reversing jury verdict where the jury was told the wrong date for the date of the taking and
assessment of damages.); Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Irwin Livestock Co., 625 P.2d 214, 216~
217 (Wyo., 1981) (reversing jury verdict because there was no appraisal testimony regarding the
change in value immediately before the date of taking and the time after such taking).
In the present case, the date of summons, and therefore the date of valuation, is

November 19, 2010. Grathol's experts~ Sherwood and Johnson, ignored Idaho's statutory
requirement and instead used different and inconsistent dates. Sherwood, in his before-and-after

valuation analysis, used a date of value of September 20103 for the "before condition'' of the
Property, and he improperly used valuation dates of March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after
condition" valuation. Sherwood Report, at 10-12 (York Aff., E:ic. 18); Sherwood Dep., at 41:1144:10; 66:10-14; 66:15-19 (YorkAff., Ex. 5). The valuation date used by Sherwood for the

"after condition" of the Property is based upon Grathol's expectations of when the Project would
be completed.
3 Even though Sherwood's date

of value in the before condition was three months prior to the
date of summons in this case, ITO does not challenge Sherwood's use of this date, since it is
relatively close to the actual date required by Idaho Code§ 7-712 and conditions relating to the
Property did not change significantly between August and November 2010.
· ·PLAINTIFFITD'S-BRIEFIN SUPPORT OFMOTIONINLIMJNE:::: 5
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Similarly, Johnson also used an improper date of valuation. Johnson's valuation only
used an "after condition" date of valuation, but like Sherwood, Johnson valued the Property as of
the estimated completion date of the US-95 Project. Grathol's Third Supp, Discovery Resp., at 7
(York AtT., Ex. 6) C'It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property, after the take, would
be worth $3,669,300 (at the time ofcompletion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as
follows: ....") (emphasis added). Neither Johnson, nor Sherwood use the date of the summons
as is required by Idaho law. And for that reason, both of their opinions are improper and
inadmissible.
The case of Oakland County Bd. of County Road Comm 'rs v. JBD Rochester, LLC, 718
N.W.2d 845, 846-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), illustrates application of these rules and the
importance of excluding the value opinions of Johnson and Sherwood. In Oakland County, a
highway district sought to exclude any "appraisals of defendants' property that took into
consideration a posttaking road construction delay caused by congressional funding problems."

Id. at 846. The trial court permitted introduction of the posMaking road construction delay. Id
However, on appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that "[t]he
trial court erred in admitting appraisals of defendants' property that took into consideration the
posttaking road construction delay because the claimed severance damages were not caused by
the taldng." Id. at 848. The court explained that "the proper measure of damages in a case
involvin& a partial taking consists of the fair market value of the property taken, plus severance
damages to the remainina property if applicable." Id. at 847.
The Oakland Count)) court emphasized that evidence of post-taking construction delay
was "irrelevant to the just compensation caleulation ... because just compensation must be
calculated on the basis of the market value of the property on the date of the taldng"-not an
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indiscriminate future date as was advocated by the defendants. Oakland Count)), 718 N.W.2d at
847 (emphasis added) (quoting Mich. Dept. ofTransp. v. Haggerty Corridor Partners Ltd

P'shp, 700 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Mich. 2005)), Likewise, the court held that post-taking
construction delay could not be considered as part of any severance damage calculation to the
remainder because the delay damages were not "attributable to the taking. 11 Id. The court
explained that the ''[d]efendants placed an unwarranted reliance on the e,cpectation that the road
project would be completed" where "[d]elays caused by lack of funding occut with some
regularity.'' Id. at 848. Ultimately, the court found that that any project delay was unrelated to
the taldng and because the "defendants were not deprived of value inherent in the land or made
to suffer noxious effects of the tal<ing," they could not recover damages. Id
Sherwood and Johnson make similar arguments to those of the landowners in Oakland

County, and they attempt to use a date of valuation other than the required "date of the talcing,"
Sherwood and Johnson use the date of completion of the Project for their valuation dates to claim
post-taking damages, including an alleged delay in the Project. Grathol's Third Supp. Discovery
Resp., at 6-8 (York Af.f., Ex. 6) (assessing a significant claim for damages based on alleged
construction delays); Sherwood Report, at 10-12 (YorkAff., Ex. 18) (same); JobnsonDep., at
102:9"13 (confirming that $947,000 of damage claim was for "the time it'll take ITD to complete
the construction of the project") (York Aff., Ex. 3); Id. at 102:23-103:12 (summarizing Gtathol's
alleged $3,779,578 damage claim).
Both Sherwood's and Johnson's valuations ignore Idaho's statutory requirement for
determining just compensation in a condemnation case and, as a result, their reasonina and
methodology are contrary to Idaho law and therefore are improper and inadmissible.

----
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Oakland County, Sherwood and Johnson's :flagrant attempt to avoid the requirements of Idaho

Code § 7-712 and seek damages not compensable in a condemnation action should be rejected.
Additionally, Sherwood's valuation should also be excluded because he used two
different dates of valuation. Idaho Code § 7-712 requires that one date be used to determine the
amount of compensation owed -the date of summons. Sherwood uses two, neither of which is
the date of summons. He uses August 2010 for his before valuation dates, and he uses different
dates for bis after valuation dates. By doing so, Sherwood not only violates the mandate of§ 7712, he artificially inflates his value conclusions by making a false comparison between the
before and much later after conditions. Sherwood's analysis and methodologies are inherently
flawed in the extreme and his valuation should excluded.
In sum, Sherwood's and Johnsons opinions of value of this case are inadmissible and
should be excluded from evidence at trial.
C.

Sherwood's Opinions Related to Determination of Gratbol's Larger Parcel Are
Inadmissible Because They Are Based On Unreliable And Improper Methodology.

Sheiwood applies an improper methodology to value the Grathol Property as it relates to
the "larger parcel." The larger parcel is a significant issue in condemnation cases because the
definition of the larger parcel directly affects the valuation of the property being acquired. As
explained by the California Supreme Court in City ofSan Diego v, Neumann, when "the property
acquired [by eminent domain] is part of a larger parcel/' in addition to compensation for the
property actually taken, the property owner must be compensated for the injury, if any, to the
land that he retains. Neumann, 863 P.2d 72S, 746 (Cal. 1993) (citing to eminent domain statute
that is substantially the same as Idaho Code§ 7-711) (citations to statute omitted, bracketed text
in original). And "fb]ecause severance damages are intended to compensate the property owner

for the destruction of the integrity of his land the property owner must be able to demonstrate
- --- ---

-
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both how his property functions as an integrated unit and how the value of what remains has
been injured by the taking of a part." Id
Here, Sherwood has improperly used a 30-acre larger parcel to value Grathol's S6-acre
Property. Sherwood,s misapplication of the larger parcel analysis is improper, and his valuation
opinions are therefore inadmissible. State ex rel. Symms v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho
528,531,493 P.2d 387, 390 (1972) e'If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger
tract held by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it constituted an entire tract
separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same owner."),
Idaho Code provides that the trier of fact must ascertain and assess the value of the
property to be condemned, and if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of
the larger parcel, the trier of fact must also ascertain severance damages to the portion not
condemned. I.C. § 7-711; Btg Lost River I". Distv. Zollinger, 83 Idaho 401,411,363 P.2d 706,
711 (1961). The tenn "parcel" under Idaho Code§ 7-711 means "a consolidated body ofland."

City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho at 532,493 P.2d at 391 (citation omitted), If the parcel taken
is part of a larger parcel, then it is error not to consider the larger parcel. Id at 531, 493 P.2d at
390. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in City ofMountain Home,
If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract held
by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it
constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in
the possession of the same owner; the amount awarded for the land
taken must reflect any enhanced value arising from its availability
for use in conjunction with the land not taken.

Id (citations omitted),

The question of whether two pieces of land constitute a single parcel is typically a factual
question for the trier of fact. Id. at 532,493 P.2d at 390. However, the larger parcel becomes a

-___ -_____-_______ :::-:-::.... :·:.:::·:.·:::_·__-_ ··.::_--:::.-·:-.·.:-:..::-_·-_·::::.--:-::.:·::--::···- ... --· -······-- -- --···-···--·--· -·--·-· --····-·:::-::-::-:.:.:·_ -:·::=-·------·-·····
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question of law when no reasonable mind could differ on the issues. 4A-14B NICHOLS ON
EMINENTDOMAJN § 14B.04[1] (2011).

To determine the larger parcel, the court must examine three elements (1) the unity of
ownership; (2) contiguity; and (3) unity of use. Id, at§ 14B.03[1] (2011). Ordinarily lands will
not be considered a single tract unless there is unity of use. Id "It is the unity of use which is
the controlling factor, not merely the contiguity, the latter being evidentiary but not controlling."
Id, at§ 14B.05[1] (2011).

Here, no dispute exists that all three elements are present and the entire 56-acre Gtathol
Property constitutes the larger parcel in this case. The parties agree that the entire 56 acres me
owned by Grathol; the entiie 56 acres are contiguous; and both the existing use and the proposed
development of the Property contemplate use of the entire parcel. See Grathol's Third Supp.
Discovery Resp., at 4 (York Aff., Ex. 6); Sheiwood Report, at 2, 4 (York Aff., Ex. 18); Grathol's
Rezone Application (York Aff. Ex. 16) (acknowledging size, ownership, and development plans
for entire Grathol Property). In fact, Sherwood testified during his deposition that "[t]he larger
parcel is approximately 57 acres." Sherwood Dep., at 77:12-13 (York Aff., Ex. 5).
Yet, despite the lack of dispute that all elements are present to establish the larger parcel,
Sherwood only considered the west 30 acres in his valuation-the acres closest to the Hwy 54
and US-95 intersection-and ignored the remaining 26.8 acres. Sherwood Report, at 6, 9 (York
Aff.,Ex.18); ShenvoodDep., 119:12-22; 120:12-15 (YorkAff.,Ex. 5). By using a smaller
segment ofGrathol,s Property for his valuation, Sherwood's entire analysis is skewed upward in
an artificial and improper attempt to reach a higher value. It is commonly known that smaller
properties sell for more than larger properties. Sherwood acknowledged that tenet of real estate
principles in his deposition.
- ---- ---····
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Q.
And you're familiar, I assume, with the notion that smaller
properties typically sell for more on a per-acres basis than larger
properties.
A.

Yes.

Q.
So would it be fair to assume that if you're looking at 16acre parcels or 16 acre comps, that you're going to be looking at
properties with higher values than you would be if you're looking
at comps for a larger piece of property?
A.

Typically that is correct, yes.

Sherwood Dep,, at 222:19-223:3 (York Aff., Ex. 5).
Thus, when Sherwood used a 30-acre larger parcel, he looked for sales that were
comparable to a 30-acre parcel, made adjustments for a 30-acre parcel, and reached a value
conclusion for a 30-acre parcel-which by Sherwood's own testimony is typically higher than
values for a larger, 56-acre parcel, which is the size of Grathol's property, Id Sherwood's
analysis fails to value the entire 56-acre Property. As a result, his analysis is biased and hi us
and adjustments to allegedly "comparable" (but much smaller) sales results in an improper and

inflated valuation of the Grathol Property. See Sherwood Dep. 222:4-225:10 (York Aff., Ex. 5);
Sherwood Report (York A:ff., Ex. 18). Sherwood's value conclusions are misleading and
improper and should be excluded.
The standard in Idaho for the admissibility of expert testimony is that ''(u]nder the rules,
ex.pert opinion testimony is only admissible when 'the expert is a qualified expert in the field, the
evidence will be of assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular field would reasonably
rely upon the same type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the
probative value of the opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect."' Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140-41, 219 P.3d 453, 464-GS (2009) (quoting Ryan
v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App. 1992)); see also Idaho R. Evid. 702, 703,

& 403. "[B]xpert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
~_-_:_-.=---::-..:-: -_-_ -.:-:--:.:-:..-:--::----=--- -_-__-:.==-===--=-===--===-.:-==::==--=----~-.:··-·:-:
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record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible.''

Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46-47, 844 P.2d at 28-29; see also Idaho R. Evid.702. Stated otherwise, the
admissibility of an expert's opinions ''depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning and
methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion." Id at 46-47, 844 P.2d at 28-29. Thus,
"so long as the principles and methodology behind a theory are valid and reliable, the theory
need not be commonly agreed upon or generally accepted." Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140,219 P.3d
at 464. And conversely, if the principles and methodology that are applied are not valid or
reliable, the opinions are properly excluded.
Here, Sherwood has failed to apply the proper methodology to value the Grathol Property
as it relates to the larger parcel analysis, and thus his opinions are inadmissible.

D.

Sherwood's Comparable Sales Are Inadmissible Because He Has Failed to Disclose
Specific Adjustments For Each Sale.

In his valuation analysis, Sheiwood failed to make any specific adjustments to the
"comparable" sales he used. His report contains no analysis, explanation or computation of the
adjustments he made to the 10 comparable sales he used to value the Grathol Property. See
Sherwood Report (York Aff., Ex. 18).
In condemnation proceedings, adjustments made to comparable sales should be well
supported by logic and reason and should also be documented in the appraisal. 7-04 NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 04.03 (2011). Thus, for a comparable sale appraisal to be admissible,

the appraiser must disclose the specific adjustments made to each of the comparable sales, See

Bell v. Village ofPoland, 722 N.Y.S.2d 194i 194 (N.Y, App. Div, 2001) (appraisal considered
flawed because appraiser failed to include necessary figures and calculations to account for
adjustments made); State Highway Comm 'n v. Callahan, 410 P.2d 818, 819 (Or. 1966)
(upholding trial court's exclusion of testimony on comparable sales for lack of specific
=====-· - ·---·--------------- - - - - - --
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adjustments for sales and concluding that it would have been improper for the court to admit
comparable sales until the adjustments were explained).
When an appraiser fails to specify and quantify the adjustments made to the comparable
sales, any probative value of the appraisal is eliminated. Johnson v. Town ofHaverstraw, S18
N.Y.S.2d 433,433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (icThis obvious failure to specify and quantify the
aforementioned adjustments vitiated the probative value of the appraisal.") (citations omitted).
And absent any quantified adjustments, an appraisal is inadmissible. Matter ofAcquisition of

Real Property by County ofDutchess, 588 N.Y.S.2d 936,937 (N.Y App. Div. 1992) (upholding
rejection of appraisal where expert appraiser failed to "include dollar or percentage adjustments"
made to comparable sales). As stated by the court in County ofDutchess in response to
petitioner's challenge to the rejection of their expert's appraisal. report and the acceptance of the
·claim.ant's report,
We find no error in either determination. Supreme Court rejected
petitioner's appraisal because the expert who prepared it failed to
include dollar or percentage adjustments to the comparable sales
and rentals used in the appraisal.. "[A]n appraiser is expected to set
forth his explanations and adjustments" including the necessary
facts, figures and calculations to account for the adjustments. A
lump-sum adjustment is improper. The failure of petitioner's
expert to specify and quantify the various adjustments made in his
appraisal. vitiated its probative value.

Id. (internal citations omitted). See also John P. Burke Apartments, Inc. v. Swan, 528 N. Y.S.2d
718, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
Since Sherwood's appraisal does not set forth, explain or quantify any of his adjustments
to comparable sales, his analysis is likewise deficient, and the appraisal and opinions should be
excluded. Sherwood apparently made adjustments to the comparable sales he used, but he failed
to provide any basis for

determining what adjustments were made, how he made the adjustments,
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or the amount of the adjustments. In fact, according to Sherwood he does not make
individualized adjustments. According to Sherwood,
A lot of appraisers love to make grids and plus and minus and that.
I typically don't. I take all the things into consideration, look at
them as a whole, and make my estimate based on those things.
Sherwood Dep., at 233:16-19 (York Aft., Ex. S), When asked how he determined size
adjustments for the sales he used in his analysis, Sheiwood testified that "[y]ou put it all in the
hopper when you look at the sales, and I realite it's going to be- size is certainly going to reflect
a higher value.'' Id at 234:4-6. Sherwood's 'tlack-box" method of making his adjustments
does not involve attributing any particular amount for a given size adjustments or quantifying the
adjustments in any way, Sherwood does not have any formula for coming up with his
adjustments. Id at 235:4-5 ("You've asked me several ti.mes and I'm telling you I don't have a
fonnula. "). He does not make his adjustments in adherence to any accepted appraisal principles,
formula, or methodology, but simply "[b]y looking at it and making my judgment based on the
sale.,, Id at 235 :9~ I 0. When asked how he knew whether his size adjustments were consistent
as between his comparable sales ifhe did not quantify the adjustments, Sherwood's response was
merely,
I guess that's why I get paid to be an appraiser. I feel that I'm
entitled to an opinion of looking at a lot of factors and trying to
quantify specific ones for size. I don't have a specific formula.
Id at 234: 14-23, When asked to summarize his processes for making adjustments to his

eomparables sales and whether he reached an adjusted value for the sales he relied upo~
Sherwood testified,
A. No, I didn't adjust them as I st.arted from square one, there's
no •• these are sales I considered, I considered location, size, other
things, in forming my estimate for the subject property.
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Q. And then based on all of that, you just sort of found $2.25? I
don't understand how you got to $2.25.

That was my best estimate based on the comparables that I
looked at, the research I did in this particular case.

A.

Q.

Okay. Anything more specific than that?

A.

No.

Id, at 236:22-237:10.
Sherwood's utter disregard for the appropriate process-or any process-of making
meaningful and appropriate adjustments to his comparable sales eliminates the probative value of
the comparable sales he relies on. In sum, the methodology used by Sherwood to create his
opinion of value for the Grathol Property is improper, contrary to established condemnation and
appraisal principles, and establishes clear grounds to exclude his opinions in this case.
E.

Johnson's Opinions Are Inadmissible Because They Include Damage Estimates For
Property That Is Not Being Taken By ITD As Part Of This Case,
Johnson's valuation analysis includes acreages for Sylvan Road, and his damage

conclusions contain damages for the construction of Sylvan Road across the Grathol Property,
Johnson Dep. at 92:6~16; 93:16~94:2; 94:8-10; 102:14-103:3 (York Aff., Ex. 3); Gratbol Third
Suppl. Discovery Resp., at 6 (York Aff., Ex. 6). As discussed in detail in ITD's motion for
summary judgment, ITD is not acquiring any of Grathol' s Property for Sylvan Road and the
Court has concluded that the taking in this case does not include any taking for Sylvan Road.
ITD's Mem. in Supp. ofMtn. for Summ. Judg., at 6-12. Itis a basic principle of condemnation
law that where no taking has occurred, no compensation is owed. See Merritt 11. State, 113 Idaho
142, 145, 742 P.2d 397,400 (1987). Thus, Johnson's valuation and resulting conclusions should
be excluded for the reason that it includes compensation for property that is not being taken.
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Evidence Of Sherwood's Sale No. 5 Is Inadmissible Because The Transaction Was A
Settlement And Compromise Of A Threatened Condemnation Between ITD And
The Landowner And Was Not A Bona Fide, Voluntary, Open Market Sale Between
Willing Participants.

In support of bis valuation, Sherwood relies upon 10 sales of property that he contends
are sufficiently comparable to the Grathol Property to provide a substantive basis for the value of
the Grathol Property. As the proponent of the comparable sales data used to support its claims
for just compensation in this case, Gtathol has the burden of satisfying the "strict foundation
requirements [that] apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as substantive proof of
the value of the property taken." See State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 23,454 P.2d
56, 60 (1969). In order to satisfy its burden to establish that its comparable sales are relevant and
thereby admissible in evidence, Grathol must show that the sales are "bona fide, voluntary,
sufficiently recent in time and substantially similar in physical characteristics to the subject
property." 7A NICHOLS ONEM1NENTDOMAIN § 013.02[2] ("[A]lljurisdictions recognize that a
comparable sale, in order to be relevant and thereby admissible in evidence, must be bona fide,
voluntary, sufficiently recent in time and substantially similar in physical characteristics to the
subject property.''); see Collier, 93 Idaho at 23, 454 P.2d at 60 (holding that comparable sales
must have "sufficient criteria of similarity to be admitted as independent substantive evidence of
the value of property taken.").
ITD takes issue with each of the 10 sales used by Orathol and the adjustments made to
the sales and intends to challenge those issues at trial, depending upon the foundation-or lack
there of-presented by Grathol, However, for purposes of the present motion, ITD only seeks an
order in limine excluding evidence of one Grathol's sales, specifically Sherwood's Sale No. S.
Sheiwood Report, at 8 (York Aff., Ex. 18). Sale No. 5 involved a parcel ofland located at the
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intersection of Highway 95 and Garwood Road and was "the sale of the Garwood Saloon
property to Idaho DOT." Id The sale is irrelevant and inadmissible because the transaction was
the settlement and compromise of an anticipated condemnation action to be brought by the Idaho
Transportation Department against the land owner and was not a bona fide, voluntary, open
market sale between willing participants.
As a general rule, damages for the taking of an interest in property are measured by the
fair market value of the property taken plus severance damages to any remainder. Canyon View

Irrigation Co. v. '/'win Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 614~ 619 P.2d 122, 132 (1980) (citing
State v. Duncliclci Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112 (1955)). In Idaho, the term "fair market
value" is defined in Idaho's model jury instructions for eminent domain cases as ''the cash price
at which a willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an

open marketplace free ofrestraints, taking into account the highest and most profitable use of the
property." IDJI2d 7.09 (emphasis added). The definition of "fair market value" further requires
that the tenn "presumeO that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no compulsion to do so,
and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so." IDJI2d 7.09.
Thus, where the property is acquired as part of the compromise between a condemnor and a
landowner, the sale is not voluntary because the parties are under compulsion to buy or sell the
property. As such, the sale is irrelevant as to the market value of property, and courts uniformly
exclude evidence of the sale as inadmissible. State v. DeTienne, 701 P.2d 534, 537-38 (Mont.
1985) ("it is generally held by the weight of authority that evidence of the sale of a parcel of land
subject to condemnation to the proposed condem:nor or to another potential condemnor may not

be admitted as evidence of the value of the land condemned.") (quoting S NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 21.33); Dean v. Board ofCounty Sup 'rs ofPrince William County, 708 S.E.2d 830
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(Va. 2011) (upholding trial court's exclusion of sale involving condemnor and landowner where
sale was not "voluntary and free from compulsion and not by way of compromise''); Jordan v.

Department ofTransp., 342 S.E.2d 482,483 (Ga. App. 1986) (holding that sales of land to
condemning authorities were inadmissible as either direct or indirect evidence in condemnation
proceedings as to the issue of value of the land sought to be condemned); City ofPortland v.

Holmes, 376 P.2d 120, 124 (Or. 1962) (upholding exclusion of evidence of involuntary sale of
property sought to be condemned despite proximity of sale to subject property and stated that
"(a] sale which is not voluntary has no tendency to prove market value").
Sherwood's Sale No. 5 is inadmissible for just this reason. It was not a voluntary sale
because it was the property sold to ITD under threat of condemnation and was the com.promise
of anticipated litigation. See ITD Offer Letter (July 22, 2008) and Right of Way Contract (July
23, 2008), (York Aff. Ex. 17).

No dispute exists regarding the facts surrounding the transaction. Indeed, Sherwood
acknowledges in bis report that "this sale was negotiated under threat of condemnation and
courts have ruled that these sales may not represent true market value for this reason."
Sherwood Report, at 8 (York Aff., Ex. 19). Similarly, Sherwood testified during his deposition

that sales under threat of condemnation may not be admissible in court because they are not
representative of market value. Sherwood Dep. 228:1·21 (York Aff., Ex. 5). Sherwood also
testified that his Sale No. S was not an open market sale and that such sales are not typically used

as a coµiparable sales. Id, at 229:19·231:6. Yet despite his acknowledgement of the sale's
inherent lack of reliability and that courts regularly exclude such sales, Sherwood used the sale
as the basis to support his value conclusions and placed "primary emphasis" on the sale. Id, at
228:1-21; Sherwood Report, at 8-9 (York Aff., Ex. 18),
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Sherwood's reliance on the condemnation transaction is improper. The transaction was
not a voluntary sale between a willing buyer and seller, and as such, does not reflect the market
value of the property. The sale is irrelevant to the issue of the value of Grathol's Property and
should be excluded.
III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, ITD respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order excluding
evidence of:
1. Valuation opinions ofGrathol's experts Skip Sherwood ("Sheiwood") and Alan
Johnson ("Johnson") that violate Idaho law and fail to apply the statutory date of
valuation as required by Idaho Code § 7-721.
2. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation methodology
relating to the ''larger parcel" analysis of the Gtathol Property.
3. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments made to
comparable sales.
4. Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being taken
as part of this condemnation action.

5. Evidence of Sherwood's Sale No. 5, which is a transaction between a condemning
authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and not a valid
comparable sale.
These subjects are improper and inadmissible and are properly excluded from evidence at
the trial of this matter.
DATED this 6th day of January~ 2012.

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA )

Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am

duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho.

2.

I am counsel of record for Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") in

the above-captioned matter, and I make this affidavit in support of ITD's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion in Limine.
3.

Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the relevant portions from

transcript of the Possession Hearing held on January 21, 2011. The cited portions have been
highlighted for ease of reference.
4.

Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the Kootenai

County Zoning Ordinance. The cited portion has been highlighted for ease of reference.

5.

Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of relevant- portions of the

deposition of Alan Johnson taken on November 18, 2011. The cited portions have been
highlighted for ease of reference.
6.

Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of the

deposition ofGeoffReeslund taken on November 17, 2011. The cited portions have been
highlighted for ease of refer-ence.

7.

Attached as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the deposition of Dewitt M.

"Skip" Sherwood taken on November 16, 2011. The cited portions have been highlighted for ease
of reference.
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Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of Defendant

HJ Grathol' s Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents served October 6,2011. The cited portions have been
highlighted for ease of reference.

9.

Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of the "after" design plan of the HJ

Grathol Development created by CLC Associates.

10.

Attached as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of the Buyer's Settlement Sheet

dated May 23, 2008 for the purchase of the subject property. Exhibit 8 was produced in discovery
by HJ Grathol and was submitted as Exhibit 44 to the Alan Johnson deposition.
11.

Attached as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of the Multiple Listing Service

information for the sale of the subject property. Exhibit 9 was submitted as Exhibit 43 to the Alan
Johnson deposition.
12.

Attached as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of the rebuttal report prepared by

Dennis R. Reinstein dated December 19, 2011. This report was produced as part of ITD 's rebuttal
expert reports on December 19, 2011.
13.

Attached as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of the relevant portions of the

rebuttal report prepared by David Evans and Associates dated December 16, 2011. This report
was produced as part of ITD's rebuttal expert reports on December 19, 2011.

14.

Attached as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of Figure 12 from the David

Evans and Associates rebuttal report dated December 16, 2011. This figure was produced as part
ofITD's rebuttal expert reports on December 19,2011.
15.

Attached as Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of Warranty Deed 504394.

E,dubit 13 was submitted as Exhibit 6 to the Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood deposition.
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Attached as Exhibit 14 is a true and correct copy of the ALTA map produced in

discovery by HJ Grathol. Exhibit 14 was submitted as Exhibit 12 to the GeoffReeslund
deposition.
17.

Attached as E:xhibjt 1S is a true and correct copy of excerpts from Plaintiff ITD 's

Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts dated December 19, 2011. This report was produced as part of
ITD' s rebuttal expert reports on December 19, 2011.
18.

Attached as Exhibit 16 is a true and correct copy of the Findings of Fact Applicable

Legal Standards, Comprehensive Plan Analysis, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation for In

the Matter ofthe Application ofHughes Investments/or a Change in the Zoning Classification on
Approximately 56 Acres From Agricultural to Rural and Hughes Investment's (HJ Gtathol)
Application for Rezoning. Exhibit 16 was submitted as Exhibit 16 to the GeoffReeslund
deposition.
19.

Attached as Exhibit 17 is a true and correct copy of the July 22, 2008 ITD Offer

letter and Right Right-of-Way Contract executed in lieu of condemnation, between ITD and
Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC.
20.

Attached as Exhibit 18 is the true and correct copy of relevant portions of the

August 2S, 2011 appraisal report prepared by of Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood on behalf of HJ
Grathol. Exhibit 19 was submitted as Exhibit 3 to the Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood deposition.
Ill
Ill

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY YORK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ITD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
387 of 1617
JUDGMENT AND MOTION IN LIMINE - 4

.Jlilt

O,LVIL

NO. 3876

j:j1r1v1

P. 6

DATED this 6th day of January, 2012.

SUBSCIUBED and SWORN to before me this 6th day of JanuaryJ 2012.

Notary Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires 5;/q..

zo, 'I
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_____________,
Defendants/Appellants.
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P RO C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: We're on the record in First
District Court fox- Kootenai County. I'm District Judge
Lansing Haynes. This is the time set for a hearing in
the matter of State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board
versus HJ Grathol, et al. It is civil case 10-10095,
Plaintiffs in the matter are represented by Ted ...
MR. TOLLEFSON: Ted ToJJefson, your Honor.
THB COURT= Ted Tollefson, thank you. I saw
another name there, as well. Defendants are represented
by Mr. Doug Marfice and Mr. Chris Oabbert.
This is a hearing on plaintiff's motion for
order &ranting possession of real property. It's a
complaint that is brought pmsuant to Idaho code
section 7-721 and other statutes. And are the parties
ready for this hearing?
MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes, your Honor.
MR. MARFICE: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Plaintiff, do you
intend to call any witnesses at today's hearing?
PLAINTIFF OPENING STATEMENT
MR. TOLLBFSON: Your Honor, ifl could
approach it in this manner. I have a brief opening
statement that I'd like to make and then the state is

prepared to proceed, your Honor, today. We have
witnesses to testify to the value and to the scope of
the taking. But we believe that based upon Idaho code
7-721, Idaho Transportation Department is onJy required
to show four elements. First, that it has the power of
eminent domain. The defendants in this case have
already stipulated to that fact •• or excuse me,
admitted in their answer.
No. 2, that the project is a public project
that is authorized by law. They have also admitted that
in their answer. Specifically, in this case it's the
realignment of Highway 95 and the construction of the
interchange at 54.
And No. 3, the third element that ITO needs to
prove that the property is necessary for that project.
And again, they have not presented any evidence contrary
to ITD's assertions both in the comp1aint and in the
affidavit of Jason Minzghor. The Idaho Transportation
Department's district engineer - project development
engineer, excuse me, that this property is necessaJY.
And four, that ITO conducted good-faith
negotiations for the purchase of the property. In this
case, ITD hired an independent appraiser, Mr. Stan Moe,
an MAI-certified appraiser, who appraised the property
necessary and detennioed that the just comi,ensation
Page s
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18
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wouldbe$571,000forthepropertysought,andITD
l
offered that amount. It is undisputed, that amount,
!
plus an additional 10 percent. So therefore, you;
'j;
Honor, we believe that at this point in time, none of
:
the issues raised by defendants actually impacts any of I
those four elements; and therefore, ITD is entitled to
~
an order forpossessioo at this time.
!
However, we have prepared. We have witnesses
here to testify to all those elements if necessary. And
so I guess, your Honor, I would just - it would be the
most efficient use of the Court's time, we believe, is
if the Court would direct the state as to-- rm as to
how - what evidence this court would like to hear, I
guess.
~
nm COURT: Well, I don't think I'll be
teUing you what it is I think I need ro hear. That's
for the advocates to put on the proof they think
necessaiy. Let me tum to HJ Grathol and find out. Do
you have any response to that legal argument made by the
State ofldaho?
DEFENDANT OPENING STATEMENT
MR. MARFICE: We do1 your Honor. And I
presume what the Court was doing was with the question 'j
.
about calling witnesses is a predicate to what kind of
1
time do we need, what order of proof are we going
to
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J?age 12

1

identified?
1
MR. TOLLEFSON: Q. I'm handing you two pieces I
A. Correct.
2 of pa.per which have been marked as Exhibit 2. Do you
Q. l'd like you to move to the second page of the
3 recognize those?
4 exhibit. Now, can you describe briefly what you see on 4
A. Yes.
s that second page?
s
Q. And what are those?
6
A. Highlighting in pink is the Gratbol portion of
6
A. These were the exhibits in my affidavit.
7 US-95 that we're condemning from.
7
MR. TOLLEFSON: Okay. And, your Honor, I have !
s
Q. And on this piece of paper here, does it s additional copies if you would like a copy to look at
'1
9 what does it depict? What do the lines depict moving
SI
THE COURT: That would be fine. Thank you.
10 sideways across the property on that piece of paper?
J.0
MR. TOLLEFSON: Q. Were these exhibits
11
A. Okay. On the farleft it shows the outline
ll attached to your affidavit?
12 shape of the right-of-way necessacy for the interchange 12
A. Yes.
13 and the ramps required, and then as it goes across the
13
Q. Can you please tell me what-- on the first
14 page, the next down to what's the four•lane divided
14 page ofExhibit 2, what the blue line represents?
15 roadway.
1s
A. The blue line represents the Grathol ownership
16
Q. And what does the pink colorrepresent?
lti boundary.
l7
A. This is a highlighted color representing the
17
Q. And on the second page, there's another blue
18 graphical portion of the entire Orathol propertY needed 18 line. What does that represent?
19 for the highway and the interchange.
19
A. That also represents a second parcel of
2O
Q. And can you describe why is that pink shaded
2 o Grathol boundary.
21 part necessary for this project?
21
Q. Thank you. At the top of the page, there's a
22
A. This is necessary to have a separated
22 series of white lines. Can you tell us what those white
23 highway/freeway standard for the traveling public to
23 lines are?
j
2 4 increase safety and mobility for this entire co1Tidor
24
A. Yes. They are various outlines of different
I
...2_s__..;:&;;;..;o;..;;.;m.__
.,Gar_w_o_od_t=o_S..,.aa.._il_e._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.,.2_s_ro_ad_w__.ay_s_an_d_r_am_,p,_s_an_d_r_i,igg.:-t-o
__f._.w_a:=-,y_req~uir_ed_fo_r_th_is~-1·!
1
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i

project.

Q. As part of these project plans, is there any
Q. In the middle of this page-- excuse me, is
property being condemned for the expansion of Sylvan 2
3 there anything on this •• bow is this document -prepared,
Road?
4 exhibit ...
A. No, sir.
5
A. It was prepared by a consultant working for
Q, Is the construction or condemnation of
1
6 ITO using an aerial and CAD overlay. The CAD files are i
property of Sylvan Road necessary to complete this
7 on the aerial to give a visual representation of what is
1
project?
8 OCClllTing in the field.
I
A. No.
9
Q.
And
is
it
generally
accurate
as
to
what
the
I
:MR. TOLLEFSON: I'm now handing you·· aod,
l
your Honor, for •• I'm not sure how your court likes to 10 project plans will construct?
11
A Yes.
1
run it, but would you like to make these premarked
before he looks at them, or do you have a preference? 12
Q. Is there any construction on the Orathol
i
13 property, which is outlined in blue, any contemplated
THE COURT: It's easier if they're premarked.
;
MR. TOLLEFSON: Let's do it that way then. If ...... eonstruction on the Gm'ihol property for any section of :
1S Sylvan Road?
1
I could have the clerk mark this as Exhibit 1.
A.
No.
i
16
(Exhibit l marked.)
17
Q. And just for the Court and Counsel's
THE COURT: And is that what - the
18 convenience, can you describe where Sylvan Road is on ,
condemnation exhibit?
:
MR. TOLLEFSON: Correct That's Exhibit B to 19 this exhibit?
t.'ie complaint of condemnation that was filed in this
A.
Sylvan
Road
is
approximately
on
the
first
page
"'..,
21 in the middle left road that's on the edge of the
case.
22
aerial.
THE COURT: Now Exhibit I.
MR. TOLLEFSON: Thank you. And ifI could 23
Q. On the left-hand side of the document, there
24 is a -- what I believe is a construction on Highway 54.
have these two just marked as Exhibit 2, please.
2S Do you see what I'm looking at there?
(Exhibit 2 marked.)
.. .,..,.. ,., . , . ____
.... ---~
l

•

)I

i

....

.J~... ... • \
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Page l8
l

2
3
4

s

6
7
8
9
10

number, where that number came from?
A. ITO sought out an independent appraisal, and
through that process we solicited an appraisal, and an
appraisal was done, and that's where we started with our
offer, plus an incentive •• an incentive was included in
that offer.
Q. Would it refresh your recollection if the
offer made to GrathoJ in June of2010 was $628,000 $628,000and$100-628,100?

A. Yes.
Q. I think I got it right that time. And after
1.2 this offer was made to Gratho~ were you aware - did
11

13
14

15
lG
17
1B

19

20
.21
.2 2

23
.24

2S

they respond?
A. Yes,theydid. Ibelieveitwaslater,the
last couple weeks of June they responded back with -rejected the offer.
Q. Do you recall how much they counter proposed?
A. It was anywhere - it was a range on their
rejection and it was 2.5 to 3 million.
Q. So it was approximately $3 million?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you - after Grathol's counter proposal,
did you have any meetings personally with Grath- - with
any representatives of HJ Grathol?
A. Yes. On Au1mst l st, we met with Oratbol aod

l

2

3
4

s
6
7

a
9

1o
ll

12
13
14
15

16
l7
18
19
.2 o

21
22
.23

24

their representative.
Q. And who is ''we"?
A. It was myself, Ron Harvey, and Yvonne Lima.
Q. And who was present on behalf of Grathol?
A. I forgot their name. Those two guys and the
two owners.
Q. So just Jet the record reflect that you
pointed to the defendants' table?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that -- was the amount ofjust
compensation, was that discussed at this meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. And were the parties able to reach an
agreement?
A.

No.

Q. Was also the issue of Sylvan Road discussed at
this meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you briefly tell the Court what was
discussed regarding Sylvan Road at this August 1st, 2010
meeting?
A. ITO was presenting Grathol with an option to
build the road, the county-funded road, in exchange for
a dedication ofrigltt~of-way.

I

s the Roberts Road extended south, which would eventually
6 connect to Sylvan Road, and they wanted to donate their
? property in exchange for the frontage road being built
8 and. asked us to discuss this also with Grathol.
9
Q. Okay. Justforthesakeofelarityofthe
1 o record, the two neighbors you were talking about were
11 Krasniek Frededck and Jason (sic) Mortgage. Are they
12 indicated on Exh:ibit 2?
13
14

A. Yes.

lG

A. Yes.

Q. ThelocationoftheirparceJs,arethey
15 indicated on Exhibit 2?
l7
18

19
2o

21
.22
23

24

2.5

Q. And where are they in relation t.o the Orathol
property to the big blue section?
A. They are just north of the Kootenai County
Farragut Trail parcel.
Q. So ifrm readingthis document, they're to
the right of the blue Grathol property?
A. Correct.
Q. And those two nejghbors had approached lTD to
see if lTD would constr.uot a S:?lvan/Roberts Road

1
2
3

,
5
6

7
8
9
lo
11·
12
13
14
15

16
l7
18

19

20
21
22
23
.24

i

j

j
Page 21 1

Page 19
1

i1

A. Two parcel -- two property oWners, Jameson

2. Mortgage •• 'the owners of Jameson Mortgage and Frederick
3 Krasnick (phonetic), had approached ITD and had beard
4 that we were in negotiations wltb them and they wanted

i

extension on their property?
A. Cotrect.
'
Q. And now back to your meeting with Gratho!.
]
How djd your meeting with Gratbol come about because of l
ypur meetings or your agreement with these two
l
neighboring property owners?
I
A. My understanding is that Grathol was- working
1
with those two neighbors and they found out that they
J
didn't accept the offer, and they had called my staff
1
engineer and myself to say that we needed to make sure
j
that they understood what we were proposing was Sylvan ]
Road.
Q. And so did you go to Grathol with that
proposai?
A.

Ye.s.

Q. And the prop0sal being if they dedicated their
property, ITD would construct a frontage road for them?
A. Correct.
Q. And did they accept that offer?
A. No.
Q. After they rejected ITD's offer, did ITO have
any plans to condemn any portion of their property to
construct this Sylvan Road?
A. No.

!

'1
/

I
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yourHonor.
THE COURT: Cross-examination?
MR. MARFICE: Very brief, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
MR. MARFICE: Q. Mr. Minzghor, you1ve been
involved in this project since 2002, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And there were various alignment alternatives
that ITO had under consideration over the course of the
planning phase; is that a fair statement?
A. Correct
Q. And with respect to the ultimate alignment
that was decided on, is it called the Brown Alternative
in the area where the Grathol property is located?

l

2
3
4

s
G
7
8

9

lo
11
12
13

14

A. Correct
Q. Y9u made mention of the first study thatthen

1s

got incorporated into what you call the·· a STIP.
That's a State Transportation Improvement Plan; is that
right? Is that what STIP stands for?
A. That's what STIP stands for, yes.
Q. Okay. And with respect to this Brown
Alternative, the State Transportation Improvement
Plan- are you able to see this from where you are
there?
A. Yeah.lean.

17

lEi
18
19

2O
21
22
23
24

25

Page 23
Q. It contemplated a frontage road where Sylvan
2 Road essentially lies, did it not?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. Okay. And to orient you and the Court, this
5 is Highway 9S, Have you seen this document before?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. This is an Idaho Transportation Department
a document?
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. Okay. And this is the Grathol property
l l outlined in blue here; is that correct?
12
A. I think it's blue.
13
Q. Kind of hard to see the blue.
14
A. Yeah.
15
Q. And you've already testified these white lines
16 depict the proposed construction and the area of the
1 7 condemnation; is that right?
18
A. Yes.
19
Q. This would be Sylvan Road to the south of US
20 Highway 54?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Or Smte Highway 54, I'm sorry.
23
And it depicts nothing here. Do you know why
24 that is?
2.~~· .... ~.:...
no_~ans in
1

.!~~!~-~-~~:

1

Page 24

eonstructingSylvanRoad.
Q. Sylvan Road as a right-of-way does not extend
across the Grathol property, does it?
A. That is correct.
Q. There's no road oh the1ground, there's no
right-of-way, there's no ownership by the Slate or any
county or municipality, is there?
A. Correct..
Q. Okay. Now, you said that after August 1 of
2010, when the proposal was made to build the frontage
road, you were referring to Sylvan Road, were you not?
A. Coi:rect.
Q. After that-A. The extension of Sylvan Road.
Q. The extension of Sylvan Road across the
Grathol property. You said after that date there was no
plan for 1he construction of Sylvan Road as part of this
project. Did I Wlderstand that correctly?
A. Across the Grathol property, yes.
Q. Okay. Have you seen the order of condemnation
that was attached to the complaint in this matter?
A. I'm not sure what...
MR MARFICE: May I approach, Judge?
THECOURT: Youmay.
MR.MARFICE: Q. Okay, Iiusthandedyoua
Page 25

j

j

1
J

l
1

j

j

:

l

I
j
1

j

;
l

l
j

i
!

document. I have not marked it. It's in the record as
2 Exhibit C to the plaintiffs 1 com.plaint Have you seen
3 that before?
4
A. Briefly, yes.
5
Q. And that's an order of condemnation
6 referencingthekeyNo.9791 thatyoutestifiedabout.
7 That's this project?
l

a

A.

i

j

I
/

!

j

Yes.

I

9
Q. And it references HJ Grathol and it has a
10 parcel ID number on the front page there. Do you see
l l that?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. And that parcel nwnber is this large

14

l
/

!

rectangular piece that the defendants own; is that your !

I

lS understanding?
16
A. Yes.
l7

i

I

Q. Okay. Now, this order of condemnation says on

18 page2,subpartE,youseethat?
19
A. Did you say D?

:
,!

20

Q. E as in-

!

21
22

A. Oh, okay.

i

23
24

'j

Q. -- elephant
A. Yeah.

1

Q. What does that first sentence read, sir?
1
395 of 1617
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1 across the Grathol property, doesn't it?
2
3

4

s
G
7

8
9
10
11
12

Correct.
Q. Okay. You testified in response to
Mr. Tollefson's questions about your familiarity with
A.

how the offer that was extended to HJ Gratho~ how that
number wa., achieved. Do you recall those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. And you've testified that the Transportation
Department selected an appraiser and an apprmser
provided an opinion as to a valuation; is that correct?

A. Yes.
Q. You read that appraisal, didn't you?
A. Portions of, yes.
Q. Did any portion of that appraisal discuss or

13
14
1s contain any treatment of evaluation for what would be
Hi necessary to create Sylvan Road across the Orathol
17 property?
A. I don't recall the •• I don't know what you're
18
19 asldng.
Q, Let •• that was poorly phrased.
2o
From your recollection of the appraisal
21
22 report, did it contain any discussion or treatment of
2 3 Sylvan Road, valuing a part of the Orathol property
2 4 where Sylvan Road would lie if it were built?
A. It was not •• Svlvan Road was not evaluated as
2s
Page 31

a part ofthe appraisal.
MR. MARFICB: Okay. Thank you. That's all I
2
3 have, your Honor.
THB COURT: Redirect?
4
MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes, your Honor.
5
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
6
MR. TOLLEFSON: Q. Jason, these documents
7
a that Mr. Marfice put up here, do any of these documents
9 dictate or control what I'ID is going to condemn or
l

1o
11

12

co11811UOt?
A. It does not.
Q. What does control what ITD is going to

13 construct?

A. T'ne project plans that we have designed.
Q. I'd like to tum your attention back to
lS
l6 Exhibit 1, which I believe are the right-of-way plans.
A. Okay.
17
Q. Are these project plans for this project'?
18
A. Yes.
19
Q. And does this control what will be constructed
2O
21 on the project?
A. Yes.
22
Q. I'd like to tum your attention oowto the
23
2 4 order of condemnation to which Mr. Marfioe referenced.
2 S l don't believe we had that numbered, did we?
~--···-~·1- -,-..
14
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MR. MARFICE: It's not marked 1I
MR. TOLLEFSON: Marked ••
MR. MARPICE: ~- Counsel.
MR. TOLLEFSON: May I have it marked, your
Honor?
MR. MARFICE: That one's got some scribbles
and highlighting on it. If you have a clean copy.
MR. TOLLEFSON: I do.
MR. MARFICE: Thank you,
(Bxhibit 3 marked.)
MR. TOLLEFSON: Should have had these
prema,ked for you.
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as
Bxhibit 3, which you've previously looked at. And just
for the sake of the record, this js Exhibit C to the
complaint of condemnation.
In your duties at ITD, do you have any role in
diafling the order of condemnation?
A. No.
Q. However, Mr. Marti~ had you read a section of
that condemnation order, so J'm soing to have you to do J
the same, but I must apologize, mine is a little longer. j
If you will take a second to read paragraphs 2 and 3 out i
I
loud.
i
A. On the first oaee?

I

Page 33
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Q. Yes, please.
A. Okay. "That the right-of:.way ne1:essacy for
the proposed project consist!, in part, of certain real
property locat.ed in the county as noted above and which
property bas been designated and shown a!I above parcel
number on the plan and said project now on file in the
offi1:e of the Idaho Transportation Department; that the
par1:el so designated and shown on said project plan is
necessary for the construction: of said pn,jeot and the
construction of said project is impossible without the
acquisition of this said parcel."
Q. Okay. So is it m to say you read those
that the property that is necessary is depicted on 1he
project plans?
A Correct.
Q. And if you look at the top of the order
condemnatfon, what is the project number?
A. 9791.
Q. I would like to tum your attention baek to
:Exhibit No. 1. What are the project plans of this
project?
A. 9791.
Q. Andagam, does an}'thiDgou these project
plans show condemnation of property for the construl:tion
of Sylvan Road?
396 of 1617
..C...,-..t,,..,.., • .)'o, ••
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A No.
Q~ Mr, Marfic;e ~lso had you read a section on
4
S page~ ~e). If you could.go back to look at tbat.
,'!: Arid it ..~ to SJJµuµatize~ it says that •i1n assoeia~9n
,$. 'Witll the ;J>,;ojecti the ldah.o Transportation DeparJ:tn~ is.
··6 in the proqess of,extendin$ Sylvan Road to tie mto, .,
7 ·Rob.e.rls !oacl,1~ At some point .in time •" ·or ~XeU$e me1
-~ at orie·poinl·in time it was .c~~P~~ted that tbei-e :m,y
9 ·be some so.rt of etn111-ectlon?
1
A. ·C01rect.
··
1'l ·Q. , Buf there's :no plans for that !!OW'?'
l~'
A. No. .
1;3., ·Q, Anydring;that Mr. Mar.lice b.as raised up th~
l ~. .~~t tequite You. ~r l'.I'P or il:1~ pr~ject ~ ~~Sl:nlct:
·1$ $ylvan R0s.d?
:J,6
A. No,
. ...
.
. .
. .
17
·Q: Atiythin,g that Mr. Marfi'ee,bas 3aid requi.te IT.I)
1-s· ~ QOJ\Sttµci Sylvan Road in any partieutat .tnannl}r or
l. ~ designation?
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Montana, Wyoming, California, and Washington.
,
Q. Do you hold any degrees or certificates
re]ated to your occupation as an appraiser?
A. Yes. I have the MAI designation. It's issued
by the Appraisal Institute.
Q. Is that the highest certification awarded by
the Appraisal Institute?
A. Yes.

Q. And we-· after discussion with Mr. Marfice,

10 we're going to make this short and to the point here.

,

11 Did you appraise property - the HJ Grathol property ;
12 that is at issue in this case?
l

A. Yes, I did.
1
Q. And who contacted you ~- excuse me.
15
Did ITO contact you to appraise this property? 1
Hi
A. Yes.
!
17
Q. And generally, what were the instructions you}
l 8 were given?
1
19
A. Well, the only instructions are to do a
A. No.
20 before-and-after appraisal in a fully documented,
Q. So even if it were aotl$l'!'Q.cted. we don't know
21 self-contained appraisal repon.
1
whatroute it would take?
22
Q. And no other instructions about directions as '
A.. Correct
2 3 to come in high, come in low, anything like that?
MR. TOLLEFSON: I have nothing further, your 2 4
A. No.
H~.!:.---~- -~-------------2_5__0~
......An~d-..iu_s_t_re_al_b--'--riefu'..L.\!4~t:::.is=a_______
13
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THB COURT; Any recross?
MR. MARFICE: No. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down. sir.
MR. TOLLEFSON: ITD will call Stan Moe.
THE COURT: If you'd come fOtWard, please,
sir. Please face our clerk and raise your right hand
for an oath.
STANLEY MOE,
called as a witness herein,
having been duly sworn on oath,
testified as follows:
DIR.ECT EXAMINATION
MR. TOLLEFSON: Q, Could you please identL.~
yourself and spell your last D8D'\C for the record
A. StanJey Moe, M-O-B.
Q. And what is your occupation?
A. I'm a real estate appraiser. I own my own
company known as Columbia Valuation Group.
Q. How long have you been a real estate

1 before-and-after appraisal?
A. It's a tenn that's used in condemnation
3 appraising. The before appraisal addresses the value of
4 the property as exists today, before the project is
S built. The after appraisal is a second appraisal,
6 separate appraisal. Assumes the project was built and
7 the right-of.way had been acquired, so it appraises what
8 is remaining, essentially.
9
Q. All right. And did you conduct the
1O before-and-after appraisal on this property?
11
A. Yes.
12
Q. And what was your designation of .. did you
13 come to a designation of what the highest and best use
2

l 4 of this property would be?
lS
A. Yes, I did. It was to hope for future
16 commercial development.
17
Q. Is that in the before condition?
lB
A. Yes.
19
Q. And do you recall how much you valued the
apptaiser?
, 2 O property at in the before condition?
A. About 40 years.
21
A. It was $35,000 an acre.
Q. Forty years. And where and what general
j 22 Q. And then in the after condition, after the
geographic location are you a real estate appraiser?
23 project was •• the project, as contemplated, was
A. I focus on North Idaho, but I'm licensed in
24 constructed, did you do another appraisal, the397
after
of 1617
Washinaton. I've appraised properties throuahoutlclaho, 25 aooraisal?
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l memorandum decision, but the findings and the
2 conclusions articulated today are the findings and
3 conclusions that support the CoUrt's ultimate order
4 today.
5
The Court is p1·ofoundly aware ofthe need to
6 protect individual property rights, rights of property
7 ownership in individuals and in corporations.
a
Property ownership is one of the foundations
9 on which our society is built and the inviability of
1 o property ownership is something to be cared for deeply
11 by the courts.
12
It is th.is court's opinion, if not holding,
l 3 after reviewing the statut.es involved in this particular
14 action, that the people of the State ofldaho, through
15 its legislature, has also taken seriously the rights of
16 property owners, both individuaJs and corporate
1 7 entities.
18
It has taken into consideration the public
19 good and the need for the state to, from time to time,
2 o condemn a property for the taking for necessary projects
21 if that taking is done according to Jaw.
22
It is this court's opinion that the
2 3 controlling statutes place a high burden on the state to
:24 satisfy legal requirements in that taking so that a
25 takin~ is not done in an arbitrarv or capricious manner
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and is not done in a way that the state can easily, and
I go back to the word capriciously. decide to force the
sale of property when an owner maybe doesn't want to
sell their property.
And so the review of7-72l has been important
to the Court. Idaho code section 7-721, subsection 2,
requires as its first element that the Court shall first
determine whether the plaintiff has the right of eminent
domain.
In the particular case before this court, that
matter is not contested in the nature of the right of
eminent domam, but the defendants have raised an issue
as to whether thar right has been properly exercised.
This court finds that the board, the plaintiff
in the matter, does have the right to condemn property.
Idaho code section 40-3 ll provides that the board bas
the authority to condemn property. Idaho code section
40-314 provides that the board has the authority to
exercise any powers deemed necessary to fully implement
and carry out the provisions of title 40 which relate to
bipways or bridges, the subject matter of this
particular litigation.
The board's policy B-03·0 I delegates the
authority to condemn a property to the director of the
Idaho Department of·· or Idaho Transportation

1
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I

Department. This coun fiods that the Idaho
I
Tra0Sportation Department and its director are entities
!
that are beneath, in the umbrella sense, the ldaho
Transportation Board
l
The board voted to approve this policy at its
May 14, 2007 and August 201 2008 regular meetings.
Further, Idaho code section 40-.SOS provides
that the director or gives the director of the Idaho
Transportation Department the authority to exercise all
necessal'y incidental powers and enforce all rules and
regulations of the board.
On November 17 of20l0, the director of the
.
Idaho Transportation Department exercised that granted j
authority and issued or entered an order of condemnation
regarding defendant's property. That order of
condemnation has now become part of and attached to by
th.e State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Department in
the particular matter before the Court.
The board has approved this particular project
in 2005 and bas approved the project eveiy year since by l
approving in its regular meetings the state
j
transportation·· or the STIP, as it's referred to,
J
State Transportation Improvement Project.
i
The Idaho legislature has approved Garvee,
J
O-A-R-V·E·E, funding for the 1>roi~ which is codified j

l

l
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in Idaho code section 40-315, subsection 1,
subsection B. The order of condemnation does not
provide or in this court's opinion does not provide for
the taking of the defendant's property for the expansion
of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The contemplation
oftbe expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts Road
is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but
more importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the
exteniion of that road, and that is not the subject of
the taking that is before this court.
The Idaho Department of Transportation bas
offered to expand those roads through Grathol's
property- rather, the Sylvan Road expansion through
Grathol's property, but that offer has been declined by
the defendant and th.is has been testified to amply
before the Court today end in Mr. Minzghor's deposition.
This court finds, then, that plaintiffs'
complaint to comply w.itb Idaho code section 7-707. The
complaint itself, the controlling portions of that
complaint, does not show a taking of defendants'
property for the expansion of Sylvan load iDto Roberts
Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the Grathol
property; therefore, this court finds that the scope of
the proposed taking is adequately defined in the
com-plaint itself.
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KOOTENAI COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE NO. 401
CASE NO. OA-133-06 (Ordinance Text Amendments)
Title 9, Kootenai County Code
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CHAPTER 9
COMMERCIAL ZONE (C)
SECTIONS:
9.9.1
9-9-2 9.01
9-9-3 9.02
9-9-4 9.03
9-9-5 9.04
9-9-6 9.0S
9~9-7 9.06
9-9-8 9.07
9-9-9 9.08
9-9-109.09

GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
SITE AREAS
USES PERMITTED
FRONT, SIDE, AND REAR YARDS
USESPERMITTED·STORA.GB
USES PROHIBITED
CONDITIONAL USES
RECRBATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS

9-9-1: GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED: The "General Commercial zone" is a land use
classification for a district suitable for wholesale and retail sales and services.
9-9-2: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: In the Commercial zone, no building or premises shall be used, nor any
building or structure be hereafter erected or altered, unless otherwise provided in this title, except for one (1) or
more of the fol1owing uses in accordance with the following standards. A Commercial lot shall have direct access
from a public. road.

All uses shall meet the following standards:
A.

Requirements of Chapter 17 of this title, Design Standards

B.

Requirements of Chapter 19 of this title, Supplementary Regulations

C.

Anticipated traffic impacts will be determined for all commercial uses using the most current edition of the
"Trip Generation Manual." A Special Notice Permit shall be required for commercial uses or buildings that
are anticipated to generate traffic impacts in excess of the following thresholds:

0.
E.

1.

For sites which access directly onto a State or Federal Highway- 25 cars per hour, or 250 vehicles per
day.

2,

For sites which access onto other public roads - SO ears per day.

Uses on all Jots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a
Special Notice Permit.
Requirements ofthe applicable Highway District and Idaho Transportation Department or ifthe site is within
an area of city impact, the city's standards for access, approaches, and street design, whichever is the higher
standard.

F.

If an existing community water system within 1,000 feet ofthe site is willing and able to provide water setvice
to the use, connection to that system shall be required.

0.

Requirements of the Panhandle Health District for sanitary sewage disposal.

H.

Requirements of the Panhandle Health District's Critical Materials Regulation.

May24,2007
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KOOTENAI COUNTY SUBDMSION ORDINANCE NO. 394
CASE NO. OA-130-06 (Subdivision Ordinance Text Amendments)
Title 10, Kootenai County Code
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Section 10-3·4 Financial Guarantees
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C. Subdivision Completion and Warranty Agreements
D. Types of Financial Guarantees
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F. Release of Financial Guarantee
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An Ordinance in and for the unincorporated areas of Kootenai County, Idaho, amending the following

sections of Kootenai County Ordinance Number 344: to clarify definitions of common driveway, gated
community and Wetland Specialist, l.06 (B) Exemptions, 2.01 (A) Application Requirements- Preliminary
Subdivision Approval, 2.01 (B) Application Requirements- Final Subdivision Approval, Table 2-1, 2.01 {C)
Approval Process and Requirements, 2.02 Minor Subdivisions, 2.01 (B) Approval Process and
Requirements, 3.01 (B) Levels of Utilities and Services, 3.01 (E) Subdivision and Lot Design, 3.01 (E)
Roads and Trails, 4.01 Bonus Densities, 4.04 Conservation Design Procedure, 4.05 Additional Requirements
for Conservation Design Subdivisions, and renumbering sections and making stylistic changes in language
for purposes of codification; adding Appendix S. Natural Resources Report and Map· Requirements for
Bonus Densities with Conservation Design Subdivisions; establishing subdivision regulations; providing
purposes, definitions, and applicability; application requirements and approval procedures; design,
improvement and maintenance requirements; standards for Conservation Design Subdivisions;
administration and enforcement procedures; Appendices; repealing conflicting Ordinances; providing for
severability; providing an effective date.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO:
SECTION 1. That former Titles l0A and l0B, Kootenai County Code, be, and the same are hereby
combined as Title 10, Kootemu County Code, the provisions of which shall read as set forth in this
Ordinance.
SECTION 2. That Kootenai County Ordinance No. 344, adopted on December 29, 2004, be, and the same
is hereby designated as Title 10, Kootenai Cowity Code, and is hereby amended to read as follows:

CHAPTER!
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 10-1 • l
Section 10-1-2
Section i0-1-3
Section 10-1-4
Section 10-1-S
Section 10-1 ~6

Title
Authority
Purpose
Definitions
Acronyms
Applicability and Exemptions

10-1-1: TITLE:
This Title shall be known as the Subdivision Ordinance of Kootenai County, Idaho.
10-1-2: AUTHORITY:
These regu.Jations are authorized by Title 31, Chapter 7, Title SO, Chapter 13, and Title 67, Chapter 65 of
Idaho Code; and Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended or subsequently codified.

10-1-3: PURPOSE:
The purpose of this Title is to promote and protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public and
to:
• Ensure that development is in confonnance with Idaho Code, with the goals and policies of the
Kootenai County Comprehemtve Plan, with 'the requirements of County ordinances, and with the
requirements of other agencies.
• Provide for orderly development of land.
• Ensure that development mitigates negative environmental, social and economic impacts.
Ordinnnce No. 394 (Subdivision Ordi11811ce Text Amondments)
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• Create buildable lots of reasonable utility and livability.
Preserve, protect and enhance ground and swface water quality.
• Establish a transportation system for vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians that is safe, efficient, and cost
effective and that minimizes congestion.
• Provide for adequate and affordable fire, water, sewer, stormwater and other services.
• Encourage the conservation of open space and environmentally sensitive areas.
• Provide for the administration of these regulations.
•

10-1-4: DEFINITIONS:

Words used in the present tense include the future tense. Words used in singular number include the plural,
and vice versa. The wo~d "shall" and "must" are mandatOJY, and the word "may" indicates the use of
discretion. Unless clearly stated otherwise, the following words and phrases shall have the following
meanings:

Affected Person - One having an interest in real property that may be affected by a decision.
Agent - One who acts for or in the place of another.

Agency - Any city or political subdjvision of the State, including but not limited to counties, school districts,
highway districts, any agency of State government, and any city or political subdivision of another state.

Amended Plat - A plat that has minor cOJTeCtions or modifications.

Approach - An access point onto a public or private road.
Best Management Practices (BMP's) • Land management practices, approved by the State of Idaho or
other Idaho public agency, designed to minimize the discharge of sediment and other pollutants. These
include, but are not limited to, the Idaho Forest P,.o.c'dcea Rules, the Rules Go,;eming Solid Waste
Management, the Rules for lndi'tJidual and Subsurface Sewage Disposal.Systems, the Rules eurd Minimum
Standard, for Stream Channel Alterations, the Rathdrum Prairie sewage disposal and critical materials
regulations, the Rules Governing Exploration and Sur-face Mining Operatiom in Idaho, the Idaho Well
Construction Standards Rules, the Rules Governing Placer Qlld Dredge Mining in Idaho, the Rules
Governing Dairy Wastes, Best Management Practices for Containing Critical Materials During Above
Ground Storage and Handling. and the Catalog ofStorm Water Best Management Practices for Idaho Cities
and Counties.

Boanl -The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners.
Building Envelope - A designated area, shown on a plat, within which all structures must be located.
Consenration Design Subdivision · A subdivision design that maximizes the conservation of open space
and the natlltal, cultural or historic eharactedstics of an area. The subdivision name for a consenration
design subdjvision will be followed by the suffix "CDS".
Conservation Easement · A non-possessory interest of a holder in real property, imposing limitations or
affirmative obligations for retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open space values of real property; for
assuring its availability for agriculture, forest, recreation or open space use; for maintaining or enhancing air
or water quality; or for preserving the historical, architecturai., archeological or cuitural aspectS of real
property (Ida/to Code §SS-2101).
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Approval Requirements

The Director may grant the extension providing: a) a complete application was submitted, b) the
project is in compliance with the requirements of the County and other agencies (those that were in
place at the time a complete preliminary application was received by the Department), and c) the
project is in compliance with its conditions of approval. Unless otherwise approved by the applicant,
the Director shall make a decision within five (S) weeks of the receipt of a complete application. The
Director's decision may be appealed in accordance with Section 10·SM2 of this Title.
10-2-6: CONDITION MODIFICATION:
At any time prior to expiration of subdivision approval, a modification of a condition of approval may be
requested according to the foHowing procedure:
A.

B.

Application Requirements. The following items constitute a complete application:
1.

Application Form.

2.

Fees as adopted by Board resolution.

3.

A Narrative explaining why a condition modification is necessary.

4.

As part of a complete application, the Director may require additional infonnation to determine
compliance with County ordinances, or the requirements of other agencies.

Approval Process and Requirements

For Major Subdivisions, the approval process and required findings are the same as that for
preliminary approval of the subdivision, as presented in Section 10-2-l(C)(l).
For Minor Subdivisions the approvaJ process and required findings are the same as the original
approval process, presented in Section l()..2-2(B).

CHAPTER3
DESIGN, IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

Section I0-3-1 Design Requirements
A. General Requirements
B. Levels of Utilities and Services
C. Utility and Service Standards
D. Basements and Rights-of-Way
E. Subdivjsion and Lot Design
F. Roads and Trails
G. Sensitive Area Requirements
Section 10-3-2 lmprovement Requirements
A. Installation of Improvements
B. Plan Approval and Site Disturbance Permit
Section 10-3-3 Maintenance Requirements
A. Mmntenance Required
B. County Authority to Maintain Private Systems
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Section 10-3-4 Financial Guarantees
A. Financial Guarantee in Lieu ofhnprovements
B. Warranty
C. Subdivision Completion and Warranty Agreements
D. Types of Financial Guarantees
E. Failure to Complete Improvements
F. Release of Financial Guarantee

10-3-1: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS: This section delineates the minimum, on site design requirements for
both major and minor subdivisions. White off site improvements may also be required to mitigate the effects
of the development, these will be considered project by project.
A.

B.

General Requirements

1.

Land Suitability. No land shall be subdivided which the Board finds to be unsuitable for building
sites because of potential hazards, such as flooding, inadequate drainage, severe erosion
potential, site contamination, excessive slope, rock falJ, landslides, subsidence (sinking or
settling), high ground water, inadequate water supply or sewage disposal capabilities, high
voltage power Jines, high pressure gas lines, poor air quality, vehicular traffic ha1Ards, or any
other situation that may be detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of residents or the public,
unless the hazards are eliminated or adequately mitigated.

2.

Within the Kootenai County Airport Overlay Zone, the proposal must be in conformance with
the Airport Master Plan and the plat must include an Avigation Easement approved by the
Airport Director.

3.

For lots that will not be used for habitable structures, such as open space, unmanned utility lots
and dock lots, the Board may waive the requirements for some services and facilities listed in
Chapter 3, providing the public, agencies, infrastructure, and future Jot owners will not be
negatively affected.

Levels of Utilities and Services

Development of land shall occur in conjunction with services and facilities that are appropriate for the
size and density of the development, with urban services being provided for urban size lots. Services
and facilities necessary to serve the subdivision must be feasible, available and adequate, and the
proposal must include on and off site improvements to mitigate the impacts of the development so that
the e"isting quality of services is not compromised, and so there is no substantial increase in the cost of
services to existing residents. If authorized by law, mitigation may include payments and fees,
donation of land, or off site improvements. Required improvements shall be directly related to the
subdivision wider consideration, shall be located in the vicinity of the subdivision. and shall be
commensurate with anticipated impacts.
The following are minimum requirements. Other services and facilities may be required on a project
by project basis.
I.

For lots Jess than one (1.00) acres, the following services are required:
a.
A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ.
b.
A shared water system that can. provide flre flows Oj water storage, if required by the Fire
District. Shared water systems may require DBQ approval. The Director may waive the
shared water system requirement if the constraints of the site warrants a modification to
the requirement.
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c.

Electrical service to each lot.

d.

Fire protection from a Fire District.

e.

Road access to each new lot meeting the standards of Section 10-3-l(F) of this Title.
For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after the construction of
fifteen (15) homes.

f.

2.

For Jots between one (1.00) and 4.99 acres, the following services are required:
a.
A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ.
b. Reasonable assurance of an adequate and reliable water source for each lot.
c.
Electrical service to each lot.
d.
Fire protection from a Fire District.
e. Road access to each new lot meeting the standards of Section 10~3· 1(F) of this Title.
f.
For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after construction of
fifteen (1S) homes.

3.

For lots of 5-00 acres or more, the following services are required:
a.
A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ.
b. Reasonable assurance of an adequate and reliable water source.
c. Fire protection from a Fire District.
d. Road access to each new Jot meeting the standards of Section 10-3-l(F) of this Title.
e.
For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after construction of
fifteen (15) homes.

4.

The following services are required for subdivisions in Commercial, Light Industrial and
Industrial Zones:
a.
Adequate infrastructure for the proposed use, including treatment of non-domestic
wastewater in a wastewater treatment plant approved by DEQ. No subsurface discharge of
non-domestic wastewater is permitted.
b. A water system that meets the State requirements for a public water system and can
pro\'ide fire flows, as requi.l'ed by the Fire District.
c. Electrical service to each lot.
d.
Fire protection from a Fire District.
e.
Publicly maintained road access to each Jot as approved by the Highway District.
f.
Garbage collection.

Note: For lots equal to or greater than S.00 acres. the size of the lot may be figured using gross
acreage (including ½ of adjoining rights-of-way). All other lot sizes are based on net demity, being
the amount of land per dwelling wiit excluding the area for roads1 parks, common open space, utility
facilities, and any other nonresidential use.
C.

Utility and Service Standards

1.

Domestic Water Systems.

a.

When a water district or utility regulated under Idaho Code Title 61 (Public Utility
Regulation) provides a ''will serve" letter for a subdivision, annexation and/or coMection
may be required. If not required, for shared water systems serving 10 or more lots, the
applicant shall form a. water district or utility corporation (non~profit or for profit) to own,
operate and maintain the system. Water districts and utility corporations must be
established in confonnance with applicable law, and cooperative corporations such as
homeowners associations must also meet the requirements of Section 10-3-3 and
Appendix B of this Title.
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The new components of a water system and any necessacy improvements to an existing
system, must be designed and constructed in conformance with the requirements of the
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, the Idaho Division of Public Works, Idaho
Standards for Public Works Construction, the fire district, and if applicable, the water
district, utility or corporation. Distribution lines shall be installed to each lot.

Fire Protection Systems
Subdivisions shall meet the requirements of the Fire District, including those pertaining to roads,
driveways, fire flows, hydrants, water storage and defensible space. In addition, each lot shall
have a building site capable of being accessed by a driveway meeting the minimum standards of
the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance or the Fire District.
Subdivisions shall also minimize the hazards associated with wildfire, and major subdivisions in
timbered areas shall provide a Fire Mitigation Plan, developed by a professional forester1 that
meets the requirements of Appendix A and is approved by the Director, the Fire District, or the
Idaho Department of Lands. The Plan must be implemented as part of the required
improvements for the subdivision.

D.

3.

Sewage Dlsposal Systems. If a public sewage system is available and provides a "will serve"
letter, connection shall be required. If a private, shared sewage system is available and provides
a ''will serve" letter, connection may be required, providing the cost of service is commensurate
with that charged to existing customers. If connection to a shared system is required, collection
lines shall be installed to each lot. All sewage disposal systems shall meet the standards of the
Panhandle Health District and/or DEQ. If required, shared sewage systems shall be installed and
approved, or the necessacy improvements secured by a financial guarantee, prior to final
approval of the subdivision. Individual septic systems may be installed after final subdivision
approval, in conjunction with building permits.

4.

Underground Utility Placement. Unless utility providers detennine that site conditions preclude
underground utility installation, all utilities shall be installed underground.

S.

Stormwater Management. Lots shall be laid out to provide drainage away from building sites.
Storm.water management and erosion control shall meet the requirements of the Kootenai County
Site Disturbance Ordinance in accordance with best management practices approved by the
County. Infiltration of storm water in small quantities is preferred. The collection and
concentration of stormwater in detention and retention basins, wet ponds, constructed wetlands
or similar facilities is discouraged and shalt only be allowed when there is no feasible alternative.
The installation of curbing is also discouraged because it concentrates runoff. Discharge of
untreated stormwater into streams1 lakes, natw-al wetlands or groundwater is prohibited.

6.

Under Road Utilities. Whenever a utility is proposed to be installed under a road, the utility's
location and construction shall meet the requirements of the Highway District, ITO or the road
owner(s), In all instances, placement of utilities shall be coordinated with proposed road
improvements and shall be installed before the road is completed.

Easements and Rights-of.Way
1.

Utility Basements. A minimum ten (10) foot general utility easement shall be provided to each
lot. Any shared components of sewage, water, stonnwater or other infrastructure systems, shall
either be within the general utility wement or an easement dedicated or conveyed to the entity
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responsible for maintenance. :Easements must also be provided for individual sewage Jines and
dmnfields that will not be located on the same parcel as residences.

E,

2.

Road rights-of-way shall meet the requirements of the Highway District or, if applicable, ITO.
Common driveway easements shall be at least 40 feet in width. Cut and fill slopes and
stormwater systems adjacent to roads and driveways must either be shown as easements or
rights-of-way, in favor of the maintenance entity. When future access may be needed to adjacent
parcels of land, road easements and rights-of-way shall extend to the property line of the
subdivision. Except for gated comm.unities and common driveways approved by the Board,
roads and associated rights-of-way shall be dedicated to the applicable high.way agency. Private
roads and common driveways shall be dedicated to the maintenance entity.

3.

Public trail easements or rights-of-way may be required, depending on the location of the
subdivision and the need for pedestrian trails and/or sidewalks. If required, they shall be
dedicated or conveyed to Kootenai County or to the entity that will provide maintenance as
approved by the Board. The width of trail easements and rights~of-way shall be adequate for the
intended use, and shall meet the requirements of the County or maintenance entity. When future
access may be needed to adjacent parcels of land, trail easements and rights-of-way shall extend
to the property line of the subdivision.

4.

Public Access, Parks and Facilities. Public access easements or the conveyance of land for
public access, parks or facilities may be required for subdivisions that are contiguous to: a)
public lands, b) streams, lakes, ponds, wetlands or similar areas, or c) for areas designated in a
County facilities acquisition plan. If so required, the property owner shall be paid fair market
value for the easement or land.

5.

The Board or Director may require that Hydrologic Protection Areas be shown as easements or
rights-of-way.

6.

Required easements and rights-of-way shall be depicted on the face of the plat.

Subdivision and Lot Design

1.

Subdivisions shall be designed to be compatible with existing homes, businesses and
neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics of the area. Subdivisions shall minimize
grading, road construction and disturbance of the terrain, vegetation, soils, and drajnageways,
and shall prevent soil erosion. To achieve this, the Board may require building envelopes, Nodisturbance Zones, height restrictions and planting or retention of vegetation.

2.

Lot Design. Subdivisions shall result in lots of reasonable utility and livability. Irregular
configurations that result in unusable ]and, or that may cause future land use conflicts, are
prohibited. All building Jots must have at least one building site that can meet required setbacks
and be accessed with a driveway meeting the standards of the Zoning Ordinance or Fire District.

3.

Lot Access. AU new lots shall have frontage and direct access onto a road or common driveway
meeting the standards of Section 10-3-1 (F) of this Title. A lot with an existing residence shall
not be consjdered a new lot. For irregularly shaped subdivisions, or sites with severe physical
constraints, the Board may allow access to individuaJ lots via an easement. Driveway
approaches to public roads must be approved by the Highway District or ITD. No new accesses
to individual lots are permitted from State Highways or arterial roads as shown on the highway
district's current Functional Classification Map. In some cases ITO or the highway distri~ may
require relocation, reconfiguration, consolidation or elimination of existing approaches.
Ordinance No. 394 (Subdivision Ordinance Text Amlllldments)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FillST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE $TATE OF IDAHO, J:N AND FOR THE COTJNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
BOARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVl0-10095

HJ GRATHOL, a California)
general partnership;
)
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a)
Washington corpora~ion; )
and DOES l through s,
)

__________
Defendants.

)
)
)

DEPOSITION OF ALAN JOHNSON
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF
AT 816 SHERMAN AVENUE, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO
NOVEMBER 18, 2011, AT 9:30 A.M.

!<SPORTED BY;
JOLIE MCCAUGHAN, C.S.R. NO. 684
Notary PUblic
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1N D E X (Continued)
DBPOSffiONEXHIBlTS;
PAGE
E mail String Dated November 11, 2010,
J23
TED S. TOLLEFSON, Attorney at Law, and MARY V. YORK 3 49 Bate$
Numbeled 000382, and Handwritten
Attorney at Law, of the firm of HOLLAND & HART, Suite
Notes Dated 9/20/10, Bates Numbcrtd
4
1400 U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O.
000383
Box 2527, Boise, Idaho 83701-2527, appearing for and on
5
50 E-mail Suing Dated November 12, 2010, 124
behalf of the Plaintiff.
6
Bates Numbered 000379, and Conditions
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, Anomey at Law, of the firm of
Precedent to ITD Taldos ofH.T Grathol
RAMSDEN & LYONS, 700 Northwest Boulevard, Post Office 7
Property, Bates Numbered 000380 and
Box 1336, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336, appearing for
000381
and on behalf of Defendant HJ Grathol.
8
51 B-mailStriagDatedMay6,2010;
127
9
May 13, 2010; May 28, 2010, and
June 1, 2010, Bates Numb~red 000011
1
2

APPEARANCES

0

rhrough 00001s
ll 52 B•mail Dm:ed October 20, 2010, Bates

10

ll

12
13
14
15

136

Numbered 000099
12
2.3

S3 E-mail Dated Ausust 30, 2010, Bates
Numbmd 000241

139

14
1S
16

16

17

18

17

:I.SI
20

18
19
20
21
22

21
22
23
24

23

24

25
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Pages

Pag-e 3
1
[NDEX
2 TESTIMONY OP ALAN JOHNSON
3 Exarnina1i011 by Mt. Tolli!!lon
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S

4

s

DEPOSITIOJII BXHIBITS:

6

~, Alan Johnson
7

!~

42 .Documenl ffillillet! •Alan Johnson. Scnlor
Vjca Presidcn~ Devclopmeot, • '8ac8$
Numbered 001402

12

4S £.mails Dated Jwie 9, 2010;
July27, 2009: October 12, 2009;
Ocrobcr 14, 2009; FebruatY J'7, 2009;
Pcbru.lly 24, 2009; July 13, 2009;
1¼

SO

3~

57

1'

17
18

21
22
2.3
24

47 Conceprual Site Plaa, SlilnsOII Timber
Comp1111y Propetty, Good Hope Road,
Kocxeaai Couniy, ldilho
48 8-mQl1 SlrillS Dated September 16, 2010,
Daies Numbered 000386

25

cause, deposes and soys:

9
10
11

14

17

lbtough ooooss

46 QARVBB Prqjeo1s on U.S. 9S

16

a

13

July 14, 2009: AuSUSI S, 2009:
August 13, 2009; Ociob;i-26, 2009;
Ol:t0bcr27, 2009; March 23, 2010:
March 2$, 2010: J'1!Uill'Y 25, 2011:
JaniWY 16, 2011; m1d f'ebrulll'Y 4,201 !,
Widl A11adlmenq, Bates NwnbeRcl
000016 lhrougb 000024, 0000!0 dlrousb
000031,000040 throush 00004S, OOOOS3

19

20

1s

6

12

13

u

4
s
7

9

43 MLS Docwue11r, Bates Numbered
10
HJ.(laATHOL 004578 and 004S?9
11 44 Buyers Sccdemenr Scaremenr, Bate&
N11.mbered 0000?4 and 00067$

THE DEPOSITION OF ALAN JOHNSON, was taken on
behalf of the PLAINTIFF, on NOVEMBER 18, 2011, at the
offices ofM & M COURT REPORTING, 816 SHERMAN AVENUE
COEUR. D'ALENE, IDAHO, before M & M Coun Reponing
Services, Inc., by JULIE MCCAUGHAN, Court Reporter and
Notary Pubiic within and for the State ofidabo, to be
used in an action pending in the District Coun of the
First Judicial District for the State ofldaho, in and
for the County of Kootenai, said cause being Case No.
CVI0-10095 in said Col.111.
AND THEREUPON, the following testimony was
adduced, to wit:
ALAN JOHNSON,
having been first duly swor.n to teU the tnltb, the
whole rnlth, and nothioe but the math, relating to said

l
2
3

PAGB

S 41 Amended Notice of0epOBiticD DuQH T"1AIII

~

P. 31

114
114

I l!I

EXAMINATION

19 QUBSTIONS BYMR, TOLLEFSON:
l9
Q, Can you please state your name and Spell
2 o your last name for the record?
.21
A. Alan JoM$0J1, 1°0°h n°s-o-n.
:22
Q, And you're here today for a deposition.
23 Have you ever had your dep0sition taken before?
24
A. Yes.
2S
Q. And how many times7
0
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1 value added type project where you buy an existing
2

3
4

s
G
7

a
9
10
ll
12
13
14
1s

16
17
1a

19

2o
21
22
23
24
2s

shopping center that perhaps is blighted or isn't
properly leased. You can take that project, you can
rehabilitate the project through adding, you know, paint
or facades, resurfacing parking Jots, changing parking
lots, re-merchandising the shopping center, leasing
vacant space. And turn the center arowid.
Q.
Any other ways that you would develop
property?
A.
Yes. Raw land. We've many occasions -and primarily take raw land, entitle it, lease it, build
it, manage it.
Q. Are you involved with the designing part
of the development of raw land?
A. To some extent, yes.
Q. Can you just briefly describe what usually
your general involvement is with the development •• or
excuse me •• with the design ofa project?
A.
Geoff is the expert. Geoff's an
architect. I'm not an architect. I rely on Geoff for
the technical aspects of it. Geoff has a tremendous
amount of history with municipalities, governmentaJ
agencies, in obtairung approvals. I oversee that
process with Geoff. rn be invoJved with meetings with
the cities and counties, as well.
Q.

And what about leasing? What's your

2 involvement with leasing of the project?
3
A. I do all the leasing.
4
Q. When you say you do all the leasing, does
s that entail finding tenants, finding potential tenants
6
7

a
9

lo
11

12
13
14

1s
16
17

1B
19
2o

21
.2 2
23
24
25

and finding potential pa.-rners?
A. Not partners, but finding potential
tenants, or buyers, for that matter. Sometimes it will
be done through a broker. We'll hire brokers to assist
us in that. But the negotiations would be through me.
Q. And when you say "potential buyers," what
kind of buyers are you looking for?
A. We'll look for end users. We're not
interested in having other developers buy pieces of our
property. We've never done that where another developer
buys a pad within your shopping center and builds a
project, you know, maybe a shop pad building. We are
looking for end users such as gas stations, fast food,
grocery stores, department stores, home improvement.
I've done deals with all those different types of
merchants.
Q. It says down here that Hughes
Investments •• l1m Sot'J)'. I'm still on page 4 of
Exlu"bit 11. It says, "Hughes Investments purchased this
property in 2008 with the sole intent to develop it into

1 a commercial retail center/hospitality project." What
2 commercial retail center/hospitality project were you
3 envisioning when you purchased the property?
A. If you look at some of the preliminary
4
S
6
?

a
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
l7
18

19
2

o

21
22
23
24
2s

1
site plans, we see this as a grocery anchored shopping
center. There certainly is service-related uses, such
as service stations. I believe there's demand -~ in my
conversations during some of OlD' conventions with - we
call it travel centers. Maybe that's a churched-up word
for a truck stop. Fast food, Bank pads. The area is
underserved.
Q. And when you say ''preliminary site plans,"
were those -· would those have been the site plans that
Mr. Reesltmd submitted to Kootenai County?
A. Yes.
Q. NowA. Let roe clarify. And I apologize. There
may be other site p]ans that be did not submit to
Kootenai County that we've used as preliminary site
plans. We have not drafted a formal site plan.
Q. Right. But when you say - when you
purchased the property, you had Mr. Reeslund draft some 'j
preliminazy site plans, and those were the ones that
1
were sent to Kootenai County. Is that correct?
j
A.
There are many prelimimuy site plans.
1

Page 25

l
i

l The1·e are some plans that were sent to Kootenai County.
2
Q. Is it fair to say that the documents that
3 were sent to Kootenai County, atthe time those were
i sent to Kootenai County, those were the plans that you 'i

I

5
G
7
8
9

lo
11
12
13
14

15
lG
17

18
19
2

o

21
22

23
24
25

anticipated developing from?
A. No, those were preliminary pians.
Q. Would you have created final plans based
upon those preliminary site plans?
A. Those preliminazy site plans would be
modified to create a formal plan.
Q. But the preliminary site plans would have
served as the basia for a final plan?
A. They could have, but again, that depends
on tenant mix.
Q. Do you recall when this ... why did you
subtnitthose particular site plans to the county?
A, That was the most cWTent site plan that
we had at that time.
Q. Do you· reea.11 when the property was
purchased?
A. It was purchased I believe in May of 2008,
j
Q. A.id when did you :first become aware - let
;
me back up. When did you first become aware 1hat this I
property was for sale?
A. I believe it was in January of 2008.
I
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3

4
5

6

7
8

9

10

11
12
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14
lS
16

17
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20
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1
2

3
4

s
6

7

a
9
10
11

Q. How did you determine whether or not you
got it for a good price?
We had been looking at other projeots jn
A.
Coeur d'Alene, and obviously, you know, Coeur d'Alene
land is going to be more valuable. We thought the price
was a bargain.
(Exhibit 43 was marked.)
BYMR. TOLLEFSON:
Q. I'm banding you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No. 43. Are you familiar with the
MLS or the Multiple Listing Service?
I'm familiar with what it is. I'm not a
A.
member of it.
Q. Do you have access to the MLS?
A.
No, Ido not.
Q. Do you know if any of the brokers that you
would work with, would they have access to the MLS?
A.
The broker that I worked with on this
particular property did not have 8"ess to MLS.
Q. And who was that?
A. Brett Terrell.
Q. And bow do you know he did not have access
toMLS?
A. We've talked about it before. He's not a
realtor.
Page 31
Q. So if you take a minute to look at this
document. So you've never seen this document before.
Is that correct?
A. I don't believe I have. I may have. It
may have been part of discovery from lTD.
Q. And just we'll go through here. It says,
"Excellent visibility with commercial potential." Do
you feel that's an accwate description of the property?
A.
As it was at that time, yes.
Q. Then it says, "Preliminary drawings showed
future off.ramps and fronm.ge roads for Highway 95
through this property." Does that also appear to be

12
13 accurate?
14
A. It appears to be

accurate.

15
Q. So at the timetha:Uhis property was up
16 for sale, it was known 'that there were some preliminary
17 drawings showing future off-ramps and frontage roads foi
18 Hiahway 9S?
1.9
A. We did know that, yes.
2o
Q. And when did you find outabout this
21 potential future off-ramps and frontage roads?
22
23
24

P. 33
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l

j

the plans were. But we've seen plans like this all the

2 time, too, that never come to fruition. But his
3 indication was that they were going to put a •• they

I

wex-e going to rwign the project. It was going to
5 be •• at that time, it was not going to be an ovezpass.
6 It was going to be an at-grade inteJSection with traffic
4'

7

8

9
lO
ll
12.

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

signals. I guess similar to what Gaiwood and 95 is now.
He indicated that there were no plans to build an
interchange •• a freeway interch8.Jl3e wjtb an overpass.
And he did inditate that actually 95 would be at the
same - approximat:ely the same grade that it is at now, 1
and 54 would be depressed under it. He said there were 1
i
no plans to consider that until 2020. At least 2020.
J
Q. And you had this conversation before you
'
acquired the property?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. On this MLS document here, halfway down on
the left-hand side, it says, "Days on the market: 344."
Does that seem accwate to you or do you know how long
this property had been on the market?
A. I'm sorry. Oh. I see it. I had no idea
how long it was on the market. I believe it was priced
higher - oh, it was priced at a million seven. They
dropped the price, and I believe shortly after they
dropped the price, we were under contract.

~

I

Page 33
1

Q.

And was the price Sl,4S0,000?

That's what we paid for the property.
(Exhibit 44 was marked.)
4 BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
S
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as
6 Deposition Exhibit No. 44. Have you seen this document
2
3

7

A.

J

I

before?

8

A.

SI

Q.

I

I have.
And what is this document?

I
,

Buyer's Settlement Statement
Q. And at the top •• and this is the Buyer's
l 2 Settlement Statement for GracaJ Corporation's
13 acquisition of the subject property. ls that correct?
lo
11

A.

That js correct.
Andjust before we move on, do you know
l G why the property was purchased by Oracal Corporation and
l 7 not one of the other entities?
i
18
A. I do not. Hughes Investments does not
:
14
l!S

A.

Q.

I

19 al.':quire property .. we'll go under contract with the
2 o right to assign to an entity that we form. Gracal may

1

,
l,
21 have been an entity that had already been formed but
A. We met • and I'm not positive ofthe
2 2 maybe was DO longer being used, but I can't be certain
I
date •• before we closed escrow with ITD. Don Davis,
23 of that.
and·· I don't recall if there was anybody else in the
24
Q. But the property was purchased. by OracaJ
meeting. He'd indicated that, you know, these were what 2s and at some point transferred to HJ Grathol; is that
~--=~-::-::.~=====-=-=-~-"!':--~---~---=--=. .
":"::.-:::=::::::~...~-·~":-=-.-==*::"l,~~-~--:"!'!'.. "!":-,-~••:-=:=::-=-=-::-:-~)
9
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1 correct?
2
A. That is coxrect.
3
Q. And do you know why it was transferred to
4 HJ Grathol?
5
A. I do not.
6
Q. Under •• in the top left-hand comer under
7 the box, it says, "Consideration: Total Consideration:
8 Buyer Charge $1,4S0,000." Do you see that?
9
A. Yes, I do.
10
Q. Is that an accurate statement of how much
l l money you paid for the property?
12
A.
It is.
13
Q. Wastbereanyotherconsiderationgiven
14 for the property?
15
A. No, there was not.
16
Q. Sorry. Before I move on, I forgot to ask
1 7 you a question. The seller was North Alpine
18 Development, LLC. Who is that or what is that entity?
19 Do you know?
20
A.
It is an entity ~- I believe the owner of
21 that entity •• and I don't know the structure - is a
22 gentleman named Shawn Montee.
23
Q. And have you had any dealings with Shawn
2 4 Montee before?
25
A.
No.

1
MS. YORK: Can you say that again? Someone was
2 driving by.
3
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry.
4
MR. MARFICE: It's on the closing statement

5
MS. YORK: Okay.
6 BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
7
Q. You said you'd had a meeting with ITD
8 pri.orto your acquisition of the property. Andljust
9 forgot to write down who was at1hat meeting.
10
A. I believe it was Don Davis.
ll
Q. And who was Don Davis?
12
A. I bclieve he's a project engineer with
13 lTD. Idon'tknowhisti.tle, Hewasthegentlemanthat
14 we were told to meet with from I!D.
15
Q. Andyourearliertestimonywas, if!
16 recall correctly, that you had seen plans like these
1 7 before, but they don't always happen.
18
A. Yeah. I mean, I think I've seen many
19 instances here, some in California, where there's
2 0 potential for freeway oveq,ass or potential off-ramp or
21 potential new freeway that's coming through, and they
22 don't happen.
23
Q. So sometimes they get built and sometimes
2"1 they don't?
25
A. That's correct.

1

!

1---;.;._----------------1---------------------1,
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1

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

1O
11

12
13
14
15

16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

Q. Or since?
A. No.
Q. Before you purchased this property, what
due diligence did you do?
A. We did environmental investigation. We
had an ALTA survey prepared. I believe that was the
extent of the due diligence.
Q. Did you talk to anybody about this
ptoperty before you. purchased it, people in the area?
A.
Other than the brokers that were involved
in the transaction. And like I said, possibly -possibly Mike Winger. No, I don't believe so.
Q. What brokers were involved in the
transaction?
A. Paul Bielec represented the seller, and
his daughter Dani Bielec, Dani !C1'8.mer now. And Brett
Terrell represented us. Motion Realty.
Q. When you purchased the property, do you
know what its zoning was?
A. It was zoned, I believe, rural
agricultural.
Q. Your broker, hov, do you spell 1-Js name?
A. B-r-e-t-t T-e-r-r-e-1.
Q. How do you spell Paul's name?
A. B-i-1-e-c, I believe.

Page 37

1

2

3
4
S
6
7
8

9
1O
11

12
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14
15

16
17

18
19
20
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24
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Q. And do sometimes the plans change?
A. Could you rephrase the question?
Q. Sure. You said sometimes that these
improvement projects, these overpasses, get built and
sometimes they don't. Does that mean sometimes the
pians change for those overpasses or those highway
projects?
A.
Well, it depends at what point in time you
see the plans. You know, preliminary, yes, plans are
changed. If it's a final plan or approved by X and X
agency, then typically the plans are pretty close to
what are shown to the public.
Q. In May of 2008 or prior to the purchase of
this property which would have been in I guess the
spring of 2008, were ITD1s plans -- were they final and
approved by agencies or were they still in the
preliminary stage?
A. They were in the preliminary stage at that
time.
MR. TOLLEFSON: We've been going for about an
hour. Do you want to take a quick break?
ryfa_ ?v1AR.FICE: Sure.
(Recess taken.)
BY MR TOLLEFSON:
Q. Real quick, let's finish up talking about

10 (Pages 34 to 37)
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A. I don't have any experience in that.
l commercial access?
Q. You've been provided through discoveiy-2
A. No.
3 have you had a chance to talce a look at any of the
3
Q. Why not?
4 project plans that have been submitted by ITO?
4
A. Mr. Reeslu.nd is better at answering that
1
5
A. I have gone through discovery for the most
5 question. That's his responsibility. We did make an
j
6 part. I think there were probably close to 4,000 pages. 6 application with the county, and it was called •• not
l
7 So I do not have those committed to memory.
7 Special Use Permit- Special Notice Permit. We took in i
8
Q. Okay. And you said you had conflicting
8 site plans of what was proposed by ITD and asite plan ~
9 evidence as to what access you'd be provided in the
9 of what would happen if the freeway did not take place. jl
10 after condition. What evidence do you have that
10 We tried to process that application with the county.
11 conflicts with the project plans that were provided to 11 The county said you can only process based on what is ;1
12 you by ITD?
l2 existing today, meaning that we could not take into
13
A. Weti we've had various plans provided by
13 aeeountthe freeway interchange. They said with that14 ITO. I've had conversations with Jason Minzghor and 14 and again, Geoff is mote of the expert in this -that
15 Justin Weist regarding an extension of Sylvan Road.
15 the first thing we would have to do is we'd have to have
16 Those were on the earlier documents. The final
16 a 1raffic study done. Hired a traffic engineer. He
I
1 7 enviroJWental impact statement has Sylvan Road as a 1 7 talked to ITD. ITD was less than cooperative, Said
18 frontage road We're just not sure.
18 that it was pointless having the conversation and
1
19
Q. So based upon -- you were provided some - 1.9 drafting a traffic stu(ty if the freeway was going to be
J
2 o the project plans. What do you have that conflicts with 2 o realigned, because it would change all the numbers.
21 the project plans?
21
Q. As the property sits now, is ther:e
22
A. The final project plans?
22 commercial ~ess to the property?
23
Q. Correct.
23
A. There are three deeded access points 20
24
A. We]), as an example, the appraisal that we
24 feet wide. I believe, and rm paraphrasing, that it
1
1-2_s_r_ec_e_iv_ed_th_ro_u,,:;,.gh_IT_D_'s_ap...1:..,.!o.P1nu_·s_er_,_St_an_M_o_.e,_I_b_el_ie_ve--11-2_s_s-=ay~s_fo_r_re_s_id_en_ti_·a1_and
__farm
__us_e_._An_d_b_ec_aus_e_of_th;,;.;.;;.,e
Page 79
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1
2

3
4

s
6
7

8
.9
10

11
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13
14
15

16

17
18
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2o

2l
22
23

time that the access was granted, that was the zoning of l
2 the property. There would be no sense in zoning
R.oad. There is no existing access on Howard Road.
3 commercial access to the property if it was zoned rural.
Q.
So the project plans that were submitted
4
Q. So there's no commercial access to the
to you by ITD, do you recall if those had accesses on
s property right now?
them?
6
A. Of those three deeded access points, "they
A. I'd have to look at them again. I don't
7 are not deeded as or deemed to be, to my understanding,
recall. I believe that it had -- Sylvan Road kind of
8 commercial access points. I can't tell you what the
nubbed into the property, but didn't show us access.
9 access point is to the smaller half-acre parcel that's
Q.
So while you're·· just to loop back to
10 actually located in the Cily of Athol.
where we were, if you're not clear what the access is
11
Q. Is it fair t.o say that there's no deeded
going to be, bow do you know it won't be remotely as 1~ commercial access to the property as it exist.s now?
good as what is presently available?
l3
A. No deed- that is correct
A. From the plans that we have from ITD,
14
Q. I want to go now to page 6 on Exhibit 11.
there's a bad scenario and there's a worse scenario.
15 At the top, there's a paraeraph where you reference a
Q. All right. What's the bad scenario?
lG meeting with Roa Harvey and Jason Minzghor ofITD. Do
A. The bad scenario is Sylvan Road just
:i. 7 you see that?
dead--ending into the south side of our property.
10
A. Yes, I do.
,
1
'?
Q, Wh at's the worst scenano.
19
Q. Do you know when th at meeting took place?
,
A. The worst scenario is Sylvan Road not
.2 O
A. I believe it was in the summer of 2010,
1
I
dead-ending into the property and that we're landlocked 2 :i. but I may have the date wrong.
i
and we don't have any access off of S4 or Howard Road. 2 2
Q.
Do you recall \\'ho was present at that
l
We don't know where access will be provided in that
23 meeting?
,
scenario.
24
A. Myself, Mr. Marfice, Tom Vandervert, Jason
i
Q. .,.,. ....Have you submitted any applications for
--~~~~!~o~~~e.~~~!~~-~~- -~~~~ever j
indicates that there wm be no access whatsoever off of

1

54 and access will come off existing access in Howard

1

i

____.

24
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1 roughly the same as 16 acres?
2
A. 29 acres is significantly larger.
3
Q. It says you believe that this property,
4 referring to land sale No. 4, is far inferior to the

s property at issue in this case because, contrary to
6 ITD's appraisal, this property did not have sewer
7 service. And by this property you mean land sale No. 4.
B Is that correct?
9
A. That is correct.
Q, And how do you know it had no sewer
10
11 service?
12
A. I contacted City of Sagle.
13
Q. Who did you talk to at the City of Sagle?
14
A. 1did it online.
15
Q. And what did you look at online?
16
A. Sewer availability, and there was no sewer
l7 availability.
18
Q. You also point out, it says, that "Sagle
19 Road is not a 'hard comer.'" What did you mean by
20 that?
A,
21
There's no traffic sigruu at the road.
22 Sagle road is more ofa T intersection. As a. matter of
23 fact, I don't believe it aligns directly with the street
24 to the west of Highway 95, and it leads to a school.
25 It's a county road. I don't believe it's a dirt road1

P. 36

1
2
3

4
5

6
7
8
9

10
11

12
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l4
15

16
l7
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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percent. I was trying to be somewhat conservative in
this by saying it was at least 20 percent
Q. So is it fair to say that this 20 percent
number is based upon your experience?
A. Yes.
Q. The you next write, "This factor
effectively places the value of1TD1s mke of Hughes
Investments' property at plus or minus $3 .23 a square
foot or $2,532,578 for the prime 18 aeres being
acquired." Whete did you get the 18 acres number?
A. We were taking Sylvan Road. Sylvan Road
I
was about an acre and a half. .Agaio, there's
~
conflicting evidence or conflicting information that we 1
;received. Even in the Record of Decision I believe it
references an additional 1.8 acre take on Sylvan Road or 1
for right-of-way of frontage roads.
Q. Handing you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No. 13. It's the Complaint filed in
tms matter. Have you seen that document before?
Yes, IbaV'e.
A.
Q, Ifyou could please flip to - I think
it's Exhibit A on there.
j
A. Okay,
l
Q. And Exhibit A, is that the legal
description of the property to be acquired?
I

I

I

Page 91
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but it's certainly not an improved road like Highway 54.
Q. You write, "Experienced developers wilt
pay at least a 20 percent premium for property located
at a signalized intersection of two highways." On what
do you base that 20-percent premium number?
A. I said at least 20 percent. You look for
the value of an expanded trade area to population
centers because you've got highways which provide better
access than county roads or dirt roads or gravel roads
or city streets, for that matter. Based on that,
merchants, tenants, buyers, end users, will pay more to
be at your site.
Q. Will they pay 20 percent more?
A.
They'd probably pay significantly more
than that. There's certain sites that if it's a
mid-block location that they just flat out will not
take.
Q. And what do you base the 20 percent number
on? Is there any reports or studies that show that
people will pay at least 20 percent more for a property
located at a signalized intersection?
A. Again, rve been doing this for 27 years.
rm involved in ICSC. We have panels and comJJ1ittees aod
discussions about these sorts of things. Is there a
hard number? I'm guessing it's probably more like so

I would assume so.
What's the acreage listed that's in ihe
upper right-hand comer?
A.
16.314 acr~s.
s
Q. And if you'll flil) tQ - I think it's
6 Exhibit B. I believe those .8{e the right-of-way pjans?

1
2
3
4

7

8
9
1o
11
12

13
14
lS

16
17

18
19
2o
21
22
23
24
2s

·"·-~,,II~\ ,...,._,....

A.
Q,

A.

·I

i
l

j

l
I

J

Yes.

j

Q. And there is a colored section.
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any property that's being
acquired according to that right-of-way plans for Sylvan
Road?
A. Is that the plan you're refening to?
Q. It's easier to look at this page.
A, Okay. No.
Q. So ifwe do the math here, if there's
nothing in the Complaint or in the right-of-way plans
that references 18 acres or acquisition of Sylvan Road,
why would you include it in the 18 acres - why would
you include it in your oalculation for damages?
A. It's my opinion that ITD is pushing off
Sylvan Road. We've bad many discussions with them. I
had several discussions with Justin Weist and Jason
Minzghor about building Sylvan Road through the
property, Those conversations went away. I don't know
,. .
-""--" -·-·-'lie- .......

:

j
'i

!
i

!

!
t

I

I
II
l

!
:
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Page 96

1 appears, then, that you list a series of factors. Are
2 these all factors that are based upon the length and
Q, Why do you feel that?
3 time it would talce ITD to complete the project, complete
4 construction? I'm looking at specifically, just for
A. They've had conversations with the highway
5 your reference, where it says it would be worth
district saying that, you know, Sylvan Road should be
extended through the property. I think they're trying
6 $3 1669,300 and there's a number 1 through 4.
7
to push Sylvan Road a$ a responsibility on us.
A. I'm looking at that. And your question,
8 sir?
Q. So you believe that l'ID should pay you for
9
construction of Sylvan Road?
Q. The question is: These damages here, are
10 these based upon the time it will take ITD to complete
A. Yes.
11 construction of the project?
Q. You write next on page 7, it says, "It is
12
estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for
Yes.
A.
13
road construction materials located underneath Hughes
Q. And it says this will be worth $3,669,300
:'
I
Investments property is approximately $300,000." Where 14 at the time of completion and opening of the
!
15 interchange. And how did you reach that number?
did you get tho $300,000 number?
'
16
Mr. Reeslund is more able to discuss that,
A.
I assumed that the opening of the
A.
17 interchange would be three years from now.
but we did have conversations with Allwest, and I
''
I
18
believe there was a grading contractor that they
Q. And then you calculated it as follows.
i
19 You said No. 1, "3.87 acres west of the take is given a
contacted or not - a materials supplier. I think the
'
20 value of $674,300 (value is reduced due to 1he inability r
number is actually more than $300,000. But again, we
'
were nying to be somewhat conser\'ative in there and put 21 to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's
the number of$300,000. ITD was supposed to supply us 22 right-of-way.)" Do you see that?
.,
with material data as part of our agreement to let them
23
A. Yes, I do.
come onto the property, and to my knowledge, until maybe 24
Q. Now, I believe this is probably the
'
25 easiest way to do this. If you flip to -- I believe
just recently, we never got that data. I don't think we

1 why. We feel that they're pushing off Sylvan Road on

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Page 97

Page 95
1 got a chance to analyze it.
2
Q. Is it fair to say, though--you bad said
3 that Mr. Reeslund was the expert one who I should talk
4 ro about this. You were present yesterday for the
s deposition where I asked him a series of questions about
6 the gravel and his coordination and commuuication with
7 Allwesl Do you recall that testimony?
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. Is there anything about that testimony
10 that you would change or add to?
ll
No.
A.
12
Q. The next line that you write here is,
13 "However, the most important component to the
14 determination of the value of the take is the time
15 period still needed wcomplete construction." What do
16 you mean by that?
17
A. We don't know when the freeway will be
18 complete. I don't believe I'ID knows when the freeway's
19 going to be complete.
20
Q. And how is that the most important
21 component to the determination of value of the take?
22
Until the project is complete, we cannot
A.
23 start our project. We 01UU1otbuild our shopping center.
24
Q, And rm trying to U11derstand what you've
25 got going on here for this next- on page 7. It

1 it's Bates No. 1414, at the end.
A. Yes.
3
Q. And 1415. Are these documents showing
;
4 your calculations of these damages? Is that what's
5 going on there or can you explain what's going on there? ,
6
I'\.,
I believe there's - 1413 and 1414 that
7 show the pricing of the project. And I refer to the
8 project as our site. Before and after the condemnation.
9
Q. Okay. So let's just make sure we're
10 clear. On Bates No. 1414, that's showing the project
11 before condemnation?
12
Correct.
A.
13
Q. And 1415 is showing after condemnation?
14
A. 1413 shows it after.
''
15
Q. I apologize, 1413?
l6
A. Yes,
17
Q. Shows after condemnation. So the munbers '
1B that you're using here on the indented 1 through 4,
:
19 those are reflected on 1413. Is that correct?
20
A. That is correct, yes.
21
Q. Do you know what the value of the property
22 was - is right now before the taking? Excuse me.
23 Strike that. Let me rephrase that. What is the value
24 of the property before the taking?
25
A. What is my opinion of the value of the
2

&
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l is no value to the gravel. You know, obviously we can't
2 ask for that and we won't ask for that. But those are
3 the nwnbers that are the most accurate as of this date.
4
Q. And other than the factors you've just

Right.

So then the difference between that,
between the $3,669,000 number and the $2,722,000 is the
$974,000. Correct?
A. Correct. lfl can use your calculator, I
can confirm that.
Q. That's okay fornow.
A.
Okay.
Q.
And so this $947,000, those are damages
that you believe you're entitled to because of the
length it'll take- the time it'll take ITO to complete
the construction of the project?
A.
That's correct.
Q. And then you went back and added nwnbers
altogether, the $2,S32,000, which was forthe 18 acres
which is for the 16.34 acres plus Syl\lan R9ad. Correct?
A.
Please state that again.
Q. I apologize. Right now rm going to run
1hrough - you had a calculation here at the end. I
just want to nm through that really quick so we've got
all those numbers worked out.
A. Okay.
.
....
Q. '.You said, to summarize, you added the
·$2 5.32,578, which you got from -- which was calculated
onpa:ge 6, which included the 16.34 acres being acquired
Q.

s listed, what other factors would cause you to change
your anticipated testimony as to value?
A. I don't know.
Q. The next •• and you'll have to bear with
me here. It says in the alternative you provide this
alternative analysis here, the next paragraph. Do you
seethat?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What was the purpose of providing that
alternative analysis?
A. To give a different perspective as to if
we were to develop the property what the anticipated
value would be of the site if it was developed as it
exists today without the take.
Q. And just to save us some time, are you
anticipating testifying to this alternative theory?
A.
Yes.
Q, Okay. Let's go through it then. It says,
"In the alternative, looking at the development
potential before the take for the property's 'highest
and best use' the value is significantly higher. The

6
7

a
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ll
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plus Syl".an Road,
A.

1

Page 104

'Page 103

2
3

P. 38

l

potential profit, as is shown in the pre-take budget, is
estimated at just over $8,670,000." Is that correct?
3
A. That's correct
4
Q. And where did that $8,670,000 number come
s from?
5
A. Bates sheet 1416 has a project budget.
7
Q. Okay. I think that's also been previously
8 introduced as Deposition Exhibit 34. Can you just
1

Right.

I

2

Correct?
j
Correct.
1
Q. And then you added the $300,000 for the
'
construction materials, which would be the gravel.
Correet?
A. That is correct.
I
Q. And then you added that to the $947,000,
9 confirm that that's the same one?
which is the damages you believe you're entitled to for 1 o
A.
Yes, it is.
,I
the length it'll, take ITD to complete the project?
11
MR. TOLLEFSON: And Doug, if it's all right with :
A. Correct.
12 you, I'd like to push back for a few minutes so we can i
Q. That's how you arrived at $3,779,578?
13 get this section done before we break for lunch.
j
A. Correct.
14
MR. MARFICE: Sure.
Q. And is that the amount you're going to
15 BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
anticipate testifying to at trial?
16
Q. So it might be easier to look at Exhibit
A. I'm not sure yet.
1 7 No. 34.
Q. Why are you not sure?
18
A. Okay.
A. The number could change.
19
Q. And then flip back to page 8 of Exhibit 11
!
Q. Why would the number change?
2 o so we've got those two in the same place, That might be j
A. lfITD delayed construction of the road.
21 the easiest way to go about doing this,
:
Q. What other reasons would cause you to
22
MR. MARFICE: Just for my edification, is .Bxbibit !
change your anticipated testimony?
23 34 the same as Bates 1
A. If the size of the take increased or
24
MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes.
decreased for that matter. If we detennine that there 25
MR. MARFICB! Okay. Thank you.
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Q.
Okay. How does that number relate to the
$8.6 potential profit number?
A. In its highest and best use as it is
today, the potential profit, we have the potential of
$8,671,994.
Q.
How does the $3,293,000 number relate to
the $8,671,000 number?
A.
That is our - after the take, that's the
anticipated value of what we think the potential profit
would be.
Q.
So if I'm understanding you correctly,
what you're saying is that this $3,293,000 number,
that's, you believe, what the potential profit will be
after the talce?
A.
The potential profit, but you've gotto
subtract $ 1.8 million for the value of the property when
we bought it and our costs to date.
Q. And where does that 1.8 million dollars
come from?
A. The value of the property, 1,450,000, and
the budget soft costs that we've discussed earlier. And
it's rounded down. It's probably closer to two million
dollars now.
Q.
So even just- we'll use the numbers
you've got Hsted here. That if you take the
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profit after the take.
Q.
Potential profit after the take. And the
potential profit without the take is $8,670,000.
Correct?
A.
That's couect.
Q.
So to get what you believe - what you'll
.l
be damaged by the take is you would take the 8.67 numbe1 1
and subtract the S1,493,000. Is that correct?
A. That would be legitimate, yes.
Q.
Is that what you anticipate testifying to
regarding tbis alternative theory?
A. Yes.
Q. So then ifmy numbers are correct, if you
subtract those two numbers, that's approximately
$7,177,000 in Jost profits.
A. rve not done the calculation, but I will
agree to use your number.
Q.
Okay. So do you anticipate testifying
that this project - or excuse me - that ITD's
condemnation and construction will cost you
approximately $7,177,000 in profits?
A. Yes.
,
Q. And that nlllllber is based upon lost
~
profits, not based upon the value of the land. Correct?
I
A. That is correct.
!

j
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$3,29.3,000, and then you would subtract the 1.8 million
from that. Correct?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
And then you would get - your potential
profit after the take you believe would be approximately
$1,493,000?
A. That's correct.
Q. And so then if I'm understanding this
testimony correctly, then, in order to get under this
alternative-· what we're calling alternative theory
here - is that you would subtract or you would take the
8.6 million and then you would subtract the 1.493
million, and that would be the number that you would be
testifying to. Is that correct?
A. Please state that again.
Q. Sure. No problem. All right. So we've
got what we'll call your after-take profits, which is
the 3.293 minus 1.88?
A. Correct.
Q, Andtbat,Ihavewrittendownas
$1,493,000. So we'll say, according to this alternative
theory, in the after condition, or after the project's
completed - let me rephrase that How would you
characterize that l .493 million dollars?
A. 1would characterize that as the potential
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So ifI understand your proposed testimony
I
con-ectly is that you'll be testifying to both a
$3,779,000 number and a $7,177,000 number?
A.
Cortect.
Q. And you believe that both of those shouJd
be compensated·· excuse me. Wouid you add those two
numbers together to get your ultimate just compensation
or are those two separate valuations?
A. They're two separate valuations.
Q, So you believe that-· is it fair to say
that your anticipated testimony will be that HJ Grathol
should be compensated somewhere between 3. 7 million and l
7.1 million dollars in damages?
j
A. That would be my testimony.
j'
Q, Is that not accurate?
A. It is accurate. Thai is my testimony,
i
Q. Do you believe that that's how much HJ'
Grathol has been damaged?
A. I believe we have potential to be damaged
thatmuch,yes.
Q. When you say potential u, be damaged that
muchJ what do you mean by potentia1?
A. Again, it depends on, again, timing of the
freeway, is the take going to be larger/smaller, acce.ss
off of 54, those sorts ofthings. I mean, just even as
Q.
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1
2

1
of today, it's changed a little bit in the potential
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as
offer from ITD to provide access to one of our remainder 2 Deposition Exhibit No. 25. Previously marked as

3

parcels providing sleeves for utilities. I mean, that's
going to cause an adjustment, We're trying T.O be mir.
Q. And you believe that the •• scratch that.
All right. Why don't we take lunch now.
Does that work for you, Doug?
MR. MARFICE: Sounds good.
(Whereupon the luncheon :recess was taken
at 12:lS p.m., resuming at 1:30 p.m.)
(Ms. York is not present after lunch.)
(Exhibit 46 was marked.}
(Bxhibit47 was marked.)
BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No. 46. We only have the one copy.
I just want to confirm that those were documents that
were in your file that we made some copies of.
A. Yes, that's conect.
Q. And then handing you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No. 47, was that document also in
your files?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And what is that document?
"Conceptual Site Plan, Stimson Timber
A.
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3 Deposition Exhibit No. 2S. This appears to be some
4 e-mail correspondenee between YoU and Mr. Reeslund. Is

s that correct?
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A.

Yes, it is.
Q. At the bottom of the pace there's an
l.
e-mail from Mr. Reeslund dated January 28, 2010, and he
says, "Have you seen a proposal from Sc:ott Auble yet?"
j
What proposal is Reeslund asking about?
~
A. We were going to engage Mr. A1.1ble to do an
1
appraisal for the project.
1
Q. And you responded back, ''No. After
another meeting, we may want somebody else." Do you see
that e-mail?
A. Yes.
Q. What meeting were you referring to?
A. I had a meeting, and I don't remember
exactly who it was with. I think it could have been
with a bioker. And Mr. Auble at that time had some
issues that he may not have been able to complete his
assignment.
Q. What issues?
A. I think there were some personal issues.
Q. Who·· do you recall what those personal

lj
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Company Property, Oood Hope Road, Kootenai Caunty,
Idaho."
Q. Why was that document in your files?

A. I had met years •• well, two years ago,
three years ago -- with a broker that represented this
residential subdivision. I wanted to get infonnation on
what was going on on that project and he wanted to get
information as to what was happening with our projeQt
Obviously people that would wiU live in the area would
have a need for services and - goods and services.
Q. Do you recall when you had your meetings
withhim?
A. I think it was two, two and a half years
ago. It was after we had acquired the property.
Q. What is the status ofthat development?
A. I have not followed up with the broker, sc
I don't know.
Q. Do you know if it's still going forward?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know if it's been tenninated or
stopped?
A. Idon'tknow.
Q. Ifit went in, would that be agood thing
for your project?
A. Yes.
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issues were?
A. I believe he had partnered -- and aaain,
this is pure speculation on my behalf, and hearsay. He
had invested or had been an appraiser in some investment
properties that maybe the appraisals weren't done
correctly, and there was some legal ramifications to it.
Q. It looks like Mr. Reeslund responds to
,:
your e-mail and he says, "A bad recommendation?'' Do you J
see that e-mail?
A.
Yes.
'!
Q. And then you respond by saying, "I met
j
someone yesterday that said that he is too
l
conservative." Who was that someone?
j
A. I believe it was a broker. Somebody that
;
just jn passing said Scott Auble's a veJY eonservative
appraiser.
Q. Do you recall which broker it was?
A. I don't. It possibly could have been
Brett Terrell.
Q. And when you say he's too conservative,
what do you mean by that'?
A. Meaning that he would - you know, the
numbers that he would use in his appraisal would side
too much on the side of caution and not be a fair
appraisal.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JOOICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN 1-\ND FOR THS COIJNTY OF KOOTENAI

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
BOARD,

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVlOrl0095

}

HJ GRATHOL, a California)
general partnership;
)
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a)
Washington corporation; l
and DOES 1 through s,
)

__________
Defendant.a.

)
)
)

DEPOSITION OF GEOFFREY B. REESLUND
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE Px..AINTIFF
AT 816 SHERMAN AVENUE, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO
NOVEMBER 17, 2011, AT 9:30 A.M.

REPORT!D BY:
JULIE MCCAUGHAN, C,S.R. NO. 684
Notary Public
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see where I read that?
A. Yes.
Q. rm tJying to make sure we're on the same
page, literally. Now, what rm going to do is I'm going
to ~o thro11gb these next couple pages 'and lafk about
what's Jisted here as your anticipated testimony, Does
that m.ake sense?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. On page 8 here, it says that
you intend to testify that the proposed ele11ated :freeway
as it traverses the site will greatly limit visibility
and sight Jines t.o the tenant buildings and signage in
the development: ~ you explain what you mean by, that-?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you please?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you do that now for me, please?
A. Yes. The :freeway1 as it, I'll sayI enters
the site .at the north end is approximately nine feet
above th~ existing grade of the site, As itp:roceeds
southerly, it reaches aa elevation of approximately 30
feet above the existing grade with tn avei:age of about
19 feet With commercial buildings that we would
develop, the m~imum. height of those buildings is
generally about 24 feet, which means the signage on

P. 5/48
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visibility, is there any site studies or anything that
would support what you're telling me here now?
A I1ve done site studies for projects
before~ not 1his specifieally.
Q. So there's not a study that you1re aware
offor this project that would support what you're
telling me?
A No.
Q. Andjust for - so we're all on the have something w Jook at,
going to hand you what's
been previously marked as Exhibit 4, just so if we need :
to point or reference to a part of the project or part
of the property, tben we can--I would just suggest
that we use this as a base so we al) know what we're
talking about. Does that work ~ot you?
A. Yes,
Q. So looking here at this first paragraph
tbatljust asked you about on page 8 of Exhibit No. 11~
is this a full and complete and accurate statement of
what you anticipate you'U be testifying to regarding
retail commercial site planning and design including
building orientation, sight line and 'Visible criteria?
A.
You're referring to the first bullet item?
,

rm

Q.

j
1

Yes.

25
1---=---------'-------------t
___A_._A_t_thi_._sP..o_in_t,__y_es_._ _ _ _ _ _ _
2S

--1·

Page 19
1 those buildings generally ranges between 18 and 22 feet
2 When someone is driving and - I'll say right now from
3
4

s
5
'7
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the north headed south -- if you look at a site plan of
the way the freeway is configured, it begins an easterly
traverse from its existing alignment as it starts to
cross our site and then go back to the southerly
direction again. If a vehicle is proceeding south,
there's a partial occlusion of buildings, blocking of
visibility, by that curve. And as the freeway rises, it
further blocks visibility. From the southern southbolltl,~
Janes, the width of the freeway further blocks the
Yisibility ofthe buildings because of the width of the
freeway from the northbound lanes. So that is a
detriment to the visibility of the buUdings. If those
'buildings become visible as the vehicle rises 011 the
freeway, it's already past the off-ramp, so they've
missed the opportunity to pull off and stop at the
project. That is a little less limiting for the
buildings on the small westerly parcels of the project
created by the freeway which front on Old 95. But
conversely, if you're coming from the south headed
north, those tenantt, those buildings, are not visible,
and there's still a limit of visibility to our buildings
on the east side of the freeway due to the elevation.
Q. And this information about the limiting of

...._•...,.... """'
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What do you mean by "at this point11 ?
If some more information becomes available
between now and trial, it may change or alter my
testimony.
Q. What additional information would you
beiieve may become avaiiable?
A I don't know.
Q. Do you anticipate any additional
information becoming available?
A. Not at this time.
Q. What kind of infonnation would make you
change your opinion?
A. Changes in the freeway design that might
lower the elevation, for instance.
Q. Anything else?
A. Not that I can think of.
Q. You had said that one ofyour duties is
that sometimes prior to purchasing a property, you will
engage in some research. Did you engage in any research
or development pJans for this project before it was
purchased?
A. In what regard are you referring?
1
Q. When head you what your duties were, you
1
gave a long list of things that you do, and one of them.
1
was providing preliminary design plans. Did you do
j

Q.

A.

~
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MR. TOLLEFSON: Can we go off the record just for ,
2 a second?
A. Yes.
3
(Off the record.)
Q. Can you please describe that for me?
4 BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
j
A. I did a number ·of preliminary site studies
5
Q. 't'Allbeeright. l'.m handinarkgyed.ou wbadt~- I
hat' ,1
Han mg you w s
for various altemative.s of the project.
6 believe 1 s n previ'Ous1y m
Q. And when you say "site studies,'' can you
7 been previously marlced as Deposition Exln'bit No. 6, have '
describe what you mean by 1hat7
B you seen that document before?
A. Yes.
A. Plans that would incorporate potential
9
Q. And what is it?
users or tenants in various configurations based on the
lo
A, 'fhu; is the deed referenc:ed on our ALTA
property configuration and potential freeway dewlop~ent 11
~r not freeway development.
12 survey regarding the three deeded access points.
(Exhibit 12 was marked.)
Q. So when you purchased this propeny,
13
you're saying you presented -you made alternative site 14 BYMR. TOLLEFSON:
studies?
15
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as
A. Yes.
l°G Deposition Exh;tbit No. 12. Do you recognize this
Q. And what alternatives did you consider?
1? ,document?'
A. We considered a combination of commercial
18
A. Yes.
Q. What is it?
retail U$es, hospitality uses, potential freeway tr~vel
19
oriented uses.
2 o·
A. This is a reduced copy of our ALTA sW'V'ey.
'Q, And by "reduced copy," what do you mean b)'
Q.
Did the site studies in.elude the
21
realignment of the highway?
22 that?
A. It is in 11-by.-17 format. The original
A. Some did, yes.
23
Q. And why did the.y include those?
24 copy w,e reteived. from our engineer was 30-by-42.
Q. Thanks. rd like you to tum to the
A.
We were aware that there were plans by the
,25
anything like that for this project before it was
purchased?

l

l

Page 23

l

ITD to potentially realign and improve the fteeway.

2

And did you know about this prior to
purchasing the property7
A.
Yes.
Q. Alt right. I'd like to now move down to
the next buJiet point you've got down here. "Division
of property/parcel configurations.'' Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. You write the public bas better access in
the before condition. How so?
A. Before the freeway?
Q. Yes.
A. We have three access points deeded off of
Highway 54. We have access off of95 -- I'll say Old 9S
for clarity's sake. And a signalized intersection at 54
and 95.
Q. Okay. Now I want to talk about this you said you have three deeded accesses. Do you know if
there's any limitations on those deeded accesses?
A. Limitations in what way?
Q. Limitations of use, what1hose accesses
can be used for.
A.
I am not aware of limitations. I know
that 1hey are specified as 20-foot wide, but I don't
know that there is a limitation on use.
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25
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Page 25

second page, please. And briefly you •• when I had
j
asked you about DeJ>Osition Exlu'bit No. 6, you said this 1
3 was the deeded insttwnent that was reflected on yolll'
j
4 ALTA survey. Can you see where that's reflected. on this 1
s ALTA swvey here?
!
6
A. Yes.
.I
7
Q. And probably the easiest way to do this,
B if I could just hand you a pen. if you could just circle
9 with 1he pen tho.se deeded accesses.
10
A.
(Witness complies.)
11
Q. Thank you. And those deeded accesses,
12 they reference warranty deed instrument 504394. Is that
13 correct?
I
14
A. That's correct.
l
15
Q. Now I'd like to tum back to Exhibit No.
1
16 61 which is the wammty deed, S04l94. And on the
j
17 second page, I'm going to read a sen~ce down there. I i
1 a wanted to ask yw ifl read it correctly. It says,
J
19 ''Except for three 20-foot approaches on the north side
J
2o of the roadway at the following stations: 27+ I 0, 29+80 !
21 and" - looks like that's·· "17+50, to be used as farm
1'
1
22 and residential approaches." Did I read that
i
2 3 accurately?
1
I
24
A. It appears, except for the last number,
iI
25 which is illegible.
i
.:-:-.==:z::::-::.....::~====~--:":=-~-,===~--:"l""!·
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Q.

And the accesses that you circled on
Deposition Exhibit No. 12, those are the accesses that
are referenced here on Deposition Exhibit N(?. 6. Is
that correct?
A. It would appear so.
Q. Are you aware of any other deeded accesses
to the property?
A. No.
Q. You also referenced that you had access ~
·the Old 95 in the before condition. Can you please
4~scribe that for me?
A. There is an existing building that we own
on the small parcel at the comet of 94 - rm sorry.
95 and 54- that has access atthe comer off of 95.
Q. Could you circle that, as well, for me,
please?
A. Access at this point. I'll circle that.
And there's access at this point.
Q. And just let the record reflect you made
marks, again, on Deposition Exhibit No. 12. Is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Thanks. And are those accesses deeded?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Do you know if there's any permits for

3
4

1

A.

Not for sure. I can only guess.

2

Q.

Why do you say that Sylvan Road is going

to go through your property?
A. Because we've never been told by ITO what
s the alignment would be.
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Q. Do you know if any of your site plans took
into account Sylvan Road?
A. Yes.
Q. And did they?
A. Yes.
Q. How come?
A. 1n other versions of documents similar to
this Exhibit 4 that we have received from ITD, they show
alignments of Sylvan Road going across our property.
.
And in different versions, there are two different
alignments that have been shown.
(Exhibit 13 was marked.)
BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
Q. Handing you what's been marked Deposition
Exhibit No. 13, have you seen this document before?
A. No, I don't remember seeing this document
1
before.
Q. Okay. Ifl represent to you that this is
the Complaint that's filed by the Idaho Transportation
Department against HJ Gratbol and Sterling Savings Bank
Page 29 J

2

Q, And on Deposition Exhibit No. 12, you said
you owned a small parcel that had access to Highway 95.
Is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
From that small parcei is it possible to
get to the main parcel? Is there a road or access
between those two?
A.
An unimproved road, yes.
Q. Do you know if there's any deeds or
pennits pennitting that road?
A. I don't know.
Q.
Do you know if that unimpr0ved road
requires the use ofITD's right-of-way?
A. rm not sure.
Q, You further write down on page 8 of
Deposition Sxhibit No. 11 that, "A third parcel will be
created when right-of-say" -· but I imagine that means
right-of-way?
A. Right.
Q. - "is acquired for the Sylvan frontage
road use." And tuming back now to Deposition Exhibit
No. 4, can you show me where Sylvan Road's going to go

l

Page 28

Page 27

1 those accesses?
.2
A. No, I do not know.
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action,

that started this condemnation
would you have 1j
any reason to doubt that?
A. Probably not.
I
Q. I'd like you to take a minute to go to
j
&hibit B, please. Here these are the US-9S Garwood to 1
Sagle, Athol Stage, Federal Aid Project No. A009(791), j
what are commonly referred to as the right-of-way plans. J
If you could flip to the second page ofE'Xbibit B. Do
l
you see where the HJ Gtathol property is repl'esented on
this document?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you see that I believe there is
!
a- I want t0 callit magenta colored section in there?
'
A. Yes.
Q. Are you aware thatthat1s the right-of-way
thatITD iucquiring as a result ofthls condemnation
action or is attempting to acquire?
A.
It looks like it.
Q, Do you ste any indication on these
right-of-way plans that show that ITD has taken property
for the const,Uction of Sylvan R.oad?
A No.
,
Q. rd like to turn to the next page.
j
A. In E::ichibit B?
1

l
j

i

Q...• ~~~~~~~-
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But before we move o~ what makes you •• or what do you
base your opinion on that ITD is going to acquire
3 propeny for Sylvan Road?
4
A. We have been •• that they're going to
l
2

s
6
7

8

9
10
11

12
13

14

is
16
17
18

acquire it?
Q. Uh-hub,
A. We have been •• it was our understanding
from meetings that wt had with ITO that Sylvan Road
would be extended from Highway 54 to Roberts ~oad across
our property in some fashion.
Q, when were those meetings?
A. The one meeting was in 2009 and one
~eetingwas in 2010.
Q. The meeting io 2009, who was present?
A. I believe that was myself, Alan Johnson,

Q.

l

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9

10
ll

And what was told to you at that meeting?
20
A. That Sylvan Ro~d was to be ex.tended across
2l our propi!lrty but that -there was no curtent funding for

20

22 it.

22

Q. So you were told jn 2009 that there was no
funding to construct Sylvan Road acro9s HJ Gratbol's
25 property?

23
24

23
24

19

21

2S

32
Sylvan :tload extension?
A. Yes. There were copies ofmy meeting
minutes provided with discovery.
Q, I might have them in here at some point,
but do you re-call what those meeting minutes said?
A. Patdonme?
Q. Do you recall what those meeting mirtutes
'
.said?
I
A.
Basically what l've already said, plus
aclclitional information about the c~t scheduling of
the construction of the freeway and some infonnation
regarding Jason providing us with copies of plans for
our engineers to work with.
Q. Do you know when the. Sylvan Road is going
to be constructed across your property?
A. We have not been told that.
Q. Do you know by whom? .
A, We were told in one of those meetings that
ITO would build the road and tum it over _to Lakes
'
Highway District to maintain.
lI
Q. And which meeting was that?
A. l'm not sure-, but I belie.v~ it was the
2009 meeting.
Q. And who told you that?
1
A,
I believe it was Jason Minzghor that said
l

Page 31
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15

At that titne, that is what they said.
Then you said the second meeting was in
2010. Who was present-at that meeting?
A. I believe that was myself; Alan Johnson,
Jason Minzghor and the right-of-way agent for - I think
he was .a right-of-way agent fo,; tm. He's named Ron
Harvey. And Chris Gabbert :from Ramsden & Lyons.
Q. And what was told to you at that meeting?
A. It was basically an update on the schedule
ofthe construction of the freeway, and it was again
represented that there was no cwtent funding for Sylvan
Road constnlcti.on.
Q. At either of these meetings ,,... strike
that. You had earlier said that Sylvan Road was going
to 'be QOnscructed in some fashion. What did you mean by
A.

Q.

16 1hat?
17
A. As I mentioned, we had seen two vaiying
18 alignments of Sylvan Road.
19
20

21
22
33
24
2$

Q. But it's your understanding that ITD
doesn't have the fimding to construct the Sylvan Road at
tbistime?
A. At that time, in 2009 and 20 lo, tl-.at is
what we were told.
Q. Do you have any documents in the file
fegarding these meetings or regarding this extension ••

, . , . , •• ,l,lofll~
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15
two of our tr,ttfic consult.an~, Jason Mimghor from ITD, 16
and another one Qt two gentlemen ftom !TD whose names I 17
18
can't reoall right now.

19
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Pi;l.ge 3-3 ]

l that.
3
Q.

All right. I'd like to go back now to
3 your Deposition Exhibit No. 11, which is the third
4 supplemental answers and responses, on page 9, first
s,. bullet point. It says, "Access and circulation on and i
g
off site." Could you take a quick moment to read that? j
7 And have you read that?
j
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. Is that a complete statement of what you I
10 anticipate testifying to at trial in this matter
!
11 regarding that bullet point?
i
13
A. At this point, yes.
1
4
13
Q. And I'm sorry to ask these questions
i
14 again, but when you say "at this point," what do you
I
15 mean by that?
I'
Hi
A. Between now and - well, I'd say between lI
17 the time this was provided and written and the time
I'
18 trial occurs, if additional information becomes
I'
19 available, such as changes in ITD's plans, that might I
I
20 change the access accessibility to our property. That
I
2l might change this testimony.
.2.2
Q. Other than ITO changing its plans, what
23 else would cause you to change your testimony?
I
24
I
A. Nothing that I can think of.
l
25
Q. And maybe if we do this, this might save

l

I
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----- _.,.,..~,.,"'··-~-~--"'"""9 ....(Pages
30 to 33)

REESLUND, GEOFFREY B.

__._.2

429 of 1617

11-17-2011

JAN. 6. 2012 3:38PM

NO. 3877

Page 34

time down the road for each of these bullet points. If
2 we maybe just take a minute and look at these next few
3 bullet points on the next two pages. And if we can
4 get -- because I'm going to ask you the same question
s about each one of those bullet JX)ints about what would
6 cause you to change your testimony. So rm hoping that
7 we can just avoid having me ask that every single time,
e and ifwe canjust agree that it sounds like you would
9 change your testimony if ITO changes its plan, but other
lo than that, you wouldn't anticipate any reason why you
11 would change your testimony.
12
A. Essentially, yes. There would be - I
13 would offer that relative to the bullet item that
14 discusses a lack of a recorded map, if a recorded map
1s was provided, that might change, as opposed to a change
16 in their freeway plans.
17
Q. Anything else that might cause you to
18 change your testimony?
19
A. Relative to bullet item that says,
2 o "Infrastructure and utility needs/provisions, 11 that
2l would probably still be accurate. Changes in their
22 plans might be that we see that they are providing
23 provisions for us to cross under the right-of-way to
24 serve both properties with utilities. Other than that,
2 5 I would agree that the statements are accurate.
Page 35
l

1
2

Q.

And hopefully that'll save us some time,

then.
3
A.
4

s
6
7

a
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
l7
18
19

2o

21
22
2J
24

Good.
You claim here that the access and
circulation on and off site - on page 9 •• that the
reconfiguration use severely impacts the viability for
developing the resultant sites by eliminating or
drastically limiting the ability to provide effective
access points critical to successful commercial
development What access points wiJJ be limited?
A. With the freeway development, we have been
told that we would not be allowed access between the
northbound onramp and the Sylvan Road location.
Q. Handing you what's been previously marked
as Deposition Exhibit No. 4, can you just point to what
you've just referenced? Let's not circle yet on this
one.
A. (Witness indicating.)
Q.
Were you told if ITD would grant any
accesses off of S4?
A. We were only told that they would not
ailow aecess between the onramp and Sylvan Road.
Q, Were you told that you would not get any
accesses off of Highway S4?
A. Not ln the meetings I was in.
Q.

P. 9/48
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lS
16
17
18
19

2o
21
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23
24
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1

Q. What accesses would be eliminated?
A. It appears that - and I'll refer to
Exhibit 12. It would appear that the two westerly
accesses might be eliminated or impacted, but it's
uncertain if the middle one is in that area without
seeing further information.
Q. Okay. So ifl understand this correetly,
your testimony is that the - you're not sure which of
j
these two access points that are circled on the ALTA map 1
would be eliminated, but they could be?
A. It is apparent that the westerly most
access would be eliminated, and potentially the second
one; but without seeing an overlay of the freeway
right-of-way, I cannot answer that.
Q. And what about the third access you've
circled on the ALTA map?
A. That is clearly out of the range of the
area they told us that we would not have access.
Q. So do you have any reason to believe that
that access would be eliminated?
A. No.
Q. What other accesses do you believe would
be eliminated? Let me rephrase that. Are there any
other accesses you believe would be eliminated as a
result ofITD's project?

j

Page 37
1
2

A.

It's unclear from the improvement plans

13

that I have seen, but there is a question relative to
access of the comer parcel. There have been no
approaches shown on ITD's plans that would continue to
serve that tJroperl:y.
11
Q. But again, you're not sure ifthat would
be eliminated?
j
A. It is unclear at this point.
1
Q.
And why is it unclear?
•
A. ITD1s plans do not address that.
'1
Q. And when you say 11ITD's plans," what are
you referring to?
A. The improvement plans that we received

14
lS

copies ofin discovery.
Q. Have you had a chance to review those

3
4

s
6

7

e
9

10

11

12

!

l

1

16 improvement plans?
l7
A. I ba-ve.
18
Q. And it's my understanding that after your
19 review, you're not sure whether or not that would
2 o eliminate. th-e access to that smallei parcel?
21
A. That is correct.
22
Q, Are there any other accesses you believe
23 would be eliminated or drastically limited as a result
24 of11D 1s project?
25
A. Yes.

25
I
-=--=-=--=,
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And what accesses are those?
A. Because ofthe cul-de-sac design of Old 9S
toward the northern end of our property, the resultant
property that we have remaining on the west side of the
right-of-way would be limited in the aspeot of there
wi'll be no through traffic on that road.
Q, Okay.
A. Which would limit the number of potential
customers that would have access,
Q. So let me see ifl understand this
correct. And please con;ectme if I misunderstand what
you're saying. You're claiming that access to the
parcel will be limited because oftb.e project, not
because lTD is taking any currently existing accesses to
Old Highway 95, but rather because they are putting in
cul-d~sacs on Old Highway 95?
A.
That's correct.
Q, What COlllJJ)ercial accesses currently exist
o~ the property? ..
.
A. The project is not developed commercially
yet, so no access exists,
Q. I would like to move down-· we're still
on page 9 of Exhibit 12. Excuse me. Exhibit 11. And
move down to the next bullet point. "InfrastrUcture and
utility needs/provision." What utilities currently
Q.

Page 40 1
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4

s
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18
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21
22
23

24

exist on the property?
A. It is my recollection that there is gas
available, there is electricity available, water is
available in US-95 for extension to our property.
Q. Any other utilities?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. And I'll start at the top. You said gas
is available. I-low is gas avaHable?
A. It's my recolleotion that there is a gas
line in the frontage along Highway 54.
Q. And what do you base this information on?
A. From the ALTA survey information.
Q. Can you point out to me where that is
located on Exhibit No. 12? I'll hand you a highlighter.
A. I cannot, because this is illegible.
Q.
A.

Okay.

It appears to be.
Q. Is it possible to use that?
MR. MARFICE: Sure.
1
MR. TOLLEFSON: And I don't want to steal your
copy, but is it possible to get it marked?
l
MR. MARFICE: Do we have another copy of that? j
MR. JOHNSON: No, I don't. And it's part of
1
discovery.
;1
MR.. TOLLEFSON: So don't mark on that yet.
Q. So maybe what we could do is if you want
to use the large ALTA map to maybe orientate where it
could beA. And this mark on this small plan? Yes.
Q. Would that work for you?
A. Yes, it will.
Q. I appreciate. Thank you.
A. I'm marking a six-inch gas line across the
frontage on Highway 54 based on what is shown on the
larger copy ofthe plan.
Q. And what would it take to get aeeess to
that gas line?
A. Working with the gas company to establish 1
a connection and e'Xtension onto our site.
'i
Q. Have you had contact with the gas company? I
A. No.
l

l

I
Page 41 '
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s
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1G

But I will point out that in the legend,
there is an indication of a •• what is called a gas
witness post, which is related to gas service. So if I
were able to read this plan, I could locate that.
Q. Understood. So let the record reflect you
highlighted•• what did you highltght on Exhibit 12?
A. I highlighted a graphic representation in
the legend of what is called a gas witness post.

j
j

A.

Page 3 9

2
3
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17
1e

19
2o

21
22
23
24

Q. Do you know what requirements this
'j
particular gas company may have?
l
A. No.
j
1
Q. Okay. Next you said that electricity was
available. On what do you base that?
A. The information shown on the ALTA survey, ]
Q. Okay. And if we could use the same
procedure, find it on the large map and then mark it on
1
the smaller one.
A. I should also add there's telephone
service I didn't mention before, across the frontage of
the property. There are indications of power poles and
power vaults on the survey. Indicating that the lines
run parallel - you want to use a different color of
highlighter?
Q. I think Ms. York may have one.
A. I have red. It's brown. Which we may
need, also.
MR. MARFICE: Here. It's not a highlighter, but
that may work.
MR. TOLLEFSON: Thank you, Mr. Marfice.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
Q, So what does the red line that you just
.!

I

l
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The overhead power poles and power lines.
And what would it take to get access to
those overhead power poles and power lines?
Working with the electric company to
A.
extend the power onto the property.
Q. And do you know what this electric company
would require for you to get access to that electricity?
A. No.
Q. Do you know the name of the electric
company?
A. Kootenai Electric.
Q. Next you said that you believe water was
available on the property. On what do you base that?
A. Water is available to extend to the
property. That is based on a meeting that we had with
the City of Athol before we purchased the project,
indicating that there was a 10-inch line in US-95 that
could be extended to the site and what they call looped,
which would provide for the fire service.
Q. And did you get an agreement from the City
of Athol to get that water?
A. A fonnal agreement? No.
Q. Is your property located in the city
limits of Athol?
A. No. I take it - part of it. One parcel
A.
Q.

Page 44
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Q.

And did the city reach a decision?
A. At that meeting, they said they were not
interested.
Q. Did they give a reason why?
~
A. Not specifically.
Q. Did they give general reasons?
A.
The only answer they gave us was relative
to septic service.
Q. And what did they say about septic
service?
A. That we would not be getting any of their
ERs.
'
Q. And what is an ER?
A. It is an equivalent unit for measuring
deposit into a septic system. I'm not sure of the
actual •• what it stands for, but it's based •• it's
what is used to determine what a septic system deposits
into the groundwater system.
Q, So ifl understand this correctly, the
'
City of Athol denied your application for annexation and
told you that you couldn't use their septic system?
A.
They have an allocation through •• I can't
remember the name of the sanitation district But they l
have an allocation for a certain number ofERs that,
based on their representation to us, were limited for

Page 43
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is located. The small comer parcel.
Q. Which comer parcel?
A. At the northeast corner of 9S and 54.
Q. Was there an attempt to get the whole
property annexed?
A.
There was.
Q. And what was the result of that attempt?
A. The City of Athol was not interested.
Q. And were you involved in that attempt to
get the property annexed?
A. Yes.
Q. And just briefly, what was your
involvement in that process?
A. After our meeting with the city, before we
purchased the property, we very shortly thereafter
applied for annexation and met with their city council.
Q, And what was your role?
A. I filled out the application. I went to
the city council hearing and made a presentation.
Q. And do you recall what the basis of your
presentation was?
A. That we were planning to develop the
property for commercial retail use and it wouJd be a
benefit to the city for tax dollars to have that as part
of their city.
.. ""'- •••• .,. fh. • - •

•••

,I-~

I-~'
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1 the size of their city and perhaps felt that a project
2
3
4

s
6
?
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21

l
of this size might hamper their ability to use further
units.
1
I
Q. Because your project would require some
I
I
sort of septic system?
fl,
Some sort of sewer service1 yes.
Q, When you say "sewer service," what do you
mean by that?
A A1i.. ability to dispose of sewage.
~
Q. So as the property sits now, it's not
annexed in the City of Athol. Does it have access t.o a
sewer system?
A. Not an µnderground sewer system, no.
Q. Does it have access to an overground sewer I
I
l
system?
'
I
A.
It has access to basic septio use.
j
Q. What do you mean by "basic septie use"'!
j
A I don't recall the actual ratio, but it is
something on the order of it's based on the size of the
property how many septic tanks or systems you can have.
Q. In order to develop the property, do you
have to have access to some sort of sewer system'!
A. We have to have some means of disposing of
'
sewage.
1I
Q. What means currently do you have to
l

22
23
24
25
-11,.,,.

A
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dispose of sewage on the property?
A. We have been in the process of design of a
3 on-site sewage treatment system.
4
Q. Have you been mvolved in that process?

1

2

5

6
7

8
.9
10
11,

12

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
.23
24
25

A.
Q.
A.

Yes.

What is your involvement in that process?
I have .met with the consultant that we
have hired to design the system several ti.mes over
several years that we'\/'e been worldn:g on this.
Q. Who is the consultant?
A. The name of the firm is Coleman
Engineering.
..
Q. And when did you first have contact with
Coleman Engineering?
A. . I don't recall exactly, but I believe we
brougbt him under contract in 2009. It could have been
earlier.
Q. Did you bring him on before or after the
City of Athol rejected -your application for annexation?
A. 'This was after.
Q. And what did you. task Colem~ Engineering
with doing?
A, Conceptualizing and designing a system
that would serve our project.
Q. And did they do so?

Page 48

l which system they would pennit,
2
Q. Do these have names, just so we're on the
3 same page when we discuss them?
4
A. No.
5
6

Q.

proposing,
4
Q. Can you just tell me briefly about that
s system?
6
A. It is a faidy complicated trea..'lnent
7 system involving filtration and reuse of filtered. sewage
8 water for irrigation purposes as well as tanks for
9 disposal of solid waste.
10
Q. If you were -- and this is maybe just
11 because I'm a layman. If you were driving by and saw
12 1his sewage system comple~ what would it look like
13 ftom the outside? Or do you know, I guess?
A, There are currently two possibilities.
15 One would involve nothing mote than perhaps a 20-by-20
16 building abo\/'e ground. Nothing else woUld be visible.
17 Second possibility would be a similar building but
18 perhaps a small treatmel1t pond.
19
Q. When you say "small treatment pond," how
20 b'lg.?
21
A. Perhaps as much as one acre.
22
Q, So cWTently it sounds like there are two
23 plans that you guys are looking at Is that correct?
24
A. We're cuuently in negotiations with the
2S state Department of Bnvirotul\ental Quality to finali1.e
..... ___ :. . .:. ,.........., ......,
3

1•

I

So the first one, the 20-by.-20 building

9

10
11

12
13
14
15·
16

l"I
18

19
20
21

22
23
2~
25

Q.

How about below ground?
It would involve the distribution of
underground perforated pipes and irrigation pipes for
disposal and reuse of the tl'eated groundwater.
Q. And haw big would the under~ound area be?
A.
That's to be detennined.
Q. Do you have an estimate?
A. It would be depending on the development
area of inigation, It would depend on the number and
size of~e tenantS.
Q., Do you have a range at all?
A. No.
Q, What about the - I'll just call it option
No. 2 for now, the 20-by-20 treatment building plus the
pond. You said at least a one-acre pond. How much
space woulcl that tako up ofthe property?
1
A. The •• probably the same size building,

A,

i

!
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I

but perhaps, as I said, as much as one acre for a
treatment pond. And as far as to anticipate your next
question, underground distribution may be less because
ofthe treatment pond use.
Q, Do you. have estitnated costs for either of
these iwo alternatives?
I
j
A, Rough estimates currently are between
1
.$700,000 and $1,000,000.
:II
Q. Is that for option 1 or option 2?
A, Both.
j
Q. Has Coleman Engineering produced any
I
I
studies or reports?
I'
A. I don't recall if we've had a formal
I
repi.irt from them. I could perhaps be confusing it With
I
another project they designed a system for us on. So
'
I'm not sure.
Q. What about corrdlpondence and
l
communications with Colranan Engineerina? Are you aware I
~~~tho~
J
A. Yes.
Q, And do you know ifthose have been
produced in discovery'?
A. I'm not certain.
Q. Is it in these - anything related to -excuse ine - Coleman
......... :Engineering and,.,..,the. ,, sewage
.,...,,

l

I

________
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that you said that would not reqUire the treattnent pond,
7 how much space would that take up on the property?
a
A Above ground, perhaps 400 square feet.
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A. We've been working with them on that for a
2 few years, and yes, there is a system that we are
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1 call -- what I call prime commercial property, which
j
2 before the taking would have been all of the propeny as ~
3 it fronts cUrrent US.,95 and Highway 54. When you put
4 the new freeway configuration through the site, it
s splits that property in two, creating a fairly isolated
6 piece of property on the Old 95 side and another piece
7 of property on the east side which would further be
~
8 impacted if and when Sylvan Road gets extended across I
9 the property.
1
10
Q.
Okay. Why do you say that the property
•
ll before the taking that fronted 95 and 54 was the prime
12 location? Prime commercial site. Excuse me.
13
A. That is a prime commercial intersection
I
14 location.
15
Q. Howcome?
lG
A.
Two fairly •• well, one very busy highway
l 7 and one fairly busy highway.
18
Q. Were there accesses off of these two busy
19 highways in the before condition?
A. That's correct.
20
A.
Yes.
Q. Is it also fair to say that you don't know
1
21
Q.
Were those the accesses we described
what infrastructure needs they would have?
:I
2 2 earlier on the ALTA map?
A. It depends on the tenant.
23
A. Yes, and the presumed access off of Old 95
Q.
So without having a purchase and sale
agreement or a leasing agreement, you would be able to 24 for the property fronting that portion.
2S
Q. The presumed--I'm sorry. rro not
detennine what their infrastructure needs would be?
Page 63
Page 6S

would build their own building and then you build the
2 smaller ones, or the major tenant·· or you would build
3 both the major building and the smaller buildings.
4 Which method is being used for tlris property?
s
A. Those are only detennined at the time
6 · leases or purchase and sale agreements are negotiated
7 and signed.
8
Q. Are there any negotiated leases?
9
A. Not at this time, to my knowledge.
lO
Q. Are there any negotiated purchase and sale
l l agreements?
12
A. To my knowledge, no.
13
Q. Who would have knowledge?
14
A. Alan Johnson would have knowledge.
1s
Q. So is it fair to say, without the purchase
16 and sale agreements or these leasing agreements, that
l 7 you don't know what requirements these tenants would
18 have?
19

1

l

l
l

As they serve specific tenants. In
general, for a retail development, the infrastructure
needs are defined As they would branch off to serve
individuaJ tenants, that's yet to be defined.
Q. I see. So·· and correct me if I'm wrong.
My understanding, then, is that certain categories of
tenants or certain classes of tenants, whatever you want
to call them, each of them will have a general
infrastructure need and you'll be able to figure those
out without knowing the specific tenant. Did that make
sense or did I totally mangle that question?
A. Only generally.
Q, So let me ask this question, then. What
general tenants is the property .,. strike that. What
general types of tenants is the infrastructlll'e currently
on the property able to support'?
A. there is no CUJTent iofrasll'lloture on the
A.

14
15
16
17
18 property,

19
2o
21
22
23

l

2
3
4

s
6

7

a
9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
l7

18

Q. All right. Moving down on page 9, it
says, "Further, that the land use development potential
is now limited due to the splitting of the prime
commercial site by the taking." What do you mean by the
splitting of the prime commercial site?
24
A. By the path or routing that the freeway
2 s takes as it traverses our site, it ttlc.es the prime - we

19
2o
21

22
23
24

2s

i
following. You said the presumed access off9S?
l
A. Right There is no defined -· there are
,
no defined approaohes off of Old 95 at this 'POin.t. It
i
is unimproved roadway edge, So the access at this point 1
for properties fronting 95 is where people enter and
\
exit. So it's not defined.
1
Q. . So you're not aware of any •• I think
1
welve been over this before, and I don't want to repeat !
myself, but you're not aware of any deeds or permits
that allow access off of the Old Highway 95 in the
!
before condition?
1
A No deeded accesses, rm not aware.
!
Q. But you're saying you do have access,
l'
though?
:
A Presumptive access, in 111.y opinion.
Q. What do you base that opinion on?
A. The fact that there is no defined roadway
edge that limits the access.
Q. When you -- the ptoperty was l)\ll'Chased in
May of 2008. Is that comet?
A. I believe so.
Q. When it was purc!wed, were you aware 1:bat
ITD had a J)roject that would impact the property'?
:
A.
Yes, !said that.
t
Q. All right. Let's go to the next page,
1'
"'··------J

!

--....Ji,,
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-
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Page 74
l

A.

2

Q.

3

A.

4
Q.
s us?
6
A.
7
Q.

a
.9
10
11
12
13
14

1s
16
1?

A.

Q.

Sure.
Thank you.
I apologize. I thought I brought it.
Can you •• how soon can you get that to

2o
21

22
23
24
25

1

Southern California.
Is that where Hughes Development is

located?

2

Q. But to your knowledge, everything else has
been produced in discovery?
4
A. That's my understanding.
5
Q. What about your documents from the general

3

e
9
10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.
A.

What city?
Newport Beach.

12
13

MS. YORK: Doug, can you coordinate getting that 14
for us?
15
MR. MARFICE:

notbeen.

6 contractors?
7
A. There really has been no documentation

As soon as I get back to the office.
And where's the office?

Yes.

16

17

(Off the record.)

18 BYMR. TOLLEFSON:
19

Page

18

Q. So what documents did CLC provide you?
A. They provided the ALTA swvey. They
provided site plan alternatives in CAD, and some
supporting documents for our application to Kootenai
County for the rezone.
Q. How many different alternatives did they
provide?

19

2O
21
22

23
24
25

from general contractors.
Q. Other than that e-mail we were just
djscussing?
A. CoJl'ect.
Q. Okay. Moving on down to the next bullet
point, "Land use entitlementS processing." It says you
worked closely with consultants and Kootenai County to ,
process the rezone. When you say "consultants," to whom,
are you referring?
'
A. CLC Associates as architects and
engineers.
Q. Any other consultants?
A. Not for the rezone.
Q. And can you tell me what your involvement
was in the rezoning process?
A.
I worked with CLC Associates to complete
and submit the application. I met with and coordinated
with the city planner during the processing. I attended

Page 75
1

2
3
4

5
6
7
a
.9

1O
11

12

13
14

15
1G
17
18
19
20

21
22

23

24
2s

I can't recall exactly. Four or five.
Do you recall when?
A.
It was over a period of time between 2008
and 2010, I guess. I don't know exactly.
Q. Have all the documents that you received
from CLC Consultants been produced?
A. I believe so.
Q. What about the environmental consultant,

Page 77

A.

1

Q.

2

Intennountain7
A.
No$ that's 'the traffic consultant.
Q. I'm sorry. I apologize. Intermountain
Traffic. Have all the documents been produced that they
provided to you?
A.
I believe so. I believe so.
Q. Andwbat about LFR, the environmental
consultants?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Are they in the orange file?
A. No, I believe they would be in what was
previously provided with discovery.
Q. And what about the Coleman Engineering
documents? Have those all been provided previously in
discovery?
A. I believe so, but I c:an't be certain.
Certainly the more recent documents in the folder have
,1., ,., _,. ....

--· -

--~---

3
4

5
6
7

B
9

10
11
12

13
14

15
1G
17
18
l9
2o

21
22
23

24
2S

and made a presentation at the hearing examiner's
bearing, and also at the Board of Commissioners'
subsequent hearing.
Q.
And what was the purpose of your
applic:ation?
A.
It was for rezone to commerciai use.
Q. And why did you want it rezoned to
commercial use?
A. Because Hughes Investments is a commercial
developer.
Q. Does the property need to be commercially
zoned before you can develop on it?
A. Yes. It was previously zoned agricuJrural
residentia~ something like that. I don't recall the
exact zoning that it was previously.
Q. And with the agricultural zoning, would
you have been able to build your development?
A. That would not have supported a retail
c:ommerciat development that we were hoping to cle\,elop.
Q. If it was zoned agricultural -- strike
that. In its zoning priot to its commerc:ial zoiring,
what, if anything, could you have developed on that
piece of property?
A. I don't know exactly. Low density,
farming, residential uses. We dicln't investigate that
;:
It

,, •• ~ , - - - -
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16

because that's not our business.
(Exhibit 1S was marked.)
BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
Q.
I'm handing you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit 15. If you could just take a moment
to look at that. lf you'd take a moment and look at the
second page, please. The second page is Bates numbered
ITO·HJGRATHOL S1, and on top of it the document says,
11 Zone Change Application, 11 and there appears to be a
signature there at the bottom that says - dated May 30,
2008. Is that your signature?
A.
Yes.
Q. And what is this document?
, A. This is the application to Kootenai County
to rezone the property.
Q. And was this application filled out by
1

l 7 you?

18
19

2o
21

22
23

24
2s

A.

It was.

1

A.

2

Q.

:3
4

s
6

7
B
9

1o
1J.

12
13
14

15
l6
17

18

I'd like you now to tum to - I believe
it's Exhibit A3, Bai:es No. ITO-HJORATHOL 54. And at the
top oftbe page it says, "Zone Change Application Hughes
Investments." Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And. then narrative responses. What is
this docUil'lent?
Q.

l

Page so

Pag-e 78

19

2o
21
22
23

24

2s

j

That wasn't the main reason.
What in paragraph 2 was the main reason?

i

A. The main reason is the location at the .
f
intersection of US-9S and 54. The fact that the freeway
was going to be rerouted through the project was not the
reason that we asked for the rezone.
Q. What was the reason you asked foT the
rezone?
A. Its location at the intersection ofUS-95
and 54 made it a good commercial property.
Q. But it appears from paragraph 2 here that
you were aware that 1-9S was going to c.ross the Grathol
property, was going to be realigned to cross the Grathol
property?
l
A.
That's correct
Q. What plans did you have to accommodate the
utilities at this time?
A, Clarify that question.
1
Q. Fair enough. You had earlier testified
that you talked to two general contractors about the
expenses and costs it would take to get the utilities
from one section of your parcel through the ITD's
right-of-way to your other section of the parcel. At
1
the time that this zone change application was filled
out, what was your plan for that utility line?

i

I
l
J'.

1-------------------1------------,.__-----=--------1
Pag-e 79
Page Bl
l
A. The zone change application has categories
2 of standard questions that need to be answered as part
3 of the application that the county requires to show what
4 the applicant is justifying as support for his
5 application.
6
Q. And did you fill out this application?
A. Yes.
7
a
Q. If you'd talce a moment and read paragraph
9 No. 2. Was this paragraph No. 2 -- was that true and
1o accurate to the best of your knowledge at the time it
11 was filled out?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. And ifl understand paragraph No. 2, it
14 says that I-9S is soon to begin improvement to full
1s freeway status and be realigned across this property
16 providing on and off.ramps at the Highway 54
l 7 intersection. Do you see that?
18
A. I do.
19
Q. Was the infonnation contained in paragraph
2 o 2 -- was that the basis for why you wanted this
21 property-· or excuse me·· the basis you gave to
22 Kootenai County to have this property rezoned
2.3 commercial?
24
A. No.
25
Q. These are not the reasons?
I.to', .... ·---

..... .,. __ .,. -

.., __

l
2

3
4

S
G
7

s
9
l0
ll
12
13

14

is
lG
l7
1s

19
2o
21
22
23

24
25

A. At the time of this application, it was
our belief that, as part of the taking and construction
of the freeway, that ITD would cooperate with us and
l
provide for those means of utility crossings.
Q.
And what do you base that on?
1
A. That we felt ITO was going to be a
i
cooperative party since they needed our property and we j
needed to develop our property.
l
Q. Do you have any documents or
correspondence which show that ITO would provide you ;
with these utility lines?
l
A. No. We had no discussionsat that time.
,
1
Q. You had had no discussions with ITO, but
yet you believed that they would provide these utility
I
Unes?
A. That was our belief. Mayr clarify
1
something?
·j
Q, Of course.
A. It may not have been that we assumed they
would install the lines, but that they would allow us to
ins1all the lines before they built the freeway.
Q. And again, what was that assumptioo based
upon?
,
A. The fact that they needed our property and
I
we were proceeding with development of the property. We

!

I

I

I

_ _, , 1 - ~ o ( l , l " O I ' ~ - -
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Page 86

1
Q. If you're not hotel developers, why did
2 you propose A-Sa that proposed a hotel?
3
A. Because the site is appropriately -- an
4 appropriate location and use for potential hotel
5 development.
Q, Did you have any intention of pursuing the
6
i hotel hospitality proposed development on A-Sa?
8
A. I can't answer that
9
Q. How come?
10
That's not my decision.
A.
11
Q. Whose decision would that be?
12
A. That would be Alan Johnson and Bill
13 Hughes' decision.
14
Q. I'd like to draw you your attention -- on
15 both of these documents A-8a and A-Sb, they both have a
16 Sylvan Road running through the middle of them. Do you
17 see that?
18
A. Ido.
19
Q. Did you draw that Sylvan Road on these
20 documents?
21
I drew these documents.
A.
22
Q. And why did you put Sylvan Road in this
23 configuration?
24
A. That was the input we bad received from
25 ITO as to how a frontage road was going to be provided,

Page 88 ·:
1

Q.

And do you recall the date of those

2 documents?
A. No, I do not recall the date of those
4 documents,
5
Q, Did you have those documents in your
6 p.ossession before o~ after the property was purchased?
7
A. Before,
a
Q. And you were aware that those weren't
9 final plans?
10
A. That's correct
11
Q. Why was •• to your understanding, could
12 this site have been developed without Sylvan Road?
13
A. Certainly. We didn't need Sylvan Road.
14
Q, How come?
15
A.
It doesn't provide any benefit to our
16 property. It's a frontage road for people who own
17 property to the north to get to Highway 54 once 95
18 removes any access they had from its frontage.
19
Q. You said a minute ago that it was your
20 understanding at the time the property was purchased
21 that some of the construction wouldn't be completed
22 until 2020. Was that correct?
23
A. Based on the first initial meeting with
24 ITD, that was what their estimate to us was, that the
25 ultimate freeway improvements would not be completed
3

3

A.

Plaos we had received from ITD for what's

4 called, I believe, the Athol brown alternative, which
s was the preferred a)temative, showed in blue on one of
6 those aerial photograph exhibits. A frontage road in
7

approximately this configuration.

12
13
14
lS
16
17
18
19
20
21

ITD, in Febl'llalY of that year. And the timeline for
construction of the freeway was told as this plan
indicates that 1-95 was going to be developed as a
four-Jane at-grade signalized int:exsections between 2009
and 2011, and then the ultimate full freeway would be
developed with grade separation at Highway 54, and it
was our w,,derstanding that Highway 54 would be depressed
llnder an at-grade freeway and that that development
would occur by about 2020.
Q. Okay. And what did you base these
assumptions on of how the project was going t.o be

22
23 constructed?
24

A.
The Athol brown documents that we received
from ITO.

j

!

l
iI

I
'
I

I
'
'
'

i

II

I

I
t

l
I

i

I
I

!
I

!
I
!
I

'I

!
i

I
1
I

1 until that time.
Q, But however, Hughes Investments still
2
3 purchased the property?

4
5

6
7

Q, Did you know if·· did you know when that
8
9 Sylvan Road was going to be oonstructed?
10
A. At this point that this was drawn, there
ll had only been one meeting, preliminary meeting. w.ith

I

Page 89 :

Page 87
l
Q, And when you say "was going to be
2 provided," provided by whom?

I
i

8

9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

That's correct.
I'd just draw your attention real quick to
A· 1. It's on Bates No, 458. I believe it's another
copy of the zone change application that you signed. Do
you see that?
A. Yes,
Q. The date on that is May 30, 2008. Is that
correct?
A.
That's correct.
Q, Do you recall when this property was
purchased?
A. I believe it was May 2008, but I don't
know the e;<a.ct date.
(Exhibit 17 was marked.)
BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
Q. Handing you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No. 17, on this first page, it has a
warranty deed dated May 22, 2008. And then if you flip
back seve..ral pa.:,oes to Bates No. 737, there is a.11other
warranty deed dated October 15, 2009. Do you see those?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen these documents before?

Q.

. .25. ..-.-..-.-.----.----.-.-.-.-,____-.-..-.-..----------------·----.-.-......i----,-.. . __________________
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A.

Probably.
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s
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Page 92
1

2
Q.
I want to draw your attention to the first
3 page, Bates No. 793. It says1 "For value received,

North Alpine Development"·· I'll paraphrase -- "North
Alpine Development sells and conveys unto Gracal
Corporation." Do you see that paragraph?
A. Yes.
Q.
And again, I apologize. How do you
pronounce A. Gracal.
Q. Gracal. Is it your unclerstandingthat
this was the warranty deed which transferred the
interest from North Alpine Development to Gracal
Coiporation?
A. That would be my understanding.
Q. And the date is May 22, 2008. And how
does Gracal Coiporation figure into the Hughes
Development/HJ Grathol structure?
A. GracaJ •• I can't answer that clearly. I
know Grac:al is an entity of Hughes Investments, but I
don't know the details.
Q. But it's fair to say that Hughes
Investments through Gracal purchased the property on May
22 of 2008?
A. Correct

July 2, 2008, Planner Donald Davis stated that the

2 Higbway 9S improve.men~ in 'the area are currently in the
3 design phase so the exact footprint of the new alignment
4

S
6
7

8
9
10

11
12
13

14
ls
16
17
18
19
2o
21

.2 2

23
24
25

has not yet been determined 11 Do you see that sentence?
A. I do.
Q. Does that accurately reflect your
understanding of the situation as it existed at this
time?
A. Yes.
Q. l'dlikctomovedowntothenext
paragraph, also in section2.12, and it start9, "In a
letter dated July 28, 2008. Litkes Highway District
.Engineer Eric Shanley stated that the developer ofthis
project should be ieq_uited to dedicat.e sufficient
right--of-way for the focal :frontage roads as defined by
the Highway 9S project. fl Do you see that?
A I do.
Q. Does that accurately reflect your
Ubderstanding of the situation as it existed at the time
this cloc~ent was created?
A. That.reflects Lakes Highway District's
desire.
Q. And did you not believe that developers of
the product should be required to dedicate sufficient
right-of.way for the local :frontage roads?

Page 91
1
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25
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Q.
And then that property was subsequently
transferred to HJ Grathol on or about October 15, 2009.
Does that seem accurate to you?
A. I guess.
Q. Fair enough. So just ifl understand this
correctly, the warranty deed is dated May 22, 2008 and
the zone change application was dated May 30, 2008. Is
it fair to assume that prior to purchase ofthe property
that you had already started to work on the documents
and infonnation necessary to create the zone change
application?
A. That would be correct.
Q. Do you recall when you started working on
the zone change application?
A. I don't recall-when we started working on
the actual application, but it was between March and
May.
Q, Before the property was purchased?
A. Yes.
Q, I'd like you asain to stay on this Exhibit
No. 16. And I'd like t.o draw your attention to this
page 2 of 6, Bates No. 4S3. And on s~tion 2.12 whioh
says "Aooess," do you see that paragraph?
A. Yes,
Q. And it says here, ''In an e~mailreceived
•••-lelt ...,.,

___ , __ _,,__
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A. We didn't believe that was our
responsibility, but the application. it's my
understanding •• and it proved to be true •• this
application was not the venue for conditions of approval j.·
such as that.
j
Q. What would be the venue for conditions of
j
approval?
1
A. I don't know.
Q. So when you say ''conditions of approval,"
,
conditions of approval to build your project. Is that
'j
cor.rect?
I
A, Entitlement or discretionary action
/
procedures often come with conditions attached that are j
the basis for the approval of the project.
I
Q, So in order to build the proj~ as you
wanted to see it developed, do you know what conditions
would be placed upon that project?
A.
Are you talking about this specific
I
project?
,
Q. rm talking about the project that HJ
:
Grathol or Hughes Investments intends on developing on I
this property?
A. We're not aware that any conditions of
approval will be levied on the project. We received the
rezone, and our next aoplication we arenotaware would .

j
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be subject to conditions of approval.
Q, And what would that next application
It's called a Special Use Permit.
Q. And what entity would YC?U send that
Special Use Permitto?
A.

A.

Page 9G

1
2
3
4

consist ofl

5
6
7

Kootenai County.

And Kootenai County, could they impose
'COijditions?
A. I'm not familiar enough with the Special
Use Permitprocessto know that.
Q. ls it possible that they could impose
conditions?
A.
I suppose it's ,possible.
Q, Is itpoS'siblethattheycouldimposetbe
C!)nditions requested by Lakes Highway District?
A. I don'.t Jmow that, but I suppose it m,ig,bt
be possible.
.
..
Q. Have you had any contact with Kootenai
County about any Special Use Permits or any permits to
finish your development?
A, We have had discussions and meetings with
Kootenai County about movn,g forward with that
application, yes.
Q. And wh~n were those discussions held?
Page 95
Q.

P. 18/48
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16 times.
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Q,
A.

19
2o
21
22

Q.

And who was your engineer?

'

Intermountain Transportation Resources.
Do you know who at Intermountain
Transportation Resources met with ITD?
A. It was either Bill White or his partner.
Q.
So ifl understand this correctly,
2 3 Intermountain Transportation Resources, either Bill
24 White or his partner, came back and said that you
2 s couldn't move through the Special Use Permit until ITD }
Page 97

A. Probably 2009 when they started. I can't
2 give you the exact dates. I don't know for sore.
3
Q. And who did you have those conversations

had commented on your transportation plan, but ITO
2 wouldn't do it until you actually filed the claim? I'm
3 trying to understand where ••

4 with?
A
6
Q.

s

l

s
7

A.

B

Q.

9 place?
1O
A.

In the offices in the Kootenai County
11 Planning Department.
l2
Q. And generally, do you remember when?
13
A. Like I said, I don't remember when. We
14 bad more than one meeting over a period of time, and I
:L! don't know when those were.
16
Q. And what were disQ:issed at 1hese meetings?
l?
A.
The ~ussion centered around what would
18 be necessary to proceed with the formal development and
19 construction ofour project.
2o
Q, And did the Kootenai County Planner·· did
21 they tell you what was going to be needed?
22
23

A.

They told us a Special Use Permit would

need to be processed.
24
Q, Have you created a Special Use Pennit?
25
A. We started the process.
.. ~.i.,.-w.,;.,.,,

1

4

Kootenai County Planner.
And who is that?
I don't recall his name.
Do you recall where these discussions took

·-·--·

-·--

-

.
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A.
Q.

~

l

ru clarify it as best as I can.
Thanks.

A. We couldn'tsubmit the Special Use Penn it
1
application until the TIA, transportation investigation
1
analysis, had been completed, which would be part of the 1
application. We could not complete the report, because
IID would not go further on commenting without us having
an application on file such that the county sent it to
them to comment on.
Q. I see. So the county •• what other steps
did you take to create this Special Use Pennit?
A. That was the first major step. The rest
of it is merely an application fonn and providing site
plans that we already had.
Q. Did you fill out any applications?
A. No. The application completion proce,s is
jUit before submitta~ and we didn't get to that point.
Q. What required ITD's comments on your
transportation study I your TIA. Exeu3e me?
A. Pardon me?
l
Q. What required ITD's input on the TIA?
1
A. We needed their input relative to the
I

w\ __....._..,... ....... . , . _ _ _
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How far along in the process did you get?
The process requires the subroiltal of a
transportation investigation analysis. We hired
'·
lntennountain Transportation Resources to prepare that.
We only got so far before ITD essentially stopped the
process because they said they could not comment on our
report until an application had been submitted So we
were kind of in a Murphy's law situation.
Q, And when was this - when did ITO
essentially put a halt to it?
A. I don't recall. ru say 20101 but I
don't know for sure.
Q. Do you recall any communications or
conversations you bad with ITD to that effect?
A. Our engineer bad met with them a couple of 1
Q,
A.
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design of our project, the traffic counts, locations of
access points, et cetera.
Q. So you say that you needed their input
Was this a requirement from Kootenai County that you
have ITD's input?
A. It was our consultant's input that be
could not complete the report accurately until he had
certain information from IID.
Q. So Intermountain Transportation, either
Bitl White or his partner, they said they couldn't
complete their study until they had gotten input from
ITO?
A.
Correct.
MR. MARFICE: Do you need a break?
THE WITNESS: I'm good.
MR. MARFICE: Okay.
MR. TOLLEFSON: Doug, my plan is as soon as rm
done with this document, take lunch. Does that work for
you?
MR.MARFICE: Okay.
BY MR. TOLLEFSON;
Q. All right. Still on page 453, let's move
up one section. It says, "2.11, Water and Sewage
Disposal." Do you see that paragraph?
A.

Yes.
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that that Special Use Permit you were talking about?
A. Yes. I told you it was something
different. Special Notice, not Special Use. I'm sorry.
I misspoke, It's Special Notice Permit.
Q, So that's the permit that we were talking
abou:t previously?
A. Itis.
Q. And you doti't know what conditions could
be placed on that Special Notice Permit'?
A. No.
Q. What is your understanding of the reasons
why Kootenai County approved the rezone application?
A. They agreed with our application that they
felt it was an appropriate use of the property.
Q. On what basis?
A. Based on the staff analysis presented in
their staff report.
Q.
And that's the one we were just looking at
on page 5 of 6?
A. Itis.
Q. What reasons did the Kootenai County give
for approving your application?
A. They would be stated in this document
Q. Do you have any independent knowledge of
why they approved your application?

Page 99
Q. And it says there, "Water service and
2 sewage disposal have not been specifically addressed in
3 this application." Is that accurate?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. I'd like to now twn to page S of 6. It's
6 Bates No. 456. Do you see that? Are you there yet?
7
A. 456?
s
Q, Yes.
9
A. Yes.
10
Q, Okay. Thank you. Here in the first
ll paragraph, it says, "The Lakes Highway District and the
12 Idaho Transportation Department are concerned with
13 accesses to any future development'' Do you see that
14 sentence?
1S
A.
I see it.
16
Q. Do you know what was meant by that
1 7 sentence?
18
A. I believe, relative to Lakes Highway
19 District, it was reflecting their concern about the
2O requirement that the county •• the request that the
21 requirement for dedication of right-of-way be placed
1

22
23
24

uponus.

The next sentence or down here in the same
paragraph, it says, "Furthermore, if this request is
2 s approved, Sp~ial Notice Permits will be required." Is
Q.

· - - · " " ' " ~ · - ..... _ _ ,. _ _
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A. Nothing other than what was shown in the
staff report and the hearing examiner's approval.
Q. So anything that •• so to the best of your
knowledge, any reasons for why Kootenai County approved j
your application, they would be contained in the
1
Kootenai County documents?
1
A. My understanding they would have to be.
MR. TOLLEFSON: Well, I don't think I have any
further questions before lunch, so it's a good stopping
point before I get another document out.
MR. MARFICB: Sure. What's your estimation for
time this afternoon?
MR. TOLLEFSON: We're making progress actually, so
a couple hours.
MR. MARFICE: Okay. I need to be done by 4:30.
MR. TOLLEFSON: That should be okay. Depending.
We're not talcing like a really long Junch, are we?
MR. MARFICE: An hour? Is that enough?
MR. TOLLEFSON: That should be fine. No, I should
be done by 4:30. Ii'II be close, but we can make this
work.
MR. MARFICE; Okay, Tha11.k you.
MR. TOLLEFSON: Off the record.
I
i
(Whereupon, the luncheon recess was taken
I
at 12:10 p.m., resuming at 1:15 p.m.)
I
,.. ___ ,,, .... ..,_
.
I
...................
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the type that would be of value for them to mine as base
to save them money?" Do you see that e-mail?
A.
I do.
Q. What were you talking about in tenns of
value of them to mine as base to save them money? Wha1
were you ta~ng about there?
A. We felt, from information that we had
about the prop~ out there, that there was significant
amount of gtavel contained in the soil and that there
may be a value to ITO in mining that for base rock for
the freeway construeti~ as opposed to purchasing it
some~ere-el~ and tracking it to the site.
Q. And you said you had infonnation that
there was gravel. Where did you get that information?
A. Our geotechnical consultant told us that
that area was known for its gravelly soils.
Q. And when you say "geotechnical
consultant," do you mean Allwest Testing and
Engineering?
A
Ido.
Q. And did they ever perform a report for you
or give you a summary of their findings?
A.
I don't remember a report.
Q. Do you recall them giving you any
documents that support that conclusion that there was

2
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some value in the gravel?
A.
No. No documents that would support that
They were based on conversations, and based on those
conversations I contacted a local contractor to find out
what base is worth, the value of base, and purchasing it
versus mining it.
Q. And what local contractor did you contact'?
A. Unless it's written here, I don't recaU
the name of the contractor, but it was a company in
Rathdrum whose name I was given that was one of the main
providers of base material in the area.
Q. Okay. On page 2, Bates No. 6, it appears
to be an e-mail dated April 7, 2010 from Andy Eliason.
Am I saying that correctly?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay. To you. Jn this he says, "The
unknown"·· this is third sentence •• "The unknown is
the quality ofthe gravel and cobbles they encountered.
If you encountered lightweight, porous rock, it could
still meet the physic.al classification as gravel but not
have much work as a structural fill.'' Do you see that
senten..ce?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Mr. Eliason ever give you a report
that said that the gravel on the property could be used
--'-~·-·"'··-·'· .......

-

f
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as structural fill?
A. I don't believe he did.
Q. Did Mr. Eliason or anyone from Allwest
Testing and Engineering tell you that there was gravel
such on the property that ITO could use?
A. As I previously said, based on the
characteristics of the soil in the area, that we were
told there was gravel on the site.
Q. And who told you that there was gravel on
the site?
A. The geotechnfoal consultant, Allwest, Andy
Eliason.
Q.
And did the Allwest Testing and
Engineering •• did they tell you that that type of
gravel Wa.5 the type that ITO could use?
A. They had not tested that type of gravel,
so they weren't aware. That's why they wrote this
e-mail.
Q, Okay. So back to the first page, then,
-j
page 5. It appears to be an ewmail at the bottom. It's
from you, appears to be to Alan Johnson and Bill Hughes
dated April 8, 2010. It says, "Follow up to his
voicemail." Do you know who "bis" voicemail would be?
A. By the way the e-mail is written, I would
guess it was Andy Eliason's voicemail.
1
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Q. And you then write, "My bet would be that
ITD will have their engineer do a separate test on the
gravel material and report subsequent to the one that
they 'share' with us, so as not to play their hand."
Why did you put "share" in quotes?
A.
It was my opinion that any geotechnicat
report we would receive from ITD would not have any
information on testing the gravel or its quality to
reuse as base.
Q. And why wouldn't it?
j
A. Because if there was value in using the
:
gravel as base, they perhaps, in my opinion, would not •
want us to know about it.
j
Q. All right. The next e-mail up, it says
I
from Bill Hughes to you, and it says, ''How valuable is
the gravel, presuming it is the right kind?" Do you
know what Mr. Hughes meant by the "presuming it is the
right kind''?
A. He had read the e-mail string to date, and
based on what Andy had said about the quality of one
gravel versus another, there would have been a right
kind and a wrons kind, a.T}d Bil! ,va.s curious to know if iI
the gravel was the kind that could be reused, what value ]1
it might provide.

l

i
I

Q.

so,!~-~~-~.:~.-~! at the t i ~ :
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Q. It says, "Approved for two hotels,
restaurant, fast food, gas." What does that mean?
A. The project is approved as what is called
a master plan resort in conjunction with Cabela's rettil
development in Post Falls, and we have processed it for
a hospitality element of a master planned resort.
Q. And I think we had already discussed you
weren't aware of any•• or you wouldn't know if there
were leases or tenants in this development?
A. I do not know the status of the marketing
of that site.
Q. Next one down it says, "Spokane Street:
Spokane Street and 1-90, Post Falls, Idaho." Are you
familiar with this project'?
A.
I am familiar with that project.
Q. It says, "Escrow terminated due to lack of
tenant demand." Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So "escrow tenninated" what does that
mean?
A. We were jn an agreement to purchase some
property in Post Falls. I had done some plans. Alan
had talked with and marketed to various tenants. But
due to the economy, tenant interest was not forthcoming
and we dropped the project and did not continue to buy
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in touch with the property owner.
Q. On the next line down it says, ''The
J
Crossings (CDA, ID, Appleway/Northwest Boulevard.)" Is j
that a location here in Coeur d'Alene?
·1
A
Yes.
j
Q. Are you familiar with this project?
l
A. I'm sure I am. I just can't place which
one it is right now. The Crossings. Oh. Yes. I'm
~

l

13 to build their project. They graded it. I'm not sure
14 of the exact size, but it's·· I'm guessing between 20
15 and 30 acres.
15
Q. It says, ''Negotiations terminated." Do
l 7 you know what that means?

l8

A
Q.

lSl
20
21
22
23
24

I'm not certain what that means.
Does that mean that p,oject is not going

foJWard?
A. l don't know that that's what that means.
You'd have to ask Alan.
Q. And the next one down is ''Riverstone."
And it looks like also in Coeur d'Alene, and Hughes is
2s under contract to buy a one-acre pad site in the
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Do you know how big that property was?

A. Approximately four acres, but I'm not sure
of the exact size.
Q. Next one down says, "Plaza Coeur d'Alene
(CDA, ID.)" Is it "9S/Agua"?
A. Yes.
Q. What does that mean?
A. That's Highway 9S and Aqua Road in Coeur
d'Alene.
Q. All right. And are you familiar with this
project?
A. I am.
Q. It says, "Proposed project." What is the
proposed project?
A.
We have been working on that for years,
have done several site plans, have talked to several
tenants; but again, because of the economy, no tenants
have committed to the site yet, so we are still in the
mix for that, but we don't have .. it's a proposed
project. We don't have any deals pending and we are
not, as far as! know, in escrow.
Q, And it appears that Hughes Investments
does not own that property?
A. No, we do not. We keep an •• Alan keeps

2
3

Riverstone Center. Are you familiar with this project?
A. I am.
Q. And it appears that someone else bought

4

it?

s

18

A. Correct.
MR. TOLLEFSON: Here's what I propose to do, Doug,
if we can take like a five-minute break, and I'm going
to go through my notes and make sure I've covered
everything, and ifit is, we'll call it a day.
MR. MARF'ICB: Okay. Good.
(Recess taken.)
BY MR. TOLLEFSON:
Q. Priorto Hughes Investments purchasing the
property, what was your involvement wjth the •• did you
participate in any af tbe mvesusation prior to
pu~a.sing the property?
A. Between.Februaey of'08 and May of '08
when we purchased the property, I did the site plan

1

.19

studies.

6
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8
SJ
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J

J
,
J

I

j
,
ij

I
I
!'

,
J

1

20
Q. Were you aware if Hughes Investments or
21 any other entity had any apprailats done on the

property?
A. Other than what was done froi:n Scott Auble,
no.
2s
Q. Do you know what Scott Auble did?
22
2~
:24
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Q.

j

9 familiar with that.
Q. How big was that project?
ll
A
If it's the site -- I think it's the site
12 where Wince Foods is supposed to go, but they have yet
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRXCT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO

)

TRANSPORTATION BO.ARO,

)
)

:E>laintiff,

Case No. CVl0-10095

)
)

vs.

)
)

HJ GRATHOL, a California)
general partnership;
)
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a)

Washington corporation;
and DOES l chrough s,

)

__________

)
)

Defend.ants. ))

DE:E>OSITION OF DEWITT M.

11

SKIP" SHERWOOD

TAKEN ON aEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF

AT 816 SHERMAN AVENT.TE, COEUR D'ALEN'S, IDAHO
NOVEMaER 16, 2011, AT 9:30 A.M,

REPORTED BY:
JULIE MCCAUGHAN,

Notary Public

c.s.R.

NO. 684

.................
www.mmcourt.com SHERWOOD, DEWITT M. SKIP

t

:ow

u ..

444 of 1617

11-16-2011

JAN. 6. 2012 3:41PM

NO. 3877

P. 24/48

Page 2
APPEARANCES

l

Page 4
l

2

3 MARY V. YORK. Attorney at Law, of the furn of HOLLAND &
HART, Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza, Boise, Idaho
4 83701-2527, appearing for and on bchalfoflhe
Plaintiff.
5

taken on behnlfof'the PLAINTIFF, on NOVEMBER 16., 2011,

3

at the

4

5

6

J, TIM THOMAS, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho
6 Transportation Department, Post Office Box 7129, Boise,

7

Idaho 83707-1129, appearing for and on bcholf ohhe
7 Plaintiff.
8 DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, Attorney at Law, of the finn of
RAMSDBN & LYONS, 700 Northwest Boulevard, Post Offi«:
9 Box 1336, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336, appearing for
and on behalf of Defendant HJ Grathol.

8

10

9

10

n
12

Also Present

13

11 STANLEYMOE

14

ALAN JOHNSON

15

12 JASON MINZGHOR

16

13

14
15

THE DEPOSITION OF DEWITT M. "SKIP'' SHERWOOD, ws

2

l7

offices ofM & M COURT REPORTING, 816 SHERMAN
AVENUE, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, before M & M CoW't
Reporting Seivices, Inc., by JULIE MCCAUGHAN, Court
Reporter and Notary Public within end for the State of
Idaho, to be used in an action pending in the District
Court of the First Judicial District for the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, said cause
being Case No. CV10· 1009S in said Court.
AND THEREUPON, the following testimony was
adduced, to wit:
(Exhibit 2 was marked.)
DEWITTM ''SKIP" SHERWOOD,
having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said
cause, dep0ses and says:

18
EXAMINATlON
19 QUESTIONS BY MS. YORK:
2o
Q. This is the time set for the deposition of
21 DeWitt M... Skip is the name you go by?
22
A. Yes.

16
17

10
19
20
21
22
23
24

23
24

25

25

Q. Sherwood. And it is November 16. aboul
9:40 a.m. And Mr. Sherwood, I am going to hand you
what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit 2. Have you

Page 3
INDEX

1

2 TESTIMONY OF DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHERWOOD
3 Examination by Ms. York
4
4

s DEPOSITlON EXHIBITS:
6 2

PAGE

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum for
Dewitt M, "Skip'' Sheiwood

4

7

3 Appraisal

47

Aerial Photograph with Overlay

167

9

S Concept Site Plans Bates Stamped.
105
000039 and 000038
169
6 Warranty Deed
12 7 Comps for Kootenai County
219
Approximate Values and Sizes
13
over the Past Pour Ycars
14 8 Land Sales Analysis Bo.tes $1Bmpcd
219
000385
10
11

:LS
:J.6
3.7
18
19

20
21
22

23
24
25
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seen this document before?
A. y es, I'--·
1m.ve.
Q. And I guess before we get to the document,
would you mind stlting yow- name and spelling your last
name for the record?
DeWitt M. Sherwood, D-e-w-i-t-t, middle
A.
initial M, S-b-e+w~o-d.
Q, And what is the address of your residence?
A. Bast 8916 Parkside Lane, Spokane, 99217.
Q. All right. In your deposition notice, it
is a Duces Tecum Notice, and you were requested,
pursuant to this notice, to bring with you to this
deposition a number of documents. Did you do that?
A Yes1 I did.
Q. What did you bring, if you could swnnuuize

lG formi?
17
A. It's what I would call my entire wOTking
18 file in this case. Notes, everything to date that rve
19 accomplished on it.

2o
21
22
23
24
25

Q, Is this the entire file?
A. Yes.
Q. ls there anything that you reHed upon in
this case that you did not bring?
A. There may be times that I have phone
conferences with somebody that could have been from a

2 (Pages 2 to 5)
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A. WeJl, typically, more often than not,
they're before-and-after valuations which is completely
different. Sometimes there are total takes, but •• so
you're viewing a property two ways versus one.
Q. Any other differences?
A.
Depending on the type of property, there
are lots of other considerations that go into a
condemnation appraisal than the typical appraisal.
Q. Like what?
A. If you're dealing with an improved
property, oftentimes it involves taking of anything from
landscaping to parking that would impact the remainder
of the property.
Q. Any other COJ1siderations other than the
type of property that's being taken how you value the
various improvements?
A. Each case is oftentimes specific to what's
being done, but they are definitely different than a
typical appraisal assignment.
Q. Any other differences other than different
considerations and the before-and-after approach to
valuation?
A. Oftentimes it might be a case that we have
a cost to cure which would be something different than a
typical appraisal.
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A.
Sure. Just to help me clarify,
Q. We're talking aboUt the condition in a
before-and-after appraisal report, what consideration do
you give to the improvements that are anticipated to be
constructed on the project?
A. Well, that's going to be what happens to
the properties, not the true before situation.
Q. Okay. So would it be fiur to say that
when you're looking at a property in the before
condition, you are to look at the property without any
consideration of the project that's to be built?
A. That's correct
Q. So to say it more concretely, with respect
to the Grathol property, there's going to be an
interchange constructed on the property. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So in the before condition, you look at
the property, assuming that that interchange is not
going to be constructed.
A. That is correct.
Q. And that's bow you would look at it in
its, as you stated i~ the true before condition?
A. Co,rect.
Q. In addition to assuming that the project's
not being construct~ when you're looking at a property

Page 39

l
2
3

4

s
6
7

a
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

l6
l7

18
19

20
21
22
23

24

2s

Any other differences?
A.
Those are the primary that come to mind.
Q. Severance damages?
A. Sometimes associated with damage to the
remafader, yes.
Q. Would you describe what is involved in
doing a before-and-after valuation?
A.
Well, a before-and-after is where there's
a taking and there's property left in the after.
Q. And what are the assumptions - start with
the before condition. What are the assumptions that you
are to take into account when looking at a property in
the before condition?
A.
In its true condition what it is in the
before situation.
Q. What does that mean in the before
situation?
A. It's prior to taking any of the property.
Q. What consideration do you give or not give
to the proposed project or improvement th.at is to be
constructed on the project when you're looking at a
property in the before condition?
A. I think I understand your question, but
maybeQ. Do I need to rephrase that?
Q.

P. 25/48
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in the before condition, do you also assume that it's
I
not intended to be constructed, so you're looking at the j
property as if it's not planned and it's never going to ;
be constructed?
j
A. Yes. The true before situation.
Q. I hadn't heard that tenn before, the true
,
before situation, but I like it. So the true before
'
situation is, assuming the project is not being built.
J
Correct?
j
I

·1

A.

i

Yes.

l1
Q. All right. When we tum to the Qfter
,
J
12 condition, what are the assumptions that you take into !'
13 accowtt when looking at the property in the after
1
1
14 condition?
15
A. Understanding what's being taken,
j
16 elevation changes, the access that the property has. a 1
17 true look at your best picture of what it will be in the
18 future when something is constructed.
1.9
Q. So you look at the property as if the
I

l

!

2o

21
22

23
24

25

I

project is completed and done?
A. Yes.
.
Q. As of what date?
A. When it gets completed.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, in this case, if we're building an
.1 ....................... ~~

_._ .. I
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:
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!
j
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1 interchange, we may have a map that shows us what's letl 1

Q.

2 over today, but the real after value occurs at the point
3 that that improvement is complete and it is what it is

A

4

in the after situation.

s

Q. . All right. So I appreciate that, but what
date are you looking at that? What dat~ are you valuing
itas of?
A.
In the report that I made jn this case, I
projected out into the future two different dates,
They're contained in that report that I Mote.
Q.
We'll turn to the actual date ofvalue.
So you're saying it's your testimony that in the after
consideration, you are to value the property as of the
anticipated completion date?
A. That's what I think is the relevant date.
It isn't just like we give you the property today and
we've got a remnant pi~e her.e, but there's no road, so
the piece that's left over might be out in the :field as
the property's still sitting there,
Q. So is your testimony that the after value
is to be valued as of the date that the project's to be
completed? Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And for the Grathol property, you valued
the property in the after condition as of the
Page 43

6
7

8

9

lo
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
2o

21
22

23
24
25

l
2

3
4
5
6

7
8
9

lo
ll
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20
21
22
23
.24

25

••••

-

• ~-.i......... __.. ·- .. ,v.-,.,

2
3

And that's your after value date of value?
Yes.
Is it your testimony that that date of

Q.
valuation is what's required by Idaho law?
5
A.
I don't know that any state would have a
6 law that specifically addresses that. If they do, I am
7 not aware ofit.
8
Q. So you're not aware ofldaho's law
4

anticipated completion date. Correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And what was that anticipated completion
date?
A. rd have to look in the report, and we can
go there, if you'd iike, at this point.
Q. We will go there in a second, but does it
sound right that you estimated about a year and a ha1f
to two years out?
A. That is my recollection, yes,
Q.
Okay. And just so I'm clear on the date,
you're estimating the after value as of one and a half
to two and a half years from the date of your appmsal.
Correct?
A. That is correct
Q. And the date ofyour appraisal is A!_!guSt
25,2011?
A. It was actually back in ...
..
Q. rm sorry. 2010. Excuse me.
A. 2010, yes.
Q.
Is that right? 2011.
A. I wwpleted that as of September 151 2010.
Q. Okay. Soitwouldbeayearandahalfto
two and a half years from September 15, 2010?
A. Co1Tect.

.__...

P. 26/48

•

governing date of valuation?
lo
A.
With regard to a specific date in an after
11 situation, no.
12
Q. When were you hired in this case?
9

A.

13

I would have said it would have probably

14 been early spring of 2010.
15
Q. Who hired you?
16
A. Mr. Marfice.
17
Q. And what were you asked to do?
18
A.
I think at the initial meeting, we met at
19 his office. I think he had a copy of Mr. Moe's
i
20 appraisal of the property. I think Mr. Johnson was at
21 that meeting. Just a brief discussion of the case in
!
2 2 general.
:
23
Q. And what were you asked to do?

l

24

2 s we

j

I think from the first meeting, basically
I think Mr. Johnson was auite famiHar with the

A.
wa

Page 45 J
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19
20

appraisal of the property. It was a first look to me,
but my recollection was to review and report back.
Q. Review what?
A. Just review - look at the appraisal of
the property, consult, give some ofmy opinions with
regard to the valuation.
Q. In early spring of 2010 when you were
hired, were you asked to do your own independent
appraisal?
A. Not atthattime.
Q.
When were you asked to do your own
independent appraisal?
A. That would have been probably a couple
months after that.
Q. So summer of 2010?
A. Roughly.
Q. When you were asked to do you, independent
appraisal of the Grathol property, had you already
reviewed Mr. Moe's appraisal?

A.

Y~-

i

i

I
:

!
i
j

,

II
,

i
1
i

,I

!
!

I

And had you already formulated your
22 opinio!'.s with respect to Ms appraisal.?
A. I don't know that I had -· there were
23
24 certainly some notes and things that we discussed,
25 strengths of the report, weaknesses of the report.

21

j

· Q.

--.:.--...A,--1-.,~......... .........
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(Recess taken.)
BYMS.YORK:
Q. We're back on the record now. Before the
quick break, we were mlking about at what point in time
you were going to be finalizing your appraisal report
And you indicated that you may be finalizing yow- report
and your opinions possibly up until a week before trial.
Is that accurate of what you stated?
A. I believe so.
Q. Okay. You testified earlier that the date
of value in this case in the before condition you stated
it was September of2010. Correct?
A,
For the date of my report?
Q. Yes.
A. When this was completed, yes.
Q. And then in the after condition, you
stated that the date of valuation was the completion
d~e of the project Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So with those date ofvaluations, how can
anything that happens after the date of valuation be
relevant to your opinions ofvalue?
A. Please ask that one more time just to
clarify.
Q, So what I wanted to do was pinpoint what
Page 67
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you use for your dates of value. And my question to you
2 is: How can anything that happens after the date of the
3 valuation with respect to the Grathol property affect or
4 change your value conclusions?

2
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4

s
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l
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A. Wel~ I believe I testified earlier that
it's my opinion that I'm viewing as after value when
this project is completed. So that we know is a moving
target on its actual completion date. So that could be
relevant to changing the way I analyze the property.
Q. So is your testimony that you use two
different dates of valuation in your before-and-after
analysis?
A.
Yes. My after value is predicated upon
the assumption of when that date is completed.
Q. You used two different valuation dates
between the before condition and the after condition.
Correet?
A.
That is correct.
Q. Is that in accordance with USPAP?
A. I don't know that USPAP has anything that
covers that situation.
Q. Is that in compJiance with Idaho !aw, as
fur as you're aware?
A. That, I do not know.

2:___ _.,~:.

j

:Page 68

l
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A. I do not.
l
Q. Can you tell me what your definition is
that you used in this case for market value?
A. It would be what I describe as the typical
market value definition with willing buyer, willing
seller, open market, neither party under undue stress,
both acting in their own best interest to procure a
piece of real estate that ultimately closes.
Q. And what is the source of that definition
that you've relied upon for market value?
A. That's an FDIC definition is my
recollection. A federal definition.
Q. And what is the definition that you use
for the tenn "just compensation"?
A. The difference in the before~and-afte,:
value.
Q. And what is the calculation or process
that you go through, in general terms, to arrive at a
'1ust compensation" figure?
A. You prepare your before valuation and your
after valuation, and the difference between the two
represents the compensation.
Q. And what is included generally in the
amount of just compensation?
MR. MARFICE: Bxcuse me. I want to interpose an
Page 69

objection. Are you asking for the witness' definition
of the legal term "just compensation'' or the term ·~ust
compensation" as it's used in the report?
MS. YORK: As he used it in his report.
MR. MARFICE: Okay. Is it used in the report?
MS. YORK: Well, I asked him how be what his
definition is for that term.
Q. Did you use that term in this report?
A. Did I use the term "jUSt compensation"? I
don't believe that I did. I think I reported a
before-and.after valuation.
Q. Okay. What is the goal or purpose of your
O&

report?

1

1
J

lj
I

1

I
!

A. To assist Mr. Martice in this case with my
15 opinion of the before-and-after value oftbis property
i
lG due to this condemnation.
'
l7
Q. Okay. And what is the end value that you
11
18 reached? What's the tenninology that you would use to
19 describe what your figure that you arrive at to
2 o detennine what the amount of compensation that is owed
21 in this oase to Grathols, to HJ Grathol?
22
A I'm sorry, That's a long question.
23
Q. Sure, !appreciate that. I'm just trying
24 to make sure that we're on the same Pllie, referring to

:~~-~~~~~-~.~~~~---~-~-~~~,,same tenninolo~.

I

J

!~~~~~~~ d_~o~~~ur
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end figure, the ultimate amount of compensation you
believe is owed in this case?
A. How would I describe it? It's the
difference between the before-and-after value.
Q, Okay, So that in the course of this
deposition, should e1tery time we refer to that number,
we should say it's the figure you arrived at that's the
difference between the before-and-after conclusion, or
can we say that that's your determination of value,
that's your detennination ofjust compensation? I don't
care what we call it.
A. If '1ust compensation'' is an easier word,
let's say that
Q. Okay. Fair enough. And just so we're
clear, that number that we're going to call "just
compensation" is your determination of the before value
minus the after value, and that's bow you reached that
end number that we're calling just cornpeasation?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. What, generally speakiog, goes into
or is included in that figure of just compensation? And
what I mean by that question •• typically it's the value
of the property being taken and any severance damages
that are caused to the remainder. Would you agree with
that?
Page 71
A.

Yes.

there's that discounting sum that's included in your
figure. Is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Is there any other severance damages?
A. Not at this point in time.
'
Q. Do you anticipate to include any other
severance damages?
A. There may be.
Q. In what respect?
A. There's I think the last meeting that I
had on this case, and I did some more reading with
regard to Sylvan Road that appears to be up in the air
whether or not •• it certainly doesn't look like it's
anticipated to be completed, but there are a lot of
indications that it will be built. And it's unknown who
would build it and whose road it would be.
Q. Oby. So at this point, yaur opinion of
value and your amount ~termination ofjust compensation ·1
does not include any sums relating to sylvan Road?
j
A. That's correct
Q, What else •• this goes back to my earlier
j
question that you stated that there may be some
severance damages to be added tO your amount of just
compensation at some point in the future. In addition
to Sylvan Road, what other types of severance damages do

1
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Page '73
l

Okay. In your opinion, is there anything
else that's included in that figure of just
Q.

2
3

compensation?
A. I think that summarizes them all, but as
we taiked earlier, many cases have many elements to them
that aren't just raw lan~ and there are improvements,
cost to cure items, in cases, which are, in fact,
severance damages, I guess, but there are other
considerations depending on the type of property.
Q. For the Orathol property, what's jncluded
in the just compensation figure, generally speaking?
A. The before-and-after land value, and
there's some discounting in there for the fact that,
although the possession of this property was granted,
the project is not completed and my after value is
predicated upon the presumption that it will be
completed as to the best of my understanding of what
rve seen in the docwnents.
Q. So your figu.re of just compensation
includes value for the property taken, Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then as you described it, a value for
discounting of values due to your use of the after value
being the date that the project's to be completed1 so

====~. . ~--~,-=·==::::::;:=~-~~--~.
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you think could be inclucled in your opinions of value?
A. I think those are primary. Mr. Johnson
relayed something in a communication that they have
built their own private sewer system on it and some of
the property that would be on the west side of this
after the take wouldn't be capable. of using that sewer
system because it would have to cross the right of way
for the freeway. There may be some issue with regard to 1
that. That's not contained in my analysis.
I
Q. 'Why wouldn't that be contained in your
I
analysis? Isn't that information you would have known j
before you prepared your report?
A. I don't think that I - I wasn't aware of
/
that until after.
Q, WoUldn't that have been information that
would have been important to know before you concluded
your report?
A. It eould have.
Q. Is that a consideration that you took into
account before your report, the fact that there may be a
sewer treatment plant and what the impacts would be as a
resu1t?
A, I knew they were building a treatment
plant That was just a consideration that was discussed
after the fact that I didn't include in this analysis
i

=
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before-and-after.
Q. So I think perhaps - oh, let xne just
finish off that l~t line of questioning. So in
addition to Sylvan Road, possibly any additional damages
that you think might be out there as a result of-- how
did you characterize it7 The sewage treatment plant on
the property?
A.
It was regarding the fact that a parcel
that would have been able to utilize that sewer
treatment system won't be able to utilize it in the
after situation, but still the number would be that it's
a parcel of land that I valued at the same rate. There
might be a -- certainly would be a benefit i! it had use
of a sewer treatment plant, but it wouldn't be a
consideration in this.
Q. So in addition to those two items, any
additional severance dam.ages that you think might be
included at so.me future time in your values?
A- Not at this time.
Q. So just tho.se two. And when will you know
for certain whether you're going to be including those
aspects of potential damages in your opinions?
A.
As we get closer to trial and ifwe leam
anything more about tbe Sylvan Road issue.
Q. Are you aware that there was an expert
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versus the individual segments of the GatWood-to-Sagle
project. The Garwood~to-Sagle project is being divided
into a number of separate segments. One of those
segments is the one that involves the Grathol property.
That's referred to as the Athol segment. So can we have
a common understanding that, betWeen you and I, when we
refer to the project, that we're just referring to the
Athol segment of the project and not the entire
Garwood-to-Sagle project?
A.
I think I understand and agree.
Q.
Okay. Just because there's some
confusion, and I just want to make sure that the
record's clear. So unless we say otherwise, we are just
referring to the portion of ITD's project that relates
to the construction of the Athol segment of the project.
Now, are you familiar with that segment oftbe project
and what it entails?
A. I know that it's being done in segments.
I don't know exactly how many, I've looked at other
properties along the way. I know some of it has been
constructed south of this loeation. And I understand
those things.
Q. Okay. With respect to the Athol segment,
which we'll now be referring to as "the project," what's
your understanding of what improvements are being made
I
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Page 77 !

l

disclosure deadline in this case?

l by Ito to U.S. 9S?
A. rm sure there typically are, but I don't
2
A. Weli at this .. with regard to this
know what date it was.
3 specific location, there will be an interchange with
Q.
So when you were preparing your report,
4 Highway S4 that the new highway will cross Highway 54,
you weren't aware that there was a specific date by
s And there are on- and off-ramps associated with it.
whieh you were supposed to have your report finalized?
6
Q. Okay. Fair enough. Would you. describe,
A. I didn't know what it was. I'm assuming
7 in general terms, the Oratbol property, where it's at,
Mr. Marfice did.
a general topography, surrowiding uses? Can you just give
Q. Let's tum now to the Grathol property in
9 me a general description of the Grathol property?
particular. And before we start this conversation, I
10
A. Sure. It's the intersection of Highway 95
think we better get on board with the same terms so that ll and 54. It's a signaled intersection. There are tum
we're not confusing terms back and fonh. When I refer
12 lanes in all directions. The larger parcel is
to the Grathol property, what I'm meaning by that is the
13 approximately S7 acres. It's generally level. The
property that's owned by HJ Grathol, previously owned by l 4 times I've been, the first couple trips to the property,
Grathol Corporation. So are we square that when I say
1s it's generally treed with smaller ponderosa pine. I
"the Grathol :property," that's what I'm refening to?
16 visited the site last Friday. The segment that is under
A. Yes.
1 7 condemnation has now been cleared. I tbmk I have the
Q. Also, I'd like to make sure we have a
18 dimensions in the report here, but we have highway
1
common understandins about "the project,'' and using air 19 frontage along both 9S and 54. There's a segment of the 1
quotes to say "the project." As you're aware - or if
2o Highway 95 frontage that's a different ownership, but
you're not, let me inform you--that ITO is in the
21 there are two points of this property that touch 95.
process of constructing a projei;t from. Garwood to Sagle. 22 And then it's longer distances along Highway S4 in terms j
That highway project is to widen and improve U.S. 9S
23 of dimension,
,
between those two cities, and so sometimes there's
24
Q. And then it's bounded on the eastern encl
confusion about that being referred to as "the project,"
2S by a county road called Howard Road?
,

!
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that tile.
Do you know whether there were any
contingencies on the zoning change?
A.
Typically with regard to zoning changes,
there are some •• I want to say facts that need to be
complied with to make the zoning change complete.
Q. What sort of contingencies are typically
applied to a zoning change?
A. They spell out various aspects of how it
can be developed. Sometimes access is discussed. It's
not uncommon that they may ask for some improvements tc
adjoining roads to pay some impact fee to somebody for
the ability to have the property zoned.
Q. And you don't know whether any
contingencies were required for the completion of the
zoning change for the Grathol property?
A.
No, I do not
Q. Do you know whether there were any
additional permits that needed. to be requested and
obtained?
A.
I don't.
Q. Do you know whether any improvements
needed to be made?
A.
That, I don't.
Q. Wouldn't that infonnation be important for
Q.
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terms of development.
J
Q. Is that determination and the exclusion of
the east half of the GrathoJ property in compliance with
USPAP?
A. I wouJd say I don't think it's covered by
USPAP. There are •• in some cases I've been involved
in, there are -- there's a lot of discussion of the
1
larger parcel theocy and what is the larger parcel. And J
there are several legal tests, that it's contiguous,
1
owned by the same property owner, similar use, things of t
that nature.
I
Q. .And what, in your opinio~ is the larger
·
parcel?
.

j

I

A.

I valued this, the west 30 acres, as the

15 independent parcel.
16
Q. And where in ygur report do you indicate
l 7 that the Jarger parcel is different than the total
18 parcel size? And that's Exhibit 3.
l9
A.
Page 6 paragraph 3.
2O
Q. The third full paragraph or the ~.
21
A.
"In viewing the subject'' -22
Q. Okay.
23
A. •• "as a lighted intersection with
2 4 commercial zoning as it exists, I view the site as being
25 developed in two phases." And there's a discussion of
Page 121
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your analysis?
A. I was given the information that it was a
commercially zoned piece of property and I knew the
location.
Q. And you accepted that fact and did no
further investigation on your own?
A. That's correct.
Q. I'd like to run through really quickly just so I have the numbers in front ofme •• can you
tell me what your conclusion for the before value of the
propeny is?
A.
My ~alyais of the property is viewing it
as the west 30 feet is all I considered in my analysis.
Q. West 30 acres?
A. The west 30 - I think it's approximately
30 - was how I analyzed this in terms of its highest
and best use and things of that nature, So with regard
to that, I conoluded value was S2,2S a square foot for
that portion of the property.
Q. And yow- before value for the east half of

2o
21 the property?
22
A.
That wasn't included in this valuation.
23
Q. Why not?
24
A. Because that's-· I viewed that as the
2s prime value of that particuJar piece of property in
, -.

...

~-

- - , ••••
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1

it there.

2
3
4

I don't see any reference to larger
'
parcel. Where do you refer to the larger parcel?
l
A. "With the site containing approximately 51 /
acres prior to the taking, I considered that
J
approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection wouJd i
be valued at a different rate than the remaining 27
j
acres."
.1
Q. You don't state, do you, that that 30
:
acres closer to the intersection is, in fact, your
I
larger parcel. Is that correct?
iI
A. I don't see a statement to that effect,
1
!
but that's the assumption in bow I valued it.
,
Q. But like you said, there's no statement to
j
that effect?
A. That's correct.
!
Q. Where's your analysis as to why your
larger parcel determination is different than the size
of the total parcel?
A. Because that's the prime piece. I did ••
through disoussion, part of that rear of the property
was going to be used for their sewer treatment p]ant. I 1
view it as that it would have to1ally different use and
!
that the prime commercial would be limited to 'the 30 !
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the anticipated completion date of the project, because
it was all preliminary at the time. Correct?
A. Anticipated completion of what project?
Q. The highway project.
A. Yes.
Q. In your analysis, you discuss, on a number
of occasions, Sylvan Road. And you state, for example,
on page 2, that plans that you've seen regarding the new
interchange planned at this location show Sylvan Road
being extended. It's in the paragraph one up from the
bottom.
A. Yes.
Q. And you make a couple other statements in
your analysis about Sylvan Road being constructed. What
is the basis for your statements that Sylvan Road is
being constructed as part of this project?
A. I think that was discussed early on in our
meetings on this project. I have seen several maps of
different alternatives to this project, several of them
showing that road being extended. These are some of the
documents in the file.
Q.
Let me take a look. And where did you
obtain copies of these documents?
A. They may have been given to me early on in
this project. I can't honestly say that I recall

l
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that were incorporated into the final record of decision
for the environmental impact statement?
A.
I don't know that I have.
Q. Have you seen any final maps of the
highway project for the Athol segment as it's going to
be constructed on the Grathol property?
A. Well, I believe some of these maps that
we're discussing are reflecting that final.
Q.
Did you review any of those final
documents in the preparation of your appraisal report?
A. No.
Q. So you reHed entirely on the 2005
documen~s?
A.
That and discussions with Mr. Marfice and
Mr. Hughes.
Q. And what did Mr. Marfice te1l you about
what was going to happen with respect to Sylvan Road?
A.
We've had several discussions that we
believe that that road will be connected. I've seen
appraisals of these two properties that the extension of
it, it's called·· there's another name up there, but
that right away was purchased for these two properties.
Q. These two properties being?
A. The two contiguous to the north.
Q. Of the Grathol property?

l
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specifically where they came from.
Q. Were they given to you by Mr. Marfice?
A. Likely.
Q. So we have four documents, so I can
s identify them. One of them is a map entitled "Initial
6 Construction Phase Option 7. U.S. 95 from Remington
7 Road to Trinity Road." I believe this is one of the
e documents we talked about yesterday during Mr.
9 Minzgbor's deposition. The second one is an aerial
10 photograph. I think I described the first one. It's an
11 aerial photograph with an overlay of the U.S. 9S
12 project The second one is entitled "DEIS Alternative"
13 dated December 2nd, 2005. Correct? The third one has
14 two maps on it. One of them is entitled "DEIS
15 Alternative December 2nd, 200S." It's the yellow
16 alternative. The first one I was referring to just a
1 7 moment ago is the brown alternative. The second aerial
18 .photograph is entitled "OBIS Alternative December 2nd,
19 200S, Blue Alternative." And the third- or the fourth
2O document is entitled "D:EIS Alternatives Map Dated
21 December 2nd, 200S." Do you know what DEIS stands f01?
22
A. Specificaliy the acronym, no, I don't.
23
Q. I'll represent to you that it stands for
2 4 draft environmental impact statement. Have you seen any
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A. Yes.
Q. And I guess the big question is: If it's
going to be ex.tended, when?
A. That, I don't know.
Q.
And by whom?
A. That, I don't know.
Q.
You don't know whether ITO is going to do
it?
A.
No.
j
Q. Do you know whether the extension of
1
Sylvan Road is part of 11D's cUIJ'ent condemnation case?
A. Ifs not, t.o my understanding.
.
Q, And what is your understanding based upon? 1
A. The documents that I've been provided,
what I've seen, what the take in this particular case
is. It's not identified on those.
Q. When you perform a condemnation appraisal,
what do you typically look at to determine what property !
is being taken?
l
A. Normally that's provided the map and
l
descriptions and all items to understand what will be
l
taken.
Q. Were you provided the legal description of
1
the property that's being taken by ITO in this case?
I
·1·

I

A. __
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1 in th.ere. rve certainly seen documentation to it.
2
Q,
And did you plat out that legal
3
4
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description?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Based on that legal description, what is
yout understanding with respect to whether that legal
description describes an e1'tension of Sylvan Roaci?
A. I don't believe it addresses it at all.
Q. And were you provided with a copy of the
right of way plans for the Grathol property?
A.
I believe I was.
Q. And in your -- based on your
~derst.anding, what do the right of way plans show?
A.
The maps that rm seeing do not sho~ the
extension of that road.
Q. So what was the basis for your inclusion
of Sylvan Road in your analysis?
A. That they're obviously building an access
off this road. I know that they all had some hearjngs
with regard to it, and it's been described as a
pedestrian access, but by all indications and even on
these draft impact statements, it's identified as
something that, you know, potentially will be built.
Q. But you just testified that it's not
included in the legal description?
Page 195
That's correct.
Q. And it's not included in the right of way
plan. Were )IOU also provided with the complaint that
ITO filed in this case?
A. I don't know that I have seen that.
Q.
rn represent to you that it's not
included in the complaint. So let me ask this question.
To what extent do you rely on planning documents to make
your determination of what property's being taken?
A. There's certainly something that's
provided and that in a condemnation case that you're
looking at what's being condemned.
Q.
And in how many instances have you relied
upon preliminary or draft plSMing documents to trump
the legal de.,cription and the right of way plans
identified by the condemning authority as to what
property is being taken?
A. rm not saying that that's being taken.
I'm sayjng that I considered it and it appears to me
that in my best esdmation that it looks like that this
road will be constructed. It's not part of this
condemnation, but it is something that impacts the
property that any knowledgeable purchaser of.hat
property would take into consideration.
Q. Why are you saying that it will impact the
A.
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1

property in this case?
A. Because it's another potential
condemnation if they talce it.
Q.
But it's not a condemnation in this case.
Correct?
A.
That is correct.
Q. If it is taken by ITO, that would likely
be a separate condemnation. Correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And in that instance, then you would
consider Sylvan Road. Is that correct?
A. rm saying it's something 1 considered in
this case simply because it appears by some
1
documentation in this other taking that by all
appearances and some other documents I've looked at, it
looks like it certainly has been earmarked for
potentially building the road, but it's certainly not
part of the condemnation, but rm saying that it's
,
something that a knowledgeable purchaser would take into 1
consideration, because they're looking at who's going to j
build it, what's the cost and do I get compensated for
my land? Who knows?
Q. Baek to your date of valuation. So you're
1
freezing time, if you will, to the date of valuation.
Correct?

j

I
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Yes.
And as of that date, you're supposed to
look at the value of the property without the project.
Correct? And then in the after condition you look at
lhe value of the property, at least in your estimation,
as of the completion date of the project. Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. But you can't say for certain, can you,
whether Sylvan Road will be constructed as of either of
those dates?
A. That is correct.
Q. And you can't say whether ITO is going to
be the entity constructing it. Is that correct?
A. That is 001Tect.
Q. So why, in your estimation, should the
property be impacted or why should the impacts that you
believe are caused by Sylvan Road appear in a
condemnation appraisal report where you're supposed to 1
be assessing the value of the property as impacted by
this condemnation?
A. Because in my opinion, it's a potential.
There's a lot of documentation whic:::h makes it appear
1
that it's very likely, and I'm saying it's certainly
somethjns a knowledgeable purchaser would consider. The j
comments were made and that's •• I let it stand at that.
I
A.

Q.

I
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cut o~ but I believe it is the property on Ramsey and
Appleway that's identified as No. 1 on Exhibit 7?
A. It appears to be, yes.
Q. Okay. There's anote on Exhibit 8 that
also appears to be in Mr. Johnson's handwriting that
states, "They are 'laking 16 acres. Comps should be
based upon that number. '1 Do you see that statement?
A. Yesfido.
Q. Do you agree with that?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A.
In my analysis, rm valuing it as 30
acres, so it's not 16.
Q. And if you based your comps on 16 acres,
W(?uldn't that result in looking at s~aller properties?
A. Yes.
Q. Than what's involved in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're familiar, I assume, with the
notion that smaller properties typically sell for more
on a per-acre basis than larger properties?
A. Yes.
Q. So would it be fair to assume that if
you're looking at l<i-acre parcels or 16-acre comps, that
you're going to be looking at properties with higher
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Q. What is unusual about a 3O~ac~
1
commercially zoned property?
A. That .something sells in that size isn't
too common in the market.
Q. When in your appraisal assignment did you
receive the document at Exhibit 77
~
A. That ~igbt have been in the July time
ji
frameof2010.
Q. Okay. So it was right about the same time
1
that you received your assignment to perform an
)I
appraisal?
A.
It would have been the start of forming
some comparable research and data, correct
Q. How much did you rely upon this document
at Exhibit 7 and the comps that were provided to you?
A.
Ilooked through the listatwhatl
thought would be relevant out of that. In my opinion,
it would be the better comparables of the group.
Q. How many of the comps on '.Exhibit 7 did you ·
end up using in your appraisal?
A. Five. Maybe six.
Q. Just so I'm clear, on Exhibit 7, you used
comps No. 1, No, 2, 3, 4, Sand 6?
A, I believe they're included, yes.
Q. Did you use 7, 8 or 9?

l
ll

~age 223

values than you would be if you're looking at comps for
a larger piece of property?
3
A. Typically that is correct, yes.
4
Q. Is it typical for someone you're working
s for to give you comps to use in your report?
6
A. Sometimes.
7
Q. How often has it happened?
A. Not too often. Depends on the property.
8
9
Q. How many times would you say it happened?
lo One? Five?
ll
A.
A few times if it's very specific and
12 something unique.
13
Q. Is this, the Grathol property, something
14 very specific and very unique?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. How so?
1 '7
A, It's a large tract and we're valuing it as
18 a 30-acre piece, so there's going to be definitely less
19 data for that type of sale.
2o
Q. What's unusual about that, that you have a
21 large parcel and you're valuing a smaller segment of it
2 2 or the fact that you're valuing only a 3O-acre parcel?
23
A. That rm valumg 30 acres as a commercial
24 piece. There will be definitely more limited data for
2._,__
s that__
type of a sale.
,, ....... ,..,,,,.,,,'\ ___ ,.
.
,, .. ,..
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·1

No.
How many toial comps did you use?
A. I believe six of these are comparables
that were included in my report.
Q. And you used 10 total?
A. Yes.
Q. So the majority of the comps that you used
were ones that were pro\tided to you by Mr. Johnson?
A.
They were on this list, yes, that is
correct.
Q. Describe for me the process you used in
deciding which 10 comps to use. Let me start with this
question. How many comps do you use typically in an
appraisal report?
A. It's on a case--by-case basis. l don't
know that there is a definitive number. Sometimes you
have this many, sometimes you have far fewer, sometimes
you have a similar amount.
Q. Is 10 considered a lot that you would use
or is it not considered very many?
A. Yeah, JO would be more than typical.
Q. On average, what is a typical number that
you use?
A. Could be three, four, five.
Q. Okay. So in that range? How did you
..... '"

ii

A.

Q.
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decide on the 10 comps that you did use in your
appraisal?
3
A. Well, they're larger tract sales in the
4 general neighborhood. Two are larger and four are
5 smaller than the subject.
6
Q. They're larger tract sales in the general
7 neighborhood. Is that what you said?
1
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A.
Q.
A.
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Yes.
Is a nine-acre tract considered large?

8

That's considerably smaller than the

10

subject.
Q. But do you consider it large, small or
medium sized parceJ?
A.
It's smal]er than subject, but nine acres
is a fairly good-sized commercial size purchase.
Q. What was the parameters that you were
looking for when you were looking for larger tracts in
the general neighborhood?
A.
rm just looking for commercial type sales
that are larger in nature. So nine would be the
smallest one on this list, and we've got 20, 17. The
Four Square purchase.
Q. You do have a four-acre parcel, too.
Correct? I'm looking in your report. So we've shifted
from Exhibits 7 and 8 back to Exhibit 3, so we're

9
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Q. So why did you give that sale more weight
than your other comps in your analysis?
A.
It is on the same highway. It's certainly
a far smaller piece so1d for a far higher rate per foot,
but it is on the same highway and it was a lighted
intersection.
Q. Although you also state that it's a sale
that's not likely admiMible. Cortect7
A.
I have seen 1hat before where they have
not been allowed in court.
Q. And why wouldn't they ~ allowed in court,
based on your experience? .
1
A. BeQause of the classic story of definition
I
of mai-ket :value. Neither party under undue duress and a '1
c.onde?DXlation •• I've seen actually bona fide sales by
·
government entities that have not been allowed for the ,
same reason.
Q. But yet you still put significant weight
on this parcel?
A. It was something I considered, yes, in my
final discussion.
Q. I think you did more than consider it. ln
fact, you stated that •• this is on page 9 of your
:
report- ''I considered the values of the comparable
,
sates with primary emphasis on comparables S and 7."

I
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looking at your appraisal report.
A. Oh, this was one other bit of information,
yes, that was discussed on the front end that I had
knowledge of that - this was obtained through Joel
Hazel. I understand this purchase was made through the
threat of condemnation. We had some discussion earlier
in this deposition about probably the nearest similar
location to some degree to this property, and this was
the next lighted intersection south of the subject
property.
Q. And the question I was getting at is in
regards to the size of the property, you were saying
that nine was considered relatively on the smaller side,
and you said, in fact, that this was the smallest
property that you used, and I was pointing out that your
comp sale No. S is only four acres. Is that accurate?
A. That is correct.
Q. Back to your comment about - sh,ce we're
going to be hopping into these comp sales anyway, why
don't we start with No. S. You said that this was a
piece of property four acres that is relatively close to
the subject property at the next lighted intersection,
but you also note that it was negotiated or it was under
threat of condemnation?

P. 34/48

Page

2291

1 You gave it significant weight, didn't you?
2
A. The fact that it was on the same road down ~
3 the street, it certainly was •• I had one other one on ~
4 95 that was north of this and that they intend to ••
1
5 one's north and one's south of it, but I considered it. I
6
Q. But like you said, it's not as reliable as
i
7 some. Correct?
1
e
A. I'm assuming that certainly there were
l
9 negotiations made and that was the estimated value of
10 the property. My concluded value's certainty far, far
11 less amount than that, but it was something I
,
12 considered, yes.
j
l.3
Q. Do you lmow whether a condemnation case ,
14 had actually been filed in that regarding that property
15 for comparable No. S?
I
16
A. I don't know if it was formally filed or
1 7 not. I do know that I called Joel Hazel on this, and
18 the discussion was with him.
19
Q, If, in fact, a condemnation case had been
2O filed and this was a settlement of a lawsuit, what
21 effect does that have on your use of that sale?
i
22
A. It was infonnation I considered.
i
23
Q. But it's not an open market sale.
:
24 Correct?
:
J

I
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1

Q.

And you wouldn't use it or it's not a sale

2

l
2

s SpokaQe where in-house appraisers at Wash DOT are using

3
4
5

that should be used. Correct?
3
A. T)'J>ically not. l could teU you that I've
4 had experience. recwly with several condemnations in

6
"I
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some of those acquisitions, so I haYe c«tainty seen it
done very recently by other condemning authorities and
appraisers in house.
Q. They're using condemnation settlements as
comparable sales?
'A. They wm using, yeah, their actual
purchases of property thatwas to be condemned,
Q. I'm not talking purchases. rm talking
condemnation settlements.
A. One~ been _identified as a condemnation
property,
Q. Was a condemnatio~ case filed?
A. No.
Q. And as you stated, if there's a sale
that's not truly reflective of an open market sale, does
it not •• that does not meet the definition of market
value. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Because part of that definition requires
that it be with a willjng buyer and a willing seller.
Page 231

Correct?
A. That's correct.
3
Q. And when you have s. sale under threat of
4 condemnation, you do not have a willing buyer and a
s willing seller. Correct?

l
2
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a
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11
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A.
That is correct.
Q. So do you believe your use of sale No. S
is proper in this case?
A.
I thought it was germane because it was
the only other sale that I knew at a lighted
intersection on this highway, so it's relevant
information in that regard. I do understand all the
rules. We oftentimes as appraisers will use a
lender-owned sale. Again, that doesn't technically meet
the term of willing buyer/willing seller, but at times

16 those are considered.
l7
Q. What discount did you give to the sales
18 price for the fact that it may not be reflective of
19
2o

21
22

23
24
25

market value?
A. As I said, my concluded value is far less
than the concluded estimate that was listed there.
Q. Weil, iet's taik about that. w'hat
adjustments did you make to sale No. S?
A. It would be certainly size. It's a far
smaller piece.
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Q.

Any other adjustments?
It's at a lighted intersection. In that
regard, it's similar. It doesn't have a - it's a
lighted intersection, but it's a county road versus the I
state highway, so in that regard it would be slightly
inferior. I think there are tum lanes in all
directions, not maybe as wide as they are at the subject 1
property.
,
Q. Other adjustments?
~
A. Those would be the primary considerations.
Q. The property of sale No. S was improved,
wasn't it?
A. Yes, there was a saloon on the property.
Q. And what adjustment did you make for the
improvement?
A. That's why I talked to Mr. Hazel about it.
In his estimate of how the property was settled, that
was deemed to be land value only and that was the
concluded land value estimate.
Q. Again, you said it was a settlement,
however, not reflective of market value?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you make an adjustment for the fact
~
that it didn't reflect market value?
i
A.
I considered what I learned from him, and '
A.

j
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there maybe •• there maybe was an adjustment, but that
was the number that he gave me 1hat it was settled on. I
Q. Okay. So let's go through those
!
adjustments. The indicated price for this condemnation
settlement was three dollars a square foot. What
j
adjustments did you make for size?
1
A. What are we talking about now?
Q. How muoh of an adjustment did you make for
size?
1
A. For what?
I
Q. We're still talking about No. 5. Sale No.
I
5.
j
A.
You said three dollars a foot
j
Q. Oops. I'm sorry. $5.30 a square foot.
I
Thanks for the clarification.
j'
A.
A lot of appraisers love to make grids and
1
plus and minus and that. I typically don't I take all
the things into consideration, look at them as a whole, I
l
and make my estimate based on those things.
'
Q. So you ballpark it?
!
li
A.
I wouldn't call it ballpark. I would call
it judgment.
Q. How do you know - so we've got a little
bit down for size and a little bit up for intersection,
adjustments for the fact that it doesn't reflect market

!
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value. We've got some improvements - although, I stand
corrected. That it's just land value. How do you
quantify all of those?
A You put it all in the hopper when you look
at the sales, and I realize it's going to be - size is
certainly going to reflect a higher 'V8lue. I liked it
because it was a lighted intersection with something I
knew about that I thought was relevant to this
particular case.
Q. So how much do you adjust it if you like
it a little versus like it a lot?
A. As I said, that's looking at the sale and
concluding a vajue based on inputs that :Q.
How do you lmow~hethetyour size
adjustments ere consistent? If you don't have a
quantified amount that you're adjusting for size, bow eta
you know that your size adjust,m~~ts are consistent
between and among your sales?
A.. I guess tha't's why I get paid to be an
appraiser. I feel that I'm entitled to an opinion of'
looking at a lot of factoIS and trying to quantify
specific on~ for size. I don't have a specific
formula.
Q. Do you provide more of a size adjustment
if the difference is a SO-percent difference versus
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Page 236 ·

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

B
9
1O

11
12
l3
l4
15
16
l7
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

on No. S?
A. I said my concluded value for the subject
was $2.25, so the difference between those two is in
excess of three dollars.
Q.
Okay. So your adjusted value for parcel
No. S is $2.25 a square foot?
A. No, you were asking something specific.
I'm just trying to answer that the best I could
Q. Right. And so when you said that your
adjusted value .w let me make sure I understand what you
said. I want t.o know - you have a sales price at $5 .30
a square foot. I want to know after you make all your
adjustments, a little up here and a little down there
and the adjustments for this, that and the other, what
is the adjusted value, the adjusted price per square
foot for sales No. S7
A. I don't have an adjusted value for the
sale of No. 5 in that regard.
Q. Is it the same for each of your 10 comps
that you use?
A. Is what the same?
Q. Do you have a11 adjusted v.alue for any of
the 10 comps that you use?
A No, I didn't adjust them as I started from
square one, there's no -these are sales I considered,
_:...,_--1:'.

25
1--------.._.:l..----------1-------------_;_...,;_.,
_____
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1 200-percent difference in size?
2
A. Certainly.
3
Q. Howmuchmore?
4
A.
You've. asked me several tlmes and l 1m
5 telling you I don't have a fonnula.
6
Q. Okay. But I'm just wondering how you
7 know, how do you arrive -- how do you go from $5.30 a
8 square foot down to an adjusted value?
A
By looking at it and making my judgment
9
l 0 based on the sale.
11
Q. So based on your judgment, how much of
12 a -· how much of a total adjustment did you make on the
13 sales price for sales No. 5?
14
A.
It would probably be in excess of·· for
l S whatever my concluded value is -· $3 .25 a foot •• to
16 $5.30 a foot - so three dollars is well over fifty
17 percent
18
Q. Is that how you do all of your
19 adjustments, your indicated value per square foot is
2 0 $2 ..SO a square foot?
2l
A. No.
22
Q. What's your indicated value for parcel No.
23 S?
24
A.
$5.30.
25
Q. And what's your adjusted value, the price

1 I considered location, size, other things, in forming my
2 estimate for the subject property.
3
Q. And then based on all of that, you just
4 sort of found $2.2S? I don't understand how you got to
5 $2.25,
A.
That was my best estimate based on the
6
7 comparables that I looked at, the research I did in this
8 particular case.
Q. Okay. Anything more specific than that?
9
10
A.
No.
11
Q. S0W1ds very fuzzy. frankly.
A. Maybe I can give you a better description.
12
13 I was a navigator in the Air Force for years. You're
14 flying an airplane at 450 nauts. rve got a line from
15 my sun line that says this. Then I've got some other
16 pressure line that tells me this. I have something else
17 that tells me that. I take all those into consideration
18 and this is my most probable p0sition. I feel it's very
l9 similar in appraisal work. You're looking at a lot of
20 information, you weigh what you know and men.tally
21 compare those to the property that you're looking at,
22 and form an opinion from that.
23
Q. How does - did you make any adjustments
2 4 on No. 5 for demographics?
25
A. I think there's a comment in here that I

60 (Pages 234 457
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ORIGINAL
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general

partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through

s,

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows:

INTERROGATORIES

-

Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Inten-ogatory

No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify,
a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore,
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the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civi1 Procedure.
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter,
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation
of the property. The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the
following:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geoff Reeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)

Mark Johnson

(8)

JeffBond

(9)

Donald Smock

(10)

Paul Daugharty

(11)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger

As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such -

persons. See1 U.S.C.A., Fed. R Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisor/ Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).
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With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these
Inte1Togatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder
of the information requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when fonnal

appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above InteITogatory will be contained
within those appraisal reports.
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt ''Sldp: Sherwood, CGA,

prodnced herewith and Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 25, 2011.
Sl!J!Plemental Answer: Defendant's actor/viewer witnesses are still in the process of

formulating their opinions and testimony for trial. As discovery and investigation continues
in this matter, Defendant's witnesses are expected to revise their opinions in their respective

areas of expertise. Defendant reserves the right to update and supplement these discovery
requests accordingly. However, the following summary sets forth the (presently} anticipated
testimony of these witnesses.
Alan Johnson anticipates testifying, generally as follows:
Hughes Investments and its various partnerships is a cornmerciaJ real estate developer
not a land speculator. Since the company was formed in 1977, Hughes Investments emities
have acquired, entitled, developed, constructed, leased and managed over 5,000,000 square
feet of OLA. Hughes Investments has never purchased a-piece of property, either raw land or

ai, income producing asset for the purpose cf quickly flipping it for a profit. Hughes
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Investments and its entities have and always will make our income from developing property.
Hughes Investments mission statement provides:

"Hughes Investments is a reputable, retail commercial development company
whose purpose is to generate equity and cash flow by developing high-quality
shopping centers. We firmly believe that this approach translates into the
highest return for long term ownership for ourselves and our partners while
providing the highest quality shopping environment for our merchants and the
communities they serve." As highly experienced commercial developers, we
convert a piece or raw land using our capabilities in design, entitlements,
leasing, construction, financing and management. to create significant value
and a financeable asset that provides cash flow over long periods of time.

Idaho, Hughes Investments purchased this property in 2008 with the sole intent to develop it
into a commercial retail center/hospitality project

Hughes InveStments acquired and

immediately rezoned the property to a commercial designation, invested in engineering a
sewage treatment system that would be approved by the Idaho DEQ, coll1Jllenced discussions
with merchants and tenants for prospective sales or leases, met with and filed site plans with
Kootenai County and commissioned the prerequisite traffic study for further development

evaluation. Hughes Investments has spent significant amounts of money on consultants,
engineers, and carl')'llli costs in order to develop this property. As of the date of this writing,

the costs for development of this property have exceeded $428,000.
Hups Investments bas a long history of successfully developing retail shopping
centers. Huibes Investments has been designing, buildins and leasing shopping centers for
DEFENDANT HJ GRAUiOL 'S 1HIRD SUPPWIENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO Pl.AINTIFF'S FIRST ser OF
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nearly forty years. With any sophisticated shopping center, developer, a signalized "hard
comer" with high traffic counts, high visibility, easy ingress and egress at the comer of two

major streets is always the most sought after location. A "Hard Comer" is recognized by the
International Council of Shopping Centers as a signalized intersection at the comer of two

shopping, a hard comer is always preferred by developers, merchants and tenants. In rhe case
of HWY 95/S4, the current configuration offers excellent visibility and slows traffic at the
lighted intersection. Easy access is provided by 4 deeded access points

at

or near the

intersection.

In contrast, from the materials I have been provided by ITD, the proposed overpass
will be at an elevation well above the current grade of the property at an assumed speed of 55
to 65 MPH. It is important to note that the new interchange is not expected to increase traffic
counts by the site. While access has not been finalized at this time, it won't be remotely as
good as what is presently available. As difficult as it is to work around the issues caused by
the overpass, Hughes Investments has still not been provided the date for the start of

construction, let alone an estimated date for completion of this project. Without either
completion, or realignment dates and timelines, Hughes Investments is unable to start

development. All of the merchants that we have been in discussions with will not move
forward with any kind of commitment until the interchange is complete or it is determined
that the highways will keep their current alignment,

Please refer to previous correspondence submitted from Mike 'Wmger of URM. (See

Bates Nos. 000016-000024, 000030-000031, 000040-00004S, and 000053-000055.)
Additionally attached are several newspaper articles "A bwnp hl the road" 11/23/08 and "US
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95 widening in N. Idaho hits another snag" 11/22/08 both referring to the !TD slashing its
request for funding for widening HWY 95 between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint. To further
the uncertainty of this project in a meeting with Ron Harvey and Jason Mingzhor with ITO,
Jason indicated that ITD would take our property through a condemnation action and if they
didn't receive funding for construction, "they could sit on the property for 15 years" and

effectively halt any development of our remaining property. This was perceived as threat.
ITD's delays and indecision to date may have cost Hughes Investments potential tenants and
has put the entire development in jeopardy. A delay in construction or re-alignment of even
two more years will cause significant financial damages through increased holding costs, lost
opportunity and the inability to develop and market the remaining property resulting in an
almost complete loss of value as a development parcel.
The estimated value of the property being taken by ITD is based on the values of
similarly available property with the potential for commercial development. The most sirn ilar
comparable in ITD's appraisal, being that it is the only commercially zoned property on
HWY 95, is at Sagle Road and HWY 95. This 29 acre site sold on 3/08 for $2.69/sf. Mr.
Johnson believes this Sagle property is far inferior to the property at issue in this case.
Contrary to notes in IID's appraisal, this property did not have sewer service. Also, Sag]e
Road is not a "hard comer.'' In fact, it is actually a T intersection leading onJy to a school to

----------~--------

the east of Highway 95 and into a small housing tract to the west. It is not at a signalized

intersection Jike the comer at HWY 9S/S4. Experienced developers will pay at least a 20%
premium for property located at a signalized intersection of two highways. This factor
effectively places the value of ITD's take of Hughes Investments' property at :1: $3.23/sf or,
$2,532,578 for the prune 18 acres being acquired.
:DBFENDA'NT HJ GRATHOL'S Tll1RD STJPPJ,,aMENTA.L ANSWERS AND RBSPONSBS TO PLAINTJFF'S FIRST SET OP
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It is estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for road construction materials
located underneath Hughes Investments property is approximately $300,000. However, the

most important component to the detennination of the value of the take is the time period stiJl
needed to complete construction.

It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property, after the take, would be worth
$3,669,300 (at the time of completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as

follows:
(1)

3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300 (value is reduced due

to the inability to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's ROW;
(2)

3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a value of $625,300;

(3)

Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and

(4)

Remaining 26.42 acres with limited commercial viability priced at $1,150,000.

Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property on the assumption
of at least an additional three year delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also,
it should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer system to significantly

fewer users will greatly decrease the value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of 10%
per annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a reduced value of $947,000.

To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials

+ a reduction in value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction of
$947,000

= $3,779,578. This

is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just

compensation for the take.
In the alternative; looking at the development potential before t.'1e take fer the

property's "highest and best use" the value is significantly higher. The potential profit, as is
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shown in the pre-take budget, is estimated at just over $8,670,000. This approach provides
Hughes Investments with the investment strategy required in our projects, developing and
holding of at least a portion of the asset, The expected value after the take is: ITD
condemnation $571 9000 + NPV of the remainder property $2,722,000

=

$3,293,000.

Subtract the land and expenses to date of approximately $1,800,000 and the potential profit is
only about 15% of that of the "highest and best use".
GeoffReeslund anticipates testifying in the following areas:
•

Retail/commerdal site ~lanning and design, including building orientation,

sight line and visibility criteria: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the proposed elevated
freeway, as it traverses the site, will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant
buildings and signage in the development. Without at-grade pass-by visibility and identity,

many po'refitial customers may sunpty speeaby me site without sfoppmg. Conversely, 'ttie
current at-grade highway with its signalized intersection provides superior visibility to the
traveling public and aJso provides better access and an opportunity for encouraging
customers to pull off the highway and patronize the project.
•

Division of property/parcel configurations: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that

the land t.aken for the freeway coostruction bifurcates the most usable portion of the property
into two pieces, one of which is very small with limited use applications, poor access and

-----

·-----

vist"bility; the other with poor visibility and ve-ry poor access opportunities. A third parcel will

be created when right-of-say is acquired for the Sylvan ftontage road use, further isolating a
large portion of the property from :the remainder and limiting the amount of property that _
could be developed for (highest and best-use) retaiVcommercial t.enantse
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Access & circulation - on and offwsite: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the

configuration and location of the land taken for the highway reconfiguration use severely
impacts the viability for developing the resultant sites by eliminating or drastically limiting
the abilit;yto provide effective access points critical to successful commercial development.
•

Infrastl'UCture and utility needs/provisions: Mr. R.eeslund intends to testify that

the taking of this property for highway reconfiguration creates a severe hardship by
impacting the ability to provide an effective and economical utility infrastructure for the
resulting properties, and will require significant additional expenses due to the potential
installation of redundant systems. such as sewer, water and electrical facilities.
•

Development process and SAAuencing, from initial planning to constnlction

completion: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the lack of a recorded map defining the
properties with which Hughes Investments are left after the taking has significantly delayed
the development of the remaining property and has likely cost Hughes Investments tenants
who were willing to proceed if the development were pennitted to occur with legally defined
parcels.
•

Land use potential: Mr, Reeslund intends to testify as to the various potentiaJ

plans for development of the subject property and its s1.titability given its reconfiguration,
location and infrastructure needs. He will also testify about Tenant leasing issues relative to
division of construction between Tenant and Landlord, includin& implementation of
requirements to affect Tenant openinas.
•

Further that the land use development potential is now limited due to the

splitting of the prime com.rnercial site by the taking,
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consultant

management: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify as to his familiarity with the property and his
work with various consultants for the three years Hughes Investments have owned the
property, including architects, civil engineers, environmental consultants, traffic engineers,
waste water engineers, general contractors and others. Hughes Investments has spent
significant dollars and prepared numerous commercial site plans, environmental studies and
reports, ALTA site surveys, traffic studies and waste water treatment system designs, all to
prepare for and support the development of this property.
•

Land use entitlements processing: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that he

worked closely with consultants and Kootenai County to process the Commercial rezone and
allow for the development of the property by Hughes Investments. During this process,
Reeslund also worked and/or coordinated with the City of Atho~ Lakes Highway District,
Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization, and numerous local residents as well as ITO

on several occasions.

•

On and off-site deyelopment and construction. including agenc)! coordination •

consultant management permit processintt and construction management. Mr. ReesJund
intends to testify as to his qualifications to manage the project A &E team in preparing the
required improvement plans for the construction of the planned commercial project,
including processing the required ministerial construction permits, managing the bidding and
construction for the on and off-site improvements and buildings for construction and leasing;

Mr. Reeslund will also be coordinating with various tenants who will construct their ov.n
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facilities and ensuring that tenants' design and construction teams produced an effective and
timely completion of construction to meet timelines for the project opening.

Additional detail in support of Mr. Reeslund 1 experience and qualifications in these
areas, are attached as a copy of his Statement of Qualifications.
Interrogatozy

No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses'

opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from
the tal<lng of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yesu, descdbe

the amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and
all facts and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied
upon, as a basis for that opinion.
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages will result Defendant does
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of
Plaintiff's actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance dam.ages may not be fully known until after the
project is completed or at least construction is initiated.
Supplemental Answer: See, Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 2, above.
Reguest for Production

No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used,

referenced or relied7lpon in responding to the interrogatories above.
RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voha-minous documents responsive to these
Requests for Production and will make them available for im;-pection and/or copying to
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CORNER OF HWY 95 & HWY 54, Athol, ID 83801
MLS f/07-8778

EXCELLENT VISIBILITY WITH COMMERCIAL POTENTIAL. PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS SHOW FUTURE OFF-RAMPS AND
FRONTAGE RD FOR HWY 95 THROUGH THIS PROPERTY. (BUYER TO CHECK WITH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION TO VERIFY).

lAgent/Agency ·Information
Listing Member

605

Listing Office

Co-llsling Agenl

Selling Member
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View;
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Road:
Water:
Sewer:
Timber:
Natural Gas:
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Telephone:

Kootenai
Terrnorial
Corner Lot; Irregular; Level; Open; Southern
Exposure; Woodad
None
Paved; Public Maintained
None
None
Part
Ava0able
Available
Available

•

Railroad:
Flood Zone:
Aircraft Fllght Zone:
Fire Protection Dist:
Terms Considered:
Showing Instructions:
Property SubJect To::
Misc:

Not Available
Unknown
Yes
Yes
Cash; Conventional
Call Listing Office
CC&R's: None; Association: No; Non-Mtg Lien:
No; LID: None
Sec: 10; Twn: 53; Rng#: 3; RngD: WBM

lnlomtallon Is deemed to be renabte, but Is not guaranteed. 11:l 2010 MLS and FBS.
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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT

The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board v. HJ Grathol, et al.

In the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of Kootenai
Case No. CV10-10095

Prepared for:

Idaho Transportation Board

Prepared by:

Dennis R. Reinstein, CPA/ABV, ASA, CVA
Hooper Cornell, PLLC
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 300
Boise, Idaho 83706

December 19, 2011
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INTRODUCTION
I was engaged by ITD to review the claim(s) for damages/lost value by Defendant Grathol in
conjunction with ITD's action to take and condemn real property owned by Grathol.
Throughout this report I may refer to the various parties as follows:
Abbreviation
Grathol
Johnson
Sherwood
ITD
Evans
Moe
Hedley
Site or Property
Project

Party/Term
HJ Grathol
Alan Johnson
Dewitt Sherwood
The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board
David Evans and Associates, Inc.
Stanley Moe
George Hedley
Land acquired by Grathol near Athol
Planned development by Grathol

Documents and information relied upon in support of the opinions contained herein are noted in
each opinion and/or are listed in Table 1 which follows the opinions.
In addition to documents referenced in my report, I may summarize information contained in
those documents in exhibit form to assist the explanation of my opinions.
As additional information or testimony becomes available, I may find it appropriate to revise or
supplement my opinions, analyses and conclusions stated herein. I may also be called upon to
provide testimony with regard to additional data or records and/or data received from or testified
to by other parties and/or their witnesses.

r:> .. -A,,
' " ' .. °". t~
~~

December 19. 2011
Date

Dennis R. Reinstein, CPA/ABV, ASA, CVA
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OPINION 1
The methodology utilized by Johnson to support Grathol's claim is deficient and not reliable.
This opinion is based upon:
Proper Approach

1) I have worked with a wide range of clients across many industries, including construction
and development, in preparing business valuations and assisting with the development
of project feasibility studies.
The "normal" process in developing reasoned and economically supported conclusion(s)
is to consider all relevant information as of the date of the conclusion(s) and to follow
appropriate procedures to collect and analyze all information relevant to the
conclusion( s).
2) Additionally, I have worked with a wide range of clients across many industries, including
construction and development, in preparing or evaluating various claims for
loss/damages. Again the "normal" process in calculating a claim is to identify, document
and analyze all relevant information.
Approach used by Johnson

1) Johnson does not rely on generally recognized methods or procedures to develop his
loss claim.
a) I have not seen any comprehensive business and/or marketing plans/studies
prepared or considered by Grathol in advance of the proposed Project that would
have established a contemporaneous base for financial expectations.
b} On a number of occasions, Johnson's response to questions about support for his
position was answered by replying that "the matter" was based on his "experience."
While experience is a valuable factor, it is not a substitute for proper analysis of
verifiable economic data or known and accepted methodologies for evaluating
economic data. Experience helps one to analyze and interpret valid data - not
automatically know what the data is or what it will reveal.
c) Specific deficiencies are further addressed below in the opinions that follow.

SUPPORTING DATA
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents
identified in Table 1.
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OPINION 2
The foundation and documentation both leading up to the conclusions and supporting the
conclusions are inadequate to provide a reliable basis for those conclusions.
This opinion is based upon:
1) Though Grathol has developed other properties - the subject Site was a "new" business
venture, in a new location.
However, according to the deposition testimony of Johnson (35/3 - 35/7) the due
diligence prior to acquisition of the Site was very limited.
In order to maximize the chances of success, any new business venture will precede
their start up with a deliberate and thorough analysis of conditions that are important to
success of the venture. This would include, by way of example, an investigation of the
following factors, none of which appear to have been completed to any reasonable
degree:
a) An analysis of the community profile and demographics.
b) An analysis of population densities, market demand and tenant profiles.
c) An analysis of general economic conditions affecting the relevant market area.
d) Engineering studies to properly understand conditions and requirements related to:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)

soils
water systems, sewer systems, and other utilities
road requirements, access and right-of-ways
set-asides and dedications
landscape and open area requirements
other development and code requirements

e) An analysis of required approvals from various governmental agencies.
f)

Prepare a time-line, illustrating activities, cash flows and financing or funding
requirements over the entire Project's development.

SUPPORTING DATA
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents
identified in Table 1.
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OPINION 3
Johnson's damage calculations reflecting a loss from real estate in the amount of $3,779,578 is
speculative, overstated and unreliable.
This opinion is based upon:
Johnson's calculations consist of three components:
Property Taken - ($2,532,578)

1) Johnson asserts a Property value of $3.23 a square foot, apparently based on what
appears to be generalized reference to a 29 acre parcel sold near Sagle Road for $2.69
a square foot. Then he cites that "experienced developers" would pay at least a 20%
premium for property at a signalized intersection. A 20% premium applied to the $2.69
price yields a value of $3.23.
It is unclear on what empirical data Johnson bases his 20%+ premium assertion and I
am unaware of any supporting market or other data that has been provided to confirm
his assertion.
Further, it is unclear how Johnson correlates solely the sale of the Sagle Road property
to the subject Property, as he has provided no supporting analysis.
2) Johnson's calculation is based on 18 acres. This appears to be a combination of
approximately 16.3 acres identified by ITD and additional land related to Sylvan Road.
It is unclear what Sylvan Road has to do with ITD's condemnation. Based on the
comments from other experts involved in this matter, it appears that any modification to
Sylvan Road has more to do with access requirements associated with development of
the Property - requirements in play regardless of the actions of ITD.
Based solely on Johnson's value of $3.23 per square foot, including the land associated
with Sylvan Road amounts to a loss overstatement of approximately $237,200.
Construction Delay- {$947,000)

1) It is unclear how delay damages are applicable, when Grathol was aware of the planned
ITD highway work before they entered into the Property acquisition.
2) Johnson provides no independent or verified information to support the values he
assigned to the Property not taken. The value assigned to the Property not taken
impacts his present value and associated loss calculation.
3) Johnson's calculation of present value, based on the numbers he uses, is
mathematically incorrect and understates his present value, which overstates his
asserted loss by approximately $34,500.
4) Johnson asserts that the Property not taken by ITD would remain at the same value over
his alleged delay period of three years. Accordingly, his calculation of the delay damage
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does not consider, and would be overstated based on any potential increase in value of
the underlying real estate that occurred over the time period covered by his calcuiation.
5) Johnson's calculation of value of the Property not taken - which is the basis for his
present value calculation, or delay damages, - is in conflict with, or duplicative of, his
listing of acreage of the Property taken. Effectively he includes the acreage and value of
the Sylvan Road Property in both calculations. To the extent that "excess" land is
included in the retained Property value, and depending on how this Property is valued,
his calculation of the present value loss will be further changed.
Value of Gravel - ($300,000)

1) Johnson provides no independent or verified basis for his assertion that there is
$300,000 of gravel that will be lost.
2) Based on the comments of other experts retained in this matter, it appears that Grathol's
rezoning of the property has now precluded mining of any gravel from the Site.
This would effectively overstate this portion of the claim by $300,000.
SUPPORTING DATA
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents
identified in Table 1.
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OP/NION 4
Johnson's conclusion on the Project's total development profit potential is speculative,
unreliable and improper.
This opinion is based upon:
1) The factors discussed in Opinions 1 and 2.
2) Johnson assumes 100% success on all land developmen t and related sales, and 100%
success on the build out and full occupancy of all lease units.
These assumptions are aggressive and not supported by any independently developed
corroborating data.
3) In addition, some specific problems associated with Johnson's analysis and conclusions
include the following, which further indicate that his calculations are overstated:
a) There is no independent data or analysis to support the underlying calculations
contained on Exhibit 34. This relates to all aspects of his projections including; sale
prices, lease rates and costs.
b) The potential development profit illustrated in Exhibit 34 reflects "profits" that will be
realized at some future point in time. A proper economic analysis would require
calculating the present value of these amounts - taking into account both the time
value of money and, more importantly, the risk inherent in achievement.
Johnson's use of a value for the retained Property (adjusted for present value) which
he compares to his calculation of development profits (not adjusted for present
value), is an improper match of amounts and significantly overstates the alleged
loss.
c) Part of Johnson's development loss calculation is based on the present value of
Property not taken. As addressed in Opinion 3, to the extent there are errors in the
calculation of the present value of that Property, those errors will also impact the
conclusions of the potential development profits.
d) Johnson's calculation includes development cost incurred to date, but no supporting
documentation or detail has been provided.
e) As discussed in Johnson's deposition (67/3- 67/12) Grathol's Project faced potential
competition from the opening of stores by Winco and Walmart.
f)

There was no commercial access to the Site. (Johnson 81/4 - 81/13)

g) An email dated November 14, 2008 noted that Super 1 Foods was previously looking
in the area a year or two ago but were turned away by no sewer availability.
(Johnson 146/5 -146/9)

6
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h} Discussions with prospective tenants never proceeded past the point of discussions.
(Johnson 176/3- 176/7) Grathol has produced no demonstrable commitments from
prospective tenants.
4) Grathol had knowledge of the condemnation prior to their purchase of the Site, and
thereby implicit knowledge of the ITD project and potential delays and uncertainty
associated with the acquisition and development of the Site.
5) I am not aware that Grathol has provided any substantive documentation to illustrate
their alleged success in similar projects.
6) Johnson's final conclusion compares the difference between his projected developed
value and the remaining Property's undeveloped value. This is not a proper comparison
as it presumes that the Property remaining after the highway project cannot or will not be
developed. This could have a substantial impact on his loss calculation.
SUPPORTING DATA
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents
identified in Table 1.
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OPINION 5
Review of the reports and conclusions of Hedley, Evans and Moe; reinforce my conclusions that
Johnson's loss assertions are speculative and unreliable.
This opinion is based upon:
1) Grathol took on many significant risks in conjunction with their acquisition of the subject
Property. It is a generally recognized economic principle that risk reduces value.
The additional risks appear to have put Grathol in a position of incurring additional and
likely unexpected costs.
2) As noted in the report of Evans, mmmg is not a permitted use based upon current
property zoning. This brings into question the validity of the gravel loss portion of
Grathol's claim.
3) Many other factors and cost outlays will potentially impact the economic viability of the
Site development:
Zoning.
Impact fees.
Public road development - Sylvan Road.
Commercial access to the Site.
Water systems will have to be developed as a prior attempt by Grathol to have the
Property annexed into the City of Athol was turned down.
f) There are no public sewer systems available. Additionally, location of the Property
over the Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer limits options and increases their expense.
g) Population density.
h) Competitors' proximity to larger communities will likely cause challenges for the
Project due to competitive factors.

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

4) Moe notes in his report that it is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, that a 56+ acre
development could be sustained on the Site.

SUPPORTING DATA
s
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or document
identified in Table 1.
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OPINION 6
Grathol is complaining about a process (the US95 project) they understand, and more troubling,
were aware of before they closed on the Property. It seems they now want to change the "rules
of the game" they knowingly and willingly entered.
This opinion is based upon:
1) In the Defendant HJ Grathol's Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, they note:
a) Hughes Investments and its various partnerships is a commercial real estate
developer not a land speculator.
b) With respect to the property at the northeast comer of Highways 95 and 54, in Athol
Idaho, Hughes Investments purchased this property in 2008 with the sole intent to
develop it into a commercial retail center/hospitality project.
c) Hughes Investments has a long history of successfully developing retail shopping
centers.
d) Hughes Investments has been designing, building and leasing shopping centers for
nearly forty years.
2) According to the deposition of Johnson (31/15 - 31/19) Grathol knew the property would
be impacted by the US95 project.

SUPPORTING DATA
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents
identified in Table 1.
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OPINION 7
of Sherwood
The Opinions of Moe, Sherwood and Johnson are widely divergent. The Opinions
and Johnson appear to be inconsistent with the economic times.
This opinion is based upon:
d to the
1) Schedu le 1 illustrates the opinions of value set forth in this matter, compare
original purchase price.
the real
2) From an outside perspective and from one who has seen many involved in
n"
Recessio
"Great
the
since
business
of
out
go
and
times
hard
on
fall
estate business
ts
defendan
the
began in late 2007 - early 2008, the values asserted by and on behalf of
property
on
impact
appear excessive. This is especially true in light of the recession's
paid by
values, the demand for commercial development and the purchase price
Grathol.

SUPPORTING DATA
documents
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or
identified in Table 1.
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TABLE 1

SUPPORTING DATA

1) Complaint
2) Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
3) Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
4) Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
5) Defendant HJ Grathol's Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
6) Letter to Ronald Harvey from Douglas Marfice dated June 28, 2010.
7) Letter to Mary York from Douglas Marfice dated October 27, 2010.
8) Deposition of Alan Johnson dated November 18, 2011 and related Exhibits.
9) Bates documents numbered 0964 -1416 inclusive.
10) Defendant HJ Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure
11) Property appraisal prepared by Dewitt Sherwood dated August 25, 2011.
12) Property appraisal prepared by Stanley Moe dated April 29, 2010.
13) Report of David Evans and Associates, Inc. dated December 14, 2011.
14) Report of George Hedley - Prelim Draft - dated December 15, 2011.
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DENNIS R, REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA
Birthdate:
Education:

University of Idaho
BS Agri-business, 1974
BS Business (Accounting), 1975

Certification:

Licensed in Idaho as CPA, 1976
CVA designation, 1995
ABV designation, 2001
ASA designation, 2003

Career
Experience:

Hooper Cornell, PLLC
Partner

January, 2002 - Present

Presnell·Gage Accounting & Consulting
Firm-wide supervisory responsibilities for business consulting services and
electronic data processing services
Boise office
Partner
Partner-in-charge
Partner
Moscow office
Partner-in-charge
Lewiston office
Partner
Manager
Staff Accountant

January, 1996 - December 31, 2001
October, 1991 - January, 1996
July, 1989- September, 1991
October, 1983 - June, 1989
May, 1980 - September, 1983
1979 - 1980
1975- 1978

Professional experience includes:
(1) Valuation of small businesses and professional practices.
(2) Assistance to clients with the analysis of business operations and significant
business transactions. These include negotiations on purchase and sale of a
business or business segments, including assistance with valuation of
business entities.
(3) Design and assist with implementation of financial accounting and control
systems for various clients served by the firm.
(4) Supervision of accounting and auditing services provided by the firm's
professional staff and consultation on procedures and methods of providing
client services.
(5) Member of team conducting review of complex mainframe and
microcomputer accounting systems.
(6) Co-authored and presented eight-hour course on cash management.
Presented other client educational seminars and seminars to other service
professionals such as bankers and aftorneys.
(7) Duties as a partner-in-charge included the responsibility for managing an
office and personnel in accordance with firm policies.
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DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA (Continued)
Career
Experience
continued:

Farmer's Home Administration -Assistant County Supervisor, 1974.
Duties included:
(1) Evaluation of credit applications and preparation of application packages
for review and approval.
(2) Residential real estate and farm appraisals.

Professional
Memberships
and Activities:

Idaho Society of CPAs, member
Chairman of Management of an Accounting Practice Committee
Member of Committees on
Public Relations
Continuing Professional Education
Relations with Bankers
Northern Chapter of Idaho Society of CPAs, president
American Institute of CPAs, member
American Society of Appraisers, member - Business Valuation
National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts, member
The Institute of Business Appraisers, member
Continental Association of CPAs, Past Chair of Litigation Services Committee and
Information Technology Committee
Boise Estate Planning Council, member, President and Treasurer
Past Vice President, Secretary and Program Chairman
Public Service
and Community
Activities:

Boise Chamber of Commerce
Member of Small Business Recognition Sub-committee
Member of Small Business Education and Advisory Sub-committee
Chair of Small Business Committee
Member of Garden City Chamber Council
Discovery Center of Idaho, Vice President of Board
Kiwanis
Moscow Chamber of Commerce
Past-President, V. Pres. Treasurer & Board member
Moscow Executive Association
Moscow Rotary
Lewiston Chamber of Commerce
Lewiston Jaycees
Held various offices & a member of Board of Directors
Prepared and presented accounting seminars for Human Advancement's
Inc., Minority Contractors Awareness Seminars and the Lewis-Clark
~Homebuilders Association.
Taught night classes in bookkeeping at the Clarkston Branch of Walla Walla
Community College.
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PRIOR DEPOSITION OR TRIAL TESTIMONY

The following is a list of cases in which I have given recorded testimony in the last four years.
1)

Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. Wheatland Agribusiness, Inc., et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - April 2008

2)

J.R. Simplot Company v. Nestle USA, Inc.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - May 2008

3)

United States of America ex rel. Cherri Suter and Melinda Harmer v. National Rehab
Partners, Inc. and Magic Valley Regional Medical Center
Deposition - Boise, Idaho -August 2008

4)

Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Construction, LLC, et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - September 2008

5)

George C. Turner. v. Russell E. and Victoria F. Turner
Trial - Murphy, Idaho - July 2009

6)

Ronald R. McCann. v. William V. Mccann, Jr., et al.
Hearing on Motion to Compel - Boise, Idaho-Augus t 2009

7)

Dare! Hardenbrook, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Co.
Trial - Boise, Idaho - January 2010

8)

Jean-Michel Thirion, et al. v. Brenda E. Sangster.
Hearing on Fees - Boise, Idaho - December 2010

9}

The City of Meridian v. Petra Incorporated
Trial - Boise, Idaho - March 2011

10)

Tim Hopkins v. Advantage Sales and Marketing Holdings, LLC
Trial - Boise, Idaho - December 2011

QUALIFICATIONS

See curriculum vitae attached.

COMPENSATION

Hourly rate of $295 plus out-of-pocket costs.
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PUBLICATIONS/PRESENTATIONS
The following is a list of publications I have authored or co-authored over the last 10 years.
1) litigation Questions, Problems & Solutions: The Bench, Bar and Clients Speak Out.
Participant on the client panel - presented to the Idaho State Bar Litigation Section on
January 10, 2003.
2) Using Business Valuations To Build An Estate - presented to the Boise Estate Planning
Council on November 3, 2003.
3) Business Valuation Basics - presented to the Boise Wells Fargo Business Bankers meeting
on December 5, 2003.
4) Business Valuation Basics: How to Use Valuation/Financial Theory to Increase the Value of
Your Business - presented to TechHeip, Manufacturers Luncheon on January 28, 2005.
5) Tax Planning for Sales of Real Estate - sponsored by Premier Alliance on March 16, 2005.
6) Valuation and Credit Analysis: Similarities and Differences - presented to Boise area U.S.
Bank business bankers on May 11, 2005.
7) The Guideline Publicly Traded Company Method and The Market Value of "invested"
Capital: Should Market Value of "Stakeholder" Capital be the Appropriate Reference Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2006.
8) A Hybrid Restricted Stock/Pre-I PO Data Point Lack of Marketability Discount for ESOP's. Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2007.
9) Pension Plans and Closely-Held Companies: Valuing Tricky Assets in Divorce - presented to
the Idaho State Bar Association on May 9, 2008.
10) Considerations in Starting a Dental Practice a) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, November 11, 2008
b) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, January 12, 2010
c) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, June 20, 2011
11) Co-presenter on damages in Personal Injury litigation to various Treasure Valley area law
firms - 2009.
12) An Update on Proposed IRS' Appraiser Penalty Procedures - published in ISCPA Adjusting
Entry, April 2010.
13) Co-presenter in "Accounting 101 Seminar for Attorneys" - sponsored by the National
Business Institute, Boise, Idaho August 12, 2010.
14) Co-presenter in "Buy-Sell Agreements: Recipe for Success or Roadmap to Ruin?" a) Presented to the Idaho State Bar - 2010 Advanced Estate Planning Seminar, September
11, 2010.
b) Presented to the Business and Corporate Law Section of the Idaho State Bar, September
14, 2011.
c) Presented to the Business Group of Holland & Hart, LLP, September 28, 2011.
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PUBUCA TIONS/PRESENTA TIONS - continued
15) Co-presenter in "So You Think You Want To Be An Expert Witness?" - sponsored by the
Idaho Society of CPA's, Boise, Idaho November 4, 2011.
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Schedule 1
ITD v. Grathol
SUMMARY OF ASSERTED VALUES - DAMAGES or LOSSES

1,450,000

Cost of 56.809 acre site - May 2008

5/28/08

Date of Value

Original
Purchase
16.314 acres taken (see below)
Time delay
Gravel

a

416,401

4/7/10

9/15/10

Stanley Moe

Skip Sherwood
Land
High
Low

Land
571,000

1,598,543
179,103

1,598,543
285,044

Alan Johnson
Land
2,532,578
947,000
300,000
8,671,994
(1,493,000)

Project Budget - Bates 1416
Profit after take
Rounding
Totals
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Calculation for value of 16.+ acres
Acres
Square feet per acre
Value per square foot
Calculated value
Rounding
Concluded value

Development

a

416,401

571,000

{2,646)
1,775,000

16.314
43,560
0.59
416,401
0
416,401

16.314
43,560
0.80
570,990
10
571,000

16.410
43,560
2.25
1,608,344
(9,801)
1,598,543

{3,587)
1,880,000

3,779,578

(1,994)
7,177,000

18.000
43,560
3.23
2,532,578
(0)
2,532,578

1 of 1
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BACKGROUND
Department (ITD) to
David Evans and Associates, Inc. (DEA) has been retained by the Idaho Transportation
Grathol. The case
HJ
vs.
provide litigation support and rebuttal expert witness testimony on the case ofITD
of a new freeway
ion
involves condemnation proceedings associated with right of way acquisition for construct
interchange near the intersection of US Highway 95 (US95) and State Highway 54 (SH54).
n of this report:
The following DEA personnel have worked on this assignment and participated in the preparatio
Carole Richardson, PE, Senior Project Manager/Transportation Planner
Ken Geibel, PE, Senior Civil Engineer
Kevin Picanco, PE, Senior Transportation Engineer
ent, Inc., in the
DEA has also worked with George Hedley, CEO of Hedley Construction and Developm
preparation and analysis of site plans on the subject property.
DEA' s responsibilities in support of ITD include:
s.
Review property site, zoning, existing and proposed land uses, and development regulation

co

selective pleadings in the litigation, including:
Order of condemnation (11-17-2010)
Complaint (11-19-2010)
Order granting possession ofreal property (1-27-2011)
n of
HJ Grathol answers and responses to first set of interrogatories and requests for productio
documents (4-15-2011)
for
o HJ Grathol supplemental answers and responses to first set of interrogatories and requests
production of documents (5-16-11)
and
o HJ Grathol second supplemental answers and responses to first set of interrogatories
1)
(9-19-201
ts
requests for production of documen
o HP Grathol third supplemental answers and responses to first set of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents

Review
o
o
o
o

e

•

Review
o
o
o
o

•

ITD right of way file documents, including:
Title datedown and title reports
Property legal description
4-7Appraisal for Right of Way Acquisition (Stanley Moe, Columbia Valuation Group, Inc.,
2010)
Revised official right of way plans (3-5-20 l 0)

Review documents produced by HJ Grathol, including:
o All west cost estimate for geotechnical evaluation (4-14-2010)
of
o Kootenai County Commissioners findings of fact for zone change application and order
decision (11-20-2008)
o CLC Associates, Inc. proposal for professional services (6-8-2009)

2
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0

o

and
Intermou ntain Transpor tation Solutions (ITS) traffic impact study scope, schedule
0)
probable cost estimate (7-16-201
ITS Trip Generatio n and Initial Operation s Analysis (9-10-2010)
Rezone Documen ts:
01
Hearing Examine r's report (9-2-2008)
" Zone change applicatio n (5-30-2008)
• Public hearing notices
Kootenai County correspon dence with Lakes Highway District, KMPO, and ITO
e
,. Misc email correspon dence between Hughes Investme nts, Kootenai County, Jim
Coleman, and others

e

"

including
Work with ITO to analyze before and after developm ent plans prepared by HJ Grathol,
confirm or
to
is
analysis
claims of land values, value ofland taken, and damages. DEA's role in this
code
ent
refute the legitimac y of facts and assumptio ns used by HJ Grathol pertainin g to developm
requireme nts, traffic access and circulatio n, and infrastruc ture costs.
role in this
Work with ITD to develop and analyze alternate developm ent plans for the site. DEA's
and
traffic
ce,
portion of the assignme nt is to provide informati on on land use regulatory complian
the site proposed
access issues, and site civil infrastruc ture costs in support of developm ent plans for
by Mr. Hedley.

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR
ANALYSIS
ZONING
Zone. Kootenai County
The HJ Grathol site is located in Kootenai County, and falls within the Commerc ial
at
line
on
available
is
and
nts,
Ordinanc e No. 401 provides county zoning code requireme
http://ww w.kc gov. us/depart ments/pla nning/ ordinance .asp

ALLOWABLE tAND USES
and service businesse s are
Hospitali ty businesse s, eating and drinking establishm ents, and wholesale , retail
expressly permitted uses within the commerc ial zone.
in the Commerc ial zone, the
While "Mini Storage" is not expressly identified as a permitted or condition al use
as a permitted use.
County considers mini-stor age to be a "service business, " which is expressly identified
RV storage) is required to be
Warehou se and storage facilities arc allowed, although all outside storage (such as
enclosed behind a site obscuring fence.
A "Recreati onal Vehicle Park" is an expressly permitted use within the Commerc ial-Zone.
a permitted use listed in the
Mining, including the developm ent of surface mines for gravel productio n, is not
County's regulation s for the Commerc ial Zone.
in Appendix A.
Other allowable uses are outlined in Chapter 9 of the County's zoning code, provided
3
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COUNTY DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS
and Supplementary
Developments in the Commercial Zone must comply with Design Standards (Chapter 17)
Regulations (Chapter I 9) of the zoning code.
ial use anticipated to
Uses on all parcels in the Commercial Zone fronting on a State Highway (or any commerc
Permit, subject to
Notice
Special
a
require
roads)
generate more than 50 vehicle trips per day on other public
nts of the
requireme
with
comply
also
must
rs
Develope
conditions as may be imposed through that process.
applicable Highway District and ITD.
Salient development requirements that would apply to the Grathol site are listed below.

Required Setbacks in Commercial Zone
Front yard:
Side yard:
Flanking street:
Rear yard:

35 feet
none
20 feet
15 feet

Design Standar ds
Building Coverage:
50% of the area of all sites must be left in open spaces free of structures
®
Parking Stall Requirements:
Offices: 3/1,000 sq. ft.
®
Retail Sales: 1/250 sq. ft.
11
Hotels/Motels: ]/rental unit, and 1/per regular employee on the largest shift
®
Restaurants: 1/250 sq. ft.
0
Warehouse & Wholesale: 1/800 sq. ft.
e
1 Handicapped Accessible parking stall required for every 35 parking stalls
11
Parking Lot Standards:
Parking Lots shall be paved
e
0
Parking must be located within 300' ft. of the building being served
Parking lots shall be paved with plant mix asphalt concrete or traffic rated concrete pavers
111
" Each parking space shall be delineated w/ a 3" line;
• Stall size 8' x 18'
Up to 25% oflot can be "compac t only," 7.5' x 15'
e
Aisle width:
c
o 90° - 24' for one- or two-way
o 60° -18' one-way, 23' two-way
o 45°-15'o neway,2 l'two-wa y
Turnarounds shall be 24' wide
e

Landscaping Require ments
•
..

,.
•

Irrigation is required for all landscaped areas
1 tree is required per 300 sq. ft. of landscaped area ( except as otherwise indicated)
o minimum 20 ft. in height, at maturity
o Minimum 2 inch caliper for deciduous
o Minimum 5 feet in height for evergreens
Landscaping must include 100% ground coverage within 5 years
ng along all other
Around primary structures: Strip of 25 feet of landscaping in front, with 15 feet of landscapi
sides; may include walkways ofup to 6 feet in width

4
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Pedestrian walkways shall be landscaped for their entire length
Public road frontage:
o Landscaping area of a minimum depth of 15' running entire length of public road frontage;
o Frontage buffers shall require a minimum of 3 trees and 3 shrubs for every 30' of public road frontage
Parking Lot Landscaping
o Lots 1- 50 spaces, 10% of area
o Lots 51-99 spaces, 15 % of area
o 100 or more spaces, 15% of the area
o No parking space can be further than 75' from a landscaped area

@

"'

®

Multiple Structure s per Lat

the open
More than one structure housing a permitted principal use may be erected on a single lot, provided that
19)
(Chapter
s
Regulation
tary
Supplemen
and
17)
space and other requirements of the Design Standards (Chapter
lot.
of the zoning code are met for each structure as though it were on an individual

Commercial Signs and Effect 011 Property Subdivision

The county's zoning ordinance prohibits off-premise signs in all zones. For commercial zones, one pole,
the parcel
projecting or banner sign is permitted per parcel, and one monument sign is permitted for each side of
that
is
nt
developme
l
commercia
liant
highway-re
for
t
that adjoins a roadway. The effect of this requiremen
individual parcels tend to be established for each distinct land use.

Public Road Requirem ents (Including Internal Streets)

The
Kootenai County zoning ordinance requires each commercial lot to have direct access to a public road.
to the
County's subdivision ordinance further requires that roads and associated rights-of-way be dedicated
with the
consistent
uses
l
commercia
with
site
Grathol
the
develop
applicable highway agency. ln order to fully
to
dedicated
and
parcels
interior
to
access
current zoning, a roadway would need to be constructed to provide
Lakes Highway District as a public roadway.

IMPACT FEES
Timberlake
Impact fees for the Grathol site would include tees for Sheriff~ Jail, Emergency Medical Services, and
tial
non-residen
for
ft.
.
of$2.07/sq
fees
Fire District. Lakes Highway District is non-participating. Total impact
451
No.
Ordinance
construction on this site is due at the time of building permit issuance. (See Kootenai County
provided in Appendix A).
LAND USE DENSITIES AND GROWTH ASSUMPTIONS

The US
The HJ Grathol site is located near the City of Athol, in a rural portion of northern Kootenai County.
period
a
Census indicates a population of 676 in 2000, and 688 in 2009 for Athol, notably low growth during
of
when rapid expansion was observed elsewhere in the region. The surrounding area consists primarily
acres.
5
of
size
lot
minimum
a
undeveloped land and rural residential properties with
east of the HJ
,~-...The small resort community of Bayview, located on Lake Pend Oreille approximately eight miles
of
proportion
high
a
has
community
Grathol site, has a current self-stated year-round population of 276. This
second homes and vacation properties.
Figure I shows existing population densities within a five-mile radius of the Grathol site.

5
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planning
The Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization (KMPO) is responsible for long range transportation
future
for
s
assumption
use
land
and
within Kootenai County, including the development of growth projections
land use
l/industrial
year analysis, Figures 4 and 5 show 2005 actual and 2030 forecasted housing and commercia
site are very
density maps from KMPO's adopted long range plan, Existing land use densities around the Grathol
low, and are not anticipated to change appreciably over the next 20 years,

EFFECT OF HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENTS ON LAND VALUES
near
Although land use densities surrounding the Grathol site do not appear conducive to development in the
long term
term, it is reasonable to anticipate that the site will benefit through increased property valuation over the
provides
Program
Research
e
Cooperativ
Highway
National
The
as a result of the US95 highway improvements,
1
indicates
guidelines for estimating changes in business productivity related to highway improvements, Research
and
safety
improving
by
nt
that new freeway facilities can increase market accessibility for commercial developme
and
reducing travel times for potential customers, These effects have been shown to facilitate business growth
values
productivity, resulting in increased profitability that typically translates to increased commercial property
over time,
highway
Several case studies have been performed to examine the general effect of highway improvements and
access management measures on property values:
"

A case study of!ong-ter m business and land development impacts associated with I-394 freeway
an
development in Minnesota found that "the corridor economic impacts of upgrading the highway from
arterial facility to a freeway were largely - in fact almost entirely-p ositive in nature,, ,Commercial land
values increased significantly,"2

"'

A case study of the Superstition Freeway Corridor (US60) in Arizona found that non-residential
development, especially retail, increased much more rapidly after freeway development than other areas
3
of the Tempe region, and vacant commercial land appeared to be valued more highly than expected,

.,

A study of the effects oftransp01iation projects on property values in Washington State found that
commercial and industrial land owners cited freeway proximity as a reason for purchasing property or
locating their business, yet still tended to underestimate anticipated prope1iy value benefits of the freeway
improvments, Following construction of l-405, freeway corridor property values were shown to
4
appreciate 17% faster than similar areas that were uninfluenced by highway changes,

.,

Additional research conducted on highway access changes in Texas, Iowa, and Florida found that
perceived negative impacts claimed by commercial property and business owners were far greater

Economic Effects of
Forkenbroc k, David and Weisbrod, Glen, NCHRP Report 456, Guidebook for Assessing Social and
2001,
Board
Research
on
Transportat ion Projects, Transportati
t:
2 Plazak, David and Preston, Howard, Long-Term Business and Land Developmen t Impacts of Access Managemen
(S;inthesized
University
State
Iowa
Education,
and
Minnesota Interstate 394 Case Study, Center for Transpmiati on Research
ation,)
by authors from their June 2007 1394 Business Impact Report prepared for Minnesota Department ofTtansport
for the
3 Carey, Jason, Impact of Highways on Property Values: Case Study of the Superstition Freeway Corridor, Prepared
Ari zonal Deparmtnet of Transpo1iation, October 200 l,
4 Palmquist, Raymond B,, Impact of Highway Improvemen ts on Property Values in Washington , Washington State
Transportat ion Commission in Cooperation with US Department of Transportation, March, 1980.
1
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"before" highway improveme nts were completed than actually experienced "after" the highway projects
were complete. 5

TRAFFIC AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS
JTD Access Managem ent Policy
IV. After
Under existing conditions, US-95 and SH-54 site frontages are classified by ITD as access control Type
front the
that
site
subject
the
of
portions
remaining
the
ofUS-95
reroute
construction of the Athol Interchange and
new US-95 alignment will be classified as access control Type V.

Private driveway approaches are not allowed under Type IV Access Control as detailed in ITD's Access
conditions
Manageme nt Standards. Public roadway intersections are allowed at a spacing of0.5 miles for urban
are
and 1.0 miles for rural conditions. Under Type V access control conditions, no private access approaches
allowed and public roadway intersection spacing is 1.0 mile for urban conditions and 3.0 mi-les for rural
conditions.
new
ITD's Access Manageme nt Standards include a variance and appeal process for projects applying for
or
criteria
certain
meet
approaches
highway accesses. ITD may consider variances if the project or proposed
conditions spelled out in the Access Manageme nt Standards.
Lakes Highway District Access Policy and Requirem ents
Lakes Highway District uses access policy guidelines provided in the Local Highway Technical Assistance
manual,
Council (LHTAC) Manual.for Use of Public Right-of Way Standard Approach Policy. According to this
minimum
the
to
limited
be
should
approach spacing should be 330 feet minimum and the number of approaches
than two
number required to adequately serve the needs of the property. The standard policy is to allow no more

approaches for any single property frontage.

Other Access Considerations

roadways
In approving site plans for new developments, Kootenai County encourages developers to connect new
e on
dependenc
reduce
and
circulation
traffic
local
to the existing roadway network at logical points to facilitate
state highway facilities for short trips.
Emergency
The County also consults with emergency responders on access needs during the subdivision process.
and
ingress
response agencies typically desire at least two ways into and out of large developments for efficent
egress of emergency vehicles.
Access to ll] Grathol Site
US-95 or
Based on records provided there are currently no permitted commercial accesses to the subject site from
SH-54.

three 20-foot
A warranty deed executed January 3, 1967 by ITD and a prior owner of the Grathol site provided for
l use.
wide driveway approaches to SH54. However, these accesses are limited to residential and agricultura
that the
(None of the three approaches described in the warranty deed has actually been constructed.) Given
access
the
of
uses
l
agricultura
and
residential
for
property now has Commercial zoning, the deed restrictions
University of
Williams, Kristine, Economic Impacts of Access Management, Center for Urban Transpo1iation Research,
South Florida, January 28, 2000.

5

7
507 of 1617

!TD v. HJ Grathol
December 16, 2011
ITDX0000-0084

DAVID EVANS
ANoASSOCIA TES 1Nc.

be constructed and used for
points described in the warranty deed mean that none of the deeded access points may
commerc ial access.
ITD's construction
There is one public road access along the SH-54 frontage of the subject site shown in
Grathol would be
below,
discussed
As
documen ts for the US95 interchange project for future Sylvan Road.
ent approval.
developm
of
required to construct and dedicate Sylvan Road on the Grathol property as a condition
Highway District's
Access to the Grathol site could also likely be permitted from Howard Road under Lakes
current access standards .
the public road approach
A develope r seeking additional commercial highway access for the Grathol site beyond
A private driveway
permit.
approach
ial
commerc
a
provided for Sylvan Road would need to apply to ITD for
ent policy. An
managem
access
approach to either US95 or SH54 would be inconsistent with the state's highway
nts in
requireme
spacing
the
additional public road approach to the Grathol site from SH54 would likely not meet
the state's access managem ent policy.

Sylvan Road

of the Grathol site that
As part of the freeway project, lTD is construct ing a frontage road for properties north
will not be
however,
property,
would otherwise be landlocked after losing access to US95. The Grathol
and ITD has
cast,
the
landlocked after freeway construction. The Grathol property fronts Howard Road on
indicated for future
provided for a new public road approach from SH54 to the Grathol site at the location
connection of Sylvan Road.
be required for
Under the County's subdivision code, a new public roadway such as Sylvan Road would
ing and dedicating new
construct
for
costs
The
subdivisi on and commerc ial developm ent of the Grathol property.
Sylvan Road is not
Because
public roadways required for developm ent are typically borne by the developer.
or surrounding private
needed to cure a landlock condition caused by the freeway project for the Grathol site
properties, the public should not be responsible for the construction costs of this roadway.

LINE OF SIGHT FROM FREEWAY TO PROPERTY
relative to the Grathol site
Cross-sections depicting the proposed freeway and interchange location and elevation
site should be visible
are shown on Figure 12. The cross-sections indicate that site and structures on the Grathol
from the new US95 freeway.
INFRAST RUCTUR E REQUIR EMENTS

Water Availabi lity

water system is located
No public water system is currently available at the HJ Grathol site. The closest public
limits and service
west ofUS-95 within the city limits of Athol. The Grathol property falls outside the city
the property into the
of
n
annexatio
require
boundarie s of Athol. Therefore obtaining city water service would
in February of2008
nts
Investme
City of Athol. Annexati on of the subject property was attempted by Hughes
and denied by the City of Athol in March of 2008.
ty water system in
Without annexation, developm ent of the prope1ty will require the establishment of a communi
water rights with the
accordance with applicabl e state iaw. The developer will be required to acquire adequate
nce with the
conforma
in
system
a
construct
and
Idaho Depaitme nt of Water Resource s (IDWR) and design
ion of a
construct
and
g
requirements of the Idaho Departme nt of Environm ental Quality (DEQ). Permittin
8
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to meet domestic and
commercial well, appropriate water storage, and a booster pump station would be required
fire protection requirements.

Sewer Requirements

(PHD) are responsible
The Idaho Departme nt of Environmental Quality (DRQ) and the Panhandle Health District
Kootenai County.
for the review and permitting of onsite wastewater treatment and disposal facilities within
With the lack of an
Currently no public sewer systems are available to provide service to the Grathol property.
ion of an onsite
construct
require
will
property
the
of
existing municipal sewer system, large scale development
treatment and disposal system to serve the new development.
limitations and special
The property is located over the Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer (RPA) and as such there are
designated by EPA as a
requirements associated with the disposal of the treated wastewater. The RPA has been
to the boundary
sole source aquifer which means it is a principal source of drinking water for an area. Adhering
resource aquifer
defined by EPA, the state of Idaho has additionally categorized the aquifer as a sensitive
d that all activities
establishe
has
DEQ
on,
designati
affording it special protection. Through the sensitive resource
the existing
improve
or
maintain
that could impact the water quality of the aquifer must be carried out so that they
quality of the ground water.
and has adopted
In addition to DEQ, the Panhandle Health District also recognizes the EPA aquifer boundary
septic systems over the
rules governing the infiltration of treated wastewater. Under the "one to the five" rule,
facilities other than
to
applied
When
parcel.
acre
five
RPA are limited to the equivalent of one dwelling per
allowed.
dwellings, 250 gallons of wastewater per day per every 5 acres of property is
than 2,500 gallons per day
To assure ground water protection, DEQ requires commercial projects generating more
athogen evaluation of
of wastewater or anyone wishing to land-apply treated wastewater to complete a nutrient-p
n helps predict whether
the proposed wastewater system as part of their application for a permit. This evaluatio
water
ground
prevent
to
as
so
level
sufficient
a
effluent from the treatment system will be treated to
be completed
study
logic
hydrogeo
a
that
contamination. As part of the pennittin g process, DEQ will also require
property.
the
of
am
to show that there would be zero degradation to the groundwater up to 1,000 feet downstre
er for a project of this
Based on discussions with DEQ, the only permitted means of disposing of treated wastewat
A or Class B treated level
size and nature over the RPA would be through treatment of the waste stream to a Class
growing season. (Land
and reuse of the wastewater for irrigation and vegetated land application throughout the
irrigation," or "crop
"crop
as
to
referred
y
commonl
application of treated wastewater over vegetated areas is
of treated wastewater
Storage
.
application," even if there is no intent to harvest the vegetation for other purposes)
would be required during the non growing season in a lined lagoon.

Roadwa y lnfh,stm cture

west, and Howard Road
The HJ Grathol property currently is bordered by Highway 54 on the south, US-95 on the
the approximate midway
on the cast. Sylvan Road would intersect and terminate at Highway 54 from the south at
point between US-95 and Howard Roads.
improvement
With or without the interchange project, any development of the property will trigger roadway
to serve the
both
requirements. Within the property boundaries, the extension of Sy Ivan Road will be needed
the final configuration
development and to provide consistency in the overall area road network. Depending upon
roadway may also be
of the development, improvements to Howard Road as well as additional interior public
developer.
the
by
borne
be
required for access and circulation. These improvements and costs would
9
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If development were to occur without the interchange, additional roadway improvements to US-95 and Highway
54 in the form of acceleration\ deceleration lanes and turn pockets would likely need to be constructed by the
developer. With the interchange project, the improvement s to Highway 54 as well as the modifications to US-95
will be constructed by ITD as part of the overall interchange project.

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PARAMETERS· SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
•

Retail, restaurant and motel land uses proposed by HJ Grathol are consistent with County zoning
regulations.

•

Surface mining for gravel production is not a permitted use in the Commercial zone.
Current population densities in the surrounding are very low, fluctuate seasonally, and do not
appear adequate to support significant commercial development in the near term.

•
•
•

Based on national case studies, the US95 freeway improvements can be anticipated to contribute to
future property value increases at the HJ Grathol site.
There are no existing deeded access points to the HJ Grathol site which may serve commercial uses.
Previous access points provided by warranty deed were limited to residential and agricultural uses,
and are not valid for access to future commercial developments.

•

An on-site wastewater treatment system including land application of treated wastewater in the
growing season and storage for winter wastewater flows would be needed for any significant
commercial development at the HJ Grathol site.

•

Water service from the City of Athol is not available without annexation, and a previous attempt at
annexation of the HJ Grathol site was rejected by Athol. Development of a commercial water
system would be needed to serve any new development.

•

The HJ Grathol site will not be landlocked by the new freeway project. An interior public road,
such as Sylvan Road, is therefore not needed to address a landlocked condition, but would be
required by the County for commercial subdivision and development of the HJ Grathol site.

•

Without the new freeway project, the developer would be responsible for constructing turn lanes
and other improvements to US95 and SH54 in order to accommodate traffic impacts at the site.
The new freeway project will construct a new public roadway intersection at Sylvan Road and
additional developer-constructed highway improvements are not anticipated to he needed.

•

The freeway interchange and Type V access control will serve to gather on and off traffic on US95
at the Grathol site, enhancing its value and utility for commercial development.

HJ GRATHOL SITE PLAN ANALYSIS
Before and after site plans provided by HJ Grathol are shown in figures 6 and 7.

PROPOSED LAND USES
Grathol site plans show only slight variations in proposed land uses "before" and "after" the freeway project:

10
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Proposed Land Use
M~jor Retail
Small Retail
Motel
Restauran t
Gas Station
Travel Plaza

"Before"
40,000 sf grocery
3 buildings
approx 5,000 sf each
2 buildings
200 rooms
3 buildings
fast food or similar
1.3 acre site
7 acre site

"After"
Sarne
1 building
approx 5,000 sf
Same
6 buildings
same
same

support the size and number
Given current and projected population densities for the area, the ability of the area to
n densities of
populatio
ative
represent
show
3
of retail uses proposed by Grathol is questioned. Figures 2 and
of the Grathol
vicinity
the
in
comparab le areas used by Grathol for land valuation purposes. Population densities
cases
in some
site are lower than comparable properties selected by HJ Grathol for appraisal purposes,
significantly lower.
DEVELO P ABLE AREA

has shown adequate space
In review of the Grathol "before" or "after" site plans it appears that neither condition
site has been maximized
to meet the code requirements for addressing landscaping and stormwat er needs. The
Additionally, no area has
for building and parking layout without consideration of landscape codes requirements.
er.
been identified or set aside to address disposal of treated wastewat
that would use recycled
Based on discussions with DEQ, HJ Grathol is proposing a wastewater disposal system
months. However, at
winter
the
wastewat er for irrigation during the summer months and simply infiltrate during
aquifer. Approval of
this time DEQ has never approved this type of system within Idaho over a sensitive resource
such a system would be precedent-setting and is considered unlikely.
e concepts prepared by
For the purpose of evaluating the HJ Grathol plans, as well as development of alternativ
be accomplished
would
er
wastewat
treated
the
of
DEA and George Hedley, we have assumed that disposal
season.
through landscape irrigation and crop application during the growing
is being developed and the
Commercial wastewater flows can vary significantly based on the type of facility that
for large systems other
expected use. Estimated daily wastewat er flows were based on typical design standards
than residential development:
Land Use
Retail (shopping center)
Motel
Restaurant (interstate or
through highway)
Gas Station
Travel Plaza (w/showers and
laundry)

Design Unit
per 1,000 sf of floor space
per room
per scat
-·-··-~.

Flow (gpd)
200-300
130
180

per vehicle served
per parking space

10
75
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When applied to the "before" and "after" proposed land uses as shown on the HJ Grathol plans, estimated
wastewater flows of 67,600 gpd and 86,700 gpd respectfully could be anticipated.
Proposed Land
Use
Major Retail
Small Retail
Motel
Restaurant

Gas Station
Travel Plaza
Totals

"Before"

Est. Flow (gpd)

"After"

Est. Flow (gpd)

40,000
3 buildings
approx 5,000 sf each
2 buildings
200 rooms
3 buildings
120 total seats

10,000
3,750

same
1 building
approx 5,000 sf
same

10,000
1,250

250 vehicles per day
50 parks

26,000

26,000

21,600

6 buildings
240 total seats

43,200

2,500
3,750
67,600

same
same

2,500
3,750
86,700

The combination of uses in the "after" condition shown by HJ Grathol would result in higher wastewater
infrastructure needs than those shown in HJ Grathol's "before" condition. This is an inconsistency that skews the
perceived cost impacts of the right of way taking.
In the "before" condition, our analysis indicates 32 acres would be needed for land application of wastewater.
The uses shown in HJ Grathol's "after" site plan would require 43 acres for land application of wastewater.
However, since similar uses have been proposed by HJ Grathol in the "before" and "after" scenarios, a more
defensible estimate may be obtained by assuming the same number, type and intensity of uses in both "before"
and "after" scenarios. We have therefore assumed 32 acres for wastewater land application would be needed in
both before and after Grathol scenarios.
In the "before" condition, approximately 24 acres are available for land application of wastewater, so an
additional 8 acres would need to be acquired by HJ Grathol to support the development shown in the "before"
condition. In the "after" condition, 17 acres are available, and HJ Grathol would need to acquire an additional 15
acres.

Therefore, if HJ Grathol's development proposal was deemed feasible, HJ Grathol would need to acquire 7 acres
more in the "after" condition for wastewater land application than in the "before" condition.
In addition to the crop area needed, lagoon storage of between 1.2 million and 1.6 million cubic feet would be
necessary to store the treated wastewater through the winter months.

ACCESS AND CIRCULATION

Before
Grathol's "before" condition site plans show two new private driveway accesses to US-95, two new private
driveway accesses to SH-54, and a public road approach to SH54 for Sylvan Road. The new private accesses to
SH-54 and/or US-95 would not be consistent with ITD's Access Management policy. The developer would have
to apply for a variance or appeal a denial of access and generally demonstrate that the proposed accesses would
12
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not diminish traffic operations or safety along the highways. In our opinion, one access at most could be
permitted for the US-95 frontage (likely with tum restrictions) through the variance or appeal process. One to two
commercial access points (possibly with turn restrictions) may be permitted through the variance or appeal
process for SH-54.

After
Grathol's "after" condition site plan shows no private approaches to SH-54, with primary site access for the
prope1iy east of the new freeway provided by one public road approach to SH54 for a new n01ih-south roadway
(Sylvan Road). This proposal provides a good and sufficient primary access point for commercial development.
Provided that Sylvan Road is connected at its north end to a new county roadway, it is reasonable to expect that
the developer's proposed scenario will be accepted by ITO, Lakes Highway District and Kootenai County.
The remainder piece fronting old US-95 (Blair Castle Road) shows two new accesses. According to Lakes
Highway District's approach manual guidelines, only one access would be permitted; however, given the
expected low traffic volumes on Blair Castle Road, it may be reasonable for the developer to apply for two access
points.

INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS
Development costs were estimated for both "before" and "after" conditions for the HJ Grathol layouts and are
summarized below. The cost of the wastewater treatment system in both the before and after condition was
estimated based on anticipated flows for the long-term fully developed condition. In both Grathol's before and
after condition there is inadequate property available to accommodate land application of the wastewater that
would be generated, and additional property would need to be acquired. An acquisition cost of the additional
property has not been included in the cost summaries below.

Before
Off-site
Sylvan Road
Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights)
US-95 and Hwy 54 Improvements (accel-decel lanes)
Commercial Water system
Wastewater Treatment System (system, lagoon, land app)
Sub-total

$338,000
$222,360
$250,000
$635,000*
$2,138, 740* *
$3,584,100

*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial water
system to serve the property.
**The land application area needed to support the quantity of wastewater that would be generated by the uses shown on Grathol's
"before" site plan exceeds the area available.

A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%)
Platting and Survey
Inspection/Testing/Staking ( 10%)
Permits & Fees (3%)
Contingency (10%)
Sub-total
Total Off-Site

$537,615
$35,000
$358,410
$107,523
$358,410
$1,396,958
$4,981,058

13
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On-site
Private Drive
Private Drive Utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights)
Sub-total

$211,000
$275,700
$486,700

A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%)
Inspection/Testing/Staking (10%)
Permits & Fees (3%)
Contingency (10%)
Sub-total

$73,005
$48,670
$14,601
$48,670
$184,946

Total On-Site

$671,646

Summary of Costs (before)
Total Off-Site Improvements
Total On-Site Improvements
Total

$4,981,058***
$671,646
$5,662,704

uses
***Costs do not include acquisition costs ofadditional land needed to accommodate land application of wastewater for the
shown.

After
Off-site
Sylvan Road
Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwT, tele, gas, cable, street lights)
Commercial Water system
Wastewater Treatment System (system, lagoon, land app)
Sub-total

$338,000
$242,000
$708,500*
$2,412,255**
$3,700,755

*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial water
system to serve the property.
**The land application area needed to support the quantity of wastewater that would be generated by the uses shown on Grathol's
"before" site plan exceeds the area available.

Sub-total

$555,113
$35,000
$370,075
$111,022
$370,074
$1,441,284

Total Off-Site

$5,142,039

Total

$5,142,039
$0***
$5,142,039****

A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%)
Platting and Survey
Inspection/Testing/Staking (10%)
Permits & Fees (3%)
Contingency (10%)

Summary of Costs (after)
Total Off-Site Improvements
Total On-Site Improvements

***In the "after" condition, all anticipated commercial parcels are served by a public road, therefore on-site costs (private drives
and private drive utilities) are zero.
uses
****Costs do not include acquisition costs of additional land needed to accommodate land application of wastewater for the
shown.
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HJ GRATHOL SITE PLAN ANALYS[S - SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
Substantial questions exist as to the ability of the surrounding area to support the number and
intensity of commercial land uses shown on both "before" and "after" site plans provided by HJ
Grathol.

@

Site plans provided by HJ Grathol show relatively modest differences in the size, number and types
of proposed hmd uses "before" and "after the freeway project, indicating that the freeway project
does not significantly change their stated development plans.

"'

While the land use types are similar, the combination of uses in the "after" condition shown by HJ
Grathol would result in higher wastewater infrastructure needs than those shown in the "before"
condition. This is an inconsistency that skews the perceived cost impacts of the right of way taking.

®

"

HJ Grathol is proposing a wastewater treatment system that has not previously been approved by
the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) over the Rathdrum Prairie aquifer. Under
current DEQ requirements, the level of development proposed by HJ Grathol in both "before" and
"after" scenarios could not be accomplished with the land owned by HJ Grathol. Without a
precedent-setti ng variance from DEQ, HJ Grathol would need to acquire additional property for
land acquisition of wastewater in both their "before" and "after" scenarios.

..

We estimate that HJ Grathol would have to acquire 7 acres more in their proposed "after"
condition than in their "before" condition for wastewater land application.

"'

Water service from the City of Athol is not available without annexation, and the City has rejected
a prior annexation application for the HJ Grathol site. A commercial water system would need to
be developed to serve the property.

"

The highway access scenario shown in HJ Grathol's "before" condition is inconsistent with ITD's
access management policy. HJ Grathol would have been required to apply for commercial
approach permits for all commercial highway access points shown in their site plan, and would
have had to request variances from ITD since the approaches would not have complied with
applicable access management standards.

o

The access scenario shown in HJ Grathol's "after" site plan is reasonable and sufficient to serve
commercial development on the site. The "after" access scenario shown would likely receive
required approvals by ITD, Lakes Highway District and Kootenai County.

"

For commercial access to Blair Castle Road (Old US95) in the "after" condition, HJ Grathol would
be required to apply for commercial approach permits from Lakes Highway District.

"

ITD is providing a public road approach to SH54 for Sylvan Road, so no permit application should
be required of the developer for this highway access point. A single public road approach to SH54
(for Sylvan Road) will provide reasonable, safe and sufficient access for commercial development
on the portion of HJ Grathol property east of the new freeway, provided that Sylvan Road does not
dead-end on the Grathol property. Sylvan Road will need to bewnnected to the new county road
north of the HJ Grathol site in order to provide good local street connectivity and adequate
ingress/egress for emergency vehicles.

e

HJ Grathol would be required to design and construct Sylvan Road in order to commercially

subdivide and develop the property. The developer would be required to coordinate the design of

15
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Sylvan Road with Lakes Highway District, and also to obtain commercial driveway approach
permits from Lakes Highway District for accesses to private properties from Sylvan Road.
o

Once completed, HJ Grnthol would be required to dedicate Sylvan Road on its property to Lakes
Highway District.

ALTERNATE SITE PLANS PROPOSED BY GEORGE HEDLEY AND DEA
Alternate "before" and "after" parcel layouts and development concepts prepared by DEA in consultation with
George Hedley are shown in figures 8 thru 11.

SUGGESTED LAND USES
In reviewing the realistic potential development for this site, substantial questions were raised as to the ability of
the area to support the development scenarios proposed by HJ Grathol in the near term given current and
forecasted population densities. The near-term development potential of the property has been further reduced by
the recent economic downturn, an unfortunate turn of events unrelated to ITD's highway improvement project.
DEA discussed potential alternate land development scenarios in consultation with George Hedley of Hedley
Construction, and Stan Moe of Columbia Valuation Group. Our team determined that ifwe were the owners of
the property, realistic options would be to a) sell the undeveloped property as-is, orb) hold it on speculation for
the longer term, deferring development plans until the economy turns around and background growth in the area
reaches sufficient population densities to justify improving the property.
Given these considerations, Mr. Hedley proposed a long-term development scenario for the prope1ty, beginning in
approximately 10 to 15 years, with buildout anticipated beyond a 20-year horizon. For this analysis, we examined
land uses similar to those suggested by HJ Grathol, scaled to address wastewater disposal constraints. Our buildout proposal includes a retail anchor such as a grocery store, along with smaller retail, a motel, restaurant, gas
station and travel plaza.
DEVELOPABLE AREA

For both the "before" and "after" site plan scenarios prepared by Mr. Hedley and DEA, the developable area was
generally driven by the proposed type of use and the land needed to accommodate the wastewater that would be
generated from those proposed land uses. Estimated daily wastewater flows were based on the typical rates
previously indicated.
When applied to the "before" and "after" proposed land uses as shown on the DEA/Hedley site plans, estimated
wastewater flows of 40,000 gpd and 35,000 gpd respectfully could be anticipated.
Suggested Land
Use
Major Retail
Small Retail
Motel

"Before"

Est. Flow (gpd)

"After"

Est. Flow (gpd)

- --40,000 sf
2 buildings
approx 15,000 sf
1 buildings
60 rooms

10,000
3,750

same
same

10,000
3,750

7,800

same

7,800
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1 buildings
40 total seats

7,200

same

7,200

250 vehicles per day
50 parks

2,500
3,750
5,000
40,000

same
same
NIA

2,500
3,750
0
35,000

Restaurant

Gas Station
Travel Plaza
Future Develop.
Totals

-

As with the prior analysis presented for the Grathol site plans, treated wastewater would be used for irrigation of
landscape areas within the development, with remaining wastewater disposed through vegetated land application
during the growing season. Based on the estimated flows outlined above, approximately 17 acres of irrigated crop
area would be needed in the "before" condition and 14.5 acres in the "after" condition to dispose of the recycled
wastewater. Additionally approximately 750,000 cubic feet of lagoon storage would be necessary to store the
treated wastewater through the winter months.

ACCESS AND CIRCULATION

Before
ITD Access Management guidelines include a variance and appeal process. For the purposes of our site analysis,
we assumed that in the "before" condition, the site developer would apply for a variance or approval to construct
one right in/right out private driveway approach to US 95 that does not comply with the Type IV access
guidelines. Left turns to and from US95 would not likely be permitted by ITD for safety reasons and to prevent
adverse impacts on traffic flow.
In the "before" condition, we further assumed a new public road would be constructed by the developer through
the site, for access to commercial parcels presumed to be created through the subdivision process. This public
roadway through the site would connect to SH54 in two locations, providing adequate ingress and egress for
emergency vehicles. The developer would need to seek and obtain a variance on the access spacing requirements
in order for two public road approaches to SH54 to be permitted. We further assumed that turning restrictions
may be imposed by ITD at one or both of these approaches to SH54.

After
Property East of New Freeway. In the "after" condition, the construction of the interchange precludes the
possibility of a direct driveway approach to US95, instead allowing safer access to the site via freeway offramps
to SH54.
In the "after" condition, one public road approach from SH54 (for Sylvan Road) is assumed to provide primary
access to the portion of the Grathol site east of the new freeway. Interior access to new commercial parcels that
are presumed to be created through the subdivision process is provided off Sylvan Road. Sylvan Road could be
extended northerly through the Grathol property to connect to a new public roadway at the north edge of the
property. This would support good local north-south connectivity for local traffic, reducing reliance on the state
highway for short trips, and providing adequate access to the Grathol property for emergency response vehicles.
Property West of New Freeway. The small remainder piece west of the new US95 alignment will continue to
have frontage on existing US-95 (Blair Castle Road after completion of the freeway project). This p01tion of
existing US95 will be relinquished by ITD to Lakes Highway District upon completion of the new interchange.
17
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Under Lakes Highway District approach guidelines, the remainder parcel would be permitted one access on Blair
Castle Road. Given the expected low traffic volumes on Blair Castle Road, our team assumed it would be
reasonable for the developer to request a variance from Lakes Highway District to allow two access points.

INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS

Before
Off-site
Sylvan Road
Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tcle, gas, cable, street lights)
interior Public Road
interior Public Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights)
US-95 and Hwy 54 Improvements (accel-decel lanes)
Commercial Water system
Wastewater Treatment System (system, lagoon, land app)
Sub-to/al

$282,000
$195,880
$291,000
$170,100
$200,000
$635,000*
$1,501.500
$3,275,480
$491,322

A&E Fees (Geotcch & Eng. Design) (15%)
Platting and Survey
inspection/Testing/Staking (I 0%)
Permits & Fees (3%)
Contingency (10%)

$35,000
$327,548
$98,264
$327,548
Sub-total

Total Off-Site

$1,279,682

$4,555,162

*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial
water system to serve the property.

On-site
Private Drive
Private Drive Utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights)
Sub-total

$149,000
$] 36.500
$285,500
$42,825
$28,550
$8,565

A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%)
Inspection/Testing/Staking ( I 0%)
Permits & Fees (3%)
Contingency (I 0%)
Sub-total

Total On-Site

$28.550
$108,490

$393,990

Summary of Costs (before)
$4,555,162

Total Off-Site Improvements
Total On-Site Improvements

$393,490

Total

$4,949,152
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After
Off-site
Sylvan Road
Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights)
Commercial Water system
Wastewater Treatment System (system, lagoon, land app)
Sub-total

A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%)
Platting and Survey
Inspection/Testing/Staking (I 0%)
Permits & Fees (3%)

$317,000
$232,820
$708,500*
$1,340,550
$2,598,870
$389,830
$35,000
$259,887

Contingency (10%)
Sub-total

Total Off-Site

$77,966
$259,887
$1,022,570

$3,621,440

*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial
water system to serve the prope11y.

Summary of Costs (after)
Total Off-Site Improvements
Total On-Site Improvements

$3,621,440
$0**

Total

$3,621,440

**In the "after" condition, all commercial parcels are served by a public road, therefore on-site costs (private drives and private drive
utilities) are zero.

ALTERNATE DEA/HEDLEY SITE PI.AN - SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
•

Based on existing and forecasted population densities, it does not appear the surrounding area will
support significant commercial development at the HJ Grathol site within the next 10 to 15 years.

•

As a long-term (15 to 20-year) development scenario, commercial uses similar to those proposed by
Grathol were suggested by George Hedley, with the condition that the proposed uses would need to
be reduced in scale.

•

Water service from the City of Athol is not available without annexation, and the City has rejected
a prior annexation application for the HJ Grathol site. A commercial water system would need to
be developed to serve the property.

•

For commercial access to Blair Castle Road (Old US95) in the "after" condition, HJ Grathol would
be required to apply for commercial approach permits from Lakes Highway District.

•

ITO is providing a public road approach to SH54 for Sylvan Road, so no permit application should
be required of the developer for this highway access point. A single public road approach to SH54
(for Sylvan Road) will provide reasonable, safe and sufficient access for commercial development
on the portion of HJ Grathol property east of the new freeway, provided that Sylvan Road does not
dead-end on the Gratbol property. Sylvan Road will need to be connected to the new county road

19
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north of the HJ Grathol site in order to provide good local street connectivity and adequate
ingress/egress for emergency vehicles.
•

HJ Gratbol would be required t9 design and construct Sylvan Road in order to commercially
subdivide and develop the property. The developer would be required to coordinate the design of
Sylvan Road with Lakes Highway District, and also to obtain commercial driveway approach
permits from Lakes Highway District for accesses to private properties from Sylvan Road.

•

Upon completion, HJ Grathol would be required to dedicate Sylvan Road to Lakes Highway
District.

•

After the,l'ight of way take, the HJ Grathol site still has ample room to accommodate the
wastewater iand application needs of the 15 to 20-year development scenario suggested by Mr.
, Hedley,
'',

•

•

Looking at ultimate buildout (beyond 20 years), the property in the "before'' condition had the
ability to accommodate S,000 gallons· of wastewater production per day more than the "after"
conditjon. This adverse impact may be roughly estimated as the loss of oppportunit y to add 35
· motel 1·ooms, or a small (25 seat) restaurant, in the distant futm·e.
The ·iucreme~tal reduction in long-term development opportunity due to the right of way take will
likely be offset by long-term property value increases anticipated as a result of the highway
Improvements.
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J, TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923)
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P.O. Box 7129
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Suite 14001 U.S. Bank Plaza
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST.ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVl0-10095

PLAINTIFF ITD'S DISCLOSURE
OP REBUTTAL EXPERTS

vs.
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;

STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washington
cosporationj and DOES 1 throqh S,
Defendant$,
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the Amended Pretrial Order dated November 16, 2011, Plaintiff Idaho

Transportation Department ('GJID") submits its disclosure of rebuttal experts and testimony.
ITD's disclosures are made in rebuttal to Defendant HJ Orathol's ("Grathol11) disclosure of three
expert witnesses, Dewitt M. SheIWOod, Geoffrey Reeslund, and Alan Johnson. Orathol 's
disclosures of its experts are set forth in its Expert Witness Disclosure (Aug. 19, 2011 ), its
Second and Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to ITD' s first set of discovery (Sept, 19,
2011 and Oct 6, 2011 ), 8lld the deposition testimony of these witnesses (Oct. 16-18, 2011 ),

In its rebuttal disclosure, rm may address issues that have previously been ruled upon by
the Court and are law of this case, For example, on January 21, 2011 during the hearing on
ITD's Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property, the Court ruled that the extension
of Sylvan Road across the Gtathol property ''is not the subject of the taking that is before this
Court'' and that "the scope of the proposed taking is adequately defined in the complaint itself."
Hrg. Transcript, at 61:11-2S (Jan. 21,2011). Nevertheless, Grathol continues to attempt to assert
claims based on Sylvan Road. By addressing these and other claims already dismissed from the

suit, ITD does not concede that the issues remain part of the case or waive its rights under the
rulings by the Court.

In its discovery responses, as well as during each expert's deposition, Grathol reserved
the right to supplement its expert disclosures. Any attempt by Grathol to supplement it'S expert
disclosures at this late date would be untimely and barred by the Court's scheduling order.
Orathol's deadline for identifying experts and disclosing their opinions has long passed.
ITD makes the following disclosure of rebuttal witnesses Jason Minzghor, Stan Moe,
Carole Richardson, Ken Geibel, Kevi..n Picanco. Jeff Key, Larry Pynes. George Hedley, and
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Dennis Reinstein. These disclosures are made in accordance with the Court's Amended Pretrial
Order and Rule 26(bX4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Il.

A.

REBUTTAL EXPERT: MR. JASON MINZGHOR

Statement of Testimony:
1.

Introduction:

ITD incorporates by teference herein the previous disclosure by ITD of advancing eXpert
testimony by Mr. Minzghor. Mr. Minzghor may be called upon to testify in rebuttal on the
subjecij and based on the anticipated testimony set forth in ITD's advancing expert witness
disclosures.
Mr. Minzghor's background, qualifications, materials relied upon, compensation, prior

testimony, and publications are set forth in ITD's disclosures of aavancing expe~ and are also
incorporated herein by this reference.
2.

Aeeess to and from the Gratbol Property~

A portion of the Grathol property is needed for the realignment of US-95 and the

construction of the Highway 54 Interchange. The Orathol prop;rty before the taking had no
access rights to US..95. The Grathol property before the taking had three deeded access rights to
Highway 54. The deeded access rights are limited to farm.and residential uses, and cannot be
used for commercial purposes. No ph.yS'ical accesses or approaches have ever been cons1ructed
pursuant to the deeded access rights to Highway S4, Likewise, neither Orathol nor any prior

owner has ever requested an encroachment permit for my access to Highway 54.
A physical approach to the Orathol Property to Highway S4 exists near the intersection

with Highway 54 and US-9S. The approach is not permitted or approved and it impermissibly

encroaches upon ITD's right-of-way. Thus, it is an illegal approach.
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The Grathol property does not have any deeded, pennitted, or approved approaches or
rights of access to US-95. Also, the Grathol property has no physical access to US-95. Neither

Grathol nor any prior owner has requested an encroachment permit for a commercial approach to
US-9S.
5.

Material and Gravel on the Grathol ProPHtf:

Grathol has made a claim for $300,000.00 for gravel on the property that it contends ITO
could use in conjunction with the US-95 Project. This claim is unfounded and improper for the
following reasons.
First, no soils or materials testing conducted by or on behalf of ITD shows any quantity

or quality of gravel that may be located on the property condemned from Orathol. Also, Grathol
has not provided any reports showing whether usable gravel is located on the property or the

quantity or quality of usable materials. No support or documentation has been provided to assign
or substantiate any dollar figure to any alleged amount of usable material on the subject property.
Second, ITD is construeting an elevated interchange with on and off ramps on and
adjacent to the condemned properly. The subsurface material in this area must be left in place to
provide sub-grade support for the infrastructure to be construeted on the property. If the
contnwtor were to remove subsurface material on the property, it would then have to replace that
material with like-kind fill material with the same support characteristics. In short, ·it would
make no sense to remove material simply to have to replace it.
Third, the contract for the Project pnmdes that ITO will not pay the contractor for rock
excavation that is made below the top of sub-grade. This means that if the contractor were to
remove any material below sub-grade, it would be required to incur the associated costs, as well
as the costs to replace with similar type and grade of fill material.
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Additional Data and Other Inforaiation. Considered in Formiog Testimony:
In addition to the materials identified in ITD' s disclosure of advancing experts, Mr.

Minzghor has relied on the following data and documents in this

matter.

Environmental docU111ents related to the Project.
Materials and soils documents relating to the Project,
Deeds and documents pertaining to access to the Orathol property,
Project design, right-of-way, and construction documents and plans.
Personal inspection of the site of1he Project and the Orathol property.
Grathol,s expert disclosures,
Deposition testimony by Grathol witnesses.
C.

Exhibits that May Be U1ed as a Summaa of or Sup.port for Testimony:

Mr. Minzghor may use some ot all of the documents and information identified above
and in the prior expert disclosure by ITD as exhibits to summarize, illust?ate, or support his
testimony.

m.
A.

REBU'ITAL EXPERT: MR. STANLEY D, MOE, MAI, RM

Statement of Testimonx:

Mr. Moe is a MAI-certified real estate appraiser licensed in the State ofidaho. He will
testify in accordance with his rebuttal report, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and his

appraisal report, which was previously provided to Orathol.
B,

Data and 0th~ Information Considered in Forming Testimom::

The da~ documents, and information relied on by Mr. Moe in fonnulating his opinions
are identified in his report. In addition, Mr. Moe has reviewed and considered the following data
and documents in this matter:
Planning documents related to the Project.
Environmental documents related to the Project.
Project design, right-of.way, and construction documents and plans.
Personal inspection of the site of the Project and the Grathol property.
Applicable federal, state, and local regulations and specifications.
Planning and zoning documents.
Engineering standards and guidelines.
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.
BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF TIIE APPLICATION
OF HUGHES INVESTMENTS FOR A
CHANGE IN THE ZONING
CLASSIFICATION ON APPROXIMATELY
56 ACRES FROM AGRICULTURAL

TO RURAL

)

)
)
)
)
)

)

1
1.01

CASE NO. ZON08..0008
FINDINGS OF FACT,
APPLICABLE LEGAL
STANDARDS, COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND
RECOMMENDATION

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On June 10, 2008, the Building and Planning Department received an appUcation for a zone
change.

1.02

The Building and Planning Department issued a Notice of Public Hearitlg on this application,
Case No. ZON0S-0008, with the hearing to be held onAugust21, 2008. On July 21 1 2008, notice
was pub1ished in the Coeztt d'Alene Press. On July 9, 2008, notice was provided to adjacent
property owners wjthin 300 feet of the project site. On July 21 1 notice was posted on the site.
Based on signed affidavits in the file, the requirements for publi~ notification have been met.

n

FINDINGS OP FACT

2.01

Applicant. Hughes Jnvesnnents, 23 Corporate Plaza, Suite 245, Newport Beach1 CA 926S88700. (Exhibit A-1 1 Application)

2.02

Owner. Gracal CoJJ). 23 Corporate Plus, Suite 2451 Newport Beach, CA 926S8-8700.

2.03

Proposal. The Applicant is requesting a change in the zoning classification of approximately 56
acres from Rural to Commercial. The narrative explains that because of the Highway 9S
jmprovements in the area, resulting in an eventual fully interstate-Uke interchange at Highway 54,
the area is much better suited for commercial development The Applicant further states that with
increased population growth. a commercia) center at this location would provide needed goods
and se,vices to area residents. (Exhibits A-3 1 Narrative; A-Sa and b, Conceptual Site Plans)

Location and Legal Description, The site is located at the northeast intersection of Highway 95
and Highway 54, on the west sjde of Howard Road in the Athol area. The site is described as a
portion of the SW¼ of Section 10, Township 53 North, Range 3 West, B.M., Kootenai County,
Idaho. The parcel numbers are 53N03W-l0-SOOO and 51N03W-10-61001 and the serial numbers
are 121649 and 21227.
2.0S

Surrounding Land Use and Zoning. The suJTounding ·land use in the area consists of single
family dweJlings and accessory buildings on parcels five acres and larger. The Athol city limits
are adjacent to ttJe sl.lbject propert)i an tM southwest comer. This uses consist of commercial
establishments. The Hackney Airfield is approximately ½ mil to the northeast The subject
property borders property zoned Rural on the north, east and o
There is Commercial zoned
property on the southeast comer of Highway 9S and Highway 54.
e is Agricul\'1Jral Suburban
zoning approximately ½ mile to the northeast. (Exhibit S-1, Zone Map

2.06

Existing Land Use. The property appears to be undeveloped and used for loggin2 activities.

~ 4~"'\ ~~-.. ·~ i-...y s+
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Comprehensive Plao, The Kootenai County Comprehensive Pl.an Future Land Use Map
designates this area. as Rural. Rural designations are given to areas of the County which are not
close to population centers and in areas where continued spars settlement is encouraged due to the
difficulty of providing services. Services and infrastructure are not expected to be improved in

the near future.
2.08

Physical Characteristics, The Soil &rvey of Kootenai County Area, Idalia identifies the soil in
the area to generally be Bonner silt loam. This is a ve-ry deep, weU drained soil that is mainly
used for woodland. Penneability is moderately rapid, runoff is slow to medium and the hazard of
erosion is slight to moderate. Topography: the site is flat throughout. Vegetation: the majority
of the property is vegetated with thick timber and brush, (Exhibit A-4, Photographs)

2.09

Flood Zone and Wetlands. According to the Flood Insurance Rate Map panel number 16007600S0C, the subject property is not located within an area of special flood hazard. There do not
appear to be any wetlands on the site.

2.10

Area of City Impact. The subject property is located within the City of Athol's Area of City
Impact. The city was asked to comment on this request, but has not done so at this time. The
Applicant did submit a copy of an AMexation into the City of Athol, but it appears that the city
was not interested in annexation at the time. (Exhibit A~10, Annexation Information)

2.11

Water and Sewage Disposal. Water s~rvice and sewage disposal have not been specifically
addressed in this application. Although asked to comment, the Panhandle Health District has not
done so at the time of this writing.

2.12

Access. The subject property fronts U.S. Highway 951 State Highway 54 and Howard Road. The
state and federal highways are maintained by the Idaho Transportation Department and Howard
Road is maintained by the Lakes Highway District. In an e-mail received July 2, 2008, Planner
Donald Davis stated that the Highway 95 improvements in the area are currently in the design
phase so the exact footprint of the new alignment has not yet been determined. lTD anticipates a
full interstate-like interebange at this location and also anticipates that properties in close
proximity to this interchange will seek changes in the zoning classification for commercial uses.
Once the final design is approved for Highway 95, 11D recommends that access to the property
be restricted to the proposed frontage roads on the east and west sides of the new alignment and
Howard Road. (Exhibit PA-2, E-mail)

In a Jetter dated July 28. 2008, Lakes Highway District Engineer Eric Shanley stated that the
developer of this project should be required to dedicate sufficient right.of~way for the local
frontage roads e.s defined by the Highway 95 project. Mr. Shanley :further stated that access to
the future development should access either Howard Road of the future frontage roads. Future
development on this property may require Howard R.oad improvements. Fina1Jy, the District
recommends that the developer address public utilities necessary to seive the proposed request.
(Exhibit PA-5, Letter)
In a letter dated July 7, 2008, Carole Richardson of the Kootenai Metropolitan Planning
Organization (KMPO) stated that major-development proposals not necessarily consistent with
the furure land use designation may have significant impacts on the regional transportatfon
system. · I<MPO suggests that traffic impacts from this proposal be analyzed prior to the issuance
of permits, and also suggests that a Comprehensive Plan amendment ma) be order.
(Exhibit PA-3, Letter)
·
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2.13

Fire Protection, The subject property is within the bouncfaries of the Timberlake Fire District
Although requested, no comment from the District has been received.

2.14

Zoning Ordinance, Section 9-51-2·D ofthe Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance requires that all
"lots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a
Special Notice Permit" If this request ts approved, the Applicant wiJl then b1:1 required to apply
for and receive approval on. the Special Notice Permit prior to the start of coDStruction.

2.15

The Application Requirements. Section 9-21-4 of the Kootenai Councy- Zoning Ordinance
states that an application for a change of zone must show the folJowing:
a. The date the existing zoning became effective (January 3, 1973).
b. The changed tonditions which are alleged to warrant other or additional zoning.
c. Facts to justify the change on the basis of advancing the public health, safety, and general
welfare.
d. The effect the zone change wm have on the value and character of adjacent property.
e. The effect on the property owner if the request is not granted.
f. Such other information the Hearing Body shall require.
g. The effect the zone change will have on the Comprehensive Plan.

?

The AppUcant's narrative in~ludes responses to these items.
(Exhibit A-3, Narradve)

Idaho Code requires that in the course of deciding zone change request, "particular consideration
shall be given to the effects of any proposed zone change upon the delivery of services by any
political subdivision providing public services, including school distTicts, within the plaMing
jurisdiction.
2.16

Public Comment. The Building and Planning Department received three comments in support
of this request, one neutral comment and one opposed. (Exhibits P-1 through p.5, Comment!!)

111

APPUCAJJLB LEGAL STANDARDS

3.01

Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 401 Chapter 21, Amendments.

?

Chapter 21 of the Zoning Ordinance 01.1tlines the application requirements, process and review
standards for zone amendments. lt requires thar the request be considered by the hearing body for
their recommendation. The hearing body recommendation goes to the Board of Commissioners,
who must bold a public bearing prior to making a final decision and signing the associated
ordinanc8 amendment. This article requires that the Applicants show that a proposed amendment
is reasonably necessary, is in the best interest of the public, and is in accordance with the
Comprehensive Plan. Notice must meet the requirements of Idaho Code, or for larger zone
amendments1 those given in the Ordinance.
3.02

Kootenai County Ordinance No. 3SS.
This Ordinance establishes Hearing Examiners and a PJanning and Zoning Commission, and
outlines procedures for the conduct of hearings.
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1994 Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan.
The Comprehensive Plan establishes long range plans for growth. development, land use, and
environmental protection in Kootenai County. The plan outlines goals, objectives and policies
that provide fundamental decision-making guidance for other County ordinances and for future
development. Included in the Comprehensive Piao is a Future Land Use Map that provides a
general outline of areas of suitable projected land uses. with approximately ¼ mile wide transition
areas between designations.

3.04

Idaho Code §67-6502, Local Land Use Planning; §67-6509, notice and Hearing Procedures; §6765011, Zoning Ordinance; §67-6S19-§6520, Permit Process; §67--6521, Actions by Affected
Persons; §67-6S3S, Approval/Denial Requirements; §67-2343, Notices of Meetings; §67-8003,
Regulatory Takings Analysis.
Idaho Code §67-6502 outlines the purpose of local land use planning in promoting the heal~
safety and general welfare of the people of the state in the following ways: a) protect property
rights while making accommodations for other necessary types of development such as low cost
housfag and mobile home parks; b) ensure that adequate public facilities and services are
provided at reasonable costs; c) protect the economy of the state and localities; d) protect the
important environmental features of the state and localities; e) encourage the protection of prime
agricultural. forestry and mining lands; f) encourage urban and urban.type development within
incorporated cities; g) avoid undue concentratio11 of population and overcrowding of land; h)
ensure that the development on land is commensurate with the physical characteristics of the
land; i) protect life and property in areas subject to natural hazards and disasters; j) protect fish.
wildlife and recreation resources; k) avoid undue water and air pollution; I) allow local school
districts to participate in the community planning and development process so as to address
public school needs and impacts on an ongoing basis.

Idaho Code §67-6511 requires that notice and hearing procedures be in accordance with Idaho
Code §61-6S09 requires a public hearing before the Planning Commission or Hearing Examiner.
At least 1S days prior to the hearing. notice must be published in the newspaper and be provided
to all political subdivisions providing services. A public service notice must also be made
available to other papets and radioffV stations. lf the Board holds a second public hearing.
notice and hearing procedures are the same, except the notice must include the recommendation
of the Hearing Body.

Idaho Code §67~6511 requires that the proposed zone change be in accordance with the
Comprehensive Plan and that it not have a negative effect on the delivery of public services by
political subdivisions. A public hearing must be held before the Planning Commission or
Hearing Examiner prior to consideration by the Board. In addition to the notice procedures
outli!Jed in Idaho Code §67-6509, notice must be mailed to property owners or purchasers of
record within the land being cons;dered, with in 300 feet of the external boundaries of the land,
and to any additional area that may be impacted by the proposed zone change. Notice must be
posted on the premises not less than one week prior to the hearing.

Idaho Code §61·6519-§6520 outline's the permit and the decjsfon specifications. The application
must first go to the Planning Commission or Hearing Examiner for their recommendation.
Recommendation and/or decisions must specify the ordinance and standards used in evaluating
the application, the reasons for the approval or denial, and, if the decision js a denial, the actions,
if any, the Applicants could take to obtain a permit
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Idaho Code §67-6521 defines an "affected person'' states that an affected person may request a
hearing on any pennit authorized under Chapter 6S, outlines the actions the Board may take, and
provides for judicial review, if requested, within 28 days after all remedies have been exhausted
ur.der local ordinances.
Idaho Code §67--6535 requires that the approval or denial be jn wrjting and be accompanied by a
reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant, the relevant
contested facts, and the rationale for the decision based on the factual information contained in
the record, applicable provfaions of the Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinances and laws.
Idaho Code §67-2343 provides general requirements for meeting notices such as the
Commissioner's weekly deliberations.
Idaho Code §67-8003 provides that applicants for site-specific land use requests may ask for a
regu_latory taking analysfa.

Amendments to Zoning, Idaho Code Title 67 Chapter 65-1 l(d) states that if a governing board
adopts a zoning classification pursuant to a request by a property owner based upon a valid,
existing Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. the governing board shall not subsequently
reverse its action or otherwise ch.a:nge the zoning classification of said property without the
consent in writing of the current property owner for a period of four (4) years from the date the
go:veming board adopted said individual property owner's request for a zoning classification
change.
/JI

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ANALYSIS
(Rese7'Vedfor the Hearing Examiner.)

V

STAFFANALYSIS

It appears that one of the more pressing issues regarding this request is access. The site plan shows the
preliminary Jocations of the future Highway 95 alignment as well as the locations of the future :frontage
roads, The Lakes Highway Djsttict and the Idaho Transportation Department are concerned with access
to any future developmenl Staff feels confident that if this request is approved. access issues will be
addressed when development plans are review. Furthermore, if this request is approved, a Special Notice
Permits will be required. Upon application of that permit, more definitive development plans will be
submitted for agency review.

-

Another issue of concern. is the future )and use designation for this property. The current Comprehensive
Plan was adopted in 1994 and reflects the rural character of the area at that time. However, with the
population growth of the County as well as amount of traffic utiHzing Highway ~S, this particuJar area
may not be as ruraJ as it was in 1994. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the Highway 9S improvements
wi1J facilitate more traffic. Staff wonders if it appropriate to encourage rural development, including ruraJ
residentiaJ .uses along this in~reasingly busy transportation conidor.
One Jast .issue regarding this request is its location adjacent to the Cjty of Athol. It js Staff's
wderstanding that the City Js not interested in amexing properties into its city limits. It seems
appropriate that the property owner pursue annexation, and, mdeed, there is information m the file that the
owner clid apply for annexation. However, the City detemiined that it was not interested.

540 of 1617

JAN. 6. 2012

: .,.
Staff Report

VI

NO. 3879

3:50PM
Case No. ZON0B-0008 (Hughes Investments)

P. 22/51

Page 6of6

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Reserved/or the Hearing Examiner.)

J/11

RECOMMENDATION
(Reservedfo,. the Hearing ExaminerJ

Prepared by:

'h,oA'
'tvt~ --Mark Mussman, Planner m

Date
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ZONE CHANGE APPLICATION
l{oot!nal Counl)' Building & PlenmngOeparnnent
PO Box 9000, Co6u.r d'Aleni; ID ~8l~900D
1'ho11e: (208) 4~6-1070

APPLICANT: liughea Investments, Attention~ Geoff R.eeeluncl
ADDR.BSS: 23 corponte Plaza, Suite 245
&w:ya,-4· b«,h I C.A 'IZ'9S8-876t>
PHONB~S49l 759-9531 X24'.fAX:

(949) 7O6•OS13 EMAJL;9%"HBlund@hughesinv.com

OWNE!t: Gtaoal Co%p.
AOCRESS: SAME AS ABOVE

PHONE! (949) 7S9-953l.X242FAX: (9491 '706•0513

E,MAlL~ greeslund.@hughuinv.com

CONSULTA'NT(!fopplicable) cr..i: Associate1a1, Actention: Tom Vandenre:rt
ADDRESS: 12730 E, M:Lrabeau pkwy,, Suite 100
PKO$: !SD9)4SB•6B40

E-MA.It.: evandervart@clcassoc.com

FAX: (S09)458-6844

o OWNER

CONTACT HRSON: (pi~ one)

ll APl'LICANT

Dl'RECTIONSTOSITS(m:imCoeurd'A.lsne)Norch on l-.95 to Hwy

s,,

o CONSDt.TANT

site is at the

northeast ~uaarant of tha~ intersection.
PARCBLNUMBER(S);\PNs:53NO3WlOSOOO;S3N03WlO61O0sect_Twp,_Rng_

TOTAL ACREACl£ Of' SUBJE!CT SlTB: ..S:.::6;.:.•;;;.:39;;..;,A;,;;e;,;:.r.;;;.es~----------CUJit!!ENT ZONE: Rural
PROl'OSED ZONt: Commer,;ial
COMPRBH!NSJVB PLAN'D!STGNATION: _n.ur_a_1________________
ARU.,OFc:ttYlMPAtn _A_t_h_o_l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

ATIACHM!NTS:

SiroPlan
Legat Descrlption of Subject Site
Pictur~ of Sill: (pafli:,rarni~)
~se.ssor's Mlp(s)

,

Narrative ~ responses to the toUowins as per Ani~~ 27 ohhe ~ootenal County Zo11ing Orclin1111ce):
1- ~ date the existing ioning became elfectfve.. , ~ "1 ~
2-Wbal 1?0ndillons w81111nt aohi.nge io 20oo1g2
,
3-How would 1he 20nc chango ~ t h e public health, Sl!Cc!y, and welfare?
4- ttow would the value Md diaract&r of.adjai;cnt propetl}' be alfec\eo?
S - What woulcl be the cffecr on 1hc propetty owncr(s) i! not gran1td?
6- What would be the effca on the Compr=hsnsi11e Plan?

1UNDERSTAND THAT:
I, This application is su"bjm to acccplillce by the Kootenai Co11niy !luilding & Pla!ming ~artml!llt 11pon
tbt.dctcrmination 1hiu !his ap,Plicatioo packagt. is ;omplc1e,
2. Th~ hearing da~ are tetJtativc and subject to lhe number of applications received. Bach applica\ion wiU
be pro~ in lhc ordlt' rooci\led. Stair will dCTomliDc th• n\lmbcr,af appti,ations to be placed on tile
naict t11ailabla agend11.
·
All ti,, b,Jbrmalion, ttol4mcntt, aaocl1nu1111J, tWL a/116,'U tnuuttdtr" l,erewitl1

'""''"""'~~12L
to, .. , ....

are""' 101/11 tir11 O/f/lJ lmo1llle"6~

l)A!E, . .y , .....,

~..... *•++f••,...,.04•..•••••.. •••..•• .. •~•••;• .........•.•••••••-'••,••••-.w.•
FOtlOPPIC! USE ONLY

l:)AT!RECBMD; ,,/fJ •08

CASH_

_

M.ff1s@n
Rtt!!PTNO. p, "-/~$"

R.EC£1VSDS\': ~-
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ZONE CHANGE APPLICATION __
Hughes Investments

N~rrative Rese,o(ls~s

1.

The date· the existing :zoning became effective? 1973

2.

What conditions warrant a change in zoning? The site is located at the
intersection of US Interstate 95, a heavily trafficked artery connecting Canada
to Coeur d'Alene and beyond, and Hwy. 54, the major route serving the
Bayview area. In addition, 1-95 is soon to begin improvement to full freeway
status, and will be realigned to cross this property, providing on and off•ramps
at the Hwy 54 in~ection. Existing properties both immediately adjacent and
to the south fronting on Hwy. 54 are also currently zoned commercial, and
both the NWC and SWC of this intersection have commercial designations as
well. TherefQre, in such a location, commercial zoning is the most appropriate
designation. Continued population growth along this corridor also warran1s
this zoning 1 which wo1:tld allow the provision of needed goods and services to
residents and travelers alike.

3.

How would the zone change advance the public health, safety and welfare?
Designating commercial uses fronting on major traffic arterials provides a
protective buffer for other less intensive potential uses, SllCh as residential,
agricultural or other rural uses, thus enhancing the health, safety and welfare
of · those users. Properly developed commercial uses would not have
detrimental effects on those other potential users.

4.

How would the value and character of adjacent properties be affected? The value
Qf these properties would be enhanced by buffering them from the busy
highways, and also by fostering a further pattern of development and growth
in the area.

5.

What would be the effect on the property owner(s), if not granted? It would create
future financial hardship by not allowing for appropriate uses on the property,
perhaps rendering the site unusable for any meaningful development.

6.

What would be the effect on the Comprehensive Plan? It would designate an
appropriate· use and zoning for the property, and lead to an intelligent and

-

logical development and growth pattern in the area.
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KUGHES INVESTMENTS 5 "'
~~__:;;~- Sl:lOPI'l.NG CEN'l"EltS

GEOFF FIE!.Slt.J~'O. AtA
VICE PRESIDENT. IJIRECTOFI

OF DESIGN ANO CONSTRUCTION

£.MAil.: greeah,N@~.ughasl"v.tom

July 31, 2008
Mark Mussman, Planner Ill
Kootenai County Building & Planning Department
451 N. Government Way
Coeur D'Alel'le, ID 83614-2988
{208) 446-1082

Via: FedEx Overnight

Re: Rezone Application Case No. ZONOB-0008
Athol Project
US 95 & Highway 54
Kootenai· County, Idaho
Dear Mark:
You may recall that at our first meeting wi~h you to discuss this project on March 21, 2008, we
mentioned that we had recently submitted an application to the City of Athol, requesting that
our property be annexed into the City. We subsequently had appeared before the Athol City
Council on Tuesday, March 4, 2008 to review this application, and were told that the City
would not support anne,cation of this property at that time. I have enclosed a copy of the
application that was submitted for your use and inclusion in the file regarding our rezone
application to Kootenai County.
·

If you have any questions, comments or need anything further, please do not hesitate to
contact me:
·
Sincerely,

Geoff Reeslund, AIA
Vice President
Director of Design and Construction

GBR/jpm
Enclosures

cc:

Mt. Doug Marfice - Ramsden & Lyons, LLP w/ enclosures
Alan Johnson - Hughes Investments

-

G;\JilllAlhol, ldaho\MussmanLtr073108.cioc

A-10

552 of 1617
93 CO:RJIOMT.C -PLAZA • SUt":l"l!: MS • l\1EWPO:RT "8:EACH, CA. 92680
:P,0. sqx 8"l'0O • l'GW'POBT Bll:A..CH, CA 1:12.6SS..S10O

000468

JAN. 6. 2012 3:53PM

NO. 3879

P. 34/51

EXHIBIT 17

553 of 1617

NO. 3879

JAN. 6. 2012 3:53PM
~
)
I

•

I
-

•

•
If

•

.,

-

RIGHT-OF-WAY CONTRACT

~,of0cP V

r;,,Ld~

'(09 1,, J
ProjectNo.

A009(870)

Parcel No.
Parcel ID No.
KeyNo.
County

3S
0043879
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f\~r.,.\'v

~o,786 . -

Kootenai

'9 3-cJ

~

,a~

TillS AGRE,EMENT, nwlo this
day of j
between the
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEi,TMENT, by and through the .
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, by its Chief Engineer or the authorized representative,

herein called "STATE", and Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC.
called "GRANTOR".

, herein

NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
l. State shall pay Grantor and the Lien holder(s)1 if any, such sums of monies as set out below.
Grantor agrees to pay all mxes and assessments due and owing, including those for years 2007
and 2008; upon payment of 2008 property taxes, the grantor may request a pro-rata
reimbursement for the portion ofthe'year 2008 that the stat.e owned the properly, and Grantor
shall execute and deliver to State a notarized instrument of conveyance cotTesponding to the
:interest being acquired.

2. This contract shall not be binding unless and until executed ~Y the Chief Engineer or the
authorized representative.
3. The parties have herein set out the whole of then- agreement, the perfonnance of which
constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said right-of-way and shall relieve the
State of all future claims or obligations on that account or on account of the location,
grade and construction of the proposed highway.
4. Gran.tor represents that to the best of their knowledge no hazardous materials have been

stored or spilled on the subject property during their ownership or during previous
ownerships at least insofar as they observed or have been informed. In the alternative, if
the Orantor has lmowledge of storage or spill of hazardous materials on the subject
property, that imormation is set out below. This sale is conditional upon titll disclosure
of any such information.
5. Grantor hereby grants the State or its contractor a Temporary Basement of ingress and
egress for construction of any item requiring a Temporary Easement, Said Easement to

terminate upon completion of construction,

554 of 1617

P. 36/51

NO. 3879

JAN. 6. 2012 3:53PM

••
.-

f) ,

Right-of~Way Contract
Page2 of2
·
Key No.
09870
Parcel No.
35
Parcel ID No. 0043879
6. Granter agrees to give the State legal and physical possession· of the property herein
being purchased bythe State OJi cu:, (' loslnq
, or upon Gran.tors receipt of
payment, whichever {s later.
·
7. State will pay Grantor for right-of-way, improvements and control of access as follows:

~ 4j}acre(•) ofland and J'mprovemmdE

$ !,Ol'i,200.QO

Total Just Compensation

$1,017,200.00

Incentive Offer Pa~ent

$

TOTAL CONSIDERATION

$ 1,117;200.00

.

100,000.00

1N WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement the day and year first
above 'Written.

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
Recommend for Approval

G.RANTOR:
Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC

000-t~
Q4
D. D. Darwood .. Member

¼£~-~
By~

ClP Right-cf-Way Coordinator
Approved for Chief Engineer

0n=.4r-;ed,,c ,A411!
B
y~=
David S. Sho~
CIP Bight-of-Way Prograai Manager
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July 22, 2008

Gaiwood Saloon and Arena, UC
17800 N. Hwy 95
Hayden, JD 83835

Re:

US-95, Gatwood to Sagle Corridor
SH-S3 to Ohio Match
Project No.
A009(780)
Key No.
09780
Parcel ID No. 0043879, Parcel No. 35
Revised Offer Letter

Dear Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC:
The Idaho T!'ansporration Department (ITD) in conjunction with Connecting Idaho Partners
(CJP), is in the process of acquiring properties along US..9'5 between Garwood and Sagle for
highway improvements. Construction plans have detenn1ned that it will be necesslll)' to purchase
your property identified as a portion c1f land in the N ½NW¼ of Section 25, TS2N, R4W, in
Kootenai County. The property has been appraised by an independent, state certified appraiser
and reviewed by another qualified appraiser to arrive at the ''Just Compensation''.
Jt is important to know that tbe offer does not include any increase or decrease in the value of the
property due to the influence of the Project.

On behalf of CIP, U:ruversaJ Field Services is authorized to present an offer to you in the
amount of $1,017,200.00 to purchase the fee simple interest in your property,
If the offer to acquil'e is accepted within 4S calendar days of receipt oftbis offer letter, you will
receive an incentive payment for an additional 10% of the offer not to exceed $100,000.00.
Should the offer to acquire be accepted witliin 46 to 60 calendar days :from receipt of the date o.n
this offer Jetter, the incentive payment will be an additional S% of the offer or $S0,860.00, After
60 days, the incentive payment no longer applies. See breakdown below:
J91,92S sf (land reguired}

Just Compensation

$ 1,017,200.0.Q
S 1,017,200.00

OOOROINA TED RIGHT OF WAY SERVICES SINCE 1958
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Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC
Parcel ID No. 0043879
Paree) No. 3S
Offer Letter
Page 2 of2

Attached you will find the following doeuments:
Right of Way Contract (duplicate orjginaJ)
Warranty Deed
Project Plan Sheet
Acquisition Brochure
Copy of Appraisal
Advice of Rights Form
Claim for Right of Way Payment
Internal Revenue Form W-9
If this offer is satisfactocy, please sign the dupJicate 01iginal contracts, retumjng both contracts to
my atrention in the envelope provided for your convenience. One fully executed. original contract
will be returned to you for your records.
If there are other parties of interest (liens, mortgages, etc.) on your property, the necessary
clearances
be obtained prior to your receipt of payment. Title insurance, olosing costs,
exoluding pro-rations of taxes, and recording fees wm be borne by ITD.

wm

It is the intent of CIP to assist you in every way possible in conveying your property. To this en~
as your acquisition agent, I will contact you within ten days ftom the date of this letter if J do not
hear from you before then.
I am available at your convenience to answer any questions y011 may have. J can be reached at
208/95S-7972.
Sincerely,
(~fMu/!J_

·n, -

f~on

Tanya M. Johnson
Universal Pield Services

Enclosures
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August 25, 2011

Doug Marfiee
Ramsden & LyoDS
P.O. Box 1336
Coeurd1A1>ene, Idaho 83816

RE: HJ' Grath.ol Condemnation
Highways 95 & 54 NEC
Athol, Idaho
Dear Mr. M-arfice;
As requested, I have made an inspection and completed an appraisal of the
ab'ove mentioned property. The purpose of the -aplJl'aisal i$ to estimate a
before and after valu:atiort of the property for a proposed condetnnation by
Idaho DOT. The date of valuation in this case will be as of the latest date of
inspection of the property OX). September IS~ 2010. This appraisal has been
prepared under the Unifonn Stau.dards of Professional Appraisal Practice
(USPAP), is limited in scope as agreed, and presented in a restricted
a:ppraisal format -according to USPAP teporting requirements. It should be
noted that the restricted report is the most abbreviated of the report formats
and as suoh may be difficult to clearly 'Ullderstmd by a third party without
additional data contained in my working files.

Idaho is a non-disclosure state and comparable sales are only verified by
parties to the transaction ,and not official records as in other states. Th'e
comparable data I am presenting to you in this mattet is believed to be
correct and obtained fiom sources considered reliable,. but cannot be verified
byrecordSw

The subject property is legally described in ''Exhibit A~' in the addenda

section ofthis appraisal. The ptoperty was tracsfetted to Gracal Corpotation
on Ma.y 22, 2008 :from Nortb. Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited
liability corporation on May 22, 2008 ,and subsequently from Or.aeal
Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California. general partnership on October 15,
2009. According to the broker who sold the site in May 20-08, tht sale price
was $1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property
from a local lender for a far higher amount and the seller was highly
motivated due to financial problems. At the time of the sale the property
l
559 of 1617

JAN. 6. 2012 3:54PM

NO. 3879

P. 41/51

was zoned residentiaL I Uildersta:nd the owners have paid for a rezol'le of the
site, ~gineering costs fot site development plans, approval ·of city water to
the site, an.d work for an onsite sewage system.
County records indicate the properey is identified under three parcel
numbers:
A-00.00..:010-6350, 53N03Wl06100, and 53N03W10SO-OO.
Assessed values for each oftbe parcels for 2010 are as follows:
A000OOl 06350 Land $58,500
Improvement $59,944
53N03W106100 Land $79,395
53N03Wl05000 Land$150o469

The property is located on the NE Cornet of 'Highway 95 and Highway S4 in
Kootenai County, Idaho and contaitis approximately 56.8 acres. In viewing
the county assessor's records l noted tha:i parcel S3N03WlOSOOO is
indicated as a 6j.24 acre parcel, which appears to be an error based on all
the other data I have reviewed on this site. Parcel A00000106350 has .419
acres and includes a stnall commercial buildingt but it is also the SW corner
of the site at the intersection <>f the bighw~ys and therefore considered an
important part of the entire propertr. The subject property ~ currently zoned
Commercial by the Kootenai County Planning Department and this zoning
was obtained by the ciln'ent owners since their purchase of the property in
2008.
The site is approximately 16 miles north of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8
miles east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of
Sandpoint. The intme'ction cUttently consists of a convenience stor~ on the
S.W-com~r, a restaurant/bar on the NW corner, vacant land on the SE Gomer,
and the subject a.lQng with some other comineroial uses on the NE cornet
along Highway 95. Although site is contiguous a,t this &le, plans I have
seen regarding the new interchange planned at this lOa\tion show Sylvan
Road being extertded n0rth thro-ugh the subject site when the interchange is
built, splitting the subject site. A map showing this extension is included
with this report.

Major attractions in the immediate area incl,ude Panagu.t State Park to the
-east of this location and Silverwood Amusement Park two mUes sou.th of
this location. Lake Pend Oreille is aceessible via publie and commercial
launch facilities at Bayview, F ~ or Sandpoint. Smi.dpo-mt !s also the
location of'Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski ar~a. in the Inland Northwest.

2
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The ·site has approximately 75~ feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090
feet alo:ng Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points. Access is also available
along Highway 95 as all three p'arcels include frontage along µie highway.
There is another property containing 1.58 acres that is l'acated north of the
comer parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along Highway 9S as well. Water
to the site is available from the City of Athol and according to the owner's
representativ~ Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on
development of a modular waste treaunent plant to meet n~s for onsite
sewage. Other site utilities include natural gas from Avist~ electric from
Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from Verizon. The site is generally leveJ
and at grade with both highways. The ·site is boonded b:y Howard Road to
the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this titn~ but these
trees h~ve no marketable tiinber value.
Market conditions for Kootenai County were sitnilar to other areas in the
It>.land Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as. well as
appreciation rates from 2002 through 2006. The number of residential units
sold in 2002 through the Coeur d1 Alene MLS was 2,958 artd that number
peaked at 5,035 units in 200S declining to 2,821 units in 2006. The average
sale price through these same years was $138,.908 in 2002 and it increaseclto
$271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a four year period. In 2007 and
2008 the number of units sold. continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with
the average sale price dropping to $269,120. In 2009 the total number of
units sold increased to 2,216 with the average price dropping to $209,415.
One of the reasons fur the large drop in 2009 was a tax credit for first time
ho:tnebuyers~ and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower price
propertit,ts. 2010 has continued to see f$wer residential sales with price:s
continuing to decline; however~ there has been continued commercial
development in Kootenai County in the past two yea.ts. Two Wal-Mart
Supercenters have been built in addition to a new Super l Foods store. and a
Lovefs Travel Plaza is being built. 111 addition the Highway 95 corridor has
seen the 'Construction of a U.S. District Court Faoility and a 55~000 square
foot Wes.tern States Cat facility in Hayden.
Census data indicates that the population of Athol doubled between 1990
and 2000 and similar population patterns are -evident in Spirit Lake and
Bayview- area as welL

3
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Other sectors of the real estate market follow the residential trends an(l have
slowed as well. With the slowing market, capitalization rates have risen,
vacancy for many types of real estate increasing and demand declining.
In completing this appraisal I consideted the highest and best use of the
subject property and this use simply stated is the ide.al use of vacant land or
an .irrtproved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be
legally permitted, pliysicruly possible, financially feasible. and maximally
productive. The subject is a large tract of vicant commercially zoned land
(with the exception of a small commercial building) m1 a nlighted'1 at grade
inter'section of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger
thap. typically utilized for a "big bo~" retail user which can range from
approximately 10 to 30 acres in size. The ~latively remote location of this
property would also dictate th;n immediate development of the site would be
limited unless some major attraetion would inea:ease demand for cormnercial
use in this area. Silverwood .Amusement P~k south of the subject occupies
a bu-ge site including parking, but this is a unique use. that has grown over
the past 20+ years and recently an application has been made by Silvenvood
to rezone an additiortal 90+ acres tt, the south of its exi$1:ing facilities.
Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues., convenience
issues will no doubt spur residents t~ patronize locally situated commercial
establishment~

The comer location and zoning of the sUbject suggest commercial uses that
can take advantage of the 1l'atlic flow at this locatian that presently exists on
flighway 9S. I understand from the ownerJs representative that they were in
negotiation with URM for a sale of a portion of the site for a Super One
Grocery store. Mike Winger of UR.M confirmed that he had been involved
in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that was
delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a
new WINCO in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of
Hayden the likelihood of a new groc-ery store at the subject site is less
probable due to new competition that was not there when negotiations were
going on with Hughes, but that chat'lging economic oonditiom hav-e n.ot
eliminated this possibility, Other po,tential uaes inelude a travel plaza/1:tuok
stop, "big box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R" or "D & B"
(local fann/rmch supply stores), motel, and a ccmvtnience store; however, in
my opinion only about½ of the subject site would be utilized for these uses,
The balance of the site might include some self storage, residential uses, or
perhaps some type of light industrial use.
4
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Current plans for the subject site included a new freeway irtterehange. The
taking in this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 aetes
leaving remnant$ on both sides of the new ~rchange. Remna:ats on the
west side of the new interchange include the .419 comer parcel and a 3.&7
acre parcel fronting the Qld Highway 9$. On the east side of the new
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36r61 acres. The
property enjoyed access fi'om both hi'ghways in the before situation and I
understand that in the after will only have limited access from Highway 54,
Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which bounds it to the east As
discussed earlier m this repOf½ the planned Syl'Van Road extension will
bisect the site effectively eha.nging the original highest and best use analysis
oftb.e site. With the site bisected, only the 8.85 acres to the east of the new
interchange and west of Sylvan Road in addition to the 3.87 acres on the
NW 'COtner of the site, and the .419 acxe site on the SW eo:rner will be
available for development out of the original west half of the site. There will
also ll"kely be a condemnltion of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it
does not currently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also
unknown at this time whi'ch may also be an additional item of
rehnbursement to the ownets of the property if-Idaho Dor makes them pay
for the road improvements.

I have completed research on various appraisal cases with regard to large
commercial tra.ct sales in the Spokane, Tri Cities, Coeur d'Alene, and Mo.ses
Lake areas and am familiar with prices fc,r sales in these areas for users such
as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes, Albertson's,
Costco> Sam's Club, and Wal-Mart. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection
in most cases for locations as is a: benefit fot customers to ac.cess stores
easier. Freeway interchanges are often lo~a.tjons of retail development, but
general1y these developments us,ually occur in higher density residential

areas.
I also have recently completed some research in Moses Lake, Washington
and reviewed development at the intersection of Interstate 90 ·and ffiShway
17. Much of the development at this location has only been completed in the
past l O years even though Interstate 90 has been completed for over SO
years.
An ex:ample of how cotftmereial property ean be infl.ueneed by a freeway
interchange is in Pasco, Washington. Sevetal years ago a new inte~hange

s
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was built at Kartebner Avenue intersection with Highway 395. Prior to the
interchange there had been a Ughted intersection with Hillsboro Street a few
blocks south and there had been much cotnmercial development at this
lighted intersection. The development included a motel, restaura~ two fast
food restaurants, a truck stop, ~d some other retail uses. Prior to the
announcement of the new interchange there were offers on several parcels
on the SW corner of the Hillsboro intersection including McDonalds and a
national motel. The construction of the new interchang~ led to offers from
McDonalds and the motel being terminated in addition to all of the
businesses that were t'Ut'tently operating suffering ,substantial losses in
revenue. due to the new interchange being built. In short, although
interchanges assist the flow of traftic0 they are often of little ot no benefit to
development or retail uses follo'Wing their oonstruction.
In attempting to estimate the impact -on the property in the after value
situation, I considered multiple examples from the local area in concluding
that it may take many years for any oQmmetcial development to occur at this
location, particularly if the freeway construction is delayed.

In viewing the subject as a lighted intersection with commercial zoning as it
exists, I viewed the site as being developed in two phases. With the site
containing approximately 57 actes prior to the taking, I considered that
approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 30 acre site would likely fit
several anchors such as grocery stores or other "big box'' retail users. The
30 acres would also likely accomt11odate oth'er pad users such as banks, fast
food uses, or convenience stote uses in addition to some additional dfnline"
retail uses associated with the big box users. Big box us,ers often pay $4 to
as high as.-$9 per s.quare foot for sites. as in the recent WINCO purchase in
Coeut d'Alene. The subject location is inf-erior to most of the comparables
discussed in this report in that it is located in a more remote area and it
doesn't presently enjoy the same demo~apbics; however, the lighted
intersection of two state highways offers excellent exposure for commercial
uses and as traffic increases this location will become the "go top' location.
between Hayden and Sandpoint.

In the after scenario, the 16..31 acre take wi11 leave thtee p.atcels; an 8.85
acre parcel on the east side of the new ih.terchange1 a 3.S1 acre parcel on the
west side, and the ..419 acre parcel in the SW comer of the site. The balance
of the site will be east of the newly planned Sylvan Road. Acces.s to these
6
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sites will be limited to the old Highway 9S for the 3.87 acre parcel ~d
Highwa., 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.SS acre parcel.. Estimating values in
the after situation will be, contingent 'Upon when the project is completed.
Upon c01;i1pletion the property will likely develop differently that in the
before situation and although the property on the east side of the freeway is
still large enough to accommodate some big b'o"* retail uses, bt,1t not stores as
large as Wal·Marl, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the
completion of this project projecting values into the future is extremely
difficult.
In a-ssisting you with this case I have considered the following comparable
sales:
Idaho Comparables
1. l 601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene..., Sale Pric,e. $1,528,360 - Sale Date 8/09
Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft)-Price P~ Foot $9.00
Comments: Tors was a former m-avel pit site that was sold for a. new \VINCO
Otocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for tbe pw·chnsers and granted
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access. The site included all
utiltties. This property would b.e considered superior to the subject for location
and size.

2. Seltice Way &1.d I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale D¢e 11/06
Size 235 AC - Price Per~ $2.00
.Comments~ Foursquare Properties, developem, bo,'Qght tbi.8 slte :which consisted
of numerous parcels· from two other dev-elopers mid Cabela's oormnitted. to
pmclmse 40 a,cres for a new store at the same time frame. Althollgh the site had
utilities, tht developers paid to build all the intetior stteets and provide·access to
the Cabela's parcel S~ the purchase another parcel has been sold fur a aew
Wal-Mart which recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and
would be considered at a lower rate for s~ but a superior rate for location. The
purchasers paid for bringing utilities to the site 1lS well as significant costs for
grading on the property to acc.o:mmodate the new buil~ $ites and roads.
3. lUghway 41 &Prairie Post Palls-Sale Pri=Sl,936,161-Sale Date 11/06
8,ize 13.5 AC (588,060 sq ft)-Price Per Foot SS.00
Comments: This sale is. in the City Qf Pest Falls and utilitie$ were availabJe, It
was pU1'ehUed with the intention of retail development, nus Is 1he SB comer of
tile intersection. T~ sale is a sn'l81.ler parcel than the snbject Which wonld
indicate a lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for loeatioD at a
lighted niter.section, but also a superior location demographiealty) although the
subject has highertraffte counts.
7
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4. Highway 41 & Prairie PosL Falls - Snle Price $6,591,S91 - Sale Date J0/07
Sfae 50.44 AC (2, J97,197sq ft)- Price Per Foot $3.00
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Swion
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post

FalJs. The site was not zoned for commercial development, but the purchaser was
confident that they could develop the site. This is an exceJJent comparable for the
subject in tenns of overall size and a similar location at a lighted intersection, but
a superior location demographlcally, The property bas no sewer which likely ma)
need to be purchased from the City of Post Falls.

5. Highway 95 & GarwoodRoad-SalePriceSl,017,200-SaleDate 7/0B
Sile 4.41 AC (J°92,l00 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30
Comments: This was th~ sale of the Garwood Saloon property to Idaho DOT.
The sale price was confirmed witb the attorney for the property owner and he
relayed that it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like
the subject and jt is the next "lighted'' h1terseetion south of the subject on
Highway 95. This intersection is with a county road versus another state highway
like the subject. The site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher
value and it is also a superior location being closer t-0 Coeur d'Alene. 1
understand this sale was negotiated under the threat of condenination and courts
have ruled that these sales may not represent true market vaJue for this reason.
6. Ramsey & Appleway-Sale Price $7,800,000-Sale Date 11/07
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft)- Price Per Foot SJ 0.53
This sale was confirmed with the owner who sold the properly to the Coeur d'
Alene Tribe. The site is near tomparable 1 and considered superior to the subject
in that it is a smaller parcel and located in a better location.

7, Highway 95 & Sagle Road - Sale Price $3,400~000- Sale Date 3/08
Size 29 AC (J,263,249 sg ft)-Priec Per Foot $2.69 but no sewer
This sale was confumed with the broker who sold the property. The site was
zoned for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the
sale relayed that the property is cwrently for sale as S lots. This parcel does not
have access to Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like
the subject. Tms is an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size
and it would be considered slightly superiol' for location being closer to
Sandpoint, but inferior as it does not ha'Ye a lighted intel'Section and it does nol
have access to Highway 95.

8
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Washington Comparables
8. 9527 N Nevada- Sale Price $4,813,685 -Sale Date 7/07
Size 18.71 AC (815,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot SS.91
This was the site of a new WINCO in Spokane that has been built and it included
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a higher value and
also a superior location.
9. 21801 E Countl')' ViSta- Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/0S
Si2e 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft)- Price Per Foot SS.00
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90
that bas been built onsite. This sjte is smaller indicating a higher value and also a
superior location.
10. 4315 E Sprague - Sale Price $7,559,686 - Sa1e Date 9/06
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $7.SS
This is a WaJ-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that bas not yet been
built. The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn't
have sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific
Railroad and required extensive work for development The site is somewhat
similar in size, but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to
COSTCO,

SaJes of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard
to economic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as
they reflect prices for big box retail uses.

VALOE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with
commercial zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the
values of the comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables S and
7 as they are on the same highway and located north and south of the
subject Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was given
more weight like comparables S and 7. I also considered the siz.es and
locations of the other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject
1 also considered the purchase price of the subject as well as the motivation
of the seller when the property was sold for $1,4S0,000, but as mentioned
earlier, the seUer was distressed and the site was not zoned at the time of the
sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot the majority of the
value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site, Based
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have
had a value in the range of$2.25 per foot or $2,940,300.
9

567 of 1617

JAN. 6. 2012 3:55PM

NO. 3879

P. 49/51

VALUE AFTER TB'.E POTENTIAL CONDEMNATlON
In the after simation, the west 30 acres will be biseo.ted by the taking as
described earlier in this report, This taking will result in the loss of 16.41
acres leaving an after value estimate as follows:
Value Before
= $2,940,.300
Take
=$1,598,143
After Value
= $1,344,457
There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some
cOIIlltlercial developtnents, but th~re will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.8,7, and
.419 acres. These remaining parcels can accottunodate various uses, but the
chances of any big bOk retail use on the west 30 acre site a.l.'e gone. With the
planned Sylvan Road forming a bounda;ty for the remaining property the
remaining property is also bisected as described earlier. I know of no cases
where a developer or user VJilt buy a property for development not knowing.
when a planned highway that will provide access to the property will be
built. This same scenario occurred in a case I was involved in that happened
when WSOOT condemned a si~ north of Spokane on Hatch Road and
Highway 395. All of the experts who testified in dlis case agreed that
without knowledge of when the plamed interchange would be built there
was no way to :estimate a value due to the unoettainty of its completion.
This property also contained approximately 30 acres and has been a'C/ailable
since the state :fin.ished the interchange approwmately 12 years, ago. The
owner has been attempting to sell or develop the site since then with no
success; again this is an example ofwhy interchanges do not add value when
they are completed. An aerial photo of this interchange with Hatch Road
and Highway 395 has been included with this teport to show all the
residential development that has occurred around this interchange since it
was constructed and yet the 30 acre commercial tract is still vacant despite
the· owner's attempts to develop the site.
Until a definitive CQmpletion date of the planned interchange at the subject
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value
fur the remaining parcels due the unknowns of the .anticipated project.

Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as
published by IDT' s website> an assumption can be made th«t the best case
10
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scenario for project construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming
this construction date is accurate, the project might be completed in the
spring of 2012. lfthe planned construttion d~te is latet,1, the completion date
will be moved farther into the future. 1n my opitu-Qn!I. no potential user of the
remaining pro·perty would have any interest in using any of the remaining
parcels until they know for oertain when the project will 'be completed.
Assuming the completion can be completed as forecast above in the spring
of 2012, the value of the land would need to be discounted from the present
date. The discount is applicable as no one would pay for something today
that they can't receive until a future date. This same principal applies to
valuing a subdivisi® that is slated to be developed in the future or the
purchase of an incotne stream like a real estate contract.
In attempthig to "{alUe the rettlaining pa,rcels, I have made the assumption
that they will have a similar value to the before scena:l"io at $2.25 per square
foot. l have also assumed that they will be available for use upon
cornpletton oftb.e new freeway at the earliest in the spJ.ilng of 2012 and the
latest in the spring of 2013. This results- in a dis¢ount titne frame of 1.5 to
2. 5 years· from the date of this vatu,ation, Using this scenario, the ~ture
value of the remaining parcels of Sl,344,457 would be discounted to a
present value.

Tbe discount rate is basical]y a rate of return that someone is looking for on
a given investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates
of safe investments, market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we
ate dealing with undeveloped land in uncertain economic times. For this
reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization rates in the ·current
mark.et and utilize4 a rate of 10%. The higher rate 11Sed to. discount the
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns ·eoucemi.ng this
condemnation including the unknown timing of the project being finished,
issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road being built, the cost of who will
be responsible for the ,cost of Sylvan Road,. and the pending condemnation of
the right of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the
antieipated after value of $1,344,457 yielded the following pres.ent values
for l .S to 2.S years~
1.5 years
= $1,165.354
2.5 years
== $1,0S9,413

11
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Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded
value estimates were completed as follows:
= $2,940,300
Before Value
After Present Value l .S years
=$1,165,000
After Present Value 2.5 years
= Sl,660~000
Difference Rounded
= $1,775,,000 • $1,880,000
This difference in value does not addtess· tbe value of the Sylvan R-oa~ cost
of' construction of Sylvan Road, o.t loss of access td Highway 54 which are
all potential additional items of compensation.

Respectfully submitted,

L~./4-,,wtl

Dewitt M. Sherwood,
Certified Geaeral Appraiser
IDCGA 1125
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department
("ITD") by and through its attomeys of record, Mary V. York, Holland & Hart LLP, will call up

for hearing its Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine before The Honorable
Charles Hosack at the Kootenai County Courthouse, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho on the 8th day of
February, 2012, at the hour or 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this 10th day of January, 2012.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D

0
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D
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 664-5884
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the
undersigned counsel that a copy of Supplemental Responses to Defendant's Second Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, along with a copy of this
Notice, was served upon·tlitrattorneys listed on the attached Cemfl~te of Service·; in-the manner
indicated, on January 17, 2012.
DATED this 17th day of January 2012.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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January 17, 2012

TO: Clerk - Civil Dept.
Kootenai County

Fax:
Phone:

208-446-1188
208-446-1160

From: Sue Turner
Secretary to Mary V. York

Fax:
Phone:

208-343-8869
208-342-5000

Message:
ITD v. HJ Grathol
Case No. CVl0-10095

Please FAX file the attached:
NOTICE OF SERVICE

and return a filed-stamped copy to me at (208) 343-8869.
Thank you very much for your help.
Sue Turner
(208) 342-5000

r-

Number of pages i:ocluding cover
sheet;
!Note: If this fax is illegible or incomplete please call us. This fax may contain confidential info,.rtiil,IW.11~
i protected by the attorney-client privilege. If you are not the named recipient, you may not use, distribute or
I otherwise disclose this information without our consent, Instead, please call (208) 342-5000, we will arrange for
j its destructio:0 or return.
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden
& Lyons, LLP, and respectfully submits this Response to Plaintifrs Motion to Exclude Expert
Testimony or Alternatively to Compel Expert Disclosures.

INTRODUCTION
This is a partial taking case. Plaintiff is acquiring, via eminent domain, approximately
16 acres of Defendant's commercial property. Plaintiff will build upon the part taken an
elevated freeway interchange leaving Defendant's property split into two smaller parcels
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separated by the elevated interchange. At issue, of course, is the amount of monetary just
compensation to which the Defendant is entitled as a result of this partial taking. As early as
the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court made clear that "just compensation" in
partial takings cases must include compensation for loss of value to any portion of the
property not taken. In Bauman v. Ross, the court stated that "when the part not taken is left
in such shape or condition as to be in itself of less value than before, the owner is entitled to
additional damages on that account." (emphasis added) See, Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,

574 (1896). Idaho Code§ 7-71 l(A)(3) codifies the property owner's right to these additional
damages.
The owner of private property to be acquired by the condemning
authority is entitled to be paid for any diminution in the value of
the owner's remaining property which is caused by the taking
and use of the property taken . . . this compensation, called
'severance damages' is generally measured by the value of the
property before the taking and the value of the property after the
taking. (emphasis added)
This "before and after" measure of damages is not, however, the only way to calculate
severance damages. In fact, there are no "formulas, artificial rules, or easy mechanistic
approaches" to determine changes in value to the remaining property before and after a
partial taking. See, State Highway Commission v. Minckler, 62 Mich. App. 273,233 N.W.2d
527 (1975). In simplest terms:
... where there is a partial taking, just compensation is measured
by the amount that the value of the remainder of the parcel has
been diminished.
Id.

Numerous factors can cause a reduction in a remainder's value, depending on the
property affected and the nature of the project for which the condemnation occurs. In
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determining just compensation, a court must consider "all the multiplicity of factors that go
into making up value." Id.

With respect to partial takings, "a wide range of factors is

relevant to determining any change in value and identifying those factors is essentially [an]

ad hoc factual inquiry." 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 368 (1996). Several common
factors that reduce remainder values are illustrated in the jury instructions used in various
jurisdictions. One fine example is the Michigan Supreme Court's model civil jury instruction
which reads in relevant part as follows:
In valuing the property left after the taking you should take into
account various factors, which may include: (1) its reduced size,
(2) its altered shape, (3) reduced access, (4) any changes in
utility or desirability of what is left after the taking, (5) the effect
of the applicable zoning ordinances on the remaining property,
and (6) the use that the condemning agency intends to make of
the property it is acquiring and the effect of that use upon the
owner's remaining property. Further, in valuing what is left after
the taking, you must assume that the condemning agency will
use its newly acquired property rights to the full extent allowed
by the law.
The note on use to this model instruction emphasizes that this is not an exclusive list of
factors that reduce the remainder's value, but merely illustrates some of the factors that can
reduce value. While arguably less "instructive," Idaho's model jury instructions effectively
say the same thing. See, IDJI 7.16.1 and 7.16.5. In short, all of the factors and possibilities
that would affect the price that a willing buyer would offer to a willing seller for the
remainder land must be taken into account, and must be quantified and included in the
property owner's just compensation award.
Although severance damages are generally measured by the reduction in value of the
remaining property; this general measure of damages can be replaced by a cost to cure
approach. See, e.g., Mulkey v. Division of Admin., State of Fla., Dpt. of Transportation, 448
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So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). One way in which the cost to cure method of
measuring injuries to the remainder can be calculated is by determining the cost of any
alteration to the property, any consequential damages due to the alteration and adding that to
the value of the property actually taken. See, Department of Transportation v. Sherburn, 196
Mich. App. 301, 306, 492 N.W.2d 517 (1992). This methodology is significant here because
it potentially addresses that which Plaintiff desperately wants to sweep under the rug: that is
the undeniable fact that this taking harms the Defendant in ways greater than the mere
"value" of the land being taken. Plaintiff behaves, and argues, as if it believes that "just
compensation" consists of only the value of the land physically appropriated from the
Defendant. That is not the case. It never has been and never will be.
What the law requires is that just compensation starts with the value of the land
taken. Added to that are both severance damages and consequential damages. Severance
damages are those damages that occur to the remainder of the property simply by virtue of
the fact that the part taken is no longer owned by the condemnee. For example: If because of
the part being taken, the shape, size or configuration of the remainder parcel makes it less
usefully or marketable, that loss of value is part of the just compensation which must be
added to the value of the part taken.
Consequential damages (those that are not severance damages) refer to harm that the
condemnee suffers by reason of the use to which the portion taken is to be put; in this case a
freeway. For example: If a partial taking is for a sewage disposal plant or a landfill or an
airport runway, that use would affect the remainder property in a much different way than if a
partial taking were for a park; greenbelt or conservative area. This is different than the
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rudimentary issue of severance damage caused by changes in the configuration of a property
impacting its usefulness after the taking. In this case, the Plaintiff stubbornly refuses to
acknowledge these distinctions and insists that the only compensation due to the Defendant is
the market value of the 16.3 acres Defendant is losing, and that Defendant's remainder
property is unaffected by the project.
However, as a direct consequence of this condemnation, the undeniable,
uncontroverted fact that Grathol's property will be bisected once by the freeway and then
again in the future by a freeway "frontage road" (Sylvan Road) which will cut through the
Grathol property to connect US Hwy 54 on the south to Roberts Road to the north. The
inevitable extension of Sylvan Road, while not being physically taken "as part of the Project"
(something that Plaintiff repeats ad nauseum), is nevertheless a direct consequence of "the
Project." Put another way, "but for" the condemnation at issue and the construction of the
project for which the condemnation is occurring, there would be no necessity or requirement
that Sylvan Road be extended through the Grathol property.

The property could be

successfully developed with Sylvan Road, or it could be successfully developed without
Sylvan Road; the choice belongs to the property owner/condemnee. However, because of
this condemnation, there will be no choice for Grathol. Sylvan Road will be extended for
frontage road connectivity. Plaintiff acknowledges as much in its briefing, but adding insult
to injury, claims that the cost of extending Sylvan Road will (and should) be foisted upon the
property owner, even though it would never have been necessary were it not for the project.
That, by definition, is a damage for which Grathol is entitled to be compensated. For the
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Plaintiff has adopted the utterly disingenuous mantra that it is not "taking" Sylvan
Road, that Sylvan Road is not part of "the Project" and that Grathol is therefore not entitled
to any discovery or damages associated with Sylvan Road. Hogwash. If Plaintiffs position
were true, it would verily emasculate Idaho Code§ 7-711(A)(3) and 100 plus years of well
established jurisprudence on the issue of severance damages in eminent domain cases.
Plaintiff continually repeats the obvious: "in Idaho a civil complaint of condemnation defines
the nature and scope of the take" citing Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. Partnership
(citations omitted). See, Plaintiff ITD 's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 15. No one is arguing that point. It is not at issue what is being physically taken. What is
at issue is the effect of the take upon the remainder of the Defendant's property. Plaintiff
contends there is no effect. Defendant's evidence and common sense, dictates that there is.
Plaintiffs motion attempts to isolate, compartmentalize and attack specific
components of Grathol' s severance and consequential damages, arguing that such damages
are not recoverable. These arguments fail however; because they ignore the long standing,
universal rule that when there is a physical taking of private property for public purposes all
incidents of property ownership are subject to an assessment of value, not just those which

the condemnor deems worthy of consideration. State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,
328 P.2d 60 (1958).
Plaintiff filed fifty pages entitled "Plaintiff !TD 's Brief in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment." However, in reviewing the substance of the motion (not just its ironic
title), it is apparent that Plaintiffs motion is not a proper motion for summary judgment.
Instead, it is a verbose argu..rnent in limine seeldng to keep out adverse evidence at trial.
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Plaintiff's motion does not seek judgment on any true legal issues. Disputed damages is a fact
issue, not appropriate for summary judgment. Plaintiff's own submissions both create and
admit substantial factual disputes that must be resolved at trial. In fact, all of the issues raised
basically go to the weight of the evidence on damages. This Court, as the trier of fact, is
certainly capable of considering and weighing the evidence and giving it appropriate measure
in arriving at the ultimate determination of value.
Also, as a point of order, the Plaintiff in this matter is the Idaho Transportation Board.
In its Motion and Briefs, Plaintiff's counsel terms the Board as "ITD." Such an abbreviation is
confusing and misleading since "ITD" refers to the Idaho Transportation Department, which
department is not a litigant in this proceeding. This blurs the lines of separation between the
Board and ITD and treats the two interchangeably. However, the Board is the only entity with
the power to condemn real property under Idaho Code § 40-311 and must be stylized as the
Plaintiff in the Complaint. IC.§ 7-707. While the Board may choose to disregard the roles of
the two entities, the Idaho Code does not, and each have their own separate enabling provisions
ai.1d

statutes. 1
Additionally, this illustrates the confusing and haphazard way that the Plaintiff initiated

and prosecuted this action, beginning with the Board's failure to include a clear identification of
all property rights to be acquired in an Order of Condemnation and in the Complaint as required
by Idaho Code. The Board's inability (or refusal) to clearly set forth its plans for "the Project"
and to properly identify all of the property rights affected has adversely impacted both

1

This significant legal distinction that the Board has historically ignored is one of the issues presently on appeal in

Supreme Court No. 38511.
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Grathol's ability to use its property and to measure its damages. Even now, after more than a
year of litigation and discovery, the Board is apparently still unable to accurately identify its
own plans and intentions with respect to the Grathol property. For example, at page 7 of its
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Board inserts a copy of a "plan sheet"

which it indentifies as having been previously attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B." The
Board asserts that the plan sheet provided the property owner notice of the property rights
implicated. However, the plan sheet attached by Plaintiff at page 7 of its Brief is not the same
as the one originally attached to the Complaint or to the Order of Condemnation!
The accurate identification of property rights in the Complaint is intended to give the
landowner sufficient notice of exactly which property rights are implicated through the
condemnation action.

IC. § 7-707.

The legislative purpose for requiring that such a

description be included in the Complaint via the Order of Condemnation is to prevent the
public entity from shifting gears mid-stream and presenting a moving target of its intentions
with respect to the condemnation. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert, Ex. A. Here, the plan sheet attached at
page 7 of Plaintiffs Brief is not the sa..rne one originally attached to the Complaint. This "new"
plan sheet conspicuously omits the intersection/approach at S.H. 54 and Sylvan Road.
Additionally, the depiction of right-of-way acquired has been modified from the original plan
sheet to reflect that the Board has extended Roberts Road right of way all the way south, deadending at the north property line of the Grathol property. The original plans attached to the
Complaint did not show this extension of the Roberts Road right of way, and its late appearance
in the Brief exhibit further evidences what Grathol has contended all along: the State intends to
run Sylvan Road right through Grathol's property, preferably at Grathol's expense.
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What is apparent from Plaintiffs own submissions is that it continues to revise its plans
and continues hiding the ball as to its intentions with respect to the extension of Sylvan Road.
Plaintiff is not even able to keep its own "approved" plans straight, raising the obvious
question: How can a landowner reasonably be expected to evaluate the property rights being
taken when the condemnor itself cannot? Plaintiffs actions and inconsistent representations in
this case demonstrate why it is imperative that the condemnor do its homework first and
concretely identify all the property rights implicated before it rushes to condemn private
property. The Constitution requires nothing less.
1.

Sylvan Road

Plaintiff virtually begins and ends all of its arguments by claiming that this Court has
already ruled that it is not condemning any property for the extension of Sylvan Road across the
Grathol property.

In doing so, the Board mischaracterizes the Court's earlier ruling and

disregards the context in which that ruling was made. Despite the Board's arguments, it is
undeniable that if it were not moving forward with the Project, the highway realignment and the
taking of a portion of Grathol's property; then there would never be the need for Sylvan Road
to be extended as a local frontage road. That is, but for the Board's actions, Sylvan Road would
never have to be built. The necessity for the extending of Sylvan Road directly flows from the
take. Therefore, the damages that Grathol will incur by reason of the Sylvan Road extension
are directly attributable to Plaintiff and are therefore relevant in determining just compensation.
When the Plaintiff requested early possession of the Grathol property under Idaho Code

§ 7-721 in December 2010 (only 30 days after the Complaint was filed and before Grathol had
even filed its A_nswer), the Board argued that it (a) had the right of eminent domain; (b) that the

use of the property was authorized by law; (c) that the taking was necessary to such use; and (d)
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that Plaintiff had negotiated in good faith without success. Grathol resisted the early possession
motion arguing inter alia that the Board failed to exercise its powers properly under Idaho
Code § 7-707 in filing its Complaint, that the Board's actions were ultra vires, and that the
failure by the Board to consider and evaluate the impacts of a Sylvan Road extension in its
offers, precluded a finding that it engaged in good faith negotiations. Judge Haynes ultimately
decided that the Board had met its burden under I.C. § 7-721 in order to be entitled to early
possession of the part taken, but the ultimate issue of damages was reserved for the finder of
fact at trial.
The Court never ruled and certainly never intended that Grathol would be precluded
from presenting evidence on damages related to the impact of Sylvan Road. Instead, Judge
Haynes merely held that such issues did not prevent him from ordering immediate possession.
While Grathol respectfully disagreed with the Court's finding that the Board had satisfied the
requirements of LC § 7-721 (and has appealed that decision), the Court clearly never predetermined the measure of damages to be presented at trial.
At that stage in the litigation, only several weeks aftei the Complaint was filed, no
discovery had been conducted and there was no evidence presented regarding the scope of the
take in terms of severance or consequential damages. Indeed, it is impossible to expect a
condemnee defendant to put on evidence of the scope of severance damages at that early stage,
since they could not be prepared to do so.
If the hearing on a motion for early possession were meant to be preclusive on the scope
of damages, then there would be no legitimate point in continuing the condemnation case
beyond that hearing. Instead, the motions and arguments made by the Board were only that it
should be granted early possession. There was nothing in that motion practice to suggest that
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Grathol would be precluded from arguing at trial for the full extent of its damages by reason of
the take. To hold otherwise would impinge on Defendant's constitutional due process right to
have damages determined at trial. The Court's ruling on the possession hearing was limited to
the Board's motion for possession and cannot now be expanded to prejudice Grathol's rights.
The Board's trys to separate out each "category" of damages and have this Court
systematically dismiss them instead of evaluating the effect upon Grathol's property rights of
the project as a whole. The Board's piece meal treatment and compartmentalization of the
damage issues is not proper. Each of the categories of damages that Grathol claims is allowed
and is supported by evidence.
Idaho Court's have uniformly held that when there is a physical taking of private
property for public purposes all incidents of property ownership are subject to an assessment
of value. State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958). The Fonburg Court
held:
These elements of damage consist of the reasonable market value
of the land taken, together with . . . severance damages to the
remainder, through which the road runs due to its severance from
the whole, ...

***
The section inter alia provides that the court, jury or referee, after
hearing the evidence, must assess the value of the property sought
to be taken ... and each and every estate and interest therein

Id. at 280, 365 P.2d 66 (emphasis added). The Fonburg decision comports with prevailing

authority that all damages incurred as a result of a condemnation action are compensable. That
is what the term "just" compensation means. Damages aie not limited to only the physical take.
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Instead they extend to each and every "estate and interest" impacted. The issue of extension of
Sylvan Road across Grathol's property certainly fits this description.
All objective evidence demonstrates that the Board will require Sylvan Road to be
dedicated and constructed in the future. The Board has acquired Roberts Road right-of-way to
the north and has dead-ended Roberts Road directly at Grathol's property. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert,
Ex. B. The Board also included in its right-of-way plan2 improvements to the intersection of

Sylvan Road and Highway 54. While the Board has cleverly substituted a different plan in its
most recent briefing, it can't hide the fact that Sylvan/Hwy 54 intersection improvements are
contemplated as shown in the plans attached to the Complaint and numerous other "plans"
produced in discovery. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert, Ex. C.
What's more, the clear language of the Order of Condemnation, as well as testimony
from the Board's speaking agent Jason Minzghor, indicate beyond a shadow of a doubt that the
Board's future plans are for the extension of Sylvan road across Grathol's property. See, A.ff. C.
Gabbert, Ex. D (J. Minzghor Depa, pp. 59, 70-73 and 75-76). In its brief, the Board bluntly

admits that development of Sylvan Road will be "required" for any future development by
Grathol.

In fact, Plaintiff tried to orchestrate such a dedication even prior to the current

condemnation. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert, Ex. H. While it argues that development concessions like
dedication of roads are ordinarily required of developers, the Board glosses over the undeniable
fact that a dedication would never be necessary if it were not for the Project. In other words, if
the Board were not moving forward with the Hwy 95 realignment, then there would be no

2

Meaning the plan attached to the Complaint, which plan, as addressed at page 7 infra, is different from the plan in
Plaintiff's Motion papers.
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necessity for a local frontage road to be dedicated or developed. Ever. It is only because of this
project that Grathol's parcel will have to be divided by another road.
Because the need for development of Sylvan Road is caused by the partial physical
taking of Grathol's property for the US 95 realignment, Grathol is entitled to present evidence
of severance and consequential damages related to Sylvan Road.

2.

Construction Delay

Plaintiff argues that Grathol cannot claim damages for the impairment of the use of
property caused by the construction delays. Plaintiff basically argues that such inconveniences
are non-compensable, no matter how great or pervasive because they are not causing a physical
taking of property. Plaintiff cites Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637
(2004). Plaintiffs reliance on Moon is misplaced. Moon was not a physical condemnation
case. Moon involved claims of trespass and negligence for the intrusion of smoke caused by
field burning. It was, in part, an inverse condemnation issue, but not one involving a direct
take.
Piaintiffs argument that a taking must involve a permanent deprivation in order to be
entitled to compensation is flat wrong. Permanency of a take may come into play with a
regulatory taking, but when there is an associated physical taking of a private party's property,
there is no such limitation on just compensation. Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho
536, 541-42, 96 P.3d 637, 642-43 (2004), citing Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,
53 P.3d 828 (2002).
Plaintiff also erroneously relies on Just 's Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462,

583 P.2d 997 (1978) for the proposition that a property mvner ca.m1ot recover damages for
construction delay. Just's Inc., like Moon, was also not a condemnation case. It involved
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causes of action based on negligence and contract. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the
plaintiff could not sustain a claim for purely economic losses resulting from the negligent
diversion of customers because liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act
would be virtually open ended. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d 1005. The Just's Inc. Court further
recognized that the bar on purely economic damages in tort should not be mechanically applied
and various exceptions existed involving a special relationship between the parties. Id.
Consider this: Business interruption damages are absolutely compensable in eminent
domain. When, as here, the condemnor is taking a portion of private property and because of
that taking a condemnee is unable to use the remainder of its property until the project is
completed, damages incurred by the delays in the project are compensable. For example, a
commercial business owner is subjected to a taking of a utility easement running directly
through his parking lot. Until the construction is complete, the business cannot operate and
must sit idle. The use of the remaining property is not directly taken, but the damage to the
business in terms of lost revenue is a proper component of just compensation as it flows directly

Here, a prime portion of Grathol's property is being taken in order to construct a
substantial elevated highway interchange. Grathol cannot develop the remainder of its property
until the condemnation and the construction is complete - which may take years. This is an
element of damages to be considered in awarding just compensation.
Grathol has attempted to proceed with the development of its property, but Plaintiff and
its agents have resisted these efforts, even refusing to cooperate in preparing a Traffic Impact
Study as required for development application under Kootenai County's ordinances. The
Board wants to argue that in order to be compensable, there must be a complete and permanent
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impairment of a property right. However, this is not a regulatory takings analysis. The Board is
physically condemning a substantial portion of Grathol's property and impairing the use, utility
and development of the remainder.
The Board's citation to non-Idaho cases even fails to support its arguments. Frank v.

Government of City of Morristown, 294 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2008) did not involve a
physical taking of the plaintiffs property. It was an action for nuisance caused by dust, noise,
dirt and debris complained of by a tenant in a building adjoining the construction. It was
essentially a "proximity damage" case by a landowner who was losing no physical property.
The Frank court even recognized that its holding was limited to cases in which there was not a
corresponding physical take:
Owners of land, no part of which has been taken for public
purposes, are not entitled to compensation for damages naturally
and unavoidably resulting from the careful construction and
operation of the public improvement which damages are shared
generally by owners whose lands lie within the range of the
inconveniences necessarily attending that improvement (internal
citation omitted).

Frank v. Gov't of City ofAforristown, 294 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
The Board also argues that damages to the remainder by reason of construction delay
are somehow not permitted because Idaho Code § 7-712 sets the date of valuation of
compensation on the date of the summons. Again, the Board confuses the separate property
rights at play. Idaho Code § 7-712 sets the date of the issuance of the summons for the
determination of value for real property actually taken. It does not impose a "cutoff date" for
severance damages accruing to the remainder or for consequential damages. Indeed, if other
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be determined on that date, any number of damages could never be compensated because the
consequences of the partial taking would not yet be identifiable.
The Board's argument is also belied by Idaho Code§ 7-711 allowing the condemning
authority to present evidence of "special benefits" accruing to the property by reason of the
proposed construction improvements. These types of special benefits are allowed in order to
offset or mitigate against severance damages. However, on the date of the issuance of a
summons for condemnation - no construction will have occurred, so the benefits (if any)
cannot be calculated. Section 7-711 cannot be rigidly interpreted to disallow compensation
for damages by reason of the severance from the remainder, if the condemning authority is
expressly allowed to present evidence of how a completed project will specially benefit the
property in the future.
Last, the Board argues that Grathol cannot claim damages based on construction delays
because it was aware when it purchased the property that condemnation was to occur. This
argument is absurd. Using the Board's logic, all use and development of property could be
stymied and delayed for decades, yet no compensable interest would exist by reason of a
condemning authority's pre-take announcement of intent to construct something, at some time
in the future. The Board's arguments might be more persuasive in the context of a total take,
wherein the property owner will not retain any property interest in the remainder which could
be impacted by delay. However, when there is only a partial taking, the Board's argument is
logically unsound.
Many jurisdictions have held that a landowner is entitled to damages, independent of

respect to announcing its intent to condemn. See e.g., Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N Las Vegas,
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124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672, (2008). A landowner may show that the public agency
acted improperly by unreasonably delaying an eminent domain action after announcing its
intent to condemn the landowner's property. Id. See also, Jones v. People ex rel. Dep't of

Transp., 22 Cal.3d 144, 151, 583 P.2d 165, 148 Cal.Rptr. 640 (1978).
In the instant case, the Board has argued that it "approved the condemnation" of the
Grathol property long, long before the administrative Order of Condemnation was executed.

See, Aff. C. Gabbert, Ex. E at p. 6. In fact, according to the Board, it has approved this
condemnation annually, beginning in 2005. (Id. at p. 5). 3

The Director of ITD then

authorized and executed an Order of Condemnation on November 17, 2010 which was
attached to the Complaint. According to the Board's own timeline, at least five years passed
between the Board's first "action" to condemn the Grathol property and the filing of its
Complaint for condemnation. In fact, the planning for the Project has been in the works for
over a decade. Additionally, even prior to the filing of the condemnation Complaint, the
Plaintiff took steps to prevent Grathol from developing its own property. Sufficient evidence
certainiy exists to demonstrate that the Board's deiay in bringing the eminent domain action
after first announcing its "decision" to condemn the Grathol property has caused Grathol
damages, and these delay damages are compensable.

3.

Pre-purchase knowledge of the project.

The Board argues that Grathol is precluded from claiming severance damages because
Grathol knew before purchasing the property that it was subject to condemnation. This

3 The Board relies on this date as the date for its "approval" of the Grathol condemnation in order to argue that it
need not take an action to approve the Order of Condemnation under LC.§ 7-707(6).
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argument factually fails, because the scope, extent, location and impact of the project both on
and off of Grathol's property, changed significantly after Grathol purchased the property.
Despite the Board's claims that Grathol had knowledge of "the Project," the actual design
and impact on the property turned out to be much different from what was being proposed
when Grathol acquired the property. One of Grathol's owners, Alan Johnson testified:

A.
We met -- and I'm not positive of the date -- before we
closed escrow with ITD. Don Davis, and -- I don't recall if there
was anybody else in the meeting. He'd indicated that, you know,
these were what the plans were. But we've seen plans like this
all the time, too, that never come to fruition. But his indication
was that they were going to put a - they were going to realign
the project. It was going to be -- at that time, it was not going to
be an overpass. It was going to be an at-grade intersection with
traffic signals. I guess similar to what Garwood and 95 is now.
He indicated that there were no plans to build an interchange -- a
freeway interchange with an overpass. And he did indicate that
actually 95 would be at the same -- approximately the same
grade that it is at now, and 54 would be depressed under it. He
said there were no plans to consider that until 2020. At least
2020. (emphasis added)
A. Johnson Depa, p. 31, ll. 22-25 top. 32, I. 13, See, Ajf. C. Gabbert, Ex. F.

Grathol's knowledge of the possibility of a future development in the vicinity of its
property does not extinguish recognized property rights. Being aware that someday, maybe, a
project, of some form, might be built does not prohibit a buyer of the property from receiving
compensation once the property is ultimately taken. The Board's actions here have effectively
eliminated any productive use of the property since the pre-take announcements. Further, it is
still uncertain just when the construction of the new highway overpass will be completed. This
renders all other development on the remaining property virtually impossible. These are facts
which result in damages.
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While the Board may argue that Alan Johnson's testimony is unreliable and his
methodology for determining damages is "flawed," such arguments only go to the weight of the
testimony and create a factual issue to be resolved at trial. Indeed, the Board proposes rebuttal
testimony from Dennis Reinstein, CPA, to attack the Defendant's testimony in support of
construction delay damages.

Mr. Reinstein's report simply challenges the testimony of

Johnson, but does not establish an entitlement to summary judgment as a matter oflaw.
Idaho law recognizes that each and every incident of property ownership is to be
evaluated in determining just compensation for a taking. Severance damages to the remainder
of the property after the physical take include damages from loss of use of the remainder caused
by construction delays and damages to its development rights. The Board's motion(s) must be
denied on this issue.
4.

Loss of Visibility.

Contrary to the Board's argument, Idaho does not limit the types of damages available
for just compensation when a physical taking occurs. All incidents of property ownership are
subject to an assessment of value. State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60
(1958). The Board fails to cite a single Idaho case that has denied a commercial landowner the
right to present damages for loss of visibility caused by a partial taking of its property.
Instead, the Board compares loss of visibility to a claim of a right to a particular off-site
traffic pattern, and cites several Idaho cases for the argument that a claimant cannot demand
damages from traffic changes. However, these cases are easily distinguishable as none of them
save State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, involved a direct taking of any portion of the landowner's

that the landowners did not have a right to any particular pattern of traffic flow and therefore no
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impairment of access.

However, Moore does not preclude evidence of damages to the

remainder and in fact, recognizes that the State is required to pay compensation not only for the
value of the strip actually taken, but is also required to compensate for damages, if any, which
that severance will cause to the remainder portion of the property. Id. at 446, 546 P.2d 401.
Grathol's damages related to loss of visibility for their commercial development have nothing
to do with traffic patterns, traffic control or loss of traffic cirquity offsite. 4
Loss of visibility as a condemnation damage has been recognized by other jurisdictions.
In 8960 Square Feet, More or Less v. State of Alaska, 806 P.2d 843 (1991), the Alaska
Supreme Court considered a landowner's claim to compensation for loss of visibility caused by
the construction of earth berms on an adjacent railroad right-of-way and caused by the
widening and lowering of the road through the portion of their land being taken. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the State based on the premise that loss of visibility is not
compensable. Id. at 844. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the construction of the
earthen berms on the railroad right-of-way (which was not property condemned) could not form
the basis for a claim as the landowner did not have any property interest in off-site
improvements and could not complain about the loss of visibility occasioned by its use. Id. at
846.
However, the Court found that the loss of visibility from widening and lowering of the
road was accomplished through the taking of part of the landowner's property and that this

4

The issue of access and cirquity of travel as severance damages is presently on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court
in Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC, S.Ct. No. 38344 (2011). See, The Advocate, January 2012, p. 38. This
appears therefore to be a matter of first impression in Idaho.
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distinction was significant.
Ownership of land gives the owner the right and ability to limit
any obstructions from being placed on that land. In particular,
ownership of land abutting on a road gives the owner the right to
control the visibility of all adjoining land further off the road. This
obviously can be an important commercial asset. Thus when the
state takes a parcel which abuts the road, it also takes the
potentially valuable right to control the visibility of the remaining
parcel. For this reason, we believe that the best rule in light of
reason and policy is that loss of visibility to a remaining parcel
is compensable where that loss is due to changes made on the
parcel taken by the state.

Id. at 846. (emphasis added)
The 8960 Square Feet Court even considered the state's argument that the right to
visibility was similar to the right to demand traffic flow and flatly rejected the argument,
finding that the state could restrict off-site traffic flow because it was not using the landowner's
property to achieve that purpose. Id. at 848-49.
Other courts have similarly allowed evidence of visibility damages. Very recently, in

Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 WL 5110962 (2011 ), the Utah
Supreme Court overturned an earlier decision (Ivers v. Utah Department a/Transportation, i 54
P.3d 802 (2007)), which had held that a landowner who had a portion of his property physically
taken could only recover severance compensation for "recognized" property rights, which don't
include visibility. Id. at 4. The Admiral Beverage Court found that its decision in Ivers was
contrary to the long-standing rule that the measure of severance damage is the diminution in
market value of the remainder property and in assessing fair market value in the context of
severance damages the Court has always allowed evidence of all factors affecting market value.

Id. The Admiral Beverage Court also recognized that Utah. Code Gust like Idaho Code)
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specifically provides for an assessment of severance damages. It wrote:
... the Ivers rule runs afoul of this statutory framework because it
would not allow Admiral to place on the "harm" side of the
equation all of the damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance . . . and the
construction of the improvement.
Id. at 9. The Admiral Beverage Court found that because the statutory scheme allowed the
condemning authority to subtract from just compensation for any increase in value to the
remainder by reason of the improvements, then precluding a landowner from presenting
evidence of the same damages would contravene the statutory intent.

Other states have

similarly allowed evidence of severance damages for loss of visibility on this basis. See e.g.,
Shileds v. Garrison, 91 Wash.App. 381, 957 P.2d 805 (1998); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d
390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Salles, 387 So.2d 1278
(La.App. I st Cir, 1980).
Distinguishing from the Alaska and Utah cases discussed above, here the Board is
attempting to compare the loss of visibility damages to claims for a specific off-site traffic
pattern. However, the ioss of visibility here is not created by off-site improvements but instead
is a direct consequential damage caused by the improvements (i.e. a full elevated freeway type
interchange) constructed directly on the land being condemned.

That taking and planned

construction causes the loss of visibility to the remainder of Grathol's property and, therefore, is
an element of damages for which just compensation must be paid. Because Idaho does not
restrict the severance damages which may be presented and (like Utah) has a statutory structure
in place to specifically require compensation for severance damages, such damages are to be
properly considered.
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As a last gasp, the Board simply attacks the opinion of Geoff Reeslund that the
remaining property will have limited visibility as a result of the construction and taking. The
Board presents a report by one of its many rebuttal "experts" that claims "structures on the
Grathol site should be visible from the new US95 freeway." This unswom opinion, at best,
partially supports the Board's contention, but this evidence is merely a difference of opinion on
whether damages will be incurred due to loss of visibility. As such, the Board has only
managed to create an issue of fact to be resolved at trial.
5.

Access

Once again, the Plaintiff stubbornly insists that if deeded access is not being "taken,"
Grathol cannot seek any damages related to access. Once again, this argument ignores the fact
that Grathol is entitled to recover for all damages to the remainder which would not have
occurred but/or this partial taking. Presently, Grathol's property is undeveloped. It has had for
years several deeded accesses off of Hwy 54. It also has had the right to request access off of
US Hwy 95. But for this project, Grathol would certainly be granted direct access off of US 95.
In the immediate corridor area both north and south of the Grathoi property, there are
numerous direct ingress and egress points from Hwy 95 to properties for various uses,
residential, commercial and industrial. Because of this project, the realignment of the highway,
the elevation of this interchange, and the very nature of the project creating a "limited access
highway" it is axiomatic that Grathol's remainder property and its rights in that property
relative to access will be different than they would have been if this project had never been
conceived.
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Clearly there are contested issues of fact as to the scope and extent of the limitations on
access, but that is a matter for the trier of fact to determine based upon the evidence at trial.
6.

Lost profits

The Board next argues that Idaho "common law" flatly precludes any claim of lost
profits in a condemnation proceeding. 5 The Board argues that Idaho Code§ 7-711(2) provides
the exclusive basis for such claims. Again, the Board mischaracterizes the nature of Grathol's
damages and the applicable Idaho law.
Although the loss of business profits are not compensable as such
in eminent domain actions, evidence thereof may be admissible if
it bears upon the fair market value of property actually taken and
the severance damage to the remainder.

State ex rel. Moore v. Bastain, 97 Idaho 444, 448, 546 P.2d 399,403 (1976). (emphasis added)
It is not clear if the Board is intentionally trying to mislead the Court or it is merely zealously
advocating its position. Regardless, it is clear that lost profits are certainly admissible evidence
of severance damages to the remainder in partial takings cases or where they bear upon the fair
market value of the property.
The damages for lost profits to be offered by Grathol at trial relate to the reduction in
value, use and marketability to the remaining property by reason of the severance of the prime
comer acreage being taken and use to which that acreage will be put. These damages go to the
value of the impairment by reason of the limitations now in place on the development of the
remainder as a commercial development site. These damages are not the same as those
"business profits" contemplated under Idaho Code § 7-711(2) as they are not damages caused
by the interruption of an ongoing business.

5

Query where this notion comes from as there simply is no "common law" of eminent domain.
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7.

Gravel

Plaintiffs brief contends that "ITD [the Board] is buying [italics original] the
condemned the [sic] entire property in its entirety, including any gravel or anything else of
value that may or may not be under the property." See, Plaintiff's Brief in Support, pg. 44.
What?! Put more cogently, the Board believes that Grathol cannot recover the fair market
value of the property and an additional amount for gravel deposits. There are no reported cases
in Idaho speaking to this issue. However, the very issue of valuation of mineral/gravel deposits
on condemned property was addressed in State of Nevada, ex rel Nevada Department of

Transportation v. Las Vegas Building Materials, Inc., 104 Nevada 479, 761 P.2d 843 (1988).
In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court held a condemnee landowner did not make a "double
valuation" by separately valuing minerals and then adding that value to the market value of the
land being taken. Citing from Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain Section 13.22 at 126-130,
the Nevada Supreme Court noted that in a condemnation action, the existence of mineral
deposits in or on the land is an element to be considered in determining the land's value. The
court noted that where the property is not taken for the purpose of obtaining the minerals or as
an ongoing business it is improper to appraise the mineral deposits separately and add the
mineral value to the value of the land. However, where "the fair market value of the subject
parcels, is determined by the comparable sales approach ... " the value of the mineral deposits
could be considered separately. While the State of Nevada argued that the minerals were
separately valued from the land resulting in an improper "double valuation," the Nevada
Supreme Court ruled otherwise stating, "Although the argument has appeal on its face, it is
flmved." Because the comparable sales figures dealt with similar lands without the presence of
minerals, the appraisers in that case added what they concluded was the value of the minerals to
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the comparable sales figures to determine the market value of the land taken. This said, the
Nevada Supreme Court, is not a double valuation. Quoting Nichols, "If the extent and quality
and value of the [gravel] as it lies on the land may not be considered, there would be no way by
which the value of the land with the [gravel] could be shown. All legitimate evidence tending
to establish value of the land with the [gravel] in it is permissible ... [C]onsideration may be
given to the quantity of the mineral that can be extracted and the value thereof, purely as
evidence for arriving at the value of the land."
Here, not surprisingly, Plaintiff's valuation appraiser completely disregarded any
treatment or consideration of gravel value in all of the comparable sales he evaluated.
Moreover, the Plaintiff resisted at every tum Defendant's efforts to pursue discovery of
Plaintiff's geotechnical data gathered, not only from the property taken but elsewhere on the
Defendant's remainder property. Like all of the other issues that Plaintiff hopes will not see the
light of day, the issue of gravel value is a disputed factual matter and certainly not subject of
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

For the multitude of reasons set forth above, each and every issue raised in Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment constitutes a genuine, dispute and material issue of fact to be
determined by the Court upon the evidence adduced at trial. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment must be denied.
II
II
II
II
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DATED this 20 th day of January, 2012.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~];land Delivered
~Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
)land Delivered
_uFacsimile (208) 343-8869

_

0

on James
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN
LIMINE

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden

& Lyons, LLP, and respectfully submits this Response to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Board ("Board") has filed a Motion in Limine to exclude
certain testimony from being introduced at trial in this condemnation action. In addition to, and
simultaneous with, its Motion in Limine, the Board also filed a voluminous Motion for
Summary Judgment which is also a limine motion of sorts. Despite the oppressive page count
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of these filings, Plaintiffs arguments can be summarized: Simply put, Plaintiff does not like
any of Defendant's evidence that contradicts its own myopic theory of damages. There is, in
essence, nothing more than that. However, despite Plaintiffs apparent disagreement with the
substance of the evidence, there is no legal basis to exclude any of it, as all of Plaintiffs
objections simply go to the weight of the evidence, which can and will be considered by the
Court acting as the trier of fact.
Idaho courts have held that there is no precise formula or methodology required for an
expert in arriving at valuation of property in condemnation proceedings. In City of McCall v.
Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006), the City argued (on appeal) that a new trial

should have been granted because the jury improperly relied on the "flawed" methodology of
the landowner's appraiser. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the methodology
used was not flawed, just different from that of the City. Relying on Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho
74, 78, 644 P.2d 1333, 1337 (1982), the Seubert court found that weighing the testimony of
expert witnesses was uniquely within the competence of the trier of fact. "The information,
theory or methodology upon which the expert's opinion is based need not be commoniy agreed
upon by experts in the field, but it must have sufficient indicia of reliability to meet I.RE. 702
requirements." Id. at 585, 130 P.3d 1123, citing State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 417, 3 P.3d
535, 542 (Ct.App.2000). The Seubert court expressly rejected arguments that disagreement
with the methodology used could form the basis for a new trial:
A review of the trial transcript indicates there is support for
Richey's valuation methodologies and opinion. The fact that his
opinion was disagreed with by the opposing experts does not
call his conclusions into question and the City presents no other
argument as to why Richey was not a qualified expert. In
essence, the City merely argues that its expert's appraisal of the
Seubert's property is more reliable than Seubert's and, therefore,
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the jury erred in relying on Seubert's expert's valuation of the
land. It is within the province of the jury, however, to weigh the
testimony of witnesses and there is nothing to suggest the jury's
consideration of Richey's testimony was improper.
Id. at 586, 130 P.3d 1124. Similar arguments were rejected in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74,

644 P .2d 1333 (1982). 1
Similar to the arguments rejected in Seubert and Rueth, Plaintiff moves in limine to
exclude Defendant's expert opinion testimony on value simply because it disagrees with the
opinions. In fact, at Section C, of its Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, Plaintiff takes the
exact same tack used in Seubert, stating that Skip Sherwood's opinions are inadmissible
because they are based on a flawed methodology. Plaintiff disagrees with Sherwood's opinion
of the damages based on a 30 acre parcel wherein it based its own evaluation on a 56 acre
valuation. Sherwood based his valuation opinion, in part, on the western portion of the Grathol
property, from which the Plaintiff was actually physically taking 16.314 acres. In a marathon
deposition of over seven hours, Plaintiffs counsel interrogated Sherwood on his methodology,
essentially trying to "brow beat" Sherwood into "admitting" that his approach was invalid.
Plaintiff similarly complains under Section D of its Brief that Sherwood fails to explain
or quantify the adjustments he has made to comparable sales and therefore his appraisals and
opinions should be excluded. Again, Plaintiff is merely arguing that Sherwood's methodology
is "improper." These arguments only go to the weight of the opinion, but do not go to the
admissibility, and the trier of fact retains the discretion to weigh the testimony.

1 "The

Department's argument overlooks the fact that weighing the testimony of expert witnesses is uniquely within
the competence of the trier of fact... Simply stated, each side's expert presented differing opinions to the district
court based on differing methodologies, and it was with the sound discretion of the district court to accept or reject
each expert's opinions." Id. at 78, 644 P.2d 1337.
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While some sorts of expert opinion testimony is properly subject to the formulaic, rigid
strictures of Daubert and it progeny, other types of opinion testimony does not fit that mold.
Perhaps no better example exists than real estate valuation opinions. Opining on the value of,
and harm to, real estate is not a matter of applying a mathematical formula.
While Plaintiff clearly disagrees with Sherwood's valuation, such disagreement does not
establish grounds under I.RE. 702 to make his testimony inadmissible.

Instead, these

arguments simply go the weight of the testimony and the trier of fact is in a position to assign as
much or as little weight to the opinion as it deems necessary.
Plaintiff also argues that both Sherwood and Alan Johnson's value opm1ons are
inadmissible because they are not linked to the date of the Summons. Plaintiffs arguments are
again without support, because their opinions include valuation for severance and consequential
damages which cannot be limited to the date of the Summons.
Plaintiffs appraised valuations attributed zero dollars to severance or consequential
damages. Affidavit of C. Gabbert, Ex. G (Depa. Stan Moe at pp. 58-59, 11. 25, 1-6). As such,
Plaintiff only values the real property physically taken. That is what this entire case is all about
Plaintiffs failure to consider condemnation damages to which Defendant is entitled by law.
Idaho Code § 7-712 does require that the date of the summons be the basis for assessment of
compensation for all property actually taken. Section 7-712 doesn't speak to other damages,
however. This lock-in valuation date makes sense when there is a physical taking of property.
However, the date of the issuance of the summons does not provide a cut-off date for severance
and consequential damages, since the extent of such damages would not be known, as there was
no

physic~! t~k-e ~t th~t timP.
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It is undeniable that Idaho law allows a property owner to present evidence of severance
damages after the value of the part taken has been established.
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has been
determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further recover
the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is determined by
the market value of such remainder before and after the taking.
The difference in value is the severance damage.

State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 55-56, 286 P.2d 1112, 1118 (1955). (emphasis
added) However, the Plaintiffs argument would limit all evidence of severance damages to the
date that the summons was issued, thus effectively precluding any evidence of damages caused
to the remainder. For example, as briefed in Defendant's Response to Plainitffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, one type of recognized severance damage is damage caused by delays in
construction. If a landowner's remaining parcels are prevented from being put to use by reason
of the condemnor's delay, then their remaining property has been damaged by such delays and
the landowner is entitled to compensation. In order to present evidence of damages caused by
the delay, the damages must be quantifiable and since they are time determinative, the damages
can't be quantified until the extent of the delay is known. If the snapshot date of issuance of the
summons is when those damages must be shown, the delay damages might not have even been
suffered yet. In those circumstances, Plaintiffs argument would virtually preclude any such
damages and would set an arbitrary cut-off date for all severance damages, even those that are
continuing. This result would be contrary to Idaho's recognition that all incidents of property
ownership are subject to compensation and would contravene the Code's intent in allowing
evidence of damages other than the mere value of the part taken. Idaho Code § 7-711(2)

provides for a separate valuation of the property to be conderru1ed a.11.d that of a remai.11.der in a
partial takings cases like this one:
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If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion
not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned, and ... (emphasis added)
Plaintiff's theory directly contravenes Idaho Code's express recognition that damages
which will accrue ("will" - meaning at some future time) to the remainder are to be
compensated for. How can a landowner be expected to present evidence of damages which
will accrue to the remainder by reason of its severance, if its expert opinions of such severance

damages are arbitrarily locked in on the date of the summons? Plaintiff's arguments are
illogical. Further, Plaintiff's arguments are contradicted by virtue of Idaho Code §7-711(3)
wherein a condemnor is entitled to present evidence of "special benefits" accruing to the
remainder by reason of the proposed construction as an offset against the severance damages.
If the severance damages that will be incurred are not recoverable because they are
unquantifiable when the summons is issued, the same would have to be true with respect to
special benefits which are not quantified on the date of the summons. What's good for the
goose ....
Here, Plaintiff attributes no value to any severance or consequential damages to the
remainder of Grathol's property after the taking and, therefore, Plaintiff's expert opinions are
limited to the portion of the property taken on date of the physical take (issuance of the
Summons). However, Plaintiff's decision to ignore Grathol's severance damages does not act
as some unilateral bar to Defendant presenting evidence of the darnages which it believes win
accrue to the remainder after the take. For these same reasons and those briefed in Defendant's

Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's arguments to exclude the
testimony regarding the damages caused by the Sylvan Road expansion are without merit. The
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direct effect of Plaintiffs actions in this condemnation upon the remainder property is
compensable as both severance and consequential damages. Just because Plaintiff refuses to
recognize Defendant's property rights does not make evidence of those rights inadmissible at
trial.
Finally, Plaintiff makes much ado about "excluding" evidence of Comparable Sale No.
5 referenced in Sherwood's valuation, because that sale was made under threat of
condemnation by the Plaintiff itself. Comparable Sale No. 5 was one of ten (10) comparable
sales considered by Sherwood.

Sherwood testified that Comparable Sale No. 5 may not

represent a true "market value" by reason of the threat of condemnation, but he still considered
the property anyway, based on its proximity and similar zoning to the Grathol property.
Sherwood also adjusted the stated sale price downward based on these differences to assist/help
in arriving at his opinions of value. While Plaintiff complains that this sale does not represent
"market value," Sherwood has not exclusively relied on that sale as the basis for his opinion.
Instead, it is merely one of a collection of comparable sales based on the size, location, zoning
ai1d

proximity to the Grahtol property to help forni the basis for his expert analysis.

Comparable No. 5 is a singular "data point," nothing more. Again, Plaintiff is simply arguing
that it disagrees with Sherwood's methodology, but such disagreement in opinion does not
make Sherwood's testimony inadmissible.

If the Court elects to entirely disregard any

consideration Sherwood gave to Comparable No. 5, so be it.

Frankly, it just isn't very

important in the whole scheme of things.

II
II
II
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant requests that Plaintiffs Motion in Limine BE
DENIED.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2012.

B·~,,..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
1///c Stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General

US Mail
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER
D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN
LIMINE

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Kootenai )
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am an attorney of record for the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and

therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter.
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2.

On January 20, 2012, I accessed the Idaho Legislature's website located at

http:llwww.legislature.idaho.govlindex.htm in order to obtain the legislative history for
Senate Bill No. 1243, which amended Idaho Code§ 7-707 to include subsection (6) in 2006.
Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a true and correct copy of the Senate Bill No. 1243, its
amendment and the Statement of Purpose/Fiscal Impact.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B, is a true and correct copy of the Plan Sheet

included in Exhibit B to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff on November 19, 2010.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C, are true and correct copies of plan sheets and

right of way plans produced by Plaintiff through discovery as Bates Nos. 006025, 006027
and 006055.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D, are true and correct copies of portions of the

deposition transcript of Jason Mingzhor, taken November 15, 2011.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E, are true and correct copies of portions of the

Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal, dated November 4, 2011.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F, are true and correct copies of portions of the

deposition transcript of Alan Johnson, taken November 18, 2011.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G, are true and correct copies of portions of the

deposition transcript of Stanley Moe, taken November 15, 2011.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H, is an e-mail dated July, 2008 from Donald C.

Davis to Mark Mussman produced by Defendant through discovery as Bates No. 000505.
II
II
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
/

yiopher D. Gabbert
SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this

21)__ day of January, 2012.
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I hereby certify that on the 20 day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail

~:~n~~~i~;i:~ 334-4498
US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 3
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SENATE BILL NO. 1243
View Bill Status
View Bill Text
View Amendment
View Engrossed Bill (Original Bill with Amendment(s) Incorporated)
View Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Impact
Text to be added within a bill has been marked with Bold and Underline. Text to be removed has been
marked with Strikethrough and Italic. How these codes are actually displayed will vary based on the
browser software you are using.
This sentence is marked with bold and underline to show added text.
Thfa Jentence iJ ma, ked .vith Jt; iketf-t, ough and italic, indic:ati;rg text to be , emo red.

Bill Status
Sl243aa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . by BRANDT
EMINENT DOMAIN - Amends existing law relating to eminent domain to require
that a complaint shall contain an order of condemnation, or resolution, or
other official and binding document entered by the plaintiff which sets
forth and clearly identifies all property rights to be acquired, including
rights to and from the public way, and permanent and temporary easements
known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning authority.
01/11
01/12
02/28
03/14
03/15
03/16
03/20

Senate intro - 1st rdg - to printing
Rpt prt - to St Aff
Rpt out - to 14th Ord
Rpt out amen - to engros
Rpt engros - 1st rdg - to 2nd rdg as amen
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg as amen
3rd rdg as amen - PASSED - 34-0-1
AYES -- Andreason, Brandt, Broadsword, Bunderson, Burkett,
Burtenshaw, Cameron, Coiner, Compton, Corder, Darrington, Davis,
Fulcher, Gannon, Geddes, Goedde, Hill, Jorgenson, Kelly, Keough,
Langhorst, Little, Lodge, Malepeai, McGee, McKenzie, Pearce,
Richardson, Schroeder, Stegner, Stennett, Sweet, Werk, Williams
NAYS -- None
Absent and excused -- Marley
Floor Sponsor - Brandt
Title apvd - to House
03/21
House intro - 1st rdg - Held at Desk
03/23
Ref'd to St Aff
03/27
Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg
03/28
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg
04/11
3rd rdg - PASSED - 67-0-3
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barraclough, Barrett, Bastian, Bayer,
Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Black, Block, Boe, Brackett, Bradford, Cannon,
Chadderdon, Clark, Collins, Crow, Deal, Denney, Edmunson, Ellsworth,
Eskridge, Field(18}, Field(23}, Garrett, Hart, Harwood, Henbest,
Henderson, Jaquet, Kemp, Lake, LeFavour, Loertscher, Martinez,
Mathews, McGeachin, McKague, Miller, Moyle, Nielsen, Nonini,
Pasley-Stuart, Pence, Raybould, Ring, Ringo, Roberts, Rusche,
Rydalch, Sali, Sayler, Schaefer, Shepherd(2}, Shepherd(8}, Shirley,
Skippen, Smith(30}, Smith(24}, Smylie, Snodgrass, Stevenson, Wills,
Wood, Mr. Speaker
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NAYS -- None
Absent and excused
Bolz, Mitchell, Trail
Floor Sponsor - Moyle
Title apvd - to Senate
04/11
To enrol - Rpt enrol - Pres signed - Sp signed
To Governor
04/14
Governor signed
Session Law Chapter 450
Effective: 07/01/06

Bill Text
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
llll
lll l
Fifty-eighth Legislature
Second Regular Session - 2006
IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1243
BY BRANDT
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9

AN ACT
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN; AMENDING SECTION 7-707,
IDAHO CODE, TO REQUIRE
THAT A COMPLAINT SHALL CONTAIN AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION, OR RESOLUTION, OR
OTHER OFFICIAL AND BINDING DOCUMENT ENTERED BY THE PLAINTIFF WHICH SETS
FORTH AND CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ALL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO BE ACQUIRED INCLUDING
RIGHTS TO AND FROM THE PUBLIC WAY, AND PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS
AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AND AMENDING SECTION 40-506,
IDAHO
CODE,
TO PROVIDE A CORRECT CODE REFERENCE AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION.

10

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

11

SECTION 1. That Section 7-707, Idaho Code, be, and
amended to read as follows:

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32
33

the

same

is

hereby

7-707. COMPLAINT. The complaint must contain:
1. The name of the corporation, association, commission or person in
charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled
plaintiff.
2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a
statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants.
3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff.
4. If a right=of=way be sought, the complaint must show the location,
general route and termini, and must be accompanied with maps thereof.
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether
the same includes the whole, or only a part, of an entire parcel or tract. All
parcels lying in the county, and required for the same public use, may be
included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff,
but the court may consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of the
parties.
6. An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding
document entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all
property rights to be acquired including rights to and from the public way,
and permanent and temporary easements.
2.:... In all cases where the owner of the lands sought to be taken resides
in the county in which said lands are situated, a statement that the plaintiff
618 of 1617
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34
35
36
37
38

has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands so sought to be taken,
or
settle with the owner for the damages which might result to his property from
the taking thereof, and was unable to make any reasonable bargain therefor, or
settlement of such damages; but in all other cases these facts need not be
alleged in the complaint, or proved.

39
40

SECTION 2. That Section
amended to read as follows:

41

40-506.

40-506, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby

COMPENSATION FOR TAKING CERTAIN PROPERTY.

(1) The

department

is

2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

authorized to acquire by purchase, gift or condemnation, all advertising displays and any property rights pertaining to them, when those advertising displays are required to be removed under the provisions of chapter 19, title 40,
Idaho Code.
(2)
In any appropriation for this purpose the department shall pay compensation under existing eminent domain law only for the following:
(a)
The taking from the owner of a sign, display, or device of all right,
title, leasehold, and interest in the sign, display or device; and
(b)
The taking from the owner of the real property on which the sign,
display, or device is located, of the right to erect and maintain signs,
displays and devices on that property. Where setback easements restricting
the erection of structures or advertising displays have been recorded by
the state on land where those structures have been erected, the landowner
of the land shall be deemed to have been fully compensated for them.
(3)
In any action at law instituted by the department under this section
the state shall not be required, as a prerequisite, to the taking of or appropriation to comply with section 7-704~2~+ or section 7-707-+6-rL_, Idaho Code.

Amendment
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
llll
llll
Fifty-eighth Legislature
Second Regular Session - 2006

Moved by

Brandt

Seconded by Davis

IN THE SENATE
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1243

3

AMENDMENT TO SECTION 1
On page 1 of the printed bill, in line 31, following "easements"
"known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning authority".

4
5
6

CORRECTION TO TITLE
On page 1, in line 6, following "EASEMENTS" insert: "KNOWN OR REASONABLY
IDENTIFIABLE TO THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY".

1
2

insert:

Engrossed Bill (Original Bill with Amendment(s) Incorporated)
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
llll
llll
Second Regular Session - 2006
Fifty-eighth Legislature

IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1243, As Amended
BY BRANDT
1
2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9

AN ACT
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN; AMENDING SECTION 7-707,
IDAHO CODE,
TO REQUIRE
THAT A COMPLAINT SHALL CONTAIN AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION, OR RESOLUTION, OR
OTHER OFFICIAL AND BINDING DOCUMENT ENTERED BY THE PLAINTIFF WHICH SETS
FORTH AND CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ALL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO BE ACQUIRED INCLUDING
RIGHTS TO AND FROM THE PUBLIC WAY, AND PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS
KNOWN OR REASONABLY IDENTIFIABLE TO THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY AND TO MAKE A
TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AND AMENDING SECTION 40-506, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE
A CORRECT CODE REFERENCE AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION.

10

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

11
12

SECTION 1. That Section
amended to read as follows:

13
14
15
16
17
18

39

7-707.
COMPLAINT. The complaint must contain:
1.
The name of the corporation,
association,
commission or person in
charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled
plaintiff.
2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a
statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants.
3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff.
4. If a right=of=way be sought, the complaint must show the location,
general route and termini, and must be accompanied with maps thereof.
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken,
and whether
the same includes the whole, or only a part, of an entire parcel or tract. All
parcels lying in the county,
and required for the same public use, may be
included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff,
but the court may consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of the
parties.
6. An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding
document entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all
property rights to be acquired including rights to and from the public way,
and permanent and temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the
condemning authority.
'J....:.. In all cases where the owner of the lands sought to be taken resides
in the county in which said lands are situated, a statement that the plaintiff
has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands so sought to be taken,
or
settle with the owner for the damages which might result to his property from
the taking thereof, and was unable to make any reasonable bargain therefor, or
settlement of such damages; but in all other cases these facts need not be
alleged in the complaint, or proved.

40
41

SECTION 2.
That Section
amended to read as follows:

19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35
36
37

38

7-707,

40-506,

Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby

Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby

2
1
2

40-506.
COMPENSATION FOR TAKING CERTAIN PROPERTY. (1) The department is
authorized to acquire by purchase, gift or condemnation, all advertising dis-
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

plays and any property rights pertaining to them, when those advertising displays are required to be removed under the provisions of chapter 19, title 40,
Idaho Code.
(2)
In any appropriation for this purpose the department shall pay compensation under existing eminent domain law only for the following:
(a)
The taking from the owner of a sign, display, or device of all right,
title, leasehold, and interest in the sign, display or device; and
(b)
The taking from the owner of the real property on which the sign,
display, or device is located, of the right to erect and maintain signs,
displays and devices on that property. Where setback easements restricting
the erection of structures or advertising displays have been recorded by
the state on land where those structures have been erected, the landowner
of the land shall be deemed to have been fully compensated for them.
(3)
In any action at law instituted by the department under this section
the state shall not be required, as a prerequisite, to the taking of or appropriation to comply with section 7-704~2~+ or section 7-707-f-6+1.:..., Idaho Code.

Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS 15562
This amendment to existing code shall require condemners to
clearly set forth in the complaint a description of the property
and property rights to be acquired. This will remove any
ambiguity about which rights are being acquired as part of the
condemnation, and shall give the condemner the right to make that
decision, via an order or other resolution entered by the
condemner. This will prevent any ambiguity or argument about
what is or is not being taken via condemnation.

FISCAL NOTE
This will not impose a cost at the State or local level; it
merely requires the condemner to incorporate into the complaint
some evidence of what the condemner seeks to acquire. There may
be a cost savings to condemners as property owners would be on
notice regarding exactly what is being taken and any ambiguity or
argument over that issue will be eliminated by requiring the
complaint to state the taking expressly.

Contact:
Name: Representative Mike Moyle
Phone: 332-1000
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE
REVISED

REVISED

S 1243aa
REVISED

REVISED
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
.THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

)
)

) Case No. CV-10-10095
Plaintiffs,

v.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS
BANK, a Washington corporation;
and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
________________

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

DEPOSITION OF JASON MINZGHOR
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS
AT 700 NORTHWEST BLVD., COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO
NOVEMBER 15, 2011, AT 1:08 P.M.

REPORTED BY:
ANITA W. SELF, CSR, RPR
Notary Public
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Page 60

Page 58
1

shutdown, no earth work after November 15th, or ground

1

A.

Yes.

Q.

What's your understanding of an Order of

2

disturbance, if they can't do work that's on their

2

3

critical path, which is the shortest duration, then we

3

4

shut them down. So a working day would be days that

4

5

they can work, excluding Sundays -- Saturdays and

5

document that ITD uses to enter -- to put the property

6

Sundays and holidays.

6

owner on notice that we will be basically going to
court.

7

Q.

Okay.

7

8

A.

So 355 days, I mean, there's 30 to 31 days in

8

9

a month -- well, there's only five working days a week,

9

10

so it's 20 in a month, versus a completion contract,

10

11

which we have on the Chilco-Silverwood project, they

11

Condemnation?

It is a document signed by our -- It Is a

A.

Q.

Okay. It's kind of the starting point for a

formal condemnation process; is that --

A.

Correct.
MS. YORK: Object to the form of the

12

need to complete the project by a certain date or

12

question. If you know.

13

they're going to be charged liquidated damages and

13

BY MR. MARFICE:

14

penalties.

14

15

Q. There was an Order of Condemnation that was

Okay. And purely, if you know, why a working

15

issued relative to the Grathol property. You've seen

16

day contract on this segment versus a completion date

16

that document?

17

on the next adjacent segment; any reason for that or

17

A.

18

just what's negotiated?

Q.

19

A.

Yes, I saw that document when we testified.

18

Q.

At the quick take hearing?

This -- we use different contracts for

19

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Were you, as the project engineer, involved

20

different reasons. For this one, the majority of our

20

21

contracts are working day. The Chilco-Silverwood had

21

in the preparation of that Order of Condemnation; did

22

some issues concerning work times that we wanted to

22

you draft that or your staff?

23

make sure that the contractor completed it as short as

23

24

possible.

24

Q.

Okay. Do you know who did?

25

Q.

25

A.

I do not.

Okay. So with a 355-day work day contract,

A.

I did not draft those, the actual document.

Page 59

Page 61

1

you equate that in your mind with potentially three

1

2

building seasons, perhaps shorter if weather is

2

normally would draft an Order of Condemnation; is that

3

cooperative?

3

a staff person?

Q.

That specific document, do you know who

4

A.

Correct.

4

A.

It doesn't occur out of my section.

5

Q.

Okay. From the standpoint of the project

5

Q.

Okay. Is there going to be any section of

6

engineer on this segment, and mindful of what you've

6

the Garwood to Sagie project that will not be served by

7

testified to previously regarding the intention of

7

frontage roads, or, I should say, will not have

8

utilizing frontage roads, is it your expectation that

8

frontage roads associated with it?

9

at some point in the future Sylvan Road and Roberts

9

10

Road will be connected up?

11
12

11

question.

12

THE WITNESS: Can you clarify the question?

13
14

10

MS. YORK: Object to the form of the

BY MR. MARFICE:

15

Q. Yeah -- well, I think.
From your standpoint as the project engineer,

16

13

A.

Can you repeat the question?

Q. The entirety of the Garwood to Sagle project
runs from Garwood Road to Sagle, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q. Is it contemplated that that entire span of

14

highway, once it's reconfigured, realigned, will have

15

frontage roads parallel to it?
MS. YORK: Can you clarify as to what time

16

17

would it be your expectation that Sylvan Road and

17

frame?

18

Roberts Road will connect, one or the other, through

18

BY MR. MARFICE:

19

the Grathol property at some point In the future?

19

Q.

When it's done.

20

MS. YORK: Same objection.

20

A,

The ultimate build-out?

21

THE WITNESS: Per our planning document, It

21

Q.

Yes.

A.

Okay. In the ultimate build-out, there are

22

will be -- It is expected to be there.

22

23

BY MR. MARFICE:

23

several sections that may not have frontage roads. To

24

look that up, we'd look at the EIS,

24

25

Q.

Okay. You know what an Order of Condemnation

is?

www.mmcourt.com

25

Q.

MINZGH0R, JASON

Okay. Those sections that will, at least by

11/15/2011
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Page 72

Page 70
1

Q.

2

was?

3

A.

4

Q.

Okay. And do you remember what your response

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Restate the

1
2

question.

I don't.

3

BY MS. YORK:

Can you clarify whether Sylvan Road is going

4

Q.

Is ITD condemning any property for the

5

to be extended across the Grathol property by ITO as

5

6

part of a future project?

6

MR. MARFICE: Same objection.

7

THE WITNESS: We are not.

7

A.

We don't know who Is going to be doing the

extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property?

8

extension of Sylvan Road. It may be part of the

8

9

development, it may be Lakes Highway District, it could

9

Q. You're familiar, are you not, as the project

BY MS. YORK:

10

be a number of agencies that actually do the

10

manager -- that's not the right term -- as the project

11

construction. ITO at this time is only focused on the

11

manager for the Athol segment (sic); is that correct?

12

construction of what is in our project plan.

12

A.

Yes,

13

Q.

And you're familiar with what property ITD

13

Q.

Now, in the planning documents, the

14

Environmental Impact Statement, there's been discussion

14

15

on how the extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol

15

16

property is shown on some of the diagrams in the early

16

17

planning documents; is that correct?

17

needs for the construction of its project?

A. Correct.
Q. Does ITD need any property for Sylvan Road?
A. We do not.

18

A.

Correct,

18

19

Q.

However, can you describe what the ROD says

19

across -- or does ITO need for Its Athol segment any
property for Sylvan Road across the Grathol property?

Q.

Let me clarify. Does ITD need any property

20

about the extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol

20

21

property?

21 .

A.

No, we do not.

22

A.

22

Q.

And Is ITD, as part of its project to

23

The ROD looks at the extension of Sylvan

Road -- there was several options. There was four

23

construct the Athol segment of the Garwood to Sagle

24

options on frontage road involving properties to the

24

project, is it building

25

north of 54 and east of existing 95.

25

Grathol property?

a frontage

road across the
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1
2

There was two proposed general locations for
Sylvan Road with respect to the Grathol piece. The

1

A.

No, we are not.

2

Q.

Another line of questioning or discussion

3

first one would be going straight across, going

3

point that you had with Mr. Marfice was in relationship

4

basically in a straight line extending Sylvan to

4

to the Stewardship Agreement.

5

Roberts. Another one would be to follow the

5

6

interchange general layout and connect into Trinity

6

7

Lane to the north.

7

that we have ITD has with the Federal Highway

8

Administration basically outlining the protocol of how

9

ITD operates and administers federal funds.

8

The ROD specifically selects which option

9

that would be, and it selected the best option would be

10
11

10

to extend Sylvan Road straight Into Roberts.

Q.

Did the ROD say anything about when the

11

Can you describe what that is?

A.

Q.

The Stewardship Agreement is an agreement

And in the context of that discussion, you

referenced ITD's work on the SEP -- the SEP-15 program?

12

extension -- or If, I guess I should say -- if or when

12

A.

Correct.

13

the extension of Sylvan Road might occur?

13

Q.

Did ITO violate its own agreement, the

14
15
16

A.

The ROD specifically states that the

construction is unknown at this time.

Q.

Is Sylvan Road -- is ITO extending Sylvan

14

Stewardship Agreement when it went through the SEP-15

15

process with respect to the Grathol property?

16

A.

No. The SEP Is approved by the Federal

17

Road across the Grathol property as part of the Athol

17

Highway Administration. They actually sign -- it's an

18

segment of the Garwood to Sagle project?

18

experimental program that they signed with ITD in the
hopes that we can_ better our system. And one of those

19

A.

We are not.

19

20

Q.

Is ITO condemning any properties for Sylvan

20

SEPs gave us the ability to purchase early

21

right-of-way, and another one gave us the ability to go

21
22
23

Road to cross the Grathol property?
MR. MARFICE: Object to the form. Calls for
a legal conclusion.

iiftv

23

document approved.

24

MS. YORK: You can answer.

24

25

MR. MARFICE: You can answer.

25

www.mmcourt.com

i11tol

22

Q.

dt::::::.iy11 t,J1iva LV hav~,,~ 011

c-11v;1v1111,c11tal

Okay. So as part of that work, ITD did not

violate its Stewardship Agreement with FHWA?

MINZGHOR, JASON
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Page 76

Page 74
1

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10

A. It did not.
Q. And then the last follow-up questions that I
had for you was with respect to the bike path that's
part of the Farragut Trail land exchange.
Do you recall that discussion you had with
Mr. Marfice?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You were asked the question of whether ITD

Why isn't ITO condemning for the extension of

Sylvan Road across the Grathol property to connect to
Roberts Road?
A.

The -- because they have access now. We --

5

the extension of Roberts Road was to ensure -- to the

6

south was to ensure all properties that had access in

7

the before has access in the after. Grathol has access

8

in the before and in the after.

Q.

Is that the only reason?

10

A.

Yes.

Do you recall that question?

11

Q.

I'm going to show you the Record of Decision

that was included in your materials. The final page of

property for the bicycle path across the Grathol

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

property?

23

District's request as part of the Record of Decision

24
25

correct?

path.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Can you explain when the bike path became

14
15

incorporated into the design for the Athol segment?

16

entire corridor from Garwood to Sagle. The Farragut

17

Trail portion was designed -- final design around 2010,

18

September of 2010.

20
21
22
23

2
3
4

Q.

9

was taking or acquiring more property for that bike

11

19

1

A. The bike path has always been a part of the

Q,

And can you explain, then, with that

background, what you meant by your testimony -- your
prior testimony stating that ITD was taking more

24

A. Well, our first -- the EIS does not depict

25

the bike path so -- for the entire corridor, so when

that Record of Decision, what is that?

A. This is a letter from Lakes Highway District.
Q. To whom?
A.

To Jerry Wilson.

Q.

Who is Jerry Wilson?

A.

He's my staff engineer.

Q.

Okay. And what's the substance of that

letter?

A.

This is regarding the Sylvan Road extension.

Q.

And paraphrasing that, that's Lake Highway

record to ask ITD to extend Sylvan Road across Grathol,
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1
2

people look at the EIS, it appears that we are
acquiring additional land, but it's just not depicted.

3

So there is property being taken for the bike

4

path, but in regard to Grathol, it has always been in

5

the offer that we made to them as far as the amount of

6

acreage has been the same throughout the project.

7
8

9
10
11

12
13

Q. So ITD has not changed the amount of property
it's taking from the Grathol for its Athol segment?

A. It has not changed.

Q. And that amount has always included the bike
path?

A. Correct.
MS. YORK: I don't have any further

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

19

Decision questions that Ms. York just asked you about

20

concerning the extension of Sylvan Road, your testimony

21

was that the Record of Decision contemplates extension

22
23

of Sylvan Road to connect to Roberts Road through four

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

alternatives considered, one being a straight shot

23

24

right across the Grathol property, right?

24
25

14
15

questions.

16

BY MR. MARFICE:

17
18

25

FURTHER EXAMINATION

Q, Two follow-ups.
Mr. Minzghor, with respect to the Record of

A. Correct.

www.mmcourt.com

A. It is.
Q. All right.

MINZGHOR, JASON

MR. MARFICE: That's all I have. Thanks.
(Deposition concluded at 3:22 p.m.)
(Signature requested.)
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Docket No. 38511
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HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership,

Defendant-Appellant.
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admits that the administrative order also did not identify any land to be condemned for Sylvan
Road.
D.

The Idaho Transportation Board Approved The US-95 Project.
The Idaho Transpo1tation Board repeatedly approved the US-95 Project. R. at 166-167,

,r,r 6, 9-12 (Vogt Aff., ,r,r 6, 9-12).

The Board approves state highway projects (construction of

new highways, reconstruction and improvement of existing highways, and major maintenance
projects) tlu·ough adoption of the annual Idaho "Statewide Transportation Improvement
Program" ("STIP"). R. at 155, ,r 10.
Grathol mischaracterizes the STIP program as a "funding mechanism." h1 fact, the STIP
program is an exhaustive, year-long process culminating in the selection and approval of state
highway projects by the Idaho Transportation Board. The process includes public hearings by
the Board and the solicitation of public comment from state and local governments, business
interests, and private individuals. It is the process th.rough which the Idaho Transportation Board
decides which projects will be built, when, and in what order. In addition, prior to adoption of
the STIP each year, the Board affinns that all federal requirements for public involvement and
comment have been met. See, e.g., R. at 191.
Every year, after months of preparation, public hearings, and public comment, the Board
approves a STIP. This decision constitutes the Board's fmmal decision on and ap_P.roval of the
state highway projects that are to be undertaken for the next five years. R. at 167, ,i 11. An
approved project is generally included in the STIP for five years, marking its progress from
design and dete1mination of route, to 1ight-of-way acquisition, through construction and
completion. The US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project has been approved by the Board in each
annual STIP since 2005. R. at 166-170. See also R. at 175-260 (Vogt Aff., Exs. 2-11) (Board
approvals and adoptions of annual STIPs for fiscai years 2005-2010).
Idaho law requires the Board to hold public hearings before making its final decision on
the location and route of an individual state highway project. LC. § 40-310. The Board is

required to serve ,vritten notice of these hea1ings, by certified or registered 111ail, on all private

RESPONDENT ITO'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 5
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property owners like Grathol whose prope1ty will be acquired for the project, either through
purchase or condemnation. LC. § 40-310(1 )(a). This process is controlled and directed by the
Board and occurs long before an administrative order of condemnation is executed. Id. The
Board must also satisfy federal requirements for public hearings and comment. See, e.g., R. at
191 ("Whereas, the STIP was developed in accordance with all applicable federal requirements
including adequate oppmtunity for public involvement and comment.").

E.

The Board Approved The Acquisition Of All Properties Needed For Tile US-95
Project.
The Idaho Trm1sportation Board approved both the route of the US-95 Project and the

acquisition of each parcel of land needed for the Project, including the Grathol property. See

infra Section IV(B)(6). The Board's approval of the condemnation of a pmtion of the Grathol
prope1ty occurred long before the administrative order of condemnation was executed by the
Director oflTD. Id.

F.

Events Prior To Condemnation Of The Gmthol Property.
After approving the US-95 Project, its route, and the prope1ties to be acquired, ITD began

the process of design, right-of-way acquisition, and contract bidding. ITD's record of right-ofway negotiations show that ITD served the right-of-way acquisition packet on Grathol's
representatives on June 19, 2010. This packet included the statement of property owner rights
required under I.C. § 7-711A, plans showing the location and route of the project across the
Grathol prope1ty and specifically showing the portion of the Grathol property to be acquired, and
a copy of an appraisal of the Grathol property commissioned by ITD. With the packet delivered
on June 19, 2010, !TD conveyed to Grathol its offer to purchase the portion of property needed
for the US-95 Project for $628,100. Tr. at 17-18. Grathol rejected the offer in late June,
demanding instead the payment of between $2.5 and $3 million. Tr. at 18.
After being unable to reach agreement with Grathol for the purchase of its prope1ty,
ITD initiated the administrative process to prepare for condemnation of the prope1ty. The legal
department of ITD prepared the administrative order of condemnation. The Director of ITO
signed the administrative order of condemnation on November 17, 2010, aiong with the Right of

RESPONDENT ITD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 6
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authority to authorize and execute the administrative order of condemnation. The Director did
not exercise the power of eminent domain. He did not file the complaint, and did not seek to
condemn prope1ty in his name or for his use.
The propeliy identified in the administrative order of condemnation is identical to the
propeliy condemned two days later in ITD's Complaint. The uncontroverted facts show that
ITD is not condemning any propeliy other than the property identified in the Complaint needed

for constrnction of the US-95 Project, and is not condemning any property for Sylvan Road. The
district couit's mlings are amply suppo1ted in the law and by the facts in this case, and should be
upheld on appeal.
DATED this 4th day of November, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
State ofIdaho, Idaho Transportation Board
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
BOARD,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CVl0-10095

)

vs.

)
)

HJ GRATHOL, a California)
general partnership;
)
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a)
Washington corporation; )
and DOES 1 through 5,
)
)

____________

Defendants. )
)

DEPOSITION OF ALAN JOHNSON
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF
AT 816 SHERMAN AVENUE, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO
NOVEMBER 18, 2011, AT 9:30 A.M.

REPORTED BY:
JULIE MCCAUGHAN, C.S.R. NO. 684
Notary Public
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Page 30
1
2
3
4

Q.

How did you determine whether or not you

got it for a good price?

A.

We had been looking at other projects in

Coeur d'Alene, and obviously, you know, Coeur d'Alene

Page 32
1

the plans were. But we've seen plans like this all the

2

time, too, that never come to fruition. But his

3

indication was that they were going to put a -- they

4

were going to realign the project. It was going to

5

land is going to be more valuable. We thought the price

5

be -- at that time, it was not going to be an overpass.

6

was a bargain.

6

It was going to be an at-grade intersection with traffic

7

signals. I guess similar to what Garwood and 95 ls now.

7
8

9

(Exhibit 43 was marked.)
BY MR. TOLLEFSON:

Q.

I'm handing you what's been marked as

8

He indicated that there were no plans to build an

9

interchange -- a freeway interchange with an overpass.
And he did Indicate that actually 95 would be at the

10

Deposition Exhibit No. 43. Are you familiar with the

10

11

MLS or the Multiple Listing Service?

11

same -- approximately the same grade that it is at now,

12

and 54 would be depressed under it. He said there were

13

no plans to consider that until 2020. At least 2020.

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

A.

I'm familiar with what it is. I'm not a

member of it.

Q.
A.
Q.

14

Do you have access to the MLS?

And you had this conversation before you

acquired the property?

No, I do not.

15

Do you know if any of the brokers that you

16

A.

Yes, we did.

17

Q.

On this MLS document here, halfway down on

would work with, would they have access to the MLS? -

A.

Q.

18

The broker that I worked with on this

particular property did not have access to MLS.

the left-hand side, it says, "Days on the market: 344."

19

Does that seem accurate to you or do you know how long

20

this property had been on the market?

Q.

And who was that?

21

A.

Brett Terrell.

21

22

Q.

And how do you know he did not have access

22

how long it was on the market. I believe it was priced

23

higher -- oh, it was priced at a million seven. They

20

23
24
25

to MLS?

A.

We've talked about it before. He's not a

realtor.

A.

I'm sorry. Oh. I see it. I had no idea

24

dropped the price, and I believe shortly after they

25

dropped the price, we were under contract.
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1

Q.

So if you take a minute to look at this

2

document. So you've never seen this document before.

3

Is that correct?

4
5

A.

1

Q.

And was the price $1,450,000?

2

A.

That's what we paid for the property.
(Exhibit 44 was marked.)

3

I don't believe I have. I may have. It

4

BY MR. TOLLEFSON:

·s

may have been part of discovery from ITD.

Q.

Page 33

Q.

I'm handing you what's been marked as

And just we'll go through here. It says,

6

Deposition Exhibit No. 44. Have you seen this document

7

"Excellent visibility with commercial potential." Do

7

before?

8

you feel that's an accurate description of the property?

8

A.

I have.

9

Q.

And what Is this document?

10

A.

Buyer's Settlement Statement.

11

Q.

And at the top -- and this is the Buyer's

6

9
10

A.

As it was at that time, yes.

Q.

Then it says, "Preliminary drawings showed

11

future off-ramps and frontage roads for Highway 95

12

through this property." Does that also appear to be

12

Settlement Statement for Gracal Corporation's

13

accurate?

13

acquisition of the subject property. Is that correct?

14

A.

It appears to be accurate.

14

A.

That is correct.

15

Q.

So at the time that this property was up

Q.

And just before we move on, do you know

why the property was purchased by Gracal Corporation and
not one of the other entitles?

16

for sale, it was known that there were some preliminary

15
16

17

drawings showing future off-ramps and frontage roads for

17

18

Highway 95?

18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25

A.
Q.

We did know that, yes.
And when did you find out about this

potential future off-ramps and frontage roads?

A.

We met -- and I'm not positive of the

date •• before we closed escrow with ITD. Don Davis,
and -- I don't recall if there was anybody else In the
meeting. He'd indicated that, you know, these were what

www.mmcourt.com

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

I do not. Hughes Investments does not

acquire property -· we'll go under contract with the
right to assign to an entity that we form. Gracal may
have been an entity that had already been formed but
maybe was no longer being used, but I can't be certain
of that.
Q.

But the property was purchased by Gracal

and at some point transferred to HJ Grathol; is that

JOHNSON, ALAN

11/18/2011
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

)
)

) Case No. CV-10-10095
Plaintiffs,

v.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS
BANK, a Washington corporation;
and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
_________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

DEPOSITION OF STANLEY MOE
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS
AT 700 NORTHWEST BLVD., COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO
NOVEMBER 15, 2011, AT 9:41 A.M.

REPORTED BY:
ANITA W. SELF, CSR, RPR
Notary Public
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Page 58
1

Q.

Has it changed over time?

Yeah. It was someone out of the Boise

2

A.

I haven't seen anything that would cause it

3

office, but the function of the reviewer is to go

3

4

through my appraisal, check all the calculations, see

4

5

that it meets the requirements for !TD report

5

6

standards. And if there are some problems, it will

6

7

come back to me for changes. And if not, he'll go

7

8

ahead and write his recommendation for the offer.

8

underneath your pink binder I think you were looking at

9

earlier?

1

2

9

10

know?

Page 60

A.

Q.

Okay. So this is -- the reviewer, to your

knowledge, is somebody within ITD?

11

A.

Uh-huh. This was, yes.

12

Q.

Okay. Was your report, prior to it being

to change at this point.
Have you been asked to evaluate or give any

Q.

opinion on that topic?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you have some project plans there

10

A.

These?

11
12

Q.

Yeah. Do you want to flip to the diagram on

the subject property?
There's two pages. This is the main part of

13

finalized, sent back to you at any point for revisions

13

14

on this parcel?

14

it. Do you want the overall?

15
16

I'm just going to refer to this diagram that's in
multiple areas in the record.

15

A.

I don't -- I don't think so. If it was, it

16

was something very minor, change in spelling or

17

something of that nature. But there was no changes to

17

18

my values.

18

19

Q.

Okay. The second portion of that table,

A.

Q.

Yeah, the overall would probably be best.

This is the Grathol property that you

19

identified?

20

there's an upper portion and a lower portion. The

20

A.

Yes.

21

lower portion pertains to value of the remainder after

21

Q.

Now, among your file materials is this Parcel

22

the acquisition.

22

19.1 that was separately appraised, and that's the
Farragut Trail?

Do you see that?

23

24

A.

Yes.

24

25

Q.

There's a category called Damages to the

25

23

A.

No. The Farragut Trail is Parcel 21. That

was a totally separate issue.

Page 59
1

Remainder, and underneath that are two sub-categories,

2

Severance and Proximity. Do you see that?

Page 61
1

Q.

Okay. Did you appraise in terms of -- in

2

terms of the scope of your work, the rerouting of the

3

A.

Yes.

3

Farragut Trail --

4

Q.

Now, you allocated -- if I'm reading this

4

A.

Yes.
-- adjacent to the improvements across

5

Q.

6

A.

Yes.

6

Grathol?

7

Q.

And you allocated zero proximity damages?

7

A.

Yes, and I believe that was 19.1.

8

A. Yes.

Q.

Okay. Tell me about that, if -- just how'd

9

Q.

Is that still your opinion today?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

On the following page, 46 of your report,

5

12

correctly, you allocated zero severance damages?

9

that come to be; what was going on there?

10
11
12

It's within the taking, as I understood it. So rather

Do you see that?

13

was going to be acquired as it shows the right-of-way

A.

Yes.

14

on the outside of that to connect up with the trail.

Q.

Okay. And I'm just going to summarize here

there's a brief explanation of damage or benefit.

13
14

8

A.

Well, it's -- I appraised it as a taking.

than an easement, it was just an additional parcel that

15
16

the final sentence or so. lt says: We have concluded

17

neither damages nor special benefits will accrue to the

18

subject property as a result of the proposed

15
16
17
18

19

acquisition.

19

20

A. Yes.

20

your knowledge?

21

Q.

was working on t'1ree of those parcels.

Do you see that?

Q.

Okay. And that was a separate and distinct

review process from your appraisal of the Grathol
property proper?

A. It was, yeah.
Q, Okay, When did that issue first come up, to

22

And then it says: This opinion is on!y

23

applicable as of the date of the appralsal and could

21
22
23

24

change over time.

24

this diagram as Farragut Recreational Trail, did you

25

actually create an appraisal report for that?

25

A.

Right.

www.mmcourt.com

A.
Q.

MOE, STANLEY

When I was doing the -- at the same time I
So this little narrow parcel Identified on

11/15/2011
643 of 1617

EXHIBIT "H"

644 of 1617

--

• • --

... ~-.,5w...,.,

W--Hb-tlH Bl~SSp

a

P!i:

9

Page 1 of l

ZON0S-0008 Hughes Investmtnt

-·
Mark Muaaman
- - - - - - - - · - · ----- -- ··- --"'".:~.-,;:\....-.''i-'il.,...,~,--~

From:
Sent!

~--=-:~~-:-- -·~--

Don Davis IDon.Davis@itd.ldaho.gov]
wecfnesday, July 02. 2008 3:49 PM

To:

Mark Mu&sman

Cc~

joe@lakeshwy.com

r:

v,... ._
........... -

,
• :

. -.
•

t

J".:i!..f'-:-. ~, ·- ·.,:,.;:: .

Subject: ZONOS-0008 Hughes Investment

Mark.
District 1 of the Idaho Transportation Department has the folIOWing eomments on the proposed zone change:
The subject property is at 1he location of a grade separamd interchange at 1he junction of LfS-95 and SH-54 and a
frontage road as shown as the preferred attemative ln the Garwood to Sagle Draft Environmental _Impact
statement (The OEtS and the alt.ematives can b8 viewed at
htt_p:/lwww.conn~idaho.gov/ProjectslUS95Garwoodm$qgl§CorrldorJU$95GatWoodtoSagleEmtirgnmentalSty(j

A Final EIS wilJ be issued for public review tater this year and a RB00Td of Decision on the entire project is
expected by the end of the year.

.I'
l

i

i

I
i

The DiSttiCt does not object to commercial 20ning on the property. however. at the present time we recommend
that there be acknowlgement on the h"igfwnrf plal\s through the land use process. The Gaawood to Sagle EIS
acknowledges that it is likely that property owners at each pre>posed interchange will pursue some sort of
commerciaf zoning and $1.lbsequent land U6e. Access to any land use on the subject property, with the
interchange and frontage road in place may be fu>m the property's exi81ing frontage on existing US-95 (which
could become tM west side frontage road) and/or from the new, east stde frontage road or frOm Howard Roacl
Once the record of decision is issued by the Federal Higtrway Administration and right of W:J'/ plans are approved,
ITO may be purchasing right of way for the freeway, ioten:hanges and frontage roads.
The Garwood to Sagle project is presently in the prefimlnary design phase so an exact footprint of the highway
layout - not yet been finaled. Once the record of decision is ISsued fmal design can proceed and alignments
will be confirmed and will be the basis of rigbt of way plall$. Untfl that time we can not fully determine the effect of
the project on the ptoperty proposed for zone change. If the county approves the zone change we recommend
that the rights of way areas o1 the interchange, freeway lanes and trontage road be considered and and that
access to the commercial zoned area be limited to existing US-95, the new, easterly frontage road and Hr;iward

React.

Donilld C. Dovis, P.e.
Senior Tronsportotion Plcmnt:r
Di.strict One
772~8019

PA'Z712/2008
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING\L-.~

vs.

Date: February 2, 2012

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,

Time: 10:00 a.m. (PST)
Place: Kootenai County District Court

Defendants.

TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

AND TO:

ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Thursday, February 2, 2012 at 10:00 a.m.

(PST), of said day, Plaintiff will bring on its Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in
Limine, before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack.

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING/STATUS CONFERENCE - 1

ORIGINAL
646 of 1617

DATED this 23 rd day of January, 2012.

opher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
orneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 23 rd day of January, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail

l-lQT TA Nn 1& l-l A RT, TIP

P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

V

J-ll'!nd neliw~r~il

Facsimile (208) 343-8869

on James

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING/STATUS CONFERENCE - 2
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AN.

1

27. 2012 5:22PM

LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

NO. 4063

P. 2/46

STATE OF IDAHO
~
£0UN_T"r' OF_KOOTENAJ
rllEO(I.,(_

i4·3

. . 7;,v

26!2 JAN 27 PM ~: 25

r~g:0~
OEP1IT\1

ICT COURJ
--

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334~8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HARTLLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CVI0-10095

PLAINTIFF ITD'S REPLY BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVrNOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,

Defendants.
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") has moved for summary
judgment to dismiss unlawful claims for compensation or damages by Defendant HJ Orathol
("Grathol'') that are barred by Idaho law. On January 6, 2012, ITD filed its opening brief and the

Affidavit of Mary V. York (''York Aff.") with documents and portions of the record attached.
The undisputed facts supporting ITO' s motion are set forth in its opening brief ("ITD Opening
Brf."), at 6-9. ITD now files this reply brief in support of its motion.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, Orathol paid $1.45 million for its 56-acre property outside the City of Athol.

ITD is condemning 16.3 acres, or less than one-third of the property, Grathol is attempting to
recover as much as $7 .1 million for the ta1cing of 16. 3 acres, even though it only paid $1.45
million for the entire S6 acres. To reach this number, Grathol has asserted damage claims that
are batted by Idaho law and have no factual basis. These claims are the subject ofITD's motion.
Gtathol' s response brief is markedly caustic and sarcastic. ITD will not respond in kind
except to say that the opposition brief does not represent or engender the civility sought by
Idaho's courts and bar.
Grathol's brief fails to address almost all of the Idaho statutes and case law cited by ITO
that bar Grathol's claims. Grathol has also failed to come forward with facts to support its
claims, as required by Rule 56 once a motion for summary judgment is filed.
In its brief, Grathol makes many legal assertions and conclusions without citation to any

authority, Consequently, this reply brief must set forth both the proper legal foundation and
explain why Grathol's assertions and conclusions are incorrect and contrary to Idaho law.

Grathol also relies on cases from a minority of jurisdictions whose constitutional
"takings" clauses differ substantially from Idaho's constitution and those of the majority of

PLAINTIFF ITD'S REPLY BRIEF JN SUPPORT OF MQ'l'I<>~ J.i'QR ~ y JUDGMENT~ I
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states. Therefore, the first segment of ITD's reply brief will set forth the fundamental Idaho
legal standards governing Grathol' s damage claims.

11,

IDAHO STANDARDS GOVERNING RECOVERY OF JUST COMPENSATION

A; · ··· ·The Issue Of Unlawful Damage Claims Should Be Addressed On Summary

Judgment Before Trial.
At a trial in a condemnation case, the only issue to be decided is the amount of just
compensation to be paid to the property owner for the land taken, any improvements taken, and
severance damages to the remainder property. As explained inIDil2d 7.01.1, "[t]he sole issue
for your determination is the just compensation to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiff[.]"
All other issues are to be decided by the court in advance of trial. "[A]ll issues, whether
legal or factual, other than just compensation, are for resolution by the trial court.'' City of

Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 857, 853 P.2d 596, 602 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Reuth v.
State, 100 Idaho 203, 222-23, 596 P.2d 75, 94-95 (1978); Tibbs v. City ofSandpoint, 100 Idaho
667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979)). The court, and not the jury, is to determine "whether a
taking occurred, the nature of the property interest taken, and when the taking occU1Ted."

Lindsey, 123 Idaho at 857, 853 P.2d at 602.
Gtathol suggests that fact questions exist that bar summary judgment on the issue of
whether certain of its claims for severance damage are legally compensable. This contention is
contrary to Idaho law. In a condemnation action, the Court is charged with resolving all issues
prior to trial except for the amount of just compensation. Therefore. "sun-unary judgment is
appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Killinger v. Twin Falls
Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325, 17 P.3d 266, 269 (2000) (quoting First Sec. Bank ofldaho

1
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N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998)); see also Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657,661 (1982).
Contrary to Gratbol's response brief, ITD's motion does not ''go to the weight" to be
given"tb.e evidence offered in support of Grathol's damageelaims. Rather, ITD's motion is
brought on the grounds that Grathol does not have the legal right to pursue these damages,

regardless of what their proffered evidence may be. This is the proper subject of a summary
judgment motion.

B.

Idaho Law Requires Individual Damage Claims In Condemnation Cases To Be
Separately Identified And Quantified.
Idaho Code§ 7-711(5) states that "[a]s far as practicable, compensation must be assessed

for each source of damages separately." I.C. § 7-711(5). This statutory provision drives the
summary judgment process in condemnation cases. The property owner cannot put on a free-

ranging litany of "severance damages" at trial and then ask for a lump sum as compensation.
Rather, as far as practicable, "compensation must be assessed for each source of dam.ages
separately." Id.
"-7here, as here, a landowner gives notice that it intends to seek recovery for fom1s of
severance damages that are barred by law, summary judgment must be brought to have the legal
issues surrounding the disputed claims resolved before trial.

C.

The "Takings" Clause Of The Idaho Constitution And Implementing Legislation,
Under Idaho's constitution, a landowner is entitled to compensation when property is

''taken" for public use. IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 14. Idaho's Constitution is one of the majority of
states whose constitutions provide for compensation only when property is "taken," as opposed
to the minority of states whose constitutions pennit compensation when property is taken and
when property is merely "damaged." Compare IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14 (requires
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compensation for taking of private property); OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 (requires compensation for
taking of private property), with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (requires compensation for taking,
destruction or damage caused to private property); W. VA. CONST, art. Ill, § 9 (requires

compensation for taking or damage causedto private property):'See also discussion of Idaho's
"taking" provisions in the Idaho Constitution in Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference

ofEvangelical LutheranAugustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568, S83-85, 119 P. 60, 65 (1911).
The Idaho Legislature has enacted legislation implementing the takings clause of the
Idaho constitution. See I.C. § 7-711. Under§ 7-711, a landowner is entitled to compensation for
(1) the value of the property taken, and (2) damages to the remaining property in partial taking

cases (commonly refetred to as "severance damages"). See Idaho Code§ 7-711(1) and (2).
State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,446,546 P.2d 399,401 (1976).
D.

Not All Forms Of Alleged Severance Damages Are Legally Compensable.
Grathol contends that since ITD is physically taking a portion of the Grathol property,

Gratbol is entitled to compensation for all forms of damages it can suggest. Grathol contends
that the law makes no distinction between compensable forms of severance damages and claims

for damages that are barred as a matter of law.
Contrary to Grathol's contention, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that a

landowner is not entitled to receive compensation for every type of damage to its property. The
Idaho Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions over many decades which define what is
and is not legally compensable in condemnation cases in Idaho. Under these cases, certain forms

of damages are specifically barred as a matter oflaw, including claims that are the subject of
ITD's present motion.
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Fonburg Does Not Support Grathol's Contention That All Claims Of Daanages Or
"Inconveniences" Are Legally Compensable,
In an attempt to recover damages barred by Idaho law, Grathol relies on an isolated quote

from State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958):
Where a part of the owner's contiguous land is taken in a
condemnation proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the
owner's remaining land, including an easement or access to a road
or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value of the
land retained by the owner, are elements of severance damage for
which compensation should be paid.

Id. at 278,328 P.2d at 64. Grathol contends that this statement allows it to recover any and all
forms of "damages" it claims to have suffered, even if Idaho law bars the damage claims and
even if the Project did not cause the alleged "damages."

In addition to being contrary to many more recent Idaho Supreme Court cases, Grathol's

argument is contrary to the actual holdings in Fonburg, In its rulings on severance damages in

Fonburg, the Idaho Supreme Court denied recovery for most of the "inconveniences" for which
the property owner sought compensation. Therefore, the quote relied on by Grathol is simply
dicta.
In Fon burg, the property owner's farm abutted and had access to State Highway 95. Id.
at 274, 328 P.2d at 61. The State was engaged in a project to construct a new four-lane limited
access highway. Id. at 274,328 P.2d at 61-62.

As

part of the project, the State condemned 12.76

acres of Fonburg's land for the construction of the new highway. Id. The new highway was

re!oca..ted a..nd did not follow the route of the old highway, but instead ran along "the north side of
defendant's land and south of the Cam.as Prairie Railroad." Id. at 62,328 P.2d at 274. As part of
its acquisition, the State condemned Fonburg's right to access the new highway. Id The project

also eliminated the old highway where it abutted Fonburg's land:
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The new road, when constructed, will eliminate the section of
highway No. 9S, where it now abuts and crosses defendant's land,
and will destroy the existent for easement for ingress and egress
from his land to said highway No. 95, and connecting points,
formerly enjoyed.

/d; The facts in Fonburg contrast sharply to the present case. ·Here, no access to the Grathol
property is being taken, closed, or restricted. In Fonburg, the property owner was denied access

to the new highway and all access to the old highway was destroyed, leaving Fonburg with no
access. The opening ofFonburg's brief before the Idaho Supreme Court shows that the State
condemned all access:
The State filed its Complaint herein asking condemnation of the
fee simple title to a strip of land extending the full length of
appellants' farm, 300 feet in width on the west end where the
easement for ingress and egress to and from appellant's land to
public roads, including U.S. Highway No. 95 exists, and is in use
and which wide right-ofway takes the entire possible access from
appellant's land to existing public highways and narrowing
considerably on the east end where no access is possible.

(Appellant's Opening Briefin State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958) (emphasis
added).
On appeai, Fonburg challenged the refusal of the district court to instruct the jury on a
number of forms of severance damages he sought to recover based on loss of access. The only
claim the Idaho Supreme Court agreed withi however, was that the jury should have been
instructed on "claimed severance damages because of destroyed or curtailed access to highway
No. 95, as formerly enjoyed .... " Id. at 65, 328 P.2d at 279.
Contrary to Grathol' s argument in this case, Fonburg was not allowed to recover for
"all inconveniences" caused by the project. For example, Fonburg's residence was located on

the other side of the railroad tracks that ran through the middle of his land, and he sought
severance damages for the loss of convenient access to his property on the other side of the
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railroad. Id. at 277, 328 P.2d at 64. The Court ruled that Fonburg could not recover the
severance damages sought because the two parcels were not contiguous, being split by the
railroad line. Id.
· Next, the Court ruled that Fonburgwas nct entitled to severance damages for not being
able to have access to the new highway, which was certainly an inconvenience to the remainder
property:
Nor is the condemnee entitled to damages because he is not
granted unrestricted access to the new part of the road being
constructed. There is no inherent right of access to a newly
relocated highway. The new highway not being in existence prior
to the present construction, the landowner would suffer no
compensable damages because his access to the new construction
was denied him. The condemnee never having had access to the
new highway there is no easement or access taken in this
proceeding.
Id at 277,328 P.2d at 64.
The Idaho Supreme Court also rejected claims by Fonburg ''to recover various severance
damages for non-contiguous parcels of land and matter not within the pertinent issues." Id. at
278, 328 P.2d at 64. Thus, the holdings in Fonburg make clear that almost all of the
"inconveniences" for which Fonburg sought recovery were denied and held not to be takings of a
property right or compensable as severance damages.
The Court in Fonburg denied most of the property owner's claims for damages. The
actual holding in the cases establishes that the quote relied on by Grathol is merely dicta. See,

e.g., McCannv. McCann, _Idaho....,_; _P.3d_, 2012 WL 98540, at *6 (Idaho Jan. 10,
2012) (discussion not embodied in court's holding is dicta). Thus Fonburg, and in keeping with

many subsequent decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court on the issues presented here, provides
no iegal basis for Orathoi to recover forms of severance damages that are barred by Idaho law.
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Severance Damages Must Be Based On A Protected Property Interest And Must Be
Caused By The Taking,
Severance dam.ages must be based on a protected property interest. The determination of

whether a taking of a protected property interest has occurred for which just compensation is
required is a question of law for the Court to decide. KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho
577,581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003); Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, S3 P.3d
828,831 (2002); Tibbs v. City ofSandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979);

Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 892, 26 P.3d 1225, 1229 (Ct App. 2001).
The landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and that his
property right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218,596 P.2d 75, 90 (1978).
Because all issues in a condemnation case, other than the amount of any compensation, are to be
determined by the court, they are proper for resolution on a motion for summary judgment. See

Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 40-41, 855 P.2d 876, 877-78 (1993); Reisenauer v.
State, 120 Idaho 36, 41, 813 P.2d 375, 380 (Ct. App. 1991).

In Idaho, "[i]t is a well-established principle that where the public's use of the
condemned land diminishes the value of other adjoining, untaken property, the owner is entitled
to recover this loss (typically referred to as 'severance damage') in addition to the value of the

invaded land." C&:G. Inc. v. Canyon Hwy. Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 148, 75 P.3d 194,202
(2003) (parentheses in original).
Idaho's civil jury instructions define "severance damages" as:
a.
A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the
talcina or severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; or
b.
A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the
construction upon and use put to the property taken.

IDJI2d 7.16-5.
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Thus, "severance damages" encompass only those damages that arise from the "public's
use of the condemned land." In Idaho, a landowner is only entitled to compensation for damages
to the remaining property "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned."

Idaho Code § 7-111 (2). To recover severance damages, the alleged severance damages must
have accrued "because of' the take. See Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Walker, 80 Idaho
105,109,326 P.2d 388,391 (1958) (emphasis added).

Thus, severance damages are only recoverable if they are actually "caused by the public
use." See C&G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at 202 (Hohnhorst, specially concWTing); See

also 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain§ 16.02(1] (3d ed.2002) (stating "severance damages may be
defined as damages or diminution in the value of the remainder resulting from the taking of a
portion of a tract of land" (emphasis added)).
In this case, ITO condemned 16.3 acres ofland adjacent to US-95. Any damages claimed
by Grathol must be caused by the physical severance of the condemned property from the

remainder (and not subsequent events that may or may not happen, separate and apart from the
physical severance). Any claimed severance damages must also be compensable under Idaho
law. Damages not caused by the severance are bmed as a matter of law. Damages that are not
based on a protected property right are barred as a matter of law.

G.

Grathol Cannot Recover "Consequential" Damages.
In its response brief, Grathol contends that severance damages can include

"consequential" damages. At other times; it makes the more general statement that it may

recover consequential damages in a condemnation case. BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY defines
"'consequential dam.ages" as "Losses that do not flow directly and immediately from an injurious
act but that result indirectly from the act -Also termed indirect damages." BLACKS LA w
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Idaho law requires severance damages to be the direct result of the
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physical severance of the condemned property from the remainder. Indirect or consequential
damages are not allowed.
Idaho law is clear that a landowner is not entitled to consequential damages. Idaho·

Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference-ofEvangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 119 P. 60, ,..,
65 (Idaho 1911 ). In Idaho-Western, a railway company brought an eminent domain action to
condemn a strip of land on the southwest side of the landowner's premises. Id at 61. The Idaho
Supreme Court explained that "the Constitution of this state provides simply for the payment of

'a just compensation' for the 'taking' of private property, and does not require the payment for
damages sustained." Id. The Court took note that:
The omission of the damage cause is significant ... And when the
convention in Idaho framed the Constitution of that state, omitting
such clause, and it was so adopted, the conclusion must be that the
omission was deliberate and because the people of that state
believed that, owning to the conditions there existing, the public
interest demanded that the additional burden ofpaying
consequential damages should l'H:!J. be imposed on those taking
property for public uses, And there is nothing in the Idaho
Constitution requiring compensation except for the taking of
property.

Id (emphasis added). The Court remarked that the Legislature is not prevented from ''adding the
requirement that compensation be made for damage sustained to the remaining property by
reason ofthe takint' and noted that the Legislature had in fact adopted legislation allowing for
the recovery of severance damages. Id. See Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a).
The forms of compensation available in condemnation cases are set forth in Idaho Code §
7-711:
1.
The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and
every separate estate or interest therein[.]

2.
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a
part of a larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the
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portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of
the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]
I.C. §§ 7-711(1) and (2)(a). The statute also allows recovery for business damages under
specified circumstances not applicable here. Under the ''universally recognized rule of
construction [] where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such
thlngs excludes all others." See Local 1494, lnt'l Ass 'n. of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene,
99 ldaho 630,639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978) (quoting Peckv. State, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d
820,822 (1941)). Since Idaho Code§ 7-711 lists the types of compensation and damages

available in condemnation cases, but does not include consequential damages, consequential
damages cannot be recovered.
No authority exists for recovery of consequential damages in condemnation cases in
Idaho. More generally, consequential damages are not allowed in condemnation cases in any
federal courts and in most states across the country. See, e.g., Dobbs, HORNBOOK ON
REMEDIES,§ 3.4 (2nd ed. 1993) (''Legal rules forbid consequential damages completely in some
kinds of cases, notably in eminent domain takings cases."),

III.

GRATHOL HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN IN RESPONDING TO
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In response to ITD's motion for summary judgment, Grathol has offered conclusory

assertions rather than competent evidence to support the damage claims at issue. Grathol has
therefore failed to meet its burden on summary judgment.

If the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving
party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact
exists, the burden then shifts to the nonm.oving party to present
evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material
fact. When presenting affidavits, they "shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein." The nonmoving party must
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submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. 11 [A] mere scintilla
of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of sununary
judgment.

Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Ser>J., 136 Idaho 835, 8-38-39) 41 P.3d 263i 266-67 (2002) .
(internal citations omitted) (holding that the non-moving party's conclusory affidavit did not
meet their burden to defeat swnmary judgment).
In Van Velson Corp. v. Westwood Mall Assoc.) 126 Idaho 401, 884 P.2d 414 (1994), the
district court on a motion for summary judgment disregarded a "highly conclusory" affidavit
from the non moving party. Id. at 405, 884 P.2d at 418. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed:
The district court correctly ruled that [the] "affidavit is more in the
form of closing argument, highly conclusory, both as to fact and
law, and although interspersed with some facts, and the conclusion
that the contract was conditional is contradicted by the other facts
that the court has been provided."

Id
IV,

A,

GRAfflOL'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION BASED ON SYLVAN ROAD
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW
Grathol Concedes That ITD Is Not Taking Land For Sylvan Road. Therefore

Summary Judgment Should Be Entered On The Claim For Compensation For The
Alleged Taking Of Land For Sylvan Road.
In its opening brief, ITO established that Grathol has continued to seek compensation for
the alleged talcing of land for construction of Sylvan Road. ITO further demonstrated that the
Court had already ruled that ITD was not condemning land for Sylvan Road. ITD Opening Brf.,
at 10. See also Tr. at 61:2-16 (YorkAff., Ex. 1).

In its response brief, Grathol now concedes that land for Sylvan Road is "not being
physically taken 'as part of the project."' Gtathol Brf., at S. Therefore, summary judgment
should be entered that ITD is not taking land for Sylvan Road and Grathol cannot recover
compensation for a taking of land for Sylvan Road.
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Gratbol's New Argument That It Should Be Allowed To Recover Severance
Damages For Construction Of Sylvan Road Should Also Be Dismissed.
After conceding that ITD is not condemning any land for Sylvan Road, Grathol now

argues that it is entitled to "severance damages'' based on Sylvan Road:
"but for,,, the condemnation at issue and the construction of the

project for which the condemnation is occurring, there would be no
necessity or requirement that Sylvan Road be extended through the
Orathol property. The property could be successfully developed
with Sylvan Road, or it could be successfully developed without
Sylvan Road; the choice belongs to the property
owner/condemnee.
Grathol Brf., at 5 (emphasis in original). This argument has no merit. If Sylvan Road is ever
needed, it will be the result of or caused by Grathol' s construction of a large commercial
development on a 40-acre parcel after the Project. The US-9S Project is not the cause of any
future conS1l'Uction of Sylvan Road, if it is ever built. Grathol' s planned commercial
development and the commercial rezone it obtained from Kootenai County are the "but for"
cause for any future construction of an interior roadway and the alleged damages.
C.

Grathol's Revised Claim For Compensation Based On Sylvan Road Fails As A

Matter Of Law.
1.

ITD has shown that construction of Sylvan Road would be required for
commercial development in both the before and after condition, regardless of
the US-95 Project.

In its opening brief, ITD established that construction of Sylvan Road by the developer of
any commercial development of the Grathol property will be required by Kootenai County.

Section 9-9-2 of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances regulating commercial zones requires
that every "Commercial Lot shall have direct access from a public road." See York Aff., Ex. 2 at

2. Similarly,§ 10-3-l(B)(4)(e) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances (identifying the
services and infrastructure that the developer must construct to serve a commercial subdivision)
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requires "[p)ublicly-maintained road access to each lot, as approved by the Highway District."
See id, at p. 33 of Ordinance.

Thus, every individual lot within the 56-acre "before" commercial development and the
40.-acre "after" commercial development will have to have-access from a public road, All of the-- .
lots on a 56-acre development in the before condition could not have had frontage on US~95,
with dozens of individual driveway accesses a few feet apart on US-95,
Section 10-3~1(0)(2) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances also makes clear that the
developer will be required to dedicate the fully constructed roads within the development to the
county or local highway district: "Except for gated communities and common driveways
approved by the Board (of county commissioners], roads and associated rights-of-way shall be

dedicated to the applicable highway agency." Id. (brackets and emphasis added).
In support of its motion, ITD submitted a report from engineers and land planners with
David Evans and Associates ("DEA"). (York Aff., Ex. 11 ). DEA reported that construction of
interior roadways within the Grathol commercial development would be a requirement of
commercial development approval in either the before or after condition. Id. at 5, The report
also states that interior roadways within the Grathol development would have to be dedicated to
Lakes Highway District as a public roadway. Id. See also, I.C. § 50~1309 (requiring owners of

new developments to "make a dedication of all public streets and rights-of-way shown on said
plat''·
It is undiSputed that Grathol applied to Kootenai County and obtained a rezoning of its
property to ''commercial." Otathol Resp. to ITD's Mot. for Poss'n, at 3 (Jan. 10, 2011). During
that process, and before the ITD condemnatio11i the Kootenai County hearing examiner cited

correspondence from the Lakes Hishway District Engineer, stating that "[t]he Developer should
be required to provide all accesses to this development from either Howard Road or the future
PLAINTIFF JTD'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JtJDGMENT-14

662 of 1617

JAN. 27. 2012 5: 24PM

NO. 4063

P. 17/46

Highway District frontage road." See Grathol's Rezone Application, at 12.12, Exhibit PA-5,
Letter (York Aff., Ex. 16). This evidence shows that public road access will be required and it
will be Kootenai County and Lakes Highway District that will require it. This correspondence

was sent well before the condemnation action by ITO, and-was applied to the proposed
development in the "before" condition.
No site plan bas ever been produced by Grathol in discovery that shows how the 56-acre
property could be developed with commercial uses with no interior road(s). In opposition to

ITD's motion, Grathol has not offered any testimony or evidence that the property could be
commercially developed in the before condition without any interior public road. It only offers a
conclusory statement in its brief. The statement is not supported and no citations are made to the
record. The conclusory statement is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on this claim.
Grathol also failed to address the Kootenai County zoning ordinances and requirements
cited in ITO' s Opening Brief. Therefore, Grathol has not met its burden on summary judgment
of coming forward with competent evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact and
its claim based on Sylvan Road should be dismissed.

2,

Gratbol has made no showing that Sylvan Road will be built, when, by
whom, who will pay for it, or what type or amount of damages it would
suffer.

Grathol argues that it should be awarded severance damages based on Sylvan Road.
However, it has not made any showing of when the road would be built, the dimensions or
location of the roa~ the cost of constriJction, who will build it, or who will pay for it. Nor has
Grathol stated what damages will be caused by the road or what the source of the damages is.
Gtathol also has not given a dollar value for its damaae claim, as required by Idaho Code § 7711 (5). As such, the claim is purely speculative and therefore barred by Idaho law against
speculative damages.
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The deadlines for expert witness disclosures and the factual bases for a claim of this
nature have passed. Having failed to provide a factual basis for the claim, particularly in the face
of a motion for summary judgment, and given the inherently speculative nature of the claim,
· · Gtathol's claim for severance damages,should be denied. -.,.

3.

Grathol is not entitled to any severance damages for Sylvan Road because
the alleged damages were not caused by the US-95 Project.

As set forth above, any claim for severance damages must be caused by the physical

severance of the condemned property from the remainder. See Section II.(F) above.

In the instant case, ITD has condemned 16.314 acres of Grathol' s property. The public
use the 16.314 acres is to be used for is construction of the Athol Segment of the US-95 Project.
The only damages Grathol is entitled to recover are damages that arise from that use. See C&G,

Inc., 139 Idabo at 148, 75 P.3d at 202. The taking did not cause the construction of Sylvan
Road. Grathol's successful application for a commercial re2one by Kootenai County subjected
the land to the infrastructure requirements of commercially zoned property, Those requirements
apply to both the before and after condition,

V.

GRATHOL CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES BASED ON iTS ALLEGATION
OF DELAY IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE us . 95 PROJECT.
Grathol's response to ITD's argument that Gtathol cannot recover damages for a

purported delay in the construction of the US-95 Project is premised on faulty and unsupported
assumptions. Gtathol claims, without any support or cited legal authority, that once there is a
physical taking of any sort there is no limit to the type of damages can be recovered in an award
of just compensation. Grathol Br., at 13. Specifically, Orathol contends that "[p]ermanency of a
take may come into play with a reauJatory taking, but when there is an associated physical taking
of a private party's property, there is no such limitation on compensation." Id. Gtathol's

unsupported statement misstates long-standing eminent domain law in Idaho.
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Contrary to Grathol's contention, Idaho Courts have regularly held, in both direct and
inverse condemnation cases, that certain types of damages are not compensable.
•

Damages that are contingent, speculative or remote damages are not recoverable.
Palmer;,, Highway Dist. No. 1, Bonner County, 49 Idaho 596,602,290 P. 393,
394 (1930) (direct condemnation action).

•

Future claims for damages based on possible negligent operation of public project
are improper and not recoverable. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Waller, 80
Idaho 105, 109,326 P.2d 388, 390-91 (1958) (direct condemnation).

•

Noise damages "should not be considered as an element of damage in the
ordinary case." Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical
Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60, 62 (1911) (diiect
condemnation),

•

Damages caused by the restriction of access or the diversion of traffic held not
recoverable. State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,447,546 P.2d 399,402
(1976) (both direct condemnation and inverse condemnation); Brown v. City of
Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 85S P.2d 876 (1993) (inverse condemnation).

•

Damages resulting from lost business profits held not recoverable. Bastian, 97
Idaho at 448,546 P.2d at 403 (direct condemnation and inverse condemnation);
State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86 Idaho 242,246,384 P.2d 480,482 (1963)
(direct condemnation).

•

Damages that are shared in common with the rest of the general public held not

recoverable. Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber, Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830
(1911) (inverse condemnation).

•

Damages caused by the temporary obstruction of access, unless the action is
WU"easonable, unnecessary, arbitrary or capricious held not recoverable. Hadfield
v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561,566,388 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1964) (inverse
condemnation).

•

Damages that are barred by law or that are not caused by the taking of a
compensable property right are not recoverable in a condemnation action. State
ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (19S8) (direct condemnation).

Thus, contrary to Gratbol's plain misstatement of the law and its misuse of Fonburg, there is no
carte blanche for damage awards in condemnation cases merely because a physical taking has
occurred.
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Adclitionally, and equally significant, is Grathol' s erroneous statement that "business
interruption damages are absolutely compensable in eminent domain." Grathol Brf., at 14
(emphasis added). Rather than provide legal authority for its statemen4 Grathol presents a
hypothetical scenario involving a lando'"vvner who is unable to operate its business because of the- _
construction of a utility line. Id. According to Grathol, this landowner is entitled to ''damage to
the business in terms of lost revenue." Id. Once again, Gtathol misstates Idaho law. Under the
correct application of the law, set forth below, the landowner in Gtathol's hypothetical would not
be able to recover any damages as a result of the construction delays.
In Idaho, the type of business damages described by Grathol are expressly prohibited by
statute. Idaho Code § 7-711 states in no uncertain terms that "[b]usiness damages under this
subsection shall not be awarded . .. for damages caused by temporary business interruption due

to construction[]" (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Grathol's statement that such damages
are "absolutely compensable,'' in fact they are expressly barred by statute, and Grathol's
hypothetical and unsupported conclusion are simply incorrect.
Additionally, Grathol's assertion regarding the compensability of temporary business
interruption damages is similarly refuted by Idaho case law. In Idaho, there is no "taking," and
therefore no claim for damages, for temporary obstructions caused by highway construction.
Hadfield v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 567, 388 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1964) 1 (holding that

there is no claim for damages unless "the temporary obstruction is a result of unreasonable,
unnecessary, arbitrary or capricious acts or conduct by the one in charge of the improvement or
construction). Grathol's contention that "business intemlption damages are absolutely
1ITD did not cite to the Hadfield case in its opening brief because Grathol is not cJaiming damages for a
physical obstruction to its property that int.erferes with an existing business, Grathol does not operate a
business on the property, and it is not claiming damages to an existing business due to the construction of
the project. However, ITD cites to the Hadfield case to demonstrate Grathol's incoITect statement of
Idaho law.
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compensable in eminent domain law" is not the law in Idaho, and its attempt to rely on its own
incorrect version of Idaho law to support its claim for consf:rl.lction delay damages is equally
invalid.

Grathol attempts to distinguish""t.hree of the cases cited by ITD on the grounds that the

-r ·

cases are inapplicable because they did not involve a direct, physical taking of property. In
particular, Grathol challenges the cases of Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,
96 P.2d 637 (2004), Just's Inc. v. A"ington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462,538 P.2d 997 (1978), and

Frankv. Government of City ofMorristown, 294 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). Grathol's
attempt to distinguish Moon, Just 's and Frank fail because Idaho cases do not distinguish

between physical takings cases and non-physical taldng cases. The only difference between the
two types of cases is that an inverse condemnation action is "an eminent domain proceeding
initiated by the property owner rather than the condemner." Reisenauer v. State, Dep 't of

Highways, 120 Idaho 36, 39,813 P.2d 375,378 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho
203,220, n.4, 596 P.2d 75, 92, n.4 (1978). Other than this distinction, "the principles which

affect the parties' rights in an inverse condemnation suit are the same as those in an eminent

domain action." Reisenauer, 120 Idaho at 39,813 P.2d at 378. See also Brown v. City of Twin
Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 41, 855 P.2d 876, 878 (1993) (holding that the claims asserted in Brown,

which was a "non·physical" taking case was "indistinguishable" from the claims asserted in

State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, S46 P.2d 399 (1976), which was a "physical"
taking case); see Hughes v. State, 80 idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958), rev 'din part on other

grounds in Moon v, North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 63 7 (2004) (holding
that there is no distinction between the valuation analysis for direct condemnation actions and

inverse condemnations actions). Grathol's attempt to suggest otherwise is directly contradicted
by Idaho law.
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Grathol has failed to challenge any of the other cases cited by ITD. Thus, Grathol
concedes the applicability of Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781-82, 53 P.3d

828, 832-33 (2002) (a landowner cannot recover damages where there is "no indication that the
condition is permanent"); Hurst v. Starr,- 607 N.E.2d 11S5,-1159..60 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (direct _
condemnation action where court held that "interference of temporary duration during
construction of an improvement... [is] not permanent in nature as they do not last beyond the
completion of the project and have no effect on the market value of the property before the
improvement was commenced and no effect upon the market value of the residue after the
improvement was completed"); State v. Baken Park Enters., 257 N.W.2d 448, 449-50 (S.D.
1977) (direct condemnation action where court held that "losses incurred by property owner in
the way of loss of income and profits ... together with other inconveniences attendant upon the
work in progress, are not compensable items of damage resulting from a construction project.'').
These cases bar recovery for construction delay damages in condemnation cases, and the same
result reached in those cases should be reached here.
The only cases Orathol cites as authority for its argument that it is entitled to construction

delay damages are Buzz Stew, LLC v. City ofNorth Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670 (Nev. 2008) and

Jones v. People ex rel. Dep 't ofTransp., 22 Cal. 3d 144, 583 P.2d 165 (1978). Grathol Brf., at
17, Neither case is applicable here.

In the Buzz Stew case, the City of North Las Vegas adopted a resolution announcing its
intent to condemn land owned by Buzz Stew. ld. 672. Buzz Stew sold the land, but the City of

North Las Vegas never initiated eminent domain proceedings or took the land in any fashion, due
to

a lack of funding. Id The announcement of the City's intent to condemn the land was never

retracted, withdrawn, or rescinded. Id Buzz Stew brought a tort claim against the City of North
Las Vegas to recover precondemnation damages." Id The Nevada Supreme Court approved of
0
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the claim, holding that "a landowner may bring a cause of action for ,precondemnation damages
based on allegations that the municipality acted improperly in announcing that it intended to
condemn the landowner's property." Id at 672~73.
Thus, Buzz Stew stands for thel)roposition that in Nevada a party can file a tort claim t°' ·.
recover delay damages for actions that occurred prior to the filing of a condemnation. But it
does not support Grathol's argument that such tort-based damages are available in a
condemnation action. Significant to the court's decision in Buzz Stew was the fact that there was
no taking and no direct condemnation initiated. As stated by the court, "[i]n this opinion, we ...
allow a landowner to assert a cause of action for precondemnation damages, independent from

the taking of its property." Id. at 673 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Buzz Stew Court
quoted the Jones case cited by Grathol for its conclusion that "a taking has not occurred under
these facts because BU.%2 Stew has failed to show 'the invasion of a property right which directly
and specially affects him to his injury." Id. at 674, n.16. Thus, the damages sought were
separate and apart from any taking of Buzz Stew's property and also separate from any
corresponding damages that might be available as a result of a taking.
An alleged tort-based claim for precondemnation damages cannot be applied to the

present condemnation case and the statutorily-based valuation requirements for detennining just
compensation. See I.C. § 7-711. In addition, Idaho Code § 7-712 provides:

For the purpose ofassessing compensation and damages1 the right
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date ofthe
summons, and its actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of
compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of
damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in
all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last
section.
I.C. 7-712 (emphasis added). See also Spokane & Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen, 3 Hasb. 381, 29 P.

8S4, 8S4 (Idaho 1892) (the value of the land at the time it is taken is the measure of damages).
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Moreover, a tort claim and a condemnation action are wholly distinct, and Orathol has
not asserted a counterclaim or even an inverse condemnation claim, in tort or otherwise, for
precondemnation damages. Indeed, even if Grathol had done so in this case, it would still not be
able to recover the Buzz Stew-type precondemnation damages either in tort or in an inverse .- ~

condemnation action in Idaho. As was made clear in City of Lewiston v. Lindsey,
precondemnation damages are not available under Idaho law. 123 ldaho at 858,853 P.2d at 603
(holding that (1) where the landowner can still use the property, no compensable taking occurs as
a result of precondemnation activities relating to the construction of road proj eet, including
designing and planning the project, obtaining approvals for the project, and negotiating with
property owners for the purchase of their property and (2) the City's precondemnation planning
activities were within the discretionary function exception of the Idaho Tort Claims Act and

landowner's negligence claim for damages was properly dismissed).
The second case cited by Gtathol is Jones v. People ex rel. Dep 't of Transportation, 22
Cal. 3d 144, S83 P.2d 165 (1978). Grathol relies on Jones for the proposition that a "landowner
may show that the public agency acted improperly by unreasonably delaying an eminent domain
action after announcing its intent to condemn the landowner's property." Orathol Brf., at 17.
Grathol's misstates the holding of Jones.
In Jones, the plaintiffs purchased land in 1963, and became aware in 1964 of the State of
California's intent to condemn for freeway purposes a major frontage road abutting their
property. Id, at 148. Tne plaintiffs attempted to obtain county approval to divide their land into
a subdivision, with access to the major frontage road; approval was repeatedly denied due to the
future f.reeway project Id. at 149. The freeway project was delayed numerous times, and had
not begun when the plaintiffs brought suit in 1974, Id. at 149-50. One of the plaintiffs' theories
of recovery was premised on the allegedly unreasonable delay on the part of the state in bringing
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an eminent domain action, but the California Supreme Court ruled that the case was actually one
of inverse condemnation and acknowledged that the landowners were entitled to compensation
because they were denied access to their land from Fair Oaks Boulevard, and this denial
·prevented development of the land att subdivision." ~d;·-at 151.

--,,.- ,

The present case is factually distinguishable from the Jones case. First, unlike the
plaintiffs in Jones who became aware of the highway project after they purchased the land, here
Grathol was aware of the project months before they bought the property. See ITD's Opening
Brf., at 21-23, Grathol was provided copies of the proposed project plans, and they met on a
number of occasions with representatives ofITD before it purchased the project. Id Second,
Grathol cannot favorably avail itself of the Jones ruling because it has not alleged that ITD' s
prior, announced intent to condemn directly resulted in substantial impairment of access to its
land. It is undisputed that Grathol did not have any permitted or approved commercial accesses
prior to the project. Id. at 33-34. It is further undisputed that neither Grathol nor its predecessors
have ever submitted an application for commercial access. Nor can Grathol show that ITO has
in any way prevented Grathol from access to their property. Accordingly, the California court's

rulings in Jones are not applicable to this case.
Grathol' s next argument focuses on the requirements of Idaho Code § 7-712, which
Grathol contends-again without supporting legal authority-does not apply to severance
damages or consequential damages. Grathol's argument is incorrect. ITO has addressed the
issue of consequential damages in Section II.G. supra, and it discusses the requirements of§ 7712 in its reply brief in support ofITD's motion in limine. Those arguments will not be repeated
here, but merely swnmarized.
Grathol's argument ignores the express lansuage of§ 7-712, which specifically states

that both "compensation and damages" shall accrue as of the date of summons and that the
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actual value of the compensation and damages "shall be the measure of compensation for all

property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but
injuriously affected." I.C. § 7-712 (emphasis added). Grathol's argument similarly disregards
Idaho case law that reaffirms the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Lieuallen, 3 Hasb. 381,.
29 P. at 8S4 (quoting the prior but identical version of § 7-712 and holding that in condemnation
proceedings "the value of the land at the time it is taken is the measure of damages, and it is error
to admit evidence of value at time of trial."). Thus, based upon the plain and unambiguous
language of the statute, § 7-712 applies to the assessment of compensation and dam.ages alike,
and Grath.ol's suggestion to the contrary has no basis. The statute mandates that compensation
and damages are to be valued as of the date of summons.
In summary, Grathol has failed to provide legal support or authority for its contention

that it construction delay damages are recoverable in this case. As discussed above, the law in
Idaho directly contradicts the propositions suggested by Grathol. Damages for delays in
construction-even assuming that such delays occurred in this case-are not recoverable in
condemnation actions, and Oratb.ol's claim for such damages fails as a matter of law and should
be dismissed.

VI.

GRATHOL CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF VISIBILITY.
Grathol seeks to recover compensation based on a claim that the remainder of its property

will be less visible from US-9S after construction of the Project. This claim is barred by Idaho
law and should be dismissed on summary judgment.

A,

Idaho Law Does Not Recopize A Right To Visibility,
A "right of visibility" or "right to be seen" is not a recognized property right in Idaho.·

The landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and that his property
right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218, S9<.i P.2d 75, 90 (1978). Since no right
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of visibility is recognized in Idaho, Grathol cannot meet this burden, and the claim should be
dismissed.

B.

Existing Idaho Law Bars Grathol's Visibility Claim,
As shown in ITD's opening-brief, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a;

property owner does not have a right to any particular fl.ow or pattern of traffic or a right to have
direct access to or from a particular direction of traffic. See !TD Opening Brf., at 24. Based on
these principles, ITD could re-route US-95 entirely so that no traffic passes Grathol's property at
all and no compensable taking would occur. A complete diversion of traffic away from
Grathol's property would also result in a complete loss of visibility of the property from US-95

traffic. Since no compensation can be had for a change in traffic fl.ow or pattern under Idaho

law, no compensation can be had for loss of visibility.

C.

Idaho Law Barring Recovery For Changes In Traffic Flow Or Pattern Applies Io
All Cases In Which A Claim For Compensation For Such Changes Is Made.
Grathol attempts to avoid this controlling Idaho authority by arguing that some of the

Supreme Court cases barring claims for compensation based on changes in traffic pattern were
"regulatory'' or "non-physical" takings cases. Grathol's argument is again contta..,y to Idaho law.
As shown in the Idaho Supreme Court cases on this issue, the rule barring recovery of damages
based on changes in traffic flow or pattern applies in all condemnation cases where such claims
are made.

In State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976) involved a physical
taking and traffic control measures. In denying a claim for compensation based on a change in
traffic flow and pattern, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on non-physical takings cases such as

James v. State, 88 Idaho 172, 397 P.2d 766 (1964), and Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d
799 (1961 ), in holding that a property owner in a physical taking case has no right to a particular
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pattern of traffic flow. Bastian, at 447, 546 P.2d at 402. Thereafter, non-physical takings cases,
such as Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39,855 P.2d 876 (1993) have relied on Bastian
for the same proposition. Id, at 43, 855 P.2d at 880 (holding that the claim for loss of access in

-Brown based on raised medians was,"indistinguishable" from the claim in Bastian where a ... ,
physical taking occurred in addition to construction of raised medians).
In Brown v. City of Twin Falls, a non-physical takings case, the property owners argued

that the city's placement of raised medians in the road adjacent to their property constituted a
taking without just compensation. Relying on Bastian and Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53
P.2d 626 (1935), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that no taking had occurred and that the claims
in Bastian and Brown were ''indistinguishable."

We find the Browns' claim to be indistinguishable from the claims
made in Bastian and Powell. Although the Browns characterize
their claim as one involving a limitation of access, they are
primarily asserting the right to have traffic traveling south on Blue
Lakes Boulevard and west on Addison Avenue access their
property by making a left hand turn across oncoming traffic instead
of traveling an additional block or two which the medians now
require. Since that "right" has been interfered with, the Browns
request damages for a taking of their property. However) similar
to the plaintiffs in both the Bastian and Powell cases, the Browns .
do not have a property right in the way traffic flows on the streets
abutting their property ... We find the situation in this case to be
indistinguishable from those of Bastian and Powell.

Brown, 124 Idaho at 43,855 P.2d at 880 (emphasis added).
This ruling by the Idaho Supreme Court is dispositive of Grathol' s argument that socalled "regulatory'' or "non-physical" condemnation cases are treated differently from "physical

taking' cases on the issue of whether a property owner can recover damages based on an alleged
riaht to a particular pattern of traffic flow or damages arising from changes in traffic flow or
pattern. In Brown, a "non-physical" ta.king case, the Court held that the claim in Bastian, a
"physical" taking case, and the claim in Brown were "indistinguishable." 124 Idaho at 43, 855
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P.2d at 880. Thus, the rule in Idaho is universal: no property owner has a property right "in the

way traffic flows on the streets abutting their property," id, at 43, 855 P.2d at 880, or, as phrased
in Bastian, "a right to any particular pattern of traffic flow or a right of direct access to or from
·both directions of traffic ...." Bastian, 97 Idaho at 447, '546 P.2d at 402.
Since a change in traffic pattern and flow necessarily changes visibility of adjoining
property by passing traffic, Grathol has no protected property right "in the way traffic flows on
the streets abutting [its] property," and no "right to any particular pattern of traffic flow or a right
of direct access to or from both directions of traffic," and its claim for loss of visibility that may
occur as a result of such changes is barred as a matter of law.

D.

If No Recovery Can Be Had For Changes In Traffic Flow, No Recovery Can Be Had
For Changes In Visibility Caused By Changes In Traffic Flow.

The issue of visibility is necessarily and inextricably intertwined with traffic flow. For
that reason, courts with constitutional provisions like Idaho's constitutional "takings" clause
have uniformly denied claims for visibility. See, e.g,, Dept. of Transp. v. Marilyn Hickey

Ministries, 159 P.3d 111, 113 (Colo. 2007) C'We hold that because a landowner has no
continued right to traffic passing by its property, the landowner likewise has no right in the
continued motorist visibility of its property"); State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. Ct.
1991), rev'd 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993) ("Just as a landowner has no vested interest in the
volume or route of passersby, he has no right to insist that his premises be visible to them.");

State ex. rel. Mtssouri Hw)J. & Transp. Com 'n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457, 468-69 (Mo. App. Ct.
1987) (in partial taking case, "any claim as to damages for 'public view' or visibility is
'inextricably related' to a property right in the traffic, [and] the decisions have consistently
refused to 'accord to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic."').
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Because Orathol has no right to a particular pattern of traffic flow, it necessarily has no
right to compensation based on loss of visibility of its property by passing traffic.
E.

The Majority Of Courts Have Barred Claims For Loss Of Visibility.
In its opening brief, ITD cited extensive authority demonstrating that most jurisdictions .

do not permit recovery for loss of visibility, including cases where the structures alleged to block
visibility are constructed on the property acquired in the condemnation. See ITD Opening Brf.,
at 25-32, and cases cited therein. The majority rule and the rationales applied by the courts in
those cases bar Grathol's claim in this case.
F.

The Cases Relied On By Grathol Are From A Minority Of States Whose
Constitutional Takings Provisions Differ From Idaho's Constitution And The
Constitutions Of States Following The Majority Rule.
Grathol's reliance on case law from Alaska, Utah, California and Louisiana to support its

visibility claim is misplaced. All of these jurisdictions have state constitutions that provide that
''[p)rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."

Compare ALASKA CONST., art. I,§ 18 with UTAH CONST. art. I,§ 22. See also Calif. Const. art.
I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the
owner''); LOUISIANA CONST. art. I, § 4 ("Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or
its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner

or into court for his benefit"). By contrast, Idaho's Constitution, like those of the majority of
states and the U.S. Constitution, only provides compensation for the "ta.ldng" of private property.

Compare U.S. CoNST. amend. V (' 1(P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation.") (emphasis added) with IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 14 ("Private property may be

taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed
by law, shall be paid therefor.") (emphasis added).
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The Utah Supreme Court in Admiral Beverage noted this distinction and stated that:
"[c]onsistent with the plain language of article I, section 22, this court has interpreted the
eminent domain provision of the Utah Constitution as being distinct from, and providing greater

· protection than, those constitutionalprovisions that pro\tide compensation for the 'taking' of~ private property." Utah Dep't o/Transp., v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62,120, 2011
WL SI 10962, at *S (2011) (emphasis added). The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized a

similar distinction, holding that "(t]he requirement that the condemnor pay just compensation
when property is damage provides broader protection for private property rights than the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution." Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage Sek Dist.,
791 P.2d 610,614 (Alaska 1990) (cited in 8,960 Sq. Feetv. Dept. o/Transp., 806 P.2d 843,845
(Alaska 1991)) (emphasis added). Likewise, the California Supreme Court explained that "the

addition of the words 'or damaged' embraced more than the 'taking' provided for" under the
previous constitution. People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 399-400, 144 P.2d 799, 804 (1943)
(emphasis added).
Grathol's reliance on eminent domain law from these jurisdictions is unavailing. The
authority to establish a statutory scheme premised on just compensation necessarily derives from
the state constitution. See, e.g., Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, 1S5 P,

680, 685-86 (1916) (explaining that the "power of eminent domain and the taking of private
property for a public use" ultimately emanates "from a higher powel' than the Legislature-the

people themselves" and directs the legislature to detennine the manner in which a landowner

may seek recourse to recover just compensation for the taking of his property), A state
constitution premised on a broader conception of compensable damages necessarily
contemplates a broader scope of recoverable damages, See, e.g., Admiral Beverage, 2011 UT
62, ,r 21, 2011 WL S110962, at *S, Accordingly, Orathol' s reliance on states in the minority as
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to the form of their constitutions and follow the minority rule on loss of visibility is unavailing.
The law of those jurisdictions is fundament.ally different from Idaho's constitution and case law.

1.

Grathol's Claim Of Loss Of Visibility Is Not Supported By The Facts.

GeoffReeslund, Grathol's.:Vice President and Director of Design and Constructio~ba$
made the conclusory assertion that the US~95 Project limit visibility of the remainjng Grathol
property. Reeslund Dep. at 18·19 (York Aff., Ex. 4), Mr. Reeslund conceded that he had not
done anything to substantiate his conclusion and was not aware of any study that supports his
opinion. Id., at 19-20.
ITD retained independent engineers to study Mr. Reesland's clann. They prepared
engineering cross-sections of the US-9S Project and the remaming Orathol property, and
determined that the Project would not block visibility of Orathol' s remaining property. See
Report by DEA, at 8 & Fig. 12 (York Aff., Ex. 11).
In response to ITD' s motion for summary judgment, Grathol has not come forward with

any competent evidence to support a claim for loss of visibility, as required under the Idaho
Supreme Court cases cited in Section III. supra. Conclusory assertions are not sufficient to
withstand summary judgment. Nor has Grathol made any attempt to identify the alleged impacts
or the amount of monetary damages that might be caused, as required by Idaho Code § 7-711 (5).
Based on the foregoing, Grathol's claim for severance damages based on loss of visibility
should be dismissed on summary judgment.

VII.

GRATHOL'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION BASED ON LOSS OR
IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

In its opening brief, ITD established the following undisputed facts. The Grathol

property is bare ground. It has no physical access to State Highway S4. It has an illegal access
to

US-95 near the comer of State Highway 54. That access is to a small portion of the Grathol

PLAINTIFF ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-30

678 of 1617

JAN. 27. 2012 5:27PM

NO. 4063

P. 33/46

property that is barely contiguous with the larger part of the property, and could not serve as
access to the larger parcel. Grathol has deeds reserving access to State Highway 54, but those
deeds only authorize access for farm or residential use. Grathol' s property is now zoned
commercial. Therefore, it needs commercial accesses and cannot construct or use the

--~. ;

residential/farm accesses reserved by deed. ITD is not taking any access to the Gtathol property
in this condemnation. See ITD Opening Brf., at 33-36,

In its opening brief, cited a number of Idaho Supreme Court cases which have held that
the issue of whether a compensable taking of access or a compensable limitation of access has
occU1Ted is properly decided by the trial court on summary judgment. Id. at 36.
ITD also cited the Idaho Supreme Court cases that have addressed whether and Wlder
what circumstances a compensable taking or limitation of access has occurred. Id. at 36-39.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized a compensable taking of access in only three
cases: Weaver v. Village ofBancroft, 92 Idaho 189,193,439 P.2d 697, 701 (1968); Hughes v.

State ofIdaho, 80 Idaho 286, 295-96, 328 P.2d 397,402 (1958); Viii. o/Sandpointv. Doyle, 14
Idaho 749, 95 P. 945,948 (1908). See Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 144, 742 P.2d 397, 399
(1987) (discussing these cases). In each of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that

all vehicular access to the property had been "destroyed," and therefore the property owner had a

"right to regain access to the public road or to be compensated for the taking of access." Id.; see

also Weaver, 92 Idaho at 193,439 P.2d at 701; Hughes, 80 Idaho at 295-96, 328 P.2d at 402;
Doyle, 14 Idaho at 758-60, 95 P. at 947-48.
Thus, the legal standard in Idaho for whether or not a compensable taking or limitation of
access has occurred is as follows. If all rights of access to a public road are destroyed - meaning

that the property is left without any means of ingress or egress to any public s'freet or road- then
a compensable taking of access has occurred. Merritt, 113 Idaho at 144, 742 P.2d at 399.
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In its response brief, Grathol suggests a different standard:

Because of this project, the realignment of the highway, the
elevation of this interchange, and the very nature of the project
creating a "limited access highway" it is axiomatic that Grathol's
remainder property and its rights in the property relative to access
will be different than they would have been if this project had
never been conceived.

· ~ -,

Orathol Brf., at 23 (emphasis added).
The suggested standard that a compensable talcing or restriction of access occurs if access
will be different is contrary to the standard set by the Idaho Supreme Court, which requires that
all access must be destroyed before a compensable taking occurs. Gtathol cannot make that

showing and has made no attempt to do so.
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that the Court dismiss Grathol' s claims for
compensation based on an alleged taking or restriction of access.

VIII. GRATHOL IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER LOST PROFITS BECAUSE ITS
CLAIM IS SPECULATIVE AND BARRED BY IDAHO LAW.
Idaho law bars Grathol's attempt to recover lost profits because it is well settled that lost
profits are not compensable in eminent domain cases in Idaho. It is also well settled that alleged
lost profits from a new business are inherently speculative and caMot form the basis for
recovery. Here, Grathol does not have a "new business." It only has a planned business.

A.

Idaho Law Bars Grathol From Recovering Lost Profits In A Condemnation Case,
In its opening brief, ITD cited Idaho Supreme Court cases barring recovery for lost

profits in condemnation cases. See ITD Opening Brf., at 40-41. These cases were decided prior
to enactment ofldaho's business damage statute. I.C.§7-711(2)(b). 1TD also showed that
Grathol cannot recover lost profits under the business damage statute. ITD Opening Brf., at41 •
42.
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Gratbol Now Concedes That It Cannot Seek A Separate Recovery For Lost Profits.
In its response brief, Grathol has backed way from its prior demands on ITD for a

separate payment for lost profits. It now argues that 11 [t]he damages for lost profits to be offered
by Grathol at trial relate to the reduction in value, use and marketability" of the remainder.. ,..
Orathol Brf., at 24 (emphasis added). Therefore, summary judgment should be entered
dismissing Grathol's claim for recovery of lost profits in this case.
C.

Grathol's New Argument For Lost Profits Should Also Be Dismissed.
Grathol is barred by law from seeking any recovery based on a showing of lost profits. It

is undisputed that the Orathol property is bare ground. Grathol has no business on the property,
and has not yet begun construction of any business on the property. Therefore, there are no "lost
profits." Lost profits necessarily assume an ongoing business that has been interrupted or
damaged and has suffered a total or partial loss of profits as a result of the interruption or
damage.
In this case, ITD' s condemnation has not interrupted or damaged an ongoing business
operation or caused it to lose profits. No business has started, and no profits and no lost profits
have occurred.

In Idaho, the law is clear that no recovery can be based on speculative and abstract future
damages. See, e.g., Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 133
Idaho 249,257, 985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999) (explaining that "lost profits and future earnings must
be shown with a reasonable certainty' and that "[d]amage awards based upon speculation and
conje<:tu.re will not be allowed."); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 9S Idaho 752, 761, 519 P.2d 421,430

(1974) (same). See also Circle C Ranch v. Jayo, 104 Idaho 353, 3S6, 659 P.2d 107, 110 (1983)
(affirming trial court's holding that claim for lost profits "failed as being speculative" where
evidence produced at trial tended to show that plaintiff's ability to secure two prospective
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temporary permits was too speculative). Here, Grathol's evidence of''lost profits" is inherently
speculative, because no business has been fanned.
In addition, longstanding Idaho law holds that "[p]rospective profits contemplated to be
derived.from a business which is-not yet establishei but one merely in contemplation, are too

uncertain and speculative to form a basis for recovery." C.R. Crowley, Inc. v. Soelberg, 81
Idaho 480,486,346 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1959) (emphasis added) (applying rule to deny damage
claim for future crop loss); Rindlisbaker, 9S Idaho 752, 761, 519 P.2d 421,430 (1974) (applying
rule to deny damage claim for future farm operations). See also Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196,
200,279 P.2d 1064, 1065-66 (1955) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim for "anticipated profits" because
at most they alleged "loss of anticipated possible profits to be derived from a business not yet in

being but only contemplated to be established" which was simply "too uncertain and
speculative" to establish a prima facie case of damage) (emphasis added).
As the Idaho Supreme Court bas explained, the question is whether the plaintiff ''has
proven the damages for lost profits with reasonable certainty" and "an established earning
record" is relevant to proving damages with any "reasonable certainty." Clarkv. lnt'l Harvester

Co., 99 Idaho 326,346, 581 P.2d 784,804 (1978). See also Lamb v. Robinson, 101 Idaho 703,
705,620 P.2d 276,278 (1980) (explaining that "the existence of damages must be taken out of
the realm of speculation") (citations omitted).
Here, Orathol's claim for anticipated lost business profits is premised on a commercial

development that has not been built and has never operated or generated any profits. Grathol's
claim for lost business profits is inherently speculative and too uncertain to support a claim for
recovery.
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ITD's motion for summary judgment on this issue does not "go to the weight" of the
evidence. The question presented is whether Grathol has a legal right to pursue a recovery, in
the form of an enhanced just compensation award, based on a showing of alleged "lost profits."
Based on the foregoing, n~D,requests that summary judgment be entered barring CJr-athol
from pursuing any recovery in this case based on alleged lost profits.
IX.

GRATHOL'S ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR
LOST GRAVEL IS CONTRARY TO BASIC VALUATION PRINCIPLES IN
EMINENT DOMAIN CASES,
In its motion for summary judgment, ITO' s demonstrated that Grathol has no legal or

factual basis to recover $300,000 for the value of gravel that Gtathol believes is located on the
subject property and believes that ITD can use for the US-95 Project. As with its other
arguments in response to ITD's summary judgment motion, Orathol has shifted its position now
that its original position has been shown to be unsustainable.

Gtathol's original position focused on the potential benefit that it believed could be
gained by ITD or its contractor by its alleged use of the gravel material located within the take
area. See, e.g., Reeslund Dep., at 134 (York Aff., Ex. 4). However, when !TD pointed out that
Gtathol had no information regarding the quality and the quantity of the gravel under the take
area, that there was no economic value to !TD or the contractor to use the gravel, and that the
mining of the gravel was prohibited by Kootenai County Ordinances, Grathol 's position
changed. Under its newly-crafted argument, Grathol now contends that it is entitled to
compensation based upon two inconsistent and mutually exclusive uses of the property-first as
a multi-use commercial development and as an operating gravel pit/mining operation. Grathol's
assertions are leially unsupportable and are in direct conflict with long-established valuation
principles.
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Contrary to Grathol' s suggestion, the owner of condemned property does not have a
general right to compensation for minerals on his land. Rather, the sole context in which the fair
market value of condemned land may permissibly take into account mineral deposits within the
property is when the highest and· best use of the land is shown to be extraction of the minerals in
question. See Eagle Sewer Dist. v. Hormachea, 109 Idaho 418, 420-21, 707 P.2d 1057, 10S9-60
(1985); see IDJ12d 7.07, 7.09, 7.11, 7.16.1.
Basic valuation principles in eminent domain cases require that the amotmt of
compensation to be paid is based upon the "highest and best use" of the property at the time of
the taldng. State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 98 Idaho 888, 891, 575 P.2d 486, 489 (1978) ("The

owner is entitled, of course, to be compensated for the highest and best use to which the property
might be put."), This foundational rule was set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Symms v.

City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho S28, 531,493 P.2d 387,389 (1972). There, the Symms Court
stated that:
The compensation which must be paid for property taken by
eminent domain does not necessarily depend upon the uses to
which it is devoted at the time of the taking~ rather, all the uses for
which the property is suitable should be considered in determining
market value.

Id (citations to Idaho and U.S. Supreme Court cases and NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
omitted). According to the Symms Court, the determination of "all the uses for which the
property is suitable" requires consideration of the "highest and best use" of the property, which
the court described as follows:
The highest and best use for which the property is adaptable and
needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be
considered, not necessarily as a measure of value, but to the full
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market
value of the property.
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Id Thus) where the landowner can show that the "use for which the property is claimed to be
adaptable is reasonably probable" and that the suggested use is "economically feasible/' then
evidence of damages relating to the suggested use is admissible. Id And, where the suggested
use is not reasonably probable cr,economically feasible, evidence of such damages is not admissible.
This rule was applied in the context of mineral deposits in the case of Eagle Sewer Dist.

v. Hormachea, 109 Idaho 418, 420-21, 707 P.2d 1057, 1059·60 (198S). The Eagle Sewer Dist.
case involved a condemnation action by the Eagle Sewer District to acquire property for an
infiltration facility. At trial, appraisal testimony from both parties concluded that the highest and

best use of the land was for a feedlot. Id. at 420, 707 P.2d at 1059. However, the landowners
argued that the property should have been valued based upon a dual use as both a feed lot and a

sand and gravel operation, and that the award of fair market value should have taken into account
both potential uses. Id at 421, 707 P.2d at 1060. The district court disagreed and established the
fair market value of the land based on its highest and best use as a feedlot. Id. at 421, 707 P.2d at
1060.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the landowners' argument that the property

should have been valued and damages assessed using two highest and best uses. Id

at 420-21,

707 P.2d at 1059-60. The Court held that ''[t]his argument is in direct contravention of the
general rule of law set forth in Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain which provides in part:

While valuable mineral deposits on condemned land constitute an
element of damages to be considered, ifthe development ofsuch
deposits is inconsistent with the highest and best use upon the
basis of which tha land i8 valuedi such deposits may not be
considered.
Id. (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Court quoted the Symms case and quoted
the general rules cited above .. Accordingly, the Court upheld the district court's decision, stating
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that "[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award extra damages for the
value of the land as a potential sand and/or gravel mining operation." Id. See also In re

Condemnation by the Commonwealth ofPenn., 404 A.2d 725, 728 (Pa. 1979) ("What is obvious,
of course, is that the highest and- best use of [the landowner's] property could not be for g:ravel
production and residential development. It must be one or the other.'').
The same conclusion applies here. No dispute exists that "the uses for which the
[Orathol] property is suitable" is for a multi-use commercial development." See, e.g., York Aff.,
Ex. 6, at 4, 6; Ex. 18, at 4·5, Consistent with the agreed-upon highest and best use, both ITD and
Gratbol valued the property based upon a futute commercial development on the site. Id
Additionally, as noted in ITD's opening brief, Kootenai County's zoning ordinance prohibits
gravel mining on commeicially zoned property, like the Grathol property. York Aff., Ex. 10.
Grathol' s claim for additional damages is not based upon "uses for which the property is
suitable," or uses which are reasonable probable as required under Idaho's valuation rules for
eminent domain cases. Symms, 94 Idaho at 531,493 P.2d at 389. The valuation of the Grathol
property as both a commercial development and as a gravel pit is "in direct contravention of the
general rule of law" for eminent domain cases and "may not be considered." Eagle Sewer Dist.,
109 Idaho at 420-21, 707 P.2d at 1059·60 (quoting Nichols on Eminent Domain,§ 13.22 (1981))
("While valuable mineral deposits on condemned land constitute an element of damages to be
considered, ifthe development ofsuch deposits is inconsistent with the highest and best use upon

the basis ofwhich the land is valued, such deposits may not be considered.") (emphasis added).
Orathol tries to support its position by citing a single Nevada case, State ofNevada ex rel.

Nevada Dep't o/Transp, v. Las Vegas Bldg. Materials, Inc., 761 P.2d 843 (1~88). Grathol's
reliance on Nevada Dep 't ofTransp. is misplaced because it is based upon Orathol 's selective
reading of the case and Grathol's failure to address the foundational principles that formed the
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basis of the court's decision. Instead of supporting Grathol's argument, the case actually forces
the conclusion that Orathol's claim for gravel damages is improper.
In its analysis of the case, Grathol focuses on the valuation methods discussed by the

court, but Orathol overlooked the-first step in the court's analysis of determining when these

methods should be applied. In the opening paragraph of the court's discussion on the evidence
concerning the valuation of the land, the court set forth the applicable principles of eminent
domain law, which states that "where property is not taken for the purpose of obtaining the
minerals or as an ongoing business it is improper to appraise the mineral deposits separately and

add the mineral value to the value of the land" Id. at 845. For purposes of the present case, that
rule of law starts and ends the analysis. Here, the Orathol property is not being t.aken for the

purpose of obtaining the minerals, nor is there an ongoing business relating to the mineral
deposits. Thusi "it is improper to appraise the mineral deposits separately and add the mineral
value to the land," and Orathol's argument to the contrary fails.
Grathol's claim for $300,000 in damages for alleged lost gravel on the property is based
upon its fundamental misunderstanding and misapplication of the basic principles of eminent

domain law. The valuation of property is to be based upon the highest and best use of the
property, and Grathol's attempt to claim damages based upon two mutually inconsistent uses is
improper and would result in a double-recovery-one for the value of the property as a
commercial development and a second time as a mining property. The Grathol property cannot
legally or physically be developed for both uses, and Grathol cannot recover damages for both
uses.
As a secondary part of its argument, Orathol contends that ITD is somehow to blame for
Orathol' s own lack of understanding and knowledae about the material resour<:es under its own
property. Grathol states that ITD has "resisted at every turn [Gtathol's] efforts to pursue
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discovery of [ITD's] geotechnical data." Def. Resp. Br., at 26. Grathol's assertions have no
basis in fact; ITD has provided full and complete responses to Grathol' s discovery requests and
provided all information ITO has relating to geotechnical information and test pits located on its
property. Furthermore, it is notITD's responsibility to perform this sort of work for Grathol, at
public expense.
Grathol's arguments about not having information underscore what is acknowledged by
all parties-that the property is not being developed as a material resource, nor is such a use the
highest and best use for the property. If that were the case, not only would Grathol's appraiser
have valued the property as a gravel pit or mining operation, but Gtathol would have obtained
information about the type, quality and quantity of the resources located on the property.

Grathol's own actions confirm that the highest and best use of the property is not as a gravel pit
or mining operation, and therefore its attempts to claim damages for such a use is not permitted
under eminent domain law.

In summary, Grathol has no factual basis for its claim. It has not met its burden on
summary judgment to come forward with competent evidence to support its claim. And

Grathol's claim is contrary to conttolling Idaho case law and fundamental principles of real
estate valuation in eminent domain proceedings. Accordingly, summary judgment should be
granted on thls claim.

X.

GRATBOL CANNOT CLAIM SEVERANCE DAMAGES FOR IMPACTS ON
ITS HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT
HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROJECT BEFORE IT BOUGHT THE
PROPERTY,
ITD has moved for summary judgment barring Orathol from seeking damages based on

its "before" site development plan, In support of its motion, ITD established that Orathol first

learned about the property in January 2008. Johnson Dep., at 25:22-25. (York Aff., Ex. 3). The
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property was listed for sale at $1.45 million in the Multiple Listing Service. York Aff., Ex. 9.
The MLS listing provided notice to all prospective purchasers that a highway interchange was
planned to be constructed on the property. Id. The listing said that construction plans for the
US-9S Project showed future freeway off-ramps "through this property." Id. Gtathol c-enfinned
that it knew about the highway project before they purchased the property. Reeslund Dep., at
22:13-23:4; 65:19-24 (York Aff., Ex. 4).
Grathol met with representatives of ITD before it putchased the property and were shown
the preliminary plans for the Project Johnson Dep,, at 31:20-32:13; 36:7-14 (YorkAff., Ex. 3);
Reeslund Dep., at 87:8-88:7 (York Aff., Ex. 4). Through its meetings with ITD and its review of
the preliminary project plans, GTathol knew about the Project and had details about the Project.
Before Grathol purchased the property they began work on their application to rezone the
property to commercial. Reeslund Dep., at 91:5-19; 189:13-19 (YorkAff., Ex. 4), On May 28,
2008, Grathol purchased the entire 56 acre property for $1 .45 million. Gtathol submitted its
rezone application to Kootenai County two days later, on May 30, 2008. Reeslund Dep., Ex. 16
(York Aff., Ex. 16).
Gratbol's rezone application acknowledged and praised the virtues of the U.S. 95 Project,
and it relied on the Project as a primary reason why a zoning change was justified. Id The

zoning application also reflected accurate knowledge of the Project, stating that "I-95 is soon to
begin improvement to full freeway status, and will be realigned to cross this property, providing
on and off-ramps at the Hwy 54 intersection." Id at A-3.
As part of its application to Kootenai County for rezoning, Gtathol presented a

development plan that showed a reconstructed US-95, in other words, an "after" site plan. Id. at
A-8a & A-8b (York Aff., Ex. 16 at A-8a & A-Sb).
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Sometime after its zoning application, Grathol prepared another site plan. This plan is a
"before>' site plan, as though no changes were to be made to US-95. Grathol now seeks to use
this "before" plan as a basis for recovering severance damages from ITD.

In response to ITO' s motion for s1.mmuu'Y judgment dismissing damage claims based on

Orathol's hypothetical "before" site plan, Grathol argues that the motion should be denied
because the US-95 Project changed after they bought the property. The change cited by Grathol
is that the interchange will have an overpass rather than having State Highway 54 go under US-

95.
The fact that the Project changed does not permit Grathol to present a hypothetical site
plan in the "before" condition - as though no changes were ever to be made to US-95, and then
use that plan as a basis for recovering severance damages because it cannot now built that plan.
Grathol could never have built that plan, and it knew that when it bought the property. The
"before" plan was created solely in an attempt to increase severance damages in this case, and
Grathol' s claims for severance damages based on that plan should be dismissed on summary
judgment.
IDJI2d Instruction 7.14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's particular
plan for development and use of the property only for the purposes ofdetermining uses for which

the property is adaptable." IDJI2d 7.14. In other words, Grathol cannot seek damages by
pointing to an un-built site plan and claiming "we cannot build this here now," or "this building
will have to be smaUer," and ask that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such alleged
"losses,, or "severance,, damages.
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that all claims for severance damages based on or
tied to alleged adverse impacts on a "before" commercial development plan created for this

litigation be dismissed on summary judgment.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, ITO respectfully requests that the Court grant ITD's motion
for summary judgment and dismiss the claims by Grathol addressed above.
DATED this 27th day of January, 2012. ·

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") hereby submits this reply
brief in support of its Motion in Limine in which it seeks an order from the Court instructing
Defendant H1 Grathol ("Grathol"), its counsel, representatives, and witnesses to refrain from

presenting expert testimony and evidence that violates Idaho-law and eminent domain principles. · ·

I.

INTRODUCTION

ITD' s Motion in Limine seeks to exclude certain expert testimony and evidence offered
by Grathol that fails to meet the legal standard for admissibility in Idaho. Eminent domain
principles and Idaho law provide a clear framework for what is admissible in an eminent domain
proceeding. Grathol's Response to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine ("Grathol Resp. Brf.") contends
that ITD's motion is premised on its disagreement with Grathol's anticipated expert testimony
and that any deficiencies with its experts' methodology goes to the weight of the testimony and
not its admissibility. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 3.
Underlying Grathol's argument is the suggestion that ITD's motion is a mere dispute
between the methodologies used by the respective experts. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 2-3. Grathol's
assertions mischaracterize ITO' s motion. ITD' s motion is not premised on a dispute between
accepted methods for valuing property in a condemnation action; rather, it seeks to exclude
expert testimony employing an improper methodology that violates well-established principles of
eminent domain and Idaho law.
Specifically, the following subjects and references should be excluded from testimony,
• •

,

,.

• .,

• . 1

eV1aence, ana argument at mai:

1.

Valuation opinions of Grathol' s experts Skip Sherwood ("Sherwood'') and
Alan Johnson ("Johnson'') that violate Idaho law and fail to apply the statutory

date of valuation as required by Idaho Code§ 7-712.
2.

Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation
methodology relating to the "larger parcel II analysis of the Grathol property.
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3,

Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments
made to comparable sales.

4.

Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being
taken as part of this condemnation action.

,:

Evidence of Sherwood',~ Sale No. S, which-is a transaction between a
condemning authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and not
a valid comparable sale.

;),.

This testimony and evidence is improper and inadmissible, and should be excluded.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Gratbol's Response Does Not Address The Requirements For Admission Of Expert
Testimony In Idaho,

In its response brief, GTathol attempts to characterize ITD' s Motion in Limine by
claiming that ITD's objections are solely based on ITD's "apparent disagreement with the
substance of the evidence." Grathol Resp. Brf. at 2. According to Grathol, a mere disagreement
about expert methodology does not constitute grounds for exclusion. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 2-3.
If that were the standard, no expert testimony would ever be excluded because the offering party
could simply claim that the dispute was simply a disagreement over methodology.

From the outset. Grathol's characterization of!TD's argument is incorrect. !TD's motion
is not a simple disagreement with the methodologies used by Orathol' s experts; it is based on the
legal requirements for eminent domain proceedings. Furthennore, Grathol fails to acknowledge
that ITD's motion also challenges testimony by Grathol's experts on the grounds that the

testimony fails to meet the threshold requirements for admissibility. See ITD's In Limine Brf. at
11-12, Grathol has not responded to IID's arguments on this issue. It should be noted,
however, that the cases cited by Grathol in its response brief set forth the foundational
requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony, stating that the proposed expert testimony
must "have sufficient indicia of reliability" to be admissible, but Grathol skips over these
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requirements. City ofMcCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 585-86, 130 P.3d 1118, 1123-24 (2006)
(citing State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410,417, 3 P.3d 535,542 (Ct. App. 2000); Rueth v. State,
103 Idaho 74, 78, 644 P.2d 1333, 1337 (1982)). Grathol's failure to apply or acknowledge the
foundational requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony nullifies its entire argument -,,
Moreover, Grathol fails to explain how the methodologies of its experts are sound.
Likewise, it fails to provide any citation to legal authority that permits its experts to use a date of
valuation different than that required by Idaho Code § 7-712, or that allows its eXperts to define
the "larger parcel'' as less than the entire property owned by Grathol, or that allows its appraisal
expert to hide, or not use, adjustments to his comparable sales. Instead Grath.ol argues th.at its
experts should be allowed to testify regardless of their methodology. That is certainly not the
standard for admissibility of expert testimony. In short, Grathol's assertions have no factual
basis or legal support. Grathol' s proposed expert testimony violates established legal principles
that are applied in Idaho condemnation cases and should be excluded.

B.

The Valuation Opinions Of Sherwood And Johnson Violate Idaho Law By Failing
To Apply The Statutory Date Of Valuation Required By Idaho Code§ 7-712 And
Eminent Domain Law.
Grathol's valuation experts, Sherwood and Johnson, both use a valuation date that is not

the date of summons as required by Idaho Code § 7-712. The date of summons, and therefore
the date of valuation, in this case is November 19, 2010. Instead of using this date, Johnson
values the Property as of the estimated date of completion of the US-95 Project Orathol's Third

Supp. Discovery Resp. at 7 (York Aff., Ex. 6)1 Sherwood, in his before-and-after valuation
analysis, uses valuation dates of March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after condition" valuation.

the Affidavit of Mary York in Support of PlaintifflTD's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine filed January 6, 2012.
1 "York Aff,'' refers to
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Sherwood Report at 10-12 (YorkAff., Ex. 18); Sherwood Dep. at 41 :11-44:10, 66:10-14, 66:1519 (York Aff., Ex. S).
In its response, Gra.thol does not dispute that these "after" valuations are not values as of
the·date of the summons, and Gtathol agr~s that "Idaho Code § 7-712 does require that the date···-- ·
of the summons be the basis for assessment of compensation for all property actually taken."
Grathol Resp. Br. at 4. However, Grathol argues that the opinions of Sherwood and Johnson are
admissible valuations because severance and consequential da.mages2 "cannot be limited to the
date of the Summons." Id. Grathol's argument misstates and mischaracterizes Idaho law. As

discussed in more detail below, Idaho law requires that the date of valuation for all ju.st
compensation, including damages, be the date the summons is issued. I.C. § 7-712. Grathol' s
experts violate this rule of law by refusing to apply the date mandated by statute for valuing
compensation and damages and instead selecting an indetenninate date in the future as their date
of valuation.

1.

The language of Idaho Code § 7- 712 encompasses the entirety of just
compensation and sets the date of value for both the property taken and
damages.

Grathol acknowledges that Idaho Code § 7-712 requires the date of summons to be the
date for assessing the value of the property actually taken, but argues that the statute does not

2 It is not clear what Grathol means by "consequential" damages.

Grathol does not cite to any

authority which explains "consequential" damages or that it is entitled to such damages, To the
contrary, general consequential damages are not allowed in a condemnation case. "While the
rule may appear unjust, it is well settled that the landowner is not entitled, at least within the
framework of a condemnation suit to be compensated for such consequential damaies as loss of
business, relocation expenses, and the like." United States v. 91.90 Acres ofLand, 586 F.2d 79,
87 (8th Cir. 1978); see also U.S. v. 15,478 Square Feet ofLand, more or less, situate in tht City
o/Norfolk, JIA,2011 WL2471S86,4(E,D.Va.)(E.D.Va.2011),; U.S. v. SOAcresofLand,469
U.S. 24, 33, 105 S.Ct 4S1, 4S7 (1984).
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require that date to be used to detemrlne severance damages. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 4. According
to Grathol, the statute "does not provide a cut-off date for severance and consequential damages,
since the extent of such damages would not be known" as of that date. Id Grathol further

·contends that "[s]ection 7•712 doesn,t speak to other damages.'' Id Orathol' s statements are
incorrect. The plain language of§ 7-712 provides otherwise.
Idaho Code§ 7-712 states in no uncertain terms that "compensation and damages" are to
be determined as of the date of summons. The full text ofldaho Code§ 7-712 provides:
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the
summons, and its actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of
compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of
damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in
all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last
section. No improvements put upon the property subsequent to the
date of the service of summons shall be included in the assessment
of compensarion or damages. The compensation and damages
awarded shall draw lawful interest from the date of the summons.
I.C. § 7-712 (emphasis added). The language of the statute could not st.ate more clearly that the
value of the property taken and damages to the property not taken shall be determined as of "the
date of the summons/' Id.
Grathol's argument is also contradicted by long-established Idaho case law. See Spokane
& Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen, 3 Hasb. 381, 29 P. 854 (Idaho 1892) ("In proceedings for the

condemnation of land for railroad purposes under the statutes of Idaho, the value of the land at
the time it is taken is the measure of damages, and it is error to admit evidence of value at the
time of trial."); City ofLewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,857,853 P.2d S96, 602 (Ct. App.
1983) (Idaho Code § 7-712 11cbronologically limits the right to compensation from the date of the

summons in an eminent domain proceeding"); Zollinger v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 83 Idaho
411,419,364 P.2d 176, 180 (1961) ("I.C. § 7-712 required determination of damages for the
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area taken in the eminent domain proceeding as of June 27, 1958, the date summons issued in
that proceeding.").

The 1892 case of Spokane & Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen is particularly instructive. In

·Lteuallen, a railroad sought to condemrrcertain real propercyrin Latah County owned by A.A.
Lieuallen. Id. At trial, one of the witnesses for Lieuallen testified, on cross-examination, that he
"based his estimate of damages upon the present value of the property, while the statute fixes the
value of the property at the time it was taken as the rule." Id The Idaho Supreme Court held
that the district court erred in permitting testimony which gave an estimate of damages that was

not the value at the time of the taking. Id
It is urged by appellant, as a ground for reversal, that one of the
witnesses for defendant, upon his cross-examination, testified that
he based his estimate of damages upon the present value of the
property, while the statute fixes the value of the property at the
time it was taken a.s the rule. We thilli) the court e1Ted in allowing
this testimony to stand against the plaintiffs motion to strike it out,
but we think such error was rendered harmless by the reiterated
charge of the court to the jury that they were to find from the
evidence the value of the property on September 27, 1890, the time
of the taking.
id (emphasis added). in its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of the Idaho Revised

Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code§ 7-721, requiring
compensation and damages to be determined as of the date of summons. Id
Idaho's jury instructions are based on § 7-712 and established case law, and set the date
· of valuation as the date of summons. See IDJI2d 7.05, 7.05.1, 7.05.S, 7.07, 7.16, 7.18, 7.20. "It
is incorrect to think of 'severance damage' as a separate and distinct item of just compensation
apart from the difference between the market value of the entire tract immediately before the
taking and the market value of the remainder immediately after the taking." U>zited States v.

91.90 Acres ofLand, 586 F.2d 79, 86 (8th Cir. 1978). The issue of the correct valuation date is
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so important that the wrong date of value "may give rise to a motion to strike the appraisal, or the
reversal of the entire verdict." See 5-18 NICHOLS ONEM!NBNTDoMAIN § 18.16 (2011).

2.

Grathol's reliance on Dunclick is misplaced,

OTathol's argument suggests that.there are different.dates for valuing the compensation.. ,..
owed for the property taken and the severance damages that are caused to the remainder property

as a result of the taking. Orathol does not provide any authority that supports the view that there
are multiple valuation dates in a condemnation case. Instead, Grathol relies on a misreading of a
single quote from Dunclick.
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has been
determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further recover
the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is determined by the
market value of such remainder before and after the taking. The
difference in value is the severance damage.

State ex ,-el. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 55-56 286 P.2d 1112, 1118 (195S) (citing J.C.
§7~711; 29 C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN§ 139); see also Grathol Resp. Brf. at 5. According to

Grathol, this quote from Dunclick provides that severance damages are to be calculated as of a
different date than compensation for the property taken. However, Grathol' s inte.tpretation of the
quote is incorrect.
The Dunc/ick quote cites and relies on Idaho Code § 7-711 which does not address the
date damages are calculated. As cited above, Idaho Code § 7-712 govems the date that damages
are to be calculated. Thus, if this quote were addressing the date damages are calculated, then it
would cite to§ 7-712 and not§ 7-71 I. ·
When this Dunclick quote is read in context, it is clear that the Idaho Supreme Court is
referencing how just compensation is calculated-not when. Dunclick, lnc, 1 77 Idaho at 55-56
286 P.2d at 1118 ("This ianer sum is determined by the market value of such remainder before
and after the taking. The difference in value is the severance damage.'~.
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The language ofl.C. § 7•711(2) does not alter the plain language ofl.C. § 7712.

Gtathol also argues that Idaho Code§ 7-711(2) mandates that severance damages be
determined on different dates. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 5-6. To support its argument, Grathol
isolates the word "will," as contained in Idaho Code § 7-711(2), from.the statutory clause and
contends that it should be ascribed a meaning of"at some future time." Id at 6. Further, Grathol
argues that damages, such as damages caused by delays in the project, "must be quantifiable"
before they can be known. Id at 5. Thus, according to Grathol, the actual construction of the
project must be fully completed before the extent of Orathol' s damages caused by the delay can
be known. Yet Grathol does not provide any legal authority to support its position or to show
when severance dam.ages are to be assessed. Arguably, under Grathol's theory, damages for a
taking could be claimed for alleged damages decades into the future and would require delaying
every condemnation trial until construction is fully completed. In reality, the reverse is true. It is
extremely rare for a condemnation trial to be held after construction is completed. It is even
more rare for a court to delay a condemnation trial until after a project is completed.

Grath:oi' s argument is further rebutted when the whole sentence with the word "will" is
read in context. Idaho Code § 7-711 (2) states in relevant part:
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part
of a larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion
not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;
Idaho Code§ 7-711(2). Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the expressed intent of
the legislature must be given effect. Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135,138,804 P.2d 308,311
(1990). The language "the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned" is a simple reference to the fa.ct that severance damages must be caused by the
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physical severance of the condemned property from the remainder. It is not a license to look
years into the future and set valuation dates different from and contrary to express provisions of
the Idaho Code.
In addition, the language ••and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff' indicates that it is prospective and looking forward. Not backwards.
If Grathol's interpretation is accepted, then the.project would have to be completed before

damages could be assessed, and the language regarding "construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff'' would be rendered meaningless, because the construction
would no longer be proposed, it would be completed. Idaho Code§ 7-711(2) (emphasis added).
Both special benefits and severance damages can be, and are required to be, valued as of the date
of summons as set by Idaho Code § 7-712, and not at some unspecified future date. Thus,
Grathol' s proposed interpretation of the statute would render meaningless the requirements of
§7-712 and violate the established rules of statutory interpretation. State v. Hagerman Water

Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 736, 743-44, 947 P.2d 409, 416-17 (1997) ("in construing
legislative acts, it is not the business of the court to deal in subtle refinements, but to ascertain
from reading the whole act the purpose and intent of the legislature and to give force and effect
thereto" and ..a statutory provision will not be deprived of its potency if a reasonable alternative
construction is possible.") (internal citations omitted).
The Idaho Court of Appeal has construed the provisions of § 7-712 and has held that the
statute places a piOspective time limit on the compensatory reiief when the government directiy
condemns property. City ofLewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 8S1, 857,853 P.2d 596,602 (Ct.
App. 1993). As stated by the Court,

This section [I.C. § 7-712] clearly places a prospective time limit,
from the date of the summons, on the compensatory relief
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available in ordinary condemnation proceedings where the
government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power
of eminent domain. ·
Id Grathol' s interpretation of § 7-712 is not supported by a plain reading of the statute, it is

contrary to Idaho law, and it violates the basic tenets of statutory construction.

4.

Contrary to Grathol's unsupported assertion, a landowner is not entitled to
compensation for delays caused by the take.

GTathol makes several unsupported statements that Orathol is entitled to compensation
for delays in the project. Gtathol Resp. Brf. at 5. Grathol cites no law, statute or case that shows
it is entitled to compensation for delays in the project. Id
It is well established that a landowner is not entitled to compensation for delays to the

project See I.C.§7-711(3); ITD's Brief in Support of Summary Judgment at 16-23; see also
ITD's Summary Judgment Reply Brief, Section V. Grathol's unsupported suggestion as to what
it believes the law provides has no merit and does not support its argument that a different date
than that set by Idaho Code § 7-712 may be used to assess damages.

C.

Sherwood's Opinion Violates Idaho Law By Failing To Appraise The Whole Parcel.
ITD has moved to exclude Sherwood's valuation regarding the larger parcel for two

reasons. First, Sherwood's opinion violates Idaho law as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in

State ex rel. Symms v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972).
Second, the methodology Sherwood uses in considering only 30 acres of the 56 acre parcel is not
scientifically sound, would not assist a trier of fact, and is therefore not admissible.

1,

Gratbol did not respond to controlling Idaho Supreme Court case law,

Sherwood's opinion violates the requirements of Idaho law regarding the "larger parcel."
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Symms, it is en-or to artificially divide a parcel as

Sheiwood attempts to do:

ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE -11

702 of 1617

NO. 4062

JAN. 27. 2012 4:58PM

P. 13

If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract held
by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it
constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in
the possession of the same owner; the amount awarded for the land
taken must reflect any enhanced value arising from its availability
for use in conjunction with the land not taken.
Symms, 94 Idaho at 531, 493 P.2d at 390. Grathol does not respond to this legal argument, nor

does it attempt to refute the case authority cited by ITD. There is no dispute that Grathol owns
the entire 56-acre parcel and Sherwood's attempt to consider only 30 acres as a separate tract
violates Idaho law and is inadmissible.
2.

Sherwood's methodology artificially divides the 56 acres and is
fundamentally unsound and not helpful to the trier of fact.

It is undisputed that Grathol's property is approximately 56 acres. Sherwood's valuation
only analyzed the front 30 acres which are bordered by US-95 and Highway 54. He ignored the
remaining 26.8 acres. Sherwood Report, at 6, 9 (York Aff., Ex. 18); Sherwood Dep. 119: 12-22,
120:12-15 (York Aff., Ex. S). Grathol suggests that ITD merely disagrees with Sherwood's
methodology and that differences in opinion as to methodology do not make his opinion
inadmissible. Orathol Resp. Brf. at 3. Grathol goes on to state that Sherwood bases his
valuation on the section of the property from which ITD is taking the 16.314 acres. Orathol
Resp. Brf. at 3. Sherwood claims that these 30 acres are worth $2,940,300. Sherwood Report at
I

9 (York Aff., Ex. 18). However, in order to suppprt that value conclusion, he ignores the
remaining 26 acres. Id Sherwood admits that smaller parcels typically sell for more on a peracre basis than larger parcels. Sherwood Dep. at 222: 19-223 :3 (York Aff,, Ex, S),
Sheiwood's opinions also violate the requirements of Idaho law that, to be admissible, an
expert's principles and rnethodoloay must be sound. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140-41,
219 P.3d 45.3, 464-65 (2009), The court's function is to distinguish scientifically-sound
reasoning from that of the self-validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present
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wisubstantiatedpersonal beliefs. State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410,417, 3 P.3d 535,542 (Ct.
App. 2000). ITD is not moving to exclude Sherwood's opinion because his methodology differs
from the methodology used by ITD's experts. ITD is moving to exclude Sherwood's opinion
because his methodology is not scientifically or logically sound. Sherwood's methodology fails·
to value the entire 56-acre property. Grathol offers no explanation or defense for Sherwood's
failure to consider the entire larger 56-acre parcel in his valuation, as required by Idaho law.
Instead, Sherwood improperly assigns a value of $2,940,300 for 30 acres-disregarding
the fact that the entire 56 acres was purchased for only $1,4SO,OOO in 2008. Sherwood's
methodology is not reliable and should be excluded.

D.

Sherwood's Comparable Sales Are Inadmissible Because He Has Failed To Disclose
Specific Adjustments For Each Comparable Sale.
Sherwood's comparable sales should be excluded because he fails to disclose the specific

adjustments he made to each of his comparable sales. Without the specific adjustments to the
comparable sales, it is impossible for the trier of fact to detennine whether those sales are
actually comparable or even relevant to the analysis. Grathol argues that a mere disagreement

regarding Sheiwood's methodology does not go to the ;'admissibiiity;; of his comparable sales
but rather only goes to the weight. Grathol Resp. Brf. 3-4. Grathol argues that real estate
valuation is not a matter of applying a mathematical formula and that it is not subject to the
''formulaic, rigid strictures of Daubert and it [sic] progeny.', Id
Grathol appears to misunderstand ITD' s challenge to Sherwood's lack of adjustments.
IID's challenge on this issue is not based on Daubert principles, as suggested by Grathol.
Rather, Im simply asks that Idaho law be applied, which requires that the methodology and
principles used by experts be sound. By refusing to provide any calculations to support his
comparable sales adjustments and relying only upon his "experience" to justify his methodolOiY5
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condemnation" but Sherwood still considered it because of its proximity and zoning. Grathol
Resp. Brf. at 7. In his Report, Sherwood acknowledges the deficiencies apparent in Comparable
No. 5, stating that "this sale was negotiated under threat of condemnation and courts have ruled

that these sales may not represent true market value for this reason," Sherwood Report at 8
(York Aff., Ex. 18). Sherwood's use of Sale No. S is inadmissible for this very reason-it does
not represent a ''true market value" and thus is not a valid comparable sale.
As the proponent of the comparable sales data, Grathol has the burden of satisfying the

"s1rict foundation requirements [that] apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as
substantive proof of the value of the property taken/' Symms 93 Idaho at 23, 454 P.2d at 60.
1

Thus, Sherwood's own opinion begs the question: if this sale does not represent true market

value, why was it used to determine true market value?
Grathol'sjustification for its expert's use of the sale is that c'Sherwood also adjusted the
stated sale price downward based on these differences to assist/help in arriving at his opinions of

value." Grathol Resp. Brf. at 7. However, because Sherwood did not provide a calculation of
his adjustments, no one can say how much he adjusted Sale No. S because of the condenmation.
Even if adjustments were made, the starting point price is not a value that was achieved on the
open market, making its use improper under any circumstances. Thus, despite any alleged
adjustment made, the underlying starting data has no bearing in determining true market value.
Perhaps sensing that Sale No. S is inadmissible, Grathol attempts to downplay its
significance. Orathol Resp. Brf. at 7. Grathol says that Sale No. S, as only one of 10 sales, "isn't
very important in the whole scheme ofthings. 11 Id. However, Orathol's characterization of the
sale is directly contradicted by Sheiwood's own report where he states he placed 0 primary
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Sherwood's unsubstantiated personal beliefs are precisely the type of opinion that Idaho courts
seek to exclude. See State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 417, 3 P.3d 53S, S42 (Ct. App. 2000).
[T]he key to admission of [an expert's] opinion is the validity of
the expert's reasoning and methodology .... The court's function is
to distinguish scientifteally sound reasoning from that of the selfvalidating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present
unsubstantiated personal beliefs.

Id, 134 Idaho at 417, 3 P.3d at 542 (citing Ryan v. Beisner, 121 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28
(Ct, App, 1992) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. 1 127 N.J. 404,605 A.2d 1079, 1084
(1992)).

Idaho also acknowledges a higher standard when it comes to the admissibility of
comparable sales. Grathol has the burden of satisfying the "strict foundation requirements [that]

apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as substantive proof of the value of the
property taken." See State ex rel, Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 23,454 P.2d S6, 60 (1969). By
failing to provide, or even make, any calculations explaining how he used the comparable sales
in his methodology, Sherwood is preventing anyone, including the trier of fact, from

substantiating the validity of his comparable sales. Sherwood is simply using appraisal
terminology to present his unsubstantiated personal beliefs. Therefore, his use of comparable

sales and his conclusions based on comparable sales should be excluded.
E.

Johnson's Damages Calculation Is Improperly Based on Incorrect Acreages For the
Property Actually Being Taken,

Johnson, who is one of the owners of Grathol, bases his opinion and corresponding
damages on an 18-acre taking by ITO, when it is undisputed that ITO is only taking 16.314
acres. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16, 93:16-94:2, 94:8-10, 102:14-103:3 (York AfJ,, Ex. 3), Grathol
Third Suppl. Discovery Resp. at 6 (York Aff., Ex. 6). Johnson's opinion states that ITD is
acquiring the "prime 18 acres" of Orathol's property. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16, Orathol Third
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Suppl. Discovery Resp. at 6 (York Aff., Ex. 6). Johnson then calculates his damages by
multiplying his estimated price per acre and 18 acres. Id The result of this multiplication is the
basis for his estimation of damages for the property acquired. Id He then uses this 18-acre
calculation to determine the rest of bi-s-claimed damages. ~zd at 6-7.
When confronted about this discrepancy Johnson testified that he had added
approximately an acre and a half to ITO' s acquisition because that is how much he believes ITD
is acquiring for Sylvan Road. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16. As discussed in detail in ITD's motion
for summary judgment, ITD is not acquiring any of Grathol's Property for Sylvan Road and the
Court has concluded that the taking in this case does not include any taking for Sylvan Road.
IID's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 6-12. Grathol has now conceded that ITO is not
taking or condemning any land for Sylvan Road. See Grathol Resp. to Mot. Sum. Jmt. at 5.
Therefore, by Grathol 's own admission, this testimony by Johnson is incorrect.
ITD is moving to exclude Johnson's testimony not because of a disagreement about
methodology, but because his opinion violates a basic premise of condemnation law-where no
t.aking has occurred, no compensation is owed. See Me"ittv. State, 113 Idaho 142; 145, 742
P.2d 397,400 (1987). Johnson's opinion asks this Court to compensate him as though 18 acres
were taken-even though it is undisputed that only 16.314 acres are actually being taken. Thus,
the facts on which his opinion is based are flawed, and his opinion would not assist the trier of
fact in making a determination.

F.

Evidence Of Sherwood's Sale No, 5 Is Not A Valid Comparable Sale Because It Was
Sold Under Threat Of Condemnation,
ITD has moved to exclude testimony and evidence regarding Sherwood's use of Sale No.

5-a sale under threat of condemnation-as a comparable sale. Grathol argues that
"Comparable Sale No. 5 may not represent a true 'market value' by reason of the threat of
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emphasis" and "more weight" on Comparable Sale No. 5 in rendering his opinion. Compare,

Grathol Response at 7 with Sherwood Report at 9 (York Aff., Ex. 18).
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site
with commercial zoning and without the planned interchange I
considered the values of the comparable sales with primary
emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 as they are on the same highway
and located north and south of the subject Comparable 4 is also
another good comparable which was given more weight like
comparables 5 and 7.

Sherwood Report at 9 (York Ail Ex. 18) (emphasis added). To avoid an unfavorable ruling,
Grathol cannot downplay the importance of data that its own expert placed "primary emphasis"
on, particularly where such use calls into question the very reliability of the methodologies and
facts used by the Grathol expert.

m.

CONCLUSION

Grathol has failed to respond to legal arguments and authority presented by ITD. Instead,
Grathol argues that mere disagreements about methodology do not render expert opinions
inadmissible. Yet, Grathol does not defend or explain its experts' methodology. Grathol ignores
controlling Idaho law which sets forth the parameters of eminent domain law. Moreover,
Grathol disregards its own burden to provide this Court with expert opinions based upon sound
methodology and principles. Accordingly, these opinions offered by Grathol are inadmissible.

Ill
Ill
Ill

I II

Ill
Ill
Ill

ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE .. 17

708 of 1617

NO. 4062

JAN. 27. 2012 4:59PM

P. 19
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-10-10095

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
IN LIMINE

)

The trial in this matter is scheduled to begin on March 5, 2012. On January 6,
2012, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") filed its motion in

limine, along with a Brief in Support and the Affidavit of Mary York. On January 20,
2012, Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") filed its Responsive Brief and the Affidavit of
Christopher Gabbert. On January 27, 2012, ITD filed its Reply Brief. The matter came
on for hearing on February 2, 2012. Mary York and Ted Tollefson appeared on behalf of
ITD, and Douglas Marfice and Christopher Gabbert appeared on behalf of Grathol.
At the conclusion of the February 2, 2012, hearing, this Court orally pronounced
its reasoning and decision. Specifically, this Court found that the record before it was
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devoid of expert witness testimony as to the fair market value of the remaining property
before the take, making any testimony as to a claimed loss of fair market value of the
remainder as a severance damage inadmissible. The Court also found, based upon the
record before it, that the nature and amount of special damages, claimed as severance
damages, are not sufficiently identified in any way that the Court could determine what,
if any, evidence would be admissible at trial on the severance damage claims.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Grathol serve upon ITD
and file with this Court an expert witness disclosure that provides: (1) evidence for the
evaluation of a fair market value for the remainder parcel of Grathol's property before
and after the take, and (2) evidence as to the nature and amount of any items of special
damages claimed as severance damages.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Grathol shall serve upon ITD and file with this
Court the disclosure within seven (7) calendar days from the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of the subjects in ITD's Motion
in limine are denied, or reserved for trial, at this time .

.r-,

DATED this ; ; day of February, 2012.

,.
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Deputy Attorney OeneraJ. ITD
POBOX7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

I
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o Overnight Mail

A Via Fax: 208-343-8869
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208-664-5884
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a Hand Delivered

2 Overnight Mail

d\ViaFax: 208-334-4498
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

) CASE NO. CV-10-10095
)
)
) ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
) FORSUMMARYJUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)

On January 6, 2012, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD")
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a Brief in Support and the Affidavit
of Mary York.

On January 20, 2012, Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") filed its

Responsive Brief and the Affidavit of Christopher Gabbert. On January 27, 2012, ITD
filed its Reply Brief. The matter came on for hearing on February 2, 2012. Mary York
and Ted Tollefson appeared on behalf of ITD, and Douglas Marfice and Christopher
Gabbert appeared on behalf of Grathol.
At the February 2, 2012, hearing, ITD sought to dismiss Grathol's seven alleged
severance damage claims. During the hearing, Grathol's counsel conceded that three of
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Grathol's claims could be dismissed, to wit: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and
(3) gravel damages. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court orally pronounced its
reasoning and decision.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ITD's

Motion

for

Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part, as follows:
1. ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: (1) construction delay; (2) lost

profits; and (3) gravel damages is granted based upon Grathol's concession,
and these claims are hereby stricken;
2. ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: a taking claim for Sylvan Road and
damages for such alleged taking is granted, and this claim is hereby stricken;
3. ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining damage claims of: (1)
visibility; (2) access; and (3) impact on development plan is denied.

DATED this

)

day of February, 2012.

CHARLES W. HOSACK, Senior District Judge
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I hereby certify that on the
day of February, 2012 a true and correct copy
of this Order re: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was served, by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Mary York, Esq.
Ted Tollefson, Esq.
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
POBOX2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

D

us Mail

o Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
~ Via Fax: 208-343-8869

us Mail

Douglas Marfice, Esq.
Christopher Gabbert, Esq.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 N.W. Blvd.
PO BOX 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

J\ Via Fax: 208-664-5884

J. Tim Thomas, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General, ITD
PO BOX 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

o US Mail
o Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
~Via Fax: 208-334-4498
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o Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail

Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk of the District Court
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'UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATI

r IDAHO

_i AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOT_t,_,r'jAI
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, ETAL.

Case No: CV-2010-10095

ORDER ASSIGNING DISTRICT JlJDGE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, is hereby administratively assigned to take jurisdiction of the above entitled action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of Kootenai County shall cause a copy of this
Order Assigning District Judge to be mailed to counsel for each of the parties, or if either of the parties are represented pro
se, directly to the pro se litigant.

DATED:

Wednesday, February 08, 2012

John T.

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows:

e<finteroffice to the Honorable Charles W. Hosack
~nteroffice to the Honorable Judge Haynes
DENNIS M. DA VIS
FAX: (208) 667-8470 ./

fl\3(\

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE
FAX: (208) 664-5884 /

J. TIM THOMAS, DEPUTY ATTY GENERAL
FAX: (208) 334-4498/
MARYV. YORK
FAX: (208) 343-8869 /

Dated: Wednesday, February 08, 2012
Clifford T. Hayes
;1
er Of The Districf

trt

Order Assigning District Judge
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NOTICE OF FILING ORIGINAL

TO:
DATE:

Clerk of the District Court - KOOTENAI COUNTY
February 10, 2012

CASE:
State of Idaho Idaho TYransportation Board vs.
HJ GRATHOL, ET AL.
CASE NO.:
CV-10-10095
Notice is hereby given that a transcript of the
Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing (Continued) of
2/2/12, totalling 45 pages, has been prepared. The
original transcripts are being filed with:
Clerk of the District Court
Kootenai County Courthouse
324 W. Garden Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Copies have been provided to:
Holland & Hart, LLP
Attention Mary V. York/Ted S. TOllefson
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

If additional copies of transcripts are requested,
please call the court rep rter at 208 446-1136.

cc:

Douglas
Mary V.

NOTICE OF FILING ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
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STATE OF IOAHO
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

I

\. (

; 1·~·

I t_

I,

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANTHJGRATHOUS
SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT
WITNESS DISCLOSURE

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, pursuant to the Court's Order of February 3,
2012 (Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion in Limine), and hereby submits the following Supplemental
Expert Witness Disclosure.
Model # 1 (Exhibit 1): Skip Sherwood will testify that the entire tract before the
taking would be valued, in his opinion, at approximately $2,940,300 1 based on a per square
foot fair market value of $2.25 for the western 30 acres 2 • The value of the 16.314 acres being
taken is $1,598,543 3 ( or $2.25/sq. ft.) and the value of the residual 40± acres after the taking

1
2

3

Sherwood valuation report, p.10.
Sherwood valuation report, p. 9; Deposition, p.l I 9.
Sherwood valuation report, p.10.

DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S

SUPPLfflfflfNArss

DISCLOSURE - I
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is $1,344,4574 with downward time value adjustment m the range of $1,060,000 to
$1,165,000 5 .
Therefore, his opinion is that just compensation should be in the range of $1,775,000
.,.,.,. q, 1

LV .VJ.,

88(\v,VV
nno6

1-~u~,.:(e,.:(\
\lV

HU U)•

Model # 2 (Exhibit 2): Alan Johnson will testify that the value of the entire tract
before the taking, in his opinion, is between $5,379,660 and $6,359,760 7 • The value of the
16.314 acres being taken is $2,295,360 8 and the value of the remainder 40± acres after the
taking and construction is $3,642,000±9 with a downward time value and impact adjustment
to approximately $2,722,000 10 as ofNovember 2010.
Therefore, his opinion is that just compensation should be in the range of $2,658,000
to $3,638,000 (rounded) 11 •
Model # 3 (Exhibit 3): Additionally, Alan Johnson is of the opinion that the value of
the part taken is $2,295,360 12 • The value of the total residual part not taken before the taking
is approximately $3,060,000 to $3,520,000 (rounded) 13 and the value of the residual

4

Sherwood valuation report, p.10.
Sherwood valuation report, p.12.
6 Sherwood valuation report, p.12 ($2,940,300 less $1,060,000 to $1,165,000 = $1,775,300 to
$1,880,300.
7 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.6 (±
$3.23/sffor west 30± acres, ±$1.00/sf for east 26± acres).
8 16.314 acres x $3.23/sf = $2,295,360. Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to
Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.6.
9 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7.
10 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7.
11 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7
($5,379,660 to $6,359,760 less $2,722,000 = $2,657,660 to $3,637,760).
12 16.314 acres x $3.23/sf = $2,295,360. Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to
Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.6.
13 ±26 acres @ $1.00/sf = $1,132,560 plus 13.7 ± acres @ $3.23 to $4.00/sf ($1,927,573 to
$2,387,088) equals $3,060,133 to $3,519,648.
5

DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 2
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(

remainder after the taking and construction is ± $3,670,000 14 with a downward time value
and impact adjustment to $2,722,000± 15 .
Therefore, his opinion is that just compensation should, under this analysis, is
approximately $2,630,000 to $3,090,000 (rounded) 16 •
DATED this 10th day of February, 2012.

· topher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
orneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

X' US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
X Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

X

USMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7, items
(1)-(4).
15 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7.
16 Difference between $3,060,000 to $3,520,000 and $2,722,000 equals range of $338,000 to
$798,000. Plus the take ($2,295,360) equals $2,633,360 to $3,093,360.
14

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE- 3
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SHERWOOD BEFORE TAKE
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$2,940,300 (Sherwood valuation report pp. IO- I I, Depo. at p. I 9)
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Model #1,

SHERWOOD AFTER TAKE
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$1,598,543 (16.314 acres @$2.25/sq.ft) (Sherwood valuati' report p. I 0)
~

- Residual 40 plus/minus after take is $1,344,457, time adjusted to range of $1,060,000 to $1,165,000 (Sherwood report pp. 10-11)
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Model #2, p. l

JOHNSON BEFORE TAKE ·
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I
- From $5,379,660 to $6,359,760 (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p. 6),
(Plus/minus $3.23 sq.ft for west-30 acres, and plus/minus $1.00 sq.ft for east -26
acres)
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- $2,295,360 (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p. 6), (16.314lacres@$3.23/sq.fi.)

i!
- Residual 40 plus/minus acres after take is $3,642,000, time adjusted to approximately $2,722,00. (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p.7.)
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Model #3

JOHNSON RESIDUAL BEFORE/AFTER TAKE
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$2,295,360 (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p. 6), (16.314 Lcres@$3.23/sq.fi.)

I

- Residual Before take: $3,060,000 to $3,520,000 (rounded), (plus/minus 26 acls@$1.00/sq.fi = $1,132,560 plus 13.7 acres@$3.23 to $4.00/sq.ft ($1,927,573 to $2,387,088)

C·.J

- Residual After take: $3,670,000, time adjusted to- $2,722,000 (Def.3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/1 L p.7, items (I) -(4).)
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TO:

Clerk of the District Court
Kootenai County Courthouse
324 W. Garden Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
83814

(P-ERKPJS1/t6f COURT

----J} .

~·~w

u

KOOTENAI CV-2010-10095
STATE OF IDAHO,

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington corporation;
and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on February 13, 2012,
I lodged the original Summary Judgment Motion
transcript of February 2, 2012, in the
above-referenced case, totalling 45 pages, and
three copies, with the District Court Clerk of
the County of Kootenai in the
First Judicial
I
District.

February 13,

2012
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STATE OF IOAHO
iss
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI I
February 8, 2012~1t:-J:
MaryV. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
101 South Capitol Blvd., Suite 1400
P.O. Box 2527
Boise ID 83701-2527
816 E. Sherman Ave .• Suite 7

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
208-765-1700
208-765-8097 (fax)
email csmith@mmcourt.com

NORTHERN OFFICES
1 800 879-1700
Spokane, Washington

SOUTHERN OFFICES
1 800 234-9611

RE: State of Idaho (1TB) v. HJ Grathol
Case No. CVl0-10095 (Kootenai County, Idaho)
Deponent: Alan Johnson
Taken on 11/18/2011
M & M Job No. 5761C2

2012 FEB 15 AM IQ: 48
CL;r OIST~T COURT

OEP'ttfJ~

k

We are in receipt of the signed original Certificate of Witness of the
deponent for the above-referenced deposition. We are forwarding the same
to you for attachment to the original transcript, which we delivered to you
on or about 11/30/2011. If an Errata Sheet was completed, a copy is also
attached.
Very truly yours,

421 W. Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2636
Boise, Idaho 83701-2636
208 345-9611
208 345-8800 (fax)
email m-and-m@gwest.net
Twin Falls, Idaho
208 734-1700
Pocatello, Idaho
208 232-5581
Ontario, Oregon
541 881-1700

M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc.
cc:

Mr. Douglas S. Marfice
Clerk of the District Court, Kootenai County

Enc.
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ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF ALAN JOHNSON

I, ALAN JOHNSON, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
That I am the witness named in the foregoing deposition;
that I have read said deposition and know the contents thereof;
that the questions contained therein were propounded to me; and
that the answers therein contained are true and correct, except
for any changes that I may have listed on the Change Sheet
attached hereto.
DATED this 2:1._ day of Det:..-

' i<6// .

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27thday of
December

,

2011

>

by Alan Johnson, proved to me on the

basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who appeared
before me.
NAME OF NOTARY PUBLIC
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR

RES,IDING AT

Arlene L. Biron

State of California

Irvine, California

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES

December 23, 2013

576JC2

1-800-879-1700

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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ORJGINAL
ERRATA SHEET FOR ALAN JOHNSON
PAGE~ LINE--6.Q_ REASON FOR CHANGE __.--~f~'1~P~t2~------------

SHOULD READ

-------'l'-"t,,...""'"'~a\..._____________________

PAGE--1..JS_ LINE~ REASON FOR CHANGE _ _t::-'---l'f<-:p~e>'------------READS _ _ ___...:fc.-..O.c..s-,;!!,,~-1b~l.w.b<.~~)t:~,$'-----------------SHOULD READ --~;:;...;=~=W:::;_~=...,,lC-.Jlb..u:::e>c.F,](,.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
PAGE

LINE

REASON FOR CHANGE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

READS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.;._ _ _ __
SHOULD READ _ _ _ _-.:__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
PAGE

LINE

REASON FOR CHANGE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

READS------------------------------SHOULD READ
PAGE

- - LINE- - REASON

FOR CHANGE

READS
SHOULD READ
PAGE

LINE

--

REASON FOR CHANGE

READS
SHOULD READ
PAGE- - LINE

--

REASON FOR CHANGE

READS
SHOULD READ

-- LINE-

PAGE

REASON FOR CHANGE

READS

SHOULD READ

WITNESS SIGNATURE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- c , ~
576JC2

1-800-879-1700

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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STATE OF ID AHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-10-10095

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT
HJ GRATHOL'S SEVERANCE
DAMAGES

On February 3, 2012, this Court entered its Order re: Plaintiffs Motion in Limine,
wherein it ordered Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") to serve upon Plaintiff State of
Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), and file with the Court, an expert witness
disclosure that provided evidence for the evaluation of a fair market value for Grathol's
property before and after in order to provide support for Grathol's just compensation
values and severance damage claims.

On February 10, 2012, Grathol filed its

Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, which essentially complied with this Court's
February 3, 2012, Order.

Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol' s Severance Damages

Page 1 of 4
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On February 13, 2012, this Court held an additional hearing to discuss ITD's
Motion in Limine and Grathol's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure. Mary York
appeared on behalf ofITD, and Doug Marfice appeared on behalf of Grathol.
At the hea.ring, Grathol's counsel conceded that Grathol's cli:iims for severance
damages 1 are incorporated or merged into its expert witness disclosures that provide
opinion testimony as to the amount of severance damages claimed for the remainder
parcel based upon the difference between the fair market values for the remainder parcel
before and after the take. Further, Grathol's counsel affirmatively stated that Grathol's
damage claims for the remainder, i.e., visibility, access, and impact on development
plan2 , are not claims for discreet compensable special damage amounts, and that any loss
based upon those claims is incorporated within the damages based upon the difference in
fair market value of the remainder before and after the take, as set forth in Grathol's
supplementary expert witness disclosures.
Based upon Grathol's concessions, arguments of counsel and this Court's
reasoning provided in open court on February 12, 2012, NOW THEREFORE, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that this Court grants, in its discretion, ITD's Motion in Limine in
regards to all of Grathol's separate special severance damage claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Grathol is hereby barred from seeking any
separate discreet special severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated in Grathol' s expert
witness disclosures as to the before and after fair market values for the remainder parcel.

This Court and the parties have referred to severance damages, or damages to the Grathol's remaining
ffoperty after ITD's take, as special damages.
Summary Judgment as to these three severance damage claims was denied via this Court's Order Re:
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on February 3, 2012.
1

Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the previously scheduled eight-day court trial
shall commence on March 5, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., in Kootenai County.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(e), the parties shall
provide this Court with pre-trial briefs that shall provide, at a minimum, a concise
statement of the case, a statement of factual and legal issues that remain to be litigated,
and a list of witnesses and exhibits. Additionally, the parties are encouraged to confer
and attempt to stipulate to the admission of exhibits, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(e)(6)(H), and
shall file the pre-trial briefs with the Court no later than 5:00 p.m. on February 27, 2011. 3

DATED this ~day of February, 2012.

'

3

.

-

Please e-mail copies of the pre-trial briefs to the Court at: bpennington@kcgov.us.

Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages
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02-16-'12 13:45 FROM-Kootenai Dist Court

208-446-1188

T-688 P0004/0004 F-894

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

It

I hereby certify that on the f<Y\day of February, 2012 a true and correct copy
of this Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages was served, by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mary Yorl<, Esq.
Ted Tollefson, Esq.

Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
POBOX2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527
Aitorneys for l'lain'/iffJTD
Douglas Marfice, Esq.
Christopher Gabbert, Esq.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700N.W. Blvd.

a USMail
a Hand Delivered
,_oJ/4""'
[J Overnight Mail
r,:J""'
Fax: 208<343-8869

J'{J)a

I

~t)

o US Mail
o Hand Delivered ()-'

r, ~emight Mail
.
Uia Fax: 208-664~5884

PO BOX 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
J. Tim Thomas, Esq.

Deputy Attorney General, ITD
l?OBOX7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
Courtesy Copy

o USMail
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

2012 FFB 21 AH 11: 40

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

HJ ORATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVIN GS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.
TO:

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 17th day of February, 2012, that Defendant
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Christopher D. Gabbert of the firm Ramsden &
Lyons, LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's Fourth Supplemental
Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff via facsimile.

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 1

ORIGINAL
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DATED this 17th day of February, 2012.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

is her D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Atto eys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
,,Hand Delivered
- ~ - "R
Fa'csimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

___,--{[L Vl t1tt!\__ , t:'1/L-v~

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772

r"
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANTHJGRATHOVS
WITNESS LIST

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendants HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, and
pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order hereby submits a witness list of persons who
may be called to testify at trial. Defendant reserves the right to supplement or withdraw any
of the witnesses listed.
1.

Alan Johnson;

2.

Geoffrey Reeslund;

3.

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood;

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S WITNESS LIST - 1

740 of 1617

4.

Tom Vandervert;

5.

Brett Terrell; and

6.

James Coleman

DATED this 27th day of February, 2012.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By: -~~r...=...~~---+-----Douglas . Marfice, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2?1h day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

. /US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S WITNESS LIST- 2
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CV-10-10095

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOUS
EXHIBIT LIST

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, and
pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order hereby files the Defendant's Exhibit List in
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

if!},~~

DouglaS. Marfice, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S EXHIBIT LIST - I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

/

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

on James

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S EXHIBIT LIST- 2
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LIST OF EXHIBITS
(Exhibit "A")

Trial Date: March 5, 2012

Case Number: CV-10-10095
Title of Case: Idaho Transportation Board v. HJ Grathol
Plaintiffs Exhibits (list numerically)
X

Defendant's Exhibits (list alphabetically)
Third Party Exhibits State Party:

Description

No.
A

Appraisal of Stanley Moe (dated 4/29/10)

B

Appraisal of Stanley Moe (dated 4/30/10)

C

Shanley letter to Wilson (dated 6/3/10)

D

Record of Decision (dated 6/30/10)

E

Sylvan Drive Access Study (dated 6/30/10)

F

Site Line Survey (dated 2/18/12)

G

ITD Plan/Maps

H

CLC Site Plans

I

Hughes Site Plans

EXHIBIT "A" - I

Admitted
by Stip.

Offered

Rec'd

Refused

Reserve
Ruling
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JJ~LE OF IDAHO

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

Zll/2 FEB 27 PH Lf,..• t, 3
CL , ;

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attomey General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8803
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (!SB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.0. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .mDICIAL DISTRICT OF TRE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL
WITNESS LIST

vs.
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through S,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST-1

;

rllf:af '.00F KODTE.NAJ 1'>SS
9D l±-LoD~
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Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of
record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby provides the following list of witnesses ITD expects to call at
the trial of this matter:
1. Jason Minzghor
District 1 Project Development Engineer

Idaho Transportation Department
600 West Prairie
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815"'.8764
2. Stanley D. Moe, MAI, RM
Real Estate Appraiser and Consultant
Columbia Valuation Group, Inc.
1410 Lincoln Way, Suite 200
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
3. Carole Richardson, P.E. ..
.
.
Senior Project Manager/Transportation Planner
David Evans and Associates,; Irie.
908 North Howard Street, Suite 300
Spokane, Washington 99201
4. Kenneth Geibel, P.E...

Senior Civil Engineer ·· ··
David Evans and Associates, Inc.
908 North Howard Street; ~uite 300
Spokane, Washington 9920 I
5. Mel Palmer
Planner 1
Kootenai County Building & Planning Department
451 GovemmentWay
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000

6. Lawrence R. Pynes, JD,~ASA
Real Estate Appraiser .
Herron Companies
2929 Edinger Avenue
Tustin, California 927~0

PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST-2 . .
746 of 1617

7. George Hedley, CEO
Commercial Developer
Hedley Construction & Development, Inc.
3300 Irvine Avenue, #135
Newport Beach, California 92660
8. Dennis R. Reinstein, CPA/ABV, ASA, CVA
Hooper Cornell, PLLC
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 300
Boise, Idaho 83706
9. Shawn Montee
Shawn Montee Timber Co.
2251 W. Ironwood Center Dr.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

I

ITD may also call the following witnesses at trial:
10. Any witness included on Defendant's witness list.
11. Any individual whose identity is not presently known but who may become
known prior to the trial of this matter.
12. Any individual whose testimony is required to establish a foundation for the
admission of any evidence offered by Plaintiff at trial.
13. Any individual named by Defendant.
14. Any individual whose testimony is necessary for rebuttal or impeachment.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February, 2012.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST - 3
747 of 1617

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

D
D
IZI
D
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5427273_I.DOCX

PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST- 4
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney Generai
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
.
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise. Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8803
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HARTLLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boule'Vard
P.O. Bo>t 2S27
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 .
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile:

(208) 343-8869

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE FJR$T JUDICW.,DIS1'RICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANllFOR l'HE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF lDAf!O,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 130.AlU), ·

. Case No. CV~I 0-1009S

Plaintiff,

.· .. :'._ PL.AIN'm'FITD'S
EXHIBIT UST .·.•. TRIAL
. .

vs.
·~ ·..

\

·1

HJ ORATHOL. ~ CaJifo~a gmu,rafpami~p;: .:
STER.LINO SAVINOS BANJ{~ aW•gto.Q · · ·
corporation;.and DOBS 1 through·s, ·.• ·· · · · · ·

· ••, : . : , . · , · .

Defendants.
,:. ;' :i· :;·. ,·

PLAINTIFF ITD'S
TRIAL EXIDBIT
.
. . . . ..LJST
,'. ..;,,i
.
.

.

.. .
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Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of
record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits Plaintiff's list of trial exhibits as follows:
Exhibit

Exhibit Description

Offered

Adm/Stlp

Refused

Reserve
Ruling

U.S 95- Garwood to Sagle Corridor

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

Aerial Photograph of Garvee Construction
Project
Right-of-Way Plans for Project·.
'·.

Aerial Access Photo of Subject Pl'QP,erty·.
North View Photo of Subject Pr9perty· .
South View Photo of Subject Property

.· . ·

East View Photo of Subject Property · · · ·
West View Photo of Subject
.
.

·--

Property- . .

: ·.··,.

ALTA Land Title Survey

. -~-

..

CV - Stanley D .. Moe
Stan Moe Appraisal of HJ Grathof .·
Property
·
·
Stan Moe's Summary _of Value
Conclusions
Photo: Grathol Property lmpro\/ement$
Kootenai County Zoning· District Map· -·•
Grathol Property Listing

·-. -:--;:

--

. ·,
. . . . ··-,

·,·.

•'.

'

'

-. -·

Moe Size Adjustment Chart .•. _.'. · ,...
.....

Moe Comp Sale AdjustmentSqnim.ary: -.
Grathol After Site Plan from' Mqe Apprai,s~t ·,,•,'
Moe Demographics Comparisori'
Stan Moe Rebuttal Report, 12l16:-:11 -C.

23

Analysis of "Comparable" Sates U$ed by
M. Dewitt Sherwood
· ... ·

24

Alan Johnson Dep9sition Transc'rip( 11- .
.
.
.. .
18-11
..

25

Flow Chart for HJ Grattiol, ·4~14..'1 i

.,

· · .,- ·

•'•

,·

·.

;

'

·· · • · ..

5-28-08 Buyer's Settlement Stateme·n:t · ·, •.
[Dep. Ex. 44]

- ..

_.,

<

;

- ··.·

Analysis of Land Sale Used by Alan >
Johnson
'
..

27

'

January 1967 Warranty Deed··.· •· ·

22

26

.

. .

,· .. , .

... ,._ ..

6-11-08 Memo to Alan Johnso·n from
Geoff Reeslund re: Koot~.nai_C:ouhty . ·. ·..
Rezone Application [Dep; Ex-:20L· :• •."
1--•:: :

....

;,

PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL E_~I'f iJst,:.:.:J'/
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Exhibit

Exhibit Description

28

11-14-08 Email String between Reeslund
and Johnson re: Grathol property [Dep.
Ex. 21]

29

8-13-09 V'v'inger and Johnson Email String
re: Athol Study

30

1-29-10 Reeslund-Johnson Email String
re: Athol Appraiser [Dep. Ex. 25]

31

6-30-10 Reeslund-Johnson Email String
re: Athol Project and ITD Meeting{Dep, _
Ex. 29]

32

1-26-11 Winger-Johnson Email String re:
Athol Research Studies
·· ·· ··
-

33

Athol Commercial Site Plans {Doc:: #s
1413-1414]
.-, __ - .

34

Land Sales Analysis with Handwritten
Notes [Dep. Ex. 8]
·

35

Geoffrey Reeslund Deposition Transcript,'
11-17-11
- - -

36

5-22-08 Warranty Deed b~tween North -_
Alpine Development and Graca1
•-- . ·
Corporation [Dep. Ex.17]
·

37
38
39

.'

.- -

··:·:···

.·.'

.

.··._.-

;-•·.

-·

--

~-

7-28-08 Letter from Lakes Highway ·
District to Mark Mussman, -Kootenai·_
County Planning Department, re: Hughes :
Zone Change Request[Dep. E>C. j9J. .____-_- i -

.

,

.

--

,·,_·

Reserved
Reserved

--

-·

..

41

8-17-09 Email from Reeslund to Johnson
re: 1-95 ROW Study and. preparation of.
overlay [Dep. Ex. 23]

· .. ··

.

r __ . • - -

1-27-10 Email from-ReeslunEito Johnson -.
re: Latest 1-95 Alignmentplari [Dep. Ex.. ~-- -

24]

·- :,·_· ·:- _

Reserved

.

:

.

. .
·\':·

'

..
. _,·.·

',

-·-•·· ...

''

.. .
,

44

Reserve
Ruling

., ...

...

6-29-09 Reeslund-CLC Associates Email String re: Athol, ID Final SiteP1ans [Pep.
~-2~
--

43

Refused

.

40

42

Offered

Adm/Stip

4-14-10 Cost Estimate from Andy Eli$son,
Allwest Test & Engineering, to Reeslund re: Estimate for Geotechnfcal-Evah.1ati0.n
on Proposed Commercial Sit~ [Dep.
26]

:ex:-·

'

.··

•.

·'··... · .. :..t··

, . •,·· ..

..

•':

•,

PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL EXIUBl'f 'tIST- 3 ·
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Exhibit

Adm/Stip

Exhibit Description

45

10-25-10 Email string re: US 95 Highway
54 Boring Logs [Dep. Ex. 27]

46

5-27-10 Email between Reeslund and
Andy Eliason re: US 95 and SH 54 Test
Pit Logs [Dep. Ex. 28]

47

Reserved

48

8-30-10 Email between Vandervert and
Johnson re: Meeting with ITD to Discuss
Options of Extending Sylvan Road [Dep.
Ex. 30]

49

8-31-10 Reeslund-Torgeson-Vandervert
Email String re: Bayview Gateway Plans ·. ·
......
[Dep. Ex. 31]

50

Reserved

;.':

.

Offered

Refused

Reserve
Ruling

·;,

,,

51

2-17-11 HJ Grathol Preliminary SoftCosf ..
Budget [Dep. Ex. 33]

52

Hughes Investments- ijayview G~eway.
Project Budget [Dep. Ex: 34] · ·
· ··

53

2-21-08 Handwritten notes re: Highway 95 .
& 54 [Dep. Ex. 35]

54

2-21-08 Meeting Minutes re: f.:.Q5 •·
Improvement Project [Dep. Ex. 36].

55

8-13-09 Handwritten Meeting Notes {Dep, _·.
Ex. 37]

56

Undated Handwritten Notes [Dep.·.ex.·38} ·

57

2-10-10 Handwritten Notes from Athol
Meeting [Dep. Ex. 39]

.,

-··
.

'•

.

. ;·--

..

. .

....

.

"·*·•·.

10-05 Handwritten notes from. meeting
with Jim Coleman [Dep. Ex. 40] ·
..

59

4-01-08 LFR Proposal to Hughes
Investments to Perform Phase I
Environmental Site Assessment [#s
1707]

..

..

..

•,

.

14H>

Brett Terrell Deposition Transcript, 2.,14- ,

12

--

..

.

58

60

.

,.

..

,,
,,

: ·-·.

::. ,.
....

·I.:·.·..
.·

,.

URM

61

6-9-1 0 Terrell Email to Johnson re:
Athol Study

62

2-04-11 Letter from Winger to Johnson re: ,
Athol Commercial Property

63

7-27-10 Terrell Email to Johnson re: URM
Study for Athol

. ..
.

.

L

PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST'.'."" 4 .
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Exhibit Description

Exhibit

Offered

Adm/Stip

64

5-28-09 Email from Reeslund to
Vandervert re: Athol Site Plans

65
66

Reserved

Refused

Reserve
Ruling

Reserved

67

8-31-10 Email Chain from Reeslund to
Torgeson and Vandervert re: Bayview
Gateway

68

6-08-09 CLC Proposal for Services

69

ITD Access Management: Standards and ·
Procedures for Highway Right-of-Way·
.
Encroachments - Selective pages

70

ITD Administrative Policy A-12-01, State
Highway Access Control

71

Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance 394 · -.

72

Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance 401 . ··• ·.

73

Tom Vandervert Deposition Transcrtpf, 2-:-:
13-12

74

Coleman Engineering, Inc. Agreement for
Professional Services with Hughes
Investments [#s 000536-000555]

75

8-16-10 Reeslund-Coleman.Email string ·
re: Athol project system aprovalwith
·
attachments [#s 000558 - 000566]

76

Coleman Engineering Invoices
Hughes
Investments for HJ Grathol Project [#s
001489 - 001517]

..

,

--·

;.··

...

'

.

'

,.

'·

.

.

..

.

..

to

...

..

77

Reserved

78

6-04-08 Email from Johnson to Coleman
re: design of treatment system for Athol
project [#s 001548 - 001579]

79

Coleman Work File: Engineers Opinion of .
Probable Cost, December 09 [COLEMAN
000001]

80

81
82

83

-

·.

'.

-- .. ,

Coleman Work File: Engineers Opinion of..
Probable Cost, January 20t2 [COLEMAN.·

·., ·.

000002]

..

... ..

..

Coleman Work File: WW Flows .;. Fre>n:i, ·.· • '

Site Plan 8-12-09 [COLEMAN 000003]

Coleman Work File: WW Flows ~ From
Site Plan 6-25-09 [COLEMAN ooqoo41

.

'

,

...

.

.

,,:

..

Coleman Work File: Township Map of

Subject Property [COLEMAN 000007]

..

..
. . · .' .

:·

'

'

.
.,.

.

,
•',

.
.·

..

.

.,

..

..

•',

,'•'
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Exhibit Description

Exhibit

Adm/Stip

Offered

Refused

Reserve
Ruling

Coleman Work File: Township Map with
Coleman Plans for HJ Grathol Property
[COLEMAN 000008]

84

Coleman Work File: Athol Travel Plaza
Summary Chart of Wastewater, Treatment
Options, Disposed Options and Total Land
Application Required, etc. [COLEMAN

85

000009 - 00001 0]
Coleman Work File: Athol Commercial
Site Plan [COLEMAN 000011]

86

Coleman Work File: Handwritten notes re:,· .
Riverside PUD/Advantex [COLEMAN

87

000030- 000034]
Coleman Work File: Figure 3: Treatment
Process Flow Diagram with miscellaneous
attached pages [COLEMAN 000041· -

88

·'

000044]

.··.

Coleman Work File: Commercial Plan for ··
HJ Grathol property [COLEMAN 000048]
Coleman Work File: Athol Commercial ·• .··
Site Plans [COLEMAN 000049 - 000051l

89
90
91

Coleman Work File: HJ Grathol Plans
[COLEMAN 000052]

92

Coleman Work File: HJ Grathol Plans
forwarded from Geoff Reeslund .. •.
[COLEMAN 000053]

93

Coleman Work File: HJ Grathol Plans
[COLEMAN 000054]

94

Deposition Transcript of Dewitt M. "Skip"
Sherwood

95

Grathol Listing Pages from Sherwood's .·
Transaction File

96

!TD-Garwood Saloon: 7-23-08 Right-of:Way Contract

97

CV - Carole Richardson

98

David Evans and Associates Rebuttal
Report, 12-16-11

.,

··.-

-

.. ·.
-.:

.

·,

,·

:

'.

99
100
101
102
103

Appendix A to DEA Report .

-- ..

...

- .

Appendix B to DEA Report
Figure 1 DEA Report
Figure 2 DEA Report
·,·:

... ·--

Figure 3 DEA Report

PLAINTIFF ITO'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST - 6 ·.
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Exhibit

Offered

Adm/Stip

Exhibit Description

104

Figure 4 DEA Report

105

Figure 5 DEA Report

106
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Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February 2012.
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), files its Trial Brief in
advance of the 8-day bench trial set to begin on March S, 2012.

I.

CASE SUMMARY

ITD is engaged-in a project to widen and improve l:T-S"-95 from Gatwood to Sagle, Idaho.
The Project will improve US-95 from a two-lane unrestricted access highway to a four-lane
divided freeway. In order to construct the us.95 Project. ITD must condemn a portion of
property owned by Defendant HJ Grathol, a California general partnership ("Grathol"). The
Grathol property is located near the City of Athol. The Grathol property consists of 56.8 acres of
undeveloped land. No utilities or infrastructure have been added to the site. The City of Athol
has refused annexation of the property and has refused to allow Grathol to connect to the city's
water and sewer systems.
The Grathol property is cwrently zoned commercial. The property was originally zoned
residential when Grathol purchased the property in 2008. Grathol applied to Kootenai County to
have the property rezone to commercial, and the County approved Grathol' s request. In light of

the current zoning of the property, the parties agree that the "highest and best use" of the
property is for future commercial development. No development has occurred on the property
and no business is located on the property.
The Grathol property is bordered by US-95 on the west and State Highway 54 on the

south. In the before condition-that is, the condition of the property before the taking and before
the construction of the US-9S Project-Grathol had no legal access to US-9S, and had no
physical access to SH 54. Grathol had three deeded access rights to SH S4 in the before
condition, but no physical access was ever constructed under those deeds. The right of access
under the deeds was limited to access for residential and fann use. However, after the rezone of
the property to a commercial zone, the old deeded access riahts for farm or residential access
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have no value or use to Grathol. Rather, Gtathol must obtain permits for commercial access. To
date, Grathol has not applied for any commercial access to the site from either ITD or Lakes
Highway District.
As part ofthe-US-95 Project, ITD is condemning i6.3 acres of the Oiathol property.
Attached to this brief as Exhibit 1 is an aerial photograph showing the general location of the
Gtathol property and the vicinity of the property. Attached as Exhibit 2 is an aerial photograph
showing the Grathol property lines and the portion being acquired. Attached as Exhibit 3 is an
aerial photograph showing the Orathol property with a computer-genetated depiction of the new

freeway, including the portion of the freeway to be constructed on the Grathol property.
On May 28, 2008, Grathol paid $1.45 million for its 56.8-acre property. Yet in this case,
Grathol is attempting to recover as much as $3,638,000 for ITD's acquisition of 16.3 acres,
which is less than one-third of the total 56.8 acres. To reach this number that is far in excess of
the amoUllt it paid for the property, Grathol uses improper and misleading valuation
methodologies and value opinions that are not supported by the market data.
Grathol has two valuation witnesses. The first is its vice president, Mr. Alan Johnson,
who asks the Court to award between $2,658,090 and $3,638,000 for the taking of 16.3 acres.
None of the valuations provided by experts on either side of the case is in that range. On
February 10, 2012, Grathol's other valuation witness, real estate appraiser Dewitt Shetwood,
caine forward with a "before and after" opinion of value as directed by the Court. His opinion is
in the form of a range of between $1,775,000 and $1,880,000. Mr. Sherwood's appraisal is filled

with errors and violations of USPAP, the professional standards governing the appraisal of real

estate.
ITD retained Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, to appraise the taldna. Mr. Moe prepared a formal
appraisal report. His appraisal is a complete "before and after'' appraisal and report. Unlike
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Grathol's valuation witnesses, Mr. Moe used the correct "date of valuation," which is the date of
summons as mandated by Idaho Code § 7-721. The date of summons and date of valuation is
November 17, 2010. Mr. Moe's appraisal determined that the difference between the fair market

v:tlue of the entire-property before the taking and the fair market value of toe remaining property
after the taking is $571,000. Mr. Moe did not find any severance damages based, in part, on the
fact that Grathol touted the benefits of the new US-95 Project as the basis for having Kootenai
Cowity rezone the property to commercial. In addition, Mr. Moe found no basis for concluding
that Grathol' s ability to develop the property with commercial uses after the US-95 Project was
impaired or damaged in any way.
Grathol refused to disclose experts and expert opinions in this case, which led to ITD's

Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony Or, Alternatively, To Compel Expert Disclosures filed on
September 23, 2011. When faced with the motion and a court hearing, Grathol relented and
designated three e,q,erts - Alan Johnson, Dewitt Sherwood, and Geoff Reeslund, and disclosed
their opinions.
When Grathol disclosed two valuation experts (Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood), ITD
retained a second appraiser, Mr. Larry Pynes, to review the opinions of Mr. Johnson and
Mr. Sherwood. Ultimately, Mr. Pynes detennined that he needed to conduct his own appraisal
and prepare a full appraisal report in order to respond to the opinions of Mr. Johnson and

Mr. Sherwood. Like Stan Moe, Mr. Pynes conducted a full "before and after" appraisal and
submitted a complete appraisal report. Mr. Pynes deter.mined the value of the property taken to
be $675,000. Mr. Pynes also determined that the remaining property will suffer no severance
damages. ITO timely disclosed Mr. Pynes as a rebuttal expert and produced his appraisal and
rebuttal reports to Grathol in accordance with the Court's scheduling order.
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The following is a summary of ITO' s two appraisal experts:

STANMOE
Licensed Real Estate Appraiser
Professional Accreditations: MAI
Date of Valuation: November 17, 2010
c~nciusions of·V-alue;- ·
Before: $1,973,000
After: $1.402.600
Just Compensation: $ 571,600
II.

LARRYPYNES
Licensed Real Estate Appraiser
Professional Accreditations: J.D., ASA
Date of Valuation: November 17, 2010
Conclusions of Value·:·" ... ,
Before: $2,350,000
After: $1,67S,OOO
Just Compensation: $ 675,000

THE SOLE ISSUE FOR TRIAL IS THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION
TO BE PAID TO GRATHOL
In condemnation cases, the sole issue for trial is the amount of just compensation to be

paid to the property owner for the taking. See IDJI2d 7.01.1 ("[t]he sole issue for your
determination is the just compensation to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiff[.]"),
As properly directed by the Court, the focus of the trial will be on the ''before and after"
valuation of the property to determine just compensation to be paid to Grathol for the taking of
16.3 acres. See also IDJI2d 7.16. ("Just compensation is the difference between the market
value of the entire property before the talcing and the market value of the remainder after the
acquisition, together with any special damages caused by the taking measured as of [the date of
summons].") (brackets added).

III.

ALL ISSUES OTHER THAN JUST COMPENSATION ARE TO BE RESOLVED
BY THE COURT BEFORE TRIAL.
Since the only issue in a condemnation trial is the amount ofjust compensation, all other

issues are to be resolved brJfore trial. All of these issues are for the Court to decide. "[A]ll

issues, whether legal or factual, other than just compensation, are for resolution by the trial
court." City ofLewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 8S7, 8S3 P.2d 596,602 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citing Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 222-23, 596 P.2d 75, 94-95 (1978); Tibbs v. City of

Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979)).
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The Threshold Legal Issues Were Resolved Early In The Case.

The threshold legal issues in a condemnation case are: (1) the scope and extent of the
taldng; (2) whether the taking is needed for the public project; (3) whether the public use is a use
~.1thorized by law;-and (4) whether the condemning auth-mity has the power-o-feminent domain.
After an evidentiary hearing, the Court entered a written order resolving these issues. In that
order, the Court held that the scope of the taking was defined in the Complaint. Order Granting

Possession ofReal Property, at 2, 12 and Exhibit A (legal description of the condemned
property, which does not include land for Sylvan Road) (filed Jan. 27, 2011). The Court further
held that the t.aking in this case is for a public use, the taking is necessary for that use, and ITD
has the power of eminent domain. Id. at 3, ~12-3.

B.

Grathol's Challenge To The "Scope Of The Taking" Based On Sylvan Road
Has Been Dismissed On Summary Judgment And Stricken From ne Case.

At the hearing on rm' s motion for possession, the Court ruled that neither the
administrative order of condemnation nor the Complaint condemned any land for Sylvan Road.

See Transcript of January 21, 2011 hearing ("Tr."), at 61 :2-16, and 61 :18-25 (Ex. 1 to York Aff.
filed Jan. 6, 2012). In its January 27, 2011 written order, the Court ruled that the scope of the
taking was defined by and limited to the land identified and described in the Complaint Order

Granting Possession ofReal Property, at 2, 12, and citing Exhibit A to the order. Exhibit A to
the order is a legal description of the land condemned in ITD' s complaint and does not include
any land for Sylvan Road.

Despite these early rulings, Grathol continued. to pursue a claim for compensation and
damages based on Sylvan Road. Therefore, ITO filed a motion for summary judiJ:D,ent on the
entire Sylvan Road issue, On February 3, 2012, the Court entered its Order Re: PlaintijfJs

Motion For Summary Judgment, granting IID's motion for summary judament on Grathol' s
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Sylvan Road claims. The Court held: "ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: a taking claim
for Sylvan Road and damages for such alleged taking is granted and this claim is hereby
stricken." Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). Therefore, all taking and damage claims relating to

·&y1van Road have bee:a dismissed on summary judgmenfand stricken from tlie case.

IV.

RULINGS BY THE COURT HAVE SET THE PARAMETERS FOR THE TRIAL
ON JUST COMPENSATION
A.

Claims For Severance Damages BaJTed By Law Have Been Dismissed On
Summary Judgment And Stricken From The Case.

Grathol sought to recover just compensation in the form of severance damages based on
improper claims for construction delay, lost profits, and the value of gravel that may be located
on the condemned property. ITD moved for summary judgment on these claims on the grounds
that they are barred as a matter of law. The Court granted ITD's motion and dismissed these

claims from the suit.
In its order, the Court noted that at the February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's motion,
"Grathol's counsel conceded that three of Grathol's claims could be dismissed, to wit:
(1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3) gravel damages." Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion

For Summary Judgment, at 2-3. Accordingly, the Court ruled that ''ITD's Motion for Summary
Judgment re: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3) gravel damages is granted based
upon Grathol' s concession, and these claims are hereby stricken[.]" Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Grathol's claims for construction delay, lost profits, and recovery for the value of
gravel have been dismissed on summary judgment and stricken from the case.

B.

The Court Bas Also Ruled That Grathol May Not Seek Separate Severanee
Damqe Awards Based On Allegations Of Restriction Of Aceess, Loss Of
Visibility, Or Development Plan Damages.

Grathol previously sought separate severance damage awards based on allegations of
restriction of access and loss of visibility, Grathol also attempted to recover severance damages
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by using site development plans to show Project impacts on a development that does not exist.
ITD moved for summary judgment on these claims.
Idaho law bars recovery for an alleged loss or restriction of access in a condem.nation

··zP..se uniess ail· access to the property is "destroyed" and the property is 'leffwithout access to the
public road system. See, e.g., Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 145, 742 P.2d 397,400 (1987)
(finding that "there having been no destruction of vehicular access to the [landowner's) property,
and the remaining vehicular access being reasonable, there was no taking of the [landowner's]
property which would entitle him to compensation.").
Idaho law and the majority of states also bar recovery for an alleged "loss of visibility" of
property from passing traffic. See ITD's Brief in Support ofMotion/or Summary Judgment, at
23-32 (filed Jan. 6, 2012).
Grathol' s claims for loss of access and loss of visibility also fail as a matter of law
because no facts exist to support them. ITD is not taking or restricting any access, and the US-95
Project will not block visibility of the property. In responding to ITD's motion for summary
judgment, Grathol failed to come forward with any evidence to support its claims. The only
support it offered were conclusory statements by its two vice presidents. It gave no specifies
regarding resttictions on access and no support for loss of visibility. Nor did Grathol explain or
quantify how the alleged restrictions affect value.
Lastly, Idaho law bars Grathol from using site plans with various visions of potential
development on the property as a basis for recovering severance damages, Specifically, IDJI2d
7.14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's particular plan for development and use
of the property only for the purposes ofdetermining uses for which the property is adaptable."

Id. In other words, Grathol cannot seek or recover damages by pointing to an un-built site plan
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and claiming ''we cannot build this here now," or ''this building will have to be smaller," and ask
that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such alleged "losses" or "severance~, damages.
On February 16, 2012, the Court entered its Order Re:

Defendant HJGrathol's

··&verance Damages: ·In that order, the Court ruled as follows:
Grathol is hereby barred from seeking any separate discreet
severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated
in Grathol' s expert witness disclosures as to the before and after
fair market values for the remainder parcel.

Id. at 2. Therefore, Grathol may not seek or recover separate awards of damages for alleged
restrictions on access or loss of visibility. Nor can Orathol use un-built development plans to
recover a separate award for severance damages. Rather, as held by the Court, "these claims are
incorporated in Orathol' s expert witness disclosures as to the before and after fair market values
for the remainder parcel." Id.
Based on the Court's ruling, no testimony should be needed from either side on the issues
of access, visibility, or site plans. Since these issues are incorporated in Grathol's opinions of
value, then only the valuation testimony is necessary.

V.

THE DISAGREEMENT OVER JUST COMPENSATION IS CAUSED BY
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE METHODS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND
CONCLUSIONS OF GRATHOL'S VALUATION WITNESSES.
The Court's decision on just compensation will turn on its evaluation of the markedly

higher opinions of value advanced by Grathol' s valuation witnesses and the methodologies and
assumptions they used to reach those high numbers. The following factors are the primary

source of the disagreement between the parties on the amount ofjust compensation.
First, the Grathol opinions assume immediate and successful commercial development on
the property. However, the facts show that the area has little or no demand for commercial
development, particularly as of the date of valuation (after the real estate crash in 2008 and after
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the bottom had fallen out of the U.S. economy). The facts also show that the surrounding area
has no consumer base to support end users like grocery stores, retail chains, and restaurants that

Grathol has suggested will purchase lots within the commercial development. Therefore, as
···--fcund by the appraisers and deveiopment experts retained by ITD, the property will have to be
held for a lengthy period of time before commercial development will be viable.
Second, Grathol's experts, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood, employ the "comparable
sales" approach to real estate valuation. However, they have not used sales of property that are

comparable to the subject property. On the contl'ary, to value property located in the sparselypopulated, rural area near the town of Athol, they have gone to Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, Post
Falls, and other developed areas and selected sales of prime commercial real estate to support
their claims for the value of the Grathol property. This is not surprising for Mr. Johnson, who
has a financial interest in the outcome of the case. However, it is surprising for Mr. Sherwood,
who would not be expected to deviate from the standards and principles that govern his
profession.
Lastly, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood misuse the "comparable" sales they selected.
They either make no adjustments where adjustments should be made for location, si2e, date of

sale~ availability of utilities and infrastructure, and other attributes, or they make adjustments
which significantly increase the value of the Grathol property - without any explanation or
analysis that would justify the adjustment or that can be evaluated or verified.
A.

Flaws In Appraisal By Mr, Sherwood,
1,

Failure to value tbe "larcer parcel,"

Mr. Sherwood's appraisal improperly values the "larger parcelu as the 30 western acres
and not the entire 56.8-ac:re parcel owned by Grathol. Mr. Sherwood attempted to fix this defect

in his valuation as directed by the Court in early February. His "fix" consists of simply stating
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that he actually valued the entire S6.8-acre parcel. H9wever, his value conclusion remained the

same.
Thus, either Mr. Sherwood did not actually value the "larger parcel" consisting of S6.8
-aires, and he continues to contend that the eastern 26+ acres are worth $0,00 per sq, ft., or his
actual value for the entire 56.8 acre Grathol property is $1.17 per sq. ft. rather than the $2.25 per
sq. ft. stated in his report.
2.

Failure to use the correct "date of valuation."

In Idaho, the date of valuation for purposes of determining just compensation is mandated
by statute. See I.C, § 7w712. Idaho Code§ 7~712 requires that the value of the property taken in
a condemnation case and the severance damages, if any, to the remaining property are to be
determined as of "the date of the summons." Id In this case, the date of summons and,
therefore, the date of valuation is November 17, 201 O.
Instead of using the date of valuation mandated by statute, Mr. Sheiwood used multiple
dates in his valuation- none of which was the date of valuation of November 17, 2010. He
valued the Grathol property in the "before" condition as of September 2010, and he used
valuation dates of March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after" value. Thus, Mr. Sheiwood's
appraisal violates the law on valuing just compensation in condemnation cases, Moreover,
Mr. Sherwood used and manipulated the dates of value to justify an inflated opinion of value.
For these reasons, stated more fully in ITD's Brief In Support OfMotion In Limine filed
January 6; 2012; ~..r. Sherwood's appraisal should be stricken,

3.

Use of "construction delay" to manipulate fair market value, and
failure to remove "construction delay" as required by the Court's
order.

Mr. Sherwood's appraisal improperly includes damages for "Downward Time Value and
Impact Adjustment." These are separate "damages" and are not attributable to a decrease in/air
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market value. "Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken measured as
of [the date of summons)." 1Dn2d § 7.05.
' The Court granted ITD's motion for summary judgment on Grathol's claim for damages
-based on construction delay and ordered that the ciaim oe"stricken frottftne·case; Order Re:

Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment, at 2. However, despite the Court's order
Mr. Sherwood continues to include dollar amounts based on construction delays of 1.5 to 2.5
years. His calculations ate set forth below:

• Value of the property taken (16.314 acres at $2.25 per sq.ft.) = $1,598,543,
He then calculates a "Downward time value adjustment," which is
based on construction delays of 1.5 years and 2.5 years.

_)

$1,598,543 (value of take)+ $176,457 (1.5 years delay)-= $1,770,000
$1,598,543 (value of take)+ $281,457 (2.S years delay) c $1,880,000
The $176,457 and $281,457 represent construction delay damages that have been stricken
from the case but continue to be included in Mr. Sherwood's appraisal.
Moreover, these figures are separate "damages" and are not attributable to a dec.rease in
fair market vaiue.

4.

Failure to use "comparable" sales.

The "comparable" sales used by Mr. Sherwood are far superior to the Grathol property
and do not reflect the value of property near Athol, Idaho. Mr. Sherwood used sales in highlydeveloped areas along Interstate 90, with much stronger market demand and significantly higher
real estate values. Mr. Sherwood also used sales in superior locations within the city limits of
Spokane, Coem d'Alene, and Post Falls with access to city services.
Using sales from developed urban areas significantly distorts the value of the Gratho!
property located outside of Athol. The sales used by Mr. Sherwood have significantly higher
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surrounding population densities to support commercial development than Athol. Mr. Sherwood
appears to have purposefully gone out of his way to find properties in Spokane, Coeur d'Alene,
Post Falls, and along I-90 to inflate the value of the Otathol property,

-· -s~ ·----

Incorrect information on sales used.

The information provided by Mr. Sherwood on the sales he relied on has been found to
be incorrect or misrepresented in many instances. In addition, many of the sales had utilities
such as water and sewer in place or available, whereas the Grathol property does not.
6.

Misuse of a condemnation settlement as a "comparable sale."

The comparable sale that Mr. Sherwood placed the greatest emphasis on was not a "sale."

Rather, his sale #5 was in fact a settlement of a condemnation, which included incentives and
payments above fair market value to achieve settlement and avoid litigation. As such, the
transaction was not a comparable sale, and is not evidence of fair market value. ITD set forth
the law and appraisal principles barring use of settlements as indicators of market value in
previous briefing filed with the Court. See PlaintiffITD 's BriefIn Support Of Motton In Limine,
at 16-19 (filed Jan. 6, 2012). Again, use of a settlement instead of an open market transaction is

contrary to the proper use of the sales comparison approach to real estate valuation.

7,

Failure to make uecessary adjustments.

Mr. Sherwood used sales that occurred at the height of the real estate market, and made
no adjustments for time to reflect market conditions as of the date of taking on November 17,

2010. He failed to make adjustments for size, location, and improvements where adjustments
should have been made.

8.

Failure to disclose and explain adjustments to "comparable'' sales.

Mr. Sherwood failed to disclose the specific adjustments he made to the comparable sales
he relied on to reach his conclusion of value. Adjustments are the key to proper use of the sales
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comparison approach to real estate valuation. He made adjustments in a "black box," without
explanation, quantification, or reasoning for the adjustments. Thus, it is not possible to evaluate
or verify the validity of his adjustments. The one thing that is clear is that he used black box
. adjustments to·increase the value of the Grathoi propedy. ·
B.

Flaws In Value Opinion Of Alan Johnson.

Mr. Alan Johnson is vice president of Grathol. He is not a real estate appraiser. The few
examples set forth below show that his valuation is fundamentally flawed and driven by
Grathol's own financial interest in the outcome of this case.
1.

Inexplicable "before" and "after" values.

Mr. Johnson's ''before" value ($3.23 per sq. ft.) is inexplicably lower than the "after"
value ($4.00 to $4.S0 per sq. ft.). This indicates that the Project increased the value of the
property in the after condition. Yet somehow, inexplicably, he manages to reach the highest
figure for just compensation in the case.
2.

Improper valuation of the property in pieces.

Mr. Johnson values the land in portions, rather giving an opinion of value of the whole or
"larger parcel.'~ As a result, the math shows that his value of the entire 56.8 acres is less than the
$3.23 per sq. ft. price used by Mr. Johnson. This inconsistency results from his placing different
values on different portions of the property, In the before condition, Mr. Johnson values the
16.314·acre take area at $3.23 per sq. ft., the west remainder at $3.23 and $4.00 per sq. ft., and
the east remainder at $1.00 per sq. ft. In the after condition, Mr. Johnson again values the take
area at $3.23, but values four different areas within the remainder at values ranting from $4.50 to
$1.00 per sq. ft. This type of valuation is improper, and is contrary to law and established real
estate valuation principles in condemnation cases.
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Valuation of the "after'' condition as if already developed.

Mr. Johnson values of the remainder as though it were developed. The property is not
developed and it is improper to value it as if it were.
- 4.- -

-... ~,...._·-._

Failure to use correct "date of'"iaiuation."

Mr. Johnson fails to establish the before and after value of the property as of the date of
summons, November 17, 2010, in violation of Idaho Code § 7-712. He manipulates the
valuation dates to reach a higher compensation figure,
S.

Use of "construction delay" to manipulate fair market value, and
failure to remove "construction delay" as required by the Court's
order.

Like Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Johnson's opinion also improperly includes damages for
"Down.ward Time Value and bnpact Adjustment." These are separate "damages" for
construction delay and are not attributable to a decrease in the fair market value of the property.
The Court has dismissed claims for construction delay, but the claim is still reflected in

Mr. Johnson's opinion of value.
6.

Use of only one comparable sale,

Mr. Johnson used only one "comparable sale" to support his opinion of value, This is not
a proper use of the "comparable sales" approach to real estate valuation.
7.

Misuse of the one comparable sale,

Mr. Johnson misuses the one sale on which his opinion is based. The folloWing are some
examples:
• The sale Mr. Johnson relied on is considerably smaller than the Otathol property.
However, he did not adjust the sale price to account for the size difference,
resulting in a substantially inflated opinion of value when applied to the Gra.thol
property.
• The sale property had water and sewer/septic available, The Grathol property has
no sewer or water, and those systems will have to be constructed at considerable
expense to Orathol. A developer always pays more for property with utilities and
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infrastructure in place or available to the site. Mr. Johnson made no adjustment to
reflect these differences.
• The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson occurred at the height of the real estate market,
yet he made no adjustment to the date of taking in this case. By using a sale at the
top of the market, without adjustment, he gives an inflated opinion of value of the
--G1athol property as of the date of taking:-···
• The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson is located in Sagle, and has considerably better
potential for commercial development than the Grathol property. He made no
adjustment for location or market support.
• Mr. Johnson's adjustments are made in a "black box," where neither the
adjustments nor the methodology or reasoning he employed can be seen,
understood, or verified.
• The comparable sale relied on by Mr. Johnson sold for $2.69 per sq. ft.
Mr. Johnson adjusted the price upward by an arbitrary 20% based on the Grathol
property being located at a signalized intersection. However, he ignored the fact
that the comparable sale is in Sagle and is a superior property in tenns of size,
utilities, and development potential.
• With his upward adjustment of20%, Mr. Johnson claims that the Grathol property
is worth S3.23 per sq. ft. About 3 months after the sale of the Sagle property, that
property was listed for sale again, this time at $3.48 per sq. ft. The property has
been on the market at that price for over 3 years now. This clearly shows that
there is no market for commercial property at that price, particularly in the remote
area around Athol.
• The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson shows that there is no market support for his
contention that the Grathol property is worth $3.23 per sq. ft., particularly where
the Sagle property is in a better location, has better development potential, and
has water and sewer available.
Mr. Johnson's opinion of value is fundamentally flawed and unreliable. In light of the
substantial disparity between his opinion and those of the three licensed real estate appraisers
involved in the case, Mr. Johnson's valuation should be given little, if any, weight.

VI.

ORDER OF PROOF AND ANTICIPATED WITNESSES

As the Plaintiff, ITD will lead off and present Mr. Jason Minzghor, P.E., the ITD project
manager for the US-95 Project Mr. Minzghor will explain the Project and identify and explain
the taking on the Grathol property. ITD will then call Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, who will go through
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his appraisal report and give his opinion of the value of the uiking. ITD will then rest its case-inchief.
After ITD presents the Project, explains the taking, and presents the appraisal and value
···-· conclusion of its independent appraiser' the burden shifts to Grathol to prove that it is entitled to
more compensation. "In this case, the defendants have the burden of proving that the just
compensation for the taking of their property exceeds the sum of$_ _ _ _, which is the
amount for just compensation presented in this trial by the state[.]" IDJl2d § 7.03. See also

Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen,_ Idaho~ _P.3d _ 2012 WL 231254, *S (Idaho Jan.
26, 2012) ("The burden of proving just compensation is borne by the landowner.").
ITO does not know what witnesses Grathol will call at trial. Since the Court has
correctly directed that the trial shall focus on the "before and after'' value of the property,
Orathol should call only Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood. However, Grathol has indicated that it
may call witnesses to testify on unrelated issues, such as the costs of construction of sewer and
waste water treatment systems on the property, and the development of various site development
plans with various visions of commercial uses and sizes and locations of commercial uses.
These witnesses are not relevant to the issue to be tried-the fair market value of the property
before and after the taking. Thus, if Grathol is permitted to call these witnesses, their testimony
should be limited.

ITD believes that Grathol may call "fact,, witnesses who are engineers and other experts
whose testimony is composed primarily of opinions. Grathol appears to be returning to the
"actor/viewer" ploy it attempted to use early in the case to hide all expert opinions. ITD will
address this issue by motion. If witnesses are permitted to testify to expert opinions that were
not timely disclos~ ITD will suffer substantial prejudice and will be forced to appeal and seek a
new trial if an adverse verdict 1esults.
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After Gtathol presents its case, ITO will call Stan Moe and Larry Pynes to rebut the
valuation opinions, methodologies, and conclusions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood. If
Grathol is permitted to call witnesses to testify about side issues unrelated to the fair market
vaiue of the property, such as water and sewer faciliti1,;;s and various visions or plans for
commercial development on the property, then ITD will call two engineers from the local firm
David Evans and Associates: Ms. Carole Richardson, P.E., and Mr. Ken Geibel, P.E. ITD is
also prepared to c~ll Mr. George Hedley, a commercial real estate developer and national
authority on real estate development, to testify in response to Grathol' s claims regarding the
development potential, costs, and time :frame for development of the subject property. In
particular, Mr. Hedley will focus on the lack of demand and market support for commercial
development in that area, and the significant questions regarding financial feasibility of
commercial development on the site.
All of these witnesses prepared written rebuttal reports, and these reports were produced
to Grathol in accordance with the Court's scheduling order.

If Grathol attempts to bring in issues that have already been resolved and stricken from
the case, such as Sylvan Road, ITD would have to call additional witnesses on rebuttal. For
example, ITD has contacted Kootenai County regarding the issue of Sylvan Road. Kootenai
County has designated Ms. Mel Palmer, a planner in the Planning and Zoning Department, to
testify on issues relating to Sylvan Road, Grathol's rezone of the property, and commercial
access requirements. Specifically, Ms. Palmer will testify that Grathol will be required to build
Sylvan Road, regardless of the US-95 Project, as a condition for county approval of a
commercial development on the Grathol property.
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In summary, the anticipated witnesses in the case are as follows:
ITD CASE IN CHIEF

GRATHOL CASE IN CIDEF

ITD REBU'ITAL

Jason Minzghor, P.E.

Dewitt Sherwood, MAI

Stan Moe, MAI

Stan Moe; r,..w-

Alan Johnson, VP o:fGrathol

.

VD.

. Larry Pynes, JD, ASA

?

Carole Richardson, P.E.
(if necessary)

?

Ken Geibel, P.E.
(if necessary)

?

George Hedley, Developer
(if necessary)

?

Mel Palmer, Kootenai County
(if necessary)

CONCLUSION

The sole issue for trial is the amount of just compensation to be paid for the taldng of
16.3 acres from the S6.8"acre parcel owned by Grathol. Therefore, the only witnesses who
should testify at trial are the valuation witnesses. Testimony by non-valuation witnesses would
necessarily be tangential at best to the issue of the amount ofjust compensation. If other
witnesses are permitted to testify, their testimony should be limited.
All claims based on Sylvan Road, construction delay, lost profits, and gravel damages
have been dismissed on summary judgment and have been stricken from the case. Therefore, no
testimony on these claims should be pennitted and no claims for monetary recovery should be
allowed to be pursued at trial.

The Court has correctly ruled that Grathol may not seek separate monetary awards for
severance damages based on allegations of restriction of access, loss of visibility, or damages
based on un"built development plans. No testimony on these issues is necessary because, as
correctly noted by the Court, ''these claims are incorporated in Grathol' s expert witness
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disclosures as to the before and after fair m.arket values for the remainder parcel." Order Re:

Defendant HJ Grathol 's Severance Damages, at 2.
The focus of the trial will be on the disparities between appraisers Stan Moe and Larry
- · · ··Pynes for ITD and Dewitt Sherwood for Gtathol. The ·verdict on jusfcoriipensatiori will
necessarily tum on who the Court finds to have conectly and fairly applied accepted appraisal
principles and methodologies and reached a fair and objective determination of fair market value.
From a broader perspective, the State ofldaho will not be able to improve its highways if
held hostage by extreme demands for payment for land. In this case, Grathol wants a minimum

of $1,775,000 for 16.3 acres ofland, or $108,895 per acre. The State will not be able to build
roads if it has to pay $108,000 per acre for undeveloped land in rural areas.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
..•. Christoph~D.-Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
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U.S.Mail
Hand Deliverecl
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
TRIAL BENCH BRIEF

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.

CO1\1ES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and submits its Trial Bench Brief in accordance
with the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding brought by Plaintiff, the State of Idaho and the Idaho Board of
Transportation (the "Board") for condemnation of a 16.314 acre portion of real property
owned by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"), at the intersection of U.S. 95 and State
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Highway 54 in Kootenai County, Idaho.
After filing its Complaint for condemnation in November, 2010, the Board moved for
and received an Order for Possession. The remaining issues to be litigated at trial in this
matter are a determination of the amount of just compensation for the real property taken and
the severance damages accruing to the remainder of the Grathol property. The determination
of just compensation owed to Grathol includes issues of the larger parcel and an examination
of different methodologies used to calculate condemnation damages.
This Court is well acquainted with the fundamental differences between the parties'
positions. This Trial Bench Brief will, accordingly, address only those primary issues
articulated by the Court at the last status conference as being areas of ongoing concern to the
Court, specifically the larger parcel analysis and the measure(s) of damages.
1.

The Larger Parcel.

The term "larger parcel" is not a regular part of the appraisal lexicon.

See, The

Appraisal ofReal Estate, 10th ed., Appraisal Institute (1992). It is an analytical premise unique
to eminent domain valuation and thus often misapplied.

The "larger parcel'' theory is

sometimes referred to as the ''parent tract" or the "rule ofjoinder." In a typical valuation, "the
appraiser estimates the value of a parcel of land which has specific boundaries and the
parameters of the property are known before the analysis is made. This is not, or should not be,
the case in condemnation appraisals." Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, 2nd ed., Eden (1995).
In condemnation valuations, the appraisal should first address what, precisely, is the larger
parcel. In condemnation valuation, when a tract or tracts of land are under the beneficial
control of a single individual or entity and have the same, or at least integrated, highest and best
use; those tracts can be considered as one "larger" parcel. See e.g., State ex rel. Rich v.
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Halverson, 86 Idaho 242, 384 P.2d 480 (1963), citing with approval Sasso v. Housing Authority
of Providence, 82 RI 451, 111 A.2d 226 (" ... it is generally held that two tracts can be treated

as one ... [it] ... the taking of one necessarily ... injures the other.")
The "larger parcel" may be all of a parcel, part of a parcel, or even several separate
parcels depending to a varying degree on unity of ownership, unity of use and contiguity.
When a condemnation does not effectuate a taking of a complete parcel but only a part of a
larger parcel; the owner is entitled to damages from the severance as well as the value of the
parcel taken. Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed; Idaho Code§ 7-711.
The tests to determine the larger parcel (i.e. - unity of ownership, unity of use, and
contiguity) cannot be applied universally and blindly. See, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation,
2nd ed. supra. Most courts, both State and Federal, have ruled that all three indicia need not be

present in every instance. The factors for consideration in determining the larger parcel are all
evidentiary in nature, and like most valuation issues, the court has broad discretion in weight
given to these factors.
The physical contiguity of land is an engineering question; the unity of ownership is
usually a legal question; and the unity of use is typically a factual question. Many examples can
be given where two or even only one of the elements of the "larger parcel" test is evident, but
where the larger parcel is still determinable.
commercial highest and best use.

One simple example is where a tract has a

However, only a small comer portion of the parcel is

presently in a commercial use, say, for example; a convenience store. In that instance, the
entire parcel may meet the test of unity of ownership and physical contiguity, but there is not a
unity of use if the remainder of the parcel is vacant. Therefore, if condemnation affects the
opposite comer from where the convenience store is located, the convenience store area is not
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part of the larger parcel and therefore does not suffer compensable damage or receive special
benefits.
By properly defining the larger parcel, the appraiser, valuation witness, or court can
confine judgments of value to the parcel(s), or parts of a parcel that are most directly affected
by the condemnation. It is universally held that the determination of what constitutes the
"larger parcel" is a question of fact, not of law. Therefore, the question is typically to be
answered by the jury (or trier of fact), which should consider evidence of the use, appearance of
the land, its legal division or divisibility, and the intent of its owner (emphasis added). State ex
rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972), citing 4A Nichols§

14.31.
Often the larger parcel analysis comes into play when part of a unified parcel is taken
and the condemnor argues that the remainder parcel is specifically benefited by the purpose for
which the take occurred and that special benefit should be an offset against any severance
damages. This was the issue in the City of Mountain Home case, supra. In that case, 14 acres
of a 255 acre parcel was condemned for a highway which would bisect the larger (255 acre)
parcel owned by the City of Mountain Home.

Both the State (condemnor) and the City

(condemnee) agreed that the remainder would derive some special benefits. The City argued
the benefits were far outweighed by the damages to the remainder.

The jury agreed and

awarded less than the lowest estimate of special benefits and the State appealed. That issue of
damages was found to be in error so an additer was awarded but, germane to this case, the
Court affirmed the notion that the larger parcel concept must be applied with flexibility, taking
into account the unique facts of each case (and property).
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"Under a statute such as our [LC. § 7-711 ], it is not the identity of
uses of the condemned and remaining land which is
determinative; what is significant is the dependency of the value
on the remaining land upon its use in conjunction with the
condemned land."
94 Idaho at 532.
In this case, the larger parcel analysis should focus on valuation of a part of Grathol's
total property, specifically the western most 30± acres, even though Grathol will still own 26.4
acres after the take. The logic for this is that the western most 30 acres are the most usable,
desirable and marketable part of the property. Like the City of Mountain Home case, all of
Grathol' s remaining property will, as a direct consequence of the take, be impacted, but not
nearly to the magnitude of the western portion. Accordingly, the effects (damages) upon the
part of the property that would be developed are (at least incrementally) greater than the effects
upon the whole property.
The remainder parcel in City of Mountain Home case (over 230 acres) was intended to
be used in part to add nine holes to the City's golf course. However, the remainder parcel was
crossed by a drainage ditch, "a physical barrier of considerable size." Id. Because this physical
barrier, together with the loss of property by the bisecting highway, impacted the ability to add
holes to the existing golf course, severance damages were properly awarded even though the
golf course was, in the view of the condemnor, not properly part of the larger parcel. In this
case, Grathol's larger parcel (the west 30 acres) will be damaged by the loss of the part taken,
by the effects of segregation created when the new highway cuts through the property (leaving
remnant parcels on both sides) and certainly by the further division caused by the need to
construct Sylvan as a frontage road. In this respect, the intent of the condemnee (Grathol)
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relative to development of the property bears heavily on the question of damages to the
remainder property.
The larger parcel evaluation can be complicated by application of the "back land
theory" or the "front land - rear land" concept. These issues arise where, as is the situation
here, a parcel with desirable frontage on a roadway is intuitively worth more closer to the
frontage and worth less toward the back or rear of the property. One of the best descriptions of
this circumstance is as follows:
A land owner is always entitled to the fair market value of the
land actually taken. The fair market value of the front land in
certain situations is higher than the average unit price of the tract
as a whole. The fact that adjacent areas of the property ... are all
under the same ownership, and together compose a large
ownership tract, does not presuppose that they would be
developed or marketed as a single tract. In fact, market realities
dictate otherwise. An owner ordinarily will sell a portion of his
property for the highest price the market will deliver so long as
that ... does not damage the value of the remainder.

State Dept ofH'ways v. Stegemann, 269 So.2d 480 (La. 1973)
Accordingly, most jurisdictions recognize that different portions of a single larger tract
may have both different highest and best uses and certainly different per unit values. Applying
the back land theory is difficult in the best of circumstances. Where, as here, the property is
bordered not just on one side by a single highway but rather on two sides by two intersecting
highways (in the before condition) and will be bisected by one of those highways and have
direct access to only one of them (in the after condition), applying these general valuation
principals in some cookie-cutter fashion is extraordinarily difficult.
Simply put, any effort to apply a precise, gradiated value to portions of the larger parcel
in proportion to the distance of each portions of the parcel from the offsite features that affect
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desirability (the road), is futile. Some commentators argue that property can be divided into
"zones of value" by moving backward through a property away from the point of a take.
However, as stated in Nichols, "this kind of scientific analysis of market conditions is not
representative of what occurs in the market and begins to drift so far away from reaiity to be an
exercise in abstract philosophy rather than an attainment of damage value."
Here, the evidence will focus on what Grathol could do in terms of development of the
property had the highway improvements never been proposed or built versus what Grathol must
address in order to develop and market the property after the project is built. That, together
with the value of the 16.4 acres being taken, constitutes Grathol' s just compensation.
2.

Measure of Damages.

In partial takings cases, as here, the government must compensate a landowner not
only for the value of the land taken but also for any damage to the remainder. Hetland v.

Capaldi, 103 RI 614, 240 A.2d 155 (1968).

Where only a portion of a property is

condemned, the measure of damages includes both the value of the portion of land actually
taken and the value by which the remaining land has been diminished as a consequence of the
partial taking. Calculating the value by which the remainder has been diminished is more
difficult when the remainder is subject to a variety of uses or is presently under-utilized.
There are two main, although not exclusive, methods of calculating damages in eminent
domain. One method enunciated by courts is the so-called "before and after rule," which
computes severance damages as the difference between the value of the entire tract before the
taking and the value of the remainder area after the taking.

State by Commissioner of

Transportation v. Silver, 92 NJ 507, 457 A.2d 463 (1983).

The difference is just

compensation. This approach is illustrated by the following equation:
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Value of entire parcel before taking - value of remainder
area after taking= just compensation.
However, strict application of the before and after rule can have a tendency to either
disregard, or conversely, to double-count severance damages. Therefore, a hybrid before and
after rule approach is sometimes applied. This involves a formulaic effort to determine the

value of the part taken (as a part of the whole), adding to that the damages to the remainder, and
then subtracting any special benefits.

This is supposed to yield a difference that should

accurately constitute the just compensation owed. This variation to the before and after rule, is
absolutely necessary in jurisdictions (like Idaho) which statutorily provide for both severance
damages and special benefits. This approach is illustrated by the following equation:
Value of entire parcel before taking - value of remainder
area after taking = value of part taken. Then, value of part
taken + damages to remainder (if any) - benefits to
remainder (if any) = just compensation.
A simple example is as follows: The landowner owns five acres of vacant, residential
land and the government takes one acre. The one acre taken is valued at $100,000.00 at the
time of taking and the remaining four acres are valued at $400,000.00 before the taking
(entire parcel is valued thus at $500,000.00 before the taking).

Under local zoning

regulations, a 1.5 acre minimum lot size is required to build. Before the taking the landowner
could subdivide the land into three buildable lots, but after the taking the landowner can only
subdivide his property into two lots. Because the landowner's use of the remainder has been
limited by the taking of the one acre parcel, the remaining four acres have been valued at
$330,000.00 after the taking. Using the above equation, the landowner's just compensation
for the partial taking would be computed as follows: $500,000.00 - $330,000.00 =
$170,000.00.
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If only it were so simple in this case . . ..

Grathol's property, being commercial

development property located on, and bordered by, two intersecting high traffic corridors,
cannot be systematically pigeonholed into a simple "unit" value equation, because the
damages to the remainder are not limited as in this example where the only severance damage
is the ability to create two lots instead of three.
The second, and generally favored, approach to measuring damages in the eminent
domain context is the "value of the take plus damages rule." Idaho courts have most often
utilized this measure. Given the uniqueness of the Grathol property, the value plus damages
approach must be given greater weight. This involves a longer and necessarily more subjective
analysis geared toward determining the market value of the property before the taking and then
measuring the hypothetical difference in value of the remainder portion before and after the
taking. The severance damages are calculated as the market value of the land taken plus the
difference before and after the taking in market value of the remainder area. Department of
Transportation v. Into, 219 Ga.App. 311, 464 S.E.2d 886 (1995). At this point, any special
benefits to the remainder are factored in to arrive at a sort of "net" damage to the remainder
figure which is added to the value of the part taken, yielding total just compensation. There are,
of course, a number of variations on this formula dictated by the challenges of applying a dollar
value to the myriad of damages a remainder may incur. This concept of the measure of
damages may be illustrated by the following equation:
Value of land taken + (value of remainder area before taking
- value of remainder area after taking)= just compensation.

Using the same simple example as above, the landowner's just compensation for the
partial taking would be the same, computed as: $100,000.00 + ($400,000.00 - $330,000.00) =
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$170,000.00. See, 60 Am. Jur. Trials 447 (Originally published in 1996).
It is in the valuation of other damages that this equation gets difficult. Some damages,

like the cost to cure a physical harm (e.g. - "salt on the ground") to the remainder, are pretty
easily calculable. Other damages (e.g. - loss of visibility, traffic noise, etc) are much less
susceptible to being "line-itemed." In this context, the Grathol parcel has to be viewed
through the owner's intended uses(s), taking into account the numerous impacts that the
condemnation will have on those uses. Effectively "monetizing" those impacts/damages is
not as easy as simply estimating a per land unit value reduction. Yet, under the constraints
imposed by recognized valuation methodologies that is what must be attempted where the
damages to the remainder can't be set out as discreet amounts in a ledger page format.
Take, for example, Grathol 's contention that the inevitable requirement of running
Sylvan Road through the property has an adverse affect on the value of the remainder. In
determining severance damages, courts give consideration to all circumstances, present or
future that may affect the residue's value at the time of the taking. In this connection, a
condemnee ordinarily should not be permitted to benefit from an advantageous highest and
best use while at the same time ignoring the fact that some of its property would need to be
given up to put the property to that use. Where a condemnee alleges severance damages
based on the development potential of the property, therefore, the government's intent to
require dedication of a portion not taken as a condition of development may preclude the
landowner from seeking severance damages. The government must, however, offer proof
that such conditional dedication is reasonably probable by showing that it would have
imposed the dedication condition if the landowner had sought to develop the property and
that the proposed dedication requirement would have been constitutionally permissible.
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Here, the Board acknowledges that Sylvan Road will be required to be dedicated
when Grathol develops. The board says, in effect; "So what? If that development exaction
occurs, it is not because of the Project." But the question stands: Would that dedication have
been required of Grathol if ITD' s project were never built? If the answer to that question is
"No," then the impact of this future dedication requirement must be considered as a
"circumstance that may affect the residue's value at the time of the taking." Simply put, it
lessens the value of the remainder. Perhaps not by dollars per square foot, but by virtue of
the fact that Grathol (or any prospective purchaser) of the remainder will consider it in
determining what that remainder is worth to them.
Likewise, there must be a value placed on the damage resulting from the fact that two
small remnant parcels of Grathol's property will be situate on the opposite side of the
highway once construction is complete.

Those parcels may still be independently

marketable, but if Grathol can't provide utility (water, sewer) connectivity to them, they are
far, far less valuable, usable or desirable to tenants or purchasers. Same consideration applies
if those parceis are essentially at the base of a steep bank leading up to the elevated highway
surface. These issues affect the value. These factors are not calculable like a cost-to-cure
damage, but they are compensable none the less.
Here, the evidence will show how the Grathol property owner could, and likely
would, have used its property had the condemnation never been considered, funded, or
completed. The owner will then show how the remainder property will necessarily have to
be used as a direct result of the condemnation having occurred. The difference between those
two development approaches has a direct monetary impact on the owner. It is that impact,
together with the value of the 16.4 acres being taken which constitutes the "just
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compensation" to which Grathol, and all similarly situated property owners, are
constitutionally entitled.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012.

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By: ~~~~~L_--2';~::::::::::-:___
Douglas . Marfice, 0
e Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITO"), by and through its attorneys

of record Holland & Hart, LLP, hereby moves the Court to exclude two new expert witnesses
identified by Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol'') two weeks before the March 5, 2012 trial:

Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom Vandervert. Tne Pretrial Order in this case required Grathol to
disclose experts and their opinions by August 19, 2011.

In addition to failing to timely disclose these experts, Grathol has failed and refused to
disclose their opinions and the basis of their opinions. It is now less than one week before trial.
ITD's motion is supported by a brief and by the Affidavit of Mary V. York also filed on
this date.

DATED this 29th day of February, 2012.

By_,_..__.,__~-d---~~;.......;.....;..__ _ __

MaryV. Y
Steven C. o an, of £inn
Ted S. Tol e son, fo:c the firm
Special Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attomey General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Douglas S. Marfic:e, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
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Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered· · ·· ·· · ·
Email
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax) (208) 664-5884

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD''), submits this brief in support
of its Motion to Exclude Experts Not Timely Disclosed. ITO has also filed the Affidavit of Mary
V. York ("York Aff. ") in support of its motion.
INTRODUCTION···

ITD respectfully moves the Court to exclude two expert witnesses disclosed by
Defendant HJ Grathol two weeks before trial. These experts are Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom
Vandervert. In addition to failing to timely disclose these experts, Grathol has failed and refused
to disclose the opinions of these experts and the basis for their opinions. Grathol has repeatedly
failed to comply with the requirements of the Court's scheduling orders and has failed to respond
properly or timely to discovery requests by ITD.

ITP will suffer substantial prejudice if these

expert witnesses are permitted to testify at trial.
BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established the pretrial deadlines for the
parties' expert disclosures. Pretrial Order, at 2. Under the Pretrial Order, ITO was required to
disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011; Grathol was required to disclose responsive
experts by August 19, 2011; and ITD was required to disclose rebuttal experts by October 19,
2011. Id. The Pretrial Order also required that expert disclosures "consist of at least the
information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Id
The Pretrial Order did not excuse Grathol from disclosing the opinions from witnesses it
deemed to be "actor/viewer'' experts. The Pretrial Order did not exempt any experts or opinions
of experts from being disclosed.
In addition to the requirements of the Pretrial Order, ITD requested the disclosure of

Grathol's expert wi1nesses and all opinions and the basis for the opinions in discovery requests

BRIEF IN StJPPORT OF ITD'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
EXPERT WITNESSES NOT TIMELY DISCLOSED-2

803 of 1617

FEB.29.2012 4:43PM

NO. 4346

P. 4/12

served more than a year ago on February 2, 2011. Ex. A to the York Aff. (ITD discovery
requests, at 8).
Grathol responded to ITD's discovery requests on April 1S, 2011. York Aff., Ex. B.

In its responses, Grathol identified 16 potential expert witr,esses, but did not disciose any
opinions or the basis for any opinions. Id Grathol' s responses were inadequate and failed to
comply with ITD's discovery requests. Brett Terrell was among the list of potential experts, but
as with the other individuals identified as potential experts, Grathol did not provide any opinions
of Mr. Terrell or the basis for any opinions. Grathol cited to an alleged "actor/viewer" exception
as the basis for refusing to provide opinions by any of the 16 experts, including Mr. Terrell.
Tom Vandervert was not disclosed as either a lay or expert witness in any of Grathol' s
disclosures.

On July 22, 2011, counsel for ITD sent a deficiency letter to counsel for Grathol,
specifically raising the issue of Grath.ol's failure to disclose the opinions of experts. York Aff.,

Ex.. C. Grathol did not respond to ITD's letter until more than a month latter.
On August 19, 2011, Grathol served its expert witness disclosures and narrowed its

expert witnesses to three: Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund, and Alan Johnson.
York Aff., Ex. D. However, Grathol did not disclose any of the opinions of these experts or any
of the information required by the Court's Pretrial Order. The Pretrial Order required that expert
disclosures "consist of at least the :information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P.
26(b)(4)(i).'' In refusing to provide opinions or the bases of the opinions of any of these experts,
Grathol again cited the "actor/viewer" exception noted in the comments to Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. York Aff., Ex. D at 19,
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On August 24, 2011, counsel for ITD sent another deficiency letter to counsel for

Grathol regarding its failure to disclose the opinions of its three experts and the basis of the
opinions, as required by the Court's Pretrial Order and ITD's long-standing discovery requests.
"'YorkAff., Ex; E. -Grathol's counsel responded on August-29, 201i, stating-only that its
appraiser, Mr. Sherwood, was preparing a report and that it would be disclosed upon completion.
York Aff., Ex. F. Counsel did not address the failure to disclose the opinions of the other two
experts, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. Nor did counsel address the fact that the deadline for
disclosure of expert opinions, such as the report of Mr. Sherwood, had already passed. Id
On September 9, 2011, counsel for the parties had a conference call to discuss the
discovery dispute and Grathol's refusal to disclose the opinions of its experts. Counsel for
Grathol confinned the conversation in correspondence dated September 19, 2011, in which he
attempted to explain his position on why he was refusing to disclose his experts' opinions, citing
an out-dated comment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See York Aff., Ex. G. Attached
to the September 19 letter was Grathol's second supplemental discovery responses, in which it
provided the untimely appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood. York Aff., Ex. H. Gtathol still refused
to provide the opinions or the basis of the opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund.
On September 20, 2011, counsel for ITD wrote to counsel for Gtathol again, in another
attempt to obtain the opinions of Grathol' s experts without having to ask the Court to intervene.
York Aff., Ex. I. ITD noted that the Court's Pretrial Order did not place any limits on the

disciosure requirements for experts or make an exception for "actor/viewer" experts, and that

Idaho's expert disclosure rules do not contain any exception for "actor/viewer" witnesses. Id.
ITD also noted that the opinions were required to be disclosed based on the specific discovery
requests that ITD had served on Grathol. Id.
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When ITO failed to receive either the required expert disclosures or a commitment from
counsel for Grathol to provide the required disclosures, ITD filed a motion on September 23,
2011, to exclude Grathol's expert wi.1nesses or, alternatively, to compel proper expert
··uisclosures. YorkAff., Ex. J. Just before the hearing on lID's motion to·-exclude, Grathoi
conceded and agreed to disclose the opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. On October 16,
2011, Grathol served its third supplemental discovery responses in which it finally provided
expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. York Aff., Ex. K.
On October 18, 2011, the parties entered into a stipulation wherein Gtathol stipulated and
agreed that "all opinions of its experts Dewitt 'Skip' Sherwood, Alan Johnson and Geoff
Reeslund have been disclosed." York Aff., Ex. L.
On January 17, 2012, counsel for ITD asked Orathol to identify the fact witnesses who it

intended to call at trial and requested deposition dates for the individuals. York Aff., Ex. M. On
January 20, 2012, during a conference call, counsel for Grathol identified four individuals that he

intended to call as fact wimesses at trial: Bill Hughes, John Shaw, Brett Terrell, and Jim
Coleman. This information was confll'll'led in a letter dated January 23, 2012. York Aff., Ex. N.
About a week later, on February 8, 2012, Grathol revised its list of fact witness to: Jim
Coleman, Brett Terrell, Tom Vandervert, and Mike Winger. York Af£, Ex. 0. Mr. Winger was
later withdrawn by Grathol as a fact witness. York Aff., Ex. P.

ITO took the depositions of Mr. Terrell and Mr, Vandervert on February 13 and 14, 2012.
Because Grathol had not disclosed these individuais as expert witnesses and had not produced
any opinions or the basis for the opinions of these individuals, ITD could not prepare for and did
not depose these fact witnesses as experts.
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Despite having disclosed these individuals as fact witnesses and after the depositions of
these witnesses, Grathol served supplemental discovery responses identifying Mr. Terrell and
Mr. Vandervert as expert witnesses late on Friday, February 17, 2012. York Aff., Ex. Q.
---counsel for ITD dictnot see these disclosures until Monday, February 20, 20t2, two weeks
before trial.
The disclosures are untimely. Grathol was required to disclose all experts and the
opinions of all experts by August 19, 2011. Permitting these new experts to testify would be
unfairly prejudicial to ITD. Moreover, identifying new ex.perts two weeks before trial is
particularly prejudicial where the disclosures do not set forth the opinions to be offered at trial or

the basis for the opinions.
Grathol's disclosure of Mr. Te1Tell and Mr. Vandervert as experts did not provide any of
the opinions that would be offered at trial or the basis of any opinions. York Aff., Ex. Q.

Grathol has once again invoked the ''actor/viewer" exception to hide the opinions of Mr. Terrell
and Mr. Vandervert and refused to comply with the requirements of Rule 26 and ITD' s discovery
requesting the opinions ofGrathol's experts and the basis of the opinions. Id.
ARGUMENT

1.

H Mr, Terrell and Mr. Vandervert Are Allowed To Testify, The Court's

Pretrial Orders, The Stipulation Between The Parties, And The Rules of
Discovery Are All Meaningless.
As set forth in detail above, Grathol did not disclose Mr. Terrell or Mr. Vandervert as

experts until two weeks before trial. In addition, Grathol did not disclose either their opinions to
be offered at trial or the basis for their opinions.

The Court's Pretrial Order required Grathol to disclose experts and expert opinions by
August 19, 2011. If Orathol is pennitted to call these individuals as experts at this late date and
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without disclosing any opinions before trial, then the Court's Pretrial Orders governing expert
disclosures are meaningless.
Likewise, the Stipulation between the parties filed October 18, 2011, in which Otathol
·--· stipulated th.at itwc;uld be calling three experts (Sherwood,-Johnson, and-Reeslund) and that it
had disclosed all of their opinions is meaningless. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing
Grathol's obligation to respond to discovery served by ITD more than a year ago, as well as
seasonably supplementing its responses, are also meaningless.
2.

The Witnesses Are Properly Excluded,

The exclusion of evidence is the recognized sanction for a party's failure to comply
with Rule 26, including the duty to seasonably supplement responses to discovery requests.
"Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion of the proffered
evidence." Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 90, 813 P.2d 897,900 (1991).
Courts have broad authority to compel obedience with its orders and may impose
sanctions upon a party wno fails to comply with its orders, including a party who fails to serve
timely responses to discovery. Idaho Code§ 1-1603(4); Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd.,

.

135 Idaho 495,499, 20 P.3d 679, 683 (2000); Ashby"· Western Council, Lumber Production

and Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686, 791 P.2d 435,436 (1990). See also Idaho R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(B) (providmg that where a party fails to obey an order of the Court to provide
discovery, the Court may enter an order "refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence.>').
If permitted, Grathol's use of previously undisclosed experts will be highly prejudicial.
Identifying new experts two weeks before trial is particularly prejudicial where the disclosures
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do not set forth the opinions to be offered at trial or the basis of the opinions. Allowing new
experts to testify at trial under these circumstances would be reversible error.
"[W]hile trial courts are given broad discretion in ruling on pretrial discovery matters,
-... reversible enorbasbeen found in allowing testimony where Rule 26 has not been compiied
with." Radmer1 120 Idaho at 90, 813 P.2d at 900 (citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784
(10th Cir. 1980)),

In cases [involving e,cpert testimony], a prohibition against
discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in
acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to
prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires
advance preparation ... Similarly, effective rebuttal requires
advance knowledge of the line of testimony from the other side.
If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the narrowing
of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery nonnally
produces are frustrated.

Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89,813 P.2d at 900 (brackets in original).
Other cases are in accord. See Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 181, 219 P.3d 1192,
1197 (2009) (district court properly excluded expert not timely disclosed from testifying at trial);

Adams v. Reed, 138 Idaho 36, 39, 57 P.3d 505, 508 (2002) (affirming dismissal of action for
Plaintiff's failure to timely disclose experts, failure to timely respond to discovery, and failure to
comply with deadlines set in pretrial orders).
In the condemnation case, City ofMcCall v. SeubertJ 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118
(2006), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court properly excluded a rebuttal expert
who the City failed to disclose until a week before trial. Id. at 586, 130 P.3d at 1125. The
Supreme Court noted that the disclosure came "well beyond the time the parties agreed upon for
disclosure of witnesses and the trial court's deadline." Id. The Court further noted that "the City
never gave any reason for the late disclosure[.]" Id. In this case, Gtathol has not given any
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reason for the late disclosure, nor did it seek leave of Court or an agreement from ITD to call
new expert witnesses.
Idaho case law clearly shows that Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert should be precluded

from testifying due to Orathol' s repeated violations of th~ Court's scheduling- orders, the
Stipulation between the parties regarding expert disclosures, and the rules of discovery.

3.

Gratbol Bas No Basis To Withhold Expert Opinions Under The
"ActorNiewer" Exception Under the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure,

In addition to failing to timely disclose Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert, Grathol has not
disclosed the opinions they will offer at trial or the bases of their opinions. Grathol specifically
refused to do so in its disclosure of these experts two weeks before trial, again relying on the
"actor/viewer" exception found in the comments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The "actor/viewer" exception is not recognized in Idaho. More importantly, even under
the Federal Rules, it does not permit a party to withhold expert opinions. Rather, the only effect
of the exception is to excuse an actor/view expert from preparing a fonnal expert report, as
required by other experts under the Federal Rule. The opinions of actor/viewer experts still have
to be disclosed, along with the basis of the opinions. No legal authority exists in either state or
federal court for the purposeful refusal to disclose expert opinions before trial.
Idaho case law specifically rejects Grathol's attempt to use the actor/viewer exception.

In Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2002), the distriet court excluded the
testimony of a treating physician who was not timely disclosed, Id at 344, 48 P.3d at 673.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was not required to produce the expert's opinions because

the expert's opinions and knowledge were not acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation
and therefore were not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4). Id. at 345, 48 P.3d at 674.
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The Idaho Court of Appeals soundly rejected plaintiff's argument, stating that
"[a]lthough Clark is conect that a treating physician's knowledge that was not developed for
pw:poses of litigation is not subject to Rule 26(b)(4), the conclusion that he then draws-that

, · ·such testimony fa,entirely sheltered from discovery--drt·ws no support fr-om~the ianguage of that
rule or the remaining discovery rules." Id. The Court of Appeals quoted the federal decision of

Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 105 (N.D. Miss. 1986) and its statement that "(t]here is simply no
reason to hold that non-26(b)(4) trial experts may not be discovered by way of the same
interrogatories as 26(b)(4) trial experts." Id. at 346, 48 P.3d at 67S (quoting Lee v. Knutson, 112
F.R.D. 105, 108 (N.D. Miss. 1986)). According to the Lee decision, "[t]his result flows from
precedent as well as logic and common sense." Id,
The Court of Appeals in Clark concluded that Rule 26(b)(4) ''provides no justification
for [plaintiff's] failure to respond to [defendant's] inteITogatories seeking disclosure of all of
[plaintiff's treating physician's] opinions that [plaintiff] wished to present at trial." Id. The
Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of the treating physician's testimony because it was not
timely produced and because plaintiff failed to seasonably supplement its responses to discovery
requests as required by Rule 26(e)(4). Id at 347, 48 P.3d at 676.
In summary, ITO will suffer substantial and unwarranted prejudice if Mr. Terrell and

Mr. Vandervert are pennitted to testify. These witnesses were not disclosed until two weeks
before trial, and their opinions and the base~ for their opinions have still not been disclosed. It is
now less than one week before trial.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Telephone: (208) 342-5000
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THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
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HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA )

Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am

duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.
2.

I am counsel of record for Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") in

the above-captioned matter, and I make this affidavit in support ofITD's Motion to Exclude
Expert Testimony.
3.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff ITD's First Set of

Interrogatories and Requests for Production.
4.

Attached as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's

Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents.
5.

Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's deficiency

letter to counsel for Grathol dated July 22, 2011.
6.

Attached as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's

Expert Witness Disclosures.
7.

Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD' s deficiency

letter and attempt to "meet and confer" with counsel for Grathol dated August 24, 2011.
8.

Attached as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of counsel for Grathol's response

to counsel for ITD's deficiency letter, which is dated August 29, 2011.
9.

Attached as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of correspondence between

counsel for Grathol and counsel for ITD dated September 19, 2011.
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10.

Attached as Exhibit His a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's

Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents.
11.

Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's

correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated September 20, 2011.
12.

Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy ofITD's Motion to Exclude

Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures and supporting brief.
13.

Attached as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol' s Third

Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents.
14.

Attached as Exhibit Lis a true and correct copy of the parties' Stipulation for

Extension of Time for Plaintiff's Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosures and for "Acarrequi
Offer."
15.

Attached as Exhibit Mis a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's

correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated January 17, 2012.
16.

Attached as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD' s

correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated January 23, 2012.
17.

Attached as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD' s

correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated February 8, 2012.
18.

Attached as Exhibit Pis a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's

correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated February 9, 2012.
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19.

Attached as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's

Fourth Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents.

DATED this 29th day of February, 2012.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 29th day of February, 2012.

Nota½, Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires

6·Ztf/-Zoltj
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Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
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STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
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Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
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Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
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Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVl0-10095

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board by and through their attorneys of
record and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby serves its First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Defendant HJ Grathol and requests
Defendant to answer all interrogatories and produce all documents for inspection and/or copying,
in accordance with the Instructions and Definitions set forth below within thirty (30) days from
the date of service of this discovery, unless otherwise provided by Court order or the parties'
mutual agreement.

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING INTERROGATORIES
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the interrogatories set forth
below are to be answered within thirty (30) days of service, fully and separately in writing, under
oath, and in accordance with the above-cited rules. When responding in written form to any
interrogatory, please give the number of the interrogatory before providing the specific response.
Answers to these interrogatories must include not only information in your personal
knowledge and possession, but also any and all information available to you, including
information in the possession of any of your agents, attorneys, or employees. If you cannot
answer any of the following Interrogatories in full, after exercising due diligence to secure the
information to do so, so state, and answer to the extent possible, specifying your inability to
answer the remainder and stating whatever information or knowledge you have concerning the
unanswered portions. If a claim of privilege is made as to any such information, you must
specify the basis for the claim of privilege and describe the information claimed to be privileged.

If any document identified in an answer to an interrogatory was, but is no longer in your
possession, custody or control, or was known to you but is no longer in existence, describe what
disposition was made of it or what became of it. No document requested to be identified or
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produced herein can be destroyed or disposed of by virtue of a record retention program or for
any other reason.
The interrogatories are intended to be continuing in nature and to require the addition of
supplemental information and documents in the future to the fullest extent provided by Rule
26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the interrogatories, you
acquire any information respective thereto, you are requested to file and serve supplemental
responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This
request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(e).

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, you are requested, within
thirty (30) days of the date this document was served upon you, to present for inspection and

copying the documents and things requested below at the offices of Holland & Hart LLP, Suite
1400, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 S. Capitol Blvd., Boise, Idaho. As an alternative to producing
documents for inspection and copying, accurate, legible and complete copies of requested
documents may be attached to your answers and responses to these discovery requests and
served within the same time period. Please clearly identify the request for production to which
each document or group of documents you provide is responsive.
Your response must include and be based not only on documents and things in your
personal possession, but also on any and all documents and things available to you, including
those in the possession of any of your agents, representatives, attorneys, or employees. If any
document requested to be identified in the following interrogatories, or asked to be produced in
the requests for production, was but no longer is in your possession or subject to your control, or
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in existence, state whether it is (1) missing or lost, (2) has been destroyed, (3) has been
transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily, to others, or (4) otherwise disposed of; and in each
instance, please explain the circumstances surrounding the authorization of such disposition
thereof, and state the date or approximate date thereof.
With respect to each document as herein denied which is required to be identified by
these interrogatories or produced in the requests for production and which you presently contend
you are not required to disclose because of any alleged "privilege" (which you are not presently
prepared to waive), in lieu of the document identification called for above, please identify each
such "privileged" document as follows: (1) give the date of each such document; (2) identify
each individual who was present when it was prepared; (3) identify each individual to whom a
copy was sent; (4) identify each individual who has seen it; (5) identify each individual who has
custody of it; (6) identify each and every document which refers to, discusses, analyzes or
comments upon it, in whole or in part, or which contain any or all of its contents; and (7) state
the nature of the privilege asserted, (i.e., attorney-client, work-product, etc.).
The document requests set forth below are intended to be continuing in nature and to
require the addition of supplemental information and documents in the future to the fullest extent
provided by Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the
requests for documents, you acquire any information respective thereto, file and serve
supplemental responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. This request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(e).
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DEFINITIONS
The following definitions shall apply to these discovery requests:
1.

"Plaintiff' means the above-named Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board

("Board").
2.

"Defendant" means the above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, a California general

partnership, its representatives, employees, agents, or other person(s) acting for or on behalf of
HJ Grathol.
3.

"You," "your," or "yours," means the above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, its

representatives, employees, agents, or other person(s) acting for or on behalf of HJ Grathol.
4.

"Subject Property" means the property owned by Defendant which is the subject of the

present condemnation action. The "Subject Property" is more completely described in Plaintiff's
Complaint.
5.

"Identify" when used with respect to a natural person requires that you provide the

following information with respect to the person:

6.

a.

Full name;

b.

Last known business address;

c.

Last known residence address;

d.

Last known business telephone number;

e.

Last known home telephone number and

f.

Name of employer or business with whom the person was associated and
the person's title and position at the time relevant to the identification.

"Identify" when used with respect to a person that is not a natural person means, to the

extent applicable, to provide the same information required as though the entity were a natural
person [see Definition 5(a) through 5(f) above], and also provide the additional information
regarding a description of the nature of the entity (e.g., partnership, corporation, limited liability
company, etc.).
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7.

"Identify" when used with respect to a document, item or thing means to provide the

following information relating to such document, item or thing:

8.

a.

A general description thereof;

b.

Date it was written or created;

c.

Nrune and present or last known address of the person or persons who
wrote or created it;

d.

Nrune and present or last known address of the person to whom it was
sent;

e.

Nrune and present address of the custodian thereof; and

f.

Whether you have a copy, duplicate, reproduction, photostat, photograph,
srunple or exemplar thereof.

"Identify" when used with respect to Appraisals and/or Appraisal Reports means to

provide the following information relating to such document, item or thing:

9.

a.

The nrune, address, and company of each appraiser;

b.

The date the appraiser was engaged and the date of each appraisal;

c.

The reason for the appraisal and who retained the appraiser to perform the
appraisal;

d.

The fair market value of the entire property;

e.

The fair market value of the property being taken for the public project;

f.

The runount of drunages to the remainder property caused by the taking;

g.

The methodology for computing the fair market value of the entire
property, the property taken, and the drunages to the remainder property;

h.

If a written appraisal report was made, the nrune and address of the
custodian of the report;

"Describe" shall mean to set forth all facts that exhaust your information, knowledge, and

belief with respect to the subject matter of the discovery request.
10.

"Document" or "documents" shall mean the original, all copies and drafts of papers and

writings of every kind, description and form, and all mechanical, magnetic media, and electronic
recordings, records, writings and data of every kind, description and form, and all photographs of
every kind, and including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following:
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correspondence, notes, e-mails, memoranda, reports, notebooks, binders, drawings, studies,
analyses, drafts, diaries, intra- or inter-office communications, memoranda, reports, canceled
checks, minutes, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, telegrams, typewritten and handwritten notes,
letters, telegrams, instructions, work assignments, messages (including reports, notes and
memoranda of telephone conversations and conferences), telephone statements, calendar and
diary entries, desk calendars, appointment books, job or transaction files, books of account,
ledgers, bank statements, promissory notes, invoices, charge slips, working papers, lab books,
lab notes, lab journals or notebooks, evaluation or appraisal reports, pleadings, transcripts of
testimony or other documents filed or prepared in connection with any court or agency or other
proceeding, deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts, agreements, assignments, instruments,
charges, opinions, official statements, prospectuses, appraisals, feasibility studies, trusts, releases
of claims, charters, certificates, licenses, leases, invoices, computer printouts or programs,
summaries, audio, video or sound recordings, cassette tapes, video recorded, electronic or laser
recorded, or photographed information. Documents are to be taken as including all attachments,
enclosures and other documents that are attached to, relate to or refer to such documents.
The above definition of "Document" or "Documents" shall also include any
"Electronically Stored Information."
11.

"Electronically Stored Information" means information made, maintained, retained,

stored, or archived by computer or electronic means in any medium, including but not limited to
word processing documents, email, email attachments, databases, spreadsheets, writings,
drawings, graphs, photographs, sound recordings, images, data, and data compilations.
Electronically Stored Information shall include prior versions or drafts of information, as defined
above, as well as all attachments, and shall include information stored on personal digital
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assistants, cell phones, smart phones, Blackberries, personal laptop computers, hard drives,
portable hard drives, and other similar devices.
12.

The words "relate to" or "relating to" shall be deemed to mean and include the following

terms: regards, describes, involves, compares, correlates, mentions, connected to, refers to,
pertains to, contradicts, or compromises.
13.

The words "and" and "and/or" and "or" shall each be deemed to refer to both their

conjunctive and disjunctive meanings, being construed as necessary to bring within the scope of
the discovery request all information and documents which would otherwise be construed as
being outside the request.
14.

The word "any" shall mean "each and every'' and "all" as well as "any one," and "all"

shall mean "any and all."
15.

The term "date of take" shall mean November 19, 2010, the date the initial Complaint

and Summons in this matter was filed.

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No. 1:

Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or

expert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is
expected to testify.
Interrogatory No. 2:

For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory

No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the
substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying
facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information referenced in and
required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Interrogatory No. 3:

(Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just

compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to
which you believe Defendant is entitled. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which may
or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change.
Interrogatory No. 4:

(Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every

fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of just
compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taking of a portion the Subject
Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and document that describes, shows, or
evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is entitled.
Interrogatory No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Take) Please state and

identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the taking of a
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein.
Interrogatory No. 6: (Opinion of fair market value-After Take) Please state and

identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a portion
of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein.
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses'

opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from the
taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yes", describe the
amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and all facts
and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied upon, as a
basis for that opinion.
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Interrogatory No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you

purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for the
real property, the buildings, the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property.
Include in your answer any all special terms or conditions related to your purchase of the Subject
Property.
Interrogatory No. 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any

portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by
you or on your behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined above)
each appraisal.
Interrogatory No.10: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in

the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so,
please state the following:
a. The amount of annual income received;
b. Every source of income for each year;
c. The amount received each year from each source of income.
Interrogatory No. 11: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please state whether in

your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project
enhancement or project influence (also referred to as project blight), and if so, please provide a
full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert(s) reached his
or her conclusion and all facts, information and data used or relied upon to support that
conclusion.
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Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or

entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien,
adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify ( as defined
above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest.
Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the

"date of take" or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any third
party applied to the applicable planning and zoning department for the development or
improvement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction permit
on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined above) each and every
application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or employed by
your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the Subject Property.
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the

five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? Ifso, please list and identify (as defined
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell.
Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Contamination) As of the "date of take," were

you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and identify
the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or damage
occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, and whether the
contamination or damage has been eradicated.
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Interrogatory No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any, to

Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identify of any and all officers, managers or
other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please also include any
involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications for zoning changes,
annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed improvements to the Subject
Property.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Request for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used,

referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above.
Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each

and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action, including Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4 )(A) experts.
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce. copies of all documents relied upon by

any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion
relating to the Subject Property.
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written

estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other document
that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited to, the appraisal
reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each appraiser or valuation
witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter.
Request for Production No. 5: For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to

call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all appraisal
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reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a ten-mile radius
of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5) years.
Request for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents, objects or

things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this
matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or other
documents. If final exhibits have not been completed, please attach drafts, if available.
Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which

relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis,
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that Defendant
intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter.
Request for Production No. 8: Please produce copies of all documents,

correspondence, and Electronically Stored Information created, produced, received or sent by
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property.
Request for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or

employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, including but not limited
to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property (or any aspect or
portion thereof).
Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any and all documents,

correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and
any expert retained by you in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the
Subject Property by Plaintiff.
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Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents,
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and
Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property
by Plaintiff.

Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents,
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and
any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, (such as the City of Athol, Kootenai County, and
the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject Property, the
present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. This document
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take"
and up to the present."

Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of
the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years.

Request for Production No. 14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all
documents relating to your purchase of the Subject Property.

Request for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental
agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration paid
for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document request
shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take" and up
to the present.

Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for Development or Improvement)
Please produce each and every application for development, improvement, rezoning, annexation,
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or construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during the period of five (5)
years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date.
Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all
pleadings, claims, or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements,
descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens, or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of the
"date of take," and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date.
Request for Production No. 18: (Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive
Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens, interests, claims, easements,
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and for
the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date.
Request for Production No. 19: (Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy of
each and every document relating in any way to environmental contamination, hazardous waste
contamination, water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or
petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years immediately
prior to the "date of take" up to the present date.
Request for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and
unrecorded surveys that have been performed upon the Subject Property, and, if more than one
survey has been performed, please produce the most recently performed recorded survey.
Request for Production No. 21: (Water, Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of
any and all documents related to any application to provide the Subject Property with water,
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the current
availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property.
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Request for Production No. 22: Please produce any and all documents and

correspondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the
development or development planning of the Subject Property.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2011.

HOLLAND & HART LLP
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Ma.rfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
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D
D
D
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U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
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Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664:5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attomeys for Defendant HJ Grathol
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
.

.

STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TIIB STATE OF IDAHO. IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATIIOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVJNGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No.-CV-10_-10095

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
ANSWERS.AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTSFORPRODUCTION
OFDOCUMENTS

Defendants.

TO:

THBABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff1s First Set of
futerrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as foJlows:

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatozy No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or
expert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is
expected to testify.

EXHIBIT

.DEF.eNDANf HJ GRATHOL'S ANSWERS AND RBSPONSBS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIR.ST SET OF INTERROGA
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - I

i D
1:2
___
____
835 of 1617

Apr.15. 2011 12:32PM

No. 2502

P. 3

ANSWER: Defendant has not yet detennined with certainty who they may call as
either expert or lay witness in this matter. Discovery is ongoing and any or all of the
individuals identified through discovery who possess relevant information may be called.
The substance of all expected trial testimony will be developed during the course of
discovery in this case. However, it is anticipated that Defendant may call any of the
following individuals as trial witnesses and those witnesses may testify as to facts known and

opinions held, as generally summarized below:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

AlanJohnson

(3)

GeoffReeslund

These persons may give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development
plans for the Subject Property; opinion testimony as to its use(s), its value (before and after
the condemnation), the value of the Defendant's property remaining after condemnation and
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and
expenses associated with the purchase, holding and development of the property; planning
and design work associated with the property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and

after condemnation; and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining property.
(4)

Dewitt "Skip" Sheiwood

(5)

EdMorse

(6)

Dee Jamison

(7)

Scott Taylor

(8)

Brent Heleker
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These persons may give testimony, including opinion testimony as to the value of the
Subject Property, pre-condemnation and post-condemnation, including impacts to the value
occasioned by tliis condemnation, and other matters within their knowledge or expertise.

(9)

Ron Harvey, Idaho Transportation Department

(10)

Yvonne Dingman, Idaho Transportation Department

(11)

Karl Vogt. counsel, Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals may be called to testify as to their .knowledge, information, and
actions relative to seeking acquisitipn of a portion of Defendant's property.
(12)

Darrell Manning, Chairman, Idaho Transportation Board

(13)

James Coleman, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(14)

Janice Vassar, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(15)

Jerry Whitehead, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(16)

Gary Blick, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(17)

Neil Miller, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(18)

Lee Gagner. Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(19)

Sue Higgins, Secretary Idaho Transportation Board

(20)

Brian W. Ness, Director, Idaho Transportation Department

(21)

Pam Lowe, former Director, Idaho Transportation Department

(22)

Jesse W. Smith, Jr., Right of Way Manager, Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals. or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge,
information and actions relative to approval of the project which precipitated the need to
condemn Defendant's property; future plans for construction of the US 95 improvements
through and adjacent to Defendant's property and other matters within their knowledge.
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James Coleman, named above, may also testify on behalf of Coleman Engineering regarding
the planning, design, and function of a proposed on-site sewage system and related
infrastructure servh1g Defendant's property.

(23)

Tom B, Cole, Chief Engineer, Idaho Transportation Department

(24)

Tamara R. Jauregui, Management Assistant. Idaho Transportation Department

(25)

Duane L. Zimmennan, P.L.S

(26)

Jason Minzghor, Idaho Transportation Department

(27)

Justin Wuest, !daho Transportation Department

(28)

Jerry Wilson, P.E., Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge,
information and actions relative to the design and construction of the highway improvements

across and adjacent to Defendant's property.
(29)

Ross Blanchard, Federal Highway Administration, Idaho Division

(30)

Rod Twete, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District

(31)

Monty Montgomery, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District

(32)

Marv Lekstrum, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District

(33)

Joe Wuest, Road Supervisor, Lakes Highway District

(34)

Eric W. Shanley, P.E., Lakes Highway District

These individuals may be called to testify as to communications and interactions with
the Idaho Transportation Department relative to acquisition and/or improvements of frontage
road(s) and access on State Highway 54 in the vicinity of Defendant's property and the

necessity, plan or expectations of bisecting Defendant's property with a frontage road.
(35)

David Evans and Associates, Inc., including Greg Holder, P.E., Michael Kosa1
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and/or Bill Stark.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this response in accordance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's Pretrial Order.
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify,
a complete statement of all opinions to he expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, ·

the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the
underlying facts and . data upon which those opinions are based, and all information

referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter,
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation
of the property. Th~ witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the
following:
(I)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

GeoffReeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)

Mark Johnson

(8)

Jeff Bond

(9)

Donald Smock
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PaulDaugharty

(11)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger

P. 7

As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such
persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).

(1)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA

(2)

E<l_Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these
Interrogatories, no fonnal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore. the remainder
of the infonnation requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal
appraisal reports are prepared, the infonnation in the above Interrogatory will be contained
within those appraisal reports.
Interrogatory No. 3:

(Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just

compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the
taking of a portion the Subject 'Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to
which you believe Defendant is entitle~. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which
may or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change.
ANSWER:

Defendant does not know at this time the precise amount of just

compensation which will be advocated at trial, Defendant may offer a value assessment at
the trial in this matter including, but not necessarily limited to, the Defendant's past and

intended future use and development of the properly as well as the opinions derived from
comparative market analysis undertaken by the Defendant for purposes of valuing the Subject
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Property, The basis of computation of the Defendant's
opinion of the value of the Subject
,
Property is s.et forth generally in the letter of June 28, 20 l 0 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD
and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York, Holland and Hart.
Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every
fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of

just compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taldng of a portion the
Subject Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and docwnent that describes,

shows, or _evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is
entitled.
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is overbroad, ambiguous and unreasonably
burdensome. Further, as phrased it seeks matters that are subject to attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product doctrine, and otherwise not discoverable under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the precise
amount of just compensation which will be advocated at trial as discovery and evaluation is
still underway. However, it is anticipated that Defendant will offer value opinions based

upon more appropriate comparable property sales which will establish a value of the portion
'•

condemned in a range of $3.00 to $5.00 per square foot for the part taken and severance
damages for the remainder. Among the facts supporting this valuation are the comparable

property sales described in the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York.
Interrogatozy No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Talce) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the talc:ing of a
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take' 1 as that tennis defined herein.
ANSWER:

It is Defendant's opinion that the fair market value of the Subject
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Property being taken before the take, was not less than $1.420,000.00 - up to approximately
$3,500,000.00 in its highest and best use. The basis of computation of the Defendant's

opinion of the value of the Subject Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28,
2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary
York.
Interrogato.cy No 6: (Opinion of fair market value~ After Talce) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a
porti~n of the Subject Property as of the· "date of take" as that tennis defined herein.
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is vague and ambiguous. Further, the

question as phrased seeks matters that are potentially subject to attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product, and the privileges afforded under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the value of the property

after the take because of the ongoing uncertainty as to time of construction, completion of
construction and ancillary severance damages occasioned by the construction and by project

influence/stigma.
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses'
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from
the taldng of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yes'', describe

the amount of severance damages! the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and

all facts and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied
upon, as a basis for that opinion.
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages will result. Defenda.t1t does
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of
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Plaintiffs actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance damages may not be fully known until after the
project is completed or at least construction is initiated.

Interrogatoxy No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for
the real property, the buildings, ·the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property.
Include in your answer any all special tenns or conditions related to your purchase of the
Subject Property,
ANSWER: Plaintiff already has the infonnation requested in this Interrogatory as it
was included in Plaintiff's own appraisal data and acquisition packet. Defendant's acquired

the Subject Property in a distress sale circumstance in 2008 for the total purchase price of
$1,450,000.00. Defendant does not know what is referred to as "any all special terms or
conditions . , .,, and as such cannot meaningfully answer this portion of the Interrogatocy,
Interrogatozy No, 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any
portion thereof) including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by
yoti or on your behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined
above) each appraisal.
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant has evaluated the property value on its own behalf and
with the assistance of consultants, including licensed real estate broker(s), certified, general
appraiser(s), and land use planner(s)/consultant(s).
Interrogatory No. l 0: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in
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the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so,

please state the following:
a,

Tne amount of annual income received;

b.

Every source of income for each year;

c.

The amoW1t received each year from each source of income.

ANSWER: A portion of the property has been leased on an annual basis to Shane

Smith d/b/a Blacksmith Fanns since its .acquisition. The rent derived from that use of the
.

'

property is $400.00 per month or $4,800.00 per year.
Interrogatory No. 11: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please state whether
in your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project

enhancement or project influence (also referred to as project blight). and if so, please provide
a full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert(s) reached
his or her conclusion and all facts, infonnation and data used or relied upon to support that
conclusion.

ANSWER! It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject Property has not experienced
and will not experience project enhancement. It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject
Property has suffered "project influence" or "blight" as those tenns are commonly used.
Defendant does not fully know at this time the amount of damage it has suffered by reason of
project influence or project blight and it is not possible to fully assess that element of damage
until the project has been completed or to even make an educated estimate until construction
is at least commenced and a completion date can be calculated.
Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or
entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien)
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adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify (as
defined above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use~ or

other interest.
ANSWER: Yes. Black Smith Fanns leased a portion of the property on a month-tomonth basis since its acquisition . .See, Response to Interrogatory No. 10, above,

Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the
"date of taken or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any
third party applied to the applicable planning and zoning department for the development or

improvement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction
permit on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined above) each and
every application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or
employed by your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the
Subject Property.
ANSWER: Subsequent to acquiring the Subject Property in 2008, Defendant, through

.

its development agent1 applied to Kootenai County to rezone the property from "Ruralu to the

"Commercial)) zone classification. The rezone was approved on or about November 20,
2008. Geoff Reeslund has been employed and retained to assist in the development and
improvement of the Subject Property, including application and submittals for zone change
and proposed subdivision of the property.

Defendant has also retained Coleman Engineering for professional services in the
design and development of sewer and wastewater treatment system to serve the Subject

Property and its anticipated development buyers/tenants. Defendant has also contracted with
and retained CLC Associates, Inc. as land use planners and architects to assist in the
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development of plans, schematics, and uses of the Subject Property, Defendant has also
contracted with and retained Intermountain Transportation Solutions to assist in analysis of
development plans and to conduct a Traffic Impact Study in order to facilitate development
proposals for the subject Property. Defendant has also contracted with and retained Allwest
Testing & Engineering, LLC as project geotechnical engineers to analyze the soils and gravel
of the Subject Property for development feasibility study purposes.
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If soJ please list and identify (as defined
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell.
. ANSWER; Yes. Defendant has actively marketed the property to prospective "end

users," both purchasers and tenants, to ascertain highest and best use options for development
of the property both with and without the anticipated project influences.

No fonnal

purchase/sale offers have been memorialized.

Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Contamination) As of the "date of takei 11 were
you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and

identify the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or
damage occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, and whether
the contamination or damage has been eradicated.
ANSWER: Please see, Defendant's Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (April
14i 2008) and the Phase II Assessment Correction Completion Certificate (May 6, 2008).
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copies of which are available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents
during regular business hours, upon reasonable request.
Interrogatory No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any,
to Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identity of any and all officers,
managers or other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please
also include any involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications
for zoning changes> annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed
improvements to the Subject Property.
ANSWER: D~fendant HJ Grathol is a Califomia general partnership which holds title
to the Subject Property, Hughes Investments, also a California general partnership is the

development agent for HJ Grathol on this property. Alan Johnson is employed by Hughes

Investments as Senior Vice President of Development and is a partner for development
purposes with Hughes Investments. Additional infonnation responsive to this Interrogatory
has been requested and will be supplemented.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Request for Production No. 1:

Please produce all documents identified, used,

referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above.

RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voluminous documents responsive to these
Requests for Production and will make them available for inspection and/or copying to
Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon reasonable request.
ReQUest for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action1 including Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) experts.
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RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production is overbroad and beyond the
scope of I.RC.P. 26(b)(4)(B). See also, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. At this time,
Defendant has not determined which experts it anticipates utilizing at trial, and discovery is
not permitted as to specially retained experts.
Reguest for Production No. 3: Please produce copies of all documents relied upon by

any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion
relating to the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: See) Answer to Interrogatory No. 2.
Reguest for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited
to, the appraisal reportsJ written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each

appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial
of this matter.

RESPONSE: Defendant has no appraisal reports responsive to this request) but
infonnation relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be found

in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and

Mary York referenced herein.
Reguest for Production No. 5: For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to
call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all
appraisal reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a
ten-mile radius of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5)
years.
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL' S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INlERROOATORlES AND
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RESPONSE: Defendant does not have any discoverable documents responsive to this

request.
Reguest for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents! objects or
things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this

matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or
other documents. If final exhibits have not been completed! please attach drafts, if available.
RESPONSE: Defendant has not yet determined what exhibits it will offer at trial but
will produce such exhibits consistent with the Court,s Pretrial Order.

Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which
relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis,
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that
Defendant intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attomey-cllent privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 8:

Please produce copies of all documents,

correspondence, and Electronically Stored Infonnation created, produced, received or sent by
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: Objection, This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied,
DEFENDANT HJ ORATIIOL"S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FID.ST SET OP IN1ERROOATORIBS AND
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(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or
employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, including but not
limited to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property (or any
aspect or portion thereof).
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.

Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any ·and all documents,

correspondence, communications, notesi and Electronically Stored Information between you
and any expert retained by you in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion
of the Subject Property by Plaintiff.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production see.ks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents,
correspondence, communications. notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you
and Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taldng of a portion of the Subject
Property by Plaintiff.
RESPONSE: Objection, This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding

this. discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(Seel Response to Request for Production No. 1. above.)
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Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents,
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Infonnation between you
and any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, (such as the City of Athol, Kootenai
County, and the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject
PropertyJ the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by

Plaintiff. This document request shall. relate to all such documents for a period of five (5)
years prior to the ''date of take" ~d up to the present.

RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to thls Request for Production have been complied.
(pee, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy
of each and every fmancial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value

of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.
Request for Production No. 14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all
documents relating to your purchase of the Subject Property.

RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
thisJ discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above,)

Reguest for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental
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agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration

paid for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of

take" and up to the present.
RESPONSE: Defendant has one document responsive to this Request for Production
which is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular

business hours, upon reasonable request.
Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for ·nevelopment or hnprovement)
Please produce each and evezy application for development, improvement, rezoning,

annexation, or construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during the
period of five (5) years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all
pleadings, claims; or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements,

descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens. or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of
the "date of take/' and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the

present date.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production other than the title insurance policy acquired at the time Defendant purchased
the property, A copy of the same is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL 'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SBT OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 18

852 of 1617

No. 2502

Apr.15. 2011 12:35PM

P. 20

and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon r~asonable request.
Request for Production No. 18:

(Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive

Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens) interests, claims, easements,
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and
for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.

Request for Production No. 19: ·(Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy
of each and every document relating in any way to environmental contamination. hazardous
waste contamination> water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks,

or petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years
immediately prior to the ''date of take'' up to the present date.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

Reguest for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and
unrecorded surveys that have been perfonned upon the Subject Property, and, if more than

one survey has been performed, please produce the most recently perfonned recorded survey.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding

this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)
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Request for Production No. 21: (Water) Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of
any and all documents related to any ap.1;>lication to provide the Subject Property with water,
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the
current availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property,
RESPONSE~ Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.
(See> Response to Request for Production No. 1, above,)

Request for Production No. 22:

Please produce any and all documents and

correspondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the

development or development planning of the Subject Property,

RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied.

(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.)

DATED this 15th day of April, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

~4.if 7K~-

Dougls, Marflce, -Ofthe Finn
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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VERIFICATION

STATEOFCALIFORNIA )
) ss.
County of
Orange
)

Alan Johnson

, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

}il [ff,0,J'\t)b \ ,

I am the managing member of
Defendant, in the aboveentitled action; I have read Defendant HJ Grahtol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents thereof,
and I state the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of May, 2O11by Alan Johnsri>n,
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who
appeared before me.

Notary Public for the State of California
Residing at Irvine, California
Commission Expires Dec. 23, 2013
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MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343--8869
myork@hollandhart.com

July 22, 2011

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Re:

ITD v. HJ GrathoL et aL
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVI0-10095

Dear Doug:
This purpose of this letter is to meet and confer on deficiencies we see in
Defendant HJ Grathol's responses to ITD's First Set oflnterrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents (the "April 15th discovery responses") and to address issues
that have arisen regarding the responses. We hope to resolve these issues with you
informally, without having to resort to a motion to compel.
First, the April 15th discovery responses are in direct conflict with the
representations that Mr. Gabbert made to Judge Haynes at the March 31, 2011 status
and scheduling conference. Specifically, Mr. Gabbert represented at the scheduling
conference that HJ Grathol would call, at most, two or three expert witnesses. This
conformed with our earlier conversations with you. Judge Haynes entered a scheduling
order and set a 10-day trial based on the representations that HJ Grathol would only call
two or three expert witnesses.
However. the April 15th discovery response list fourteen ( 14) potential expert
witnesses. See Response to Interrogatory No. 2. Regardless whether these witnesses
are designated "actor/view experts" or "valuation experts" these witnesses will be
providing expert testimony - which requires substantial additional time both at trial and
in discovery.
After we received the April 15th discovery response, I spoke with Chris Gabbert
about this and he indicated that he would speak to you about the number of witnesses
HJ Grathol intended to call at trial. If the number of experts is going to be greater than
the two or three represented to the Court, then the scheduling order will have to be
revised, the period of time for discovery extended, the trial will have to be moved to a
later date, and additional trial days will have to be reserved.

EXHIBIT

Holland & Hart LLP
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [2081 343-8869

www.hollandhart.com

101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O. Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527
Aspen Boulder Carson City Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center BIiiings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole Las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Sant
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If you only intend to call two or three witnesses to provide expert testimony,
regardless of whether they are "actor/viewer experts" or "valuation experts" please
identify which experts you actually intend to call so that, if possible, we can keep the
current trial date and schedule.
Second, your response to Interrogatory No. 8 indicated that you could not
describe any special terms or conditions of HJ Grathol 's purchase of the Subject
Property in 2008. You responded that the Subject Property was purchased in 2008 in a
distress sale, but did not describe any of the terms of the purchase. Additionally, ITD
does not have the information regarding the specific terms of your client's purchase of
the Subject Property. The documents provided (00648-00768) detail a purchase of the
Subject Property by Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation. It does not provide
documents regarding HJ Grathol's acquisition of the Subject Property. Please provide
documentation or an explanation how HJ Grathol acquired the Subject Property from
Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation. We are also entitled to know all terms of
the sale to and acquisition by HJ Grathol. Therefore, we request that you please
provide all terms and conditions of HJ Grathol's 2008 purchase of the Subject Property.
Third, your response to Interrogatory No. 9 represented that there were
appraisals done on the Subject Property. However, your response to Interrogatory
No. 9 failed to identify (as defined in the definition section) each of those appraisals.
Please indentify each of those appraisals and provide them pursuant to Request for
Production No. 1.
Fourth, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 stated that HJ Grathol received
offers to purchase the Subject Property in the five (5) years prior to the date of take.
However, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 failed to identify any of those offers.
Please fully respond to Interrogatory No. 14 by identifying, as that term is defined, each
and every offer to purchase or sell the Subject Property within the five (5) years prior to
the date of take. Please also provide any relevant documents pursuant to Request for
Production No. 1.
Fifth, your response to Interrogatory No. 16 references that "additional
information" regarding HJ Grathol's relationship to Hughes Investment has "been
requested and will be supplemented." Please provide us with that supplemental
information.
Sixth, your response to Request for Production No. 5 stated that you had no
"discoverable" appraisal reports prepared by your expert witnesses regarding properties
in the vicinity of the Subject Property. Please clarify whether or not appraisals
responsive to Request for Production No. 5 exist. If appraisals exist, they are
discoverable.
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Seventh, response to Request for Production No. 9 also states there are no
"discoverable" expert compensation agreements. We ask that you please produce all of
these agreements or explain how they are not "discoverable."
Eighth, your response to Request for Production No. 13 indicated that you had no
"discoverable" documents regarding the value of the Subject Property. Thus, it is our
understanding that no documents responsive to Request for Production No. 13 exist because if they did exist these documents would be discoverable. Please confirm that
your response to Request for Production No. 13 is that there are no "financial
statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of the Subject Property
has been set forth during the last five (5) years."
Ninth, please provide an explanation regarding your responses to Request for
Production Nos. 14 and 16. Specifically, please explain how documents relating to the
purchase of the Subject Property or applications for development are protected by the
attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. For example, is it your response
that the Subject Property was acquired for the purposes of this litigation?
Tenth, please provide us with any new or supplemental documents or information
responsive to our First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production.
We look forward to resolving the above- referenced issues with you. It is our
hope that we can resolve these discovery deficiencies without having to resort to a
motion to compel. Therefore, we request that you please provide us with full and
complete responses as outlined above by August 5, 2011 or we will be forced to turn to
the Court for assistance. Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

MVY:st
5098030_1.DOC
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d,Alene, Idaho 83816~1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grnthol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintitt:
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; ~nd DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial
Order and discloses the following experts intended to be called at the trial of the abovereferenced matter:

1)

Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood
Cornerstone Property Advisors
1311 N. Washington, Ste, C
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 321-2000

EXHIBIT
DEFENDANT HJ ORATHOL' S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE - l
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Statement of Testimony:

Mr. Sherwood is a real estate appraiser licensed in the states of Idaho and Washington.
He will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon
completion. Mr. Sherwood will testify generally as follows:
The subject property is was transferred to Gracal Corporation on May 22, 2008 from
North Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited liability corporation on May 22, 2008 and
subsequently from Gtacal Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California general paitnership on

October 15, 2009. According to the brokei- who sold the sit~ in May 2008, the sale price was
$1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property from a local lender for
a fat higher amount and the seller was highly motivated due to financial problems. At the
time of the sale the property was zoned residential. Cunent ovvners have paid for a rezone of
the site, engineering for site development plans, approval of city water to the site, and work
for an onsite sewage system.
County records indicate the property is identified under three parcel numbers: A0000-010-6350, 53N03Wl06100, and 53N03Wl05000. Assessed values for each of the
parcels for 2010 are as follows:
A00000 106350
53N03Wl06100
53N03Wl05000

Land $58,500

Improvement $59,944

Land $79,395
Land $150,469

The property is located on the NE Comer of Highway 95 and Highway 54 in Athol,
Idaho and contains approximately 56.8 acres. In the county assessor's records, parcel
53N03Wl05000 is indicated as a 63,24 acre parcel, which appears to be an e1Tor based on all
the other data reviewed on this site, Parcel A00000106350 has .419 acres and includes a
small commercial building, but it is also the SW comer of the site at the intersection of the
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highways and therefore considered an important part of the entire property. The subject
property is cun-ently zoned Commercial by the Kootenai County Plfilllling Department and
this zoning was obtained by the current owners since their purchase of the property in 2008.
The site is approximately 16 miles n011h of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8 miles
east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of Sandpoint. The
intersection currently consists of a convenience store on the SW corner, a restaurant/bar on
the NW comer, vacant land on the SE corner, and the subject along with some other
commercial uses on the NE comer along Highway

?S,

Although site is contiguous at this

time, the new interchange planned at this location show Sylvan Road being extended north
through the subject site when the interchange is built, splitting the subject site,
Major attractions in the immediate area include Farragut State Park to the east of this
location and Silve1wood Amusement Park two miles south of this location. Lake Pend
Oreille is accessible via public and commercial launch facilities at Bayview, Farragut, or
Sandpoint. Sandpoint is also the location of Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski area in the

Inland Northwest.
The site has approximately 750 feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090 feet
along Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points, Access is also available along Highway 95
as all three parcels include frontage along the highway, There is another property containing

1. 58 acres that is located north of the corner parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along
Highway 95 as well. Water to the site is available from the City of Athol and according to
the owner's representative, Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on development
of a modular waste treatment plant to meet needs for onsite sewage,

Other site utilities

include natural gas from Avista, electric from Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from
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Verizon. The site is generally level and at grade with both highways. The site is bounded by
Howard Road to the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this time, but these

trees have no marketable timber value.
Market conditions for Kootenai County were similar to other areas in the Inland
Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as well as appreciation rates from
2002 through 2006, The number of residential units sold in 2002 through the Coeur d'Alene

MLS was 2,958 and that number peaked at 5,035 units in 2005 declining to 2,821 units in
2006.

The average sale price through tiles~ same years was $138,908 in 2002 and it

increased to $271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a fom year period. In 2007 and 2008
the number of units sold continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with the average sale price
dropping to $269,120.

In 2009 the total number of units sold increased to 2,216 with the

average price dropping to $209,415, One of the reasons for the large drop in 2009 was a tax
credit for first time homebuyers. and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower pl'ice
properties,

2010 has continued to see fewer residential sales with prices continuing to

decline; however, there has been continued commercial development in Kootenai County in
the past two years, Two Wal-Mart Supercenters have been built in addition to a nev,r Super 1
Foods store and a Love's Travel Plaza being built. In addition the Highway 95 cmTidor has
seen the construction of a U.S. District Court Facility and a 55i000 square foot Western
States Cat facility in Hayden.
The highest and best use of the subject property is the ideal use of vacant land or an
improved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be legally permitted,

physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally productive. The subject is a large
tract of vacant commercially zoned land (with the exception of a small commercial building)
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on a <'lighted~) intersection of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger than
typically utilized for a "big box" retail user which can range from approximately 10 to 30
acres in size. Silverwood Amusement Park south of the subject occupies a large site
including parking. This is a unique use that has grown over the past 20+ years and recently
an application has been made by Silverwood to rezone an additional 90+ acres to the south of
its existing facilities, Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues, convenience
issues will no doubt spur residents to patronize locally situated commercial establishments.
The corner location and zoning o( the subject suggest commercial uses that can take
advantage of the traffic flow at this location that presently exists on Highway 95. I
understand from the owner's representative that they were in negotiation with URM for a sale
of a portion of the site for a Super One Grocery store. Mike Winger of URM confinned that
he had been involved in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that
was delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a new WINCO

in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of Hayden the likelihood of a new
grocery store at the subject site is less probable due to new competition that was not there
when negotiations were going on with Hughes, but that changing economic conditions have
not eliminated this possibility. Other potential uses include a travel plaza/truck stop, "big
box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R" ot "D & B" (local farm/ranch supply
stores), motel, and a convenience store; however, in my opinion only about ½ of the subject
site would be utilized for these uses. The balance of the site might include some self storage,
residential usesi or perhaps some type of light industrial use.

Clm-ent plans for the subject site included a new freeway interchange. The taking in
this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 acres leaving remnants on both sides
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of the new interchange. Remnants on the west side of the new interchange include the .419
comer parcel and a 3.87 acre parcel fronting the old Highway 95. On the east side of the new
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36.61 acres. The property enjoyed
access from both highways in the before situation and I understand that in the after will only
have limited access from Highway 54, Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which
bounds it to the east. As discussed earlier in this report, the planned Sylvan Road extension

will bisect the site effectively changing the original highest and best use analysis of the site.
With the site bisected, only the 8.~5 acres to the east of the new interchange and west of

Sylvan Road in addition to the 3.87 acres on the NW corner of the site~ and the .419 acre site
on the SW comer will be available for development out of the original west half of the site.
There will also likely be a condemnation of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it does
not cu1Tently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also unknown at this time which
may also be an additionalitem of reimbursement to the owners of the property ifldaho DOT
makes them pay for the road improvements.
I researched various large commerciai tract saies in the Spokane, Tri Cities, Coeur
d'Alene, and Moses Lake areas and am familiar with prices for sales in these areas for users
such as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes) Albertson's, Costco, Sam's
Club, and Wal-Ma1t. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection in most cases for locations as
is a benefit for customers to access stores easier. Freeway interchanges are often locations of
retail development, but generally these developments usually occur in higher density
residential areas.
As a lighted intersection with commercial zomng, I viewed the site as being

developed in two phases. With the site containing approximately 57 acres prior to the taking,
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I considered that approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 30 acre site would likely fit several anchors
such as grocery stores or other "big box" retail users. The 30 acres would also likely
accommodate other pad users such as banks, fast food uses, or convenience store uses in
addition to some additional ''inlinell retail uses associated with the big box users, Big box
users often pay $4 to as high as $9 per square foot for sites as in the recent WIN CO purchase
in Coeur d'Alene. The subject location is inferior to most of the comparables discussed in
this repo1t in that it is located in a more remote area and it doesn't presently enjoy the same
demographics; however, the lighted intersection of two state highways offers excellent
exposure for commercial uses and as traffic increases this location will become the "go to"
location between Haden and Sandpoint.
In the after scenario, the 16.31 acl'e take will leave three parcels; an 8.85 acre parcel
on the east side of the new interchange, a 3.87 acre parcel on the west side, and the .419 acre
parcel in the SW corner of the site. The balance of the site will be east of the newly planned
Sylvan Road. Access to these sites will be limited to the old Highway 95 fur the 3.87 acre
parcel and Highway 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.85 acre parcel. Estimating values in the
after situation will be contingent upon when the project is completed. Upon completion the
property will likely develop differently that in the before situation and although the property
on the east side of the freeway is still large enough to accommodate some big box retail uses,
but not stores as large as Wal-Ma11, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the completion of
this project projecting values into the future is extremely difficult.
I have considered the following comparable sales:

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE· 7
865 of 1617

Aug. 19. 2011

4:12PM

No. 4332

P. 9/25

Idaho Comparables
1. 1601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene~ Sale Price $3,528,360-Sale Date 8/09
Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $9.00
Comments: This was a former gravel pit site that was sold for a new WINCO
Grocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for the purchasers and granted
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access. The site included all
utilities. This property would be considered superior to the subject for location and
size.
2, Seltice Way and I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale Date 11/06
Size 235 AC - Price Per Foot $2.00
Comments: Foursquare Properties, developers, bought this site which consisted of
numerous parcels from two other developers and Cabela's committed to purchase 40
acres for a new _store at the same time frame. Although the site had utilities, the
developers paid to build all the interior streets and provide access to the Cabela's
parcel. Since the purchase another parcel has been sold for a new Wal-Mart which
recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and would be considered at
a lower rate for size~ but a superior rate for location. The purchasers paid for bringing
utilities to the site as well as significant costs for grading on the property to
accommodate the new building sites and roads.

3. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls - Sale Price $2,936,161- Sale Date 11/06
Size 13.5 AC (588,060 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.00
Comments: This sale is in the City of Post Falls and utilities were available. It was
purchased with the intention of retail development. This is the SB corner of the
intersection. This sale is a smaller parcel than the subject which would indicate a
lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for location at a lighted intersection,
but also a superior location demographically, although the subject has higher traffic
counts.

4. Highway41 &PrairiePostFalls-SalePrice$6,591,591-SaleDate 10/07
Size 50.44 AC (2,197,197 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $3.00
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Station
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post
Falls. The site was not zoned for commercial development} but the purchaser was
confident that they could develop the site. This is an excellent comparable for the
subject in terms of overall size and a similar location at a lighted intersection, but a
superior location demographically. The property has no sewer which likely may need
to be purchased from the City of Post Falls.

5, Highway 95 & Garwood Road-Sale Price $1,017,200- Sale Date 7/08
Size 4.41 AC (192,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30
Comments: This was the sale of the Gaiwood Saloon property to Idaho DOT. The
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sale price was confirmed with the attorney for the property owner and he relayed that

it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like the subject and it
is the next "lighted" intersection south of the subject on Highway 95. This
intersection is with a county road versus another state highway like the subject. The
site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher value and it is also a
superior location being closer to Coeur dl Alene. I understand this sale was negotiated
under the threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not
represent true market value for this reason.
6. Ramsey & Appleway- Sale Price $7)800,000 - Sale Date 11/07
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $10.53
This sale was confim1ed with the owner who sold the property to the Coeur d, Alene
Tribe. The site is near comparable 1 and considered superior to the subject in that it is
a smaller parcel and located in a better location.
7. Highway 95 & Sagle Road- Sale Price $3,400,000-Sale Date 3/08
Size 29 AC (1,263,249 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $2.69
This sale was confirmed with the broker who sold the property. The site was zoned
for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the sale relayed
that the property is currently for sale as 5 lots. This parcel does not have access to
Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like the subject. This is
an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size and it would be considered
slightly superior for location being closer to Sandpoint, but inferior as it does not have
a lighted intersection and it does not have access to Highway 95.
Washington Cornparables
8. 9527 N Nevada-Sale Price $4)813,685 -Sale Date 7/07
Size 18.71 AC (815,100 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $5.91
This was the site of a new WINCO in Spokane that has been built and it included
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a higher value and also
a superior location.

9. 21801 E Country Vista - Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/05
Size 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.00
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90 that
has been built onsite, This site is smaller indicating a higher value and also a superior
location.
10. 4315 E Sprague- Sale Price $7,559,686- Sale Date 9/06
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $7.55
This is a Wal-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that has not yet been built.
The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn 1t have
sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific Railroad
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and required extensive work for development. The site is somewhat similar ·in size,
but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to COSTCO.
Sales of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard to
economic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as they reflect prices for
big box retail uses.

VALUE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION

In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with commercial
zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the values of the comparable sales
with pl'imary emphasis on comparnbles 5 and 7 as they are on the san1e highway and located
north and south of the subject. Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was
given more weight like comparables 5 and 7. I also considered the sizes and locations of the
other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject. I also considered the purchase
price of the subject as well as the motivation of the seller when the property was sold for

$1,450,000, but as mentioned earlier, the seller was distressed and the site was not
commercially zoned at the time of the sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot
the majority of the value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site. Based
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have had a value in the
range of$2.25 per foot or $2,940,300.
VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION

In the after situation, the west 30 acres will be bisected by the taking, This taking will
result in the loss of 16.41 acres leaving an after value estimate as follows:

Take

= $2,940,300
= $1,598,543

After Value

= $1,344,457

Value Before
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There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some commercial
developments, but there will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.87, and .419 acres. These remaining
parcels can accommodate various uses, but the chances of any big box retail use on the west
30 acre site a1·e gone. With the planned Sylvan Road forming a boundary for the remaining
property the remaining property is also bisected,
Until a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value for the remaining
parcels due the unknowns of the anticipated project.
Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as published
by

IDrs website, an assumption can be made that the best case scenario for project

construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming this construction date is accurate, the
project might be completed in the spring of 2012. If the planned construction date is laterj
the completion date will be moved fa1ther into the future.

In my opinion, no potential user of

the remaining property would have any interest in using any of the remaining parcels until
they know for certain when the project will be completed. Assuming the completion can be
completed as forecast above in the spring of 2012, the value of the land would need to be
discounted from the present date.

The discount is applicable as no one would pay for

something today that they can't receive until a future date, This same principal applies to
valuing a subdivision that is slated to be developed in the future or the purchase of an income
stream like a real estate contract.
In attempting to value the remaining parcels, I have made the assumption that they

will have a similar value to the before scenario at $2.25 per square foot. I have also assumed
that they will be available for use upon completion of the new freeway at the earliest in the
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spring of 2012 and the latest in the spring of 2013. This results in a discount time frame of
1.5 to 2.5 years from the date of valuation, Using this scenario, the future value of the

remaining parcels of $1,344,457 would be discounted to a present value.
The discount rate is basically a rate of return that someone is looking for on a given
investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates of safe investments,
market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we are dealing with undeveloped land in
uncertain economic times. For this reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization
rates in the current market and utilized a rate of 10%. The higher rate used to discount the
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns concerning this project including the
unknown timing of the project being finished, issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road
being built, the cost of who will be responsible for the cost of Sylvan Road, and the need for
condemnation of the right of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the
anticipated after value of $1,344,457 yielded the following present values for 1.5 to 2.5 years:

1.5 years
2,5 years

= $1,165,354

= $1,059,413

Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded value
estimates were completed as follows:

Before Value
After Present Value 1.5 years
After Present Value 2.5 years
Difference Rounded

= $2,940,300
.: : : $1,165,000
= $1,060,000
== $1,775,000 - $1,880,000

This difference in value does not address the value of the Sylvan Road, cost of

constructfon of Sylvan Road, or loss of access to Highway 54 which are all potential
additional items of compensation.
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Data and Other Information Considered in F om1ing Testimony:

The data, documents, and information relied on by Mr. Sherwood in fonnulating his
opinions are:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection ofthe site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Kootenai County Assessor's records;
Property records and documents for the property and comparable properties; and
MLS sales data and comparable sales information from personal interviews with
transaction participants/agents

C.

Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Supp01t for Testimony:

Mr. Sherwood may use the documents and infmmation identified in his appraisal report
to summarize, illustrate, or suppo1t his testimony. He may also use some or all of the following:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, rlght-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Kootenai County Assessor's recol'ds;
Property records and documents for the property and comparabie properties; and
MLS sales data and comparable sales info1mation

D.

Qualifications of Mr. Sherwood:

The qualifications of Mr. Sherwood are set forth in his curriculum vitae, attached
hereto.
E.

Compensation Paid to Mr. Sherwood:

:W.Ir. Sherwood was paid a flat fee for his appraisal research/evaluation. He will be paid

his standard hourly rate of $175.00 per hour for research and testimony.
F.

Pubiications Authored by Mr, Sherwood in the Past Ten Years: None.
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Ust of Other Cases in Which Mr, Shenvood has Testified as an Expe1t:
WSDOTvs. McKinley
City ofSpokane vs. Frost
WSDOT vs. Costich
Schade vs. American West Bank
City ofCheney vs. Showies
WSDOTvs, Swanson
Avista vs. Ashland Estates
Jergens vs. Jergens
Cuny vs, Lenhertz
Stevens County vs. Taylor
Stevens County vs. Nelson
Zunino vs. Rejewski
Raynor vs. IPEC
WSDOTvs. Douglass
City ofSpokane vs. Vonholt
Peltier, et al vs. Markley, et al
Martin Estate
Sinchuck vs. Casteal
WSDOTvs. Miller
Idaho DOT-vs. Romine
WSDOT vs. Wittkop[
Benton County vs. Ross
WSDOTvs. Coffield
Koch et al vs. Shields
Lindell vs. Lindell
Bell vs. McDaniel
Yon vs. Gibbs
Walter vs. Malott
Colley vs. Steelman Duff
WSDOTvs. Smith
Purvis vs. Purvis
SRM vs. Barnes & Noble

Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition & Testify
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Testify
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition & Testify
Deposition
Deposition and Testify
Deposition
Deposition and Testify
Testify
Deposition and Testify

Testify
Testify
Deposition
Deposition
Testify

Deposition

2)

Geoffrey B. ReeslundJ AJA
Vice President, Director of Design and Construction
Hughes Investments, LLC
Clo Ramsden & Lyons, LLP

A.

Statement of Nature of Testimony:

Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the development plans for the Property,
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations
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on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land use planning/entitlement,
construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and
development of the Property; planning and design work associated with the property; and the
effects of the condemnation on the development of the remaining Property.

B.

Data and Other Information Considered in Forming Testimony:

Mr. Reeslund has relied on the following data and documents in this matter:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Engineering standards and guidelines; and
Property records and documents
C.

Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summazy of or Support for Testimony:

Mr. Reeslund may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his
testimony:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Engineering standards and guidelines; and
Property records and documents

D.

Qualifications of Mr. Reeslund:

Mr. Reeslund is a graduate of the University of Southern California, where he earned
Bachelors and Masters Degrees in Architecture. A registered Architect since 1977, for over
21 years Geoff worked for SGPA Architecture and Planning, one of the foremost

retail/commercial architectural firms in the country. A Principal with SGPA si11ce 1986, he
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provided leadership in the planning, design and entitlement prncessing of over 200
community, specialty, regional and ente1tainment centers throughout California and other
\Vestem states, including nine projects for Hughes. In addition, he served as SGPA's
Southern California Marketing Director from 1993 to 1997, helping to expand their pl'esence

and Client bf)se in the region.
As Director of Design and Construction at Hughes Investments, Mr. Reeslund
oversees all aspects of project planning, design~ governmental approvalsi and construction.
He assembles and manages the project consultant teams, works closely with tenants and their
consultants, and coordinates the construction process to a successful completion,
Mr. Reeslund is a member of the American Institute of Architects, and is actively
involved in the Intemational Council of Shopping Centers.

E.

Compensation Paid to Mr. Reeslund:

Mr. Reeslund is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC, His only compensation is his
regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is
being paid for his testimony.

F.

Publications Authored by Mr. Reeslund in the Past Ten Years; None.

G.

List of Other Cases in Which Mr. Reeslund has Testified as an Expert: None.

3)

Alan Johnson

Senior Vice President, Development
Hug._hes Investments, LLC
Clo Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
A.

Statement of Testimony:

Mr. Johnson will give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development plans
for the Property1 testimony as to its uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the
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values of the Property remaining after condemnation and before and after construction and
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase,
holding and development of the Property~ planning and design work associated with the
property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation; and the effects of
the condemnation on the remaining Pl'operty.

B.

Data and Other Infom1ation Considered in Forming Testimony:

Mr. Johnson has relied on the following data and documents in this matter:
Planning documents related to the Property~
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;

Engineering standards and guidelines; and
Property records and documents
C.

Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summruy of or Support for Testimon__x:

Mr. Johnson may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his
testimony:
Planning documents related to the Property;
Environmental documents related to the Property;
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans;
Personal inspection of the site of the property;
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications;
Planning and zoning documents;
Engineering standards and guidelines; and
Property records and documents
D.

Qualifications ofMr. Johnson:

Mr. Johnson attended Mount Royal College in his native Calgary, Canada and

graduated from the University of Oklahoma in Nmman, Oklahoma. After graduation in
1983, he joined Coldwell Banker now CB Richard Ellis, as a retail specialist, transferring to
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In 1989 Mr. Johnson was hired by Hughes

Investments as Vice President - Leasing. After nine years with Hughes Investments, Mr.
Johnson joined The Irvine Company as Director of Leasing and concentrated on the
development and leasing of several ground-up projects including The Market Place - Irvine,
Northpark Plaza, Quail Hill, Trabuco Grove, Oakcreek Village, Irvine Spectrum Pavilion,
Newport Coast, The Bluffs and several other projects throughout Irvine and Newport Beach.

Mr. Johnson completed transactions and fom1ed relationships with Albertsons, Sav-on Drugs,
Lowe's, Target, Kohl's, Office Depot, Ralph's, Ethan Allen, Vons, Sears and many other
national tenants,
In September of 2003 Mr. Johnson left The Irvine Company to serve as Senior Vice
President, Development with Hughes Investments. Mr. Johnson is responsible for all phases
of acquisition and development of shopping centers throughout California. Utah. Washington
and Idaho. Mr. Johnson is a member of ICSC and has attained his Senior Certified Leasing
Specialist "SCLS" credential.

E.

Com12ensation Paid to Mr. Johnson:

Mr. Johnson is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC. His only compensation is his
regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is
· being paid for his testimony.
F.

Publications Authored by Mr, Johnson in the Past Ten Years: None.

G.

List of Other Cases in Which l\tfr. Johnson has Testified as an Expert: None.
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As an actor/viewer ''expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of

persons, such as Reeslund and Johnson. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 (West 1995).
5)

Reservation.

Defendant reserves the right to call additional expe1t witnesses, including fact and
expert witnesses, identified through discovery by Defendant. Defendant also reserves the
right to call any expert disclosed by Plaintiff through those certain expe1t disclosures filed by
Plaintiff pursuant to the Comt's Uniform Pretrial Otder and the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure. Defendant further resei-ves the right to supplement this response in a timely
manner and upon proper motion to identify rebuttal expert witnesses should the same be
necessary in light of Plaintiff's disclosures both through discove1y and Plaintiffs expert
disclosures.
DATED this 19 111 day of August, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l 911i day of August, 2011, I served a true and correct. copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transp01tation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
vemight Mail
and Delivered
~
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~land Delivered

__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHERWOOD

APPRAISER QUALIFICATIONS
EDUCATION
Bachelor of Science Degree - Educatjon - University of Mont. - 1970
Navigator Flight Training - USAF 1971
30 Semester Hours - Masters Degree - Guidance & Counseling
1973 - I 975 Central Michigan University & Chapman College
Residential Appraisal - 1978 - Amerjcan Institut.e of RE Appraisers
Real Estate Law - 1978-Rockwell lnstitute
Fundamentals of Real Estate Investment and Taxation-1980-CCIM
Course l O1 - National Association of Realtors
Fundamentals of Real Estate Appraisal - 1997 -Mykut RE School
USPAP 1991,1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007
.
IRS 1OJI ·Exchanges & Charitable Trusts - 1993 - NW Closing
Commercial Real· Estate Tax Update - 1994 - WA Assn. RE
Marshall Swift Cost Analysis - I 99$ - Appraisal Inst.
Multifamily Appraisals - 1999.,.. McKissock Data
Regression Analysis - 1999 - McKissock Data
Income Capitalization - 2002 - McK.issock Data
Disclosures and Disclaimers -2005 - McKissock Data
Red Flags Property Inspection Guide - 2005 - Mykut RE School
Environmental Issues in Real Estate Practice - 2005 - Mykut RE
Valuation ofDetrimental·Conditions in RE- 2007 -Appraisal Inst.
BUSINESS HISTORY
1971 -1977 Navigator & Instructor USAF
1977 - 1979 Real Estate Sales, Crane & Ward Realtors, Spokane, WA
1980-1984 Real Estate Sales, Wolff & Walker Realtors, Spokane
1984 - 2005·- Real Estate Appraising & Sales, Byrd RE Grp. LLC
2005 - Present - Cornerstone Property Advjsors, Spokane, WA
1977 - 1981 ·Mortgage & ·Finance Committee, Spokane Brd. of RE
1986 - Member of Commercial Multiple Listing Committee
1986 - Instructor for Metropolitan Mortgage - Financial Analysis
1977 - Present- Member Spokane Ass~. of Realtors
1976 - I 994 - Officer Wash. Air National Guard, Retired Lt. Colonel
2005 - Instructor- Lannan Education Services - Eau Claire, WI
1997 - Licensed General Appraiser, WA # 1100412
2004-Licensed General Appraiser, ID #CGA 1125
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DEWITIM, <'SKIP,, SHERWOOD
(Appraiser Qualifications Continued)

SAMPLES OF APPRAISAL ASSIGNMENTS
REO (real estate owned) properties for various lenders
Non-conforming properties for various lenders
Estate Appraisals - Commercial, Land, & Residential
Internal Revenue Appraisals -All Types
Feasibility Analysis for Real Estate Investors
Insurance Company Va]uations -AU Types
Condemnation Appraisals .:.. All Types
Qualified as an Expert Witness -Superior Court of WA-Counties of
Spokane; Adams, Grant, & Pend OreiUe -. Su_perior Court of ID Bonner County
PARTIAL LIST OF APPRAISAL CLIENTS
Al1ied Insurance Company, Spokane Washington
American States Insurance, Indianapolis, Indiana
American West Bank, Spokane, Washington
Burlington Northern Santa Fee Railroad
Central Pre-Mix, Spokane, Washington
City of Cheney, Washington
City of Fairfield, Washington
Farmers Insurance Group
Fanners and Merchants Bank, Spokane, Washington
General·Electric Corporation, Kent, Washington
Global Credit UnionJ Spokane, Washington
Kaiser.Aluminum; Spokane, Washington
Marsh Insurance, Spokane, ·Washington
Prudential Insurance Company> San Francisco, California
SAFECO: Insurance,. Seattle, Washington
Spokane County Washington
Tomlinson Black Realtors, Spokane, Washington
Unigard Insurance, Spokane, Washington
US Bank, Spoka.ne,.Washington
United States ·Marshals Service
Wheatland Bank, Spokane1 Washington
Numerous Attorneys & Accountants
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MaryV, York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Felix (208) 343-8869
myork@ihollandhart.com

August 24, 20Il

Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and
E-mail: fim@,ramsdenlyons.com
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court1 Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095

Dear Doug:
This letter constitutes our efforts to "meet and confer" regarding the deficiencies in
your Expert Witness Disclosure received August 19, 2011, prior to seeking intervention by the
Court.
First, your expert disclosures do not comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, nor do they
comply with discQvery requirements. Under Idaho case law and the Court's order, expert
opinions and the bases of the. opinions must be disclosed, whether formed for litigation or not.
The Pretrial Order states:
2.

EXPERT WITNESSES:

Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before. trial,
Plantiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at triaJ. Not
later than one hundre!J fifty (15()) days before, Defendant(s)
shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Rebuttal
witnesses shall be disclosed by all parties not later than ninety
(90) days before trial. Such disclosure shall consist of at .least
the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P.
26(b)(4)(i). Notice of compliance shall be contemporaneously
filed with the Court.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(i) requires, among other things, the expert to
disclose a "complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefore." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(i) states the following:
(4) Trial preparation--Experts. Discovery of facts known and
opinions held by experts, expected to testify, otherwise

EXHIBIT

Holland&Hart LJ.P
Phone [208] 342-5000

Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com

101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise.ID 83702 Mailing Add res• P.O.Box 2527 Boise.ID 83701-2527
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Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
August 24, 2011
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discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(l) of this
rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for
trial, may be obtained by interrogatory and/or deposition,
including:
(A) (i) A complete statement of .all opm1ons to be
expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions;
any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the
opinions; any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten
years; the compensation to be paid for the testimony; and a listing
of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert
at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
Please provide full and complete disclosures as requ~red by the Courf s order within
seven (7) days of the date of this letter, which we are faxing and emailing to you today.
Otherwise, we will file our motion to compel.
Second, the disclosure regarding Mr. Sherwood states that "He will testify in
accordance with his appraisal report, which will he provided to Plaintiff upon completion."
Under the scheduling order, Mr. Sherwood's report was req11ired to be completed and delivered
to us by the expert disclosure deadline. Moreover, references to Mr. Sherwood and his report
have been made for nearly a year. No possible reason or excuse exists for failure to complete
the report after these many months and after the Court-imposed deadline for expert disclosures.
Please produce Mr. Sherwood's report within seven (7) days of the date of this letter.
If we do not receive his report by that date, we will file a. mi;ition to exclude any testimony by
Mr. Sherwood that he. appraised the property, that he prepared a report, and any testimony not
contained in the expert disclosures of August 19, 2011.
Third, please respond within seven (7) days to our letter of July 22, 2011 regarding
deficiencies in the Defendant's discovery responses.

U/ofHolland & Hart LLP

MVY:st
52110S6_2.DOC

882 of 1617

11ug,o.

lVII

No. 44 73

IL:JLrM

P. 2/4

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNBYS AT LAW
MICl1Alil. &. ftAMSD!ltl•

MARC A. LYONS•
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August 29. 2011

Via facsimile (208) 343-8869
MatyV. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.0. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

The Stat~ ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol, et al.
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10~10095

Dear Mary,
We have reviewed your correspondence dated July 22, 2011 taking exception to
Defendant Grathol's discovery responses and the letter of August 24, 2011 over your
signature concerning the expert witness disclosure we filed and served August 19, 2011. I
will address the points in the order pl'esented in your letters:
1) Expert witnesses. Grathol's recent expert witness disclosures should have addressed
your concerns as to the identity of our anticipated testifying opinion witnesses. The
disclosure filed on August 19, 201 I compiles wlth the :Pretrial Order and contains all
of the information required by Rule 26(\>)(4)(i), Referring specifically to the August
241h letter (signed by Mr. Tollefson on your behalf), nothing in the Pretrial Order or
the State Court Rules requires a testifying expert to prepare a formal) written report,
''Full and complete disclosures as required by the Couit's Order . , ,'' wereJ in fact,
made in the expert witness disclosul'e. Nevertheless, Skip Sherwood is preparing a
report, the contents of which will comport to the disclosure and will be pL'ovided to
you once it is completed.
2) Inten·ogatory No. 8. - We have produced tho documents describing the pul'Chase of
the subject property and all te1•ms 1·elated thereto. It appeai·s that you are more
precisely seeking information regarding the ownership oftht, property by HJ Grathol,
instead of the acquisition of the property by Hughes Investments. As such, your
inquiry focuses on the 1·elationship between the two entitiesJ which have been
EXHIBIT
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August 29, 2011
Pagel
described in our answer to Interrogatory No. 16, and a supplemental answer dated
May 16> 2011. If this response does not adequately address the information you are
seeking please let us lmow.
3) Interrogatory No, 9. - The property has been fully evaluated by Skip Sherwood and
his opinions and the basis for his opinions were included in Defendant's Expert
Witness Disclosure, Because Mr. She1wood is the only retained valuation expert we
anticipate calling to testify, his opinions and the basis for them are the only facts
discoverable. Appraisals, if any, prepare by non•testifying expert witnesses and
consultants are not discoverable.

4) Interrogatory No. l4. - .Your interrogatory was compound. It asked whether
defendant made any offers to sell m: received any offers to buy the property. Grathol
reSponded to th~ 1·equest indicating that it has not received any formal, written offers
for the purchase of the StJbject Property (other than ITD's "offer"). It has, however,
marketed the property for sale or lease as the answer described. Please make fill effort
to read the subject discovery before complaining about the adequacy of the response.
5) Inten-ogatory No. 16. - Additional information responsive to this request was
provided to your office on May 16, 2011, via Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental
Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Intell"ogatories and Request for
Production of Documents, Please make an effort to read the discovery before,
including the supplemental responses, befote complaining about the adequacy of the
response.

6) Reguest for Production No, 5. - Discoverable information responsive to this Request
for Production was set forth in Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure. To the extent
that Defendants specifically retained or consulted with other experts who are not
expected to testify, such information is precluded from discovery by application of
IRCP 26(b)(4)(B). To the extent the Defendant's anticipated testifying expert has
appraised other properties; those documents are not discoverable in this case.
7) Reguest for Production No. 9, - lnformatlon responsive to this request was included
in Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, including compensation to be paid for
testimony by the expert. Any other compensation agreements with experts not
expected to testify are precluded from discovery by application ofIRCP 26(b)(4)(B).
8) Request for Prnduction No, 13. -There are no discove1·able documents responsive to
this Request.
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9) Reguest for Productions Nos, 14 and 16. -As stated, the materials responsive to this
request may contain attorney-client privileged materials, if they contained internal
privileged discussions of the legal implications involved with acquisition,
development and or/zoning changes, Notwithstanding the stated objection, all
responsive matel'ials were provided.

Please review these responses and let me know ifthere is anything else.

CDO/sj
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September 19, 2011

Viafacsimile (208) 343-8869

Letter Only
MaryV. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box:2527
Boise, ID ·83701

Re:

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Graihol, et al.
Kootenai Co. Case No, CV-10-10095

Dear Mary,
This correspondence is in follow up to our telephone conversation on Friday.
September 9, 2011, regarding various ongoing discovery issues, I will attempt to address our
discussion in the order presented to the best of my recollection.
. 1. Ongoing Discovery:

First, enclosed herewith please find Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery
Responses. Included with these responses is a copy of the recently completed appraisal
report of Dewitt Sherwood. The contents of the report are entirely consistent with the Expert
Witness Disclosure previously filed. This report should alleviate your client's concerns with
respect to Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, dated August 19, 2011. We stand on our
position that lRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) does not require such a report to be created. Further,
contrary to Mr. Tollefson's letter of August 24, 2011, the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order did
not require that such a report be created or disclosed by the expert witness deadline. Instead,
the Pretrial Order simply requires disclosure of the information listed in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)
which we have done. Nonetheless, Mr, Sherwood had completed a report, which you now
liave a copy of.
EXHIBIT
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Second, I included in Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery Responses some
additional information in light of our discussions. I included a supplemental response to
Inte1Togato:ry No. 8 pertaining to the cash purchase of the property and a reference to the
Phase I Environmental Site Assessment and Phase II Completion Certificate which were
previously produced, There are no other terms or conditions related to the purchase of the
property. I also supplemented our Response to Interrogatory No. 9 that there were no
appraisals performed on the Subject Property when our client acquired it. The supplemental
response to Interrogatory No. 14 describes marketing discussions and inquiries about the
property. Again, I reiterated that no offers were made/received.
With respect to Request for Production No. 5, (appraisals performed by Mr.
Sherwood during the previous five years), Defendant stands.on its prior response that it does
not have any documents responsive to this request. To the extent such documents exist, they
would likely either be in the possession of Mr. Sherwood or the persons who commissioned
them and subject to the ownership interests of whatever client or entity employed Mr.
Sherwood to conduct them. However, Defendant does not own or have in its possession
such materials, therefore, canlt produce them.
With respect to Request for Production No. 13, we will supplement this request with
additional materials, as necessary. As to Request for Production Nos. 14 and 16, there are no
additional materials responsive to this request.

2. Johnson and Reeslund as Opinion Witnesses:
Defendant disclosed Mr. Jolmson and Mr. R.eeslund as "expert witnesses" in order to
comply with the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order. However, these individuals are not "expert
witnesses" in the traditional sense of a Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) disclosure. They fall within the
"actor/viewer exception', possessing information not acquired in preparation for litigation,
but instead are actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject
matter of this litigation - specifically the history, development, construction and value of the
subject property. See, Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b)(4).
These "experts" are to be treated as ordinary witnesses, and as such, Mr. Tollefson's
assertions that our Disclosure with respect to these individuals fails to comply with Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(i) is without merit, Out of an abundance of caution, these individuals were
identified because they will testify as to $eir opinions concerning the Subject Property,
including their opinions of its potential· developability and its value before and after
condemnation. These opinions might constitute what is traditionally thought of as "expert"
testimony because their opinions are based upon specialized knowledge, experience and
expertise, but that fact alone does not subject them to Rule 26(b)(4(A)(i) considerations.
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You indicated that you desire to depose Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund and we
provided their availability to do so on October 51\ 61\ 251h and 26th • With respect to your
request that all of their opinions be disclosed to you, that information may be discovered
through their depositions which you are entitled to talce, Their opinions will be based on
their observations and familiarity with the property, their experience and history in
commercial developments and on the documentary materials previously produced and
disclosed to you.
We do not agree that your request for infonnation concerning other (unrelated)
projects with which our clients have been involved are either relevant or discovei:able, but in
the interest of avoiding any further arguments, we will produce that information to you and

are compiling the supplemental infonnation.
Pl.ease let us know when you would like to take these deposition

your consideration.

hristopher D, Gabbert
CDG/sj
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows:

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify,
a compiete statement of aii opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore,
EXHIBIT
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the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter,
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation
of the property. The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the
following:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geoff Reeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

{'7\

\' J

Mark Jo!u1son

(8)

Jeff Bond

(9)

Donald Smock

( 10)

Paul Daugharty

(11)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger

As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such
persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAlNTIFF'S FlRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 2
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( 1)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA

(2)

Ed Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these
Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder
of the info1mation requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal
appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above Interrogatory will be contained
within those appraisal reports.
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip: Sherwood, CGA,

produced herewith and Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 25, 2011.
Interrogatory No. 3:

(Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just

compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to
which you believe Defendant is entitled. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which
may or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change.
Af~SWER:

Defendant does not know at this time the precise amount of just

compensation which will be advocated at trial. Defendant may offer a value assessment at
the trial in this matter including, but not necessarily limited to, the Defendant's past and
intended future use and development of the properly as well as the opinions derived from
comparative market analysis undertaken by the Defendant for purposes of valuing the Subject
Property. The basis of computation of the Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject
Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28, 2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD
and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York, Holland and Hart.

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
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Supplemental Answer: Based upon the appraisal calculations prepared to date,
Defendant anticipates that it will advocate just compensation for the land taken of not
less than $1,775,000.00 per the opinion of Dewitt Sherwood. Additionally, Defendant
anticipates advocating additional severance damages not less than $1,000,000.00 for
diminishment to the use and developability of the property for commercial purposes,
project influence, project delay and damages related to the anticipated loss of property
and utility of the property with the extension of Sylvan Road and loss of access,
visibility and development opportunity, and tax liabilities.

Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every
fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of
just compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taking of a portion the
Subject Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and document that describes,
shows, or evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is
entitled.
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is overbroad, ambiguous and unreasonably
burdensome. Further, as phrased it seeks matters that are subject to attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product doctrine, and otherwise not discoverable under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the precise
amount of just compensation which will be advocated at trial as discovery and evaluation is
still underway. However, it is anticipated that Defendant wiii offer value opinions based
upon more appropriate comparable property sales which will establish a value of the portion
condemned in a range of $3.00 to $5.00 per square foot for the part taken and severance

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAJNTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 4
892 of 1617

damages for the remainder. Among the facts supporting this valuation are the comparable
property sales described in the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York.
Supplemental Answer: See, Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 3.
Interrogatory No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Take) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the taking of a
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein.
ANSWER:

It is Defendant's opinion that the fair market value of the Subject

Property being taken before the take was not less than $1,420,000.00 - up to approximately
$3,500,000.00 in its highest and best use. The basis of computation of the Defendant's
opinion of the value of the Subject Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28,
2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary
York.
Supplemental Answer: It is the opinion of Defendant's designated expert witness
(appraiser) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood that the fair market value of the Subject Property
before the take was $2,940,300.00. It is the opinion of Defendant's general and limited
partners, who as owners of the Subject Property are deemed competent to opine as to
its value, that the fair market value before the take was approximately $3.00 per square
foot "as is" and significantly more in its highest and best form.
Interrogatory No 6: (Opinion of fair market value - After Take) Please state and
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein.

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
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ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is vague and ambiguous. Further, the
question as phrased seeks matters that are potentially subject to attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product, and the privileges afforded under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the value of the property
after the take because of the ongoing uncertainty as to time of construction, completion of
construction and ancillary severance damages occasioned by the construction and by project
influence/stigma.
Supplemental Answer: It is the opinion of Defendant's designated expert witness
(appraiser) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood that the value of the Subject Property after the
taking will be between $1,060,000.00 and $1,165,000.00. It is the opinion of Defendant's
general and limited partners, who as owners of the Subject Property are deemed
competent to opine as to its value, that the fair market value of the Subject Property
after the taking will be approximately $1,000,000.00 "as is," and without regard to the
significant severance damages and negative project influence(s) that will result to the
remaining property.

Interrogatory No. 8:

(Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you

purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for
the real property, the buildings, the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property.
Include in your answer any all special terms or conditions related to your purchase of the
Subject Property.
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ANSWER: Plaintiff already has the information requested in this Interrogatory as it
was included in Plaintiffs own appraisal data and acquisition packet. Defendant's acquired
the Subject Property in a distress sale circumstance in 2008 for the total purchase price of
$1,450,000.00. Defendant does not know what is referred to as "any all special terms or
conditions ... " and as such cannot meaningfully answer this portion of the Interrogatory.
Supplemental Answer:

The Subject Property was purchased for cash.

Defendant's Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (April 14, 2008) and the Phase II
Assessment Correction Completion Certificate (May 6, 2008), were previously
produced as Bates Nos. 000785-000963. No other terms or conditions are related to the
purchase of the Subject Property.
Interrogatory No. 9: {Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any
portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by
you or on your behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined
above) each appraisal.
ANSWER: Yes. Defendant has evaluated the property value on its own behalf and
with the assistance of consultants, including licensed real estate broker(s), certified, general
appraiser(s), and land use planner(s)/consultant(s).
Supplemental Answer: No other appraisals have been performed on the Subject
Property.
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined
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above) each and every offer to purchase or sell.
ANSWER: Yes. Defendant has actively marketed the property to prospective "end
users," both purchasers and tenants, to ascertain highest and best use options for development
of the property both with and without the anticipated project influences.

No formal

purchase/sale offers have been memorialized.
Supplemental Answer:

Defendant received inquiries from McDonalds for the

purchase of approximately one acre of land, from a Taco Bell franchisee for a purchase
or co-branded location, from URM for a Super 1 store or other branded store, from a
travel center operator who also had hotels, Ace Hardware, the local video and pizza
store in Athol Idaho. The terms discussed ranged depending on the amount of lands
discussed ranging from $2.63/square foot for the entire 56 acres of the property as a
bulk sale, to $12/$15/square foot for smaller parcels.
None of these inquiries were formalized into offers. Additionally, see Bates Nos.
00013-00015, 00025-00026, previously produced.
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited
to, the appraisal reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each
appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial
of this matter.
RESPONSE:

Defendant has no appraisal reports responsive to this request, but

information relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be found
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in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and
Mary York referenced herein.
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA,
produced herewith.

Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value
of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA,
produced herewith.

DATED this

il

day of September, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:

~'il-~/4

Dou~.Marfice, Of thFfrm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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August 25, 2011
Doug Marfice
Ramsden & Lyons
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
RE:

HJ Grathol Condemnation
Highways 95 & 54 NEC
Athol, Idaho

Dear Mr. Marfice:
As requested, I have made. an inspection and completed an appraisal of the
above mentioned property. The purpose of the appraisal is to estimate a
before and after valuation of the property for a proposed condemnation by
Idaho DOT. The date of valuation in this case will be as of the latest date of
inspection of the property on September 15, 2010. This appraisal has been
prepared under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
(USPAP), is limited in scope as agreed, and presented in a restricted
appraisal format according to USP AP reporting requirements. It should be
noted that the restricted report is the most abbreviated of the report formats
and as such may be difficult to clearly understand by a third party without
additional data contained in my working files.
Idaho is a non-disclosure state and comparable sales are only verified by
parties to the transaction and not official records as in other states. The
comparable data I am presenting to you in this matter is believed to be
correct and obtained from sources considered reliable, but cannot be verified
by records.
The subject property is legally described in "Exhibit A" in the addenda
section of this appraisal. The property was transferred to Gracal Corporation
on May 22, 2008 from North Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited
liability corporation on May 22, 2008 and subsequently from Gracal
Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California general partnership on October 15,
2009. According to the broker who sold the site in May 2008, the sale price
was $1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property
from a local lender for a far higher amount and the seller was highly
motivated due to financial problems. At the time of the sale the property
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was zoned residential. I understand the owners have paid for a rezone of the
site, engineering costs for site development plans, approval of city water to
the site, and work for an onsite sewage system.
County records indicate the property is identified under three parcel
numbers:
A-0000-010-6350, 53N03W106100, and 53N03W105000.
Assessed values for each of the parcels for 2010 are as follows:
A00000106350
Land $58,500
Improvement $59,944
53N03W106100 Land $79,395
53N03W105000 Land $150,469
The property is located on the NE Comer of Highway 95 and Highway 54 in
Kootenai County, Idaho and contains approximately 56.8 acres. In viewing
the county assessor's records I noted that parcel 53N03W105000 is
indicated as a 63 .24 acre parcel, which appears to be an error based on all
the other data I have reviewed on this site. Parcel A00000106350 has .419
acres and includes a small commercial building, but it is also the SW corner
of the site at the intersection of the highways and therefore considered an
important part of the entire property. The subject property is currently zoned
Commercial by the Kootenai County Planning Department and this zoning
was obtained by the current owners since their purchase of the property in
2008.
The site is approximately 16 miles north of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8
miles east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of
Sandpoint. The intersection currently consists of a convenience store on the
SW comer, a restaurant/bar on the NW comer, vacant land on the SE comer,
and the subject along with some other commercial uses on the NE comer
along Highway 95. Although site is contiguous at this time, plans I have
seen regarding the new interchange planned at this location show Sylvan
Road being extended north through the subject site when the interchange is
built, splitting the subject site. A map showing this extension is included
with this report.
Major attractions in the immediate area include Farragut State Park to the
east of this location and Silverwood Amusement Park two miles south of
this location. Lake Pend Oreille is accessible via public and commercial
launch facilities at Bayview, Farragut, or Sandpoint. Sandpoint is also the
location of Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski area in the Inland Northwest.
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The site has approximately 750 feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090
feet along Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points. Access is also available
along Highway 95 as all three parcels include frontage along the highway.
There is another property containing 1.58 acres that is located north of the
comer parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along Highway 95 as well. Water
to the site is available from the City of Athol and according to the owner's
representative, Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on
development of a modular waste treatment plant to meet needs for onsite
sewage. Other site utilities include natural gas from Avista, electric from
Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from Verizon. The site is generally level
and at grade with both highways. The site is bounded by Howard Road to
the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this time, but these
trees have no marketable timber value.
Market conditions for Kootenai County were similar to other areas in the
Inland Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as well as
appreciation rates from 2002 through 2006. The number of residential units
sold in 2002 through the Coeur d'Alene MLS was 2,958 and that number
peaked at 5,035 units in 2005 declining to 2,821 units in 2006. The average
sale price through these same years was $138,908 in 2002 and it increased to
$271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a four year period. In 2007 and
2008 the number of units sold continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with
the average sale price dropping to $269,120. In 2009 the total number of
units sold increased to 2,216 with the average price dropping to $209,415.
One of the reasons for the large drop in 2009 was a tax credit for first time
homebuyers, and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower price
properties. 2010 has continued to see fewer residential sales with prices
continuing to decline; however, there has been continued commercial
development in Kootenai County in the past two years. Two Wal-Mart
Supercenters have been built in addition to a new Super 1 Foods store and a
Love's Travel Plaza is being built. In addition the Highway 95 corridor has
seen the construction of a U.S. District Court Facility and a 55,000 square
foot Western States Cat facility in Hayden.
Census data indicates that the population of Athol doubled between 1990
and 2000 and similar population patterns are evident in Spirit Lake and
Bayview area as well.
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Other sectors of the real estate market follow the residential trends and have
slowed as well. With the slowing market, capitalization rates have risen,
vacancy for many types of real estate increasing and demand declining.
In completing this appraisal I considered the highest and best use of the
subject property and this use simply stated is the ideal use of vacant land or
an improved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be
legally permitted, physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally
productive. The subject is a large tract of vacant commercially zoned land
(with the exception of a small commercial building) on a "lighted" at grade
intersection of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger
than typically utilized for a "big box" retail user which can range from
approximately 10 to 30 acres in size. The relatively remote location of this
property would also dictate that immediate development of the site would be
limited unless some major attraction would increase demand for commercial
use in this area. Silverwood Amusement Park south of the subject occupies
a large site including parking, but this is a unique use that has grown over
the past 20+ years and recently an application has been made by Silverwood
to rezone an additional 90+ acres to the south of its existing facilities.
Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues, convenience
issues will no doubt spur residents to patronize locally situated commercial
establishments.
The comer location and zoning of the subject suggest commercial uses that
can take advantage of the traffic flow at this location that presently exists on
Highway 95. I understand from the owner's representative that they were in
negotiation with URM for a sale of a portion of the site for a Super One
Grocery store. Mike Winger of URM confirmed that he had been involved
in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that was
delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a
new WINCO in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of
Hayden the likelihood of a new grocery store at the subject site is less
probable due to new competition that was not there when negotiations were
going on with Hughes, but that changing economic conditions have not
eiiminated this possibiiity. Other potential uses include a travel plaza/trnck
stop, "big box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R" or "D & B"
(local farm/ranch supply stores), motel, and a convenience store; however, in
my opinion only about ½ of the subject site would be utilized for these uses.
The balance of the site might include some self storage, residential uses, or
perhaps some type of iight industriai use.
4
901 of 1617

Current plans for the subject site included a new freeway interchange. The
taking in this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 acres
leaving remnants on both sides of the new interchange. Remnants on the
west side of the new interchange include the .419 comer parcel and a 3.87
acre parcel fronting the old Highway 95. On the east side of the new
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36.61 acres. The
property enjoyed access from both highways in the before situation and I
understand that in the after will only have limited access from Highway 54,
Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which bounds it to the east. As
discussed earlier in this report, the planned Sylvan Road extension will
bisect the site effectively changing the original highest and best use analysis
of the site. With the site bisected, only the 8.85 acres to the east of the new
interchange and west of Sylvan Road in addition to the 3 .87 acres on the
NW corner of the site, and the .419 acre site on the SW comer will be
available for development out of the original west half of the site. There will
also likely be a condemnation of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it
does not currently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also
unknown at this time which may also be an additional item of
reimbursement to the owners of the property if Idaho DOT makes them pay
for the road improvements.
I have completed research on various appraisal cases with regard to large
commercial tract sales in the Spokane, Tri Cities, Coeur d'Alene, and Moses
Lake areas and am familiar with prices for sales in these areas for users such
as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes, Albertson's,
Costco, Sam's Club, and Wal-Mart. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection
in most cases for locations as is a benefit for customers to access stores
easier. Freeway interchanges are often locations of retail development, but
generally these developments usually occur in higher density residential
areas.
I also have recently completed some research in Moses Lake, Washington
and reviewed development at the intersection of Interstate 90 and Highway
i 7. Much of the development at this location has only been completed in the
past 10 years even though Interstate 90 has been completed for over 50
years.
An example of how commercial property can be influenced by a freeway
interchange is in Pasco, Washington. Severai years ago a new interchange
5
902 of 1617

was built at Kartchner Avenue intersection with Highway 395. Prior to the
interchange there had been a lighted intersection with Hillsboro Street a few
blocks south and there had been much commercial development at this
lighted intersection. The development included a motel, restaurant, two fast
food restaurants, a truck stop, and some other retail uses. Prior to the
announcement of the new interchange there were offers on several parcels
on the SW comer of the Hillsboro intersection including McDonalds and a
national motel. The construction of the new interchange led to offers from
McDonalds and the motel being terminated in addition to all of the
businesses that were currently operating suffering substantial losses in
revenue due to the new interchange being built. In short, although
interchanges assist the flow of traffic, they are often of little or no benefit to
development or retail uses following their construction.
In attempting to estimate the impact on the property in the after value
situation, I considered multiple examples from the local area in concluding
that it may take many years for any commercial development to occur at this
location, particularly if the freeway construction is delayed.
In viewing the subject as a lighted intersection with commercial zoning as it
exists, I viewed the site as being developed in two phases. With the site
containing approximately 57 acres prior to the taking, I considered that
approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 3 0 acre site would likely fit
several anchors such as grocery stores or other "big box" retail users. The
3 0 acres would also likely accommodate other pad users such as banks, fast
food uses, or convenience store uses in addition to some additional "inline"
retail uses associated with the big box users. Big box users often pay $4 to
as high as $9 per square foot for sites as in the recent WINCO purchase in
Coeur d'Alene. The subject location is inferior to most of the comparables
discussed in this report in that it is located in a more remote area and it
doesn't presently enjoy the same demographics; however, the lighted
intersection of two state highways offers excellent exposure for commercial
uses and as traffic increases this location will become the "go to" location
between Hayden and Sandpoint.
In the after scenario, the 16.31 acre take will leave three parcels; an 8.85
acre parcel on the east side of the new interchange, a 3.87 acre parcel on the
west side, and the .419 acre parcel in the SW comer of the site. The balance
of the site will be east of the newiy pianned Syivan Road. Access to ihese
6
903 of 1617

sites will be limited to the old Highway 95 for the 3.87 acre parcel and
Highway 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.85 acre parcel. Estimating values in
the after situation will be contingent upon when the project is completed.
Upon completion the property will likely develop differently that in the
before situation and although the property on the east side of the freeway is
still large enough to accommodate some big box retail uses, but not stores as
large as Wal-Mart, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the
completion of this project projecting values into the future is extremely
difficult.

In assisting you with this case I have considered the following comparable
sales:
Idaho Comparables
1. 1601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene - Sale Price $3,528,360 - Sale Date 8/09
.Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $9.00
Comments: This was a former gravel pit site that was sold for a new WINCO
Grocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for the purchasers and granted
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access. The site included all
utilities. This property would be considered superior to the subject for location
and size.
2. Seltice Way and I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale Date 11/06
Size 235 AC -Price Per Foot $2.00
Comments: Foursquare Properties, developers, bought this site which consisted
of numerous parcels from two other developers and Cabela's committed to
purchase 40 acres for a new store at the same time frame. Although the site had
utilities, the developers paid to build all the interior streets and provide access to
the Cahela' s parcel. Since the purchase another parcel has been sold for a new
Wal-Mart which recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and
would be considered at a lower rate for size, but a superior rate for location. The
purchasers paid for bringing utilities to the site as well as significant costs for
grading on the property to accommodate the new building sites and roads.
3. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls- Sale Price $2,936,161- Sale Date 11/06
Size 13.5 AC (588,060 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $5.00
Comments: This sale is in the City of Post Falls and utilities were available. It
was purchased with the intention of retail development. This is the SE corner of
the intersection. This sale is a smaller parcel than the subject which would
indicate a lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for location at a
lighted intersection, but also a superior location demographically, although the
subject has higher traffic counts.
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4. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls - Sale Price $6,591,591 - Sale Dale 10/07
Size 50.44 AC (2,197, 197sq ft) - Price Per Foot $3.00
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Station
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post
Falls. The site was not zoned for commercial development, but the purchaser was
confident that they could develop the site. This is an excellent comparable for the
subject in terms of overall size and a similar location at a lighted intersection, but
a superior location demographically. The property has no sewer which likely may
need to be purchased from the City of Post Falls.
5. Highway 95 & Garwood Road - Sale Price $1,017,200 - Sale Date 7/08
Size 4.41 AC (192,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30
Comments: This was the sale of the Garwood Saloon property to Idaho DOT.
The sale price was confirmed with the attorney for the property owner and he
relayed that it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like
the subject and it is the next "lighted" intersection south of the subject on
Highway 95. This intersection is with a county road versus another state highway
like the subject. The site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher
value and it is also a superior location being closer to Coeur d'Alene. I
understand this sale was negotiated under the threat of condemnation and courts
have ruled that these sales may not represent true market value for this reason.
6. Ramsey & Appleway- Sale Price $7,800,000 - Sale Date 11/07
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $10.53
This sale was confirmed with the owner who sold the property to the Coeur d'
Alene Tribe. The site is near comparable 1 and considered superior to the subject
in that it is a smaller parcel and located in a better location.
7. Highway 95 & Sagle Road- Sale Price $3,400,000- Sale Date 3/08
Size 29 AC (1,263,249 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $2.69 but no sewer
This sale was confirmed with the broker who sold the property. The site was
zoned for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the
sale relayed that the property is currently for sale as 5 lots. This parcel does not
have access to Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like
the subject. This is an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size
and it would be considered slightly superior for location being closer to
Sandpoint, but inferior as it does not have a lighted intersection and it does not
have access to Highway 95.
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Washington Comparables
8. 9527 N Nevada - Sale Price $4,813,685 - Sale Date 7 /07
Size 18.71 AC (815,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.91
This was the site of a new WIN CO in Spokane that has been built and it included
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a higher value and
also a superior location.
9. 21801 E Country Vista - Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/05
Size 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $5.00
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90
that has been built onsite. This site is smaller indicating a higher value and also a
superior location.
10. 4315 E Sprague- Sale Price $7,559,686 - Sale Date 9/06
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $7.55
This is a Wal-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that has not yet been
built. The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn't
have sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific
Railroad and required extensive work for development. The site is somewhat
similar in size, but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to
COSTCO.

Sales of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard
to economic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as
they reflect prices for big box retail uses.
VALUE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION

In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with
commercial zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the
values of the comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables 5 and
7 as they are on the same highway and located north and south of the
subject. Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was given
more weight like comparables 5 and 7. I also considered the sizes and
locations of the other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject.
I also considered the purchase price of the subject as well as the motivation
of the seller when the property was sold for $1,450,000, but as mentioned
earlier, the seller was distressed and the site was not zoned at the time of the
sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot the majority of the
value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site. Based
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have
had a value in the range of $2.25 per foot or $2,940,300.
9
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VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION
In the after situation, the west 3 0 acres will be bisected by the taking as
described earlier in this report. This taking will result in the loss of 16.41
acres leaving an after value estimate as follows:
Value Before
= $2,940,300
Take
= $1,598,543
After Value
= $1,344,457
There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some
commercial developments, but there will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.87, and
.419 acres. These remaining parcels can accommodate various uses, but the
chances of any big box retail use on the west 30 acre site are gone. With the
planned Sy Ivan Road forming a boundary for the remaining property the
remaining property is also bisected as described earlier. I know of no cases
where a developer or user will buy a property for development not knowing
when a planned highway that will provide access to the property will be
built. This same scenario occurred in a case I was involved in that happened
when WSDOT condemned a site north of Spokane on Hatch Road and
Highway 395. All of the experts who testified in this case agreed that
without knowledge of when the planned interchange would be built there
was no way to estimate a value due to the uncertainty of its completion.
This property also contained approximately 30 acres and has been available
since the state finished the interchange approximately 12 years ago. The
owner has been attempting to sell or develop the site since then with no
success; again this is an example of why interchanges do not add value when
they are completed. An aerial photo of this interchange with Hatch Road
and Highway 395 has been included with this report to show all the
residential development that has occurred around this interchange since it
was constructed and yet the 30 acre commercial tract is still vacant despite
the owner's attempts to develop the site.
Until a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value
for the remaining parcels due the unknowns of the anticipated project.
Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as
pubiished by IDT' s website, an assumption can be made that the best case
10
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scenario for project construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming
this construction date is accurate, the project might be completed in the
spring of 2012. If the planned construction date is later, the completion date
will be moved farther into the future. In my opinion, no potential user of the
remaining property would have any interest in using any of the remaining
parcels until they know for certain when the project will be completed.
Assuming the completion can be completed as forecast above in the spring
of 2012, the value of the land would need to be discounted from the present
date. The discount is applicable as no one would pay for something today
that they can't receive until a future date. This same principal applies to
valuing a subdivision that is slated to be developed in the future or the
purchase of an income stream like a real estate contract.
In attempting to value. the remaining parcels, I have made the assumption
that they will have a similar value to the before scenario at $2.25 per square
foot. I have also assumed that they will be available for use upon
completion of the new freeway at the earliest in the spring of 2012 and the
latest in the spring of 2013. This results in a discount time frame of 1.5 to
2.5 years from the date of this valuation. Using this scenario, the future
value of the remaining parcels of $1,344,457 would be discounted to a
present value.
The discount rate is basically a rate of return that someone is looking for on
a given investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates
of safe investments, market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we
are dealing with undeveloped land in uncertain economic times. For this
reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization rates in the current
market and utilized a rate of 10%. The higher rate used to discount the
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns concerning this
condemnation including the unknown timing of the project being finished,
issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road being built, the cost of who will
be responsible for the cost of Sylvan Road, and the pending condemnation of
the right of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the
anticipated after value of $1,344,457 yielded the following present values
for 1.5 to 2.5 years:
1.5 years
= $1,165,354
= $1,059,413
2.5 years
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Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded
value estimates were completed as follows:
= $2,940,300
Before Value
After Present Value 1.5 years
= $1,165,000
After Present Value 2.5 years
= $1,060,000
Difference Rounded
=== $1,775,000 - $1,880,000
This difference in value does not address the value of the Sylvan Road, cost
of construction of Sylvan Road, or loss of access to Highway 54 which are
all potential additional items of compensation.

Respectfu11y submitted,

Ly,y_ ~_,(')

Dewitt M. Sherwood,
Certified General Appraiser
ID CGA 1125
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View West Toward Intersection
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Pr)~Ye'af;,; 20Q9·

$58,500 Hoinepwnens !;llglb,1'.Amt·

'U!nd

Market Value

0

$118,444

·

. ·.····

Allowed· ··

·

·

' , ...

· ··

0.4190 Total Market Value

Homeowners Exemption

Allowed
Ag/Timber Ex.emption
Net Taxable Valuo

U!mt

,

$118,444 Total Market Value

$149,304

$0

Homeowners Exemption

$0

Agmmbar Exemption

$118,444 Net Taxable Value

$0

$0
$0

$149,304

mntj Be('k to Liit j << Firsi < Previous Ncx.i > Lasi ;,;:..
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Ownor Information ,

·

HJGRATHOL
23 CORPORATE PLZ STE 245
NEWPORT BEACH CA 926{)0
11/02/2009

,

'

:"

Tax Authority

,

Location I 0escriptiOll
Current Leg11I

156000

Desc.

Group

Situs Addreu
Acnlage

·

TAX #18907 [IN S2~ 10 53N 03W

,
10.0000

,

Paree! Type

Property ci.½. t:oda

512- Rural residential tract

Neighborhood Code

1202 RURAL N OF HWY 64

·

,

Assessmentlnformation

01-01-.c1111'$ntYear~201or
2010
. , ''" . ,·,,, .. , ,,, .
MarketValueLa.nd
Market Value

lmprovemellt
Total Market Value

0

$79,395 Hp,rieowne~Etlgl~ie A,mt

~od

$0

$0

Prlor,Yeai'::2009
·
':'
., ..

0

'

Homeowners Ellglbkl Amt

$0

Hom,own.,-s Eliglble Amt

$0

~n«l

·· ··

··

Homeow~'l!llglbleAmt

$0

$79,395 Amt
sum Homeowners
,
, ...... l;llalble
' ····

$0

Sum HO!l'leowne~ f:llglble
Amt ...

$0

$0

Homeowners Exemption
Allowed

$0

hpp

, , , ·•... , •. ",

Homeqwner$.ExoippUon

Allowed

···

10.0000 Total.Market Value
Homeowners Exemption

,•

Imp . . ,

.

.

··•.

$79,395 1'otal Market Value

$133,875

$0

Homeowners Exemption

$0

Ag/Timber Ex&mpllon

$0

Allowed
Ag/Timber Exemption

Net Taxable Value

$127,435

$79,395 ,Net Taxable Value

$6,440

£d.n.Ll Vusk 10 I.l5; I << First < Pre,·ious Next> Lust>>
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r

Owner Information

,'

·

HJGRATHOL
23 CORPORATE PlZ STE 245
NEWPORT BEACH CA 92660

Transftr Date.

11/02/2009
Location I Description

:

Talt Authority

156000

,

S2-SW NW OF CO RD LYINGS OF
AE!A NO RR R[W EX N 165' 10 53N 03W

Current Legal
Desc.

Group

·

Situs Addre.ss

Acreage

63.2400

)

Parcel Type

Property Clau Code .
Nelgoborhood Code

,

·

512· Rural residentlaltracl
1~02 RURAL N017 ti.WY 54

·

Appral&al Date

Assessment Information

20~i·ot- ·clll!~{!~ifrgo10.
$150,469 Homaownars'Ellglbla Amt

.L?~_cF ·

Market Value
Improvement
Total Mllt'ketValue

$0
$150,469

,

o

' ·

·

$0

PriorYeat-200i

0

H0"180Wn11rs Eligltlle Amt

$0

Land

::t~~·~JiJg.~la,/~mt

$0

Home9Wners
Jmp
. J:llglble
. .....Amt

$0

Sl,lll'.I Home()1rVners.Ellglble

$0

Sum Home.owners El!g!ble
Amt
.

$0

Homeowner$ Exemp~on

$0

Homeowners Exe111ptlon

$0

AmF'···c·
Allowed

·

·.··'

Allowed

63.2400 Total Market Va.lue

$150,469 Total Market Value

$269,-407

Homeowners Exemption
Allowed
..

$0

Homeowners Exemption

Ag(Timber Exemption

$0

Agffimber Exemption

$150,469 Net Taxable Value

Net Taxable Value

Pnnl i

Bads i(! kiU i << Fil"ili
01s111a1111e,

so
$239,532
$29,875

< Previous Nexi :> Lasi :,.:,.
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Warranty Deed
• eot1~nued

EXHIBIT A
PARCEL l:
That portion of the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 53 North,
Range 3 W~ Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, state of Idaho, tying Westerly of the county
road fonnerly known as the Athol-Bayview Highway, now known as Howard Road, which

runs ln a Northeasterly and Southwesterly direction across the Southeast Quarter of the
Southweu Quarter of said Section 10, and lying Southerly of the South line of that certain
strip appropriated by the United states of America in Oeaee of Condemnation recorded April
29, 1944 in Book 20 of Misc., Page 436.
EXCEPT all that portion of the Southwest Quarter commencing at a point on the Southwest
comer of the said Southwest Quarter of Section 10 where the North line of the state
Highway known as the Athol-Bayview Hfghway Intersects the East line of U.S. Highway No.
95;thence
North along the East IJne of said U.S. Highway No. 95, a distance of 32 rodsi thence
East parallel to the South line of said Southwest Quarter, a distance of 10 rods; thence

South parallel to the West line of said Southwest Quarter, a distance of 32 rods to the North
line of' said Athol-Bay.new Highway; thence
West along the North line of said Athol-Bayview Highway, 10 rods to the PLACE OF
BEGINNING.
AND EXCEPT that portion of the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10,
Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Bofse Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, desoibed as

follows:
A sbip of land 165 feet wide, said 165 feet being measured along the East right-of-way of
Highway 95, lylng South of and contiguous to that tract of land taken by the United States of
America by Deaee or Condernnatfon, recorded in Book 20 of Miscellaneous Records, Page
436, records of Kootenai county, Idaho and Northwest or the county road known as Howard

Road.

·

AND ALSO EXCEPT that certain strip conveyed to the State of Idaho In Deed recorded June 4,
1942 In Book 119 of Deeds, Pages 442 and 444, and in deed recorded January 31, 1967 as
Instrument No. 504394.
PARCEL 2:

A tract of land situated In section 10, Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian,
Kootenai County, Idaho, more particularly desaibed as follows:

Page 3 of 4
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WarranlyDei!d
- continued

BEGINNING at a paint which is identical to the Intersection of the North right-of-way line of
the Athol-Bayview Highway No, 54 and the East right-of-way line of U.S. Highway No. 95i

thence

·

North 00°55' East, along the East rlght•of-way llne of U.S. Highway 95, 110.68 feet distant;
thence
North 89° Eas~ parallel to the North right-of-way line of Highway No, 54, 165.00 feet

distant; thence
South 00°55' Wesft 110,68 feet distant to a point on the North right-of-way llne of Highway
No. 54; thence
South 89° West, 165.00 feet on and along the North right-of-way of Highway No. 54 to the

POINT OF BEGINNING.
PARCEL 3:

That portion of the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 53 North,
Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, desoibed as follows:
A strip of land 165 feet wide, said 165 feet being measured along the East right-of·way of
Highway 95, lyJng South of and contiguous to that b'act of land taken by the United States of
America by Deaee of Condemnation, recorded in Book 20 of Mlscellaneous Records, Page
436, records of Kootenai County, Idaho and Northwest of the county road known as Howard
Road.

Page 4 of 4
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MARKET VALUE
The most probable price which a property should bring in a
competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair
sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and
knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue
stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sa]e
as of a specified date and the passing of title from sel1er to buyer
under conditions whereby:
1. Buyer and seller are typica!Zv motivated;
2. Both parties are well informed or well advised, and both acting
in what they consider their best interest;
3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;
4. Payment is made in terms of cash in United States dollars or in
terms offinancial arrangements comparable thereto; and
5. The price represents normal consideration for the property
sold, unaffected by special or creative .financing or sales
concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale. *1

*1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), 12
CFR Part 225
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CERTIFICATION
I certify, that to the best of our knowledge and belief:

1. The statements of fact contained in this report are true and con-ect.
1

The appraiser has no present or future contemplated interest in the
subject property and have no personal interest or bias with respect to
the pa1iies invoJved unless it is mentioned in the report.

3. The compensation for this report is contingent only upon delivery of
the report and neither the employment to make the appraisal or the
value determined in the appraisal are contingent upon a predetennined
appraised value or the attainment of a stipulated result, or a
subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this report.
4. The appraiser has made a personal inspection of the property
appraised.
5. The reported analysis, conclusions, and op1mons contained in this
appraisal are limited only by the reported assumptions and limiting
conditions and are my personal, impartial, and unbiased professional
analysis, opinions, and conclusions.
6. I have no bias with respect to the property that is the subject of this
appraisal.
7. No one provided significant professional assistance to the appraiser
unless mentioned in the appraisal.

8. This appraisal along with the analysis, conclusions, and opinion were
prepared under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice.

Dewitt M. Sherwood, General Appraiser
Idaho GCA l l 25
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LIMITING CONDITIONS
1. No responsibility for matters of a legal nature with regard to the
property and its title is assumed by the appraiser.
2. This report is considered confidential between the client and the
appraiser for the specified use in the report. Any other use of the
report constitutes an unauthorized use of the report.
3. The appraiser is not required to appear in court or give testimony as a
result of this report unless previous arrangements have been made.
4. Maps, photos, and sketches are intended to assist the reader of the
report; however, no warranty for the accuracy of these maps is made
and the appraiser is not trained nor has made a survey of the property.
No encroachments are assumed unless stated in the report.
5. The appraiser obtained information, estimates, and opinions from
sources he considers reliable and believes them to be correct;
however, he does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of this
information provided by other parties.
6. The appraiser assumes there are no hidden or unapparent conditions of
the property, subsoil, of structures, which would render it more or less
valuable and he assumes no liability if such conditions are present.
The appraiser has no expertise with respect to toxic waste, hazardous
materials, or undesirable substances. A Leve1 One Environmental
Audit of the property by qualified experts is recommended to
determine whether or not there are any potential problems with the
property such as toxic waste, hazardous materials, or undesirable
substances as they can be EXTREMELY COSTLY to remove. He
has no knowledge of the presence of Radon or if Radon has been
detected, it has been assumed that the present level is considered safe
according to the standards of the Environmental Protection Agency.
No warranty sha11 be implied that the property has been tested for
Radon or if tested that the tests were conducted pursuant to EPA
procedures.

924 of 1617

7. The appraiser is also not qualified to test for asbestos, mold, or lead
based paint and recommends that any parties who may be concerned
about the presence of any of these substances obtain an inspection by
an expert to determine their presence and any potential risks
associated with them.
8. The estimated value contained in this report is considered accurate for
the date it was appraised. Real estate markets tend to fluctuate due to
many conditions and the property may be worth more or less at a
future date depending on market conditions.
9. The liability of the appraiser is limited to the client only and only up
to the amount of the fee charged for the assignment. There is no
accountability, obligation, or liability to any third party.
10. This report was prepared for the client specified in the report and the
information contained is for their use only. Neither the report nor any
part of it including the identity of the appraiser shall be conveyed to
the public without written permission of the appraiser.
The
certification and limiting conditions are an integral part of the report
and the report should not be used without them.
11. No opinion is rendered as to the value of any subsurface oil, gas, or
mineral rights on the property in this report.
12. No responsibility for hidden defects or conformity to specific
governmental requirements such as fire, safety, earthquake, or
occupancy codes is assumed by the appraiser.

925 of 1617
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CHAPTER 9
COMMERCIAL ZONE (C)

SECTIONS:
9-9-1
9-9-2 9.01
9-9-3 9.02
9-9-4 9.03
9-9-5 9.04
9-9-6 9.05
9-9-7 9.06
9-9-8 9.07
9-9-9 9.08
9-9-109.09

GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED
PERFORMANCE STAND ARDS
SITE AREAS
USES PERMITTED
FRONT, SIDE, AND REARY ARDS
USES PERMITTED - STORAGE
USES PROHIBITED
CONDITJONAL USES
RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS

9-9-1: GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED: The "General Commercial zone" is a land use
classification for a district suitable for wholesale and retail sales and services.
9-9-2: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: In the Commercial zone, no building or premises shall be used, nor any
building or structure be hereafter erected or altered, unless otherwise provided in this title, except for one (1) or
more of the following uses in accordance with the following standards. A Commercial lot shall have direct access
from a public road.

All uses shall meet the following standards:
A.

Requirements of Chapter 17 of this title, Design Standards

B.

Requirements of Chapter 19 of this title, Supplementary Regulations

C.

Anticipated traffic impacts will be determined for all commercial uses using the most current edition of the
"Trip Generation Manual." A Special Notice Permit shall be required for commercial uses or buildings that
are anticipated to generate traffic impacts in excess of the following thresholds:

D.
E.

1,

For sites which access directly onto a State or Federal Highway- 25 cars per hour, or 250 vehicles per
day.

2.

For sites which access onto other public roads - 50 cars per day.

Uses on all Jots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a
Special Notice Permit.
Requirements of the applicable Highway District and Idaho Transportation Department or if the site is within
an area of city impact, the city's standards for access, approaches, and street design, whichever is the higher
standard.

F.

lfan existing community water system within 1,000 feet ofthc site is willing and able to provide water service
to the use, connection to that system shall be required.

G.

Requirements of the Panhandle Health District for sanitary sewage disposal.

H.

Requirements of the Panhandle Health District's Critical Materials Regulation.

May 24, 2007

Ortlinance No. 40 I/ Cas1: No. OA-133-06 (Znning Ortlinance Amendme111s)
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I.

All uses shall be in a structural Fire Protection District and meet all applicable District regulations; or absent a
structural Fire Protection District, shall incorporate fire protection measures recommended by the State Fire
Marshall.

J.

No uses shall generate sound pressure levels greater than 80 dBA as measured at the property line.

9-9-3: SITE AREAS: Filly percent (50%) of the area of all sites must be left in open spaces free from structures.

9-9--4: USES PERMITTED:
A.

Parks, playgrounds, and golf courses.

B.

Community facilities, including fire stations, public utility installations. etc.

C.

Public or non-profit recreational buildings.

D.

Any wholesale, retail or service business.

E.

Public or private office buildings.

F.
G.

Any eating or drinking establishment. or other entertainment facility.
Hospitality businesses, such as hotels and motels, and meeting and convention facilities.

H.

Transfer, storage. and warc110use facilities. except outside storage must be within a sight-obscuring fence.

I.

Single family, two-family or multi-family dwellings are allowed provided they are on the second and/or third
floors of a commercial building, or in a separate structure provided it is accessory to the commercial use of the
site. Residential uses are subject to the density requirements of the High Density Residential (HDR) zone.

J.

Recreational vehicle park.

K.

General farming, except the minimum lot area for the keeping of livestock shall be 3/4 acre.

L.

Vocational, trade, or private instructional schools, providing a specialized or single-item curriculum.

M.

Churches.

9-9-5: FRONT, SIDE, AND REAR YARDS: The following front, side, and rear yard setback requirements shall

apply in the Commercial zone.
All Buildings:
A.

B.
C.
D.

Front yard................................. 35 feet
Side yard ......................................none
Flanking streel. .........................20 feet
Rear yard.................................. l 5 feet

9-9-6: USES PER.i\1.JTTED -STORAGE: No premises in the Commercial 7.one shall be used as a storage area for
any purpose other than storage of materials required in connection with the enumerated pem1itted uses in the
Commercial zone.

May 24. 2007

Ordinance No. 401/ Case No. OA-133·06 (Zoning Ordinance Arncndmcnls)
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Storage areas must conform to the minimum setback regulations of the zone. Automobiles and other mllchinery
nonnally displayed for sales purposes on an open lot may be so displayed.

9-9-7: USES PROllIBITED:
A.

Automobile wrecking yards and junk yards.

B.

Processing and manufacturing are prohibited, unless they are part of the operation of a business or service
specifically permitted in the Commercial zone. Such processing and manufacturing uses must be clearly
incidental to the permitted use on the site.

9-9-8: CONDITIONAL USES:
A.

Outdoor Theaters.

B.

Public Utility Complex Facility.

C.

Zoos. .

D.

Radio and Television Towers.

E.

Special Events Location (Note: See the definitions of Special Events and Special Events Location in Section
9-2-2 of this Title).

F.

Wireless Communication Facility (WCF).

9-9-9: RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS:
A.

Intent - The intent of these standards is for temporary living quarters and not permanent or year-round
housing.

B.

Accessory Uses - Management headquarters, recreational facilities, toilets, dumping stations, coin-operated
laundry facilities, and other convenience establishments are permitted as accessory uses incidental to the
operation of the recreational vehicle park.

C.

Recreational vehicles shall be separated from each other and from other structures by at least ten (I 0) feet.
Any accessory structures, such as attached awnings or carports, shall, for the purpose of this separation
requirement, be considered to be part of the recreational vehicle.

D.

Each recreational vehicle lot/space shall contain a stabilized vehicular parking pad composed of paving,
compacted crushed gravel, or other all-weather material.

E.

Interior drives in recreational vehicle parks which enter and exit onto a public road must be approved by the
applicable Highway District or the Idaho Transportation Department.

F.

Yurds. fences, walls, or vegetative screening shall be provided at the property lines of a recreational vehicle
park where the park adjoins adjacent lands that are zoned or used for residential purposes. In particular.
extensive off-street parking areas and service areas for loading and unloading purposes other than for
passenger uses and areas for storage and collection of refuse shall be screened.

G.

Jfit is detcnnincd by the applicable 1-lighway District or Idaho Transportation Department that traffic control
devices or other traffic regulation improvements are required as a result of development of a recreational
vehicle park, the Sponsor shall be responsible for the cost of installation or construction of said improvements.

May 24. 2007

Ordinance No. 40 I/ Case No. OA-133-06 (Zoning Ordinance Amendments)
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H.

Internal roads and parking service areas shall provide safe and convenient access for service and emergency
vehicles and to amenities within the recreational vehicle park. Internal roads shall not be designed to
encourage use by outside traffic to traverse the recreational vehicle park to adjoining developed areas.

I.

Each recreational vehicle lot shall have one (I) off-street vehicle parking space.

J.

Any action toward removal of wheels of a recreational vehicle, except fortemporary purposes of repair or to
attach the recreational vehicle to the grounds for stabilizing purposes is prohibited.

K.

Occupancy ofa recreational vehicle park space by a particular recreational vehicle shall be limited each year
to only those days between Memorial Day and October 1, and/or a maximum of thirty (30) consecutive days
during the remaining months of the calendar year.

L.

A site plan shall be submitted upon application for a building permit with a North arrow and date of drawing,
showing uses and structures which are proposed. Said plan shall include adequate infonnation to clearly depict
existing and proposed structures and their uses, existing and proposed roads, easements, points of access,
_recreational vehicle lot dimensions, number of acres in site, dimensions of property lines, property line
setbacks, reserved or dedicated open space, major landscape features (both natural and man-made), locations
of existing and proposed utility lines, accessory off-street parking and loading facilities, parking space areas,
wastewater drain field area, traffic circulation patterns, refuse and service areas, signs, outdoor storage, and
fences, yards, or wall or vegetative screening.

9-9-10: SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS:
A.

Outdoor Lighting of Pennitted Recreational Uses.

B.

Railroad car or truck cargo container/trailer used for storage or any other purpose not associated with the
active operation of a railroad or trucking business.

C.

As required by section 9-9-2 of this chapter.

Muy 24. 2007

Ordimmcu Nu, 401/ C'IISC No. OA-133-06 (Zoning Ordinllnce Amendm~n!s)
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DEWITT M. "SKIPn SHER WOOD

APPRAISER QUALIFJCATIONS
EDUCATION
Bachelor of Science Degree - Education - University of Mont. - 1970
Navigator Flight Training - USAF 1971
30 Semester Hours - Masters Degree - Guidance & Counseling
1973 - 1975 Central Michigan University & Chapman College
Residentia] Appraisal - 1978 -American Institute of RE Appraisers
Real Estate Law - 1978 - Rockwell Institute
Fundamentals of Real Estate Investment and Taxation - 1980 - CCIM
Course l Ol - National Association of Realtors
Fundamentals of Real Estate Appraisal - 1997 - Mykut RE School
USP AP 1991, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007
IRS l 031 Exchanges & Charitable Trusts - 1993 - NW Closing
Commercial Real Estate Tax Update - 1994 - WA Assn. RE
Marshall Swift Cost Analysis - 1995 - Appraisal Inst.
Multifamily Appraisals - 1999 - McK.issock Data
Regression Analysis - l 999 - McK.issock Data
Income Capitalization - 2002 - McKissock Data
Disc1osures and Disclaimers -2005 - McK.issock Data
Red Flags Property Inspection Guide - 2005 - Mykut RE School
Environmental Issues in Real Estate Practice - 2005 - Mykut RE
Valuation of Detrimental Conditions in RE- 2007 -Appraisal Inst.
BUSINESS HISTORY
1971 - 1977 Navigator & Instructor USAF
1977 - 1979 Real Estate Sales, Crane & Ward Realtors, Spokane, WA
1980- 1984 Real Estate Sales, Wolff & Walker Realtors, Spokane
1984 - 2005 - Real Estate Appraising & Sales, Byrd RE Grp. LLC
2005 - Present - Cornerstone Property Advisors, Spokane, WA
1977 - 1981 Mortgage & Finance Committee, Spokane Brd. of RE
1986 - Member of Commercial Multiple Listing Committee
1986 - Instructor for Metropolitan Mortgage - Financial Analysis
1977 - Present - Member Spokane Assn. of Realtors
1976- 1994 - Officer Wash. Air National Guard, Retired Lt. Colonel
2005 - Instructor - Lorman Education Services - Eau Claire, WJ
1997 - Licensed General Appraiser, WA# I J00412
2004 - Licensed Genera] Appraiser, ID #CGA 1125
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DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHERWOOD
(Appraiser Qualifications Continued)
SAMPLES OF APPRAISAL ASSIGNMENTS
REO (real estate owned) properties for various lenders
Non-confonning properties for various lenders
Estate Appraisals - Commercial, Land, & Residential
lnternal Revenue Appraisals - All Types
Feasibility Analysis for Real Estate Investors
Insurance Company Valuations -All Types
Condemnation Appraisals-All Types
Qualified as an Expert Witness - Superior Court of WA- Counties of
Spokane, Adams, Grant, & Pend Oreille - Superior Court of JD Bonner County
PARTIAL LIST OF APPRAISAL CLIENTS
AUied Insurance Company, Spokane Washington
American States Insurance, Indianapolis, Indiana
American West Bank, Spokane, Washington
Burlington Northern Santa Fee Railroad
Central Pre-Mix, Spokane, Washington
City of Cheney, Washington
City of Fairfield, Washington
Farmers Insurance Group
Fanners and Merchants Bank, Spokane, Washington
General Electric Corporation, Kent, Washington
Global Credit Union, Spokane, Washington
Kaiser Aluminum, Spokane, Washington
Marsh Insurance, Spokane, Washington
Prudential Insurance Company, San Francisco, California
SAFECO Insurance, Seattle, Washington
Spokane County Washington
Tomlinson Black Realtors, Spokane, Washington
Unigard Insurance, Spokane, Washington
US Bank, Spokane, Washington
United States Marshals Service
Wheatland Bank, Spokane, Washington
Numerous Attorneys & Accountants
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HOLLAND&HART-"J

MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

myork@hollandhart.com

September 20, 2011
VIA FACSIMILE
(208) 664-5884

Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 38511-2011

Dear Chris:
We received your letter from yesterday afternoon regarding the parties' continuing dispute
over HJ Grathol's expert disclosures and other discovery issues. Since your faxed letter did not
include the appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood or Grathol's supplemental discovery responses, we
are unable to respond to the sufficiency of the information provided. We will review and respond
to those documents once they are received.
With respect to the expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund, it appears from
your letter that the discovery responses being produced do not contain the opinions of these
experts. Your explanation for the reason why the opinions are not being produced does not excuse
the withhoiding of these individuai's expert opinions.
The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures,
stating that "such disclosure shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." It does not excuse any particular type of expert from the
requirements of the Order. Instead, it specifically requires that the expert disclosures shall include
at least the information required under Rule 26(b)(4). In order for any witness to offer opinion
testimony, the opinions must be disclosed in advance - as required by the Court's scheduling order
and the Idaho Rules.
Additionally, despite your contention that these individuals are "actor/viewer" experts
and are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i}-a contention with which
ITD disagrees-ITD has specifically requested in discovery a complete statement of these
individuals' opinions, the substance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions, and
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. ITD's First Set of Discovery, at
Interrogatory 2. Regardless of how these individuals are characterized, Grathol is still required to
Holland & Hart u,
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Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
September 20, 2011
Page2

HOLLAND&HARL"J

comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and to provide supplemental responses to
discovery. IRCP 26(e)(l)(B). Moreover, to the extent that any of these individual's opinions were
developed in anticipation oflitigation, those opinions are subject to disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4).
We renew our request that Grathol comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and also
supplement its discovery responses to provide a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and
Mr. Johnson's opinions, the substance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions,
and the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. We intend to proceed with
a motion to exclude these experts from testifying or, in the alternative, to compel the disclosure of
their opinions.
If you would like to discuss this matter further, please feel free to contact me.

vfe

truly yours, .

Mary . ork I /
of Ho 1 d &

LLP
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or,
Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures. ITD requests an order from the Court excluding
the expert testimony of two expert witnesses identified by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"),
Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Grathol has failed to comply with the expert disclosure
requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order entered on April 5, 2011 and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Grathol has also failed to respond to ITD discovery requests that specifically ask for
the opinions and supporting information of all ofGrathol's experts. Accordingly, testimony by
these experts should be excluded.
As a result of Grathol's failure to disclose its expert opinions, ITD has been prejudiced
because it cannot determine what rebuttal experts it will need, and it cannot prepare rebuttal
expert reports, prepare for the depositions of Grathol' s experts, prepare for trial, or engage in
settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is unable under these circumstances to make a proper
pretrial offer in accordance with the requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi,
105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1987) and subsequent, related cases.

In the aitemative, ITD moves this Court to compei Grathoi to comply with the Pretrial
Order requiring disclosure of expert opinions and the basis of those opinions, which are also the
subjects ofITD's discovery requests served on February 2, 2011. If the Motion to Compel is
granted, ITD will necessarily need an extension of time to disclose rebuttal experts and reports,
and therefore requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order accordingly and continue the trial
in this matter.
Counsel has made repeated efforts to reach an agreement with opposing counsel on the
issue of Grathol 's expert disclosures and despite those efforts, no agreement could be reached.
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Therefore, if successful, ITD also requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred
in bringing this motion.
ITD's motion is supported by a brief and by the Affidavit of Mary V. York also filed on
this date.
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2011.
HOLLAND & HART LLP
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D
D
D
lZl

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 664-5884
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this brief in support of its Motion to exclude the
expert testimony of certain experts identified by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"). Grathol has
failed to comply with the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order and has failed to respond
properly to discovery requests propounded by ITD. ITD has suffered and will continue to suffer
prejudice without the required expert disclosures in that it ITD is unable to identify rebuttal
experts needed for trial, and cannot prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for the depositions of
Grathol's experts, prepare for trial, or engage in settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is
unable under these circumstances to make a proper pretrial offer in accordance with the
requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067
(1987) and subsequent, related cases.
Grathol claims that it is not required to disclose the opinions or basis of opinions of these
experts under the "actor-viewer" exception noted in the Committee Notes of Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Grathol's attempted justification for its refusal to disclose
expert opinions and supporting information is not supported by the facts or applicable law. The
stated subject matters upon which these experts will offer opinion testimony fall squarely within
the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, even if it is
determined that the testimony of these experts' testimony is exempted from the Idaho Rule, the
experts' opinions and the basis and facts supporting those opinions were specifically requested in
ITD's discovery and Grathol has refused to produce the requested information. Additionally,
Grathol has ignored the Court's Pretrial Order and has sought to place limitations on the Court's
requirement for the disclosure of Grathol's experts that are not contained in the Order. Finally,
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even in one were to accept Grathol' s argument regarding application of the "actor-viewer"
exception under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal case law, Grathol still could not
hide its experts' opinions. On the contrary, the federal rules require "actor-viewer" experts to
disclose "a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions is purely an attempt to
hide the ball and deny ITD the ability to properly prepare for trial. The exclusion of expert
testimony is the typical sanction for a party's failure to comply with Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and should be applied here.
Alternatively, ITD requests the Court enter an Order compelling Grathol to submit
adequate and sufficient expert disclosures as required by the Court's Order and as requested by
ITD in its discovery requests. Additionally, because ITD is unable to identify rebuttal experts,
prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for expert depositions, or make an appropriate pretrial

Acarrequi offer, ITD also requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order to extend the time for
ITD to disclose rebuttal experts and expert reports, and vacate and continue the trial date in this
matter. If the testimony of Grathol's experts is not excluded, then the extension of time and
continuance of the trial date is the only remedy that will prevent unfair prejudice to ITD by
requiring Grathol to disclose the opinions of its experts, and thereafter providing sufficient time
for ITD to prepare for the depositions of Grathol's experts and to indentify rebuttal experts and
submit rebuttal expert reports. This remedy is also necessary to give ITD an adequate
opportunity to evaluate the opinions of Grathol' s experts and present a fair and reasonable

Acarrequi offer to Grathol. The continuance is also necessary to provide a fair opportunity for
ITD to prepare its case for trial.
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II.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established the pretrial deadlines for the
parties' expert disclosures. Pretrial Order, at ,i 2. Under the terms of the Order, ITD was
required to disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011. Id. Grathol was then required to file
its responsive experts on August 19, 2011. Id. And then the parties would file any rebuttal
experts on October 19, 2011. Id. The Order did not place any limitations on which experts or
types of experts were required to be disclosed and, with respect to the substance of the
information to be provided for each parties' respective experts, the expert disclosures were to
"consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Id.
On August 19, 2011, Grathol filed its Expert Witness Disclosure in which it identified
three expert witnesses who were expected to be called to testify at the trial of this matter, Dewitt
"Skip" Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Affidavit of Mary V. York, Ex. H
(Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosures). With respect to Mr. Sherwood's expert testimony,
Grathol stated that "[h]e will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be
provided to Plaintiff upon completion." York Aff., Ex.Hat 2. Despite the specific reference to
Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report, Grathol did not produced Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. 1
With respect to Grathol's expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol
merely outlined in broad terms the general subject matter of the anticipated testimony. Grathol's
disclosures did not provide any of the "opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefore," as required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it "consist

1 On

September 19, 2011, counsel for Grathol faxed a letter to ITD' s counsel in which it stated
that it was belatedly producing Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. The fax did not contain a copy
of the appraisal report or the supplement discovery responses being provided by Grathol. ITD
just received Grathol's discovery responses, which included a copy of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal
report on September 21, 2011.
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of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)," as required
by the Court's Pretrial Order. Grathol's expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Reeslund stated
that:
Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the
development plans for the Property, testimony as to its potential
uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations
on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land
use planning/entitlement, construction planning activities; efforts
and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and
development of the Property; planning and design work associated
with the property; and the effects of the condemnation on the
development of the remaining property.
York Aff.

,r,r 11-18, Ex. H.

Grathol' s expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Johnson is similar,

stating that:
Mr. Johnson will give opm1on testimony as to the
acquisition, ownership and development plans for the Property,
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the
condemnation), the values of the Property remaining after
condemnation and before and after construction and
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses
associated with the purchase, holding and development of the
Property; planning and design work associated with the property;
marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation;
and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property.
York Aff., Ex. H. Grathol failed to provide any actual opinions to be offered by either expert;
there is no detail as to the experts' value opinions, condemnation impact opinions, or
condemnation damages opinions. Furthermore, there is no information about the basis, reasons
or support for the experts' opinions.
Upon receiving Grathol's expert disclosures, on August 24, 2011, counsel for ITD
notified Grathol's counsel that its expert disclosures were deficient in that they did not comply
with the Court's Pretrial Order, the disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, or with ITD's discovery requests and the corresponding supplementation
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requirements of the Rules. York Aff., Ex. I (August 24, 2011 Letter from counsel for ITD to
counsel for Grathol). ITD' s August 24th letter requested that Grathol provide full and complete
disclosures. Id
Counsel for Grathol responded to ITD's August 24th letter by stating that it believed that
the disclosures did in fact comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and contained all of the
information required by Rule 26(b)(4). York Aff., Ex. J (August 29, 2011 Letter from counsel
for Grathol to counsel for ITD). While not expressly stating the underlying reasoning behind its
refusal to provide the requested opinions and supporting information in its August 29th letter,
Grathol's assertion that its disclosure complied with the Court's Pretrial Order and Rule 26(b)(4)
is based upon its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are "actor-viewer" experts and
are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. In support of its as~ertion, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, but provided no argument or analysis to support its cited reference. Grathol
had made a similar statement in its original responses to ITD's First Set oflnterrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents. York Aff., Ex. D (Grathol's Ans. and Resp. to Plfs First
Set oflnterrogs. and Req. for Prod. of Doc.) at 5-6. TTD's Interrogatory and Grathol's Answer
stated the following:

Interrogatory No. 2:
For each expert witness identified in
response to Interrogatory No. 1, please provide the subject matter
upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the
reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions,
the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and
data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b )(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANSWER:
Defendant anticipates offering expert opm10n
testimony in this matter, including testimony concerning the plan,
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design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs project across
or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony
concerning valuation of the property. The witnesses offering
opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the following:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geoff Reeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)

Mark Johnson

(8)

Jeff Bond

(9)

Donald Smock

(10)

Paul Daugharty

(11)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger

As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover
the testimony of such persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114
(West 1995).
(1)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA

(2)

Ed Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the
Answers to these Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have
been completed. Therefore, the remainder of the information
requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when
formal appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above
Interrogatory will be contained within those appraisal reports.

Id.
On September 9, 2011, counsel for ITD held a conference call with counsel for Grathol
as a formal "meet and confer" conference on the issue of Grathol' s deficient expert disclosure, as
well as other discovery matters. York Aff., at ,r,r 18-19. During the conference, counsel for ITD
made reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with counsel for Grathol on the issue of Grathol' s
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deficient expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. Id. At the close of conference,
counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the expert issues the following week. Id.
Grathol's counsel did not respond within the stated time frame, but a week later, on
September 19, 2011, Grathol 's counsel sent a letter again refusing to disclose the expert opinions
of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. York Aff., at~ 19 and Ex. M. In its September 19th letter,
Grathol once again reiterated its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were "actorviewer" experts and therefore not subject to the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order or
Rule 26(b)(4). Id. Notably, Grathol's letter did not explain why it was unable to provide the
experts' opinions and supporting information in response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2, which
asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons
therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions,
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based." See, id.
ITD's counsel responded on September 20, 2011 and stated its express disagreement with
Grathol's arguments and conclusions. York Aff., Ex. N. The September 20th letter from ITD's
counsel also notified Grathol that it would be filing a motion to exclude the testimony of Mr.
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson testimony or, alternatively, to compel the disclosure of their opinions
and supporting information. Id.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Testimony of Grathol's Experts Should be Excluded Because Grathol
Has Failed to Comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, and ITD's Discovery Requests.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow ITD to obtain "discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
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other party[.]" Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). With respect to expert witnesses, Rule 26(b)(4)
provides that a party may discover, by interrogatory and/or deposition, a complete statement of
the opposing party's expert's opinions and the reasons for those opinions. Id at 26(b)(4).
The exclusion of evidence is the recognized sanction for a party's failure to comply with
Rule 26, including the duty to seasonably supplement responses to discovery requests.
"Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion of the proffered
evidence." Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 90,813 P.2d 897,900 (1991).
Additionally, courts have broad authority to compel obedience with its orders and may impose
sanctions upon a party who fails to comply with its orders, including a party who fails to serve
timely responses to discovery. Idaho Code§ 1-1603(4); Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135
Idaho 495, 499, 20 P.3d 679, 683 (2000); Ashby v. Western Council, Lumber Production and

Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684,686, 791 P.2d 435,436 (1990). See also Idaho R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(B) (providing that where a party fails to obey an order of the Court to provide
discovery, the Court may enter an order "refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence."). "Moreover, while trial courts are given broad discretion in ruling on
pretrial discovery matters, reversible error has been found in allowing testimony where Rule 26
has not been complied with." Radmer, 120 Idaho at 90, 813 P.2d at 900 (citing Smith v. Ford

Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1980)).
In the present case, in addition to the requirements imposed by Rule 26(b)(4), the Court's
Pretrial Order required that expert disclosures "shall consist of at least the information required

to be disclosed pursuant to J.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Pretrial Order, at 2. The Order made no
exception for alleged "actor-viewer" experts. Further, ITD propounded discovery requests on
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Grathol in which it sought "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert
and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for
the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as well as all
information referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A, Interrogatory No. 2.
Grathol failed to comply with or satisfy the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order
and Rule 26(b)(4) because it did not include a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and Mr.
Johnson's expert opinions or the reasons for those opinions in its expert disclosures. Moreover,
Grathol failed to respond to ITD's discovery requests and provide a complete statement of these
experts' opinions and the underlying substance, reasons and basis for those opinions. See York
Aff., Exs. H through M, and 1117-19. Accordingly, the recognized sanction for Grathol's
disregard of the Court's Order and the discovery requirements of Rule 26 is to exclude the
testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson.

B.

The Expert Testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Fall Directly
Within the Scope of Rule 26(b)(4) and Should Have Been Disclosed In
Accordance with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Requirements of
Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure.

Grathol's explanation of why it refuses to produce the expert opinions of Mr. Reeslund
and Mr. Johnson is that these experts "are not 'expert witnesses' in the traditional sense of a Rule
26(b)(A)(i) disclosure." York Aff., Ex. M. According to Grathol, these individuals "fall within
the 'actor/viewer exception'" of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because their
testimony is based upon knowledge and information not acquired in preparation for litigation and
they are "actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject matter of this
litigation." Id. In support of its argument, Grathol cites to the Committee Notes of the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b )(4).
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Grathol's argument has no merit because Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are identified as
experts who will be offering expert testimony that was obtained or created in anticipation of
litigation. Specifically, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson have both been identified as offering
expert testimony on the very issues relating to the present condemnation action. Grathol
identified Mr. Reeslund as providing expert testimony on issue of the value of the subject
property before and after the condemnation, the limitations on uses of the remaining property

after the condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the development of the
remaining property. York Aff., Ex. H. Similarly, Mr. Johnson is identified as providing expert
testimony as to ITD's acquisition of a portion of the subject property, the value of the property
before and after the condemnation, the values of the Property remaining after condemnation and
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities, marketing efforts
of the property prior to and after condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the
remaining Property. Id.
Each of these identified areas of expert testimony are directly related to and, in fact, arise
out of or in direct response to the current lawsuit. An opinion about this condemnation action
could not have been formed in the absence of this condemnation action. Such opinions
necessarily arise from and are directly related to this suit. Therefore, Grathol cannot sustain its
claim that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson created their opinions prior to or independent of this
action. The identified subject areas of expert testimony for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson fall
directly within the bounds of Rule 26(b)(4) and should have been disclosed by Grathol on
August 19, 2011. Grathol's failure to do so violated the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the testimony should be excluded.
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C.

Grathol's Suggested Justification for Its Refusal to Produce the Expert
Opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Is Contrary to Idaho Law.

Grathol's contention that it is not required to disclose the expert opinions of Mr.
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson expert fails under Idaho law, which requires Mr. Reeslund's and Mr.
Johnson's expert opinions to be disclosed under Idaho's discovery rules. In fact, the assertions
made by Grathol are nearly identical to those that were rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in

Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2002).
In Clark, the district court excluded the testimony of a treating physician who was not
timely disclosed. Id. at 344, 48 P.3d at 673. On appeal, plaintiff argued that he was not required
to produce the expert's opinions because the expert's opinions and knowledge were not acquired
or developed in anticipation of litigation and therefore were not subject to the requirements of
Rule 26(b)(4). Id at 345, 48 P.3d at 674. The Court of Appeals soundly rejected plaintiffs
argument, stating that "although Clark is correct that a treating physician's knowledge that was
not developed for purposes of litigation is not subject to Rule 26(b)(4), the conclusion that he
then draws-that such testimony is entirely sheltered from discovery---draws no support from
the language of the rule or the remaining discovery rules." Id. The Court of Appeals quoted the
federal decision of Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Miss. 1986) and its statement that
"[t]here is simply no reason to hold that non-26(b)(4) trial experts may not be discovered by way
of the same interrogatories as 26(b)(4) trial experts." Id. at 346, 48 P.3d at 675 (quoting Lee v.

Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104, 108 (N.D. Miss. 1986)). According to the Lee decision, "[t]his result
flows from precedent as well as logic and common sense." Id.
The Court of Appeals in Clark concluded that Rule 26(b)( 4) "provides no justification for
[plaintiffs] failure to respond to [defendant's] interrogatories seeking disclosure of all of
[plaintiff's treating physician's] opinions that [plaintiff] wished to present at trial." Id. And it

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES -12
951 of 1617

upheld the exclusion of the treating physician's testimony as not being timely produced and for
plaintiffs failure to seasonably supplement its responses to discovery requests as required by
Rule 26(e)(4). Id. at 347, 48 P.3d at 676.
Applying Clark to the present case, the same result should follow. While ITD does not
concede that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are not subject to Rule 26(b)(4) and the Court's
Pretrial Order, the ruling in Clark makes clear that Grathol is still subject to ITD's discovery
requests, which specifically asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by
the expert and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and
reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as
well as all information referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A., Interrogatory No. 2.
Grathol has offered no explanation as to why it continues to refuse to answer ITD's
discovery requests or why it has failed to comply with Rule 26(e)(4) and supplement its initial
responses that failed to provide the requested information. Indeed, given that Grathol states that
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are prepared to testify at deposition, at which time ITD can ask
these experts about their opinions, Grathol obviously knows these opinions and is required under
Rule 26(e)(4) to supplement its responses and provide that information. Grathol has refused to
answer ITD's discovery and has refused to comply with Idaho's discovery rules, including the
rule requiring Grathol to supplement its discovery responses.
Grathol' s continued and strenuous efforts to hide the opinions of its experts violates the
very purpose of the discovery rules and their efforts should not be rewarded. Like the court in

Clark, the Court should exclude the testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson for Grathol' s
failure to comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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D.

Even if Grathol's Actor-Viewer Argument is Accepted and the Federal Rules
are Applied, Grathol Would Still be Required to Disclose the Opinions of
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson.

In support of its argument that it is not required to provide the expert opinions of
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol cites to the Notes of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26, Subdivision (b)(4). The Committee Notes referenced by Grathol state that "[i]t should be
noted that the subdivision [Rule 26(b)(4)] does not address itself to the expert whose information
was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with
respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit." See
Comments to 1970 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b )(4).
The federal rule that formed the context for the Committee Notes differs from Idaho Rule
26 in that the federal rule distinguishes between those experts who are required to produce a
report and those who are not. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(b) with Idaho R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4). Under the federal version of the rule, an expert is required to produce a report that
contains a complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for the opinions "if the
witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one
whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony." Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(b). However, even if an expert, such as an actor-viewer expert, is not required to
produce a report, he is still required to disclose the subject matter on which the witness is
expected to present evidence and "a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is
expected to testify." Id.; Nagle v. Mink, 2011 WL 3861435, *2-3 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2011)
(experts not required to disclose reports under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) are required to disclose
"(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule

of Evidence 702, 703 or 705 and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is
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expected to testify."). Additionally, if that expert's opinion testimony goes beyond the facts
known to him as an actor-viewer, the expert is then required to comply with the disclosure
requirements of Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B). See e.g., Zarecki v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
914 F.Supp. 1566, 1573 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (concluding that the substance of expert's testimony
went beyond personal observations and experience and therefore should have been disclosed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule); Wreath

v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that to once an testifying
physician develops additional specific opinion testimony beyond the facts made known to him
during the course of care and treatment of the patient, he becomes subject to the provisions of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule).
The actor-viewer expert may be excused under Federal Rule 26 from preparing a formal
report. However, no rule excuses them from being required to disclose opinions under Rule 26,
court scheduling orders, or interrogatories and requests for production. Thus, if one accepts
Grathol's argument, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson may not be required to prepare a report
under the Federal Rules, they are certainly required to disclose a "summary of the facts and
opinions" to which they would testify at trial. And to the extent their testimony went beyond the
facts known to them as an actor-viewer, then Grathol would be required to comply with the
additional requirements of Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B).

E.

The Court's Pretrial Order does not Excuse Any Particular Type of Expert
from Disclosure.

The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures,
and it does not excuse any particular type of expert from the requirements of the Order. Pretrial
Order, at~ 2. The Court's Order specifically requires that Defendants "shall disclose all experts
to be called at trial" no later than 150 days before trial. Id. (emphasis added). The Order makes
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no qualification, limitation or exception to the type of experts that are required to be disclosed.

Id. With respect to the information that must be disclosed, the Order states that "such disclosure
shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)."
Id. (emphasis added). Grathol should be required to comply with the provisions of the Order.
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were identified as experts and they have been disclosed
by Grathol as individuals who will be offering expert opinion testimony at trial. York Aff.,
Ex. H. As the Court well knows, witnesses are limited to testifying as to facts within their
personal knowledge. Under certain circumstances, a witness may go beyond that and testify as
to opinions they have formed on matters relevant to the case. To offer these opinions, the
witness must qualify as an expert based on their specialized training, education, or experience.
Here, as in most cases, and in accordance with Rule 26, the Court's Pretrial Order requires all
experts to disclose all opinions and the basis of those opinions by certain specified dates. The
Court's Order does not exempt any experts of any kind from this requirement.
Moreover, to the extent that Grathol contends that these individuals are experts whose
opinions were not developed in anticipation of litigation, their opinions and the basis therefore
must have already been formed prior to the commencement of this case. In that case, Grathol
should have immediately disclosed Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's opinions in response to
ITD's discovery in April. At a minimum, Grathol was under a duty to supplement its discovery
under Rule 26(e)(4) long before now. Grathol's failure to do so is not supportable or justified
and should result in the exclusion of their testimony.

F.

ITD Will Be Prejudiced by Grathol's Failure to Disclose Its Experts'
Opinions and Supporting Information.

Grathol refusal to provide expert opinions and supporting information results in
substantial unfair prejudice to ITD. Without sufficient disclosures, ITD cannot determine what
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rebuttal experts it will need at trial. ITD cannot prepare and serve its rebuttal opinions in
response to the opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson because Grathol has not produced any
substantive information about these experts' opinions or the basis for them. ITD has no
information about their opinion as to either the before or after value of the property, what
opinions they are going to offer as to the limitations on the use of the subject property after the
condemnation, or their conclusions as to the effects of the condemnation on the development of
the property. In short, ITD has nothing to rebut because Grathol has refused to provide any
opinions from these experts.
Additionally, ITD is not able to adequately prepare for the depositions of these experts
without an undue and unnecessary expenditure of time and expense. ITD should not have to, nor
is it required to, go into an expert deposition without an adequate disclosure of the experts'
opinions and the reasons and basis for them. The Rules have been structured to require complete
disclosures of an expert's opinions to prevent such inequities. As stated by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Clark v. Klein,
In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a
prohibition against discovery of information held by expert
witnesses produces in acute form the very eviis that discovery has
been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert
witness requires advance preparation.... Similarly, effective
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the
narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery
normally produces are frustrated.

Id., 137 Idaho 154, 157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes,
Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P.). "The purpose of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient
pretrial fact gathering." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,873, 136 P.3d 338,344 (2006). "It
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follows, therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to encourage or reward those whose
conduct is inconsistent with that purpose." Id
Additionally, ITD is prejudiced by Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions
because ITD will be unable to evaluate the opinions and properly prepare a fair and appropriate
pretrial offer as required by Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P .2d
1067 (1987) and succeeding cases. Under Acarrequi, ITD as the condemnor is required to make
a timely pretrial offer of settlement of at least 90% of the ultimate jury verdict and no later than
90 days before trial. Id at 876-78, 673 P.2d at 1070-72. This offer serves as the basis for
determining awards of costs and attorney fees ih condemnation actions. Iri cases involving large
sums, such as the present case, the amount of costs and fees can be considerable. ITD is simply
unable to assess these witnesses' opinions as to the fair market value of the property, before or
after the condemnation, or their opinions on damages suffered by the remaining property after
the condemnation. Consequently, ITD is unable to assess or determine an appropriate offer of
settlement under Acarrequi, due solely to Grathol's unjustified refusal to disclose the opinions of
individuals who will offer expert testimony at trial.
The prejudice faced by ITD has been addressed by Idaho appeiiate courts. In the case of

Clark v. Raty, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he potential for prejudice to the
opposing party from the admission of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is particularly
acute with respect to expert testimony." Clark, 137 Idaho at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. The Idaho
Supreme Court echoed this concern when it noted that in cases involving expert witnesses,
advance preparation is necessary and pretrial discovery is fundamental. Klein, 137 Idaho 154,
157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002). Because of Grathol's failure to disclose its experts'
opinions or the underlying basis for the opinions, in compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order,
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Rule 26(b)(4), and ITD's discovery requests, ITD is unable to adequately prepare its case for
trial. Accordingly, the expert testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson should be excluded.
This sanction is particularly appropriate given Grathol's repeated willful failure and refusal to
provide any of the opinions from these experts, as required by the Court's Pretrial Order and the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

G.

In the Alternative, ITO Requests that the Court Compel Full Disclosure of
Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's Expert Opinions and the Supporting
Information and Modify the Pretrial Order.

Alternatively, if the expert testimony of these individuals is not excluded, ITD requests
that the opinions and basis for those opinions be compelled to be disclosed, and that the Court's
scheduling order be modified to extend ITD's deadline to serve rebuttal reports and to continue
the trial of this matter in order to avoid prejudice to ITD. The extension of time and continuance
of the trial date is necessary to allow time for ITD to receive the expert opinions and supporting
information of Grathol' s experts, to prepare for the expert depositions, and to complete its own
expert rebuttal reports. The additional time is also needed to afford ITD a fair opportunity to
present a reasonable Acarrequi offer to Grathol. This remedy is also needed to provide ITD with
a fair opportunity to for trial.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Grathol has identified expert witnesses who will testify and offer opinions at trial, but it
has refused to provide the opinions or the basis for the opinions-despite the Court's Pretrial
Order, the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and ITD's outstanding discovery
requests. Without the disclosure of these experts' opinions, ITD will be substantially and
unfairly prejudiced. Accordingly, the testimony by these experts should be excluded at trial. In
the alternative, Grathol should be compelled to disclose the opinions of their experts and the

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 19
958 of 1617

basis for them, and the trial should be vacated and the Pretrial Order should be amended to give
ITD adequate time to identify and disclose rebuttal experts.
ITD further requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of
Grathol's failure to comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and to answer its discovery requests.
DATED this 21st day of September, 2011.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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ORIGlt~AL
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows:
INTERROGATORIES

Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify,
a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore,
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the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter,
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation
of the property. The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the
following:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geoff Reeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)
\'/

Mark Johnson

(8)

Jeff Bond

(9)

Donald Smock

(10)

Paul Daugharty

(I 1)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger

As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such
persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).
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( 1)

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA

(2)

Ed Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these
Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder
of the information requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal
appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above Interrogatory will be contained
within those appraisal reports.
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip: Sherwood, CGA,
produced herewith and Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 25, 2011.

Supplemental Answer: Defendant's actor/viewer witnesses are still in the process of

formulating their opinions and testimony for trial. As discovery and investigation continues
in this matter, Defendant's witnesses are expected to revise their opinions in their respective
areas of expertise. Defendant reserves the right to update and supplement these discovery
requests accordingly. However, the following summary sets forth the (presently) anticipated
testimony of these witnesses.
Alan Johnson anticipates testifying, generally as follows:
Hughes Investments and its various partnerships is a commercial real estate developer
not a land speculator. Since the company was formed in 1977, Hughes Investments entities
have acquired, entitied, deveioped, constructed, leased and managed over 5,000,000 square
feet of GLA. Hughes Investments has never purchased a piece of property, either raw land or
an income producing asset for the purpose of quickly flipping it for a profit.

Hughes

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORJES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 3
963 of 1617

Investments and its entities have and always will make our income from developing property.
Hughes Investments mission statement provides:
"Hughes Investments is a reputable, retail commercial development company
whose purpose is to generate equity and cash flow by developing high-quality
shopping centers. We firmly believe that this approach translates into the
highest return for long term ownership for ourselves and our partners while
providing the highest quality shopping environment for our merchants and the
communities they serve." As highly experienced commercial developers, we
convert a piece or raw land using our capabilities in design, entitlements,
leasing, construction, financing and management, to create significant value
and a financeable asset that provides cash flow over long periods ohime.
With respect to the property at the northeast comer of Highways 95 and 54, in Athol
Idaho, Hughes Investments purchased this property in 2008 with the sole intent to develop it
into a commercial retail center/hospitality project.

Hughes Investments acquired and

immediately rezoned the property to a commercial designation, invested in engineering a
sewage treatment system that would be approved by the Idaho DEQ, commenced discussions
with merchants and tenants for prospective sales or leases, met with and filed site plans with
Kootenai County and commissioned the prerequisite traffic study for further development
evaluation. Hughes Investments has spent significant amounts of money on consultants,
engineers, and carrying costs in order to develop this property. As of the date of this writing,
the costs for development of this property have exceeded $428,000.
Hughes Investments has a long history of successfully developing retail shopping
centers. Hughes Investments has been designing, building and leasing shopping centers for
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S r-IRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 4
964 of 1617

nearly forty years. With any sophisticated shopping center, developer, a signalized "hard
comer" with high traffic counts, high visibility, easy ingress and egress at the comer of two
major streets is always the most sought after location. A "Hard Comer" is recognized by the
International Council of Shopping Centers as a signalized intersection at the comer of two
main streets.

While freeway on and off ramps are often the location of services and

shopping, a hard comer is always preferred by developers, merchants and tenants. In the case
of HWY 95/54, the current configuration offers excellent visibility and slows traffic at the
lighted intersection.

Easy access is provided by 4 deeded access points at or near the

intersection.
In contrast, from the materials I have been provided by ITD, the proposed overpass
will be at an elevation well above the current grade of the property at an assumed speed of 55
to 65 MPH. It is important to note that the new interchange is not expected to increase traffic
counts by the site. While access has not been finalized at this time, it won't be remotely as
good as what is presently available. As difficult as it is to work around the issues caused by
the overpass, Hughes Investments has still not been provided the date for the start of
construction, let alone an estimated date for completion of this project.

Without either

completion, or realignment dates and timelines, Hughes Investments is unable to start
development. All of the merchants that we have been in discussions with will not move
forward with any kind of commitment until the interchange is complete or it is determined
that the highways will keep their current alignment.
Please refer to previous correspondence submitted from Mike Winger of URM. (See
Bates Nos. 000016-000024, 000030-000031, 000040-000045, and 000053-000055.)
Additionally attached are several newspaper articles "A bump in the road" 11/23/08 and "US
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95 widening in N. Idaho hits another snag" 11/22/08 both referring to the ITD slashing its
request for funding for widening HWY 95 between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint. To further
the uncertainty of this project in a meeting with Ron Harvey and Jason Mingzhor with ITD,
Jason indicated that ITD would take our property through a condemnation action and if they
didn't receive funding for construction, "they could sit on the property for 15 years" and
effectively halt any development of our remaining property. This was perceived as threat.
ITD' s delays and indecision to date may have cost Hughes Investments potential tenants and
has put the entire development in jeopardy. A delay in construction or re-alignment of even
two more years will cause significant financial damages through increased holding costs, lost
opportunity and the inability to develop and market the remaining property resulting in an
almost complete loss of value as a development parcel.
The estimated value of the property being taken by ITD is based on the values of
similarly available property with the potential for commercial development. The most similar
comparable in ITD's appraisal, being that it is the only commercially zoned property on
HWY 95, is at Sagle Road and HWY 95. This 29 acre site sold on 3/08 for $2.69/sf. Mr.
Johnson believes this Sagle property is far inferior to the property at issue in this case.
Contrary to notes in ITD's appraisal, this property did not have sewer service. Also, Sagle
Road is not a "hard comer." In fact, it is actually a T intersection leading only to a school to
the east of Highway 95 and into a small housing tract to the west. It is not at a signalized
intersection like the comer at HWY 95/54. Experienced deveiopers will pay at least a 20%
premium for property located at a signalized intersection of two highways.

This factor

effectively places the value of ITD's take of Hughes Investments' property at± $3.23/sf or,
$2,532,578 for the prime 18 acres being acquired.
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It is estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for road construction materials

located underneath Hughes Investments property is approximately $300,000. However, the
most important component to the determination of the value of the take is the time period still
needed to complete construction.
It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property, after the take, would be worth

$3,669,300 (at the time of completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as
follows:
(1)

3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300 (value is reduced due
to the inability to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's ROW;

(2)

3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a value of $625,300;

(3)

Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and

(4)

Remaining 26.42 acres with limited commercial viability priced at $1,150,000.

Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property on the assumption
of at least an additional three year delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also,
it should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer system to significantly
fewer users will greatly decrease the value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of I 0%
per annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a reduced value of $947,000.
To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials
+ a reduction in value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction of
$947,000 = $3,779,578. This is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just
compensation for the take.
In the alternative, looking at the development potential before the take for the
property's "highest and best use" the value is significantly higher. The potential profit, as is
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shown in the pre-take budget, is estimated at just over $8,670,000. This approach provides
Hughes Investments with the investment strategy required in our projects, developing and
holding of at least a portion of the asset.

The expected value after the take is: ITD

condemnation $571,000 + NPV of the remainder property $2,722,000

= $3,293,000.

Subtract the land and expenses to date of approximately $1,800,000 and the potential profit is
only about 15% of that of the "highest and best use".
Geoff Reeslund anticipates testifying in the following areas:
•

Retail/commercial site planning and design, including building orientation,

sight line and visibility criteria: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the proposed elevated
freeway, as it traverses the site, will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant
buildings and signage in the development. Without at-grade pass-by visibility and identity,
many potential customers may simply speed by the site without stopping. Conversely, the
current at-grade highway with its signalized intersection provides superior visibility to the
traveling public and also provides better access and an opportunity for encouraging
customers to pull off the highway and patronize the project.

•

Division of property/parcel configurations: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that

the land taken for the freeway construction bifurcates the most usable portion of the property
into two pieces, one of which is very small with limited use applications, poor access and
visibility; the other with poor visibility and very poor access opportunities. A third parcel will
be created when right-of:-say is acquired for the Syivan frontage road use, further isolating a
large portion of the property from the remainder and limiting the amount of property that
could be developed for (highest and best-use) retail/commercial tenants.
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•

Access & circulation - on and off-site: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the

configuration and location of the land taken for the highway reconfiguration use severely
impacts the viability for developing the resultant sites by eliminating or drastically limiting
the ability to provide effective access points critical to successful commercial development.
•

Infrastructure and utility needs/provisions: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that

the taking of this property for highway reconfiguration creates a severe hardship by
impacting the ability to provide an effective and economical utility infrastructure for the
resulting properties, and will require significant additional expenses due to the potential
installation ofredundant systems, such as sewer, water and electrical facilities.
•

Development process and sequencing, from initial planning to construction

completion: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the lack of a recorded map defining the
properties with which Hughes Investments are left after the taking has significantly delayed
the development of the remaining property and has likely cost Hughes Investments tenants
who were willing to proceed if the development were permitted to occur with legally defined
parcels.
•

Land use potential: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify as to the various potential

plans for development of the subject property and its suitability given its reconfiguration,
location and infrastructure needs. He will also testify about Tenant leasing issues relative to
division of construction between Tenant and Landlord, including implementation of
requirements to affect Tenant openings.
•

Further that the land use development potential is now limited due to the

splitting of the prime commercial site by the taking.
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•

Predevelopment

planning

and

research

including

A&E

consultant

management: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify as to his familiarity with the property and his
work with various consultants for the three years Hughes Investments have owned the
property, including architects, civil engineers, environmental consultants, traffic engineers,
waste water engineers, general contractors and others. Hughes Investments has spent
significant dollars and prepared numerous commercial site plans, environmental studies and
reports, ALTA site surveys, traffic studies and waste water treatment system designs, all to
prepare for and support the development of this property.
•

Land use entitlements processing: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that he

worked closely with consultants and Kootenai County to process the Commercial rezone and
allow for the development of the property by Hughes Investments. During this process,
Reeslund also worked and/or coordinated with the City of Athol, Lakes Highway District,
Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization, and numerous local residents as well as ITD
on several occasions.
•

On mid off-site development and construction, including agency coordination.

consultant management, permit processing and construction management. Mr. Reeslund
intends to testify as to his qualifications to manage the project A &E team in preparing the
required improvement plans for the construction of the planned commercial project,
including processing the required ministerial construction permits, managing the bidding and
construction for the on and off-site improvements and buildings for construction and leasing;
Mr. Reeslund will also be coordinating with various tenants who will construct their own
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facilities and ensuring that tenants' design and construction teams produced an effective and
timely completion of construction to meet timelines for the project opening.

Additional detail in support of Mr. Reeslund' experience and qualifications in these
areas, are attached as a copy of his Statement of Qualifications.
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses'
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from
the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yes", describe
the amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and
all facts and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied
upon, as a basis for that opinion.
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages will result. Defendant does
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of
Plaintiffs actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance damages may not be fully known until after the
project is completed or at least construction is initiated.
Supplemental Answer: See, Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 2, above.
Request for Production No. 1:

Please produce all documents identified, used,

referenced or relied upon in responding to the inten-ogatories above.
RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voluminous documents responsive to these
Requests for Production and will make them available for inspection and/or copying to
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Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon reasonable request.
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos.

001401 -001416 produced herewith.
Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action, including Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) experts.
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production is overbroad and beyond the
scope of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B).

See also, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. At this time,

Defendant has not determined which experts it anticipates utilizing at trial, and discovery is
not permitted as to specially retained experts.
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos.

001402 -001404 produced herewith.
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce copies of all documents relied upon by
any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion
relating to the Subject Property.
RESPONSE: See, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2.
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos.

001401 -001416 produced herewith.
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited
to, the appraisal reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each
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appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial
of this matter.
RESPONSE:

Defendant has no appraisal reports responsive to this request, but

information relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be found
in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and
Mary York referenced herein.

Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA,

produced herewith.

Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos.
001401 -001416, produced herewith and Bates Nos. 0000964-0001400 already produced.
Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value
of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years.
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request
for Production.

Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates No.
001416, produced herewith.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP -~

1stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Kootenai )

Alan Johnson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am the managing member of HJ Grathol, Defendant, in the above-entitled action; I
have read Defendant HJ Grahtol 's Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents
thereof, and I state the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

HJrathol =

for
Its: Senior VP Development

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

h_ day of October, 2011.
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Project List Idaho

Bayview Gateway (Athol, ID): Owned. 56 acres (subject to partial condemnation) Zoned commercial.
Grocery, gas, fast food, pads, retail
RiverviE:?w (Spokane County, WA): Owned. 10 acres. Approved for 2 hotels, restaurant, fast food, gas
Spokane Street: Spokane Street and 1-90, Post Falls, ID. Escrow terminated due to lack of tenant
demand.
Plaza Coeur d Alene (CDA, ID. 95/Aqua): Proposed project. Was to be a relocation for JC Penney's,
Target. Circuit City and other interest. Deal postponed as Penney's elected not to relocate and Target is
on hold. Not owned by Hughes
The Crossings (CDA, ID. Appleway/NW BLVD): Project was under negotiation until Kohl's elected to build
on HWY 95. Negotiations terminated.
Riverstone (CDA, ID.) Hughes was under contract to buy a 1 acre pad site in the Riverstone Center. Pad
and entire project was sold to another party prior to dosing.

Also own commercial property In Park City, UT as well as our shopping centers in southern California.
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AlaJ1 Johnson
.S:ENIO.R VICE PRES]DENT; DEVl;LQPMSNT
At.AN JOHNSON - Alan attended Mounl Royar College ln ·his· naiive Calgary, Canada and graduated from the
University of Oklahoma in Norman, Oklaho·ma. After graduation in 1983, he joined Coldwell Banker now CB Richard
E:il!S, as a retal[ speciallst, transferring to the Anaheim, California office in 1985. In 1989 Alan was hired by Hughes
lnve:stineiits as Vice Pr.esldenf- Leasing. After-nine years with Hughes Investments, Mr. Johnson joined The Irvine
Cotilpariy .asDir$clor Of· Leasing and concentrated· on· 1he d~ve!cipment and:teasing of several ground-up projects
.ini;i.uding th(i Markel Place - Irvine (500,000 sf GLA), Northpark Plaza ( 124,00sf GLA), Quail Hill (150,000sf GLA},
Trabuco Grove (!80,000 sf GLA), Oal<creek Village (139,000sf GLA}, Irvine Spectrum Pavilion (471,000 sf GLA).
Newpor.t'C:oast(103;000 sf GLA), The ~luffs (61,000 sf GLA}, Vineyards Marketplace (10,000 sf GLA), Corona Valley
(84,000 sf GLA) and several other projects throughout Irvine, Newport Beach Utah, Idaho and Washington.
During the· past 26·years Alan completed transactions and formed relationships with Albertsons, Sav-on Drugs.
Lowe's, Target, Kohl's, Office Depot, Ralph's, Ethan Allen, Vons, Sears and many other national tenants. He has
been res11onsible for all aspects of acquisitlon and development including site and proper1y identification, purchase
negotiations, desJgn, site planning, entitlements. development, leasing, management, broker coordination and all
other aspects of commercial development.
ln·Si:ipWm'i>er of:2003 Alan .left The li:1./ine Company to serve as Senior Vi<ie President, Development with Hughes
lnvastments .. Mr. Johnson Is responsible for all pbas.es of acquisition <111d development of shopping centers
·ihroughout:Califorriia, Utah, Washfngton and idaho; .Alan 1s·a member oflCSC. and has att~lned his Senior Certified
.Leasing Specialist "S.CLS" credential.. .
·Please s·eeattached project brochures and slbplans.
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HUGHES INVESTMENTS
A· Rl:AL- l:STATlo St::RVICl:S COMPANY

GEOFFREY B. REESLUND, AJA

STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATlONS
Mr. Reeslund is a graduate of the University of Southern California, where he earned
Bachelors and Masters degrees in Architecture. A registered Architect since 1977, for over
21 years Geoff worked for SGPA Architecture and Planning, one of the top retail/commercial
architectural firms in the country. A Principal with SGPA since 1986, he provided leadership
ii) the planning, design and entitlement processing of over 200 community, specialty,
regional and entertainment centers ttiroughout California and other Western states,
Including nine projects for Hughes Investments. In addition, he served as SGPA'~ Southern
California Marketing Director from 1993 to 1997, helping to expand their presence and Client
base in the region.
In 1998, Geoff joined Hughes Investments, one of his longstanding Clients, as Vice
President and Director of Design and Construction. Hughes Investments, established in
1977, is one .of the most successful developers of shopping centers in Southern California.
In addition to building and managing their own centers, the firm also co-develops with,·
and/or provides development services to many of the country's most successful major
tenants, such as Home Depot, Albertsons, Target and Wal*Mart
As Director of Design and Construction, Mr. Reeslund oversees all aspects of project
planning, design, governmental approvals, and construction. He assembles and manages
the project consultant teams, works closely · with tenants and their consultants, and
coordinates the construction process to a successful completion. He also works closely with
Hughes Investments' Senior Management and Property Management staffs on a regular
basls·to facilitate clear Internal communications, project services and ongoing maintenance
programs for existing centers.
·
Mr. Reeslund is a member of the American Institute of Architects, serves on the Advisory
Board of the California Business Properties Association, and is actively involved in the
International Council of Shopping Centers, where he· was a member of the Southern
California Program Committee from 1991 to 1995.

Representative projects managed and constructed whiie at Hughes investments:
•

The Marketplace at Hollywood Park- a 43 acre "Power Center'' in Inglewood,
Califomla with 453,000 SF of retail uses including Home Depot, Target, El Super
grocery store, Bally Fitness, Walgreens, and Staples.

13 CORPORATE PLAZA• SUITE 150 • NEWPORT BEACH, CA 92660
P.O. BOX 8700 • NEWPORT BEACH, CA 92658-8700
PHONE (949) 759-9531
FACSIMILE (949) 759-8531
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977 of 1617

•

Mountain Gate Marketplace- an 11 acre neighborhood retail center with Albertson's
and 45,000 SF of other retail shops and freestanding pad tenants.

•

Heritage Marketplace:... a 10 acre neighborhood center with Albertson's, Wells Fargo,
Carl's Jr., Del Taco, 7 Eleven and 23,000 SF of retail shop space.

•

Corona Valley Marketplace ~ a 10 acre neighborhood center with Albertson's, Chase
Bank, Carl's Jr., 7 Eleven and 20,000 SF of retail shop space.

•

Garden Promenade - a 31 acre community center with Regal Cinemas, Ross Dress
for Less, Marshall's, Party City, PetSmart, 24 Hour Fitness Bank of America, Carl's
Jr., Pizza Hut and 50,000 SF of other retail tenant spaces.

•

Southpointe Plaza - a 25 acre big box center with Home Depot and Sam's Club.
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HUGHES INVESTMENTS - DEVELOPMENT

SILVER CREEK JUNCTION
Prepared: 10/11/05

PROJECT BUDGET

POTENTIAL INCOME:
$/BldgSF
$180,000
$18.37

9,800 Bldg, SF

Drug - Ground Lease

{Assumed :lo/. Mgml Fee only)

N.O.L
$174,600

Land SF
60,000

Share of Open Space
Cap
Rate

Potential Value

44,245

7.50%

$2,328,000

Pad 1 Bank •ZL
(Assumed 3% Mgml fee only)

5,000 Bldg, SF

$75,000

$15.00

$72,750

35,000

25,810

8.00%

$809,375

Pad 2 Ba11k/Thrift GL
(Msumed 3% Mgml Fee only)
Pad 3 Multi ·renan!
(Assumed :I¾ Mgml Fee & 5% Vacancy)
Parcel 4 Medica!/dentaUre office GL
(Ass\lmecl ;3% Mgmt Fee only)

5,000 Bldg.SF

$7S,000

$15.00

$72,750

35,000

25.810

8.00% ::.:

$909,375

5.000 Bldg.SF

$120,000

$24,00

$110.580

20.000

14,74$

8.00%

$1,382,250

5.000 Bldg.SF

$70,000

$30.00

$64,505

25,000

18.'135

8.00%

$806,313

TOTAL VALUED

TOTAL BUILDING SQ.FT. _ _,;29=.a..
o.,o

$495185

$520,000

TOTAL SQ. FT.==-=="""

OPMENT PROPERTY
S6,335,313
129,048 7 .82% OveraU cap
TOTAL VALUE
$6,335,313

Loan Value Using DSCR:
NOi@ 1.25 OSC@S.25% k

25YtAmOr1..
Loan Value Using 75"/4 LTV

$4,801,794 Loan Arnau
$495,185 NOi
$4,751,484

POTENTIAL COSTS:
_.....,,_,nd Purcrn,s&
304,048 NET SF
)urchasing 6,98 acres, however, only 175k sf useable)

-.:IITE COSTS:
Off S;te Conslruction Costs:
Off S~e Permit & lmpiu;t Fees/A & E
On site Construction Costs

$1,300,000

$4.28 PER SF

.
175,000 Net

$1.SO PER SF
$0.15 PER SF
Net
$3.50 PER SF
$0.77
$0.25 PER SF
$0.25 PER SF
1,088,750 Hanf Cost
975.000

175,000
129,048
175,000
175.000

Onslte Costs for.Open Space• Wetlands
S~e Penntt Fees & Impact Fees
A& E/Testin!l

SubTotal Site Costs prior to Reimb.;

Reimbursem,enl On-Sile & DffsRe Salas/GL

1,088.750

Permanent Loan Amount:75%LTV
Pay Sack of Equity Loan lo HI
Pay Sack of !interest on Equity Loan
Consb'ucl0!1 Loan Pay Off
Loan Fee/Legal/T'ot!e@1 ••5%
Net Cash from Perm Loan:

262,500
26.250

175,000 Net

612.500
100.000
43,750
43,750

88.57%

cash Flow after Permanent Loan:
Assumed Perm Loan Amount

($964.321)

SUBTOTAL NET SITE COSTS

Ne! Operaffng Income
Debt Service @ 8k
(Int @ 7% ror 30 yrs)
lmpaoods/Rollover @$1/sf/yrf
Net Cash Flow Annually

124.429

BUii.DiNG CONSTRUCTION:

$80.00 (SF
$15.00fSF

5,000 SF

Shops • Retail
Tl Contributions to Shop Tenarns
A & E Build;ngs
Testing/Fore Mgmt
PERMITS & FEES
Hard Cost C.,nGngency

S.000 SF
5,000 SF
S.000 SF
5,000 SF

400,000
. 75,000
17,500
10,000
15,000
250.000

$3.SO /SF
$2.00 /SF

~00/SF

Excess Reimbursement to r(I
!Net HI Equity

$767,500

SUBTOTAL BLDG. CONSTRUCTION COSTS

s.ooo

Leasing Commissions - Shops

HI Equity Required;
(Interest on Equity Not Included in Budget)
112Yr.@ll%

50,000

$10.00

1yr.@9%
Lease Comm. On Ground Leases
AEGAL. ACCOUNTING. RE TAXES
i )AN COSTS/Appraisal/Fees/Legal

·

24.800 Blddg. SF

1 yr. Rent

.,,TEREST CONSTRUCTION LOAN

@50%0ot

SOFT COST CONTINGENCY
DEVELOPMl1NT COS'rS

(S100k min)

400,000

1.50%

$3,350,000

8.25%

$3.350.000

4.00%

$1,856,250

200,000

Total Interest 18 mos.
Total Equity Due HI al Perm Loan

100.000
50,250
138,188
150.000
100,000

SUBTOTAL OTHER COSTS

$786,4$

SUBTOTAL BLDG., SITE & OTHER COSTS

$1.680.367
TOTAL POTI:NTIAL NET COSTS

1.680.367
2.980.367

TOTAL REIMBURSMEN'TS INCLUDED ABOVE
TOTAL COSTS WITHOUT REIMBURSEMENT

3.944.688

Potential loan Amount @ 85% of Gross Costs:
Loan Amount Used:

Loan Amounr @ 85¾ of Net Costs
Pay back required to bring loan down to 85% of Costs
Loan Equity Required /JpFront
Less Rcimb. From Tenants
Plus Additional Pay Down of Loan to get to 85% of Net Costs
Net Reimbursements availabte lo Pay Oown HI Eql.lity

G:\$.'5\little summit.xis GO Ls Drug

50.00%

$3,352,984
$3,350,000
$2,533,312

PROFIT

$4,751,484
•$447.055
-$66,996
-$2.533,312

-$71~72
$1,632,850

$4,751,484
$495,185
·$380,119
-$5,000
$110,066

$594.688 (A)
$26,761
$147,633 (B)
$447,055

$40,235
$66,996
$514,051

964,321

$3,354,946!

$816,688

$594,688 (A)
$964,321

NOi RelUtn on Cos1s

16.61%

S816,688
$147,633 (B)

1 l/2912005
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HUGHES INVESTMENTS
Bayview Gateway
PROJECT BUDGET
POTENTIAL INCOME:
3,500 Bldg. SF

Pad - Ground Lease FF
(Assumes 4% Mgmt. Fee)
Pad - Ground Lease Fast Food
(Assumes 4% Mgmt Fee)
Pad - Ground Lease Restaurant
(Assumes 4% Mgmt. Fee)
Retail Shops
(Assumes 4% Mg~t. Fee)
Retail Pad
(Assumes 4% Mgmt Fee)

Scheduled
$/Bldg SF
Rent
$50,000
$14.29

Net Operating
Income
$48,000

Land SF
65,340

Cap Rate
7.50%

Potential Value
$640,000

4,000 Bldg. SF

$50,000

$12.50

$48,000

65,340

7.50%

$640,000

5,000 Bldg. SF

$55,000

$11.00

$52,800

65,340

8.00%

$660,000

10,000 Bldg. SF

$220,000

$22.00

$211,200

87,120

8.00%

$2,640,000

5,000 Bldg.SF

$100,000

$20.00.

$96,000

65,340

8.00%

$1,200,000

$456,000

348,480

7.89%

$5,780,000

$475,000

27,500
TOTAL BUILDING SQ.FT.======

Price/ sf

Land sales:

$10.00
$4.50
$8.00
$7.50

Gas Station

Groceiy Store (Major Tenant)
Future Development
Travel Center
·

Motels

Size

Price

58,370
216,493
138,956
304,920

$7.75__:2:,;5.;.,7,""87c::5_
976,614

TOTAL LAND SALES:

Commsision

$583,700.00
$974,218.50
$1,111,648.00
$2,286,900.00

Total
$566,189
$944,992
$1,078,299
$2,218,293
$1,938,575
$6,746,348

$17,511
$29,227
$33,349
$68,607

_:$t:.:.1i.;,9~982:,53:::.:.:1·:::25:.__
$6,954,997.75

_,.::$;:.;:5.::,9,.;:95:;.6
$208,650

Total Potential Revenue

$12,526,348

POTENTIAL COSTS:
Land Purchase
Development Land total Square Footage:
SITE COSTS:
Off Site Construction Costs: (Dev Land)
On Site Construction Costs: Site A
Permit & Fees
A & E/Testing
Sewer (aU Dev Land)
Hard Cost Contingency - Site

2,439,360 SF
1,325,094 SF

$0.49 PER SF
$0.49 PER SF

1,325,094
564,973
1,325,094
1,325,094
1,325,094
5%

$0.23
$3.00
$0.06
$0.13
$0.75

SF
SF
SF
SF
SF

Not included in costs below &
$1,200,000 excludes value to Athol comer

$651,857

PER SF
PER SF
PER SF
PER SF
PER SF ·
$2,994,919.00

Total Site:
Site Reimbursements
Offsites (Sales & Gril Leases)

760,121 SF

Onsites (GL and Grocery)

412,513 SF

$0.15 PER SF
@70%

1,172,634 SF

Sewer Costs

Net Site Reimbursements:
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION:
Shops (Includes TA's)
A & E Buildings
Permits & Fees
Hard Cost Contingency- Bldg.
Soft Cost Contingency - Bldg.

-$114,018

$2.10 PER SF

88.49% of total

-$866,2TT

$1,000,000

-$884.944 _-:--,-e::-=-:,:-,=-$1,865,239

15,000 SF
15,000 SF
15,000 SF
5%
5%

$75.00 /SF
$2.25 /SF
$1.00 /SF
1,125,000
48,750

Total Bulding Construction
G & A & Marketing
Leasing Commisslons - Shops
Pad Ground Lease Commissions
Overhead Construction Fee
Subtotal G & A & Overhead Costs

$300,000
$1,694,919
$75,000
$170,000
$1,000,000
$149,746 ---,-,-,,.,,..
$3,389,665

15,000 SF
50% of first year's income
4% of Hard Costs

$3.00 /SF
$155,000
$4,328,352

$1,125,000
$33,750
$15,000
$56,250
$2,438 - - - - $1,232,438
$150,000
$45,000
$77,500
$173, 134 _ __,,..,..,-=-=,....,..
$445,634

Total Potent/al Costs: _ _$_3.,_,8;..;5_4.:..;.,3_54_

Total Profit Potential:j

$8,671,9941
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1. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General

Idaho Trmsportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boisep Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-881S
Faodmile:

(208) 334 4498
11

Mary V, York OSB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400) U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701 ..2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000

Facsimile: (208) 343-8869

Attorneys for Plamtiff
IN nm DISTRICT COURT or Tim FIRS? Jtrl>ICJAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDA.HO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV10~10095

IDAHO TRANSPORTA!lON BOARD,

Plaintiff,
vs.
BJ GRATHOL1 a Calif0r12ia ge11eral
'

' corporation; and DOES 1
a Washington
through 5,

STl:PtJLATION FOR
:EXTENSION OF TIME FOR
PLAJNTJFJ•s REBUTTAL
EXPERTS WITNESS
DlSCLOSVllES AND .FOR
ER"

Defendants.

STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION or TlME FOR PLAINTIFF'S RJBUTTAL
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR "ACA.RREQUl OFFER" • 1

EXHIBIT

I __L___
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No. 5307

9:31AM

P. 3

Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") and Defendant
HJ Grathol (''Grathol") (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "parties',), by and

through their counsel of record. hereby stipulate and agree as follows:

1.

The parties agree to extend the deadline for ITD to identify rebuttal expert

witnesses and serve their disclosures of opinions to be offered at trial from October 19,
2011 to November 21, 2011, and request the Court to enter an Order accordingly. The
Court's Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretrial Order will otherwise remain unchanged.
a.

The Court's Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretrial Order provides
that all parties are to disclose rebuttal expert witnesses no later
than ninety days (90) before trial. The trial in this matter is

scheduled to begin on January 17, 2012, which would require that
rebuttal expert witness be disclosed no later than October 19, 2011.
b.

The parties agree to a one-month extension for ITD to disclose
rebuttal expert witnesses and opinions, which would extend ITD's
deadline to November 21, 2011.

2.

The parties also agree to extend by one month the date by which ITD may

submit an offer of settlement in accordance with Ada County Highway District v.

Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and succeeding cases and other
relevant provisions ofidaho law. Under this extension, ITD's i'Acarrequi" Offer will
be due no later than November 21, 2011 and Grathol may not assert any argument that
an "Acarrequf" offer made on or before November 21, 2011 is untimely.
3.

Grathol agrees that all opinions of its experts Dewitt "Skjp" Sherwood,

Alan Johnson. and Geoff Reeslund have been disclosed.

STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR "ACARREQUI OFFER" - 2
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4.
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No. 5307

9:37AM

ITD agrees to withdraw Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony

or, Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures, currently pending before the Court and
scheduled for hearing on October 19, 2011.
5.

The parties respectfully submit that good cause exists for this Stipulation

and that this Stipulation is not intended to impact other existing deadlines in this case.
DATED this .JJj_day of October, 2011.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
By

~

~

. ._ <;,.,
Do~Marfi~rm

Attorneys for Defendant
HJ Grathol

Attorneys for lain.tiff
Idaho Transportation Department

STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.11_1ay

I hereby certify that on this
of October, 2011, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing. by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83816-1336

D

ij
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Artorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

S2S8B23_2.DOC

STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFF,S REBUTTAL
EXPERT '\VITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR "ACAR.R.EQUI OFFER,, - 4
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HOLLAND&HART".

"J

MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

myork@hollandhart.com

January 17, 2012

Via Fax: 208-664-5884
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095

Dear Chris:
We are enclosing with this letter ITD's supplemental responses to Grathol's second set of
discovery requests. We have completed our review ofITD's prior productions of documents in this
case and confirmed that the documents requested have already been produced. When we requested
the extensions of time to obtain additional documents responsive to Grathol's discovery, we were
searching for new documents located at District 1 and ITD's Headquarters. We did not expect that
the responsive documents had already been produced and so had not initially reviewed our prior
productions in preparing ITD's supplemental response.
As stated in my letter of Friday, January 13, 2012, the information requested in this
discovery has no relevance either to the trial on just compensation or the issues raised in ITD's
motion for summary judgment and motion in limine. Additionally, since the requested information
had already been produced, there is no reason why you should not be able to meet the Court's
deadline for responding to ITD's motion for summary judgment and motion in limine.
Please contact me if you have any further questions.

MVY:st
Enclosure
5372315_1.DOC

EXHIBIT

Holland &Hart up
;•hons [208] 342-5000
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MaryV. York

HOLLAND&HART-"J

Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

myork@hollandhart.com

January 23, 2012

Via Fax: 208-664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814

Re:

ITO v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVI0-10095

Dear Doug:
This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation from Friday, January 20, 2012 regarding
the Grathol matter. Among other things, we discussed the fact witnesses you intend to call at trial.
You indicated that you are planning on calling four fact witnesses at trial - Bill Hughes, John Shaw,
Brett Terrell, and Jim Coleman.
We requested available deposition dates for these individuals for the week of January 30th
or at the latest, the first part of the week of February 13th. With the rapidly approaching trial date,
our preference is for the week of January 30th. If not all of the depositions can be scheduled for
that week, we would at least like to take Jim Coleman's and Brett Terrell's depositions during that
week. You stated that you would check on available dates. Please let us know as soon as possible
the available dates for these individuals.
Also during our conversation, we requested that the deponents provide their complete files
relating to the Grathol matter prior to the depositions. In response, you stated that you would not
object to the request and that you would follow up with the individuals regarding the files.
Please let us know if you have any questions and we look forward to hearing from you.
V

/

truly yours,

,

Mary Y:· , ork
of Holl d &
'·

MVY:st
5376985_1

EXHIBIT

Holland & Hart LLP
Phone [208] 342-5000

fax (208] 343-8869

www.hollandharLcom

101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702
Aspen

Billings

Boise

Boulder

Cheyenne

}

j

'V!a,;;,,.J And•,·,, P.O.Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527

Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center

Jackson Hole

Salt Lake City

Santa Fe Wash·

Iv

996 of 1617

HOLLAND&HAR1:..

"!I

MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869
myork@hollandhart.com

February 8, 2012

Via Fax: 208-664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095

Dear Doug:
In light of the upcoming fact witness depositions, I want to confirm that Grathol only
intends to call four fact witnesses at trial-Jim Coleman, Brett Terrell, Tom Vandervert, and Mike
Winger. These four individuals were identified in response to my question as to whom you
intended to call as fact witnesses at trial. Please confirm that you will not be calling any other fact
witnesses. Also, it will expedite the depositions if you can provide a brief summary of the facts that
these individuals will be testifying to at trial.
We have not yet received confirmation of Mike Winger's availability for deposition on
Tuesday, February 14, 2012. We would like to take all of the fact witness depositions (other than
Mr. Coleman's) next week, so that we do not have to make another trip to Coeur d'Alene. Can you
please let me know as soon as possible whether we will be going forward with Mr. Winger's
deposition on Tuesday?
Also, can you provide the complete files of Messrs. Terrell, Vandervert, and Winger relating
to the Grathol matter prior to the depositions. It will help speed up the depositions if we can receive
those documents this week.
Please let us know if you have any questi ns and we look forward to hearing from you.

ary V York
ofH
&
MVY:st
5402809_l .DOCX
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MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax {208) 343-8869

myor1<@hollandhart.com

February 9, 2012
Via Fax: 208-664-5884

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons~ LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County
Case No. CVl0-10095

Dear Doug:
This letter is to confirm our conversation today regarding the fact witnesses Grathol intends
to call at the trial of this matter. The first issue involves Mike Winger who you had originally
identified as a fact witness in this case. During our conversation today, you confirmed that you are
withdrawing Mike Winger as a fact witness and will not be calling him as a witness in this case.
As a result of your decision not to call Mr. Winger, we will not depose him.
The second issue involves Jim Coleman, who you also identified as a fact witness in this
matter. After reviewing Mr. Coleman's file and discussing in general terms the scope of his
testimony, Mr. Coleman made clear that all of his testimony is opinion testimony. Specifically,
he stated that his design of the sewer treatment facility for the Grathol property is all based on his
engineering opinions. He also made clear that the feasibility of his proposed system, his cost
estimates for the proposed system, and. whether or not his proposed system would be approved by
the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality are all engineering opinions. He further stated that
he cannot testify without offering his opinions.
Because all of Mr. Coleman's testimony constitutes opinions developed through his
expertise as an engineer, we will not be taking Mr. Coleman's deposition tomorrow as originally
planned. Our scheduling of Mr. Coleman's deposition was based upon your designation of him as
a fact witness, and not as an expert or any claimed category of expert witness. Any offer of opinion
testimony by Mr. Coleman is barred by your failure to identify him as an expert witness and
disclose his opinions as required by the Court's pretrial orders, the civil rules governing expert
witness disclosures, and ITD's long-standing requests for identification of experts and disclosure
of expert opinions. As it stands, we believe we have the facts within Mr. Coleman's knowledge,
which are limited to the dimensions of the Grathol property and the lack of available water or sewer
connections to the site, and therefore, have no need to depose him as a fact witness.

Holland &Hart LLP
Phun~ [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.~om
101 South Capltol Boulevard Suite 1400 8oise,ID 83702 Malli n,I ~c1,1, ,_.,, P.O.Box 2527 Boise.ID 83701-2527
Aspen Billings Boise Boulder Cheyenne Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center Jackson Hole Salt Lake Oty Santa Fe Washl
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"J

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
February 9, 2012
Page2

Lastly, I am writing to confirm your statement today that you will not solicit any testimony
from Mr. Coleman regarding the expert opinions by David Evans and Associates.
Please let us know if you have any questions.

lltfilyVd
Mlf4iork
ofttffd&

MVY:st
5405973_1.DOCX
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ORIGINAL
RAMSDEN &LYONS,LLP
700 No1thwest Blvd,
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Ma:dice, ISB #4072
Christopher D, Gabb01t, !SB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TIIB STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ID GRATHOL, a Califomia general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095
DEFENDANT BJ GRATHOL'S
FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINmF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTSFORPRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Defendants,

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby supplements its l'esponses to
Plaintiffls First Set ofinteri-ogatodes and Requests for Pl'oduction of Documents as follows:

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or
expert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is
expected to testify.

DEFENDANT HJ 0RATHOL'SFOURrlf SUPPLBM£NTAL ANsmRs AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
INTERR.OOATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Of DOCUMENTS -1

EXHIBIT

Q
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ANSWER: Defendant has not yet dete1mined with certainty who they may call as
either expert

01·

lay witness in this rnatte1·. Discovery is ongoing and any

Ol'

all of the

individuals identified through discovery who possess relevant information may be called.
The substance of all expected trial testimony will be developed during the course of
discovery in this case. However, it is anticipated that Defendant may call any of the
following individuals as trial witnesses and those witnesses may testify as to facts known and
opinions held, as generally summadzed below:
(l)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

{3)

GeoffReeslund

These persons may give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development
plans for the Subject Prope1ty; opinion testimony as to its use(s), its value (before and after
the condemnation), the value of the Defendant's prope1ty remaining after condemnation and
before and after constmction, and entitlement/construction planning activities; effo1ts and
expenses associated with the purchase, holding and development of the property; planning
and design wol'k associated with the property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and
after condemnation; and the effects of the condemnation on the l'emaining property.
(4)

Dewitt "Skip'1 Sherwood

(5)

EdMorse

(6)

Dee Jamison

(7)

Scott Taylor

(8)

Brent Heleker

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-2
1001 of 1617

Feb. 17. 2012 4:38PM

No.7150

P. 4/11

These persons may give testimony, including opinion testimony as to the value of the
Subject Property1 pre-condemnation and post-condemnation, including impacts to the value
occasioned by this condemnation, and other matters within their knowledge or expertise.
(9)

Ron Harvey, Idaho Transportation Department

(10)

Yvonne Dingman, Idaho Transportation Department

(11)

Karl Vogt, counsel, Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals may be called to testify as to their knowledge, information, and
actions relative to seeking acquisition of a portion of Defendant's property.
(12)

Darrell Manning, Chairman, Idaho Transportation Board

(13)

James Coleman, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(14)

Janice Vassar, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

{15)

Jerry Whitehead, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(16)

Gary Blick, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(17)

Neil Miller, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(18)

Lee Gagner, Member, Idaho Transportation Board

(19)

Sue Higgins, Secretazy Idaho Transpmtation Board

(20)

Brian W. Ness, Director, Idaho Transportation Department

(21)

Pam Lowe, former Director, Idaho Transportation Department

(22)

Jesse W. Smith, Jr., Right of Way Manager, Idaho Transportation Dep8.11ment

These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge,
infonnation and actions relative to approval of the project which precipitated the need to
condemn Defendant's property; future plans for construction of the US 95 improvements
through and adjacent to Defendant's property and other matters within their knowledge,
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James Coleman, named above, may also testify on behalf of Coleman Engineel"ing regarding
the planning, design) and function of a proposed on-site sewage system and related

infrastructure serving Defendant's property.
(23)

Tom E. Cole, Chief Engineer, Idaho Transportation Department

(24)

Tamara R. Jauregui, Management Assistant, Idaho Transportation Department

(25)

Duane L. Zimmerman, P.L.S

(26)

Jason Minzghor, Idaho Ti-ansportation Department

(27)

Justin Wuest, Idaho Transportation Department

(28)

Jeny Wilson, P.E., Idaho Transportation Department

These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge,
information and actions relative to the design and construction of the highway improvements

across and adjacent to Defendant's property.
(29)

Ross Blanchard, Federal Highway Administration, Idaho Division

(30)

Rod Twete, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District

(31)

Monty Montgomery, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District

(32)

Marv Lekstmrn, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District

(33)

Joe Wuest, Road Supervisor, Lakes Highway District

(34)

Eric W. Shanley, P.E., Lakes Highway District

These individuals may be called to testify as to communications and interactions with
the Idaho Transportation Department relative to acquisition and/or improvements of frontage
road(s) and access on State Highway 54 in the vicinity of Defendant's property and the
necessity, plan or expectations of bisecting Defendant's property with a frontage road.
(35)

David Evans and Associates, Inc., including Greg Ho1der, P.E., Michael Kosa,
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and/or Bill Stark.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this l'esponse in accordance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's Pretrial Order.
Supplemental Answer:
(36)

Torn Vandervert, CLC Associates

Mr. Vandervert may be called to testify as to his services provided to Defendant as a

land planner, including but not limited to the scope of his work on the Subject Property,
designing and site planning, subdivision configuration for commercial development, planning

and accessibility issues both before and after the condemnation of 16.314 acres of the Subject
Property. He may also testify as to subdivision and zoning regulations, design standards and
services he performed to determine the suitability of uses and feasibility for development of
the Subject Property. .Mi·. Vandervert was deposed in this matter on Febrnary 13, 2011 by

the Plaintiff and may testify as to all matters upon which he was interrogated by Plaintiff.
(37)

Brett Terrell, Motion Realty1 LLC

Mr. Ten-ell may be called to testify as to his service provided to Defendants as a

commercial real estate broker, including but not limited to the scope of his work for Defendants
marketing the Subject Property as a commercial development, discussions with potential
tenants, lessees and purchasers for the Subject Property, analysis of demand and market price

for commercial real estate development at the Subject Property, and discussions with interested
parties and negotiations for the use of the p1·operty, M1·. Terrell was deposed in this matter on
February 14, 2012 by the Plaintiff and may testify as to all matters upon which he was

inten·ogated by Plaintiff.
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As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such

persons. See, U.S.C.A.J Fed, R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisol)' Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).
Intel'rogato1y No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to hltell'ogatory
No. I, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify,

a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefol'e,
the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expe1t opinion testimony in this matter,

including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering ofpmtions of the Plaintiffs
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation
of the property, The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the
following:
(1)

Bill Hughes

(2)

Alan Johnson

(3)

Geoff Reeslund

(4)

Scott Taylor

(5)

Brent Heleker

(6)

John Beutler

(7)

Mark Johnson

(8)

Jeff Bond

(9)

Donald Smock
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Paul Daugharty

(II)

Brett Terrell

(12)

Mike Winger
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As an actor/viewer "expert,i» Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such
persons. See, U.S.C.A,) Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).
(I)

Dewitt 1'Skip0 Sheiwood, CGA

(2)

Ed Morse, MAI

With respect to these valuation expe1ts, as of the date of the Answers to these

Inten·ogatories) no fo!"mal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder
of the information requested in this Intenogato1-y cannot be provided. If and when formal
appraisal 1·eports are prepared) the information in the above Interrogatm-y will be contained

within those appraisal reports.
Suppleme11tal A11swer:
Tom Vanderve1t, CLC Associates. Mr. Vanderve1t may be called to testify as to his
services provided to Defendant as a land planner, including but not limited to the scope of his

work on the Subject Property, designing and site planning, subdivision configuration for
commercial development, planning and accessibility issues both before and after the
condemnation of 16.314 acres of the Subject Property, He may also testify as to subdivision
and zoning regulations. design standards and services he performed to determine the

suitability of uses and feasibility for development of the Subject Property. Mr. Vanderve1t
was deposed in this matter on February 13, 2012 by the Plaintiff and may testify as to all
matters upon which he was inte1rngated by Plaintiff
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Brett Terrell, Motion Realty, LLC. Mr, Tei.Tell may be called to testify as to bis service
provided to Defendants as a commercial real estate broker, including but not limited to the
scope of his work for Defendants marketing the Subject Property as a commercial development. ·

discussions with potential tenants, lessees and purchasers for the Subject Property, analysis of

demand and market price for commercial real estate development at the Subject Property, and
discussions with interested parties and negotiations for the use of the property. Ml·. Ten-ell was
dep~sed in this matter on Febnuuy 14, 2012 by the Plaintiff and may testify as to all matte1·s
upon which he was intel'l'ogated by Plaintiff.
As an actor/viewer- "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such

persons. See, U.S.CA., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970
Amendment at 114 (West 1995).

DATED this 17th day of Pebruary, 2012.

i pher D. Gabbe11, Of the Finn
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES l through 5,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-10-10095

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF ITD's
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
WITNESSES NOT TIMELY
DISCLOSED

On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board
("ITD") filed its Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses not Timely Disclosed, along with a
supporting brief and the Affidavit of Mary York. On March 3, 2012, the motion came on
for hearing.
In its Motion, ITD requested that this Court exclude two of Defendant HJ
Grathol's ("Grathol") untimely disclosed expert witnesses 1 from testifying, to wit: Brett
Terrell and Tom Vandervert.

ITD argued that these two witnesses were originally

1 Grathol was required to disclose all of its experts and their opinions no later than August 19, 2011,
pursuant to this Court's Uniform Pre-Trial Order. The eight-day court trial began on March 5, 2012.
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denominated and deposed as fact witnesses, but in Grathol's supplemental expert witness
disclosure, served on February 17, 2012, they were denominated as expert witnesses.
At the March 5, 2012, hearing, Grathol conceded that Mr. Terrell and Mr.
Vandervert are only fact witnesses, but due to ITD's line of questioning during their
depositions, Grathol thought it best to supplement its disclosure and denominate them as
expert witnesses out of an abundance of caution. Further, Grathol's counsel affirmatively
stated that Grathol will only inquire into opinions that were covered in the witnesses'
depositions.
The impositions of sanctions, to include the exclusion of witness testimony, is in
the sound discretion of the court. Viehweg v. Thompson, l 03 Idaho 265, 64 7 P .2d 311
(Ct. App. 1982).
Based upon Grathol's concession and lack of opposition to ITD's Motion, and
this Court's reasoning provided in open court on March 5, 2012, NOW THEREFORE, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court grants, in its discretion, ITD's Motion to
Exclude Expert Witnesses not Timely Disclosed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert are barred from
providing expert witness testimony as to valuation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert are allowed to
testify as fact witnesses only.

DATED this

4

day of March, 2012.

ew::~Q.Q-·-

CHARLES W. HOS~ Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of February, 2012 a true and correct copy
of this Order Re: ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses was served, by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Mary York, Esq.
Ted Tollefson, Esq.
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
POBOX2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

o US Mail
o Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
o Via Fax: 208-343-8869

Douglas Marfice, Esq.
Christopher Gabbert, Esq.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 N.W. Blvd.
PO BOX 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

o
o
o
o

US Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: 208-664-5884

J. Tim Thomas, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General, ITD
PO BOX 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

o
o
o
o

US Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: 208-334-4498

Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk of the District Court

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

NO. 4442
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STArE OF !!JAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTEN1\l7ss

FILED:

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civii Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8803
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #S020)

Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVl0-10095

PLAINTIFF ITD'S POST-TRIAL
BRIEF

vs.
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES l through 5,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD''), hereby files its Post-Trial
Brief as directed by the Court at the conclusion of the trial in this matter on March 9, 2012.

I.

SUMMARY OF ITD'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF

Defendant HJ C1athol ("Grathol") called t'.vo valuation witnesses at trial, Mr. Sherwood
and Mr. Johnson. The opinions of these witnesses violate Idaho law and therefore cannot be
used in determining just compensation in this case.

1.

Sherwood failed to value the larger parcel as required by Idaho law. Because of

his violation of this fundamental legal requirement, Sherwood's opinion cannot, as a matter of
law, serve as a basis for determining just compensation in this case.
2.

Sherwood and Johnson failed to use the correct date of valuation mandated by

Idaho Code§ 7-712. They used dates years after the statutory date. The Idaho Supreme Court

has held that it is error for a district court to admit testimony of a valuation based on a date other
than the date mandated by statute. Since allowing the testimony at all is error, it would certainly
be reversible error for the Court to rely on these opinions in determining just compensation.

3.

Sherwood and Johnson included claims for severance damages based on alleged

delay in construction of the US-95 Project. These claims are barred by Idaho law and were
dismissed by the Court in its February 3, 2012 Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Therefore, these claims should be dismissed again.
4.

Johnson based his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical development

were completed. This approach is barred by law and bars consideration of his opinion of value.
Il.

THE GRATHOL PROPERTY AND THE TAKING

Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property located at the comer ofUS-95 and
State Highway 51 near Athol, Idaho. ITD is condemning 16.3 acres of the property, leaving a
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remainder of 40.5 acres. The Orathol property and the land taken by ITO are illustrated in Trial
Exhibit 166.
A small but contiguous parcel of 0.4 acres is located at the southwest comer of the

.. -pr~perty. Some appraisers inciuded the 0.4 acres in the larger-parcel, others did not. All agreed, ...
however, that whether the 0.4 acres was included or not had no bearing on the issue of just
compensation. Accordingly, for ease of discussion, this brief will refer to the entire Grathol
property, the "larger parcel," as 56.8 acres.

m.

SHERWOOD FAILED TO VALUE THE LARGER PARCEL. THEREFORE,
CONSIDERATION OF ms OPINION IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW,
As the Court knows, Sherwood did not value the larger parcel owned by Gratbol. Rather,

he used an imaginary 30.acre parcel bounded by US-95 on the west and an imaginary line on the
east. Grathol bought the 56.8 acres in one transaction. All of the property is contiguous. The
property has not been subdivided. No legal division or physical barrier separates the 30-acre
parcel from the rest of the 56. 8-acre larger parcel. Grathol sought and obtained a rezone for the
entire property in 2008. All of the property is now zoned commercial. The property is all owned
by Grathol. It is undeveloped land. All witnesses agree that the highest and best use of the

property is for commercial development. Thus, the larger parcel is unquestionably 56.8 acres.
Idaho law bars the use of an artificial division of property as the basis for determining
just compensation in a condemnation case.

A,

Idaho Statutory Provisions,

Idaho Code§ 7~707 states that "[t]he complaint must contain: ... (S) A description of

each piece ofland sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole, or only a part,
ofan entire parcel or tract." I.C. § 7-707 (emphasis added), In this case, no 30-acre parcel or
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tract ofland exists. Rather, the "whole" or ''entire parcel or tract" is the 56.8 acres owned by
Grathol.
Idaho Code§ 7-711 governs the assessment of just compensation.

The court, jury or referee- must hear such legal -testimony as may
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon
must ascertain and assess: . , . If the property sought to be
condemned constitutes only a part ofa larger parcel: (a) the
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to
be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]
I.C. § 7-711(2) (emphasis added). In Idaho, the "larger parcel" is the property owned by the
defendant, so long at it is contiguous and has the same highest and best use. Grathol cannot
create an artificial larger parcel, particularly a smaller one that simply inflates its compensation
claim. No case law or appraisal principle supports the designation of part of a piece of property
that is contiguous, under the same ownership, with the same zoning, and having the same highest
and best use as the larger parcel. That would defy logic and Idaho law. A smaller part of the
same piece of property cannot be the larger parcel.
B.

Idaho Jury Instructions.

Idaho jury instructions make clear that Grathol's attempt to create an artificial larger
parcel is contrary to Idaho law. IDJI 7.16 states:
lust compensation is the difference between the market value of
the entire property before the taking and the market value of the
remainder after the acquisition, together with any special damages
caused by the taking, measured as of [date].
IDJI2d 7.16 (emphasis added). The entire Grathol property is 56.8 acres, not 30 acres. Not even
Gtathol's witnesses disputed the fact that the remainder of the Grathol property after the taking
is 40.5 acres (56.8 -16.3 ~ 40.5 acres). The agreement as to the remainder necessarily reflects
the reality that the "larger parcel" is S6.8 acres.
PLAINT1FF ITD'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF - 4
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The Comment to IDfl 7.16 states: "This instruction applies where there is a partial take
with severance damage to the remainder and no offsetting benefit." Comment, IDJI2d 7.16. It is
undisputed that this is a partial taking case and that Grathol has sought to recover severance
damages. Therefore, IDn 7.i 6 governs fue determination of.just compensation in this case, and ...
that determination begins with the market value of the entire property. not an artificial or
imaginary portion of the entire property.

Similarly, IDJI 7.16.l sets forth factors that may be considered in deter.mining what
compensation should be paid for severance damages, if any, "to the remainder of the property."
IDJI2d 7.16.1 (emphasis added). The instruction makes clear that these factors may only be
considered to the extent that they are found to "affect the market value of the property." Id. The
Comment to IDn 7.16.1 is particularly germane to the "larger parcel" issue.
Where there is no benefit claimed to the remainder, the approach
of State v. Dunclic.k, Inc., 77 Idaho 45 (1955), of determining just
compensation by subtracting the fair market value of the remainder
from the fair market value of the whole before the take would
eliminate the necessity for this instruction. Where, however, the
parcel taken and the parcel remaining are separately valued, this
instruction might be useful.
Comment, IDJI2d 7.16.1 (emphasis added). The entire statutory scheme in Idaho, as reflected in

the jury instructions, is premised on the market value of the whole property and the market value
of the remainder.
These principles are further demonstrated in IDfl 7.16.5, which states that ''Severance
damages may arise where the property being taken is only part of a larger parcel belonging to the

defendant.'' IDJI2d 7.16.5 (emphasis added), The larger parcel is the whole property belonging

to the defendant. Again, Idaho's statutes and jury instructions are based on the determination of
the fair market value of the whole property owned by the defendant and the remaining property

after the talcing.
PLAINTIFF ITD'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF- S
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Idaho Case Law Bars Grath~l's Use Of An Artificial And Smaller "Larger
ParceL',

The Idaho Supreme Court has long enforced the fundamental principles noted above. In

Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference ofEvangelical Lutheran Synod, 20 Idaho 568,
·-

..

•-·-·.·\

119 P. 60 (1911), the Court cited the provisions ofldaho Code now codified as§ 7-711 and held:
It will be observed by the foregoing statute that under the laws of
this state three facts are to be determined in a condemnation suit
where it is not sought to take the entire tract ofland but only a
portion thereof. First, the value of the property sought to be
condemned together with all the improvements thereon pertaining
to the realty; second, if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part ofthe larger parcel, the damages which will
accrue to the remaining portion by reason of the severance must be
assessed; and, third, if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes a part ofa larger parcel, the benefits which will accrue
to the remaining portion after the severance of the part condemned
must be ascertained and assessed and be deducted from the
damages that will be sustained by the severance.

Id. at 119 P. 64 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that ITD is not condemning "the entire tract
of land" owned by Grathol, "but only a portion thereof." It is also undisputed that the
condemned property is "part of a larger parcel." And, lastly, it is undisputed that ''the entire tract
of land" owned by Orathol is 56.8 acres. No factual or legal basis exists for determining just
compensation in this case based on an artificial 30-acre segment of "the entire tract of land."
In Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. 88 (1912), the Idaho
Supreme Court, again citing the statutory provisions now codified as Idaho Code § 7-711,
explained:
Under the provisions of the statute it was not necessary that the
jury should find the value of each legal subdivision of the tract
sought to be condemned. It however, there is more than one
parcel ofland, or several separate parcels or tracts, each
separated from the other, then it is necessary for the jury to
determine the value of each separate tract or parcel. But where the
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value then may be fixed
as a single parcel or tract. "Parcel" or "tract" ofland, as used in
PLAINTlFF ITD'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF- 6
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this section, does not mean legal subdivision but a consolidated
1

body of land, and the finding of the jury may be upon each single
parcel or tract of land.

Id. at 121 P. at 92 (emphasis added). In this case, the Grathol property has not been subdivided.
No-separate parcels ofland exist, and ncseparate par~els are '~each separated from the other."
Rather, the undisputed facts are that Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property. By
any definition, the Grathol property is a "consolidated body of land."
In State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112 (1955), the Idaho Supreme

Court began by noting:
Under our Constitution and statutes, Art. I, § 14, Idaho
Constitution and sections 7w711 and 7-714 I.C., a defendant in a
condemnation suit is entitled to be paid in money the value of the
property to be taken and the damages which will accrue to the part
not taken because of its severance.

Id. at 51, 286P.2d at 1116. The Court then described thefonnulafor detenniningjust
compensation in Idaho:
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has
been determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further
recover the damages to the remainder. This latter swn is
determined by market value of such remainder before and after the
taking. The difference is the severance damage.

Id. at S5·56, 286 P.2d at 1118. It would be impossible for Idaho courts to follow this formula if
property owners were allowed to create artificial "larger parcels" (particularly smaller larger
parcels) and artificial "remainders." The only workable approach, and the only approach
authorized by Idaho law, is to base the larger parcel and remainder on contiguous real property
having the same ownership, the same zoning, and the same highest and best use. In this case, the
larger parcel is plainly 56.8 acres.

State ex rel. Rich v Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (19S8), demonstrates when
separate parcels of land, but under common ownership, should not be considered together as a
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ularger parcel" for purposes of determining ju.st compensation for property taken and damages to
the remainder. In Fonburg, the state sought to condemn 12. 76 acres of Fonburg' s farm to build a

new highway. Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 61. A railroad line divided Fonburg's property in the
before condition. Id. at 274,328 P.2d-at62. Fonburg alw-Gwned "land non-contiguous to the _______
land through which the new road crosses, namely, a residence and farm land, located in or near
Culdesac, and north from the railroad track, his dwelling being approximately 600 to 1,000 feet
distant from the land taken." Id. Fonburg sought severance damages for impacts on the land
where his home was located. In other words, Fonburg wanted his home and sUITounding
property to be included with his farm as part of a "larger parcel" of land, a portion of which was
being condemned by the state. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this claim.
The contention of appellant in assignments of error and
arguments here made, that his residence in Culdesac, and
ownership of land non-contiguous to and disconnected with the
land sought to be condemned should be considered as an element
of severance damage is not sustainable.
The different parcels of defendant's land, separated and
located at a distance, one from the other, one south of the track and
the other north, are not severed by the proposed road. The land
separating the two parcels of defendant's land is owned by third
persons. The trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct the jury
to allow severance damages in this regard.

Id. at 277, 328 P.2d at 64. In this case, Orathol's property is all contiguous. It is not divided by
a railroad line, and no third party owns land between the artificial 30-acre parcel used by

Sherwood and the rest of the Grathol property, On the contrary, the Grathol property is all
contiguous. It is a "consolidated body of land." Big Lost River, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. at 92,
In State ex rel. Symms v_ Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P.2d 56 (1969), the district court and
the Idaho Supreme Court had no difficulty identifying the larger parcel of land to be "a 40 acre
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tract belonging to defendants," id. at 20,454 P.2d at 57, despite the fact that the 40 acres was
actually divided into separate tracts. In Collier, the state filed a condemnation action
to acquire 25.47 acres of land located in Ada County for the
purpose of constructing theteon an interchange between Broadway
Avenue, Boise, and Interstate Highway SON;-· The property to be
acquired was part of a 40 acre tract belonging to defendants. The
land remaining in possession of defendants after the taking is
approximately 14.S acres divided into five separate tracts. The
entire area was characterized as undeveloped, dry graze land. The
best use for the land apparently was industrial.

Id. (emphasis added). In this case, Grathol owns a 56.8-acre tract of land. The valuation
witnesses on both sides all testified that the land has the same highest and best use. As in

Collier, the Grathol property is undeveloped land. In Collier, the larger parcel was found to be

the entire 40-acre tract, even though it was actually divided into separate tracts, five of which
remained after the taldng. In Gtathol, the property has not been divided into tracts. If the Idaho

Supreme Court deemed the larger parcel to be the whole property owned by the Colliers, even
though it had actually been divided, it would certainly do so in this case, where the Grathol
property bas not been divided.
In State ex. rei. S)Rnms v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972), tiie
state sought to condemn 14 acres of land owned by the City of Mountain Home for Interstate 80.
As described by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The property taken (about 14 acres) was part of a larger
tract of land (255.44 acres) which was purchased by the city in
1963 for $36,000 and which was to be developed and used for
recreational purposes, including an eighteen-hole golf course, a
trap shoot, a fishing and skating pond, a park, trailer parking, an

archery range, and hildng areas.

·

Id, at 530,493 P.2d at 389, After a jury trial, the state appealed the verdict arauing, in part, that
the city could not recover severance damages to the land where the golf course was located
because it was distant from the area of the taking. Id., at 531,493 P.2d at 390. The Idaho
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Supreme Court denied this part of the appeal, finding that the jury properly concluded that the
"larger parcel" was the entire 255.44 acres ofland owned by the city. Id. at 532, 493 P.2d at
387.
As part of its ruling, the Supreme Court held that-"[i]:f, as a matter of fact, the parcel --~-.
taken is part of a larger tract held by the same owner, it is e"or to consider such parcel as if it

constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in the possession ofthe same
owner." Id. at 531, 493 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added). This principle is controlling in the case at
hand. Moreover, in the present case, no 30-acre tract exists. It is not the product of any legal
division or any physical separation from the other Grathol property.
The Court in Mountain Home further held:
The question raised by the state is, in essence, whether the
255 acres owned by the city (and including the golf course land)
may properly be considered a 'larger parcel,' only a part of which
is sought to be condemned, within the meaning of I.e. § 7-711.
'Parcel,' as used in this section, means a consolidated body of land.
Big Lost River I"igation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 171-172,
121 P. 88 (1912). Ordinarily, the question whether two pieces of
land constitute a single parcel is a practical one for the juzy, which
should consider evidence on the use and appearance of the land, its
legal divisions, and the intent of its owner.

Id. at 532, 493 P.2d at 391. In the case at hand, no 30~acre parcel exists. Therefore, no grounds
exist for even considering whether the artificial 30-acre parcel is part of a larger parcel or not.
Since the 56.8 acres of the Orathol property is not divided or separated in any way, no legal or
factual basis exists to take a smaller part of the whole and call the smaller piece the larger

parcel.
The criteria set by the Supreme Court in Mountain Home also make clear that the larger
parcel is the entire Gtathol property. It is all zoned for the same use. Its appearance is the same
-undeveloped land. No legal division exists creating the 30wacre parcel. Grathol's site plans
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(both in the before and after) show commercial development on the land east of the artificial 30acre parcel. Therefore, the intended use of the property is the same.

In City o/Coew d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idah~ 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006), the Idaho
· ·· · supreme Court noted that "Courts t'ypieally reject the so-called 'conceptual severance' theory--.,
the notion that whole units of property may be divided for the purpose of a takings claim." Id. at
848, 136 P.3d at 319. This is precisely the situation here. Grathol is attempting to divide the

whole for the purpose of enhancing its recovery in a takings case.
D.

Because Sherwood Did Not Follow Idaho Law, His Opinion Of Value Cannot
Be Used In Determining Just Compensation.

Sherwood created an artificial "larger parcel" in violation of Idaho law. Since
Sherwood's opinion violates Idaho law, it cannot, as a matter of law, serve as a basis for
determining just compensation in this case. Based on the many holdings of the Idaho Supreme
Court on this issue, an award based on Sherwood's opinion would constitute reversible error.
IV.

SHERWOOD AND JOHNSON VIOLATED IDAHO LAW BY FAILING TO USE
THE DATE OF VALUATION MANDATED BY STATUTE. THEREFORE,
THESE OPINIONS CANNOT BE USED IN DETERMINING JUST
COMPENSATION
In Idaho, the date of valuation for determining just compensation is mandated by statute.

Idaho Code § 7-712 requires that the value of the property taken in a condemnation case and the
severance damages, if any, to the remaining property are to be determined as of "the date of the
summons." Id In this case, the date of summons and, therefore, the date of valuation is
November 17, 2010.
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced the statutory mandate of Idaho Code
§ 7-712. See Spokane & Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen, 2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. 854 (Idaho 1892) ("In

proceedings for the condemnation of land for railroad purposes under the statutes of Idaho, the
value of the land at the time it is taken is the measure of damages, and it is error to admit
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evidence of value at the time of trial."); Zollinger v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 83 Idaho 411, 419,
364 P.2d 176, 180 (1961) ("I.C. § 7-712 required determination of damages for the area taken in
the eminent domain proceeding as of June 27, 19S8, the date summons issued in that
· · · i,ro-ceeding."); City ofLewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851;-857, 853 P.2d 596, 602 (Ct. App.
1983) (Idaho Code § 7-712 "chronologically limits the right to compensation from the date of the
summons in an eminent domain proceeding"),
Instead of using the date of valuation mandated by statute, Sherwood used multiple dates
in his valuation - none of which was the date of valuation of November 17, 2010. He valued the

Grathol property in the ''before" condition as of September 2010, and he used valuation dates of
March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after" value. Thus, Sherwood's appraisal violates Idaho
law and cannot be used in determining just compensation in this case.
Johnson also failed to value the property as of November 17, 2010. He valued the
remainder three and/our years after the date of taking. This is a clear violation of the law.

In Spokane & Palouse Ry Co., the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred
by even allowing a witness to testify as to a date of valuation other than the date mandated by the
statute.
[O]ne of the witnesses for defendant, upon his cross-examination,
testified that he based his estimate of damages upon the present
value ofthe property, while the statute fixes the value of the
property at the time it was taken as the role. We think the court
erred in allowing this testimony to stand against the plaintifr s
motion to strike it out, but we think such error was rendered
harmless by the reiterated charge of the court to thejtLty that they
were to find from the evidence the value of the property on
September 27, 1890, the time of the taking.
2 ldaho 1101, 29 P. at 8S4 (emphasis added). In its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of
the Idaho Revised Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code
§ 7-712, requiring compensation and damages to be detennined as of the date of summons. Id.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is error to allow testimony of an opinion of
value based on a date other than the date of the taking. Therefore, it would undoubtedly be

reversible error to base a determination of just compensation on the opinions of either Sherwood
···or Johnson, who use dates of value years after the date of.taking in formulating their opinions.n..f _
just compensation.

If the proper date of valuation is not applied, the validity of the expert's valuation
analysis is irreparably compromised. As stated in Nichols on Eminent Domain, "[i]t is critical
that the appraisal performed by both parties reflect the legal date of valuation." 5-18 NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011). A partf s "[f]ailure to appraise according to the correct

date of value may give rise to a motion to strike the appraisal, or the reversal of the entire
verdict." Id. Jmisclictions across the nations are uniformly in accord. See ITD BriefIn Support
OfMotion In Limine, at 5-7 (filed Jan. 61 2012).

Because they did not value the property as of the date of taking, and instead used dates
years after that date in order to inflate their opinions, these opinions cannot, as a matter of law,
be considered in determining just compensation in this matter.

V.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO LAW, THE COURT DISMISSED
SEVERANCE DAMAGES BASED ON CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN ITS
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On January 6, 2012, ITD filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Grathol's
claim for construction delay damages on the grounds that the claim is barred by Idaho law, that
there is no compensable taking of property rights belonging to Gtathol as a result of a delayed
consttuction schedule, and there has been no delay of the US-95 Project. On February 3, 2012,
the Court granted IID's motion and dismissed Orathol's claim for construction delay damages.
Despite the Court's order, both Sherwood and Johnson improperly included damages for
construction delay in their testimony at trial. They attempted to disguise the construction delay
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claims by labeling them ''downward time value and impact adjustments" or generic "severance
damages." Although the delay claims were labeled differently, the amounts and the calculations
are exactly the same.
· - --- · --~-. - Idaho's jury instructions leave-no doubt as tc the manne-r in which severance damages...axe
calculated, "Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the
remainder immediately before the taking, and deducting from this value the fair market value
which results after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the project in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff." IDJI2d 7.16.5. Stated as a formula, the method for
determining severance damage in Idaho is:
Value of Remainder Before Taking
-Vaine of Remainder After Takin&

=

A.

Severance Damages

Sherwood's Construction Delay Claim.

Sherwood perfonned the basic calculation for determining severance damages, but then

added an extra amowit for alleged delay in the construction of the US-9S Project. His
calculations are as follows:

First, Sherwood determined the value of the artificial 30-acre "larger" parcel that he used
in his analysis before the taking. According to Sheiwood, he valued the 30-acre parcel at

$2.25/s.f. for a total of $2,940,300.

Value of30 Acres Before Taking (30 Acres@$2,2S/s.f.) = $2,940,300
Using Sherwood's $2.25/s.f. ''before" value, his conclusion of value for the 13,69wacre remainder
of the 30-acre larger parcel before the taking is $1,341,757.
Value of 13,69 Acre Remainder Before Taking (13,69 Acres @$2.2S/s,f,) = 51,341,757
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Next, Sherwood calculated the "after" value of the remainder of the 30-acre larger parcel
that he used in his analysis. As with his "before" value, Sherwood concluded that the value of
the remainder of the Grathol Property after the taking was $2.25/s.f. and totaled $1,341,757.
· Value of 13~69 Acre Remaind~ After Takhig (13.69 Acres @$2.25/s,f,) = Sl,341,757 .. _ .

Applying Idaho's method for determining severance damages, there are no severance

damages to the Grathol property under Sherwood's analysis because the "before" value and the
"after" value for the Grathol property are the same.
Value of 13.69 Acre Remainder Before Taking (13.69 Acres@ $2.25/s,f,) =eo Sl,341,757
- Value of 13.69 Acre Remainder After Taking (13.69 Acres @S2.2S/s.f.) = $1,341,757
=- $0 Severance Damages

Next, Sherwood's value of the property taken for the US-95 Project is $2.25/s.f., for a
total of $1,598,543.
Value of 16.31 Acres Taken (16.31 Acres@$2.25/s.f.) = $1,598,543

Sherwood explained his "before and after analysis" in Grathol' s initial eXpert disclosures
and in his subsequently disclosed appraisal report. Grathol' s Expert Witness Disclosure, at 10;
Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 10); Trial Ex. 154

VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION
In the after situation, the west 30 acres will be bisected by the
ta.king. This taking will result in the loss of 16.41 acres leaving an
after value estimate as follows:
Valu.e Before
Take
After Value

-$2,940,300
=$1,598,543
=$1,344,457

Id. The figures contained in Sherwood's report are consistent with the values to which he
testified at trial, with the exception of the "after" value, which Sherwood noted at trial contained
a math error. Sherwood corrected this figure at trial and testified that the conected "after'' value

was $1,341,757.
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In accordance with Idaho law, this should have been the end of Sherwood's analysis,
which would have resulted in a conclusion of value of $1,598,543 (although based on use of a
smaller 30-acre "larger'' parcel that violates Idaho law). Yet, rather then ending his analysis,
· - --Sherwood went on·to add additional--stm1s to his value -conclusion based upon alleged delay m--

...

completion of the US-95 Project.
Sherwood's construction delay damages were described in both Grathol's expert
disclosures and Mr. Sherwood's report. Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure, at 11-12; Second
Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 11-12); Trial Ex. 154. According to Sherwood's
analysis "[u]ntil a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject
intersection can be established, it will be vezy difficult to estimate a value for the remaining
parcels due to the unknowns of the anticipated project." Id at 11; Second Supp. Ans. and Resp.
to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 11); Trial Ex. 154. Therefore, Sherwood looked out into the future,
considered the anticipated completion date of the US-95 Project as part of his analysis, and
added dollars to his market value determination using these later dates. Id.
As stated by Sherwood, "[a]ssuming the completion can be completed as forecast above

in the spring of 2012, the value of the land would need to be discounted form the present date."

Id Mr. Sherwood also projected a later project completion date of the spring of 2013. Id. at 1112; Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 11-12); Trial Ex. 154. Sherwood
then applied a 10% capitalization rate to his "after" value of $1,344,457 1 "due to all the
unknowns concerning this project including the unknown timing of the project being finished[.)"

Id at 12; Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 12); Trial Ex. 154. Thus,
based upon a LS year and a 2,5 year estimated completion date of the Project and bis present
1

Sherwood's original report contained a math error, which he corrected at trial. As co1Tected,
Sherwood's after value (as noted above) is $1,341,364.
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valuation discounting using a 10% capitalization rate, Sherwood reduced the after value of the
remainder from $1,344,457 to either $1,161,732 or $1,065,1202-not because of any decrease in
the fair market value of the Grathol property, but based solely on his belief that the US-95
- --Project-would not be completed fortu1other i.S to 25 years. Id. By reducing the after val~_.
the remainder property, Sherwood's conclusion of just compensation in this case is artificially
inflated because the reduction is not due to a decrease in the fair market value of the Grathol
property. The magnitude of the increased damages added by Sherwood is $180,025 based on 1.5
yeaxs of construction delay or $285,637 based on 2.5 years of construction delay.

Also, as noted above, Sherwood's use of two separate dates for his after value, which are
l .S and 2.5 years after the date of summons in this case, is a clear violation of Idaho law. See
Idaho Code § 7-712. Under § 7-712, the date of summons is to be used for both the before and
after valuation and the accrual of any damages.
Sherwood's improper methodology is further demonstrated in his description of his
analysis where he clearly shows that he is using two different "after values" in his analysis and
that the reason for the two different "after values" is based upon either a 1.5 year or a 2.5 year
delay in completion of the Project, denoted as the "After Present Value 1.5 years" or the "After
Present Value 2.S years." Id As stated in Sherwood's report,
Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final
concluded value estimates were completed as follows:
Before Value
After Present Value 1.5 years
After Present Value 2.5 years
Difference Rounded

=$2,940,300
=$1,165,000
•$1,060,000
•$1,755,000- $1,880,000

Id.

2

Sherwood also had math errors contained in his report in his calculation of the construction
delay damages, Those errors were corrected during Sherwood's trial testimony.
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Sherwood's addition of construction delay damages to his value conclusions was also
referenced in Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to ITD's Discovery.
There, Grathol described the construction delay damages as follows:
~--· ·-·

~·

~

~- ..

Based upon the appraizal calculation prepared to date, Defendant
anticipates that it will advocate just compensation for the land
taken of not less than $1,775,000.00 per the opinion of Dewitt
Sherwood. Additionally, Defendant anticipates advocating
additional severance damages of not less than $1,000,000.00 for
diminishment to the use and developability of the property for
commercial purposes, project influence, proiect del©:, and
damages related to the anticipated loss ofproperty and utility of
the property with the extension ofSylvan Road and loss ofaccess,
visibility and development opportunity, and tax liabilities.

Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc., at Supp. Ans, to Interrog. No, 3 (emphasis added);
Trial Ex. 1S4.
Throughout this case, Gtathol consistently characterized its additional damages based on
construction delay as just that---damages based on delay in completion of the US-9S Project.
Suddenly, in February 2012, after the Court's order on summary judgment, Grathol began
referring to its construction delay damages by different names. The timing of Orathol's change
in terminology coincided with the Court's Order on Summary Judgment granting ITD's motion

for summary judgment and dismissing Grathol' s claim for construction delay damages. Order
Re: ITD's Mtn. for Summ. Judg., at 2. ITD had filed its summary judgment motion on several
grounds including Grathol's claim for "money damages based on what it characterizes as 'delay'

on the part oflTD in constructing the US-95 Project." ITD's Br. in Supp, of Mtn. for Summ.
Judg., at 3. ITD described Grathol's damage claim as "construction delay damages'' based upon
Alan Johnson's own characterization of the damages as compensation for the '~eduction in value

for the remaining property while waiting for the completion of construction." Id. at 16
(referencing Grathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Disc., at 11).
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In its first filing after the Court's Order on summary judgment) Grathol referred to its
construction delay damages as a "downward time value and impact adjustment.' Supp. Expert
1

Discl., at 2 (Feb. 10. 2012). Notably, the analysis and conclusions for the "downward time value

··and impact adjustment" were identic-al to the constructica de!ay damages. Grathol' s discloS11!~.,
for Sherwood contained the same value conclusions of $1,775,000 and $1,880,000 as contained
in his original report; it contained the same "after" values of $1,060,000 and $1,165,000 as used

by Sherwood when he discounted his original "after" values based upon 1. 5 year and 2.5 year
construction completion dates; and, significantly, the disclosures specifically cited to the portions
of Sherwood's appraisal report where he explained his methodology for applying the discounted

present valuation analysis to add an additional damage amount for construction delay damages.

Id Since Grathol uses the exact same figures and specifically cites to the portions of
Sherwood's report where he explains that he is adding damages based upon future completion
dates of the US-95 Project, there can be no question that Grathol simply relabeled its
construction delay damages so that it could avoid having to reduce its compensation claim as
ordered by the Court on summary judgment.
Orathol's attempt to disguise its construction delay damages continued through trial when
Sherwood testified to the "downward time value and impact adjustment."3 Significantly, when
ITD raised objections during Sherwood's testimony about his inclusion of construction delay

damages in his valuation, counsel for Grathol did not ask Sherwood to testify to any conclusion

as to either just compensation or damages. Then, on re-direct of Sherwood, counsel for Grathol
sought to gloss over the construction delay damaaes by merely having Sheiwood testify to his
Grathol's attempts to keep its construction delay damages alive in contravention of the Court's
order is more apparent in its labeling of the damages as "severance damages" for the first time
during Johnson's testimony at trial. See Trial Ex. J. Prior to trial, neither Johnson nor Sherwood
had referred to damages caused by the time delay in completion of the Project as severance
damages.
3
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ultimate conclusion of just compensation. However1 when Sherwood finally testified to the
"downward time value and impact adjustment," he explained that it was an "adjustment" based
on the fact that the project would not be completed for several years-which was an express
·· ····~admission that he,was adding damages based on delay i.n'COnstruction of the US-95 Project.....U..
shown on a chart, Sher.vood's testimony is as follows:

Sherwood's Valuation of Grathol Property
With Added Damages for Construction Delay
Value of 30 Acres Before Take
(30 Acres @ $2.2S/sf)
Value of 13,686 Acre Remainder After Take
(13.69 Acres@$2.2S/st)
Value of16.31 Acre Take
(16.31 Acres @ $2.25/sf)

Added Damage tor Construction Delay
(Value of Remainder After Completion of
Development)

1.Syrs@
10%

AD.nJSTED COMPENSATION

52,940,300

$2,940,300

- $1.341.15?

- $1,34J,7S7

$1,598,543

$1,598,543

+ $180.025

2,5 yrs @

+$285,637

10%

$1,778,568

$1,884,180

Grathol' s attempt to hide its construction delay damages is intentionally misleading and a
flagrant violation of the Court's order dismissing the claim. The adding on of construction delay
damages to the fair market value determination also violates the method established by Idaho law
for determining severance damages in condemnation cases. It also serves to improperly increase
Grathol;s claim for compensation in this case. The construction delay damages aiso violate
Idaho law because they are calculated using dates 1. S and 2.5 years after the date of summons,
which is the mandatory date for determining the value of the take and damages to the remainder.

See Idaho Code § 7-712. As a matter of law and due to violation of the Court's order,
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Sherwood's opinion of just compensation should not be considered in determining just
compensation in this case.
B.

Johnson's Construction Delay Claim.

Alan johnson's valuation, lilre Sherwood's, also-includes damages for construction d.el»,y

damages, with the only difference being that Jolmson used a three and four-year estimated
completion date for the Project. Like Sherwood, Johnson's inclusion of construction delay
damages violates Idaho law requiring the value of the property taken and severance damages to
be determined as of the date of summons. Johnson's inclusion of delay damages also violates
the Order of the Court dismissing the claim from the case.
Grathol first disclosed that Johnson would be claiming damages for alleged delay in the
construction of the US-95 Project in its Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. There, Gtathol
stated that

Additionally, Defendant anticipates advocating additional
severance damages not less than $1,000,000.00 for diminishment
to the use and developability of the property for commercial
purposes, project int1uence, project delay and damages related to
the anticipated loss of property and utility of the property with the
extension of Sylvan Road and loss of access, visibility and
development opportunity, and tax liabilities,
Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to Disc.., at Second Supp. Resp. to Jnterrog. No. 3 (emphasis
added). On October 6, 2011, Grathol further explained Johnson's opinions and anticipated
testimony .regarding his elaims for damages, including his claims for construction delay
damages. Third Supp. Ans. and Resp. to Disc., at 3-8. Construction delay was the focus of the
damage claim by Johnson. Mr. Johnson's proposed testimony included the following statement:

ITD's delays and indecision to date may have cost Hughes
Investments potential tenants and has put the entire development in
jeopardy. A delay in construction or re-alignment of even two
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more years will cause significant financial damages through
increased holding costs, lost opportunity and the inability to
develop and market the remaining property resulting in an almost
complete loss of value as a development parcel.

Id at 6. Johnson characterized construction delay as the "most important component" of value.
However, the most important component to the determination of
the value of the take is the time period still needed complete
construction.

Id. at 7. Johnson then went on to state that his valuation of the remainder property included an
assumption of delayed construction of the US-9S Project. According to Johnson,
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property
on the assumption of at least an additional three year delay in the
ability to sell by reason of construction.

Id Like Sherwood, Johnson used an anticipated completion date and a 10% capitalization rate to
reach a net present value of the remainder property. Id. Then based upon the net present
valuation, Johnson reduced his "after" value of remainder property to account for "a reduction in
value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction." Id This reduction in
value, when reduced from the before value, resulted in an increase in the just compensation
claim based solely on cowuuction delay, noi fair market value in L1ie before a.i-id after.
After the Court dismissed Grathol' s claim for construction delay damages, Orathol
submitted its Supplemental Expert Disclosures in which it provided the "new'' value opinion that
Johnson would testify to at trial. Supp. Expert Witness Disc., at 2-3. In its supplemental
disclosures, Grathol noted for the first time that Johnson, like Sherwood, would be testifying to a
''downward time value and impact adjustment." Id Significantly, however, the "downward time
value and impact adjustment" by Johnson applied the .same net present value calculation and the

same 10% capitalization rate as he applied in calculating his construction delay damages.
Additionally, as support for Johnson's "downward time value and impact adjustment,'' Grathol
cited to the portions of its discovery responses where Johnson explained his calculations for "a
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reduction in value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction." Id at 2,
fn. 10 and 3, fn. 15-16. According to Johnson, the reduction in the "after" value of the property

caused by the alleged construction delays total $338,000 or $798,000. Id. at 3, fn.16. Johnson's
attempt to change the name ofhis-e·o:nstruction delay·claim does not change what it really ig-c-a claim for an additional amount of money based on delay in completion of the US-95 Project.
During trial, Johnson changed the label of his construction delay damages again. This

ti.me, be referred to the construction delay damages as "severance damages.,, See Trial Ex. J.
Johnson's attempt to put a new label on the dam.ages and cast them as "severance damages" is

even more transparent than the characterization of an adjustment for time. In his testimony at
trial, Johnson applied the same calculation as he did in the Supplemental Expert Disclosures and
concluded that the newly labeled "severance damages" (that were previously "downward ti.me

value and impact adjustments" and before that construction delay damages) totaled either
$338,000 or $789,000. These are the exact same figures for construction delay damages that
Johnson disclosed earlier in the case.
The fallacy of Johnson's attempt to cast these damages as "severance damages" is further

demonstrated through application of Idaho's formula for detennining severance damages, set
forth in the Idaho Jury Instructions. Idaho law provides that severance damages in condemnation
cases are calculated as follows:
Value of Remainder Before Takina
- Value of Remainder After Taking

=

Severance Damaaes

IDJI2d 7.16.S. As described in Trial Exhibit J, Johnson values the remainder property under two
scenarios - one where the ''western remainder" is valued at $3 .23/s.f. and one where it is valued
at $4.00/s.f, Based on these assumptions, Johnson concludes that the value of the remainder
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property "before" the talcing is either $3,060,133 (at $3.23/s.ffor the western remainder) or
$3,519,648 (at $4.00/s.f. for the western remainder).

Johnson's conclusion of the value of the remainder property "after" the taking is
··· 13,670,140. Based upon his testimony at trial, Johnson's-after value is based upon values aft..er

the "completion of [the] Grathol Development."4 See Trial Ex. J. Thus, by his own acc0Wlt,
there are no severance damages to the Gtathol property because Johnson's "after" values are
higher than his ''before" values.
Using Johnson's $3.23/s.f. values, the value of the remainder "after" the taking is

$610,007 higher than the before value.
Value of 40.48 Acre Remainder Before Taking ($3.23/s.f. for Western Remainder)="' $3,060,133
- Value of 40.48 Acre Remainder After Taking {Using Developed Values)= $3,670,140
Severance Damages= SO (After Value is $610,007 Higher Than Before Value)

Similarly, if Mr. Johnson's $4.00/s.f. value is used, the value of the remainder ''after'' the taking
is $150,492 higher than the before value.
Value of 40.48 Acre Remainder Before Taking ($4,00/s.f. for Western Remainder)= $3,519,648
- Value of 40.48 Acre Rernainder After Taking (Usine Developed Values)= $3,670,140
Severance Damages= SO (After Value is $150,492 Higher Than Before Value)
C,

Conclusion.

Both Sherwood and Johnson calculated construction delay damages early in the case.
These calculations were produced to ITO in discovery responses and expert disclosures. Precise
figures were given for the construction delay damages, as well as the method for calculating the
damages.

The valuation of undeveloped land as if it were developed is improper and another basis for
excluding Johnson's valuation testimony. See Section VI. below. At trial, ITD objected to
Johnson's testimony on several bases, including his use of values of the property as if it were
already developed.

4
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After the Court dismissed Gtathol,s claims for construction delay damages, Sherwood
recharacterized his construction delay claim as a "doWI1ward time value and impact adjustment."
However, the figure for this "adjustment" was identical to the construction delay damages he had

.

·disclosed previously. In addition,·th.e method for calc~ating the damages was identical~ and the
reason for the calculation was the same - delay in construction of the US-95 Project,
Johnson first recharacterized his construction delay claim as a "downward time value and
impact adjustment,, At trial, we saw for the first time a heading for "severance damages."
However, the figure Johnson gave for his "downward time value and impact adjustment'' and
then his "severance damages," as well as his calculations and the reasons given for the add on
were all identical to his construction delay claim.
At no time did either Sherwood or Johnson calculate severance damages using the
formula set by Idaho law. In fact, using their market value conclusions) Sherwood determined
that severance damages amounted to $0.00, and Johnson concluded that the after value was

higher than the before value. For all of these reasons, the construction delay claim, whether
labeled as "severance damages" or downward time value and impact adjustments'' should be
dismissed again.

VI.

JOHNSON'S OPINION BASED ON "DEVELOPED" LAND VALUE VIOLATES
IDAHO LAW AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AS A MATTER OF LAW
In Idaho, just compensation is defined as "the difference between the market value of the

entire property before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition,
together with any special damages caused by the taking, measured as of [the date of summons]. 1'
IDJI2d 7.16. In the present case, Johnson ignored the established method for valuing property in
condemnation cases and instead valued the Grathol property based upon a hypothetical
development plan and the sale prices he hopes to obtain for subdivided commercial lots after the
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property is fully developed. The Idaho Supreme Court long ago rejected this cype of testimony

and valuation methodology because it is purely speculative, and it substantially and artificially
inflates the value of undeveloped and non-subdivided land.

In his valuation, Johnso?ttlsed values that as.Swnc the completion ·of a hypothetical--~.· commercial development on the property. Trial Exs. H, J. According to Johnson's testimony,
his "after" values included the future sales prices be hopes to obtain once the conceptual
subdivision development is completed. Trial Ex. 33, 33-1. Mr. Johnson used the following

subdivided parcels and values:
It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property,
after the take, would be worth $3,669,300 (at the time of
completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as
follows:
(1)

3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300
(value is reduced due to the inability to provide sewer to
the parcel across ITD's ROW;

(2)

3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a
value of $625,000;

(3)

Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and

(4)

Remaining 26.4 acres with limited commercial viability
priced at $1,150,000.

Trial Ex. 1S4, at 7 (Grathol's Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Discovery). Reduced to a
per-square-foot basis, Johnson's values for the four separate subdivided parcels are as follows:
(1)

3.87 acres west of the take= $4.00/s.f.

(2)

3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan Road "" $4.50/s.f.

(3)

7 acres for the Travel Plaza east of Sylvan Road== $4.S0/s.f.

(4)

Remaining 26.42 acres at $1.00 s.f.

Trial Ex. 33,
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Johnson's use of values as ifdeveloped was expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme
Court in City o/Caldwellv. Roark, 92 Idaho 99,101,437 P.2d 615,617 (1968). Roark involved
a condemnation action by the City of Caldwell to acquire a portion of the Roark property for the
-·~··- -expansion and improvement ofthe"Caldwell airport. ·Jd at 100, 437 P.2d at 616. The Roarks
had previously platted their property for residential development and the plat had been accepted
and approved by the city. Additionally, the Roarks had marked the proposed streets and alleys
for their development and utility services had been made available to the property. Id.
At trial, the Roarlcs sought just compensation based upon the aggregate value of the
individual lots in their development plan. On appeal, the Roarks challenged the trial court's

instructions requiring the jury to determine the fair market value of the property as one parcel
and instructing the jury that the values given to hypothetical parcels in the Roarks development
plans were not to be considered. Id The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Roarlcs' argument
and upheld the trial court's instructions.
The Supreme Court concluded that the jury was allowed to consider the property's
potential for residential development to determine the highest and best use of the property. Id at
101,437 P.2d at 617. However, the Court prohibited the use of "developed" land values to
determine the fair market value of bare land. The Court held that
where the entire parcel of land, as a unit, is taken at one time by
condemnation, the jury is required to fix the value of the entire
parcel as a unit as of the time the summons is issued. I.C. § 7-712.
This value cannot properly be determined by aggregating the
individual sales value which separate lots may brina when sold to
individual prospective home builders over a period of time in the
future, for the reason that such a basis of valuation would permit
the jury to speculate upon future developments.

Id at 101-102, 437 P.2d at 617-18. The Court further explained that "[t]he test is not what the
lots will brina when and if 62 willing buyers come along, but what the tract, as a unit, and as is,
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platted or not, and in whatever state of completion, will bring from a willing buyer of the whole
tract." Id (citing numerous state cases from Utah, Oregon, Colorado, North Carolina and a
federal case from the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals as additional support). Rather, "[t]he
· -- - -, -· ·· valuation must be on the basis of-what a willing pureh:aser would pay now and not what a:---

,

number of purchasers might be induced to pay in the future for the land in smaller parcels." Id
(emphasis added) (quoting Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917,920 (Utah 1963)).
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's instruction that the property should be
valued as one parcel of bare land and not on potential subdivided and developed values. Id
The majority of other jurisdictions reach the same conclusionsi aptly summarized in the
case of Department ofHighways v. Schulhoff, 445 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1968) and its citation of
Nichols on Eminent Domain, the primacy treatise on eminent domain law:
The applicable rule is ably stated in 4 Nichols, The Law of
Eminent Domains 12.3142(1) (3d ed. rev. 1962):

'* * * It is well settled that if land is so situated that it is actually
available for building pµrposes, its value for such purposes may be
considered, even if it is used as a fann or is covered with brush and
boulders. The measure of compensation is not, however, the
aggregate of the prices of the lots into which the tract could be best
divided, since the expense of cleaning off and improving the land,
laying out streets, dividing it into lots, advertising and selling the
same, and holding it and paying taxes and interest until all the lots
are disposed of cannot be ignored and is too uncertain and
conjectural to be computed. * * * The measure of compensation is
the market value of the land as a whole, taking into consideration
its value for building purposes if that is its most available use.'
It is proper to show that a particular tract of land is suitable and
available for subdivision into lots and is valuable for that purpose.
It is not proper, however, to show the number and value of lots as
separated parcels in an imaginary subdivision thereof. Stated
differentlyi it is improper for the jury to consider an undeveloped
tract of land as though a subdivision thereon is an accomplished
fact. Such undeveloped property may not be valued on a per lot
basis, the cost factor clearly being too speculative.

Id. at 405.
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Idaho law bars the valuation approach by Johnson in this case. That law has been
endorsed across the country. Johnson's valuation testimony based upon estimated values of his
hypothetical subdivision of the property when developed should be disregarded as a matter of
- law. Idaho law requires that just·compensation be valued based on the state or character of the
property on the date of summons in all eminent domain proceedings. Plans for future
development may not be considered for purposes of determining the fair market value of the
property. See Idaho Code§ 7-712; IDil2d 7.05.5, 7.14, 7.16, 7.16.S, 7.20. The appropriate
measure of compensation damages for a partial taking is the "fair market value of the entire
property before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition." IDil2d
7.16. See also Idaho Code§ 7-712.

In tum, severance damages are calculated as the difference between the value of the
remainder before and after the taking. State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 55-56, 286 P.2d 1112,
1118 (1955); IDffid 7.16, 7.16.5. Both compensation and severance damages are to be
computed as of the date of summons in the eminent domain action. l.C. § 7-71t State ex rel.

Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,449,546 P.2d 399,404 (1976); IDil2d 7.05, 7.0S.S; 7.16.5.
The law does not allow just compensation or damage calculations based upon the
aggregate values oflots or zones created only on paper and existing only in a hypothetical
development. Therefore, Johnson's opinion using "developed" values should be stricken and
disregarded as a matter oflaw.

'\'11.

CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, the opinions of Sherwood and Johnson cannot serve as a basis for
determining just compensation in this case. They did not value the larger parcel as required by
Idaho law. They used dates of value long after the date of valuation mandated by Idaho law.
They included construction delay claims barred by Idaho law and dismissed by the Court. And
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Johnson used future "developed" values to value bare, vacant land, in violation of wellestablished Idaho law.
DATED this 23rd day of Marchi 2012,
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE
STATE
OF
IDAHO,
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

IDAHO

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANTHJGRATHOUS
POST TRIAL BRIEF

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") and submits its Post Trial Brief in
accordance with the Court's Order.

INTRODUCTION
At the close of evidence, the Court requested briefing to address two narrow legal
questions. The first concerns the determination of the larger parcel. The Court heard evidence
at trial to support the theory that the larger parcel could be a portion of Grathol's 56.8 acres.
The second issue is whether Grathol' s valuation methodology for calculating severance
damages, as a component of its claim for just compensation, is appropriate.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Larger Parcel.
The concept of larger parcel is an analytical tool unique to eminent domain. The term

larger parcel is not found in comprehensive appraisal textbooks such as The Appraisal of Real
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Estate or USPAP guidelines. All of the licensed appraisers who testified in this case agreed that
the determination of the larger parcel is a subjective decision that the appraiser must make as a
part of the analytical valuation process.
The concept of the larger parcel is important in a condemnation appraisal, because the
appraiser cannot determine the highest and best use of a property and properly value that
property in relation to that use until a conclusion as to the larger parcel is reached. "The larger
parcel may be all of one parcel, part of a parcel, or several parcels, depending to varying
degrees on unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity." Real Estate Valuation in
Litigation, J.D. Eaton, Appraisal Institute at 76, (2 nd ed. 1995) (emphasis added). 1
In a typical appraisal assignment, an appraiser is retained to
estimate the value of a parcel of land which has specific
boundaries and the parameters of the property are known before
any in-depth appraisal analysis is made. This is not, or should not
be, the case in condemnation appraisals.
Id.

[P]arcel, or right-of-way, maps are developed by the condemnor. When a roadway is to
be constructed, the condemnor's engineers prepare a survey of the proposed right-of-way
limits, which is then given to the title department to identify all ownerships within the proposed
right-of-way and to determine the property boundaries of each parcel affected. These
boundaries include all of the land that is contiguous to and under the same ownership as the
land within the proposed right-of-way.
The physical contiguity of land is an engineering question, while unity of ownership is
usually a legal question. The right-of-way map is prepared and the boundaries of the properties
to be appraised are thus determined prior to any consideration of the unity of use. Therefore,
most appraisal assignments specify that the appraiser is to estimate the value of a parcel which
may or may not be the larger parcel. "The ultimate determination of the larger parcel must be
made by the appraiser." Id. at 76 (emphasis added). The Uniform Appraisal Standards for
Federal Land Acquisitions speak directly to this point.
Often essential in the appraiser's consideration of the highest and
Real Estate Valuation in Litigation is a recognized treatise for condemnation appraisal authority. It is sometimes
referred to as "the Bible," and is widely recognized as providing hombook law on condemnation valuation.
1
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best use is the conclusion concerning the larger parcel. Because
the ultimate determination of highest and best use is the
appraiser's to make, and that determination cannot be made until
after considerable investigation and analysis has been completed,
the appraiser's conclusion as to the larger parcel is sometimes
different from the specific parcel he or she was requested to
appraise by the agency.

Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1992), § B-1-14, p. 73 (emphasis added).
Unity of use is an appraisal question, and the ultimate determination of the larger parcel
is typically in the strict purview of the appraiser. This is strongly supported by two court
rulings:
The method of valuation of the parcels taken, whether as a
separate entity or in a relationship to the whole tract, then
becomes a matter of opinion of appraisers to be weighed by the
jury ... We conclude that in this case the use of either method of
valuation by the expert witnesses was proper and their testimony
admissible, subject only to the inherent risk of nonpersuasion.

Territory ofHawaii v. Adelmeyer, 363 P.2d 979,986 (Haw.1961).
Where the property taken is less than the entire tract, other
considerations arise. The highest and best use of the part taken
may be as a separate and distinct piece of property unrelated to the
entire property endowing such part with a fair cash market value.
On the other hand the highest and best use of the part taken may
be so related to the entire property that the value of the part taken
for its highest and best use is dependent upon the value of the
entire tract. Such a relation or dependence may present an issue of
fact and either party is entitled to present his theory of
independent or dependent valuation.

Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Oberlander, 235 N.E.2d 3, 9, 92 111.App.2d 174,
185 (Ill. 1968), ajf'd247 N.E.2d 888 (1969).
Thus the determination of the larger parcel may be limited to the take area, the entire
parent tract or a portion of the parent tract that is less than the whole. Real Estate Valuation in

Litigation at 76, (emphasis added). This determination will depend on a critique of the requisite
factors; unity of title, contiguity, and unity of use. Of the factors to be considered, unity of use
is often the key factor. However, where, as here, the use (hig11est an.d best) to which the
property is properly put has yet to be created the analysis becomes even more subjective.
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Idaho has not yet addressed the issue of larger parcel theory. Indeed there are only a
handful of Idaho cases on eminent domain in general. While Idaho courts have not decided
whether the larger parcel may contitute a portion of the entire parent tract, the courts have not
restricted the larger parcel to only the entirety of a landowner's property. Because Idaho courts
have not addressed the issue, the Court must look to other jurisdictions' treatment to resolve the
case at bar. However, Idaho cases and statutes support Grathol's contention that the larger
parcel can encompass less than the total property owned.

In City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (2001), the City condemned a
portion of landowners' 23.24-acre vacant property for a fire station. The City took 1.4 acres.
The take area was at the very comer of the parcel and situated on the intersection of two
adjacent streets, much like the take of Grathol's property. The trial judge permitted the
landowners' expert witness to estimate damages based on an opinion that a portion of the
property had a different highest and best use from the rest, just as Grathol's valuation witnesses
did. The appraiser in Wilson testified that the 23.24-acre property should be treated as two
separate "units" before the taking, with different valuations given to the 5-acre comer, on which
the take was to occur. Wilson at 4, 21 P.3d 390. The jury verdict was based on that theory. The
Court of Appeals reversed holding that the trial court erred in permitting this portion of the
property as larger parcel theory, but the Arizona Supreme Court granted review and
determined that the Court of Appeals deprived the landowner of just compensation. Id.
At the time of the condemnation, the entire 23 .24-acre parcei was uniformiy zoned for
low density residential development. The City's General Plan, however, classified the area as
one that should be developed with high-density uses and the evidence showed that rezoning
was "very likely". The landowners' appraiser testified that the property had different highest
and best uses in different locations and as two parcels: the 5-acre comer lot including the take
valued at $1.25 per square foot, and the remaining 18.24-acres, valued at $.60 per square foot.
Id. Tnese vaiue opinions were supported by market data. The iandowner aiso cakuiated

severance damages based on testimony that the value of the 3.6-acre remainder of the 5-acre
comer parcel was reduced to $.60 per square foot because after the take it was only suitable for
the same type of low density development as the landowners' remaining 18.24-acres. This is
precisely the type of evidence Grathol presented in this case.
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In Wilson, the City's appraiser opined that the highest and best use of the entire 23.24-

acre property was for low density residential development. Based on that highest and best use
opinion; no separate economic use existed for any portion of the property. Relying on sales
data, the City appraised the value of the entire 23.24-acre parcel at $.55 per square foot. The
City's appraiser concluded that the value of the 1.4-acre parcel taken was $35,088.00 and there
were no severance damages. Id. at 5, 21 P.3d 391. This is exactly how ITD's valuation witness
testified.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict for the landowners, holding that
the property taken should have been valued either as a discrete, separate unit or as part of the
entire parcel, but not as part of a hypothetical unit less than the entire parcel. The Court of
Appeals held that to allow the jury to follow the landowners' methodology would be to apply
an unrecognized method of valuation. Id.
However, on review, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred
in concluding that there are only two methods of evaluation - the part taken as a separate unit
or as part of the whole. Id. at 6, 21 P.3d 392. The Supreme Court properly recognized that these
two approaches are usually utilized when the area of the take is a "strip-take," wherein the
value of the part taken, based on the comparable market analysis, would not be of any value
because of irregularity in size, shape or utility. 2 In those partial (strip) takings cases, the Wilson
Court observed land should be valued as a part of the whole in order to attribute some value for
the take and protect the condemnee by assuring a just reward. Id. at 7, 21 P.3d 393. Where the
part taken is not some unusable, un-economic "strip," the rules are different. The Wilson Court
succinctly stated:
However, the converse is also true: when the units of property are
actually worth more when valued independently, the landowner
should have the benefit of that greater, more realistic marketbased value. Emphasizing the role of the market in Buchanan that
when the part taken has a "Separate and independent economic
use and could therefore command a higher value as a separate
entity, this value must be considered without resort to the value of
any tract from which it was severed." (Internal citations omitted.)
This statement referred only to the monetary value of the part
An example of a "strip take" would be when the area of a take was the simple expansion of an existing right-ofway along the same route for purposes of highway expansion.
2
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taken and not to any tract larger than the taking but smaller than
the whole parcel. Nowhere in Buchanan, however, did we
restrict an expert from ascribing different values before the
taking to different units of the parcel, as White did in the
present case. To do so, when the market supports different uses
and resulting differing valuations, would undermine the very
rationale on which Buchanan rests: the protection of the
landowner's interest in receiving just compensation based on the
highest and best use of the property. (Internal citations omitted.)
Thus, we have never limited such a method of valuation to just
the part taken and the remainder.
Id. at 7, 21 P.3d 393 (emphasis added).

The Wilson Court continued:
As we have seen, the cases do not support a rigid rule that "the
property taken should have been valued either as a separate unit
or as part of the whole parcel" but not "as part of a hypothetical
parcel within the whole parcel." (Internal citations omitted.)
The independent value rule exists to protect the landowner
from being compensated for the most valuable part of his
property by averaging the market price for the most
valuable with that of the least valuable land. The obverse of
that rule is that when the part taken has no independent value
before the taking, it must be valued based on the average of the
whole parcel because the part taken, having no independent use,
would be valueless. People v. Silveira, 236 Cal.App.2d 604, 46
Cal.Rptr. 260, 272 (1965) (citing 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain
§ 14.231).
Id. at 8, 21 P.3d 394 (emphasis added). The Wilson court went on to say that "when the

evidence provides an adequate foundation by common sense and market data showing
different highest and best uses, we see no reason why it is improper to consider a large tract
of property, as if, in the before condition, it were divisible into separate hypothetical entities.
See 4A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 14.02 at 14-34 (3d ed.rev.1999)." Id.

The Wilson court found that the landowners' could have developed their 5-acre comer
lot without a concurrent development of the remaining 23.24 acres. "There is no logical
reason to prejudice them for owning more than the most valuable portion taken." Id.
The Wilson court's analysis is spot on! It's reasoning, rationale, and logic applies
perfectly to the very situation presently before this Court. The Wilson court found that the
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methodology of calculating the value of the take plus severance damages could be
demonstrated by the market value of the independent economic unit, greater than the take, but
less than the whole of the parent tract. Similarly, Skip Sherwood's valuation of the area of the
take is based on the western 30-acre property as a single economic unit, independent from the
remaining property to the east. Identical to the City's contentions in Wilson, ITD argues for this
Court to ignore the independent use and development of Grathol's property simply to justify the
application of a pro-rata valuation of the entire acreage to the take area and arrive at a minimal
per unit value. These arguments were soundly rejected by the Wilson Court, since such
argument basically prejudices landowners for owning more than the most valuable portion of
land taken. But this is not one, single aberrant opinion. Other courts have found the obvious
merit in this approach as well.
In People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Corp. etc. of Latter-Day Saints, 13 Cal. App. 3d
371, 91 Cal. Rptr. 532 (Ct. App. 1970), the State of California condemned a strip of land
across landowners' entire property for the expansion of a roadway. Prior to the taking,
landowner owned a 264-acre parcel adjacent to the roadway and the property enjoyed
unrestricted access to the roadway. After the take, the property's access was limited to only
the southeast comer. Latter-Day Saints at 374, 91 Cal.Rptr. 534. The landowners' expert
witness valued the property taken based on a highest and best use as commercial and
multiple-family residential development along the road and as single-family residential
development away from the road. The landowner sought compensation for the take at the
rate of $65,000 per acre for the commercial area, $40,000 per acre for the multiple residential
area and $22,500 per acre for the single family area. Id.
Conversely, the State's experts valued the property taken based on a "holding use,"
i.e. - an investment holding for a period of time until market demand justified development.
The State's experts assigned a uniform value of $17,000 per acre to all of landowners' land
and assigned that pro-rata vaiue to the take. Over objection by the iandowner, the State's
experts also testified that after construction the remainder would have the same potential
commercial and residential use, albeit at different locations from those testified to by the
landowner. Id. at 375, 91 Cal.Rptr. 534. The trial court refused the owner's proposed
instruction that the take should be valued as a distinct piece of property, if that valuation was
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higher than the proportionate value of the take as part of the whole. The jury returned an
award based upon a valuation of$18,000 per acre. Id. at 376, 91 Cal.Rptr. 535.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court erred in refusing
the landowners' instruction as to valuation of the take as a part of a separate and distinct
parcel less than the whole. The Latter-Day Saints court recognized that when a parcel taken is
of such a size and shape that it is not susceptible to being valued as a separate and distinct
parcel, the larger parcel must be the entire parcel. However, where, the property condemned
approaches a size that renders it independently usable, it is appropriate to determine what a
willing buyer would pay for the property taken as part of an independent parcel less than the
whole. Id. at 379, 91 Cal.Rptr. 537.
The Latter-Day Saints court also found that it was error to admit evidence by the State
of the potential commercial and residential uses of the remainder created by the project
(special benefits) to be off-set against the value of the take. Id. at 379-80, 91 Cal.Rptr. 537.
The Latter-Day Saints court recognized that the California Code required the trier of
fact to separately determine the value of the take from severance damages and benefits, if
any. Id. at 376, 91 Cal.Rptr. 535. Similar to Idaho, special benefits could only be off-set
against severance damages and "shall in no event be deducted from the value of the portion
taken." Id.
The evidence of potential higher (and hence more valuable) uses
of land on the property remaining is thus irrelevant if it tends to
only establish a special benefit because no severance damages
are claimed in the case at bench. It is relevant if it goes to the
valuation of the property taken.
Id.

Similar to the State of California's arguments in Latter-Day Saints, ITD argues that
the larger parcel must encompass the entirety of Grathol's property to arrive at a lower prorata value for the 16.314-acre take. While ITD has not been so bold as to overtly assert that
special benefits accruing to the remainder are to be off-set against the value of the take (as
did the State of California), ITD is, in effect, doing just that by including the additional
acreage in their square foot value estimate (through adjustments). ITD is offsetting the lower
value of the unaffected acreage against the value of the take. Indeed, ITD's witnesses
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testified that the Project will provide "benefits" to the remainder and off-set any severance
damages even though ITD failed to identify or quantify such benefits in their appraisal. Such
an off-set, however termed, is impermissible as against the value of the take and ITD's larger
parcel analysis is flawed.

To determine the larger parcel, unity of use becomes the key component. In State v.
Lacey, 8 Wash.App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973), the State sought to acquire 31 acres from a

parent tract of 237 acres known as Lacey Farm. The State appealed from a jury verdict for the
landowners based on the trial court's determination that the land was comprised of five
separate tracts instead of a single larger parcel as contended by the State. Lacey at 543, 507
P.2d 543.
The Lacey court held that in order to find that a tract of land constitutes a single larger
parcel rather than separate parcels for purposes of determining just compensation, a finding
of unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity was required. The Lacey court found that
in many cases the court can, as a matter oflaw, determine that a portion of the land taken is a
separate or independent parcel, but ordinarily this is a question of fact for a jury, unless
reasonable minds could not differ. Id. at 543-544, 507 P.2d 1208; citing 4A J. Sackman,
Nichols on Eminent Domains 14.31 (rev.3d ed. 1971).
In Lacey, the State argued that the entire 237 acres was one unit, for the purpose of
offsetting special benefits against the award for the taking and damaging of other portions of
the owners' property. The Lacey court rejected the State's argument of combining properties
(assemblage), even though the property was all under one ownership. There was no dispute

that the parcels were physically separated by intersecting streets. The Lacey court recognized
that the contiguity requirement in condemnation cases is not necessarily a conclusive test. "If
the land is occupied or in use, unity of use, becomes an important factor in determining
whether contiguity has been established." Id. at 544, 507 P.2d 1208-09. The Lacey court
found that it must, therefore, look to the integrated uses of the property in question to
determine contiguity existed.
The Lacey court found that the parcels were used for separate purposes (pasture, a
small gasoline station and store, growing raspberries, airport hanger, a fruit stand and sign
advertising). These uses were not dependent on one another.
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In determining unity of use, it must be kept in mind that the
parcels must be used in connection with each other, and a
mere devotion to the same use by other tenants will not serve to
fuse two separate parcels into one unity of use. Condemnation
Appraisal Practice (1972 reprint). Not one of the tracts m
question was used in connection with any other tract.
Id. at 545-46, 507 P.2d 1209 (emphasis added). Thus the Lacey court found there was not a
unity of use for the parcels and instead a complete diversity of uses, independent of one
another existed. "Failing to establish each of the elements of the larger parcel prevents
offsetting special benefits against the larger parcel and requires a separate determination of
the just compensation for damages to each of the independent parcels." Id. at 546, 507 P.2d
1209.

Because reasonable minds could not differ in rejecting the State's theory of

assemblage, the trial court correctly determined that the tracts were to be treated separately
and independently for purposes of determining just compensation. Id. Thus, in order to find
unity of use for purposes of assemblage, the uses of the parcels need to be dependent on one
another, not merely incidental or convenient.
The larger parcel analysis may also be used to combine parcels to determine a value
for the take. In M&R Investment Company, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 103 Nev.
445, 744 P.2d 531 (1987), the State of Nevada condemned a portion of property located on
the west side of a freeway. The State sought to obtain approximately 17 acres of M&R's 27acre parcel for the expansion of the freeway. The 27 acres were located on the west side of
the freeway, but the Dunes Hotel, also owned by M&R was located on the east side of the
freeway directly across from the property at issue. M&R at 446, 744 P.2d 533. M&R
contended that the larger parcel should consist of the combined properties on both the west
and east sides of the freeway because of their integration. The State of Nevada insisted that
only the 27-acre parcel on the west side should be the larger parcel. The trial court agreed
with the State and ruled that the larger parcel consisted only of the western property from
which the property was taken. Id. at 448, 744 P.2d 533.
The question on appeal was from which larger parcel the condemned property was
taken. M&R contended that the trial court erred in ruling that the 27-acre parcel to the west
of the freeway was the larger parcel for purposes of determining the value of the take and
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severance damages to the remainder. Id. at 448, 744 P.2d 534. The Nevada Supreme Court
found that the evidence showed several development plans to integrate the uses of the
western and eastern portions of M&R's property. During the time in which those
improvements were contemplated, the Dunes Hotel used the west parcel for overflow
parking.
In deciding the contiguity of the properties, the M&R court found that ordinary
contiguity must be shown, but it is not always necessary. The court held that parcels damaged
need not be physically contiguous to those taken so long as the evidence discloses an actual
and existing unity of use and purposes. Id. at 449-50, 744 P.2d 534. 3 The M&R court found
that the use of the west parcel as a parking facility in conjunction with the Dunes Hotel
justified the jury's finding of a unity of use favoring M&R's position and the trial court erred
in not allowing the jury to determine whether the condemned parcel was part of the east
parcel for the award of severance damages. Id. at 450, 744 P.2d 535. Thus, for purposes of
deciding severance and/or benefits, existing integration of uses was required.
The M&R court also reviewed the trial court's exclusion ofM&R's assemblage of the
two tracts for purposes of valuing the take. Id. at 451, 744 P.2d 535.
If the highest and best use of separate parcels would involve a
prospective, integrated, unitary use, then such prospective use
may be considered in fixing the value of the property
condemned providing joinder of the parcels is reasonably
practical. (Internal citations omitted.) Hence, when valuing the
condemned parcel as part of a large parcel or assemblage, the
requisite unity of use may be merely prospective; whereas, when
assessing severance damages to the remaining part of a large
parcel, the requisite unity of use must be actual and present.
Id.

The M&R court recognized that for purposes of determining the value of the property
condemned, in order to support assemblage to create a larger parcel, there must be the
likelihood of an integrated use of the properties in connection with one another. Other
jurisdictions have similarly held that in considering unity of use in determining the larger
Citing e.g., Sauvageau v. Hjelle, 213 N.W.2d 381 (N.D.1973) (unity of use evidenced by integrated use of noncontiguous parcels); State Road Commission v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 301, 452 P.2d 548 (1969) (unity of use
evidenced by non-contiguous parcels functioning as a single economic unit); 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent
Domain§ 14.26[1] at 14-678 (J. Saclanan ed. 1985).
3
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parcel, the uses of the parcels must be dependent on one another. 4

In the Grathol case, the property is vacant but will be developed separately into
commercial uses. There has been no evidence introduced by ITD to support the contention
that the development of the western 30 acres is dependent in any manner on the eastern 26
acres for purposes of valuing the take. Skip Sherwood based his theory of the larger parcel
on the western 30 acres as a separate economic unit, which will be developed independently
from the eastern 26 acres. Sherwood limited his opinion of severance damages to the western
30 acres, caused by the take. Sherwood did not opine on any value for the eastern 26 acres
and did not attribute any severance damages to that portion of the property.
Conversely, ITD has impermissibly included in its valuation of the take the average
square foot value for the entire 56.8-acre tract, despite admitting no severance damages exist
for that portion of the Grathol property. ITD has based its opinion of the larger parcel on the
unsupported assumption that the properties are dependent on one another for development.
However, ITD offered no evidence to support its position that the eastern and western
properties are dependent on one another.
ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe, is well acquainted with the risks associated in failing to
consider the integrated use of properties for the larger parcel analysis in condemnation
proceedings. In State v. Wandermere Co., 89 Wash.App. 369, 949 P.2d 392 (1997), the
Washington DOT appealed from a jury verdict for the condemnee in the amount of
$3,500,000. The Wandermere case is particularly apropos here as it involved the same two
competing valuation witnesses: Skip Sherwood and Stan Moe.

The Washington DOT

condemned 5.56 acres as part of a highway construction project. Wandermere leased 24.45
acres as a sand and gravel pit which included the 5.56-acres taken. Id. at 371, 949 P.2d 394.
The State's valuation was premised on the theory that the 5.56 acres was simply a part of the
24.45 acre parcel, containing little remaining sand and gravel and that its highest and best use
See, e.g. Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Oberlaender, 92 Ill.App.2d 174, 235 N.E.2d 3 (I 968), (the
highest and best use of the part taken may be so related to the entire property that the value of the part taken for its
highest and best use is dependent upon the value of the entire tract. It is the nature of the relationship of the part to
the whole which determines that value of the part since all parts are not necessarily equally related); Territory by
Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961), (where, as here the parcels taken approach such size
and character as to assume proportions of independent economic use, in the light of the highest and best use of the
land, the rationale of the rule valuing 'the whole first, then on that basis, assign a value to the part condemned'
dissolves into meaninglessness.
4
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was no longer as a mine, but for residential development. Wandermere, however, maintained
that the taking was from a portion of a larger 62-acre parcel containing 4.5 million cubic
yards of sand and gravel yet to be mined. Id. at 372, 949 P.2d 395.
The State argued that only the 24.45-acre leasehold was currently zoned for mining
operations and the additional 37 acres was zoned for single family residential, therefore, the
highest and best use of the take area would be for residential purposes. Id. at 372, 949 P .2d
395. Wandermere presented evidence that the gravel pit had been in use since the 1920's, the
family regarded the entire 62 acres as a single economic unit and expected to mine all of it
once it was rezoned. Testimony also showed that the Department of Natural Resources would
likely have granted a request for the expansion of the mining operations, if applied for.
Wandermere argued the highest and best use of the 37 acres was therefore mining. Id. at
372-73, 949 P.2d 395-96.
Skip Sherwood testified for Wandermere that the highest and best use of the larger
parcel was mining and the take had eliminated the highest and best use for the 62-acre parcel

because there would be insufficient area left for a batch plant. Using the income approach to
measure the loss, Sherwood discounted the future royalties and rent amounts to a present
value and subtracted the reversionary value of the property after the mine was depleted in

order to arrive at a value for the property in the amount of $4,580,000. Id. at 374, 949 P.2d
396. Appraiser Stan Moe for the State disputed Sherwood's valuation believing that the
future royalty payments were too uncertain to be inciuded in the vaiuation process. 5 Id. The
State offered $38,900 for the taking. Id. at 371, 89 Wash.App. 394.
The State objected to proposed jury instructions on the larger parcel theory which
instructed the jury that "the property is defined as all parcels which are unified by ownership
and use." Id. at 375, 949 P.2d 396. The State argued that the instruction was erroneous
because under its theory, the parcels must be presently used in connection with each other for
the same use.
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals determined that the property owners
presented sufficient evidence of intent to use the full 62 acres as a sand and gravel pit to

5

This battle of appraisal methodology is reminiscent of the Grathol case where Moe again attacks Sherwood's
valuation approach. See, Section II, herein.
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submit the case to the jury. Id. at 379, 949 P.2d 380. Because the evidence of Wandermere's
theory was sufficient to submit its larger parcel analysis to the jury, the trial court did not
commit error and the jury's award based on the integrated use of the property as a mine was
upheld. That award included damages based on Sherwood's discounted valuation
methodology. Ironic, that 14 years later, Moe is still dismissive of Sherwood's valuation
methodology and larger parcel analysis, even though both were upheld in the Wandermere
case.
Other jurisdictions are in accord. In State Through Dept. of Highways v. Landry, 171
So.2d 779 (La.Ct.App. 1965), the State appealed from a condemnation award based on the
value the condemned portion (a "strip-take") had as commercial highway frontage, as if it were
sold in lots with a depth of 150 feet. The sole issue on appeal was whether the method of
determining the market value of the highway frontage taken was proper.
The State argued that following the taking, the remainder of the landowners' 25-acre
"parent tract" was provided with new frontage on the highway with a commercial value
equivalent to the frontage taken on the old highway. Landry at 780. The State argued that the
landowners therefore did not sustain the loss of valuable commercial frontage. Since the entire
parent tract had a value of $2,750.00 per acre prior to the taking, the State argued that value of
the take was only the pro-rata loss in value of the entire tract caused by its take of 1.3 acres. Id.
The State's contention was that it was improper to award landowners the commercial value of
the frontage taken, or to vaiue the take as if it were soid on the market for commerciai purposes
as lots separate from the entire parent tract.
The Louisiana Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that although a willing buyer might
not pay $0.83 per square foot for an irregularly shaped strip, the evidence showed that such
price would be paid for the land squared offto a depth of 150 feet. Id.
Since it was a portion of [the] valuable front land that was taken,
we think the trial court correctly determined the market value of
the portion taken as proportionate to that which a willing buyer
would pay for the land squared off to a depth of 150 feet.

Id. The Landry court found that this method of computing compensation was consistently

utilized

aitd

appro,red,

aitd

tl1at prior cases pro,rided authoriry for basiI1g the av" ard on the
1

higher market value of the frontage taken, rather than on its lesser pro rata average-acre value
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as a proportionate piece of the entire parent tract. In Landry, the State basically argued that the
true market value of the commercial frontage actually taken should be reduced to allow credit
for the benefits received by the remainder (i.e. the "slide-back" theory). The Landry court
disagreed, because in Louisiana (like Idaho), the market value of the take cannot be offset by
the benefit that the remainder may receive. Such benefits can only be off-set against severance
damages, if claimed. Id. at 781.
A similar result was reached in State Through Dept. of Highways v. LeDoux, 184
So.2d 604 (LA, Ct.App.1966), holding that a landowner is entitled to recover the highest per
acre market value of frontage property "squared off'' to a depth which would be most suitable
for commercial purposes, even though property actually taken by the State did not have
sufficient depth to accommodate such commercial development. See also, Territory by
Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961), rejecting the State's argument

that the sole method of valuation for a partial take was a pro-rata application of the value of
the entire parcel.
The import of these diverse cases is that there is not a single, required "method" for
determining the larger parcel. The courts have recognized that the larger parcel may be the
entirety of the parent tract, the parent tract plus other non-contiguous tracts, the take (only), or a
part of the parent tract, if such hypothetical divisions are logical, rationale and supported by
market data demonstrating that such parts are independent economic units. The determination
of the larger parcel is vital. Determining the highest and best use of the subject property, is part
of the larger parcel analysis, but only part, and difficulties arising in valuation based on
theories of assemblage, or the "slide back value theory" would be avoided if the larger parcel
included only those integrated lands actually affected by the condemnation. The issues become
more complicated where, as is the situation here, a parcel with desirable frontage on a roadway
is intuitively worth more closer to the frontage and worth less toward the back or rear of the
property. One of the best descriptions of this circumstance is as follows:
A land owner is always entitled to the fair market value of the
land actually taken. The fair market value of the front land in
certain situations is higher than the average unit price of the tract
as a whole. The fact that adjacent areas of the property ... are all
under the same ownership, and together compose a large
ownership tract, does not presuppose that they would be
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developed or marketed as a single tract. In fact, market realities
dictate otherwise. An owner ordinarily will sell a portion of his
property for the highest price the market will deliver so long as
that ... does not damage the value of the remainder.

State Dept ofH'ways v. Stegemann, 269 So.2d 480 (La. 1973).
Courts have consistently recognized that such pro-rata methods of valuation are really
only useful in cases where the area of the take would have no independent market value or a
value could not be determined from the market because of irregularities in size, shape or utility
of that part taken. In those cases, the valuation must be based on a pro-rata valuation of the
entire value of the parent tract to avoid finding that the take was valueless. However, when the
take by itself or as part of a larger tract does have an independent economic value based on the
market, then the "larger parcel" must be identified accordingly. Further, when severance
damages are not claimed, assemblage of independent, unrelated parcels in order to arrive at a
lower pro-rata value of the take is disallowed. This is exactly what ITD has proposed.
Here, ITD valued the take as part of Grathol's entire 56.8-acre parent tract, instead of
the western 30 acres. In order to arrive at an estimate of value for the entire parent tract, Stan
Moe used a comparable market analysis to identify comparable properties and then made
adjustments to the size of those comparables to reach a value conclusion for the entirety of
Grathol's parent tract. Moe arrived at a range of "adjusted values" for his comparables then
"reconciled" those values to reach liis value opi11ion value for Grathol's entire tract at
$35,000.00 per acre. Finally, Moe simply applied the lower average value of the whole property
to the 16.314 acres taken.
In failing to recognize the larger parcel as the western 30 acres, ITD advocates an

approach that ignores reality. The value of the Grathol property is significantly higher on the
front than the rear and ITD is condemning the front; i.e. - the most valuable part. ITD's
application of a pro-rata valuation based on the 56.8-acre larger parcel impermissibly compares
apples to oranges; including the lower average values for the eastern 26.8 acres for which no
severance damages were given by Sherwood. ITD has opined that there are no severance
damages and that the eastern acreage remains unaffected by the Project. However, by including
the eastern 26.8 acres in its calculation, ITD is basically arguing that special benefits accruing
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to the eastern parcel (which are unaffected) should be set-off against the value of the take. This
analysis is flawed and unsupportable.
ITD offers no cogent explanation for determining that the larger parcel encompasses all
56.8 acres. ITD concluded that the highest and best use of the property is to be held as
development land. However, holding land is not an integrated use of property. While both
parcels remained vacant at the time of these proceedings (therefore requiring a broader
analysis), the future use and values of those parcels are not so intertwined or dependent on one
another to lead to the inescapable conclusion that, as a matter of law, the "larger parcel" can
only be the entire 56.8 acres. Stan Moe based his determination of the larger parcel on his
assumption that the eastern acreage would be needed as land application for treated water in

connection with the commercial development to the west. However, there is no evidence in the
record to support such an assumption.
Instead, the un-contradicted testimony at trial by Grathol's project engineer and modular
waste water system designer, Jim Coleman, is that he designed a sewer system that takes up
very little space and could be put virtually anywhere on the property. Coleman also testified
that the treated water could be applied on-site to landscaping, circulated throughout the western
commercial development, applied to right-of-way or even transported off-site at very little cost.
Coleman did not testify that the system needed or required any of the eastern 26-acre parcel in
order to function.
Conversely, ITD failed to put on any evidence that Coleman's system could not be
designed or located entirely on the western 30 acres, nor did ITD put on any evidence
whatsoever that the eastern 26 acres was necessary or required for the development of the
western acreage. Indeed, ITD chose not to cross-examine Jim Coleman on any of these issues
and chose not to call any rebuttal experts to testify that such a system was infeasible or
insufficient. ITD had identified several engineers from David Evans & Associates as rebuttal
experts to Coleman, and even had such persons physically present in the courtroom during the
trial, but chose not to call those persons to rebut Coleman's testimony. See, Plaintiff!TD 's
Trial Witness List, at p. 2. Coleman's testimony remains un-contradicted. Because ITD failed

to put on any evidence of the integrated and necessary use of the eastern 26 acres in connection
with the development of the western 30 acres, Stan Moe's basis for including the entire
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property in his larger parcel analysis is without any factual support whatsoever.
Further, the property will be physically divided by the inevitable extension of Sylvan
Road across Grathol's property, into the eastern and western parcels. ITD acknowledged the
extension of Sylvan in the Board's resolution attached to the Complaint. Complaint at Exhibit
C. ITD's witness, Jason Minzghor, testified in his deposition that Sylvan "is expected to be
there." Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion in Limine, at Exhibit D; Depa. Minzghor, p. 59, 11. 5-22. ITD's right-of-

way plans show that they are constructing an approach to the Grathol property at the
intersection of Sylvan and Highway 54. Id. at Exhibit C. ITD's right-of-way plans also show
that it acquired right-of-way to the north along Roberts Road, dead-ending at the Grathol
property and such plans indicate a "Permanent Easement for Future Roberts Road
Development." Id. Finally, Lakes Highway District also requested that Sylvan be developed as
part of the rezone hearing in April 2009, and has indicated that such development and
dedication of Sylvan will be a requirement of any commercial development. Id. at Exhibit H.
While ITD may not be physically condemning Sylvan Road across the Grathol property and
compensation for its extension is not part of these proceedings, ITD cannot, in good faith,
ignore that the Grathol property will be bisected by Sylvan Road for purposes of the larger
parcel analysis.

Based on the inevitable extension of Sylvan Road, the remaining parcels will be
physically separated, destroying any contiguity between the western and eastern remainders. As
contiguity will not be present, the Court must look to the integrated uses of the properties to
determine the larger parcel. However, the uses of the remnant eastern and western parcels are
independent and there is no evidence to show otherwise.
Further, market data supports Grathol's theory that the western 30 acres is the larger
parcel. Sherwood testified that he valued only the western 30 acres because that was the size

that most commercial developments utilize and Sherwood reviewed and compared commercial
sales of that size in his analysis. ITD offered no testimony to refute this market data, but
instead simply utilized the entire 56.8-acres. ITD's valuation methodology essentially penalizes
Grathol for owning "too much land," a theory that has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.
ITD's inclusion of unaffected property is directly contrary to the cases cited, holding that
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special benefits (i.e. - more land) cannot be off-set against the value of the take. Idaho law is in
accord with this approach, providing that special benefits can only be deducted from severance
damages, if any. Idaho Code § 7-711 requires a separate determination of the value of the take
from severance and special benefits, if any. I. C. § 7-711 (1-3). 6
ITD's argument that the property is benefitted by the Project by reason of increased
values to the remainder (i.e. "slide-back") has no applicability in the larger parcel analysis for
arriving at the value of the take. This approach is only relevant to claims for severance damage
and cannot be used as an off-set against the take. ITD's "slide-back" theory also fails factually
because, in the instant situation, there is not simple expansion of an existing right-of-way (i.e.
"strip-take), but instead the construction of an entirely new freeway with off-ramps directly
across the Grathol property. 7 Access has changed, visibility has changed, speed of traffic has
increased, the western 30 acres has been bisected by the new alignment, and the values of the
western remainder after the take are not the same as before the take.
Because the western 30-acres is a separate economic unit, and is not dependent upon the
eastern 26-acres for its highest and best use, the evidence supports Skip Sherwood's
determination of the larger parcel. Based on the foregoing authority and arguments, there is
sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to determine that the 30-acre property west of Sylvan
constitutes the larger parcel for a determination of market value for the take.
II.

Severance Damages.
Just as the appraisers who testified in this case disagreed about the larger parcel

approach, so too do they part ways philosophically on how to approach severance damages
or, more properly, the value of the remainder in the "after" condition. ITD repeatedly moved
to strike the testimony of Sherwood, arguing that he was using two different dates of
valuation. In point of fact, Sherwood was not using two dates of valuation. Instead, he was
addressing the value of the remainder in the after condition (its value after the take, taking
into account the affects of the take and ITD's use of the portion taken) by appiying a
recognized appraisal methodology of reaching the present value (i.e. - the value of the

6

See also, I.DJ.I. 7.18, separating the assessment of the fair market value of the take from severance damages and
benefits, if any.
7 The "slide back theory" is not applicable as the remainder's exposure is not the same in the before and after. See e.g.,
City ofLos Angeles v. Allen, 36 P.2d 611 (Cal.1934); State, Dep 't ofH'ways v. LeDoux. La., 184 So.2d 604 (La. 1966).
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remainder after the take) by examining the property's future value and discounting it back to
the date of the take.
Discounting is a general term used to describe the process of converting a future value
to a present value. In the discounting process, future values are converted into present value
through discounting, a concept that benefits received in the future are worth less than the same
benefits received today. The Appraisal of Real Estate, Appraisal Institute (12th Ed. 2001) at p.
550. Discounting is simply the application of the time value of money and the application of
interest, wherein the present value of a future amount will be less than that expected future
amount. In other words, discounting of a future benefit uses the reciprocal of the growth of
compound interest. Id. at 551. The Appraisal of Real Estate is hornbook law on appraisal
methodology and recognizes that the discount approach is an accepted method of appraisal to
arrive at a present value for a future income.
The use of a discount rate in condemnation proceedings is not an isolated anomaly or
unrecognized method of valuation by appraisers. Discounting is most frequently utilized
through the "income approach" of appraisals in order to arrive at a present value for income
streams produced by commercial property at some point in the future. This approach is
accepted and utilized by most courts. See e.g., Boring v. Metro. Edison Co., 435 Pa. 513, 522,
257 A.2d 565, 570 (1969); Matter of Acquisition Prop. by Eminent Domain, 263 Kan. 470,
479, 949 P.2d 1115, 1121, (1997); City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry & Const. Co., 394
S.W.2d 300, 306 (Mo. 1965). See also, Weese v. Pinellas County, 688 So.2d 221, 1996 WL
34001 (Fl. App.3 Dist.1996), holding that trial court improperly struck landowner's expert's
testimony on ground that he used wrong date for calculation of damages then discounted
back to date of take.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that the use of the income approach is permitted
even when other methods of appraisal are available.
The approach which we have elected to follow takes into
account the practice followed by appraisers in preparing an
opinion as to value. Appraisers do not adopt an isolated
approach to reach an opinion as to value, but attempt to utilize
all three approaches to test the validity of their conclusion as to
the fair and actual cash market value of the property to be
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condemned. Opinion evidence as to value requires that the
unique and different characteristics of every individual piece
of property be analyzed for its comparability to other
property that bears comparable characteristics. Factual
circumstances may cause one approach to valuation to be
more appropriate than another. Rarely are two pieces of real
estate identical, and usually each parcel of real property has
advantages and disadvantages which are not possessed by
another. No purpose is served by limiting testimony to one
approach or to the most appropriate method of attaining an
opinion as to value. Recognition should be given to all
relevant factors which tend to provide a means for arriving
at a fair evaluation.
Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Berglund-Cherne Co., 193 Colo. 562, 566-67, 568 P.2d 478,

481 (1977) (emphasis added).
In fact, the two expert witnesses involved in this case are well-acquainted with the
discount income approach, as demonstrated in State v. Wandermere Co., 89 Wash.App. 369,
949 P.2d 392 (1997), supra. In Wandermere, Stan Moe, on behalf of the State of
Washington, was especially critical of Skip Sherwood's use of the same appraisal
methodology used here for arriving at the present value of the gravel pit and mine property.
Id. at 372, 949 P.2d 396. However, the Washington Court of Appeals found that use of

Sherwood's methodology was supported by market evidence and the State was able to argue
that Sherwood's methodology was not related to present fair market value during trial. The
State in Wandermere did not attack the discounted approach as being an unrecognized
method of appraisal valuation, but instead disagreed with Sherwood's inclusion of future
income streams in arriving at his present value conclusions as being speculative. The jury,
however, accepted Sherwood's methodology and awarded $3,500,000.00 for the taking and
severance damages. Id. at 376, 949 P.2d 397.
Here, Sherwood has used the same recognized appraisal methodology by arriving at
an opinion of the value of the remainder after the take by using the future value of the
remainder after development, then discounting that same amount back to the date of the take.
The methodology is identical. While the use of the discounted cash flow analysis is regularly
empioyed by appraisers to a..--rive at the present value for commercial properties, the same
methodology is appropriate here because the land is currently unused but will be developed
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into commercial property as its highest and best use.
All of the appraisers who testified in this case (Moe, Pynes and Sherwood) spoke of
recognized appraisal methodologies being the comparative market approach, replacement
cost approach, and income approach. All three testified that ordinarily appraisers strive to use
all three approaches and then reconcile their conclusions. However, because the Grathol
property was, for the most part, unimproved, bare ground held for development purposes, the
replacement cost approach was largely inapplicable. Of the two remaining approaches
(income approach and comparative market approach), all the appraisers emphasized a
comparative market approach to arrive at a baseline unit value of the property. For ITD's
appraisers, the analysis simply stopped there because both concluded that the property's
highest and best use was to hold the property as vacant, unimproved property for some
distant future development. However, holding land for speculative purposes is not a "use" of
property. Neither Pynes nor Moe gave so much as a second thought to the application of any
appraisal methodology to arrive at an opinion of the value in the after, other than to
dismissively conclude there were no severance damages and therefore no change in value of
the remaining property in the after from the before.
Conversely, Sherwood's testimony clearly recognizes that the value of the property in
the after condition is impaired and has suffered damage. Sherwood also recognized that
calculating the impairment is difficult because the effect of the condemnation on such
property will continue in the future. If the property were a fully improved income-producing
property, a net present value analysis comparing the post-take income stream from the
property would be applied. But, because the property is in the process of being developed and
not yet producing income, Sherwood utilizes the same recognized methodology by estimating
what the value of the property would be to an end-user after completion of the project and
then applying a discount rate to determine the net present value as of the date of the take.
Sherwood used a flat discount rate of 10%, identical to the rate that ITD's appraisers used in
making their adjustments to comparable sales occurring prior to the date of the take.
Sherwood also used a period of 1.5 to 2.5 years to apply that discount rate back to the date of
the Summons. Sherwood's use of this time period cannot be criticized as excessive (and
indeed appears conservative), since the property remains unusable at the time of trial more
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than 16 months after the official date of the take.
Indeed, ITD's main criticism of Skip Sherwood's discount method is that Sherwood
failed to use the same date of valuation for the "before and after" analysis. However, such
argument completely ignores that Sherwood's appraisal methodology is widely recognized
and his discounting adjusts those future values (of the property) back down to the date of the
take, November 2010. Sherwood's analysis uses the same date of the taking in the "before
and after" utilizing a recognized and approved methodology to account for the uses of the
western 30-acres in a commercial highest and best use, and the affects ofITD's partial taking
on that property.
DATED this 23 rd day of March, 2012.

·stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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I hereby certify that on the 23 rd day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

'KUS Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

>( US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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Attomeys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff:

Case No. CV-10-10095
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a Califomia general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a
Washington col'poration; and DOES 1 through

5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, pursuant to Rule 6(b), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, and respectfully moves this Court for its order enlarging Defendant's time within
which to file a Reply to Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief and file its proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Counsel represents to the Cou1t that the grounds above stated in support
of this request for an enlargement are consistent with the actual existing needs of the defense
and are made in good faith and not as a dilatory matter; as fmther explah1ed in Affidavit of

Christopher D. Gabbert attached hereto.
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Defendant requests an enlargement of time of approximately seven (7) days from the
date hereof to pe1n1it said Reply and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

DATED this

2.'1

day ofMarch, 2012.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Film
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the '2.tf day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transpo1tation Depru.tment
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
Ma1yV. York

Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

us Mail
_
_

Overnight Mail
~ rlD e.1vere
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--an~ Facsimile (208) 334~4498
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__ Ovemight Mail
Hand Delivered
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COUNTY OF KOOTENAlf

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Mar:fice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbe1t, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlllST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER
D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME

HJ GRATHOL, a Califomia general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through

5,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )

) ss.
County of Kootenai )

CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am an attoiney of reco1·d fo1· the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and

therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter,
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The Court has requested post-trial briefing of the parties due on Friday, March

23, 2012, with Reply Briefs due on Friday March 30, 2012.
3.

The Court has requested the pru.ties to provide proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, also due on Fl'iday Mru.·ch 30, 2012.
4.

On the afternoon of March 23, 2012, I received copies of the trial transcripts

for the 5-day jury tt·ial dated March 5 through March 9, 2012.

5.

The trial transcript contains over 950 pages of testimony.

6.

Douglas Marfice has been away from the office from March 12, 2012 through

March 30, 2012 for a previously scheduled vacation and has been unable to assist in the
preparation of the briefing or the pl'oposed findings.
7.

Due to the time constraints and the volume of the trial transcript, I am unable

to finalize and submit the Defendant's Reply Brief and the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law by Friday, March 30, 2012.

8.

I have spoken with ITD's attorneys who are unwilling to agree to any

extension of time.
9.

Grathol has not previously requested an extension of time.

10.

I believe that a one week enlargement of time to Friday, April 6, 2012 for the

filing of the Reply Bdef and the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will
provide a reasonable time to finalize Defendant's submissions.
11.

O1'athol is not requesting the enlargement for improper purposes and does not

believe that the one-week extension will unreasonably delay the orderly administration of this
proceeding.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day ofMai·ch, 2012J I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

J. Th'll Thomas
Deputy Attomey General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_k. Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. Yol'k
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART1 LLP
,.,.,.,, BOX L.JL.
""'"'""'I
l:',U,
Boise, ID 83701-2527

__ Oveinight Mail
Hand Delivered
,x Facsimile (208) 343-8869

US Mail

US Mail
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S, Marfice, ISB #4072
Christophel' D. Gabbe1t, ISB #6772
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095

ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on Defendant HJ Grathol 's Motion to
Enlarge Time;

.

Based on the pleadings and documents on file, the argument of counsel and evidence

presented;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Enlarge Time for filing its Post
Trial Reply Brief and proposed Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law is hereby granted, and

the deadline for the parties

to

submit theiL' Reply Bl'iefs and proposed Findings of Fact and
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Conclusions ofLaw is enlarged by seven (7) days to April 6, 2012,

DATED this-3° day of March, 2012.

THE HONORABLE CHARLES HOSACK
District Court Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thej_Q_ day of March, 2012, I served a true and coffect copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

MaiyV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

Chrfatopher D. Gabbe1t
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d~Alene, ID 83816-1336

_

v

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand DeHvered
Facsimile (208) 334-4498 jf ;z,'74-.£;'

US Mail
_

Overnight Mail

Hand Delivered
_Jj_ Facsirnile (208) 343-8869 ;#- 11~~

US Mail
_

Overnight Mail

7

Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 664-5884 -k- ;;2. 7 47

CJuvm UAwJnm dt:

Clerk of the Couit
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8803
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
VS,

Case No. CVl0-10095

PLAINTIFF ITD'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;

STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
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As directed by the Court, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"),

submits the following proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law.
I.
i-.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

-----This is a condemnation case brought by ITD to condenin a·portion of real

property owned by Defendant HJ Grathol, a California general partnership ("Grathol"). The
Court conducted a bench trial on March S through March 9, 2012. The Court has carefully
reviewed and considered all of the testimony and evidence admitted at trial. The Court has also
reviewed and considered the post-trial briefs filed by the parties, as well as prior briefing on
ITD's motion for summary jud~ent and motions in limine. The Court has also reviewed its
prior orders on the aforementioned motions.
2.

Based on a full and complete review of the record in this matter, the Court makes

the following findings of fact. To the extent that any fmding of fact may also be a conclusion of
law, that finding of fact is hereby incorporated within the Court's conclusions of law.
3.

Unless otherwise noted, references to e,chibits in these findings are to trial

exhibits. References to the trial transcript shall be abbreviated as "Tr."

A.

The ITD Project.
4.

The Idaho Transportation Department is engaged in a project to widen and

improve a section of US-95 between the communities of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the
Project'').
5.

Mr. Jason Minzghor, P.E., is an engineer with ITD and has had primary

responsibility for the Project. He testified at trial regarding the specifics of the Project. He also
submitted a detailed affidavit regarding the Project on January 18, 2011.

6.

US-95 is the key north-south link for northern Idaho transportation, commerce,

and tourism. In the area of the Project, US-95 is eUtTently a two-lane highway. Rapid growth in
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Bonner and Kootenai Counties has caused traffic volumes to increase substantially, in turn
causing traffic congestion and reduced public safety, The purpose of the Project is to improve
safety and increase the capacity ofUS-95.
1.--~--·--In-2002, ITO initiated a comprehensive study ofUS~9Sbetween Garwood and

Sagle. The study detennined that US-95 should be redesigned and expanded to improve public
safety and enable the highway to accommodate increasing traffic volumes. Id. This process
involved extensive work with the public, local governmental entities, and state and federal
agencies.
8.

The study cu1roinated in a decision by the Idaho Transportation Board to upgrade

31.S miles of US-95 to a four-lane divided freeway with interchange access only.
9.

Due to the size of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into

seven segments. The Grathol property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, ITD
Project No. A009(791), Key No. 9791. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 1.8 miles
of US-95 from a two-lane, unrestricted access highway to a four-lane divided and accesscontrolled high.way. The Athol Segment will also construct an interchange with State Highway
54 just outside the town of Athol.
10.

In order to construct the Project, ITD must take and condemn a portion of the

Gtathol property. This is a partial taking case.
11.

ITD filed this action and had summons issued on November 17, 201 O. Therefore,

under Idaho Code§ 7-712, the date oftalcing and the date of valuation in this case are
November 17, 2010.

B.

The Grathol Property And The Taking.
12,

The Grathol property consists of 56.8 acres located in Kootenai County, Idaho,

outside the town of Athol.
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The Grathol property is baxe, undeveloped land, except for an old building located

at the southwest comer of the property.
14.

The property is located at the northeast comer of present US-95 and Highway 54.

It is bounded-by--US-9S on the west, State Highway 54 on the south;·Howard-Road on the east,
and the Farragut Trail on the north.
15.

Upon completion of the US-9S Project, a small portion of the Grathol property

will continue to have front.age on the former US-95. The remaining property will be adjacent to

the new interchange with State Highway 54, at the northeast quadrant of the interchange.

16.

ITD is condemning 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.486 acres after the

taking. A metes and bounds legal description of the 16.314 acres condemned in the Complaint is
attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint.
17.

The Grathol property, the area of the take, and a computer-generated depiction of

the new US-9S across the Orathol property are shown in detail in Trial Exhibit 166.
18.

Grathol first learned about the property in January 2008. At that time, the

property was for sale, and the listing for the property by the Multiple Listing Service provided
notice to any prospective purchaser that a highway interchange was planned to be constructed on
the property. Specifically, the listing for the property stated that "preliminary drawings show
future off-ramps and frontage road for [highway] 95 through this property." Trial Exhibit 16.
The MLS listing also advised that the purchaser should "check with [the] Department of
Transportation to verify" the details regarding the Project.
19.

Grathol purchased the 56.8 aere parcel on May 28J 2008 for the sum of

$1,450,000.
20.

At trial, Mr. Skip Sherwood, testifying for Grathol, stated that he believed the

seller was in financial distress when he sold the property to Gtathol. However, he did not
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confirm this with the seller. Mr. Stan Moe, testifying for Im, stated that he spoke personally
with the seller, who informed Mr. Moe that he was not in fmancial distress at the time of the sale.
Mr. Moe also testified that he reviewed and relied on an affidavit from the seller attesting to the
fact that the sale was not made under financiai disttess. Tne Cotu-t findscthis-evidence
persuasive, The Court further finds that the May 28, 2008 sale of the subject property for

$1,4S0,000.0O is indicative of the fair market value of the property at that time.
21.

According to the witnesses called by Grathol, Grathol purchased the property in

order to pursue a mixed-use commercial development on the property.
22.

Before purchasing the property, Orathol started work on an application to

Kootenai County to change the zoning of the property from Rural to Commercial.
23.

Grathol purchased the property on May 28, 2008 and submitted its rezone

application to Kootenai County on May 30, 2008. Trial Exhibit 130,
24.

Grathol's rezone application referred to the US-95 Project and cited the Project as

one of the reasons why a zoning change to Commercial was warranted for the property. Id The
application stated that ''1-95 is soon to begin improvement to full freeway status, and will be
realigned to cross this property, providing on and off-ramps at the Hwy 54 intersection." Id at
A-3.

25.

On November 20, 2008, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners issued an

Order of Decision granting Grathol's requested zoning change, and ordered that the Grathol
property be rezoned from Rural to Commercial, Trial Exhibit 135.
26.

No utilities or infrastructure have been added to the site. The City of Athol has

refused annexation of the property and has refused to allow Grathol to connect to the city's sewer
system,
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In order to develop its property, Grathol will have to build its own waste water

treatment system. Grathol will also have to use land application to dispose of its treated waste
water or make arrangements for other property owners to accept its treated waste water.
-- ,

C.

Findingt Relating To Assessment Of Just Compensation;"- - .- .-. - ·

28.

Idaho Code§ 7-711 governs the assessment of just compensation in Idaho

condemnation cases. It requires the finder of fact to "ascertain and assess" the "value of the
property sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty[.]" I.C.
§ 7-711(1).

29.

ITD has condemned 16.314 acres of the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol. No

improvements are located on the condemned property. Therefore, Grathol is entitled to just
compensation for the fair market value of the condemned property as of the date of talcing,
November 17, 2010.
30.

Under Idaho Code§ 7-711, "[i]fthe property sought to be condenmed constitutes

only a part of a larger parcel," then the :finder of fact must also "ascertain and assess" "(a) the
damages which Will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff; and (b) the damages to any business qualifying under this
subsection[.]" I.C. § 7-711(2)(a), (b).
31.

The Grathol property consists of 56. 8 acres of contiguous land. Therefore, the

condemned property is part of a larger paxcel owned by Grathol. Accordingly, Grathol is entitled
to recover damages, if any, to the remaining 40 .486 acres by reason of the severance of the

16.314 acres from the remaining property. I.C. § 7-711(2)(a).
32.

The Grathol property is undeveloped and no business is operated on the property.

Therefore, Idaho Code§ 7-71 l(b), governing claims for business damages, does not apply.
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Fair market value of the condemned property.

Based on the testimony at trial and the evidence presented, the Court finds that the

highest and best use of the property is for commercial development. The Court further finds that
. the highest-and-best use of the property is the same both before and-after the.taking.
34.

No testimony or evidence was presented at trial that Grathol is contemplating or

has contemplated the idea of rezoning any portion of the property to a different use other than
commercial.

35.

No testimony or evidence was presented at trial that portions of the Grathol

property would be put to uses other than commercial uses or uses necessary to support
commercial development.
36.

Based on the testimony at trial and the evidence presented, the Court finds that its

determination of the highest and best use of the property for commercial development, both
before and after the talcing, applies to all 56.8 acres. This finding is in accord with Grathol's
application for rezoning and the decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners
approving the rezoning of the entire property to commercial use. This finding is also in accord
with the development plans presented by Grathol. This finding is also in accord with the

testimony and evidence showing that most of the 56.8-acre property would be used in the
mixed-use commercial development planned by Grathol.
37.

Based on the testimony and evidence presented, the Court finds that Grathol

failed to present persuasive evidence of economic feasibility or market demand for its planned
commercial development in the near term. However, because the parties are in agreement that
the highest and best use of the property, before and after the takina, is for commercial
development, the Court finds sufficient basis for that conclusion.
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The real estate appraiser called by Gtathol, Mr. Skip Sherwood, prepared a

restricted appraisal report. He testified that in his opinion the fair market value of the 16 .314
acres condemned by ITD is $1,598,543.00.
39.- - -Fox.the followlng reasons, the Court does not find Mr; Shel'W'Ood's opinion to be
credible or persuasive.
a.

The testimony at trial showed that Mr. Sherwood failed to follow the

Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP") in conducting his appraisal.
b.

Mr. Sherwood used the ''sales comparison" approach to real estate

valuation. However, he admitted at trial that most of the sales he relied on were in far superior
locations in the cities of Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, and Post Falls.
c.

Many of the sales Mr. Sherwood relied on were of properties that had

utilities and other improvements already in place or readily available to the property.
d.

By contrast, the Grathol property is in a comparatively remote location

outside of Athol, has no improvements, and cannot tie into a municipal or other sewer system.

e.

A number of the sales were substantially smaller than the subject property,

and Mr. Sherwood acknowledged in his testimony that small properties generally have a higher

per acre or per square foot price than larger parcels like the Grathol property.
f.

Many of the sales used by Mr. Sherwood occurred at the top of the real

estate market before the substantial drop in property values that occurred between the time of
those sales and the date of taking in this case of November 17, 2010.
g.

Mr. Sherwood did not meaningfully or persuasively identify, explain, or

quantify the adjustments he made to the sales he used in order to reflect the fair market value of
the subject property. He made adjustments without explanation, quantification, or reasoning for
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the adjustments. Thus, it is not possible to detennine what adjustments he made or evaluate the
appropriateness of his adjustments.
h.
· - -- ·

Mr. Sherwood's restricted appraisal report stated that he gave ''primary

emphasisP1o·two sales, one of which (Sale No. S) was a transactioiftlial occuired under threat of
condemnation, which he himself stated in his report and testified at trial does not reflect ''market
value."
1.

Mr. Sherwood did not value the whole Orathol property in the before

condition. As discussed in more detail below, Mr. Sherwood used an artificial "larger parcel" as
a device to increase the per square foot price of the Grathol property.
J.

Mr. Sherwood admitted that he valued the Grathol property in the "before"

condition as of September 2010, rather than November 17, 2010. He also testified that he valued
the Otathol property in the "after" condition l.S and 2.S years after the date of taking. Idaho law
requires property in condemnation eases to be valued using the same date, for both the before
and after value, and the law requires the date of taking to be the date of summons, which in this

ease is November 17, 2010. See I.C. § 7-712.
k.

Mr. Sherwood added an amount to his opinion of fair market value to

compensate Grathol for delay of 1.5 and 2.5 years in the completion of the US-9S Project. This
construction delay claim is contrary to Idaho law and was dismissed by the Court prior to trial,
However, Mr. Sherwood continued to include this claim in his testimony at trial.

1.

in post-trial briefing, Orathoi has suggested that the additionai amount

added by Mr. Sherwood for construction delay was a variant or component of an "income
approach" to the appraisal of real estate. However, Mr. Sherwood testified at trial that he did not
use the income approach and only used the sales comparison approach, Tr. at 447:2-11. He also
testified that the income approach only applies to improved property that is producing income,
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Id. It is undisputed that the Grathol property is bare land and is not producing income. In
addition, Sherwood's appraisal report makes no mention of the income approach or discounting
future income. Trial Exhibit 154.
· -40;-- .· As the proponent of the comparablt·sales used by tv.lr; Sherwood, Grathol had the
burden of satisfying the "strict foundation requirements [that] apply when evidence of
comparable sales is offered as substantive proof of the value of the property taken." State ex rel.

Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 23,454 P.2d 56, 60 (1969). In all cases, the sales must have
"sufficient criteria of similarity to be admitted as independent substantive evidence of the value
of property taken." Id. The Court finds that the sales used by Mr. Sherwood did not have
"sufficient criteria of similarity," Moreover, Mr, Sherwood could not identify, explain, or

quantify the adjustments he made to the sales. Having selected sales that were substantially
dissimilar to the subject property, and being unable to identify and explain the adjus1ments he
made to the sales, Mr. Sherwood was not able to show that the sales could be relied upon as
''proof of the value of the property taken."
41.

Mr. Alan Johnson is vice president and part owner of Grathol. He also gave an

opinion of value of the Grathol property. However, he used an "as developed" valuation
approach, as though the Grathol development project were completed. He also divided the
property into different areas of value based on the anticipated composition of Grathol' s planned
commercial development. These methods of valuing property are not pennitted in condemnation

cases in Idaho.
42.

Mr. Johnson testified that the value of the 16.314 acres condemned by ITD is

$2,295,360.00. His opinion of the compensation owed in this matter has gone through a number
of iterations, taken different approaches, and has changed in amounts from his initial disclosures
in October of 2011 through his testimony at trial on March 8, 2012.
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Mr. Johnson is not areal estate appraiser. However, his opinion of value

resembled a "sales comparison" approach to valuation used. by real estate appraisers. His
analysis considered only one sale, which is not typical in the use of the sales comparison
approach.· In addition, the evidence showed that Mr. Johnson;s·use of the sale to be unreliable
for the following reasons.
a.

The sale Mr. Johnson relied on is considerably smaller than the Grathol

property. However, he did not adjust the sale price to account for the size difference, resulting in
an inflated opinion of value when applied to the Grathol property,
b.

The sale property had water and sewer/septic available. The Grathol

property has no sewer or water, and those systems will have to be constructed at considerable
expense to Grathol. Mr. Johnson made no adjustmen~ to reflect these differences.

c.

The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson occurred at the height of the real est.ate

market, yet he made no adjus1ment to the date of taking in this case. By using a sale at the top of
the market, without adjustment, his opinion of the value of the Grathol property as of the date of
taking is inflated.

d.

The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson is located in the town of Sagle, and has

measurably better potential for commercial development than the Grathol property. He made no
adjustment for location or market support.
e.

Mr. Johnson did not identify or explain adjustments he made to the sale

and neither the adjustments nor the methodology or reasoning he employed could be discerned or
verified.

f.

The one adjustment Mr. Johnson apparently made appeared to be an

arbitrary 20% upward adjustment based on the Orathol property being located at a signalized
intersection. However, he did not account for the fact that the comparable sale in Saale was
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shown by the testimony at trial to be a superior property in tenns of size, utilities, and
development potential.
g.

With his upward adjustment of20%, Mr. Johnson opined that the Grathol

property~is worth_$3.23 per sq. ft. About 3 months- after the sale of the Sagle property, that
property was listed for sale again at $3 .48 per sq. ft. The property has been unable to sell at that
price for over 3 years. This evidence indicates that there is no market for commercial property at
that price.
44.

Based upon review and consideration of Mr. Johnson's testimony and the entire

record in this matter, the Court does not find Mr. Johnson's opinion to be persuasive or a
credible indication of the fair market value of the condemned property as of November 17, 2010.
45.

The opinions of value asserted by Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson assume

immediate and successful commercial development on the Grathol property. However, Grathol
did not present any economic feasibility or market analysis to support this assumption. The
evidence shows that the area has little or no demand for commercial development, particularly as
of the date of valuation. The evidence also shows that the surrounding area has no consumer
base to support end·users like grocery stores, retail chains, and restaurants that Gtathol has
suggested will purchase lots within the commercial development Therefore, the evidence
indicates that the property will most likely have to be held for a lengthy period of time before
commercial development will be viable.
46.

ITD presented two appraisers at trial, Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, and Mr. Larry Pynes,

ASA. Both appraisers testified that they prepared complete "before and after" appraisal reports.
In addition to their testimony, Mr. Moe's appraisal repon was admitted into evidence as Exhibit
12 by stipulation of the parties.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -12

1083 of 1617

NO.4516

APR. 6. 2012 4:31PM

47.

P. 14/46

Mr. Moe testified that his opinion of the fair market value of the Grathol property

before the taking is $1,973,650.00 and the fair market value of the remaining property after the
talcing is $1,402,660.00. He therefore further testified that his opinion of just compensation
, - .r·

,

owedto·6rathol is $571,000.00, being the difference between'thefait-market value of the
property before and after the taking, determined as of November 17, 2010.
48.

Mr. Pynes testified that his opinion of the fair market value of the Grathol

property before the taking is $2,350,000.00 and the fair market value of the remaining property
after the taking is $1,675,000.00. He therefore further testified that his opinion of just
compensation owed to Grathol is $675,000.00, being the difference between the fair market
value of the property before and after the taking, determined as of November 17, 201 0.
49.

Both Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes used the "sales comparison'' approach to real estate

appraisal. They used sales that had similar characteristics to the Grathol property. They also
explained and quantified the adjustments they made to the comparable sales in order to provide
accurate and reliable indications of the market value of the Grathol property on the date of the

taldng.
50.

Having carefully considered the testimony of Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes and the

record before the Court, the Court finds the opinions of Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes to be credible
and persuasive, and their opinions are reliable indications of the fair market value of the
condemned property as of the date of taking.

2,
S1.

Severance Damages.

Orathol's appraiser, Mr. Skip Sherwood, testified that he did not find any

severance damaaes to the remaining property. Tr. at S23:8-18.
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Mr. Sherwood added amounts to his determination of the fair market value of the

condemned property based on periods of 1.5 and 2.5 years of delay in completing the US~95
Project.
53. ·-·· Mr. -Sherwood testified that he added amounts to his opinion of the fair market
value of the condemned property based on anticipated time needed for completion of the US-9S
Project. Tr. at603:1 to 606:9.
54.

Mr. Sherwood also testified that the amounts he added to his opinion of just

compensation had nothing to do with the fair market value of $2.25 per square foot that he
assigned to the condemned property. Tr. at 606: 19-22.

55.

Mr. Sherwood also testified that he used two dates of valuation for his opinion of

just compensation. He used dates of valuation of 1.5 and 2.S years after the date of taking,

despite the fact that the date of value in this case is November 17, 2010. Tr. at 606:23 to 607: 15.
56.

Based on the record before the Court, including the restricted appraisal report of

Mr. Sherwood (Trial Exhibit 154); expert witness disclosures pertaining to Mr. Sherwood;
briefing by the parties; the trial testimony of Mr. Sherwood; and the rebuttal testimony of
Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes, the Court finds that the amounts added by Mr. Sherwood to his
determination of the fair market value of the condemned property are a restatement of the
construction delay claim previously dismissed by the Court. The amounts are not severance
damages as defined by Idaho law and are not attributable to a decrease in fair market value of the
property.

57,

In the opinion of Grathol' s other valuation witness, Mr. Alan Johnson, the

remaining property has a higher value after the taking than before the taking. Specifically, his
''before" value is $3.23 per sq. ft., which is lower than his "after" value of $4.00 to $4.50 per
sq. ft. Since his "after" value is higher than his "before" value, no claim for severance damages
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can be made based on the testimony and opinions of Mr. Johnson. Based on the definition of
severance damages and the formula for determining severance damages under Idaho law, the
Court cannot by law find severance damages based on the testimony of Mr. Johnson.
58.

Upon review of Mr. Johnson's oth~rtestimony, the'Court finds no credible or

reliable basis to support a finding of severance damages based on his testimony.
59.

Mr. Johnson prepared an exhibit which contained heading labeled "Severance

Damage." Trial Exhibit J. Based on the record before the Court and the testimony at trial, the
Court finds that the severance damages claimed by Mr. Johnson are solely a product of
calculations by him based on the time needed for ITD to complete the US-95 Project. Thus,
Mr. Johnson's claim for severance damage is in fact a claim for construction delay, which is
barred by Idaho law and was previously dismissed by the Court.
60.

Based on the entire record in this matter, the Court finds no persuasive evidence

upon which to conclude that the remaining Grathol property suffered severance damages.
61.

The real estate appraisets called by ITD, Mr. Stan Moe, MAI and Mr. Larry

Pynes, ASA also testified that the remaining property did not suffer any severance damages.

They each testified that they had found no basis for concluding that Grathol's ability to proceed
with their plans for commercial development of the property after the US-95 Project was
impaired or damaged in any way.

3.
62.

The "Larcer Parcel" Issue.

In his restricted appraisal report and testimony at trial, Mr, Sherwood offered an

opinion that the "larger parcel" to be valued in this case is a hypothetical 30-acre parcel within
the 56.8 acres of the Grathol property.
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All witnesses who testified on the subject at trial agreed that in the profession of

real estate appraisal, the elements for identifying the "larger parcel" are unity of title, contiguity,

and unity of use.
· .· ·M;· · ·, All-Witnesses agreed that the entirc'56.8 acres has·unity of title. ·It is all owned by
Grathol.

65.

All witnesses agreed that the 56.8 acres is contiguous.

66.

The Grathol property has not been subdivided. In addition, no physical barrier

exists separating one portion of the property from any other portion.
67.

Mr. Sherwood testified that, in his opinion, the westernmost 30 acres of the

property does not have "unity of use" with the other 26.8 acres. However, he did not testify that
the 26.8 acres has a different highest and best use. He also did not testify that the 26.8 acres
would not be put to commercial use. In addition, neither Mr. Sherwood nor anyone from Grathol
testified that Grathol intends to rezone the 26.8 acres again, to perm.it uses such as industrial or
residential uses on that property.
68.

Mr, Sherwood testified that the waste water treatment facilities needed for the

Gtathol development would be placed on the eastern 26.8 acres, thereby conceding that at least
some of the 26.8 acres would be part of the commercial development planned by Grathol.
69.

Grathol's witness, James Colem~ testified that Grathol would need between 13

and 16 acres for the waste water treatment system and land application for the treated water.
Coleman speculated that Grathol might be allowed to pipe its waste water onto someone else's
property, but he did not testify that any such mangement had been made,
70.

ITD witness George Hedley testified that Grathol would need 19 to 25 acres of

land application for its treated waste water based on det.ailed analyses by engineers with David
Evans and Associates. Thus, both Grathol witness Coleman and ITD witness Hedley testified
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that a substantial part of the eastern portion of the Grathol property would be needed for the
commercial development planned by Grathol.
71.

The development plans presented by Grathol for both the before condition

(without>&iy change to US-95) and the after condition (with eompletion-0fUS-9S Project) show

commercial development on the 26.8 acres east of Mr. Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel.
Below is a "before" site plan prepared by Grathol (without any change to US-95), which shows
commercial development (a Travel Plaza) east of Mr. Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel.
Specifically, the eastern edge of the hypothetical Sherwood parcel is the edge of where Grathol
may construct Sylvan Road running from State Highway 54 on the southern edge of the property

due north (shown by a yellow line).
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Trial Exhibit H, at p. 5.

72.

At trial, Geoffrey Reeslund, Orathol's vice president for project development,

testified that Gtathol is proceeding with the development as planned. Tr. at 432:12-18.

Mr. Reeslund did not testify that Grathol will not develop the eastern portion with commercial
uses. Therefore, Mr. Sherwood's larger parcel detennination is contrary to the stated intention of

his client.
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·Mr. Sherwood testified that he believes commercial real estate developers and

end~users do not typically buy parcels larger than 30 acres for commercial development. This
testimony is refuted by the fact that Grathol bought the entire 56.8-acre parcel for commercial
developme..'lt 3.1).d had the entire properttrezoned for commercial development. His opinion is
also refuted by his own comparable sales, which reflect sales of commercial properties ranging
in size from 9 acres to 235 acres.

74.

The second sale used by Mr. Sherwood in his sales comparison approach was a

sale of commercial property consisting of235 acres. In his discussion of that sale,
Mr. Sherwood noted that Cabela's committed to 40 acres alone, which refutes his claim that no

end-users want anything larger than 30 acres. He also notes that a Wal-Mart is going in at that
site, which further demonstrates that a nuxed use development like the one proposed by Grathol
needs more than 30 acres. Similarly, Grathol has proposed one to two motels, an undefined
"major" tenant, a travel plaza, and multiple pad sites for restaurants and other smaller users. In
addition, testimony at trial established that the development will need land for setbacks,
landscaping, roads, parking lots, waste water treatment facilities, and land application of treated
waste water.
75.

Mr. Sherwood did not perform a market study or provide any documentation to

support his claim that commercial real estate developments generally do not exceed 30 acres.
He also did not offer any explanation for why Grathol bought a 56.8 acre parcel and rezoned the

entire property for commercial use.
76.

Based upon review of his testimony and appraisal report, the Court finds that

Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that the hypothetical 30-acre
parcel may have a higher value than the other 26.8 acres. As testified by all witnesses who
addressed the subject, including Mr. Sherwood, "higher value'' is not a factor in detennining the
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larger parcel in the field of real estate appraisal. The three elements are unity of title, unity of
use, and contiguity. If higher value were the test, then every property owner could use the comer
or frontage of its property to set the unit value for the condemned property and the before and
after·Yfdue,ofthe·remainder. · This is not allowed under Idah<rlaw. -·
77,

~

_.

The Court finds that Mr. Sherwood created an artificial "larger parcel'' as a device

to increase the per square foot price of the condemned property,
78.

Three of the valuation witnesses called at trial, Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, Mr. Larry

Pynes, MAI, and Mr. Alan Johnson of Grathol, did a before and after valuation of the entire 56.8
acres. Only Mr. Sherwood failed to value the entire property before and after the taking.
79.

Based on the testimony at trial and the evidence presented, the Court finds that the

condemned property is part of a larger parcel of property owned by Grathol. The Court further
finds that the larger parcel is the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol. The 56.8 acres has unity of title
because it is all owned by Gtathol, and it is all contiguous. The 56. 8 acres also have unity of use
in that the entire property is zoned commercial, its highest and best use is for commercial

development, Grathol's plans show commercial development east of Sherwood's hypothetical
30-acre parcel, and the weight of the testimony at trial established that much of the eastern 26.8
acres will be needed for Grathol' s planned commercial development.
80.

The Court finds that Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel being a

hypothetical 30-acre segment of the Grathol property is not credible or persuasive, and is not
supported by the facts presented in the case.

II,

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the record before it, the Court makes the following conclusions oflaw, To the
extent that any conclusion of law may also be a finding of fact, that conclusion of law is hereby
incorporated within the Court's findings of fact.
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The Court incorporates the following prior orders in this case by reference as if

set forth in full: Order Granting Possession of Real Property (filed Jan. 27,2011); Order Re:
Motion in Limine (filed Feb. 3, 2012); Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
·-

0

(filed-Feb. 3-, 2012); and Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathoi's Severance Damages (filed Feb. 16,
2012),

A.

Foundational Legal Principles.
2.

Article I, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides that private property may

be taken for public use. Idaho Const., art. I,§ 14. When the government seeks to acquire private
property, it is required to pay just compensation for the taking. Id.; Covington -v. Jefferson

County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828~ 831 (2002). See also U.S. Const. amend V (providing
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation'').
3.

The threshold legal issues in a condemnation case are: (1) the scope and extent of

the taldng; (2) whether the taking is needed for the public project; (3) whether the public use is a

use authorized by law; (4) whether the condemning authority has the power of eminent domain;
and (S) whether the or not the plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to
be taken. I.C. § 7-707(2). After an evidentiary hearing, the Court entered a written order
resolving these issues. In that order, the Court held that the scope of the taking was defined in
the Complaint. Order Granting Possession of Real Propetty, at 2, 1 2 and Exhibit A (legal

description of the condemned property) (filed Jan. 27; 2011); The Cott.rt :further held that the
taking in this case is for a public use, the taking is necessary for that use, ITD has the power of
eminent domain, and it negotiated in good faith to purchase the portion of the Gtathol property
needed for the US-95 Project. Id. at 3, 112-3.
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In condemnation cases, the sole issue for trial is the amount ofjust compensation

to be paid to the property owner for the talcing. See IDmd 7.01.1 ("[t]he sole issue for your
determination is the just compensation to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiffI.]'').

··-· -·· ·5·, ·- . -The Idaho Legislature has enact~ legislation implementing the takings clause of
the Idaho Constitution. See I.C. § 7-711. Under § 7-711, a landowner is entitled to
compensation for (1) the value of the property taken, and (2) damages to the remam.ina property
in partial taking cases (commonly referred to as "severance damages"). See Idaho Code§ 7711(1) and (2); State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,446,546 P.2d 399,401 (1976).

6.

Gtathol has the burden of proving just compensation. See IDJI2d § 7.03; and

Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _

2012 WL 2312S4, *5 (Jan. 26,

2012) C'The burden of proving just compensation is bome by the landowner.,').
7.

This is a partial taking case. Just compensation in partial takings eases is defined

as follows. "Just compensation is the difference between the market value of the entire property
before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition, together with any
special damages caused by the taking, measured as of [the date of summons]." IDJI2d 7.16.
8.

~'Fair market value" is defined as follows:
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a
willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject
property, in an open marketplace free of restraints, taking into
aecount the highest and most profitable use of the property.
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no
compulsion to do so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but
is under no compulsion to do so.
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, knowledgeable
and aware of all relevant market conditions and of the highest and
best use potential of the property, and are basing their decisions
accordingly.
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It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the
subject property has been exposed to the market for a reasonable
time.
IDJI2d 7.09.
·. ,,9_ ·.

"Severance damages" are defined as follows: .... - ··· .

,..........

Severance damages may arise where the property being taken is
only part of a larger parcel belonging to the defendant. Severance
damage consists of either or both of the following:
a.
A diminution in the value of the remainder caused
by the taking or severance of the parcel taken from the remainder;
or

b.

A diminution in the value of the remainder caused

by the construction upon and use put to the property taken.

Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market
value of the remainder immediately before the taking, and
deducting from this value the fair market value which results after
the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the
project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
IDil2d 7.16.S.
10,

As noted in the Findings of Fact, the three real estate appraisers in the case all

testified that the remaining Grathol property did not suffer any severance damages. A fourth
witness, Mr. Alan Johnson, included a line in an exhibit titled "Severance Damage." However,
the amounts claimed under that heading were a product of Mr. Johnson's calculations for
construction delay, Grathol's claim for construction delay was previously dismissed.
11.

Idaho jury instructions provide that the fmder of fact C{may consider the owner's

particular plan for development and use of the property only for the purposes of determining uses
for which the property is adaptable." IDJI2d 7.14. Therefore, Orathol's attempts to value the
property "as developed" and its assignment of particular land values to particular portions of the
property based on its anticipation of the eventual composition of its commercial development is
not permitted under Idaho law.
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Date Of Valuation.
12.

Idaho Code§ 7-712 provides:

For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the
summons., and its actual value, at that date1 shall be the measure of
compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of
damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in
all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last
section.
I.C. § 7-712 (emphasis added).
13.

That the valuation of the taking and severance damages must be made as of the

date of t.aking has been repeatedly recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g., State ex

rel. Moore v. Bastian, 91 Idaho 444,449,546 P.2d 399,404 (1976); State ex rel. Symms v.

Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 21-22, 454 P.2d 56, 58-59 (1969) (the date of swnmons "shall be the
measure of compensation."). See also IDJI2d 7.OS, 7.0S. 1.
14.

Thus, Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of

taking, including "damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the
property to be valued in the after condition as if the public project has been built as of the date of

taking.
15.

Mr. Sheiwood did not do this. He used future dates of 1.5 and 2.5 years after the

date of taking in forming his opinion of the value of the property after the taking. Mr. Johnson

was less specific, but stated in his expert disclosures that his opinion of the value of the property
after the talcing used a period of at least three years after the date of taking of November 17,
2010. Trial Exhibit 156 (Grathors Third Supp. Resp. to Disc., atp. 7).
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In Spokane & Palouse Ry Co., the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district

court erred by even allowing a witness to testify as to a date of valuation other than the date
mandated by the statute.

[O]ne of the witnesses for defondant, upon his cross-examination,
testified that he based his estimate of damages upon the present
value of the property, while the statute fixes the value of the
property at the time it was taken as the rule. We think the court
erred in allowing this restimony to stand against the plaintiff's
motion to strike it out, but we think such error was rendered
hannless by the reiterated charge of the court to the jury that they
were to find from the evidence the value of the property on
September 27, 1890, the time of the taking.
2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. at 854 (emphasis added). In its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of
the Idaho Revised Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code

§ 7-712, requiring compensation and damages to be determined as of the date of summons. Id
17,

Since the Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is error to allow testimony of an

opinion of value based on a date other than the date of the taking, the Court finds that it may not

rely on the opinions of Mr. Sherwood or Mr. Johnson, who used dates of value years after the
date oftaking, in forming their opinion of the amount of compensation to be awarded in this
case.

C.

Mr. Sherwood's Use Of A Transaction Made Under Threat Of Condemnation Is
Barred By Law.
18.

Mr. Sherwood's comparable sale No. S was a transaction under threat of

condemnation. In his report, Mr. Sherwood states: "I understand this sale was negotiated under
threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not represent true market
value for this reason." Trial Exhibit 154 (Sherwood restricted appraisal report, at 8).
19.

At trial, Mr. Sherwood testified that "I've been in a condemnation case before

where the purchase by a govenunent entity was disallowed for that reason [does not represent
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market value]." Tr. at 556:22-24 (brackets added). Mr. Sherwood is correct in his understanding
of the law. The clear weight of authority shows that courts exclude such sales
20.

The definition of"fair market value" "presumes that the seller is desirous of

selling, but is under no compulsion to do so; a."id that the buyer-is desirous of buying, but is under

·. "' ·

no compulsion to do so." IDJI2d 7.09. Thus, where the property is acquired as part of a
compromise between a condemnor and a landowner, the sale is not voluntary because both
parties are under compulsion to buy and sell the property. As such, courts uniformly exclude
evidence of the sale as inadmissible. See, e.g., State v. DeTienne, 707 P.2d 5341 537~38 (Mont.
1985) ("it is generally held by the weight of authority that evidence of the sale of a parcel of land
subject to condemnation to the proposed condemner or to another potential condemnor may not
be admitted as evidence of the value of the land condemned. (quoting S NICHOLS ON EMINENT
11
)

DOMAIN § 21.33).

21.

Despite his own acknowledgement that courts will not accept such transactions as

indications of fair market value, Mr. SheIWood states in his report that "I considered the values
of the comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 ...." Trial Exhibit 154
at 9 (emphasis added). By bis own admission, Sherwood's appraisal places primary emphasis on
Sale No. 5, a transaction that does not represent fair market value. For this reason and the othe1
reasons stated herein, much of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal is inadmissible and cannot be relied
upon as an indication of fair market value or a proper basis for determining just compensation in
this case.

D.

Severance Damages.
22.

In Idaho, "[i]t is a well-established principle that where the public's use of the

condemned land diminishes the value of other adjoining, untaken property, the owner is entitled
to recover this loss (typically referred to as 'severance damage') in addition to the value of the
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invaded land.'' C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Hwy. Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 148, 75 P.3d 194,202
(2003) (parentheses in original).
23.

Idaho's civil jury instructions define "severance damages" as:
a,
A diminution in the valae of the remainder· caused by the
taking or severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; or
b.

A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the

construction upon and use put to the property taken.
IDJI2d 7.16. S.
24.

Thus, "severance damages" encompass only those damages that arise from the

"public's use of the condemned land." In Idaho, a landowner is only entitled to compensation
for damages to the remaining property "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be

condemned." Idaho Code§ 7-711(2).
2S.

To be compensable, the alleged severance damages must have accrued "because

o/' the take. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Walker, 80 Idaho 10S, 109,326 P.2d 388,391
(1958),
26.

Thus, severance damages are only recoverable if they are actually "caused by the

public use." See C&G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at 202 (Hohnhorst, specially concurring).

See also SA Nichols, Eminent Domain§ 16.02[1] (3d ed.2002) (stating "severance damages may
be defined as damages or diminution in the value of the remainder resulting from the taking of a
portion of a tract of land") (emphasis added).
27.

Orathol's appraiser, M_r, Sherwoo~ testified at trial that the property did not

suffer any severance damages. Both his trial testimony and his appraisal teport states that the

remainder property has a value of $2.25 per square foot before the taking and $2.25 per square
foot after the taking.
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Q. All right. Where you used the same per unit
value in all of your calculations, you used it - in
the before value, you used $2.25 a square foot, you
used the after value of $2.25 a square foot -- excuse
me -- that was the part taken at $2.2S a square foot,
and the after value at $2.25 a square foot. Would it
be fair to say that you conclude t.11ere's zero severance
damages?
A. There's zero severance, correct.
Q. So I'm going to put a circle around zero.
A. Okay.

Tr. at 523:8-18.

28.

Idaho's jury instructions establish the method for calculating severance damages.

"Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the remainder
im.mediately before the talcing, and deducting from this value the fair market value which results
after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the project in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff." IDJI2d 7.16.5.
29.

Stated as a formula, the method for determining severance damage in Idaho is:
Value of Remainder Before Taking

-Value of Remainder After Taking

=
30.

Severance Damages

Using the Idaho formula, Mr. Sherwood's opinion that the remainder is worth

$2.25 before the taking, minus his opinion that the remainder is worth $2.25 after the tal<lng,
equals $0.00 severance damages.

31.

Mr. Sherwood further testified that he did not assess any damages for loss of

access. Tr. at 524: 17-19. He also testified that he did not assess any severance damages for loss
of visibility. Tr. at 527:16-18. And he testified that he did not assess any damages based on
utilities. Tr. at 524:S-8. He offered no testimony of damages to the remainder property due to
the severance of the condemned property from the remainder.
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In its Findings of Fact above, the Court found that the additional amount added by

Mr. Sherwood to his determination of the fair market value of the condemned property is in fact

a claim for construction delay.
·· ·· 33.

In its post trial briefi Gtathol s-.1ggested that ~.r~·Sherwood's calculation of

construction delay is some variant or component of an "income approach" to real estate
valuation. However, Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report (Trial Exhibit 154) makes no mention of
the income approach to real estate appraisal. In addition, he testified at trial that he did not use
the income approach and that the income approach only applies to improved property generating
income and does not apply to undeveloped land that is not generating income. Tr. at 447:2-11.
34.

Grathol has also not provided any authority for the proposition that Mr. Sherwood

should be permitted to determine the fair market value of the property through the "sales
comparison approach" and then add an additional amount to that figure using some variant or
component of the "income approach. 11 To do so would result in an impermissible double
recovery in the form of taking two real estate valuation methods and adding the results together
to make a large, combined claim for compensation.
35.

In its post trial brief, Gtathol also suggests that Mr. Sherwood's future value

discounted back to the date of taking is the same thing as adjustments for "date of sale" that
appraisers make to comparable sales used in the sales comparison approach. However,
Mr. Sherwood did not testify that his discounting for delay bad anything to do with adjustments
made to comparable sales in the comparable sales approach. Moreover, Grathol has failed to cite
any authority to support its post-trial contention. Thus, the Court concludes that Mr. Sherwood's
claim for additional compensation in the amounts of $176,757 and $280,757 based on
construction delay cannot be equated with adjustments to comparable sales made as part of the
sales comparison approach to real estate valuation.
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Grathol's other valuation witness, Mr. Johnson, prepared an exhibit which

contained a section labeled "Severance Damage." Trial Exhibit J. Based on the record before
the Court and the testimony at trial, the Court finds that the severance damages claimed by

M1-..--Johnson are solely a product of calculations by him based·on the bis estimate of the delay by
ITD in completing the US-95 Project. Thus, Mr. Johnson's claim for severance is in fact a claim
for construction delay, which is barred by Idaho law and was previously dismissed by the Cowt.
37.

In its post trial brief, Gtathol m~e no attempt to explain or justify the

"severance" damage claim by Mr. Alan Johnson.
38.

The record also shows the calculations by both Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson

mirror their construction delay calculations before that claim was dismissed by the Court.
39.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the amounts added by

Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson to their determination of the fair market value of the property are

not severance damages.
40.

The Court further concludes that Grathol has provided no persuasive evidence

that would support an award of severance damages in this case.

E.

Construction Delay,
41.

Grathol has freely admitted that the discounting calculations by Mr. Sherwood

and Mr. Johnson are based on the future value of the property 1.5 to 2.5 years (Sherwood) or at
least three years (Johnson) after the date of taking, to account for the time needed to complete
the US-95 Project. Neither Mr. Shetwood nor Mr. Johnson testified to any reason for the these
calculations and add-ons other than the time needed to complete the US-95 Project.
42.

Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of taking,

including ''damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement
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in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the property to be

valued in the after condition as if the public project has been built as of the date of taking. Mr.
Sherwood and Mr. Johnson did not do this. For example, Mr. Sherwood used future dates of
valuation of l.5 and 2.5 years after the date cftaking, and then added $280,757 and $176,757,
respectively, to his opinion of the value of the condemned property.
43.

As noted above, Mr.

Sherwood's and Mr. Johnson's additional sums for delay are

not "severance" damages. These amounts are claims for compensation based on their estimate of

the time it will take ITO to complete the US-95 Project, and those claims have been dismissed by
the Court,
44.

Under Idaho law, '"before an owner is entitled to compensation for a violation of

Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution, his property must be 'taken' and not merely
'damaged."' Moon v. N. ldaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,541, 96 P.3d 637,642 (2004).
45.

The landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and

that the property right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218,596 P.2d 75, 90
(1978).

46.

The Court finds no Idaho statute or case law supporting the proposition that

Orathol has a protected property right to have the us.95 Project constructed on a schedule or by
a date desired by Grathol.

47.

A landowner cannot recover damages where there is "no indication that the

condition is permanent." Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 7771 781-82~ 53 PJd 828,
832-33 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387
(1992)). Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Moon that ''the mere interruption of the use
of one's property, as it is less than a permanent (complete) deprivation, does not mandate
compensation." Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96 P.3d at 643. See also 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
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DOMAIN § 13.19 ("Under the prevailing rule, the profits a business owner has been deprived of

by reason of the interruption of operations by the condemnation are not compensable."),
48.

By its nature, an alleged "delay" in construction of the US-95 Project is not

· pennanent, .. Anything less than a permanentdeprivation ofpmp-erty does not amount to a
compensable taking. Covington, 137 Idaho at 781, S3 P.3d at 832; Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96
P.3d at 643. See also 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 10.02(3), n.61 (Matthew Bender, 3rd
ed.) (citing cases}.
49,

In Jusfs, Inc. 11. Arrtngton Const. Co. 1 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978), the

Idaho Supreme Court denied a claim based on construction delay in the course of a public
project, and highlighted the policy reasons behind the rule that a landowner cannot recover
damages for construction delay. The Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]his plaintiff is surely not
the only person who may have suffered some pecuniary losses as a result of the downtown
renovation project" but "could conceivably include not only all the other business in the area, but

also their suppliers, creditors, and so forth, ad i,,tinitium." Id at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005. Thus,
the court reversed the award of damages because such a holding "would unduly burden any
construction in a business area." Id.
SO.

In summary, claims in condemnation cases for compensation based on

construction delay are barred by the Idaho Constitution and decisions by the Idaho Supreme
Court,
St.

In its 0tder addressing ITD's motion for S\llw-nary judgment, the Cow-t noted that

at the February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's motion, "Grathol's counsel conceded that three of

Grathol's claims could be dismissed, to wit: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3)
gravel damages," Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment, at 2-3. Accordingly,

the Court ruled that "ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: (1) construction delay; (2) lost
PLAINTIFF ITD'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 31

1102 of 1617

APR. 6. 2012 4:34PM

NO. 4516

P. 33/46

profits; and (3) gravel damages is granted based upon Grathol's concession, and these claims are

hereby stricken[.]" Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
52.

Therefore, Grathol's claims for construction delay and lost profits were dismissed

orrsummary judgment, and are hereby dismissed again.

F.

Tbe Larger Parcel Issue.
S3.

As noted in the Findings of Fact, Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel

being a hypothetical 30-acre segment of the 56.8-acre Grathol property is contrary to the facts

and not supported by the criteria used by real estate appraisers to determine the larger parcel for
a real estate appraisal (contiguity, unity of use, unity of title).
S4.

Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that a

hypothetical 30-acre piece of the property has a higher value than the other 26.8 acres. "Higher
valueu is not a factor in determining the larger parcel under either Idaho law or the field of real
estate appraisal. The three elements are unity of title, unity of use, and contiguity. If higher
value were the test, then every property owner could use the comer or frontage of its property to
set the unit value for the condemned property and the before and after value of the remainder.

This is not allowed under Idaho law.
5S.

At the close oftrial, the Court directed Grathol to cite Idaho law that would

support the larger parcel opinion of Mr. Sherwood. In its post trial brief filed March 23, 2012,
Grathol did not cite any Idaho statutes, case law, or jury instructions that support Sherwood 1s
opinion of the larger parcel.
56.

Idaho law bars the use of an artificial division of property as the basis for

determining just compensation in a condemnation case.

57.

Idaho Code § 7-707 states that "[t]he complaint must contain: ... (5) A

description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole, or
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only a part, ofan entire parcel or tract." I.C. § 7-707 (emphasis added). In this case, no 30-acre
parcel or tract of land exists. Rather, the ''whole" or "entire parcel or tract" is the 56.8 acres
owned by Gtathol.

58.-

Idaho Code § i-i 11 governs the assessment of just compensation.
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon
must ascertain and assess: ... If the property sought to be
condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel: (a) the
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to
be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]

I.C. § 7-711(2) (emphasis added).

59.

In Idaho~ the "larger parcer' is the property owned by the defendant, so long at it

is contiguous and has the same highest and best use. Grathol cannot create an artificial larger
parcel, particularly in the absence of any facts to support a division of the property.
60.

No case law or appraisal principle cited by Grathol supports the designation of

part of a piece of property that is contiguous, under the same ownership, with the same zoning,
and having the same highest and best use as the larger parcel.
61.

Idaho jury instructions make clear that Orathol' s attempt to create an artificial

larger parcel is contrary to Idaho law. IDJI 7.16 states:
Just compensation is the difference between the market value of
the entire property before the taking and the market value of the
remainder after the acquisition, together with any special damages
caused by the taking, measured as of [date).
IDil2d 7.16 (emphasis added). The entire Grathol property is 56.8 acres, not 30 acres. Grathol's
wimesses disputed the fact that the remainder of the Grathol property after the taking is 40. 5
acres (56.8 - 16.314 =40.486 acres). The agreement as to the remainder necessarily reflects the
reality that the "larger parcel" is 56.8 acres.
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The Comment to IDJI 7.16 states: "This instruction applies where there is a

partial ta.lee with severance damage to the remainder and no offsetting benefit." Comment,
IDJI2d 7. 16. It is undisputed that this is a partial taking case and that Grathol has sought to
:recoverseverance damages. Therefore, IDJI 7.16 govemsthe detennination of just
compensation in this case, and that determination begins with the market value of the entire

property, not an artificial portion of the entire property.
63.

Similarly, IDJI 7.16.1 sets forth factors that may be considered in determining

what compensation should be paid for severance damages, if any, "to the remainder ofthe

property." IDJUd 7, 16.1 (emphasis added). The instruction makes clear that these factors may
only be considered to the extent that they are found to "affect the market value of the property.''

Id. The Comment to IDn 7.16.1 is particularly germane to the ''larger parcel" issue.
Where there is no benefit claimed to the remainder, the approach
of St.ate v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45 (1955), of detennining just
compensation by subtracting the fair market value of the remainder
from the fair market value ofthe whole before the take would
eliminate the necessity for tbis instruction. Where, however, the
parcel taken and the parcel remaining are separately valued, this
instruction might be useful.
Comment, IDil2d 7.16.1 (emphasis added). The entire statutory scheme in Idaho, as reflected in
the jury instructions, is premised on the market value of the whole property and the market value
of the remainder.
64.

These principles are further demonstrated in IDJI 7.16.S, which states that

"Severance damages may arise where the property being taken is only part of a larger parcel

belonging to the defendant.'' IDJI2d 7.16.S (emphasis added). The larger parcel is the whole
property belonging to the defendant. Again, Idaho's statutes and jury instructions are based on
the determination of the fair market value of the whole property owned by the defendant and the

remaining property after the taking.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has long enforced these legal principles. In Idaho.

Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference ofEvangelical Lutheran Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P.
60 (1911 ), the Court cited the provisions of Idaho Code now codified as § 7-711 and held:
·It will be observed by the·fowgoing statute that under the laws of
this state three facts are to be determined in a condemnation suit
where it is not sought to take the entire tract ofland but only a
portion thereof. First, the value of the property sought to be
condemned together with all the improvements thereon pertaining
to the realty; second, if the property sought to -be condemned
constitutes only apart of the larger parcel, the damages which 'Will
accrue to the remaining portion by reason of the severance must be
assessed; and, third, if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes a part of a larger parcel, the benefits which will accrue
to the remaining portion after the severance of the part condemned
must be ascertained and assessed and be deducted from the
damages that will be sustained by the severance.

Id. at 119 P. 64 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that ITO is not condemning "the entire tract

of land" owned by Grathol, "but only a portion thereof." It is also undisputed that the
condetnned property is "part of a larger parcel." And, lastly, it is undisputed that "the entire tract
of land" owned by Grathol is 56.8 acres. No factual or legal basis exists for determining just

compensation in this case based on an artificial 30-acre segment of "the entire tract of land."

66.

In Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 ldaho 160, 121 P. 88 (1912), the

Idaho Supreme Court, again citing the statutory provisions now codified as Idaho Code § 7-711,
explained:
Under the provisions of the statute it was not necessary that the
jury should find the value of each legal subdivision of the tract
sought to be condemned. ~~ however, there is more than one
parcel ofland, or several separate parcels or 'tracts, each
separatedfrom the other, then it is necessary for the jury to
determine the value of each separate tract or parcel. But where the
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value then may be fixed
as a single parcel or tract. "Parcel" or "tract" of land, as used in
this section does not mean legal subdivision bur a consolidated
body of land, and the finding of the jury may be upon each single
parcel or tract ofland.
1

1

PLAINTIFF lTD'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -35 1106 of 1617

APR. 6. 2012 4:34PM

NO.4516

P. 37/46

Id. at 121 P. at 92 {emphasis added). In this case, the Grathol property has not been subdivided.
No separate parcels ofland exist, and no separate parcels are "each separated from the other.,,
Rather, the undisputed facts are that Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property. By
· ·any definition; the Orathol property is a ~'cunsolidated body ofland;" ·
67.

In State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 1112 (1955), the Idaho

Supreme Court began by noting:
Under our Constitution and statutes, Art. I, § 14, Idaho
Constitution and sections 7-711 and 7-7141.C., a defendant in a
condemnation suit is entitled to be paid in money the value of the
property to be taken and the damages which will accrue to the part
not taken because of its severance.

Id. at 51, 286 P.2d at 1116. The Court then described the formula for determining just
compensation in Idaho:
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has
been determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further
recover the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is
determined by market value of such remainder before and after the
talcing. The difference is the severance damage.

Id. at 55-56, 286 P.2d at 1118. Idaho courts could not follow this formula if property owners
were allowed to create artificial "larger parcels'' and artificial "remainders." The only workable
approach, and the only approach authorized by Idaho law, is to base the larger parcel and
remainder on contiguous real property having the same ownership, the same zoning, and the
same highest and best use. In this case, the larger parcel is plainly 56.8 acres.

68.

The Supreme Court case State~ rel. Rich v Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60

(1958), demonstrates when separate parcels of land, but under common ownership, should not be
considered together as a "larger parcel" for purposes of determining just compensation for
property taken and damages to the remainder. In Fonburg, the state sought to condemn 12.76
acres of Ponblll'g's farm to build a new_ highway. Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 61. A railroad line
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divided Fonburg's property in the before condition. Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 62. Fonburg also

owned land non.contiguous to the land through which the new road crosses, namely, a
11

residence and fann land, located in or near Culdesac, and north from the railroad track1 his
dwelling being approximately 600 to 1,000 feet distant fromthe-landtaken." Id. Fonburg

• ·

sought severance dam.ages for impacts on the land where his home was located. In other words,
Fonburg wanted his home and surrounding property to be included with his farm as part of a
"larger parcel" of land, a portion of which was being condemned by the state. The Idaho
Supreme Court rejected this claim.
The contention of appellant in assignments of error and

arguments here made, that bis residence in Culdesac, and
ownership of land non-contiguous to and disconnected with the
land sought to be condemned should be considered as an element
of severance damage is not sustainable. The different parcels of
defendant's land, separated and located at a distance, one from the
other, one south of the track and the other north, are not severed by
the proposed road. The land separating the two parcels of
defendant's land is owned by third persons. The trial judge did not
err in refusing to instruct the jury to allow severance damages in
this regard.

Id. at 277, 328 P.2d at 64.
69.

In this case, Grathol's property is all contiguous. It is not divided by a railroad

line, and no third party owns land between the artificial 30-acre parcel used by Sherwood and the
rest of the Grathol property. On the contrary, the Orathol property is all contiguous. It is a
"consolidated body ofland." Big Lost River, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. at 92.

70.

In State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P.2d 56 (1969), the district

court and the Idaho Supreme Court had no difficulty identifying the larger parcel of land to be "a
40 acre tract belonging to defendants,'' id at 20, 4S4 P.2d at 57, despite the fact that the 40 acres

was aetually divided into separate tracts. In Collier, the state filed a condemnation action
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to acquire 25.47 acres of land located in Ada County for the
pwpose of constructing thereon an interchange between Broadway
Avenue, Boise, and Interstate Highway 80N. The property to be
acquired was part of a 40 acre tract belonging to defendants. The
land remaining in possession of defendants after the taking is
approximately 14.5 acres divided into five separate tracts. The
entire area was characterized as undevelop·ect~· dry graze land. The
best use for the land apparently was industrial.

Id. (emphasis added),
71.

In this case, Grathol owns a 56.8-acre tract of land. The valuation witnesses on

both sides all testified that the land has the same highest and best use. As in Collier, the Grathol
property is undeveloped land. In Collier, the larger parcel was found to be the entire 40-acre
tract, even though it was actually divided into separate tracts, five of which remained after the
taking, In Grathol, the property has not been divided into tracts. If the Idaho Supreme Court
deemed the larger parcel to be the whole property owned by the Colliers, even though it had

actually been divided, it would certainly do so in this case, where the Grathol property has not
been divided.
72.

In State ex. rel. Symms v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387

(1972), the S"'i.ate sought to condemn 14 acres ofland owned by the Ciiy of Mountain Home for
Interstate 80. As described by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The property taken (about 14 acres) was part of a larger
tract of land (255.44 acres) which was purchased by the city in
1963 for $36,000 and which was to be developed and used for
recreational purposes, including an eighteen-hole golf course, a
trap shoot, a fishing and skating pond, a park, trailer parking, an
archery range. and hiking areas;

Id. at 530, 493 P.2d at 389. After a jury trial, the state appealed the verdict arguing, in part, that
the city could not recover severance damages to the land where the golf course was located
because it was distant from the area of the taking. Id., at 531,493 P.2d at 390. The Idaho
Supreme Court denied this part of the appeal, finding that the jury properly concluded that the
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"larger parcel" was the entire 255.44 acres ofland owned by the city. Id. at 532,493 P.2d at
387.
As part of its ruling, the Supreme Court held that "[i]f, as a matter of fact, the parcel

,tfiken,is part of a larger tract held by-the same owner, it is error to ,consider such parcel as if it

constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in the possession ofthe same

owner." Id. at 531, 493 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added). This principle is controlling in the case at
hand. Moreover, in the present case, no 30-acre tract exists. It is not the product of any legal
division or any physical separation from the other Grathol property.
The Court in Mountain Home further held:
The question raised by the state is, in essence, whether the 255
acres owned by the city (and including the golf course land) may
properly be considered a 'larger parcel,' only a part of which is
sought to be condemned, within the meaning of I.C. § 7-711.
'Parcel,' as used in this section, means a consolidated body of land.
Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 171-172,
121 P. 88 (1912). Ordinarily, the question whether two pieces of
land constitute a single parcel is a practical one for the jury, which
should consider evidence on the use and appearance of the land, its
legal divisions, and the intent of its owner.

Id. at 532,493 P.2d at 391. In the case at hand, no 30-acre parcel exists. Therefore, no 1;i10,mds
exist for even considering whether the artificial 30-acre parcel is part of a larger parcel or not.
Since the 56.8 acres of the Gtathol property is not divided or separated in any way, no legal or
factual basis exists to take a smaller part of the whole and call the smaller piece the larger
parcel.
73.

The criteria set by the Supreme Court in Mountain Home also make clear that the

larger parcel is the entire Grathol property. It is all zoned for the same use. Its appearance is the

same- undeveloped land. No legal division exists creating the 30-acre parcel. Gtathol's site
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plans (both in the before and after) show commercial development on the land east of the
artificial 30~acre parcel. Therefore, the intended use of the property is the same.
74.

In City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006), the

-Idaho Supreme Court noted that "Cour.s ~ypically reject the so .. called 'conceptual severance'
theory - the notion that whole units of property may be divided for the purpose of a takings
claim." Id. at 848, 136 P.3d at 319. This is precisely the situation here. Otathol is attempting to
divide the whole for the purpose of enhancing its recovery in a takings case. ·
75.

Grathol has cited cases from outside Idaho to attempt to support Sherwood's

theory of the larger parcel in this case. However, the cases cited by Grathol either reinforce the
conclusion that Sherwood's larger parcel is contrary to law or are so different factually that they
have no application to this case. In some inst.ances, Grathol has mischaracterized or omitted the
key facts or holding of the cases.

76.

Mr. Sherwood created an artificial "larger parcel" in violation ofldaho law.

Since Mr. Sherwood's opinion fails to adhere to Idaho law, it cannot, as a matter oflaw, serve as
a basis for determining just compensation in this case.

G.

Mr. Johnson's Use Of Developed Land Value.
77.

In Idaho, just compensation is defined as "the difference between the market

value of the entire property before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the
acquisition, together with any special damages caused by the taking, measured as of [the date of

summons]." IDJI2d 7.16.
78.

Mr. Johnson disregarded the established method for valuing property in

condemnation cases and instead valued the Grathol property based upon a hypothetical
development plan and the sale prices he hopes to obtain for subdivided commercial lots after the
property is fully developed.
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Mr. Johnson's use of values as ifdeveloped was expressly rejected by the Idaho

Supreme Court in City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 101, 437 P.2d 615, 617 (1968). Roark
involved a condemnation action by the City of Caldwell to acquire a portion of the Roark
.property for the expansion and improvement of the Calawelfairport. Id. at TOO, 437 P.2d at
616. The Roarks had previously platted their property for residential development and the plat
had been accepted and approved by the city. Additionally, the Roarks had marked the proposed

streets and alleys for their development and utility services had been made available to the
property. Id
At trial, the Roarks sought just compensation based upon the aggregate value of the

individual lots in their development plan. On appeal, the Roarks challenged the trial court's
instructions requiring the jury to determine the fair market value of the property as one parcel
and instructing the jury that the values given to hypothetical parcels in the Roarlcs development
plans were not to be considered. Id The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Roarks' argument
and upheld the trial court's instructions.
The Supreme Court concluded that the jury was allowed to consider the property's
potential for residential development to determine the highest and best use of the property. Id at
101, 437 P.2d at 617. However, the Court prohibited the use of "developed" land values to
detennine the fair market value of bare land. The Court held that
where the entire parcel of land, as a unit, is taken at one time by
condemnation, the jury is required to fix the value of the entire
parcel as a unit as of the time the summons is issued, I.C. § 7-712.
This value cannot properly be determined by aggregating the
individual sales value which separate lots may bring when sold to
individual prospective home builders over a period of time in the
future, for the reason that such a basis of valuation would permit
the jury to speculate upon future developments.
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Id. at 101Al02, 437 P.2d at 617-18. The Cottrt further explained that "[t]he test is not what the

lots will bring when and if 62 willing buyers come along, but what the tract, as a unit, and as is,
platted or not, and in whatever state of completion, will bring from a willing buyer of the whole
. . ,,,tract.~.'

!d ·(citing numerous state eases frnm Utah, Or~gon, Colorado, North Carolina and a

federal case from the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals as additional support). Rather, "[t]he
valuation must be on the basis of what a willing purchaser would pay now and not what a
number of purchasers might be induced to pay in the future for the land in smaller parcels." Id
(emphasis added) (quoting Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917,920 (Utah 1963)).
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's instruction that the property should be
valued as one parcel of bare land and not on potential subdivided and developed values. Id
80.

The majority of other jurisdictions reach the same conclusions, aptly summarized

in the case of Department ofHighways v. Schulhoff, 445 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1968) and its citation of
Nichols on Eminent Domain, the primary treatise on eminent domain law:
The applicable rule is ably stated in 4 Nichols, The Law of
Eminent Domains 12.3142(1) (3d ed. rev. 1962):

'* **It is well settled that ifland is so situated that it is actually
available for building purposes, its value for such purposes m.ay be
considered, even if it is used as a fann or is covered with brush and
boulders. The measure of compensation is not, however, the
aggregate of the prices of the lots into which the tract could be best
divided, since the expense of cleaning off and improving the land,
laying out streets, dividing it into lots, advertising and selling the
same, and holding it and paying taxes and interest until all the lots
are disposed of cannot be ignored and is too uncertain and
conjectural to be computed. * * * The measure of compensation is
the market value of the land as a whole, taking into consideration
its value for building purposes if that is its most available use.'
It is proper to show that a particular tract of land is suitable and
available for subdivision into lots and is valuable for that purpose.
It is not proper, however, to show the number and value of lots as
separated parcels in an imaginary subdivision thereof. Stated
differently, it is improper for the jury to consider an undeveloped
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tract of land as though a subdivision thereon is an accomplished
fact. Such undeveloped property may not be valued on a per lot
basis, the cost factor clearly being too speculative.

Id at 405.
81..

Idaho law bars the valuatiun approach by rvtr. Johnson in this case. That law

has

been endorsed across the country. Mr. Johnson's valuation testimony based upon estimated

values of his hYPothetical subdivision of the property as if fully developed &hall be disregarded
as a matter of law. The law does not allow just compensation or damage calculations based upon

the aggregate values oflots or zones created only on paper and existing only in a hypothetical
development.
82.

Idaho law requires that just compensation be valued based on the state or

character of the property on the date of summons in all eminent domain proceedings. Plans for
future development may not be considered for purposes of determining the fair market value of
the property. See Idaho Code§ 7-712; IDJI2d 7.05.5, 7.14, 7.16, 7.16.S, 7.20.
H.

Determination And Award Of Just Compensation.

83.

The Court concludes that the valuation opinions of Mr. Sherwood and Mr.

Johnson are not supported by the evidence admitted at trial and are not a credible or reliable
indication of the fair market value of the property before and after taking.
84.

The Court further concludes that the opinions of Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson

cannot serve as a basis for determining just compensation in this case. Mr. Sherwood did not
value the larger parcel as reqwred by Idaho law. They bot.11 used dates of value long after the
date of valuation mandated by Idaho law. They included constniction delay claims barred by
Idaho law and previously dismissed by the Court. And Mr. Johnson used future "developed"
values to value bare, vacant land, in violation of established Idaho law.
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The Court further concludes that the appraisal opinions of Mr. Stan Moe and Mr.

Larry Pynes are thorough, competent, and comport with Idaho law and recognized standards and

practices governing real estate appraisal.
-,.,..

86.

The Court further coneiudes that the opinions of Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes provide

a credible and reliable basis for determining just compensation in this matter.

87.

Having carefully and thoroughly considered the evidence in this matter and

applicable law, the Court finds that the amount of just compensation to be paid to Grathol in this
matter is $_ _ _ _ _.oo.
88.

The Court's determination of just compensation reflects the fair market value of

the 16.314 acres condemned by ITD as ofNovember 17, 2010.
89.

No improvements were condemned and no severance damages to the remainder

were properly asserted or supported by facts.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of April, 2012.

HOLLAND & HART LLP

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095
DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through their attorneys of record, and
hereby submit (Proposed) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The matter having come before the Court for trial on March 5, 2012 and the Court
having heard the testimony of the witnesses and reviewed the admitted exhibits and
considering the arguments of counsel, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
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I.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Board through the Idaho Transportation

Department ("ITD") is engaged in construction of a 31 and a half mile project known as the
"Garwood to Sagle Project" ("Project"). The "Athol" stage is part of the Project. (Tr. Vol. I, pp.
40, 42-43.)
2.

The Athol stage begins at Remington Road on existing US 95 then diverts past

the City of Athol. The construction of this stage will create a new highway interchange with
on- and off-ramps to connect to Highway 54 in either direction. The Athol stage then connects
back to existing US 95 at Trinity road to the north. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 42-43.) Currently US 95
runs through the City of Athol with a 45 mph max speed limit. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 43-44.) The
existing intersection of US 95 and Highway 54 is signalized (lighted) and at-grade. (Tr. Vol. 1,
p. 43.) Construction plans by ITD propose an interchange that will be elevated above the
existing grade of Highway 54 to a maximum height of approximately 25 feet. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp.
44-45.) After construction, the new highway will allow traffic to go around Athol at a
maximum speed limit of 65 mph. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 44.) The anticipated Project completion date
is fall of 2013. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 48.)
3.

Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") is a California general partnership owned by

Hughes Investments ("Hughes"). (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 716.) Hughes is a commercial property
developer specializing in the acquisition, ownership and development of retail shopping centers.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 332, Vol. 4, p. 725.) Grathol owns the property on the northeast comer of the
current existing US 95/Hwy 54 intersection. (Complaint at p. 4.) The entire Grathol property
("Subject Property") consists of three parcels totaling 56.8-acres in the aggregate. (Complaint
at p. 4, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 10.) The Subject Property was rezoned from Rural to
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Commercial by Kootenai County in 2008 at Grathol's request. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No.
135.)

ITD has taken steps to acquire 16.314-acres of Grathol's property for the construction of

the new US 95 highway realignment project. The Subject Property is located outside of the city
limits of Athol. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 3.)
4.

Prior to ITD's project, the Subject Property is situated adjacent to the signalized

intersection of US 95 and Highway 54 and is generally level with no significant improvements.
ITD's realignment and construction will relocate US 95 to the east and the new alignment will
split the Subject Property into several parcels. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 3.)
5.

ITD's right-of-way plans show an approach at the intersection of Highway 54

and Sylvan Road on the south side of the Subject Property. ITD's right-of-way plans show that
ITD has acquired right-of-way on Roberts Road to the north boundary of the Subject Property.

Id.

The Board's Order of Condemnation attached to the Complaint contains an

acknowledgement that Sylvan Road will be extended across the Subject Property in connection
with ITD's project. (Complaint at Exhibit C.) The extension of Sylvan Road to the north to tie
into Roberts Road and provide local frontage access roads is likely to occur in the future.
6.

After the extension of Sylvan Road, the Subject Property will be effectively

segregated. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 468, Vol. 4, p.747.) The eastern portion will contain approximately
26.8-acres situated furthest to the east of the proposed US 95 realignment. The western portion
will contain approximately 30-acres, including the 16.314-acres physically taken by ITD in this
condemnadon.
7.

After the take, the furthest western portion of the Subject Property remaining will

contain approximately 3.87 acres on the west side of the new US 95 alignment and east of"old"
(or currently existing) US 95. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 758-59.)

The western portion will also consist of
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approximately 8.85 acres laying to the east of the new US 95 alignment and to the west of the
Sylvan Road extension, once it is created.
8.

Both IID and Grathol retained licensed appraisers to value the subject property.

Both ITD and Grathol offered other (non-appraiser) valuation witness testimony as well. ITD
called appraiser Stanley Moe ("Moe"), who testified that the value of the Subject Property was
$35,000.00 per acre or $0.80 per foot. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 87.)
9.

Moe utilized a "before and after appraisal" methodology to arrive at his opinion

of value as of April 7, 2010. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 86.) Moe testified at trial that his opinion of value
would be the same as of the statutory date of the take (November 17, 2010). (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 8485.)
10.

Moe opined that the highest and best use of the Subject Property was for

eventual commercial development and opined that the value of the Subject Property would be
unaffected by the interchange (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 88.). Moe also opined that the market demand for
retail uses that Grathol proposes for the Subject Property does not currently exist. (Tr. Vol. 1,
pp. 123-24.)
11.

In valuing the Subject Property, Moe identified the "larger parceI'' as 56.39

acres, excluding the small .419 acre improved parcel on the NE comer of US 95 and Hwy 54,
which parcel lies in the city limits of Athol. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 136-37.)
12.

Moe acknowledged that appraisers have discretion in determining the "larger

parcel'' for valuation purposes. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 287.)
13.

In determining the larger parcel Moe considered the highest and best use of the

property and testified that the eastern portion of the property would be needed in order to
support any development of the western portion, for waste water disposal. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 139.)
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14.

Moe identified four land sales occurring in Kootenai, Bonner and Shoshone

Counties prior to the date of the take to arrive at a comparative market value opinion of the
Subject Property. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12, p. 30.)
15.

One of the comparable lai.7.d sales relied on by Moe was a sale of property located

at the northeast comer of Highway 41 and Prairie Avenue in Post Falls, Idaho (Land Sale# 1).
(Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12, p. 36.) IID also called appraiser, Lawrence Pynes to testify.
Pynes identified Moe's Land Sale# 1 as being the best comparable to the Subject Property. (Tr.
Vol. 5, pp. 830-831.)
16.

Moe made "adjustments" to Land Sale # 1 for location, access to utilities and

size difference of 58% (downward) and arrived at an indicated value of Land Sale # 1 of
$50,930.00 per acre, or $1.17 per sq. ft. before reconciling. Moe then testified that after
factoring in time adjustments, the indicated value of Land Sale # 1 on that date of the take
(November 17, 2010) would be $35,500.00 per acre or $0.81 per sq. ft. in comparison to the
Subject Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 205, 237-40, 245-46, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 18.)
17.

Both Pynes and Moe testified that it would be highly unusual for the same

appraiser to assign two different values to the same property on the same date. (Tr. Vol. 5, pp.
894-95, 940).
18.

On cross-examination, Moe admitted he had conducted an appraisal for Zions

Bank on the same property identified as Land Sale # 1, wherein Moe concluded that same
property (Land Sale# 1) was worth $3.50 per sq. ft. as of October 2010. (Tr. Vol 5, pp. 943-47).
In the appraisal of the Hwy 41/Prairie property for Zions Bank, Moe utilized a future value
discounting approach based on development potential of that property. (Defendant's Trial

DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED) FINDINGS OFFACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 5

1121 of 1617

Exhibit K.) This future value discounting approach is the same methodology used by Grathol's
appraiser Skip Sherwood.
19.

Moe's appraisal opining of the Hwy 41/Prairie property indicated an increase in

value from the October 2007 purchase date to the valuation date in October 2010. (Defendant's
Trial Exhibit K.)
20.

Moe made adjustments to each of the comparable land sales in order to reach a

range of comparable values. Moe adjusted each of the land sales based on size to compare to
the entirety of the Subject Property's 56.39 acres. Moe also made adjustments for location,
orientation/access and utilities/zoning. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 237-40, 245-46, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit
No. 18.)
21.

Moe's adjusted values for the comparable land sales ranged from $24,408.00 to

$69,172.00 per acre. All of the comparable land sales identified by Moe were further adjusted
downward in his "reconciliation" stage to reach a "final" opinion of value for the Subject
Property of $35,000.00 per acre or $0.80 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 245-46, Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit No. 18.) Pynes did not do a similar final reconciliation, but gave a final opinion of
value of $41,382.00 per acre or $0.95 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 5, p. 838, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No.
145.)
22.

Moe applied the uniform ($35,000.00 per acre) value opinion to the 16.314 acre

"take" to arrive at his opinion of the total just compensation owed to Grathol of $571,000.00.
(Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 246,251, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 13.)
23.

Moe did not utilize any other methods of appraisal, including the Replacement

Cost Approach, Income Capitalization Approach or Development Cost Approach to reach his
opinion of value. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 76, 82.) Moe did not provide an opinion on either severance
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damages or special benefits and concluded that the value of the remainder after the take was the
same as before the take. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 88.)
24.

Grathol presented evidence of potential development plans for the Subject

Property that would include a hotel, grocery store, travel plaza, restaurants and other highwayrelated commercial services. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, Defendant's Trial Exhibit I.)
25.

Geoff Reeslund is an architect and project manager and coordinator employed by

Hughes and minority owner in Grathol. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 332-33.) Reeslund prepared conceptual
site plans for commercial retail development of the Subject Property based on an ALTA survey
and ITD's preliminary project plans that were available at the time the Subject Property was
acquired. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, Defendant's Trial Exhibit I.)
26.

Reeslund was told by ITD in February 2008 (prior to Grathol's acquisition of the

Subject Property) that the highway realignment would likely be an at-grade, signalized,
intersection and would require the taking of about 10 acres. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 342-44.) Reeslund
utilized IID's then available materials to create several conceptual site plans to evaluate what
type of yield, uses and coverage the Subject Property would have. These conceptual site plans
were used by Hughes to illustrate to potential users, including tenants and purchasers, possible
retail and commercial sites. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, Defendant's Trial Exhibit I.)
27.

In August 2009, Grathol learned from 11D for the first time that the Project

would entail an elevated interchange which increased the amount of the Subject Property taken.
(Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 364-65, Vol. 4, pp. 731-32.)
28.

Grathol also learned that the proposed Sylvan Road extension would no longer

curve to the west but instead would run straight northward connecting to Roberts Road to
provide access to those properties to the north. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 374-80, Vol. 4, p. 743.)
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29.

In the "before" condition, the signalized highway intersection at-grade allows

patrons and customers to see the property and make a decision to visit the retail businesses
located there.

In the "after" condition, patrons and customers have to be aware of the

commercial development before approaching the off-ramps to Hwy 54 to access to the Subject
Property. The elevated design of the highway interchange adversely affects the visibility of the
Subject Property for potential retail customers traveling both north and south. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp.
383-84, Vol. 3, pp. 403-04, Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 752-53.)
30.

Grathol's ability to attract customers to the Subject Property is impacted because

they will be unable to see much of the development until they are parallel to the property, at
which time it will be too late to exit the highway to access the development. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp.
383-88.)
31.

Reeslund testified that the Subject Property is also adversely affected by the

higher speed limits on the new highway which will reduce the time in which patrons will have
to make a decision to exit the highway. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 388-89.)
32.

Jim Coleman, a licensed professional engineer and owner of Coleman

Engineering testified that he was employed by Grathol to design a waste water treatment system
to accommodate the commercial development of the Subject Property. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 620-21,
623, 625.) Coleman has designed similar systems, including one serving the Silverwood Theme
Park and one for another retail project Hughes is constructing near Stateline. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp.
623-25.)
33.

Coleman testified that the system he designed takes very little physical space,

requires two expandable "modules" eighty feet wide by forty feet long which can be located
underground, and utilizes a micro-filtration system that would be housed in a building about
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twelve by twenty feet long. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 652-55.) Coleman stated that the system he
designed will exceed Idaho Department of Environmental Quality standards for wastewater, and
that the wastewater land application would require between 13 to 16 acres of area which could
be on-site or off-site for landscaping features (such as ponds/fountains), irrigating common
areas, irrigating off-site right-of-way, or could even be recycled inside buildings (such as a
hotel) for flushing toilets. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 653-55, 657-59.)
34.

Reeslund testified that the realignment of Highway 95 also creates an

impediment to the use of the 3.87 acre portion that will be located on the west side of the new
interchange once it is built. Before the take, the 3.87 acre portion could share any utilities
infrastructure built on the Subject Property, including the wastewater system Coleman designed.
After the take, the 3.87 acre (west) parcel can only be tied in to the wastewater treatment system
and to any wells, gas and electrical infrastructure by running lines under, around or over the
new elevated interchange. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 405-15.)
35.

Reeslund testified that providing utility sleeves directly under the new freeway

during construction of the Project would be the most cost-effective method (comparatively) for
getting utility services to the 3.87 acre parcel on the west from the property remaining on the
east. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 405-15.) Without connecting the westerly 3.87 acre remainder parcel to the
utility systems servicing the rest of the property that 3.87 acre remainder would be almost
unusable because the cost of stand-alone utility services for it would be prohibitive. (Tr. Vol. 4,
pp. 758-60.)
36.

Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood was employed by Grathol to appraise the Subject

Property. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 445.) Sherwood, like both Moe and Pynes, employed the "comparable
market data approach" to formulate his opinion of value. Sherwood used comparable market
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data for existing sales of comparable property to arrive at a value conclusion, and Sherwood,
like Moe, testified that there was limited data available for larger commercial development
property sales. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 447-51, 455.)
37.

All of the appraisers who testified, including Sherwood, stated that it is not

unusual for differing valuation opinions to be reached by different appraisers. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp.
453-54.)
38.

Sherwood initially reviewed twenty to twenty-five property sales before selecting

ten which were the most comparable to the Subject Property. Sherwood also reviewed sales of
properties where grocery stores were located to determine if that proposed use would be
indicative of the size of parcel that he was evaluating. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 455-59.)
39.

Sherwood testified that the identification of the "larger parcel" is relevant to

appraise the value of the part being condemned and the conclusion of the larger parcel rests in
the discretion of the appraiser. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 464-67.) Sherwood viewed the Subject Property
as a large commercially zoned tract with multiple potential uses. He identified the "larger
parcel" as the western 30 acres of the property based on the typical market size for retail
(grocery) and/or developments of the type proposed for the property by Grathol. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp.
468-70.) Sherwood concluded that while the entire property's "generic" highest and best use is
for commercial; the western 30 acres of the property has different highest and best use( s) than
the eastern 26 acres. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 468.) Sherwood testified that the larger parcel can be a part
of the "parent tract" for purposes of valuation, even when the parent tract is under common
ownership and is contiguous to the rest of the property. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 467-68.) Sherwood
testified that the eventual extension of Sylvan Road across the Subject Property would

DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED) FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - IO

1126 of 1617

physically separate the western 30 acres from the eastern 26 acres and that was also a factor in
his larger parcel conclusion. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 469-70.)
40.

Of the ten properties, Sale No. 7 (Sagle) was identified by Sherwood as being the

most comparable to the Subject Property because Sale No. 7 was proximate in time to the date
of the summons, similar in size to the western 30 acres and physically closest to the Subject
Property. Sherwood testified that he gave the greatest weight to Sale No. 7 for these reasons
and arrived at an opinion of value for the Grathol property of $2.25 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp.
477-78, 481-82, 484.)
41.

Sherwood concluded the value of the 16.314 acres taken at $2.25 per sq. ft. is

$1,598,543.00. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 484.)
42.

Sherwood testified that the value of the western 30 acres (which he considered

the larger parcel) before the take was $2,940,300.00 and that the value of the western 30 acres
after the take was between $1,165,000.00 and $1,060,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 596-598.) For
purposes of his evaluation, Sherwood gave no consideration to the eastern 26 acres one way or
another because it would likely be used differently and developed further out in the future. (Tr.
Vol. 3, pp. 464-65, 467-68.)
43.

Sherwood testified that in his opinion the value of the remainder (of the western

30 acres) after the take would be less than its value before the take based on the market factors
that a reasonable buyer would consider, including its utility (uses), its availability and its
configuration/shape. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 486.) According to Sherwood, the value of the remainder
would be affected by IID's take but it was difficult to quantify the amount since the land was
not presently developed; so he quantified the impacts of the take and Project on the remainder
of the western 30 acres by using a discounted present-value approach, to arrive at the value of
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the remainder as of the date of the take. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 485.) Although Moe criticized the
discount development approach used by Sherwood, Moe use the same approach to value
comparable properties for Zion's Bank.
44.

Sherwood used a discount rate of 10% per annum and applied that rate to the

time period of 1.5 to 2.5 years in order to arrive at the present value of the remainder at the time
of the take. Sherwood subtracted the present value of the remainder after the take from the
value of the western 30 acres before the take to arrive at his opinion of a range of just
compensation in the amount of$1,775,000.00 to $1,880,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 596-598.)
45.

Alan Johnson is one of the owners of the property and testified to its value, and

Grathol's plans for the Subject Property and the various impacts the Project will have on the
value of the portion(s) of the Subject Property remaining after the take.
46.

Johnson testified that he is familiar with the local commercial real estate market,

is knowledgeable of the local conditions and had gone through the same processes employed by
the appraiser witnesses in arriving at his opinion of value. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 726-35.)
47.

Johnson and Hughes are involved in other commercial development in the area

including the development of two hotel sites, a fast-food restaurant and gas station located at
Stateline adjacent to Cabelas. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 717-20.) Johnson initially identified the Subject
Property as a prime retail development opportunity because of its location at the intersection of
two highways. Johnson testified that the Subject Property was desirable because of the
signalized intersection of US 95 and SH 54, which causes traffic to stop adjacent to the Subject
Property increasing exposure time to potential purchasers of goods and services from retail
businesses that could be located there. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 720-21, 722-725.) Johnson referred to
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this as a "hard comer" and stated that in retail development circles, this type of location is
highly desirable and commands a premium from end users. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 720-21, 748-50.)
48.

Johnson also opined that the Athol area is underserved by commercial/retail

business and the absence of competition nearby increases its potential for near-term
commercial/retail development, based on his research and study of regional demographics and
traffic counts. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 722-725, 738-43.)
49.

At the time of acquisition of the Subject Property, Johnson was aware of a

proposed highway project but not the final plans for the take area or the configuration of the
new interchange as it would ultimately be designed. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 731-32.) Only after Grathol's
purchase of the Subject Property, Johnson learned that ITD's Project would consist of an
elevated highway interchange with on and off ramps as opposed to a widened, at-grade
signalized interchange. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp 731-33.)
50.

Johnson evaluated the feasibility of a grocery store at the Subject Property and

concluded that the market would support commercial development at that location based on
tenant interest and demographics. Grathol also evaluated the feasibility of a hotel at the Subject
Property and concluded that the market area is underserved based on the surrounding amenities
including Silverwood, Farragut Park and Bayview/Lake Pend Oreille. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 722-725,
738-43.)
51.

Based on preliminary right-of-way plans provided by ITD, Grathol's conceptual

site plans depicting various potential configurations of the Subject Property for development
were produced and Johnson used these plans to begin marketing the property to potential
tenants, buyers and users.
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52.

The preliminary site plans depicted the alignment of Sylvan Road curving to the

west based on materials initially provided by IID. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 364-65, Vol. 4, pp. 731-32,
743.)
53.

Based on his research and analysis of the market for commercial/retail property,

Johnson testified that the value of the Subject Property before condemnation was $3.23 per sq.
ft. for the western 30 acres and approximately $1.00 per sq. ft. for the 26 acres located to the
east. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 745-46.)
54.

Johnson based his opinion on a review of the comparable properties identified by

the various appraisers, including Moe, Sherwood and Pynes, and opined the Sagle (US
95/Algoma) sale as being the most comparable property to the Subject Property. Johnson
testified that the Sagle comparable is inferior to the Subject Property due to the fact that it is has
no traffic signal and is not at the intersection of two highways. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 747-49.)
Additionally, even though the population demographics near the Sagle property indicates higher
density, there are existing retail and commercial businesses already serving that population
within a 5-mile radius whereas the Grathol property has little commercial/retail competition
within a greater (10 mile) radius. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 751-52.)
55.

Johnson testified that retailers seek to locate at signalized intersections in order to

drive sales. He added a "premium" to the Grathol property by reason of the intersection
location. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 720-21, 749-51.)
56.

Johnson testified that after the take, the remainder will suffer great detriment

caused by the new highway alignment, configuration and elevation. After the take, the property
will no longer have the signalized at-grade intersection; the highway travel lanes will be
elevated to 25 feet above the grade, affecting visibility and the traveling speeds of the traffic
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will be increased to 65 mph causing customers to "fly by" the property possibly before even
seeing the retailers and services located there. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 753-55.) Because of the elevation,
speed and limited access to the new highway alignment, even if potential customers were able
to see the Subject Property they would have difficulty getting off the highway and back to the
property. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 753-55.)
57.

Also, the remainder 3.87 acre piece of property located west of the new highway

alignment will be unable to be served by sewer and water by reason of the construction of the
elevated highway, unless utility lines can be extended beneath the new highway. Before the
take, that 3.87 acre "west" parcel could be served by any waste water system located on
Grathol's property, but without access to a waste water system, the potential uses of that 3.87
acre west parcel would be limited to low intensity uses, such as a tire store or auto shop. (Tr.
Vol. 4, pp. 756-60.)
58.

Johnson testified that his opinion of$3.23 per sq. ft. yields a value for the 16.314

acre take of$2,295,360.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 764.)
59.

Johnson also testified that the value of the western most 30 acres before the take

was between $1,927,573.00 at $3.23 per sq. ft. and $2,387,088.00 at $4.00 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol.
4, pp. 764-67.) Johnson opined that the eastern 26 acre portion of the Subject Property before
the take was worth $1.00 per sq. ft. and was not materially changed after the take, therefore still
worth $1.00 per sq. ft. Johnson explained that the difference between the western and eastern
portions was because the west side is where the "development value" is and Grathol does not
value the full 56 acres as a single, integrated unit and would not undertake to develop the
eastern 26 acre portion of the property in the same way, or at the same time, as the western
portion. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 765-66.)
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60.

Johnson testified that the values for the remainder of the western 30 acres after

the take would be $2,722,000.00 assuming that the highway project was complete as of
November 17, 2010, the statutory date of the take. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 768-69, 773)
61.

Johnson testified that the severance damages to the remainder were in the range

of $338,000.00 to $798,000.00 based on all of the impacts of the condemnation to the Subject
Property. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 773-75.) Those impacts included the loss of the signalized
intersection, increased speed of traffic, the elevated interchange and the loss of visibility.
62.

Johnson added the severance damages to the value of the area taken to arrive at a

total opinion of just compensation in the amount of$2,633,360.00 to $3,093,360.00. (Tr. Vol. 4,
pp. 775-76.)
63.

ITD called George Hedley of Hedley Construction Company to testify as to the

feasibility of development of the Subject Property. Hedley also offered opinion testimony as to
the value of the Subject Property and the cost of all necessary infrastructures to place a retail
development of the type Grathol planned on the Subject Property. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 663-67, 68182.)
64.

Hedley testified that in his opinion the Subject Property has a net value of less

than zero and that Grathol should not have purchased the property for development. (Tr. Vol. 3,
pp. 673-75, 681-82, 702.)
65.

Hedley testified that he and a team of other consultants, including David Evans

& Associates, calculated the infrastructure costs of Grathol's conceptual plans for the Subject
Property at $4.92 per sq. ft. before the taking. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 667-668, 691-92, 695, 705-06.)
Hedley testified that the same infrastructure costs of developing the Subject Property after the
taking would amount to $6.92 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 695-98, 706-07.)

DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED) FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 16

1132 of 1617

66.

ITD did not call any witnesses from David Evans & Associates.

II.

STANDARDS OF LAW

In condemnation proceedings, the broadest latitude is allowed in the admission of
evidence to show value of a property. State ex rel McKelvey v. Styner, 58 Idaho 233, 72 P.2d
699 (1937). Here, evidence of the value of the property taken was presented by the Plaintiff
through two appraiser witnesses, Moe and Pynes. Evidence of the value of the property was
presented by the Defendant as well through Sherwood and Johnson. The valuation evidence
presented was widely divergent.
The Court, as the finder of fact, must ascertain and assess the value of the realty
condemned and if the property taken constitutes part of a larger parcel, the finder of fact
must ascertain and assess the damages which will accrue to the remaining portion of property
by reason of its severance from the portion condemned. See, Idaho Code § 7-701, State ex
rel Burns v. Blaire, 91 Idaho 137, 417 P.2d 217 (1966). Idaho Code § 7-711 imposes a

mandatory duty on the court to fairly assess the value of the property condemned and the
value of damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of
severance and construction of the improvement by the condemnor. See, Big Lost River
Irrigation District v. Zollinger, 83 Idaho 401, 363 P. 2d 706 (1961).

In an eminent domain proceeding, the fact finder's award will only be set aside if it is
not supported by any evidence. See, State ex rel Ohman v. Ivan H Talbot Family Trust, 120
Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991). An appellate court will not set aside an eminent domain
award that is within in a range of estimates of just compensation given by various witnesses.
Id. In this case, the range of estimates given by the various witnesses was $571,000.00

(Moe) to $3,093,360.00 (Johnson).
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III.

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The low end of the range of damage estimates was offered by Stan Moe. The Court
finds that while Moe utilized a recognized appraisal methodology ( comparative market
approach), evidence adduced at trial established that Moe made significant adjustments to the
comparable land sales and then further adjusted those values downward through a
"reconciliation" to arrive at a value conclusion for the Grathol property of $35,000.00 per
acre. Further evidence adduced at trial impeached Moe's value conclusion by establishing
that one of the identified comparable land sales (Land Sale # 1 - NEC of US Hwy 41 and
Prairie) to which he ascribed an adjusted value of $35,000.00 (or $.80/sq. ft.) in this case,
was appraised by Moe for other purposes at $3.50 per sq. ft. on or near the date of the take.
Moe's valuation of the property is further impeached by the fact that a second, independent
appraiser (Pynes) hired by the State, utilizing virtually the same comparable market approach
as Moe and most of the same comparable land sales, offered opinion of just compensation
nearly 20% higher than Moe at $675,000.00. based on the evidence, the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs valuation evidence and conclusions are not supported or credible.
For purposes of their valuations, both Moe and Pynes considered the Defendant's
"larger parcel" to be the entire parent tract of 56.8 acres. The determination of the larger
parcel in a condemnation valuation problem is significant because it can materially alter the
applicability of size adjustments to comparable land sales and the calculation of severance
damages to the remainder of the larger parcel.
Defendant presented evidence, and the Court concludes that in this context, the larger

parcel can and should be a portion of the parent tract if it is a separate economic unit. Here,
the appropriate larger parcel is the western 30 acres of the Grathol property which comprises
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a separate economic unit from the remaining 26.8 acres of the Grahtol property.
Grathol' s valuation evidence established a fair market value as of the date of the take
of the western 30 acres of the property in a range of $2.25 to $3.25 per sq. ft. (Sherwood and
Johnson).

These witnesses based their valuation opinions upon recognized appraisal

methodologies of comparative market analysis and development approach reduced to a net
present value. Johnson, as one of the owners of the property, places a greater premium on
the property for its location in comparison to the various comparable sales considered.
Additionally, Grathol's witnesses testified that the remainder of Grathol's 30 acre larger
parcel not taken will be negatively impacted by various consequences associated with both
the loss of 16.34 acres taken and the project that will be built by Plaintiff on the 16.34 acres.
Based on the evidence at trial, the Court can conclude as a matter of law that the remainder
property will be impacted, albeit in a manner and to a degree that is difficult to calculate.
Both Johnson and Sherwood calculate the impact to the remainder property by
application of a net present value discounting method. This entails estimating the value of
the remainder property upon completion of ITD's project and discounting the value of the
property to a current value as of the date of the take. The Court finds as a matter of law that
this methodology represents a legitimate valuation approach, particularly for purposes of
valuing commercial development property, taking into account its highest and best use. This
approach was utilized by the State's own appraiser in a non-condemnation appraisal of one
of the properties identified as a comparable to the Grathol property (Land Sale # 1).
Utilizing this valuation approach, Grathol' s valuation witnesses estimated impact to the
remainder property in the ranges of $282,000.00 (Sherwood) to $338,000.00 - $798,000.00
(Johnson).

The Court finds as a matter of law that this valuation approach utilized by
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Grathol is appropriate. The Court notes that another recognized valuation analysis technique,
the "development cost approach," was utilized by one of the State's rebuttal witnesses to
illustrate that Grathol's proposed development plan for the subject property was not
financially feasible. Utilizing this methodology, the State's witness (Hedley) testified that
for no reason other than the condemnation, Grathol's post-take development costs would be
$2.00 per sq. ft. higher than if the take had not occurred. The Court can conclude as a matter
of law that while likely mathematically accurate, this conclusion strains credulity.
Idaho law is well settled that a condmnee may show whether a property has market
value for a certain purpose and the extent of such value. See, Idaho Farm Development
Company v. Brackett, 36 Idaho 748, 213 P. 696 (1923). Here, the condemnee, Grathol,
presented adequate and admissible evidence of the market value of its property for a
"certain" purpose, to wit: commercial/retail development. While the State offered evidence
calling into question the wisdom, timing and financial viability of Grathol' s intended
purpose, the fact remains that as the owner of the property, Grathol has the prerogative of
developing the property as it sees fit. The key question then is what is the fair market value
of the property taken in light of the purpose to which the property will be put by Grathol, and
what is the harm to the property not taken as a consequence of the Project.
Weighing the evidence presented at trial, the Court determines as a matter of law that the
fair market value of the 16.34 acres "taken" as of the date of condemnation was $3 .23 per sq. ft.
or $2,295,360.00. The Court further concludes that the remainder of the 30 acre larger parcel
(not taken) is impacted as a direct consequence of the take in the amount of$798,000.00.
In Idaho the measure of just compensation to be awarded is the value of the taking plus
severance damages accruing to the remainder. Therefore, the Court concludes that Grathol is
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entitled to just compensation in the amount of $3,093,360.00.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2012.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
_/

/

---~ --------
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---·

By: ~"""A-v,_---~-----_--________
1/,...Z;'- -··stopher D. Gabbert, of the Firm
ttomeys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CV-10-10095

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S
REPLY TO PLAJNTIFF'S POST
TRIALBRIEF

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK,
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") and submits its Reply to Plaintiffs
Post Trial Brief in accordance with the Court's Order.
ARGUMENT

I.

ss

The Larger Parcel.
ITD argues in its Post-Trial Briefthat Idaho statutes and cases "bar" the identification of

the larger parcel as anything less than the entire parent tract owned by a landowner. Not true.
ITD essentially argues that the larger parcel must be confined to either the take, or the entire
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parent tract of a landowners' property; propositions which have been soundly rejected by
numerous courts in numerous jurisdictions. ITD cites exclusively to Idaho cases, despite the
fact that none of the cases cited hold that the larger parcel can only be determined by resorting
to one of these two options. In fact, even the Idaho cases cited demonstrate that the larger parcel
analysis must be tailored to the specific facts of the case and those cases support the idea that
the larger parcel can be an independent economic unit from which the take is severed.
ITD first cites to Idaho Code §§ 7-707 and 7-711 and the Idaho jury instructions
(IDTI's). However a careful reading of those authorities does not in any way limit the
identification of the larger parcel to the entire parent tract. Idaho Code § 7-707 sets forth the
necessary elements of a condemnation complaint. Under ITD's interpretation, a condemning
authorities' identification of the parcel contained in the complaint is infallible, even if that
parcel described does not have any relation to the actual intended uses of the lands. Had the
Idaho Legislature intended the larger parcel always encompass all lands owed by the
condemnee, it could have done so, but it did not. LC. § 7-711(2) specifically allows for
severance damages caused by the ti:ike and constmction of the improvement by the conderrmor;
when the take is a part of a larger parcel, but it does not limit the larger parcel determination to
the entirety of a landowners' property.
Similarly the IDTI's do not support ITD's position. ITD asserts that references in the
IDTI's to the value of the remainder "from the whole" refers to the entire parent tract. This
conclusion is without support. The IDTI' s do not contain any definition of the larger parcel. If
such a definition were included in the IDTI's, it would no doubt state that the larger parcel can
be less than the parent tract under appropriate circumstances. See generally, Eaton, Real Estate

Valuation in Litigation, Chapter 5.
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ITD claims that Grathol cannot create an "artificial" larger parcel, particularly a smaller
one, to inflate its compensation claim. What ITD fails to address is that limitations on the larger
parcel analysis cut both ways and as a condemnor, ITD cannot include more land than

necessary in its iarger parcei in order to artificiaiiy lower the value of the take. This is not a
one-size-fits-all proposition. The trier of fact is tasked with identifying the larger parcel based
on the evidence presented and upon the particular circumstances of the case.
ITD cites several Idaho cases, with little analysis of the facts of the cases. I1D cites to
Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 20 Idaho 568,

119 P.2d 60 (1911) which simply recited the Revised Codes in existence at the time. ITD's
analysis stopped there, neglecting to note that in that case one of the respondent's witnesses had
testified as to the value of land as if it were divided up:
One witness that was called on the part of the respondent in this
case testified as to what he considered to be the value of the land
sought to be taken, and later on in explaining his evidence and
giving his reasons for placing such a value on the property stated
that it would be worth so much if divided up and placed on the
market as town lots. We fail to see any serious error in this
evidence. The ju..ry were able to judge of the value oft.lie evidence
thus given and the speculative character of the evidence. On the
other hand, we cannot say that it was improper to allow
witnesses to testify as to such a use to which the property
could be devoted.
Id. at 66 (emphasis added). Indeed Idaho-Western does not limit the larger parcel analysis and,

more importantly, it recognized that value could be based on hypothetical divisions.
I'ID next cites to Big Lost River Irr. Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. 88 (1912) to
support its argument that the larger parcel must be considered a consolidated body of land. In
fact, the landowner in Biz Lost River included in its affirmative defenses an assertion that an
additional 80-acres of land, separately subdivided, should be added to the take area. The
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condernnor (irrigation company) did not contest this addition, but on appeal challenged the
jury's verdict as to the value of the land as a consolidated piece of instead of separated out. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that where tracts are consolidated, the value may be fixed as a single
parcel, without regard to legal subdivisions. The only significance of the Big Lost River case is
that legal subdivisions are irrelevant for determining the larger parcel. {A similar result was
reached in State v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P.2d 56 (1969).} Despite the recognition in these
cases that subdivision lines do not control the larger parcel analysis, ITO continues to argue
that the Grathol property has not been subdivided. So what? The holding of these cases has
little to do with the issues before the Court and fail to support ITO's arguments in any event.
Moreover, neither case presents any discussion whatsoever of the independent economic unit
value for the proposed uses of the remainder. See, Grathol's Post-Trial Brief.
Next, ITO cites State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958) which
1s factually distinguishable. In Fonburg, the landowner condernnee attempted to include
additional lands he owned as the larger parcel to support severance damages to those additional
lands, even though they were physically remote from the area of the take and were separated by
land owned by a third party. Thus there was no contiguity to support the landowner's theory of
assemblage. Again, ITO cites a case that stands for nothing relevant to this case.

ITO's analysis of State v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972) is
also unreasonably simplistic and deficient. ITO would have this Court believe that under City of
Mountain Home the determination of the larger parcel is only to be based on a consolidated

body of land. Instead, the actual analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court in City ofMountain Home
(for purposes of determining severance damages) took into account the combined use (or, more
accurately, potential use) of the properties in connection with one another as the key factor in
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determining the larger parcel. This part of the opinion is critical:
Although the city's tract was crossed by a drainage ditch (a
physical barrier of substantial size), substantial evidence was
introduced to show the feasibility of joint use of the land on both
sides of the ditch ... Under a statute such as ours, it is not the
identity of uses of the condemned and remaining lands which
is determinative; what is significant is the dependency of the
value of the remaining land upon its use in conjunction with
the condemned land ....
In the case at bar there was considerable testimony at the trial to
demonstrate that the value of the golf course land (part of the
remaining land) was dependent upon the availability of land
upon which could be constructed an additional nine holes, part of
which land was taken for the proposed highway. Hence, we
conclude that the jury could have properly awarded severance
damages for the diminution in value of the land upon which the
existing golf course was situate, which land was part of a larger
parcel, a part of which was condemned, and which damages
would result from its severance and the construction of the
proposed highway.
Id. at 391, 93 P.2d 532 (emphasis added). Thus, even though the Mountain Home golf course

was non-contiguous and under different ownership structure, it was "added to" the larger parcel
since it (the golf course) would be harmed by the taking of property on the other side of the
drainage ditch because that property could have been used to add additional holes (and thus
value) to the golf course. Indeed, City ofMountain Home court clearly recognizes that proposed
future uses of properties in connection with one another are relevant to the larger parcel

analysis. That being the case, there is no logical argument against the idea that part of a
property ca..TJ. be the larger parcel where it is viewed

l'I'-

a separate economic unit. ITD fails to

bring this to the Court's attention and ignores the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis.
Finally, ITD cites to City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d (2006)
for the proposition that courts typically reject 'conceptual severance' theory. City of Coeur
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d'Alene was a regulatory taking analysis and the lands in question were owned by two separate
parties. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in summarily
disregarding the separate ownership of the parcels for a regulatory takings analysis. Id. at 849,
i36 P.3d 320. If anything, this case supports Grathoi's position.
ITD seeks to convince this Court that Idaho cases have constrained the larger parcel
analysis, despite the abject absence of any such actual holdings. One can only conclude that
ITD has limited its authority to Idaho because it is well aware of ample authority which
undercuts its position from numerous sister states with statutory and constitutional structure
similar to Idaho's. Simply stated; No Idaho court has ever ruled that the larger parcel is limited
to the take or the entirety of the landowners' parent tract.
The determination of the larger parcel is to be resolved by the fact finder. The fact
finder can rely on the appraiser. Here, Sherwood concluded the larger parcel is the west 30
acres because it has a different economic value than the rest of the property. Idaho case law
supports Sherwood's treatment of the larger parcel as a separate economic unit based on its
potential fotnre use. In City of Orofi,no v. Swayne; 95 Idaho 125, 504 P.2d 398 (1972), the City
condemned a 1.59 acres of a larger 93-acre tract. The landowner had previously waived any
claim of severance damages to the remainder, but the City's experts presented evidence of
increased value of the entire property after the taking, arguing that the new roadway would
provide better :frontage. The trial court found that the land taken was an "independent economic
unit" and entered judgment in favor of the landowners. Id. at 126, 504 P.2d 399: On appeal, the
city argued that the court erred in refusing to consider general benefits to the remainder of land
as an off-set against the damages for the take. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed stating that
the rule prohibiting such offsetting increases in valuation against the take is particularly
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applicable in a case where the land taken was determined to be an independent, economic unit.

Id. at 128, 504 P.2d 401. The City of Orofino Court recognized that when the evidence
supported such an "artificial" division, then the finder of fact could make that determination:
The appellant here would have this Court apply the rule of
damages considered by its appraisers, that is: the 'before' and
'after' basis for valuation. It is the conclusion of the Court that
under the particular facts here where the land taken constituted an
'independent, economic unit' strict application of such a rule
would in effect force the respondents to part with their land
without compensation.

Id. at 129,504 P.2d 402.

In the instant case, there was considerable evidence to show that the proposed (Grathol)
development of the eastern and western parts of the property is unrelated and those portions are,
in fact, independent economic units. Sherwood's identification of the western 30-acres as an
independent economic unit was supported by market data based on the size and configuration
of commercial (grocery store anchored) developments such as Grathol plans for the property.
Sherwood testified that these types of retail developments are almost always around 30 acres in
size. ~hP.rwooil ~ko iilP.ntifieil thP. [arger parrel h~c:.eil on thP. phyc:.ir.~l c:.ep~r~tion th~t will or.cnr

by the inevitable extension of Sylvan Road through the property. Sherwood's identification of
the western 30-acres as the larger parcel focused on its highest and best use as commercial
development that was independent from the eastern 26-acres.
There was no evidence introduced at trial to conclude that the highest and best use of the
west portion of the property was in any manner dependent on the east portion of the property.
The un-contradicted testimony of Jim Coleman demonstrated that the waste water treatment
system could be placed virtually anywhere on (or even off of) the property and the wastewater
could be re-circulated within the commercial development or land applied virtually anywhere.
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Sherwood did not attribute any value or severance damages to the eastern 26-acres because it
remained, in his opinion, largely unaffected by the condemnation. Instead, Sherwood limited
his analysis of the value of the take and severance damages to the western 30-acres. So too,
Aian Johnson placed the value of the eastern 26± acres at $1.00 per sq. ft. both before and after
the take.
Conversely, Moe's treatment of the entire 56+ acre parent tract as the larger parcel was
clearly intended to allow rm to argue for a lower per unit value. Moe ignores the actual uses of
the Subject Property as independent economic parcels, ignores the inevitable extension of
Sylvan Road and blindly assumes that the development of the entire 56 acre property will be
integrated based on his erroneous belief that the eastern 26-acres must be used for wastewater
treatment, despite the fact that rm offered no evidence whatsoever in support of this theory or
in rebuttal to Jim Coleman. Moe simply took IID's right-of-way plans identifying the Subject
Property and used that description for his larger parcel. Moe did this even though his own
former employer, mentor and author of authoritative text on condemnation appraisal, Eaton,
ur<>rn~ ag!'.linc::t dnino
sn
'-'.&..1..&.b
'-'•
Ti'C-Li.i..u.,

..............a.LL.JO.,_

Nevertheless, the larger parcel determination, as part of highest
and best use analysis, is the appraiser's decision, and it must be
made objectively regardless of the desires, or opinions, of the
client.

***
[The appraiser] . . . has an obligation to make a proper
analysis of the larger parcel, rather than merely appraise an
entire ownership or the parcel as shown on the condemnor's
map.
Eaton, MAI, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation (1995) (excerpt attached) (emphasis added)
By including the eastern 26-acres, unaffected by the condemnation, Moe is artificially
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decreasing the value of the take based on his unsupported assumption that both properties will
be needed for wastewater treatment. By including the extra land, size regression theory means
that the unit value decreases. Moe's approach to the larger parcel question simply seeks to
spread the pro-rata cost of owning more land than necessary across the entire parcel to arrive at
the lowest possible value for the part taken. Moe simply ignores the fact that ITD is
condemning the best situated and most valuable portion of the Subject Property and that
different portions of the land have different values.
ITD failed to identify a single case directly supporting its argument that the larger
parcel can only be the entirety of Grathol' s property. None of the cases cited by ITD stand for

this one-size-fits-all application. Instead, the cases recognize that the determination of the
larger parcel is to be based on the evidence presented, including the intended uses of the

property in the future .... Grathol has presented nufnerous authorities to support Sherwood's
identification of the larger parcel as an independent economic 30 acre unit and Idaho cases
support Sherwood's approach, if not explicitly, at least implicitly. Further, Idaho law is in
accord with most other jmisdictions that prohibit the off-setting of special benefits to the
remainder unaffected by the take, against the value of the take, which is really what ITD
advocates here by including additional acreage that is unaffected by the condemnation in order
to decrease the value of the part taken.
II.

Date of Valuation.
In its Post Trial Brief ITD again argues that both Sherwood and Johnson "violated"

Idaho law in failing to use the date of the summons as the basis for valuation and damages.
ITD's arguments are misplaced as Grathol's valuation witnesses clearly testified that their
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opinions of just compensation were based on the date of the summons, November 17, 2010. 1
IID cites to Spokane & Palouse Ry Co. v. Lieuallen, 2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. 854 (1892) as support
for its argument that to allow such testimony is error. However the testimony criticized by the
Spokane & Palouse Court was value as of the date of trial. The witness in that case apparently

did not give any opinion of value as of the date of the take, as other witnesses had, but
(regardless) the Idaho Supreme Court held that the allowance of such testimony was harmless.
In the instant case, ITD stubbornly ignores Grathol's valuation witness's testimony.
Grathol's witnesses all stated the date on which values and damages were calculated and
specifically connected their opinions to the date of condemnation.
Q. Okay. And what is your opinion as to the value of that
property as ofNovember 17, 2010?
i
A. $2.25 a square foot.
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 484, 11. 5-8 (Sherwood).
Q. Now, through this process, based on everything you've
described as what you do in your day-to-day business, do you
feel that you've developed an opinion as to the value of the
Grathol property in general?
A. Yes, I have. I have
Q.
Okay. You feel like you've adequately developed an
opinion base upon everything I've asked you so far as to what
that property is worth after the date of take, November 17,
2010?
A. Yes, I have.
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 734, 11. 14-24 (Johnson).
Q. Based on everything you've testified to, to this point,
It is worth noting that ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe, appraised the Subject Property as of April 7, 2010. In this trial
testimony, Moe said there was no difference between the value on April 7 and the value on November 17. Yet ITD
continues to argue that Defendant "violates Idaho law" if it doesn't utilize the correct date of November 17, 2010.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 84, 11. 12-21.) Defendant's value witnesses used the same procedure as Moe to reconcile their value
opinions to the date of the summons, and so testified at trial. See above.
1
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research and the analysis of the market and so forth, did you
come to an opinion as to what this property is worth as its
depicted here without regard to the portion being taken by the
State of Idaho for the 95 alignment?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What's your opinion?
A. For the front 30 acres, $3.23 a square foot; for the back 26
acres, $1 a square foot.
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 745-46, 11. 19-25, 1-3 (Johnson).
Q. Okay. Now, then, what about after the take but before your
project is done, have you calculated an opinion of that that
property is worth on November7th - the remainder property is
worth on November 1ih, 2010?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Okay. And that's assuming that the highway has been built
and it's in place but your retail shopping center is not complete?
A.Yes.
Q. And what is that opinion?
A. I put a value on it of$2,722,000.
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 769, 11. 2-13 (Johnson).
Q. So, in that respect, is it your testimony that $2,722,000 is the
actual value of the remaining property not taken by I1D as of
November 17th, 2010?
A.Yes.
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 773, 11. 14-17 (Johnson).
Because IID's take impacts the value of the remainder based on loss of visibility,
configuration of the remainder property, speed of passing traffic and impaired accessibility to
the remainder, Grathol's witnesses valued the property as if the construction ofIID's Project
were complete and the effects of the project were being considered by purchasers, tenants and
others whom Grathol would be marketing the remainder property to. This is not related to
"construction delay," as argued ad nauseum by IID, but instead this is evidence of numerous
market factors which negatively affect the value of the property as if ITD's Project were

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S POST TRIAL BRIEF - 11

1148 of 1617

completed, as is required under Idaho Code § 7-712.

Grathol's witnesses specifically

testified as to those factors and their valuations as of the date of the talce, and ITD's
arguments to the contrary are disingenuous.
III.

Severance Damages.
ITD continually attempts to re-characterize Grathol's evidence of severance damages

as "construction delay damages," ignoring that the facts and opinions testified to by
Sherwood and Johnson were related to the impacts of ITD's Project on the value of the
remaining property. ITD claims that Grathol utilized a previously "unrecognized
methodology" in determining the value of the remainder by utilizing a discounted or net
present value approach. ITD's argument is simply, flat wrong. The discounted approach to
arriving at the net present value of property is an accepted appraisal method. The method is
particularly appropriate in the instant case, where the existing land is not currently being put
to any "unified" use but will be developed into diverse commercial uses in the foreseeable
future. ITD desires to have its simplistic "before and after" appraisal method applied in a
vacuum, ignoring the actual highest and best use of the property as commercial development,
instead characterizing the highest and best use of the land as "speculative land" to be held for
future development.
On that point, ITD plays fast and loose with the definition of "highest and best use" by
first agreeing that the highest and best use is "commercial," but then arguing through its
expert witnesses that the best use of the property is to simply hold it as speculation land for
some future time. Holding land vacant for better economic times in the future is not a
"highest and best use" of commercial property. Commercial development of the property is.
Because the Subject Property will be developed for commercial purposes, its highest
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and best use it is just that - commercial development. As such, it is mandated by Idaho law that
the impacts of the condemnation on that use be evaluated to establish whether there are
severance damages.

In this regard, the uncontroverted evidence at trial presents an interesting scenario. One
of ITD's own expert witnesses, George Hedley testified in response to questions by ITD's
counsel that the Subject Property was significantly impacted by the take because the remainder
after the taking was far more costly to develop than it was before the take. Hedley was retained
by ITD to evaluate the feasibility of Grathol's development plans for the Subject Property. He
did this by conducting a detailed analysis of the development costs for Grathol's shopping
center. Hedley was asked to give an honest opinion about the development potential and
feasibility of the Grathol property for that development. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 667, 11. 22-25.
Hedley testified that he looked at Grahtol' s proposed "before" and "after" conceptual
site plans and came up with what it would cost to prepare the entire 56 acres (less the 16 acres
taken) to make it ready to develop. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 691-692, 11. 16-25, 1-5.
Q. Okay. And what was your total figure for development costs
for this Grathol before plan?
A. The before plan turned out to be - well, including the
$1,450,000 to buy the land, it was $7,102,000. So ifl deduct - it
was about five and a half million of improvement cost, plus the
price of the property, So you take the $1,450,000 and add the
price of improvements, the off-site improvements, infrastructure,
it came to $7,103,000.
Q. And--A. Which worked out to $4.92 a square foot.
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 691-692, 11. 16-25, 1-5.

Then, ITD's counsel elicited testimony from Hedley as to what the development costs
are for the remaining property after the take:
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Q. Okay. And so after you've done that, would you look at the
development costs, the infrastructure costs for this after plan?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was your total figure for the infrastructure costs for
this after plan proposed by Grathol?
A. It's about a million dollars less because the right-of-way is not
included. You know, that land went away. So it worked out to,
including the price of land of a $1,450,000, it came in at
$6,592,000. But if I subtract out what Stanley Moe's $571,000
take money, it worked out to $6,021,000 will be the net cost to
Grathol to improve the sit on the 20 acres, which works out to
$6.90 a square foot of developable land.
So you start at $0.58, and really when you get done, its $6.92 is
what it really costs you to own the land.
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 696-97, 11. 25, 1-17.
On cross-examination, Hedley made it abundantly clear that in his analysis, the cost to
Grathol to develop the remainder property after fID's take increases by $2.00 per square foot:
Q. So in your before development cost analysis, you came up with
the cost that Grathol is going to have to spend is $4.92 to do this
right?
A. The $4.92 Q. - per square foot?
A. - includes the price of the land.
Q. Okay. $4.92 to do this.

***
Q. Gotcha. Then you did a cost analysis of the property in the
after condition, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And your conclusion is that it will cost $6.92 for Grathol to
develop their property in the after condition; isn't that what you
said?
A. Well, let me back up?
Q. Yes or no, is that what you said?
A. I said yes.
Q. Okay.
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 706, 11. 1-7, 12-21.

Q. So in the before condition, the cost of development is $4.92
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per foot, that's your opinion?
A. Per net usable acreage, yes net usable acreage.
Q. And in the after condition, the cost to develop is $6.92, a $2
increase in cost per foot to develop after the take; that's your
testimony, isn't it?
A. Based on the net available acreage left.

Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 706-07, 11. 25, 1-7. (emphasis added)
While Hedley presumably offered this testimony to show the economic "infeasibility" of
Grathol's development plans; ITD's questioning of him, in fact, elicited testimony that the
effect of ITD's take is to increase the cost to develop the property to the tune of $2.00 per
square foot! The import of his evidence cannot be overstated, as Hedley was not flying solo in
arriving at this opinion. By his own description, Hedley led a team with David Evans &
Associates (civil engineers) and Stanley Moe (appraiser) in order to conduct this detailed
analysis. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 667, 11. 10-21, p.668, 11. 18-20. Through its own expert witness
testimony, ITD proved that the Grathol property suffered severance damages in the amount of
$2.00 per square foot by virtue of the increased costs to develop the net acreage left after ITD's
condemnation. While ITD continues to argue that Grathol suffered no severance damage, its
own witnesses apparently collaborated to agree that severance damages not only do exist, the
damages are greater than even Grathol thought.2
ITD's criticism of both Sherwood and Johnson's analysis is that they both allegedly said
that no severance damages existed at the time of the condemnation but instead added additional
amounts based on construction delay. This grossly mischaracterizes the approach that both

In this regard, Grathol faces the obvious temptation to concede the larger parcel issue addressed irifra so as to take
advantage of Mr. Hedley's generous severance damage analysis as to the whole parent tract. However, Grathol
admits that Hedley's $2.00/sq. ft. increase cost of development should in no event be applied beyond the remainder
of the west 30 acres which is all Grathol intends to develop.

2
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witnesses took. Neither Sherwood nor Johnson found that there were no severance damages to
the remaining property. Instead, they each applied a recognized discount approach to arrive at
their opinions of the actual present value of the property on the date of the condemnation. The
difference between that actual present value of the remainder after the take and the value of the
remainder before the take is severance damage: by definition. In fact, the difference between
the actual value of the remainder before and after the taking can be measured by the
"development cost approach"3 which is exactly what was utilized by Hedley and the "team."
While they used a development cost approach to try to demonstrate the folly of Grathol's plans,
that approach is still a legitimate way to value development property. In short, that is "how
developers do it." It may note the same approach used by our appraiser, but it is legitimate
nonetheless.
Condemnation cases require an analysis of the property before and after the take as if
the contemplated construction magically dropped out of the sky. This artificial construct is
created in order to allow the fact-finder to determine the amount of damages caused solely by
the completed project and to avoid other (unrelated) influences on property value. The
severance damages testified to by both Sherwood and Johnson were not construction delay
damages (i.e. damages attributable to non-use of property caused by construction), but instead
were based on the market factors that a buyer would consider in valuing the property, if such
construction was complete. Those damages included consideration of the value of the
commercial development as impacted by ITD's project. The analysis necessary to get to this
value is scarcely different from that method employed by Hedley's team. Because the property

3

Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, Chapter 12, p. 245 (attached).
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is not currently in "use" (but will be a commercial/retail development as per its "highest and
best use"), it is possible (and appropriate) to value the property as if both the retail development
and highway construction have occurred and then to discount the value to a present value that
reflects the impacts of the (highway) Project as well as the present non-existence of the
commercial/retail improvements. That analysis necessarily requires an opinion of property
value at a future date, and then discounts that value back to the date of the condemnation to
arrive at the actual (net) present value of the remainder as of the time of the summons (date of
the take).
Sherwood specifically testified that his opinions were based on the market impacts of
ITD's Project on the remainder value after the construction of the Project. That is exactly what
is required by Idaho law.
Q. And is it the object of the exercise in producing a valuation
opinion for you to try to predict, based upon all of the data and
information that you consider, to try and predict what a buyer in a
buyer's shoes, would pay for a property at a given point in time?
A. That's what I was attempting to do, sir.

Tr. Vol 3; pp. 391-92; ll. 20-25; I Sherwood didn't line-item out each of the m::irket factors
influencing the remainder value after the taking, but instead included those considerations in
arriving at the value for the remainder on November 17, 2010, including the diminishment to
the use and developability of the property for commercial purposes as well as damages related
to the loss of access, visibility and development opportunity. Second Supp. Ans. and Responses

to ITD 's Discovery at No. 3. This is not construction delay damages, no matter how many times
ITD says it is.
Alan Johnson also testified to the various factors influencing the value of the remainder
after the taking. Johnson's valuation was based on the fact that the property will no longer be at
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a signalized, at-grade intersection; the property will adjoin an elevated fly-by interchange; the
property will be segmented with several acres on the west side of the "new" highway; the west
parcel will not have utility connectivity; the increase speed of the traffic past the property, and
the other market factors affecting value and desirability to tenants and users, all of which he
testified to in detail. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 774-75, ll. 21-25, 1-18. These market factors are what any
rational buyer would consider in valuing the property after the talcing, as if ITD's project were
complete. The lower values after the talcing are directly caused by ITD's condemnation and are
properly subject of just compensation. At trial, ITD elected not to cross-examine Johnson on
any of these issues, and instead it simply tries to re-label all of Johnson's testimony as
"construction delay related." Johnson did not testify as to any severance damages for
"construction delay" and ITD cannot now change Johnson's testimony via argument.
IV.

Johnson's Opinions on Damages.
Last, ITD criticizes Johnson's valuation based on the market value of the property as

commercial development. ITD argues that Johnson's testimony is contrary to Idaho law,
prohibiting valuation testimony on speculative future sales of lots. However, in making this
argument, ITD ignores the fact that neither Johnson's valuation of the take or the severance
damages is based on what individual retail lot sales would bring. Instead, Johnson testified as to
the value of the property both before and after the condemnation and construction of the
highway. Johnson did not testify as to the potential sales profits of individual lots to arrive at an
opinion of value for the take. Instead, he compared the market value of the whole property
before the take with the market value of the remainder after the take in order to arrive at his
opinion of severance damage. He did this, in part, by looking at the end-user value of the
property once all of the development work was completed and then discounted that value back
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to the net present value (as of the date of the take). The decreased value of the property after the
take as compared to the higher value before the take is, by definition, the severance damages to
the remainder.
ITD relies on City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99,437 P.2d 615 (1968) to argue that
such valuation methodology is verboten. However, the landowner in City of Caldwell didn't
even seek severance damages. Instead, he attempted to utilize future hypothetical lot sales as
the basis for finding the value of the land actually taken (condemned). That is not what Johnson
has done here.
The Supreme Court in Roark recognized that although the property was subdivided,
there were no separate ownerships involved and the tract taken by the City "constituted a single
quadrangular, consolidated body of land." Id. at 101, P.2d 617. The trial court had instructed
the jury to find the value of the land taken as a single tract ofland by the condemnor. The court
also recognized that the take's value was to be based on the "highest and best use" to which the
land could be devoted. "Its value for the highest and best use to which the land was adaptable
was the basis upon which the defenda.nts were entitled to recover." Id.
In arriving at a value for the take, the Roark court ruled that the take was to be valued as
a single tract of land, instead of the aggregate individual values which separate lots (that could
be created from the part taken) might bring over a period of time in the future. However, the

Roark court also recognized that the jury was properly permitted to consider the prospective
value of the property in the future for determining its value as of the date of the summons. Id. at
102, 437 P.2d 618. The Roark case did not hold that the decrease in market value of the
proposed development caused by a condemnor's actions was barred in any manner. Indeed,
that case did not address severance damages in any respect, as none were requested by the
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landowner.
Johnson's opinion testimony as to the value of the take, on November 17, 2010 was
based on his opinions of the market value of the property, in its highest and best use as
commercial development, on that date. Unlike the landowners' in Roark, Johnson did not base
the value of the take on an aggregate of individual future hypothetical lot sales, but instead
attributed a flat value of $3 .23 per sq. ft. to the area of the take as a single parcel of commercial
land. This was Johnson's opinion of the amount that an informed, arms-length buyer would pay
on the date of condemnation. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 745-46, ll. 19-25, 1-3. 1hls was the same
valuation method expressly recognized and approved by the City of Caldwell v. Roark court.
ITD mixes apples and oranges, and fails to recognize that Roark does not even address the
propriety of calculating severance damages.
Indeed, the very same valuation approach criticized by ITD (value based on the
property's potential future use) was expressly recognized in Ada County Highway Dist. By and
Through Silva v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 662 P.2d 237 (1983). There the Idaho Supreme
Court considered an appeal by the County from an award of just compensation for a highway
widening project. At the time of the taking the property was zoned residential and carried
restrictive covenants preventing its use for anything other than for residential purposes. The
property was located on the comer of an intersection of two major streets. Id. at 658, 662 P.2d
239. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the uses to which the property taken or is adaptable
are those that are reasonably probable. It held that the full extent of such probable use (as it
affects the value of the take) must be considered. The Court said that the probability of a
potential zone change would be taken into consideration by a hypothetical buyer in determining
value. "It is the effect, if any, upon the fair market value on the date of taking, which makes
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relevant evidence of a possible rezoning of the property." The Silva Court found that because
the rezoning was reasonably probable and would affect the value of the property at the time of
the take, it was a proper basis for the jury to utilize in determining value.
Similarly, the Grathol property has to be valued as commercial development at the time
of the condemnation. That is its highest and best use. Johnson testified as to the value that a
hypothetical buyer would arrive at on the date of taking, based on the property being a
commercial/retail development parcel. Those factors influencing the market value include all of
the impact ofITD's project on that use.
IID's criticism of Johnson's methodology is without merit. ITD spends much of its
post-trial brief claiming that Johnson "violated the law" or applied an "unrecognized"
methodology in arriving at his opinions of value. It is a well settled rule in Idaho that the owner
of property is a competent witness to its value, as he is presumed to be familiar with its value by
reason of inquiries, comparisons, purchases and sales. Weaver v. Vil!. of Bancroft, 92 Idaho
189, 193, 439 P.2d 697, 701 (1968); Riley v. Larson, 91 Idaho 831, 432 P.2d 775 (1967);
Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 99 P. 108 (1908). Further, Johnson is not merely an owner
of property, but is also a commercial/retail real estate developer whose business is to arrive at
an opinion of land values for commercial development. At trial, Johnson testified at length
(and was unchallenged, even on cross-examination) as to his depth of knowledge, experience
and acumen in valuing property. Johnson employed the same methodology as other
developers for determining the value of the Grathol property based on its features for a
commercial/retail development. Johnson's analysis included a prospective analysis of the
development project and how such development is impacted by ITD's taking. A developer
with a bare piece of ground must conduct a broader analysis in order to evaluate the

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S POST TRIAL BRIEF - 21

1158 of 1617

economic prospects of a proposed project to determine the market value of the land itself.
This is not some fabricated analysis derived solely to increase the claims for just
compensation as alleged by ITD. Indeed, ITD's own expert witnesses utilized a very similar
development approach to analyze the costs of development and concluded that such costs
increased by reason ofITD's take and Project. ITD's own experts proved severance damages

using the same development cost approach! Johnson's methodology to identify the actual
existing impacts of the take on the Grathol property was sound and logical. While ITD's
witnesses testified that the severance damages equated to $2.00 per square foot, Johnson's
estimate of those damages was considerably more conservative. 4
Simply put, the severance damages are not easily calculable for this type of land and
this type of take. The traditional "cost to cure" method doesn't work. There is no way to
systematically "measure" to any degree of mathematical certainty how the Project and the take
will lessen (or increase) the value of the remainder. There is no "formula." Instead, it is both
appropriate and accepted to look at how the Project will impact the intended use(s) of the
property in its "highest and best" state. The only way to quantify those impacts to the property
is through either a discount analysis to reach the present value of the remainder after the take, or
through Hedley's development approach. Either one gets you to a result, but as evidenced here,
one approach (ITD's, as it were) gets to a considerably higher number.
ITD fails to recognize that Johnson testified with sufficient foundation as to the value of
the property at the time of the taking and provided an opinion of the remainder value after the

4 Johnson's testimony as to severance damages to the remaining property was from $338,000 to $798,000 based on
pre-take values of $3.23 and $4.00 per square foot. Broken down, that equates to a per foot value of severance
damage to the total remainder of $0.19 to $0.45, compared to Hedley's $2.00 per sq. ft.
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taking as if ITD's project were completed. Johnson then compared the value of the whole
"before" with the remainder "after" to arrive at a range of value (severance damages) from
$338,000.00 to $798,000.00 based on the multiple market factors and impacts he identified. Tr.

Vol. 4, p. 775, ll. 2-15. Johnson then added that opinion of severance damages to his valuation
of the take to arrive at a total amount of just compensation in the range of $2,633,360 to
$3,093,360. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 775-76, ll. 19-25, 1-2. This testimony was literally unchallenged.
ITD had the opportunity to cross-examine Johnson on his methods and calculations but chose
not to do so, and it cannot now attempt to re-characterize his testimony as something other than
it was.
Hombook law on condemnation appraisal practice supports Grathol's valuation in this
case. Eaton's, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation reads as follows:

Historically, the value of a remainder property in a partial taking
case was estimated assuming the public improvement was
complete and operational on the date of valuation. Because the
size of public projects and the cost of money have increased, as
has the amount of time between land acquisition and the
completion of many public projects, it is now more corn.mon to
estimate the value of a remainder property in its physical
condition as it exists on the date of valuation, giving consideration
to the proposed public construction and its anticipated effect.
The 'after value' is based on the value of the remainder property
assuming that the actual construction of the proposed project will
not be completed until an estimated future date.
Eaton at p. 271.

5

Copies of selected chapters and text from Real Estate Valuation in Litigation are attached at Appendix "A" for the
Court's use. All three appraisers who testified in this acknowledged this as an authoritative treatise on property
valuation in condemnation.
5
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Although the appraiser is to view the remainder property as it
physically existed on the date of value, he or she must consider
the impact of the pending construction on the remainder property.
Therefore, the appraiser must be able to visualize the remainder
property after the proposed public project is complete to estimate
its value and reflect the damages and/or special benefits that will
accrue to it.

Id. at p. 272.
The appraiser measures damages, not as an end in itself, but to
assist in estimating the value of the remainder tract. Id. at 295. In
other words, the estimate of damages is the basis for arriving at an
adjustment that will be applied to various market data in valuing
the property in the after situation. One . . . method of estimating
damage is by analyzing comparable sales using the matched pairs,
or paired data analysis, technique. Damages can also be estimated
by capitalizing the net rent loss resulting from the damage. Id. A
third method applied to estimate a proper adjustment for damage
is known as the cost to cure. This method can be used when the
property being appraised has suffered damage that can be
physically and economically corrected.

In estimating the value of the remainder tract, it is important
that the appraiser consider all observations made in
determining the highest and best use of the tract in the after
situation and the effect, if any, of the proposed public
improvement.

Id. at 306.
While ITD spends an inordinate amount of time critizing Johnson' opinion, it doesn't'
reflect on its own expert witnesses' testimony at trial, establishing a higher range of severance
damages than even the Defendant could come up with. ITD's consultants, at its directive,
evaluated the impacts of ITD's take and project on the value of the Grathol property in its
highest and best form. While IID attempted to present this (Hedley) testimony to demonstrate
the perceived financial folly of Grathol's proposed development, it unilaterally elicited
testirn.ony from its own expert as to the actual severance damages caused. Hedley did not
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unwillingly present this testimony, nor was it elicited by some savvy cross-examination
trickery. Hedley volunteered this testimony in response to IID's own line of inquiry. His
testimony was based on a collaborative effort and analysis between Hedley, Moe and experts at
David Evans & Associates (who were never called to testify.) This "team" conducted its
analysis because the inherent difficulty in valuing raw ground as commercial property
necessitates a broader analysis than IID's simple "before and after" appraisal approach.
Johnson and Sherwood undertook similar analyses to arrive at their opinions of value for the
take and severance damages. How ironic that IID castigates the condmnee for using the very
same analytical approach that its own witness resorted to, particularly where, as here, IID' s
witnesses concluded severance damages will be in excess of what Grathol seeks.

DA1ED this 6th day of April, 2012.

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
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The Larger Parcel

II

he apprniser seldom encounters a

valuation or analytical premise in condemnation appraising that cannot also be
found in general appraisal assignments. The concept of the larger parcel, however,
is an exception. It is an analytical premise unique to eminent domain valuation
and is often misunderstood and/ or misapplied by appraisers, condemnors, lawyers, and the courts.
The term larger parcel cannot be found in comprehensive appraisal textbooks
such as The Appraisal of Real Estate, 1 but two definitions are provided in The Dictionary
of Real Estate Appraisal. One definition of the larger parcel is
In condemnation, the portion of a property that has unity of ownership, contiguity, and unity of use, the three conditions that establish the larger parcel for the
consideration of severance damages in most states. In federal and some state
cases, however, contiguity is sometimes subordinated to unitary use.2

Black's Law Dictionary defines the larger parcel as:
A term used in eminent domain proceedings, signifying that the parcel taken is
not a complete parcel but part of a "larger parcel"; the owner, therefore is entitled
to damages from the severance as well as the value of the parcel taken. Unity of
ownership, use, and contiguity must be present, although federal courts and some
states do not require contiguity where there is a strong unity of use.3
The larger parcel is sometimes referred to as the parent tract4 or the rule of joinder.5
l. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed. (Chicago: Ap-

4. United States v. 8.41 Acres of Land, 783 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1986).
5. People v. Ocean Shore RR, 196 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1948);
M & R Invest. Co. v. Nevada DOT, 744 P.2d 531 (Nev.
1987).

praisal Institute, 1992).
2. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, 3d ed. (Chicago: Appraisal Institute, 1993), 202.
3. Black's Law Dictionary, abr. 6th ed., s.v. "larger parcel:'
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A second definition of the larger parcel included in the Dictionary of Real Estate
Appraisal is more meaningful and useful to appraisers. It reads:

\., e--·

1i'\~

<.•

'/.., ~i.:'.ir
.:!}.!":;-

r\~-.~-

J
r/

I ,

(!

In condemnation, that tract or tracts of land which are under the beneficial control of a single individi'.ial or entity and have the same, or an integrated, highest
and best use. Elements for consideration by the appraiser in making a determination in this regard are c~ntiguity, or p~oximity, a~ it bea~s on the highest and best
use of the property, urnty of ownership, and urnty of highest and best use.6

I

I
I

I
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Understanding the concept of the larger parcel is vital in condemnation appraisal
because the appraiser cannot determine the highest and best use of a property
until a conclusion as to the larger parcel is reached. The larger parcel may be all
of one parcel, part of a parcel, or several parcels, depending to varying degrees on
unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity.
In a typical appraisal assignment, an appraiser is retained to estimate the
value of a parcel of land which has specific boundaries and the parameters of the
property are known before any in-depth appraisal analysis is made. This is not,
or should not be, the case in condemnation appraisals.
It is useful to understand how parcel, or right-of-way, maps are developed by
a condemnor. If, for example, a roadway is to be constructed or widened, the
condemno:r's engineers prepare a survey of the proposed right-of-way limits.
This survey is then given to the title department within the condemning agency,
or to a title company, with instructions to identify all ownerships within the
proposed right-of-way and to determine the property boundaries of each parcel.
These boundaries include all land that is contiguous and under the same ownership as the land within the proposed right-of-way. A right-of-way map like the
one shown in Figure 5.1 is then prepared. Figure 5.2 shows the typical ownership
information included on such a map. The right-of-way map is then usually passed
on to the appraiser with instructions to appraise a specific parcel identified on the
map.
The physical contiguity of land is an engineering question, while unity of
ownership is usually a legal question. The right-of-way map is prepared and the
boundaries of the properties to be appraised are determined prior to any consideration of unity of use. Therefore, most appraisal contracts between an appraiser
and a condemning agency, and most instructions assigning an appraisal to a staff
appraiser, specify that the appraiser is to estimate the value of a parcel which may
or may not be the "larger parcel'.' The ultimate determination of the larger parcel
must be made by the appraiser. If it is found that the parcel defined by the rightof-way map and the appraisal contract or assignment does not constitute the
larger parcel, the appraiser must insist on a revised contract or assignment. As
stated in the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions:
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FIGURE 5.2 TYPICAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION

OWNERSHIPS
1¥1RCELNO.
f-l'l/7
4•/'l/8
4·1919

4-192()
4·1'121

•-1,.n

4-l'llJ
4•1924
•f-1925
/921,

4-1'129
.f·/660

NAME

TOTAL AREA

J.ALDRICH
8.£. TRE!SCH£l
3.24 AC,
2.44 AC.
£.A.SOWERS
0.20 AC.
K. D£C.KFRT
0.86 AC.
R. P. SCHUMACHER
O. 92 AC.
R.L.SMAZA
1.39 AC.
$.LOCKWOOD
0.65 AC.
E.C.MORRIS
1.96 AC.
A. R.JANISCH
D. 0. WALSTON
1./4 AC.
A JANISCH
3.88 AC.
!JUlrLINGTON NOR7:H£/rN INC.

TAKE
SEE
0.3.2 AC.
0 . .38 AC.
0.07 AC.
0.20 AC.
0.28 AC.
0.32 AC.
0./5 AC.
0 • .36 AC.
0. 13 AC.
0.60 AC.

LT.

REMAINDER RT. EASEMENTS

SHEET

,?O

2.92 AC.
2.06 AC
0, 1.3 AC
0.66 AC.
0.64 AC.
1.07 AC.
0.50 AC.
1.60 AC.
I.Of AC.
3.28 AC.
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Often essential in the appraiser's consideration of highest and best use is the
conclusion concerning the larger parcel. Because the ultimate determination of
highest and best use is the appraiser's to make, and that determination cannot be
made until after considerable investigation and analysis has been completed, the
appraiser's conclusion as to the larger parcel is sometimes different from the specific parcel he or she was requested to appraise by the agency. In such an instance,
the appraiser shall inform the agency of his or her determination of the larger
parcel and the agency shall amend the appraisal assignment accordingly.7

The determination of the larger parcel is particularly important in partial
taking cases, in which compensable damages and/or special benefits accrue to
the remainder parcel after the taking. Like many other elements in condemnation appraisal, the tests to determine the larger parcel (i.e., unity of ownership,
unity of use, and contiguity) cannot be applied universally and blindly. The
federal courts and some state courts have ruled that all three tests need not be
met in ey.ecy-instanee.
- A situation in which a right-of-way map may not correctly depict the larger
parcel is illustrated in Figure 5.3. In this case, the entire parcel meets the tests of
unity of ownership and contiguity, but it fails the test of unity of use. Therefore,
the service station is not a part of the larger parcel8 and cannot suffer compensable
damage or receive a special benefit.
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FIGURE 5.3 NO UNITY OF USE
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Another situation is depicted in Figure 5.4. In this instance, the two sites have
unity of ownership, but they are certainly not contiguous or put to the same use.
However, unity of use has often been defined to include an integrated use.9 The mill
may have been constructed for the sole purpose of processing logs harvested from
7. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), §B-1 - 14, p. 73.

'-~~{t

-11·

-

8. O'Brien v. City of New York, 32 A.D.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1969).
9. United States v. Mattox, 375 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1967).

10. Bae!
194
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FIGURE 5.4 NONCONTIGUOUS LARGER PARCEL
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the 500-acre timber stand. Thus, while the two tracts do not have identical uses,
they certainly have an integrated use. In some jurisdictions, the larger parcel
would be defined as the mill site plus the timber stand. In such a case, damages
accruing to the mill site due to the taking of the timber stand would be
compensable.
In an often-cited landmark case, a federal court ruled that two parcels located 17 miles apart, on two different islands, constituted a single larger parcel. In
this ruling the court said:
The first question before us here, therefore, and the basic one in all severance
damage cases, is what constitutes a "single" tract as distinguished from "separate"
ones. The answer does not depend upon artificial things like boundaries between
tracts as established in deeds in the owner's chain of title, nor does it depend
necessarily upon whether the owner acquired his land in one transaction or even
at one time. Neither does it wholly depend upon whether holdings are physically
contiguous. Contiguous tracts may be "separate" ones if used separately, and tracts
physically separated from one another may constitute a "single" tract if put to an
integrated unitary use or even if the possibility of their being so combined in use
"in the reasonably near future" "is reasonably sufficient to affect market value'.'
.. .Integrated use, not physical contiguity, therefore, is the test. Physical contiguity is important, however, in that it frequently has great bearing on unity of use ...
[S]eparation still remains as evidentiary; not an operative, fact. 10 [Citations omitted]

es have
me use.
rhe mill
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Note that in the above case the court recognized that separate parcels do not
have to be put to the same use on the date of valuation; rather, if the highest and
best use of the properties requires a unity of use, they constitute a single larger
parcel. However, the mere fact that two parcels constitute a single larger parcel
does not necessarily mean that the remainder property is damaged. On remand
of the above case, the court found that .the remaining lands had not suffered any
compensable damages.11
By defining the larger parcel, the appraiser can confine his or her judgments
to those parcels, or parts of a single parcel, that are affected by condemnation.

N.Y.1969).
Cir. 1967).

10. Baetjerv. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 394-395 (1st Cir.
1944) cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 (1944).

11. United States v. 7936.6 Acres of Land, 69 F. Supp. 328
(P.R. 1947).
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Figure 5.5 shows a 100-acre farm that is subject to two zoning classifications. The
proposed widening of Road A necessitates the acquisition of the easterly 25 feet
of the tract. The highest and best use of the property coincides with its current
zoning. The property is owned by a single individual and is contiguous, but there
is no unity of highest and best use. Thus, the larger parcel in this case is the
easterly 500 feet of the ownership and only this part of the tract is subject to
compensable damages and/or special benefits.
FIGURE 5.5 No UNITY OF USE
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This determination of the larger parcel eliminates the application of the backland
theory described in Chapter 3. The backland theory would be used, and :mifused,
furless frequently if appraisers and others involved in condemnation proceedings had a better understanding of the larger parcel prernise. Once the appraiser
has identified the larger parcel, the scope of the analysis required is narrowed
substantially. In the above case, only the easterly 500 feet need to be appraised, so
only comparable commercial land sales have to be investigated and analyzed.
Residential land sales need not be studied.
As the preceding examples illustrate, the appraiser must consider more than
single ownership and parcel size to define the scope of the assignment. Because
the tests of the larger parcel can be applied in a variety of ways, it is necessary to
study each element of this trinity-unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity-in some depth. Although most of the rulings pertaining to the larger parcel
involve the question of compensable damages, the rulings are equally applicable
to special benefits.
It generally has been held that determination of the larger parcel is a matter
of foct, not a matter of law. Therefore, when a question of the larger parcel arises
in a condemnation trial, it is a question to be answered by the jury (or trier of
fact), not by the court. 12 However, some confusion exists in this regard in the
federal court system because all federal condemnation cases are conducted under
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13. Federa;
14. United
15. United
605 F.

of Lan
1972),

12. Arkansas State H'way Comm. v. Arkansas Real Estate Co.,
471 S.W.2d 340 (Ark. 1971); Sharp v. United States,
191 U.S. 341 (1903).

341.4~
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that just compensation will be
determined by the trier of fact, but that "[t]rial of all issues shall otherwise be by
the court'.' 13 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that "[tlhe Rule [71(h)] thus provides
that, except for the single issue of just compensation, the trial judge is to decide
all issues, legal and factual, that may be presented'.' 14
Because determination of the larger parcel is intertwined with the question
of highest and best use, strict adherence to the above rule would result in the
court, rather than the trier of fact, making the finding of highest and best use.
The Reynolds' decision quoted above dealt with the issue of the scope of the project
rather thari the question of highest and best use or the larger parcel. (See Chapter 6 for further discussion of the scope of the project rule.) Several federal
circuit cases decided after Reynolds have interpreted that decision narrowly and
have ruled that the question of highest and best use, and thus the larger parcel,
rests with the jury. 15
It is suggested that "it is safe for the practitioner to prepare and present the
case upon the assumption that the theory of unity of use [the larger parcel] is a
factual question for the trier as it relates to the ultimate issue of value, damage
and just compensation. If there is a question, the Motion in Limine is available to
preliminarily resolve questions, particularly in the federal courts where judges
and magistrates have broad powers available to them at the pretrial stage of
litigation'.'16
As the examples presented demonstrate, determination of the larger parcel is
critical. The appraiser should discuss this issue with legal counsel in the early
stages of the appraisal assignment if the larger parcel determination is in question.

UNITY

OF

TITLE

It is generally held that for one or more parcels to be considered a single larger

parcel, it is essential that they be owned by the same individual or group of
individuals.17 In a few cases, however, the courts have held otherwise. In a Kansas
case, for instance, the court held that three contiguous parcels of land, owned by
three different individuals and being used as one farm operation by mutual agreement, were a single larger parcel and, therefore," ... injury to each [parcel]resulting from the whole taking may be considered:'rn Most cases that have aHowed
consideration of lands owned by others have done so under the theory of the
highest and best use of an assemblage. (The highest and best use of an assemblage is further discussed in Chapter 6.)
On the other side of the coin, there is case law that supports the proposition
that the quality of the title to all parcels must be identical for the tract to be
13. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71A(h).
14. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 17 (1970).
15. United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, More or Less in Cty.,
605 F2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 100 Acres
of Land, Etc, Marin Ct1i, CaL, 468 E2d 1261 (9th Cir,
1972), cert. den., 414 U.S. 822 (1973); United States v.
341.45 Acres of Land, 633 E2d 108 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied 451 U.S. 938 (1981).

16. Nichols'TheLawofEminentDomain, rev. 3d ed. (New
York: Mathew Bender Co., Inc., 1992), vol. 4A,
§14B.04[2].
17. Commonwealth, Dept. ofHighways v. Dennis, 409 S.W.2d
292 (Ky. 1966); United States v. 429.59 Acres ~f Land,
612 F2d 459 9th Cir. (1980).
18. County of Smith v. Labore, 15 P. 577 (Kan. 1887).
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considered a single larger parcel. For example, if Parcel A in Figure 5.6 is owned
by Mrs. Jones, as her sole and separate property, and Parcel B is owned by Mr. and
Mrs. Jones jointly, some courts would rule that the larger parcel is Parcel A only
and that no compensabl~ damages can accrue to Parcel B, even though the two
tracts have contiguity and unity ofuse. 19 The federal government has historically
supported the proposition that the form of title must be identical.
To satisfy the requirement as to unity of ownership, title to all parts of the whole
must be vested to the same extent in the same person(s). Unity of ownership is
lacking when the owner has different interests in the two or more tracts, as, for
example, where he owns one tract in fee simple, has a leasehold interest in another, and owns in entirety the stock of a corporation which owns another tract.
Likewise, unity of ownership is lacking between two tracts when one is owned by
the husband and the other by the wife, or where one is owned by the father and
the other is owned by the son. 20
FIGURE 5.6 No UNITY OF TITLE
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The federal government most often cites United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co. 21
in support of identical ownership. The court in that case said (at page 178, 179)
"[t]he rule requiring compensation for loss in market value of the remainder of
the tract is applied strictly only where there is but a single parcel owned by one
party in fee simple.... If, therefore, the fee owner of one tract holds a lesser tenure
in the tract taken, there can be no additional compensation for this reason. The
explanation is that the fee is the integer." However, it is clear that the foregoing is
dicta. In introducing this issue the court said (at page 178) "[a]lthough disposition
has thus been made of the erroneous claims and theories of the experts, it behooves us to consider whether Plantation is entitled to compensation, without
regard to the clauses of the respective leases:'
Nevertheless, the same court later ruled in two different cases that identical
title was not required to find a single larger parcel. In one case the larger parcel
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(9th<
24. State,
1968:

25. Counl
19. Glendenning v. Stahlty, 91 N.E. 234 (Ind. 1910).
20. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, §A-11, p. 29.

1966:
26. PeopL

21. United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172
(9th Cir. 1950) cert. den., 340 U.S. 820 (1950) at 178,
179.
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was found to be ownership of an easement in one parcel and a leasehold interest
in a second parcel. The court said "Honolulu Plantation is inapposite, however,
because the party seeking severance damages in that case had no interest whatsoever in the land which had been condemned'.'22 In the second case, the court
found that three tracts of land constituted a single larger parcel, even though the
tracts were owned by three different corporations, because ownership of all three
corporations was held by the same individuals. In making this ruling the court
said that "[t]he fact that land thus treated [as a single entity] is owned by different
entities does not destroy the unity concept:'23 In a footnote the court distinguished
this case from Honolulu Plantation "because the plaintiff sugar refinery in that case
had no compensable interest in sugar cane fields taken from a third party.'
These rulings suggest that the policy stated in the Uniform Appraisal Standards
for Federal Land Acquisitions with regard to unity of ownership is not without its
weaknesses. Any appraiser involved in a federal condemnation assignment concerned with multiple tracts that have a unity of highest and best use, but lack
identical ownership, should seek the advice of legal counsel, whether the client is
the property owner or the government.
In most jurisdictions, unity of ownership does not necessarily mean that the
quality of the title is identical. Two parcels, one owned in fee and one owned
equitably by a vendee's interest in a real estate contract, could be considered to
have unity of title. 24 One California case held that unity of title existed where an
individual owned one parcel in fee and was the equitable owner of an abutting
parcel because he had exercised an option to purchase the second parcel.25 In
another California case, however, where the interest in the second parcel existed
only in the form of an unexpired, but unexercised option, the court held that
there was no unity of title. 26
Unity of title generally requires equal legal control over the ownership and
future of the lands in question. Acquisition of the parts of a whole at different
times does not destroy unity of title,27 nor, in some cases, does the fact that one
parcel is owned by an individual and the second parcel is owned by a corporation under the control of that individual. 28 Some courts, however, have ruled
conversely.29
A fee interest in one parcel and a leasehold interest in an abutting parcel, as
depicted in Figure 5.7, can operate as one larger parcel for the remaining term of
the lease. 30 Similarly, if three individuals independently own separate parcels of
land and lease them to a fourth individual, there could be unity of title during the
term of the lease of all the parcels,31 and the compensation would flow to the lessee.
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22. United States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 280, 281
(9th Cir. 1983).

27. Baetjerv. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (1st. Cir. 1944),
cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 (1944).

23. United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459,464
(9th Cir. 1980).

28. M.T.M. Realty Corp. v. State, 261 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y.
1965); United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d
459 (9th Cir. 1980).

24. State Highway Comm. v. Miller, 155 N.W.2d 780 (S.D.
1968).
25. County of Santa Clara v. Curtner, 54 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Cal.
1966).
26. People v. Hemmerling, 58 Cal. Rptr. 203 (Cal. 1967)

F.2d 172
l) at 178,

reversed on other grounds, Hemmerling vs. Jombeau

29. Sams v. Redevelopment Authority, 244 A.2d 779 (Pa.
1968).
30. Chicago, etc., R Co. v. Dresel, 110 Ill. 89 (Ill. 1884).
31. Berman v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh,
324 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1974).

432 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1967).

'*• .
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The second test of the larger parcel requires that the parcel or parcels of land can
be devoted to the same use as, or an integrated use with, the land from which the
taking is made. It is generally not the presence or absence of actual unity of use
that is considered; rather the unity of highest and best use is the controlling factor. 32
If a property is not being put to its highest and best use, but has a common
highest and best use, the current use of the land does not generally destroy the
unity of use.33 Some courts that have ruled conversely, however. 34 These decisions,
which seem to contradict the well-established premise that property is appraised
at its highest and best use, are generally based on the reasoning that the unity of
use has to exist because potential unity of use is too speculative and conjectural
to be considered.35 A careful reading of many of these cases (e.g., the case cited
above) suggests that the court may well have found that the proffered highest
and best use of the property would have been too conjectural and speculative to
be considered by the jury, even if the larger parcel were not at issue.
Appraisers must recognize that stronger proof of unity of use is required
when the parcels are not currently being used as a unit, but merely have a common highest and best use. "The question of unity of use of two or more tracts is a
question of fact to be determined upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and is not to be based upon fanciful claims, speculation or conjecture, and in such cases the burden of proof is upon the landowner to prove his
claim:'36
·
Political boundaries do not interrupt the continuity ofuse if the government's
land-use controls permit a continuous highest and best use. 37 Moreover, unity of
use does not require physical adjacency. There may be physical separation by

32. Baefjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944),
cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 (! 944).
33. United States v. Mattox, 375 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1967).
34. Cole Investment Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d 203 (9th
Cir. 1958).
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35. City of Washington v. Koch, 456 S.W.2d 628 CMo. 1970).
36. Ives v. Kansas Tpke.Authority, 334 P2d 399,407 (Kan.
1959).
.

39. Bamesv.,
2d 219 (
391 (1st

37. Northeastern, etc., v. Frazier, 40 N.W. 604 (Neb. 1888). '
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baJriers such as streets, railroads, and creeks, but again this type of separation
requires stronger proof of unity.38

CONTIGUITY
The third element of the larger parcel trinity, contiguity, normally requires that
physical contiguity be present for a larger parcel to exist. However, this condition
is not always mandatory and jurisdictions have ruled differently on this issue.
Most courts hold unity of title and unity of use as the most important tests of the
larger parcel.39 For this reason, the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions states:
To constitute a "whole" for purposes of assessing severance damages, the law
requires the property to meet two tests. First, there must be a unity of ownership
in all parts of the whole. Second, there must be a unity of use as to all parts of the
whole.40

Whether a real estate ownership constitutes a single larger parcel as distinguished from separate parcels is best reflected by unity of use, and does not preclude a reasonable separation. Such a separation does, however, require study..
The appraiser must be able to answer "yes" to the question: "Is it probable that the
separated tracts would sell as an integrated single entity, even with the separation?" Only then can the separated tracts can be considered as a single larger
parcel. As a Rhode Island court put it:
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Quite a different situation is presented when, as here, the two parcels in question
are unequivocally separated from each other by fixed and definite boundaries,
such as a highway. In such a case it is generally held that the two tracts can be
considered as one only when they are so inseparably connected in the use to
which they are applied that the taking of one necessarily and permanently injures the
other.41
An important factor to bear in mind, particularly (but not only) where the
taking involves non-contiguous parcels devoted to a unitary use (e.g., a mill site
and one or more parcels providing raw material for the milD is the availability of
replacement property for the parcel taken, since a reasonable buyer and seller
V./ould consider L11e availability of a replacement:'42

iuired
com:ts is a
e parJnjecve his
nent's
1ity of
on by

i

I

The greater the separation between the parcels, the more likely it is that suitable
replacement property will be available.
Sometimes a larger parcel exists in the before situation but, in the after situation, the parcel has been severed by the taking and becomes two separate parcels. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 5.8. Although the property had unity
of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity in the before situation, it is no longer
contiguous in the after situation. Quite probably, one or both of the tracts will
have a different highest and best use after the taking than they did before. It is

\",.:_

[o.1970).
07 (Kan.

~:1~1
J.

1888).

..}l

38. Tucker v. Massachusetts C.R Co., 118 Mass. 546 (Mass.
1875); State v. Hoblit!, 288 P. 181 (Mont. 1930).
39. Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Comm., 109 S.E.
2d 219 (N.C. 1959); Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d
391 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 Cl 944).

40. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for federal Land Acquisitions, §A-11, pp. 28-29 (emphasis added).
41. Sasso v. Housing Authority of the City of Providence, 111
A2d 226, 230 (RI. 1955).
42. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, §A-11, p. 30.
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highly unlikely that unity of use, or integrity of use, will exist between the two
parcels in the after situation. Thus, it is unlikely they would be sold as a single
parcel and, in all probability, they would be considered two separate larger parcels.
FIGURE

s.s

Two LARGER PARCELS-AFTER SITUATION
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Figure 5.9 illustrates a very different situation in which two tracts that were
separate in the before situation could become a single larger parcel in the after
situation. If Parcel A could be developed to a greater density in the after situation
by using Parcel B for required parking, special benefits could accrue; in those
jurisdictions that allow the offsetting of special benefits against both damages
and the value of the property taken, the property owner might not be entitled to
any monetary compensation. (See Chapter 12 for information on the offsetting of
special benefits.)
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FIGURE 5.9 ONE LARGER PARCEL-AFTER SITUATION
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Another problem which the courts have ad.dressed upon occasion is illus.trated in Figure 5.10. This could be described as the problem of the paper plat. The
tract identified as Parcel A, the whole parcel, is, of course, considered the larger
parcel and the entire remainder parcel is subject to potential compensable damages by reason of the taking. In regard to Parcel B, however, the determination of
the larger parcel will often depend on the specific status of the paper plat.
FIGURE 5,10 PAPER PLATS
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If the property owner has not dedicated the proposed street rights of way, or
has only granted easements thereto while retaining the underlying fee, and no
lots have been sold, the courts have generally ruled that all of Parcel B constitutes
the larger parcel. The current status of the particular paper plat appears to be the
key determinant. If the plat processing is beyond its initial stages, there could be
two larger parcels (i.e., Lots 1 and 9), with Lots 2 through 8 falling outside the
larger parcel and not subject to any compensable damages and/or special benefits.
An Ohio court expressed this situation well:
As an allotment develops, as it progresses from open land to individual lots, there

comes a point where the lots not only can be but must be considered as separate
entities. When this point arrives and a part of the allotment only is taken, consisting of a number of lots, the question arises as to what is the remaining land to
which damage may occur. Is it the whole remaining subdivision, or is it just the
fragment of an individual lot not taken?
Whether certain lots, taken by appropriation proceedings, constitute part of an
entire tract so as to entitle the owner of the remaining continuous lots to damages
within the rule is principally a question of unity of use and, as such, constitutes a
factual matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions.43 [Citations
omitted]
43. In re Appropriation For Highway Purposes, 239 N.E.2d
110, 115 (Ohio 1968).

1182 of 1617

88
REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION

parcel
gardlf
plus c

MYTHS ABOUT
THE LARGER PARCEL
As has been demonstrated, nearly all of the court decisions relating to the larger
parcel involve either alleged damages or special benefits to the remainder. Two of
the definitions of the larger parcel quoted previously specifically relate the term
to damages to the remainder property. However, determination of the larger parcel is also important in cases in which damages and/or benefits are not claimed.
In nearly all jurisdictions, the value of the land taken is measured as it contributes to the whole (larger parcel), rather than as a separate entity, regardless of
whether the before and after or taking plus damages rule is applicable. Thus,
appraisers must make a determination of the larger parcel in all cases.
Even when damages or benefits are not alleged, determination of the larger
parcel can have a significant impact on the amount of compensation indicated.
Two economic factors can come into play in larger parcel valuations: plottage (or
assemblage) and size regression.
Plottage is an increment of value that results when two or more sites are combined
to produce greater utility. Sometimes highest and best use results from assembling two or more parcels of land under one ownership. If the combined parcels
have a greater unit value than they did separately, plottage value is created.44

Size regression is the basic economic principle that as the number of units of a
commodity increases, the price per unit paid for the commodity decreases. It is
the concept of the bulk sales discount. As applied to land, as the number of units
(e.g., acres, square feet) in a tract of land increases, the price, or value, per unit
tends to decrease. "Common sense tells us that a larger tract of land, holding
other factors equal, would sell for less per unit:' 45
The courts seem to recognize piottage, but faii to acknowiedge the effect of
size regression. In fact, at least two courts have ruled, as a matter of law, that two
assembled tracts of land always have a larger square foot value than they would
if considered as two separate tracts.46
Appraisers are well aware of size regression. In fact, a favorite technique of
the biased (and unethical) appraiser who is attempting to support a high value
estimate is to compare the prices paid per acre for.small tracts against the price of
a substantially larger subject parcel, without making a size adjustment. Conversely, the biased appraiser attempting to support a low value will compare the
prices paid per acre for large tracts against a small tract under appraisal without
making a size adjustment.
The situation shown in Figure 5.11 illustrates the importance of the larger
parcel determination even when damages and/or benefits are not at issue. Assume that the physical characteristics of all parts of the 100-acre farm are equal
and that sales data show that farms of 75 to 125 acres sell for $2,000 per acre. If no
damages or benefits are involved and the entire farm is considered a single larger

44. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 211-212.
45. Gene Dillmore, "Size Adjustment Tables," The Real
Estate Appraiser (May-June 1976), 23.
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46. City of Buffalo v. Goldman, 406 N.Y.S2d 407 (N.Y. 1978);
In re Elgart's Appeal, 149 A.2d 641 (Pa. 1959).
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. ' parcel, the indicated compensation for the two-acre taking would be $4,000, regardless of whether the before and after rule or the taking (as a part of the whole)
plus damages rule is applied.
FIGURE 5.11 PARTIAL TAKING OF 100-ACRE FARM
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However, the situation might be more complicated. Further assume that small
acreage sales in the area, ranging from five to 15 acres, typically sell for $5,000 per
acre for use as rural homesites. If the appraiser concluded that the IO-acre parcel
separated from the balance of the ownership by the creek had an independent
highest and best use as a homesite, and thus a value of $5,000 per acre, the
indicated compensation would be $IO,000.
Even if the IO-acre tract had the same highest and best use as the 90-acre
tract (i.e., farming), the two parcels could constitute separate larger parcels. A
conclusion that two larger parcels existed could probably be justified if there
were no actual unity of use between the parcels and/or no bridge across the creek
physically connecting the two parcels. In such a case, it would not be surprising
to find that IO-acre tracts were selling for substantially more per acre than IO0acre tracts because of size regression, even though the tracts had the same highest
and best use.
Appraisers, whether they are retained by the condemnor or the condemnee,
have a tendency to estimate the value of the parcel shown on the condemnor's
right-of-way map, often without adequately analyzing the larger parcel. If an
appraiser receives an assignment from a condemnor to appraise the property
shown in Figure 5.11, and is provided with a right-of-way map depicting the
entire 100-acre ownership as the parcel to be appraised, it is the appraiser's obligation to determine whether the larger parcel is, in fact, the IO0-acre parcel or the
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I 0-acre parcel. If the appraiser reasonably concludes that the I 0-acre parcel is the
larger parcel and thus the value of the taking, as a part of the whole, is $10,000, it
is possible that he will receive resistance and/or criticism from the client. Nevertheless, the larger parcel determination, as a part of highest and best use analysis,
is the appraiser's decision, and it must be made objectively regardless of the
desires, or opinions, of the client.
The condemnor may disagree with the appraiser's conclusion as to the larger
parcel and reject the appraiser's value conclusion; that is the condemnor's prerogative. However, a distinction must be made between rejection of the appraiser's
conclusion and rejection of the appraiser's report. Appraisal reports are rejected
for technical deficiencies; conclusions are rejected because of a difference of opinion.
If an appraisal report is technically sufficient but the conclusion is rejected, the
appraiser has fulfilled his or her obligation under the terms of the appraisal assignment and the appraisal contract. The appraiser has been retained to furnish
the client with an adequately supported opinion of value. There is no guarantee
that the client is going to like the opinion. As a matter of fact, it is considered a
compliment by some appraisers to have their reports approved, but their opinions rejected because appraisal reviewers tend to look harder for technical deficiencies in appraisal reports when they disagree with the appraiser's conclusion.
A report must be well supported to pass such scrutiny.
The property owner's appraiser also has an obligation to make a proper analysis
of the larger parcel, rather than merely to appraise an entire ownership or the
parcel shown on the condemnor's map. Returning to the situation depicted in
Figure 5.11, improper analysis of the larger parcel in this case could result in the
appraiser's client receiving only 400/o of the compensation due.
Figure 5.12 shows the same property shown in Figure 5.11, but in this instance it is assumed that the taking is of the entire frontage of the property.
Condemnors wouid invariabiy treat this situation as one taking from one parcel,
even those condemnors who would be astute enough to recognize that the 10
acres shown in Figure 5.11 might constitute a separate parcel. Nevertheless, the
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FIGURE 5.12 TAKING OF FARM FRONTAGE
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~xtent or location of the taking should not alter the analysis of the larger parcel in
the before situation. The larger parcel determination made under the circumstances shown in Figure 5.11 would be the same under the circumstances shown
in Figure 5.12, or under the circumstances of any other taking configuration, including the taking of the entire ownership.
The Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions states:
It should be noted, however, that since unity of use is one of the elements for an
integrated unit, it would not necessarily follow that a contiguous body of land in
the same ownership constitutes a unit for valuation if the highest and best use for
various parts are different. Failure to value the property as an integrated unit
should, however, always be explained and supported [in much the same way that
highest and best use is supported].47

J

If the appraiser concludes that the IO-acre tract south of the stream is a
separate larger parcel, iff,the situation depicted in Figure 5.12 the appraiser would
estimate the values of the IO-acre parcel and the 90-acre parcel as two separate,
independent tracts. If the client has requested a single appraisal report, the appraiser can simply include two separate valuations within a single report. In such
a report, many of the report sections (e.g., regional data, neighborhood data,
assumptions and limiting conditions) will be applicable to both parcels, while
other sections (e.g., highest and best use, sales comparison approach to value) will
have to be developed separately for each parcel.
If the appraiser is following the before and after rule, the value conclusions
might be reported as follows:
Homesite parcel:
Before value (lo acres @ $5,000)
After value (8 acres @ $5,000)
Difference (just compensation)

$ 50,000
- 40.000
$ 10,000

Farm parcel:
Before value (90 acres @ $2,000)
After value (83 acres @ $2,000)
Difference (just compensation)

$180,000
-166.000
$ 14,000

Note that the before value of the homesite parcel and the before value of the farm
parcel are not added together and reported as a single figure. Together the value
of the farm parcel and the value of the homesite parcel do not equal the value of
the two parcels as a single entity. The above value estimates are separate appraisals and should be reported as such. If the client insists that a single figure be
reported before and after the takings, this can be done, but it must be shown as
the sum of the two independent value estimates. Moreover, it must be explained,
every time the sum is reported, that the total is the mathematical sum of two independent value estimates and does not (or at least may not) represent the value of
the properties if sold as a single entity.
47. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, §A-13, p. 42.
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Although the courts seldom address the issue, larger parcel determination
can be important in cases that do not involve alleged damages and/or benefits.
Because most legal treatises on eminent domain do not recognize this fact, they
usually state that property owners often advocate the expanded parcel (so as to
claim damages to the remainder), while condemnors advocate the limited larger
parcel (to limit the property subject to compensable damage).48 As the preceding
discussion demonstrates, however, reducing the larger parcel can, in some circumstances, substantially increase an owner's claim of compensation.
The myth that the larger parcel determination is only important in damage
and/or benefit cases can only be broken if appraisers carefully analyze properties
subject to eminent domain action, properly support larger parcel determinations,
and properly explain the valuation principles involved.
ADVANCED
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PROBLEMS

There are a number of larger parcel questions that have not been adequately
addressed by the courts and by condemnors and thus no definitive guidance on
these matters can be provided to the appraiser. This is not because these problems are rarely encountered; rather, it is because they are frequently unrecognized or ignored. Some of these issues are not really valuation problems, but
inequalities in the treatment of property owners.
The best advice for the appraiser in these situations is to remember two
things. First, the appraiser is estimating market value, so any approach to value
should mirror market realities. Second, the goal is to place the owner in the same
position, monetarily, after the taking that he or she was in before the taking.
To demonstrate the potential inequality in the treatment of property owners,
assume that all of the property depicted in Figure 5.13 is under the same ownership and that the condemnor is acquiring all of Lot I. Under these circumstances,
the condemnor would undoubtedly treat Lot I as a separate parcel, claiming that
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FIGURE 5.13 TREATMENT OF PROPERTY OWNERS

Road

Lot 1

Lot2

Lot3

and
afte

Lot4

A
N

48. Nichols', vol. 4A, §14B.03[2] (1992).
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. 'the balance of the property is not part of the larger parcel because it consists of
legally platted lots that have separate highest and best uses. Such treatment would
deny the owner the right to any damages to the remainder lots. However, if all of
the lots were being taken, many condemnors would take the position that all of
the lots should be valued as if they were sold as a single parcel because all of the
lots are being acquired by the government as a single parcel. Valuing the land as
if it would be sold as a single parcel would typically lead to a value estimate
lower than the sum of the values of the lots valued individually.
This variation in treatment suggests that many condemnors attempt to apply
different standards in larger parcel determination, depending on the extent of the
taking. This different treatment appears to have no basis in either the law or
market realities. The extent of the taking does not alter the larger parcel in the
before situation. If the four lots are considered independent parcels when only
Lot I is being taken, they should remain independent parcels when all four are
taken, and they should be valued as such.
The argument advanced by condemnors ·that they are acquiring the entire
property in one transaction, and therefore the property should be valued on the
basis of a single sale, is without merit. The fact that the government is condemning the entire ownership should not preclude the prop<';rty owner from receiving
compensation equal to the market value of the pn>per-ty as if voluntarily marketed in the most advantageous way. The owner should not be forced to take a
bulk sales discount when a bulk sale of the property does not produce its highest
value, and is therefore not the highest and best use of the property.
Another potential inequity can be demonstrated by referring to Parcel B in
Figure 5.10. If Parcel B were fully developed, the courts and condemnors would
undoubtedly recognize Lots I and 9 as independent parcels. However, they often
fail to recognize that the larger parcel in the after situation can include lands that
were not part of the larger parcel in the before situation, as was demonstrated in
Figure 5.9. This failure can result in overcompensation in some instances. For
example, assume that Lots I, 2, 8, and 9 each contain 12,000 square feet of area in
the before situation and that comparable sales indicate that residential lots are
selling for $3.00 per square foot. Further assume that the taking from Lots I and 9
removes 9,000 square feet of area from each lot and that, in the after situation, the
two remainders would be uneconomic remnants as independent parcels with only a
nominal value of $0.60 per square foot.
If Lots I and 9 are treated as two separate larger parcels in both the before
and after situations, total compensation might be computed using the before and
after rule:
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Before value:

:r-

Lot 1, as separate parcel (12,000 sq. ft.
Lot 9, as separate parcel (12,000 sq. ft.
Sum of before values

@ $3.00)

$36,000

@ $3.00)

36.000

then
with
appl~
deso
be cc

$ 72,000*

After value:
Lot 1, as separate parcel (3,000 sq. ft. @ $0.60)
Lot 9, as separate parcel (3,000 sq. ft. @ $0.60)
Sum of after values
Difference (indicated compensation)

$ 1,800

F

1.800

I
3.600*
$ 68,400

* Not indicative of the value of both lots if sold as a single entity.

However, the reality of the situation is that the owner of Lots 1 and 9 also
owns Lots 2 and 8. Recognizing this market reality, and the fact that the remnants
of Lots 1 and 9 could be merged with Lots 2 and 8 after the taking, compensation
could be computed as follows:
Before value:
Lot 1, as separate parcel 02,000 sq.
Lot 2, as separate parcel (12,000 sq.
Lot 8, as separate parcel (12,000 sq.
Lot 9, as separate parcel (12,000 sq.
Sum of before values

ft. @ $3.00)
ft. @ $3.00)
ft. @ $3.00)
ft. @ $3.00)

$36,000
36,000
* Suf
t Pre:
Rat,

36,000
36.000
$144,000*

After value:
Lots 1 & 2 merged, as separate parcel
(15,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00)
Lots 8 & 9 merged, as separate parcel
(15,000 sq. ft @ $3.00)
Sum of after values
Difference (indicated compensation)
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$45,000
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90.000*
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$ 54,000

• Not indicative of the value of the lots if sold as a single entity.

This second method of analysis produces an indicated compensation amount
that is 210/o lower than the compensation calculated by the first method. Moreover, this second method mirrors the realities of the marketplace and puts the
owner in exactly the same position, pecuniarily, in the after situation as he would
have been in had the taking never occurred.
Another inconsistency in the treatment of property owners can be demonstrated by considering Parcel Bin Figure 5.10. Assume that all lots in 1;he subdivision are fully developed and all are to be taken. Under Premise 1, each lot is
owned by a different party and each, as a independent entity, has a market value
of $36,000. The typical condemnor would have each lot valued independently
and pay each lot owner $36,000 in compensation; thus the condemnor would pay
total compensation of $324,000 (9 lots @ $36,000) for all of the lots.
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Now consider the same property under another premise. Under Premise 2,
the fully developed lots have not yet been sold and ownership of the lots remains
with the developer. In this situation the typical condemnor would attempt to
apply a modified development approach to value. (See Chapter 12 for a detailed
description of the development approach.) Compensation, under Premise 2, might
be computed as follows:
$324,000

3.600*
68,400

Retail value of lots (9 lots @ $36,000)
Less costs:
Sales costs (10%)
Developer's (entrepreneur's) profit (20%)*
Net sale proceeds

- 32,400
- 64.800
$226,800

l 9 also
mnants
nsation

Market absorption:
Absorption rate - 3 lots per year
Absorption time (9 lots + 3 lots per year)

3 years

Annual net sales income ($226,800 + 3 years)
Factor to convert 3-year income stream into
present value discounted @ IQD/ot
Value of property (compensation)

$ 75,600
X

2.486852
$188,006

* Supported by market data.

t
144,000*

90.000*
54,000
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Present worth of$1 per period for 3 years discounted at 10%. (See The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 710.)
Rate supported by market data.

In comparing the results of these two approaches, a number of interesting
and perplexing questions arise. First, how can the market value of a property
change by more than 400/o due to its ownership, particularly when an eminent
domain action is in rem and not in personam. The answer is, of course, it cannot.
Therefore, it is necessary to look at the elements, or assumptions, that are built
into these two different value indications.
Under Premise 2, sales costs are deducted from the retail value of the lots, but
no such deduction is made under Premise 1. Realistically, sales costs would be
incurred in both situations. However, it is a long-standing policy in eminent
domain valuation, and in estimating market value for other purposes, that sales
costs are not deducted from the price at which a property could be sold. No
definition of market value in use today suggests that market value is the price
that could be received for a property less the costs of sale. Thus, it must be concluded that to penalize a property owner by deducting sales costs from the market value of his lots merely because he owns more than one lot is inappropriate.
The other amount deducted from the retail value of the lots using the modified development method of valuation was identified as developer's, or
entrepreneur's, profit. Developer's profit is obviously an appropriate part of any
real estate development proposal, be it the subdivision of land or improvement
of the land with a building. However, a distinction must be drawn between a
proposed development and an existing development. In this instance all of the
lots are fully developed, not proposed. Therefore, the developer has already de-
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signed the development, obtained all necessary permits, procured financing (if
necessary), and made all improvements to the land necessary for the sale of the
individual lots. This is an existing subdivision, not a proposed subdivision.
Developer's, or entrepreneur's, profit compensates the developer for the time
and risks assumed in undertaking the development. In this case the developer
has already expended the time and money to develop the land and already assumed the risks associated with the land's development. In other words, the developer has already earned his profit associated with the development. (The risks
inherent in the actual sale of the lots is reflected in the discount rate applied to
the projected annual net sales income.) This position was supported in a Louisiana case. In fact, the court went beyond allowing developer's profit for fully developed lots, saying:
Thus, where an owner-developer owns land forming part of a subdivision actually developed and in the process of being sold as individual lots, and where a
portion of the tract destined for that use but not actually yet developed is taken,
the owner-developer is entitled to receive just and adequate compensation for
the tract taken on the basis of the retail value of the lots to individual purchasers
(assuming that the evidence shows such sales to be reasonably prospective), rather
than artificially limited to a value based upon a hypothetical sale as a single-tract
unit to another developer. The owner-developer should not be excluded from the
land-profit the evidence shows he was reasonably certain to receive, except that
the taking took place.
The owner-developer is entitled to receive as just and adequate compensation
the actual pecuniary loss caused by the taking which the evidence shows to be
attributable to the loss of the value of the land itself. He should not be deprived of
the profit attributable to the retail (as compared with the wholesale) value of the
land simply because of some arbitrary formula that bases the market value ofti¾e
tract, not upon its actually prospective retail sales to lot-purchasers, but instead
upon a fictitious, unintended, and unlikely sale of it as a single tract to a nonexisting third person who would himself develop and retail the land (and keep the
la~d-profit), just as the owner-developer was in the process of doing. 49
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However, because this Louisiana case dealt with land that was not fully developed, as is the land in our example, the court added:
Nevertheless, as the Department correctly contends, an owner of land is not entitled to recover on the basis of its retail value if sold as lots, simply because the
land's highest and best use is for subdivision purposes. The evidence must additionally show that it was reasonably certain that the owner could and would have
sold them on such basis, had it not been for the intervening expropriation.50

The issue of absorption, or marketing time, is more difficult to relate to the
factual situation and market realities. First, there must be a clear understanding of
the definition of market value. Implicit in all definitions of market value is the
presumption that "a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open mar49. State, DepL ofHighways v. Terrace Land Co, Inc., 298 So.2d

-

SO. Ibid.

51. The

fessil

859, 863 (La, 1974).
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51 Exposure time, as used in the definition, is retrospective, not prospective. It
· ket'.'
has already occurred on the date of value. If a reasonable exposure time for the
property under appraisal is 90 days, the question to be answered by the estimate
of market value is "What would the property have sold for today (the date of
value) had it been placed on the open market 90 days ago?': not "What would the
property sell for within the next 90 days if it were placed on the market today?"
When this definition is applied to an individual lot valued under Premise 1
(with each lot owned by a different party), it is assumed that the exposure time
has already occurred. There is no presumption that the other eight, individually
owned lots being acquired by the condemnor were placed on the market at the
same time, thereby skewing the supply and demand for such lots and resulting in
abnormally excessive competition for the lot under appraisal. Yet that is precisely
the presumption made under Premise 2.
Under Premise 2 it is assumed that all nine lots will be placed on the market
at same time, outstripping the demand for such lots so that they must compete
for a limited number of buyers. This is obviously treating, and valuing, the lots
differently because of the nature of their ownership, which would appear to violate the in rem nature of the condemnation action. It would also appear to violate
the definition of market value applied under Premise 1, inasmuch as prospective,
rather than retrospective, market exposure time is being assumed.
However, treating the nine lots owned by the developer in exactly the same
manner as the lots owned by nine individuals is to ignore the realities of the
situation and the market. The nine lots are, in fact, owned by the developer and if
he were to sell them individually, it would take him three years to do so.
The source of this apparent conflict is found in the various definitions of just
compensation handed down by the courts. Black's Law Dictionary states that "'just
compensation' means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken," but
goes on to say that "[i]t means a settlement which leaves one no poorer or richer
than he was before the property was taken. It requires that the owner be put in as
good position pecuniarily as he would otherwise have been if the property had
not been taken'.'52
Applying the first part of this definition to the example would indicate just
compensation of $324,000 because the market value of the lots is not altered by
the form, or nature, of t.1-ieir mvnership. However, applying the second part of the
definition (i.e., putting the owner in the same position pecuniarily that he would
have been without the take) leads to a different conclusion. Recognizing that sales
costs are never deducted from the estimate of market value and that the developer has already earned his profit from developing the land, and further recognizing the market realities of the situation, the developer's "pecuniary position"
before the taking is essentially:

: to the
ding of
! is the
n mar51. The Appraisal Foundation, Vnifonn Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 1994 ed., p. 8.

52. Black's, s.v. "just compensation:'
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Retail value of lots (9 lots @ $36,000)
Absorption rate (9 lots + 3 lots per year)
Annual income stream ($324,000 + 3)
Factor to convert 3-year income stream into
present value discounted @ 100/o*
Pecuniary position of owner before taking
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$324,000
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$108,000
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* Present worth of$1 per period for 3 years discounted at 10%. (See TheAppraisalojRealEstale, 10th ed., 710.)
Rate supported by market data.

Resolving this conflict is ultimately the obligation of the courts, not appraisers. Nevertheless, the appraiser must understand the conflict and why it exists
and should make the client aware of the conflict when it is encountered. Until
this conflict is settled by the courts, if it ever is, the best policy for appraisers is to
estimate the market value of the real estate unaffected by its ownership. While
the courts have deviated from the market value standard of measuring just compensation in some instances, for every such instance there are literally hundreds
of instances in which the courts have adhered to the market value standard.
Thousands of the public acquisitions that occur each year are based on the market value standard. To encourage appraisers to use a different standard of measurement and then proclaim, as some lawyers do, that "[a]n appraiser's mission in
a condemnation case is to estimate 'just compensation"'53 is misleading. Accepting
such advice places a burden on appraisers that even the U.S. Supreme Court has
found difficult to shoulder. The appraiser should never deviate from estimating
market value without clearly written legal instructions that are reasonable and
adequately supported.
If the appraiser's condemnor client wants to argue to the court that the Premise
2 method of valuation results in just compensation, rather than the Premise 1
valuation, the appraiser can, upon receipt of proper legai instructions, prepare a
double-premise appraisal and report both value estimates. It will then be up to
the court, or trier of fact, to determine whether just compensation requires payment of the market value of the individual lots (Premise 1) or whether the owner
should merely be put back in the same pecuniary position enjoyed before the
taking (Premise 2).
Although one of the rules of the larger parcel specifies that for two or more
parcels to be considered part of a single larger parcel, there must be unity of
ownership, there is no inverse rule. There is no rule that prescribes that two or
more tracts under the same ownership must be treated as a single larger parcel.
With regard to subdivided lots, or legally separate parcels, case law supports the
conclusion that they are separate larger parcels and should be treated as such:
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In the case now before the court there is no evidence whatsoever as to the adaptability of the plaintiff's land for any purpose other than building lots, and therefore each lot, primafade, is a separate and distinct entity.... Where the entire tract
has no adaptability peculiar to itself as an entity, and can be subdivided without

-

54. Gai:

53. Jay Dushoff and Denise Henslee, "When Eminent

Domain 'Working Rules' Don't Work," The Appraisal
Journal (July 1991), 429.
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injury to its adaptability for use as an entire tract, and the value of a particular
subdivision thereof is not dependent upon being incorporated in the tract as a
part of the entity, as where the entire tract has been subdivided and plotted into
building lots, and the value of no individual lot is dependent upon its relationship to the entire tract, each lot, for the purpose of assessment of damages ... may
be regarded as a separate distinct tract.54

It is clear that the nine lots used in our example are separate and distinct
parcels, each with their own highest and best use, and therefore should be valued
independent of one another.
The example above referred to nine subdivided lots, but lands under the
same ownership do not necessarily have to be subdivided for the appraiser to
conclude that they constitute two or more separate and distinct larg{'.!r parcels. If
there are two or more distinct highest and best uses in geographically different
portions of the property, the ownership may consist of two or more larger parcels,
and each larger parcel should be treated and valued as a separate and distinct
entity. In fact, it has been ruled that they must be valued as separate parcels.55
If a client requests that the value of an entire ownership be reported as a
single figure, the appraiser can comply with such request, but only if the single
figure is identified as the mathematical sum of the two or more estimates of
market value, which is not or may not be indicative of the market value of the
entire ownership as a single entity.
SUMMARY

The larger parcel is a premise unique to eminent domain valuation. The premise
asserts that it is the larger parcel which is considered in condemnation valuation,
and that the larger parcel must generally possess unity of title, unity of use, and
contiguity. Court rulings clearly indicate that all three of these elements need not
be present in every case. The courts have been most lax in requiring physical
contiguity, but unity of use and unity of title have been almost universally held
to be prerequisites of the larger parcel.
The courts in the various jurisdictions disagree as to whether unity of use
must be an existing unity, or a highest and best unity, of use. The latter view
appears to be prevalent in the majority of jurisdictions. In many of the cases in
which the courts have ruled that unity of use must be existing, it appears that the
alleged highest and best use would have been ruled so remote and speculative as
to merit no consideration, even if the larger parcel were not in question.
Unity of title is generally a legal question. The quality of title to the various
tracts making up the larger parcel need not be identical; as a general rule, if the
same individual or group of individuals control the title and future use of all of
the tracts, unity of title is considered to be present. Physical contiguity, which is
generally an engineering matter, is not always necessary, nor does it follow that a
whole parcel constitutes the larger parcel just because it possesses contiguity and
54. Gains v. City of Calhoun, 42 GaApp. 89 (Ga. 1931).

55. Foster v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1977).
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unity of ownership. Right-of-way maps do not control the determination of the
larger parcel and, in fact, may have no bearing on the question. The same is true
of appraisal contracts or assignments.
Unity of use is an appraisal question, and the ultimate determination of the
larger parcel is typically in the strict purview of the appraiser. This is strongly
supported by two court rulings. First:
The method of valuation of the parcels taken, whether as a separate entity or in a
relationship to the whole tract, then becomes a matter of opinion of appraisers to
be weighed by the jury.... We conclude that in this case the use of either method
of valuation by the expert witnesses was proper and their testimony admissible,
subject only to the inherent risk of nonpersuasion. 56

And second:
Where the property taken is less than the entire tract, other considerations arise.
The highest and best use of the part taken may be as a separate and distinct piece
of property unrelated to the entire property endowing such part with a fair cash
market value. On the other hand the highest and best use of the part taken may
be so related to the entire property that the value of the part taken for its highest
and best use is dependent upon the value of the entire tract Such a relation or
dependence may present an issue of fact and either party is entitled to present his
theory of independent or dependent valuation.57

It is commonly believed that determination of the larger parcel is only important in cases in which damages and/or special benefits are alleged. This belief
is false. Due to the effects of size regression and plottage, determination of the
larger parcel can have a significant effect on the indicated compensation in cases
in which neither damages nor benefits are claimed.
Because of the importance of the appraiser's determination of the iarger parcel and its potential effect on value, the appraiser should exercise the same care in
developing the larger parcel determination as is exercised in developing highest
and best use conclusions and value estimates. A complete description of the analysis
of the larger parcel and the reasoning on which the appraiser's conclusion is
based should be included in the appraisal report.
The extent of a condemnor's taking does not alter the standards under which
the larger parcel is determined. A larger parcel determination made prior to the
government's taking should be made without any reference whatsoever to the
taking. The appraiser should only be concerned with contiguity, or proximity, as
it relates to highest and best use, unity of ownership, and unity of highest and
best use.
"It should be noted ... that since unity of use is one of the elements for an
integrated unit, it would not necessarily follow that a contiguous body of land in
the same ownership constitutes a unit for valuation if the highest and best use for
various parts are different:'58 Thus, parcels that are contiguous and under the
same ownership may have independent highest and best uses. Those highest and
56. Territory ofHawaii v. Adtlmeyer, 363 P2d 979,986 (Haw.
1961).
57. Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Oberlaender,
235 N.E2d 3, 9 Cill 1968), Affd 247 N.E2d 888 (1969).

-

59. USPA

58. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi·
tions, §A-13, p. 42.
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best uses may be identical (e.g., single-family homesite), but if the highest and
best uses of the tracts do not require a common, or integrated use, they are
separate larger parcels and should be valued as such.
Proper application of the larger parcel premise can reduce the scope and
complexity of the appraisal assignment. Moreover, it will often prevent misapplication of the backland theory.
Court applications of the larger parcel premise can be quite contradictory.
Therefore, it is important that the appraiser fully understand the court's application of this premise in the jurisdiction where the property being appraised is
located. If, after proper analysis, the appraiser concludes that the larger parcel is
unquestionably that tract or tracts that are physically contiguous, are under the
same ownership, and have the same existing, and highest and best, use, it is
usually safe to complete the appraisal assignment without legal guidance. Under
any other circumstance, however, the legal permissibility of the appraiser's larger
parcel determination should be reviewed by legal counsel.
If there is a question as to the legal acceptability of the appraiser's detepnination of the larger parcel, the appraiser must obtain legal instructions from the
appropriate attorney, with supporting citations as to the legal acceptability of
such a determination. If these instructions are contrary to the appraiser's determination of the larger parcel, and the legal instructions are reasonable and supported by applicable citations, the appraiser must alter his or her determination
to conform with jurisdictional law. This is the only way appraisers can fully comply with their professional obligations. The inclusion of such legal instructions in
the appraiser's report is a prudent appraisal practice and is required by professional and technical appraisal standards.59
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59. USPAP, 1994 ed., Ethics Provision (Conduct), p, 2
and Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, §C-9, pp. 95-97.
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he development approach to value
car, ;e applied in valuations for eminent domain purposes. According to Nichols;
The best illustration of the rule that market value is not limited to value for the
existing use, and the situation in which this rule is most frequently invoked (and
also most frequently abused), is where evidence is offered of what the value of a
tract ofland that is used for agricultural purposes (or is vacant and unused) would
be if cut up into house-lots. 1

The development approach, or anticipated use method of valuation, is described in another source as
[al method of estimating the value of vacant land. The usual application is to
[value] raw, unsubdivided land by deducting from the estimated gross selling
price, the direct expense of development such as cost of streets, utilities, sales,
advertising, and overhead (taxes, carrying charges, inspection). Profit and "time
lag" (interest on the money invested for the time needed to complete the project)
are also deducted, after which the land value is indicated. 2

This method of land valuation has also been referred to as the lot method3 and the
developer's residual approach. 4
The development approach to value is examined in detail here not because it
is widely applied in eminent domain valuation, but for two other reasons. First,
there has been a great deal of controversy and confusion among the various
I. Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, rev. 3d ed. (New
York: Mathew Bender Co., Inc., 1990), vol. 4,
§12B.14[l][a].
2. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers and
the Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Real Estate
Appraisal Terminology, rev. ed., Byrl N. Boyce, ed.

(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1981), 14.
3. United States v. 47.3096 Acres, etc., 583 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.
1978).
4. United States v. 147.47 Acres of Land, 352 F.Supp. 1055
(M.D. Pa. 1972).

24S
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courts as to the applicability of this approach. Thus a considerable amount of case
law has been developed on the subject. Second, in many cases the development
approach has been applied under the wrong circumstances or in the wrong way.
If all of the land that has been appraised by the development approach were
actually subdivided, there would be enough subdivision lots on the market to
last hundreds of years and little, if any, farmland left in the United States.
There is no single correct way to apply the development approach to value.
In 1978 the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers published Subdivision Analysis, an educational memorandum on subdivision analysis and the development
approach to value. 5 Seven different methods of subdivision analysis were demonstrated in this publication. All of the- methods are correct, but some are more
applicable under certain circumstances. In 1993 the Appraisal Institute published
a monograph titled Subdivision Analysis,6 which emphasizes market analysis, forecasting techniques, and financial modeling. The new text delves into the theory
and economics of subdivision analysis and contains some excellent discounted
cash flow examples. Nevertheless, the 1993 book is not a replacement for the 1978
publication which focuses on the mechanics of the development approach. Both
publications are useful to appraisers, but an attorney preparing to present, or
rebut, a development approach appraisal to a trier of fact will probably find the
1978 memorandum more helpful.
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APPLICABILITY
The development approach is the primary, and sometimes the only, method of
valuation in a condemnation case when:
1.

The appraiser concludes through proper market analysis that the property in
question does, in fact, have a highest and best use for subdivision purposes;

2. Comparable before and/or after sales are lacking, and

T

3. Sufficient market and technical data are available to estimate the value of the
property being appraised reliably using the development approach.

b
a

In determining that a property's highest and best use is for subdivision purposes,
the appraiser must consider factors such as supply and demand, zoning, the available utilities, the direction of population growth, the physical characteristics of
the property being appraised, local land development regulations, and legislative
attitudes towards the development of properties in the area. Properties valued
with the development approach may range from raw acreage to sites that are
nearly 1000/o developed. With a partially developed site, of course, there is a stronger
case for determining that the highest and best use is for subdivision purposes
and that the development approach to value is appropriate. If data on recent
sales of developed lots that were originally part of the tract being appraised are
available, the demand for developed lots can be demonstrated with factual market data. "The bald assertion by the condemnee or his witnesses that such a de-
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5. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, Sul,division Analysis (Chicago: AI REA, 1978).

pra
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6. Douglas D. Lovell and Robert S. Martin, Subdivision Analysis (Chicago: Appraisal Institute, 1993).
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mand exists is not enough. Such a demand must be established by competent
proof'.'7
If comparable sales are available, they should be used in evaluating the property under appraisal. "Bona fide sales data provide a better indication of value
than a subdivision development prospectus'.'8 If the sale property is truly comparable, it will have the same potential as the property being appraised. As one
court put it,
The comparable sales relied upon by both expert witnesses in valuing the subject
property involved properties purchased by developers for development purposes
and accordingly were sales in which development costs have been considered
and were reflected in the sale price. To add an increment to the value established
on the basis of these sales is to inflate and distort the market value of the subject
property.9 [Citations omitted]

A New York decision stated,
[t]he court actually valued the property as having a residential development potential by relying upon the State's comparable sales. In the present case there was
no need for a separate increment value to be found by the appraisers or the court
because the market data inherently included the value in raw acreage sales. 10

This is not to say that under such circumstances the development approach
should be totally disregarded. Rather, it should be used to support the indicated
value of the property developed using comparable sales, if additional support is
needed. The procedure applied in the development approach can often give the
appraiser greater insight into the relative comparability of the sale property. Although many condemning agencies will not allow the development approach to
be used as the only measure of value, they recognize it as supporting evidence.
According to a Washington State Department of Transportation rule,
The employment of the hypothetical subdivision to develop raw land value may
be introduced to support the market data and to illustrate the amount of money
a prudent purchaser would likely pay for raw subdivision land. However, due to
the many variables and speculative elements, the estimate of value is never based
solely upon such a hypothesis."

If the appraiser cannot find any raw acreage sales with development potential comparable to the property being appraised, the analysis of supply and demand for developed lots may need to be re-examined as well as the estimate of
highest and best use. Similarly, if market data on retail lot prices, development
costs, and sellout times in the neighborhood are not available, a review of the
supply and demand analysis and estimate of highest and best use may be re-

7. Shillito v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 A2d 650, 65 l

(Pa. 1969),
R. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed. (Chicago: Appraisal Institute, 1992), 307.
9, Ridgeway Associates, Inc. v. State, 300 N.Y,S.2d, 944, 947
(N.Y, 1969).

10, United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. State, 384 N,Y,S.2d
543, 544 (N,Y, 1976).
11. Washington State Dept. of Transportation, Right
of Way Manual, Chapter 4-1, p. C-11, Tab C, §4A
(revised August 1991).
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quired. While a lack of sales and/or development activity may indicate an insufficient supply of land suitable for such use, it can also indicate a lack of demand.
Any appraiser who uses the development approach to value should confirm that
the lack of market data is a result of the first condition, rather than the latter.
Technical data can be obtained from engineering firms involved in plat design and development cost estimating or from contractors who install underground utilities or construct other subdivision improvements. "[T]his approach to
value is complex, often requiring the assistance of other experts and always requiring substantial amounts of research, analysis and supporting documentation'.'12
APPRAISAL
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PROCEDURE

If the development approach is applicable, the appraiser must apply it in a logical
sequence. The development approach to value replicates the land residual technique13 applied to land with a highest and best use for subdivision purposes. In
fact, if an owner-developer were planning to develop lots and lease them on a
long-term basis rather than sell them, the two procedures would be identical.
The procedure described below is a typical application of the development
approach to valu.e. It is not necessarily the only workable procedure nor the most
appropriate in every instance.
First, the appraiser determines the number and size of the lots that can be
developed. After completing the highest and best use analysis, the appraiser should
be totally familiar with the applicable subdivision ordinances regarding minimum lot sizes, widths, and depths; minimum street right-of-way width; pavement width; etc. The appraiser must remember, however, that land often is not
developed to its maximum allowable density or to the minimum improvement
requirements. Analyzing existing subdivisions and lot sales in the area will help
the appraiser determine the typical conditions, as well as the minimums and
maximums legally allowed.
It is often advisable, particularly in preparing for trial, to request that an
engineering consultant be retained to help lay out the most economical and physically practical plan for subdividing the property. Topographic maps of the property in question can be extremely useful in this process. The appraiser and the
engineer should work together to construct a subdivision plan that develops
marketable lots and produces the greatest residual value for the raw acreage.
The appraiser will work with a paper plat showing the number, size, and
shape of the anticipated lots as well as the proposed street rights-of-way and
open space. The retail value of each proposed lot is estimated by comparing it
with similar, fully developed lots in the same neighborhood which have been
sold recently. If no such lot sales exist, the value of the lots can be estimated using
the abstraction or extraction method of site valuation. 14 However, as mentioned earlier, lack of comparable lot sales in the area might suggest that the estimate of
highest and best use should be reconsidered.
12. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), §B-1 15, p. 74.

1. I
C

2. I

3. I

4. I
5. (

r
6. I
7. I
8.

13. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 307-308.
14. Ibid., 304-305.
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It is not always necessary to estimate the retail value of each potential lot
within the parent tract; often only the average or typical value of a lot is estimated. From this estimate, the cumulative retail market value of all the proposed
lots within the appraised property can be computed.
The next step in the valuation process is to estimate the direct and indirect
costs of developing the subject tract into a completed subdivision. Direct development costs include items such as engineering, street construction, installation
of underground utilities, street light installation, and construction of sidewalks.
Indirect development costs cover items such as the increasing d,evelopment fees
charged by many local municipalities to generate additional revenues or discourage further development within their boundaries. Other indirect costs to be considered include municipal exactions, advertising expenses, sales costs, and
administration and overhead expenses incurred during the development and
sellout period. Administrative and overhead expenses cover taxes, insurance, interest, financing, and inspection fees. Cost information can be extracted from
market data on similar developments; gathered from engineers, contractors, and
real estate agents; or obtained from a combination of these sources.
The estimated direct and indirect costs of development are deducted from the
cumulative retail value of all the potential lots. Then the appraiser allocates the amount
remaining to entrepreneurial (developer's) profit, raw land value, and a discount that
reflects the time required for full development and market absorption of the lots.
A profit factor is deducted from the value of the lots to compensate the developer for the time, trouble, and risk incurred in the undertaking. A deduction
for time is necessary because, in the construction of any large subdivision, a
considerable period could elapse from the beginning of the development process
to the sale of the last lot. Thus, the developer could receive net income over a
period of years. The income stream from the development must be converted
into a current value by discounting it at an appropriate risk rate. The result will
be the indicated market value of the property being appraised in its present,
undeveloped state.
The steps in the development approach are summarized below.
1. Prepare a subdivision layout to determine the number, typical size, and shape

of all potential lots.
2. Estimate the retail value of the lots.
3. Estimate direct development costs.
.4. Estimate indirect development costs.
5. Compute the income attributable to developer's profit and land value (Step 2
minus Steps 3 and 4).
6. Deduct developer's profit.
7. Estimate the amount of time required to develop and sell out the subdivision.
8. Discount the anticipated income stream into an indication of the current raw
land value.

·308.
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The federal court has summarized the procedural steps in the development approach as follows:

Table 1:
ment a
sellout
demo~

In arriving at their values, the owner's witnesses took into consideration the market data of sales of adjacent subdivided lots and made deductions for selling and
advertising expenses, engineering and development costs, overhead costs, taxes,
buyer's anticipated profits, and for acreage loss for streets, etc., in order to reflect
or indicate the value of the property at the time of taking. In this case, the data
relied on was derived from the market and facts as had been generated in the
development of adjacent land. This method is referred to as the "developer's residual approach'.' 15

Step
Step
Step

Figure 12.1 illustrates how a relatively small tract (19.90 acres) might be subdivided into 60 lots. Table 12.1 demonstrates the application of the development
approach to this property.
FIGURE 12.1 PROPOSED SUBDIVISION LAYOUT
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All direct unit costs have been applied to the linear measure of the streets to be
developed in the tract (i.e., 2,740 linear feet). This methodology is commonly used
in making preliminary estimates of this type and is also employed in some cost
manuals. 16
The costs per linear foot used in Table 12.1 include all engineering, plan, and
inspection fees. Direct costs can generally be more accurately estimated with unit
costs for various items than with a cost per linear foot of street. Unit costs might
include the cost per streetlight, per sewer manhole, or per fire hydrant. Costs per
cubic yard of grading or base rock are also generally accurate. The figures used in
15. United States v. IOO Acres in Marin County, 468 F.2d
1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822
(1973).
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16. Marshall Valuation Service (Los Angeles: Marshall and
Swift Publishing Company, 1979), §66, I.
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Table 12.l were selected merely to demonstrate the application of the development approach; they should not be construed as typical or all-inclusive. The
sellout time, developer's profit, and discount rate shown were also selected for
demonstration purposes only.
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TABLE 12.1 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO VALUE

Step 1.
Step 2.
Step 3.

: be subfopment

Step 4.

Step 5.
Step 6.
Step 7.
Step 8:

19.90 acres @ 3.02 lots per acre
60 lots@ $17,500
Direct costs:
Grading (2,740 lin. ft.@ $6.72)
Base rock (2,740 lin. ft.@ $8.96)
Paving (2,740 lin. ft. @$20.14)
Curbs & gutters (2,740 lin. ft. @$11.10)
Concrete walks (2,740 lin. ft.@ $10.40)
Sewer main (2,740 lin. ft.@ $12.40)
Sewer laterals (2,740 lin. ft.@ $9.50)
Sewer manholes (2,740 lin. ft.@ $2.43
Fire hydrants (2,740 lin. ft.@ $4.27)
Street lighting (2,740 lin. ft.@ $6.50)
Water main (2,740 lin. ft.@ $13.20)
Water laterals (2,740 lin. ft.@ $3.25)
Electric (2,740 lin. ft.@ $7.25)
Total direct costs
Indirect costs:
Overhead and sales costs
($1,050,000@ 10%)
$105,000
Management and supervision
36,000
Taxes and insurance
12,500
Total indirect costs
Developer's profit & raw land value
Developer's profit ($1,050,000@ 20%)
Net before cost of capital
Sellout in 3 years @ 20 lots per year.
Annual income stream ($368,331 + 3)
Discount rate factor (present worth of
one per period, 3 years, 12%)
Indicated raw land value

Indicated value per acre ($294,890 + 19.90)

60 lots
$1,050,000
$18,413
24,550
55,184
30,414
28,496
33,976
26,030
6,658
11,700
17,810
36,168
8,905
19 865
-318,169

153,500
$ 578,331
210 000
$ 368,331

$ 122,777
X 2.401831
$ 294,890

$

i4,819
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Both the appraiser and the attorney should be aware of the basic assumptions built into this methodology. First, it is assumed that the expenses of development will be incurred steadily over the three years of project development,
and that sales income will be spread evenly over the life of the project. In this
case, it is assumed that exactly 20 lots will be sold each year.

Vlarshall and
S, 1.
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Such assumptions will be true only under the most unusual circumstances.
The procedure has merit, however, because it is probably the most easily understood application of the development approach. Also, the actual pattern of development expenses and sales income may approximate the assumptions built into
the method enough to warrant its use. After all, the development approach is an
appraisal tool, not an exact mathematical formula. In using this methodology, the
appraiser should be aware of the value differential that would result if the sales
income and expenses were treated as they are actually anticipated to occur, rather
than being spread evenly over each year. If the differential is significant, the appraiser may have to use one of the more complex methods of applying the development approach. These methods are demonstrated in the 1978 publication,
Subdivision Analysis. 17
PROBLEM
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Much of the data used in applying the development approach can be supported
by market evidence, but in two areas the appraiser must reach conclusions that
cannot be readily supported. First, the appraiser's estimate of the sellout or market absorption period is affected by so many factors that the appraiser could
spend hours answering hypothetical questions about how various economic trends
could affect the development's absorption. The appraiser might be asked: 'What
if mortgage interest rates go up three points? What if the largest employer in the
area reduces its workforce by 500/o? What if two competing subdivisions opened
up directly across the street?" If the cross-examiner has done his homework, he
may be able to question the appraiser about absorption rate projections made by
the appraiser in prior development approach applications and ask why they did
not come to fruition. 18
To estimate absorption time, the appraiser must be fully familiar wit.½ t.½e
economic factors affecting the market in which the property being appraised is
located. After ascertaining the general economic trends in the area, the appraiser
should establish the geographic boundaries of the areas that will compete with
the parcel under appraisal. The area of competition may be a neighborhood, a
city, or an entire county. After this determination is made, the appraiser should
make a physical inventory of the lots in developed subdivisions that could compete with the lots to be developed from the parcel being appraised. The appraiser
should also investigate whether any preliminary plats have been submitted for
projects that could foreseeably compete with the property being appraised.
Next, the appraiser should ascertain the number of dwellings constructed annually in the neighborhood over the past several years. Under normal circumstances, this will indicate how many lots can be absorbed each year within the
subject's market area. Based on this local economic information, the appraiser can
logically estimate the absorption time required to sell the lots to be developed from
the property under appraisal. The appraiser must make this estimate carefully. If
the appraiser testifies that a hypothetical subdivision of 400 lots can be sold out
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17. Subdivision Analysis (1978).
18. In responding to such questions, the appraiser
may properly state that the absorption projec-

tion made in the approach is an attempt to mirror developer/purchaser attitudes at the time of
the appraisal.
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within two years, when historically only 150 lots have been absorbed each year in
the entire area of competition, the court or trier of fact will be skeptical.
The appraiser's estimate of sellout time can be supported by some historical
data, but the second problem area requires more pure judgment. The appraiser
must estimate the developer's profit to be deducted from the retail price of the
developed lots. In Table 12.l a developer's profit equal to 20°10 of the retail value
of the lots is indicated for purposes of illustration. Many developers estimate
potential profit as a percentage of gross retail sales, so the procedure used to
compute developer's profit in the table is representative of the, thinking and actions of typical buyers in the marketplace.
However, the appraiser should recognize that not all developers estimate profit
as a percentage of gross retail sales. Some developers estimate profit at a certain
dollar amount per lot; others project profit as a percentage of raw land costs; and
still others calculate profit as a percentage of raw land costs plus development
costs. No matter which method is used by the developer, the question for the
appraiser remains: How much should be allowed for developer's profit in applying the development approach to value?
One way to select an appropriate profit factor is to examine the actual profit
earned by developers of completed subdivisions similar to the one contemplated
for the property being appraised. Table 12.2 illustrates how a developer's profit
can be extracted from sales data It concerns a 22-acre parcel purchased for $286,000
and subdivided into 66 lots that sold for an average price of $14,500 each. In
actual practice, of course, several subdivisions would be analyzed in this manner
to establish a pattern of the net profit realized by developers.
The problem with this procedure is that the computations are based on the
amount of money the developer ended up with after the development was completed, and that amount is not of concern to the appraiser. Rather, the appraiser
wants to know what the developer envisioned when the raw acreage was purchased. Unless the 27.3% profit factor computed is the amount of profit the developer anticipated when the land was purchased, it is of little or no use to the
appraiser in estimating an appropriate profit factor for the property being appraised.
The computations shown in Table 12.2 may support the appraiser's estimate

TABLE 12.2 ABSTRACTION OF DEVELOPER'S PROFIT

Gross retail price (66 lots@ $14,500)
Direct costs
Indirect costs
Less total development costs
Profit and land cost
Less land cost
Profit
Percent of profit ($261,000 + $957,000)

$957,000
$270,000
140,000
AfQ.QQQ
$547,000
286,000
$261,000
27.3%

Note. All figures were verified by the developer.

Jt to mirie time of
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of developer's profit, but this estimate must be based on the developer's expectations going into the project, not the profit eventually gotten out of it. Extremely
careful and extensive sales verification is required. It may also be helpful for the
appraiser to determine whether developers active in the area have any rules of
thumb for anticipated profit that they use when purchasing raw acreage for subdivision purposes.
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In an all too infrequent moment of lucidity and comprehension, one court said:
It is significant that the method of valuation used [by the appraiser] has been

recognized by the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers. Indeed, income
capitalization in general and the anticipated use or development method in particular are standard appraisal practices. It would be unwise for us to require exclusion of such a widely recognized method of valuation through unduly rigid
evidentiary rules. 19

However, "[t]here is some authority for the proposition that valuation evidence based on the lot method of appraisal should never be admitted in condemnation cases involving unimproved raw land'.'20 Nor is the development
approach necessarily applicable because a legal plat of the property being appraised has been recorded. "[T]he fallacy of treating land as subdivision land or as
farm land depending upon whether or not a plat thereof had been recorded, is
the conclusion that there is magic in the recording of a subdivision plat. Obviously the highest and best use of the land is not transformed from one thing into
another by that ministerial act'.'21
This is not to say that the subdivision plan of a tract of land is inadmissible.
These plans generally are admissible, but often only in support of a witness's
opinion as to the highest and best use of the land.22 Thus it is often good trial
strategy for a condemnor to stipulate that the highest and best use of the land is
for subdivision purposes, if the question of highest and best use is not contested.
This stipulation will often preclude the submission of any specific development
plan, which can severely restrict the effective presentation of the condemnee's
case. 'Where both parties have conceded or agreed upon adaptability to the highest
and best use of the land in question, the introduction of a plat showing the land
as subdivided lots is merely cumulative and is subject to misconception by the
jury, and should therefore be excluded by the trial court'.'23 [Citations omitted]
As a general rule, it can be said that as a tract of land physically and legally
progresses from state of raw acreage to a completed subdivision, the development approach also progresses from inadmissibility to admissibility. The two extremes were discussed in a federal case.
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It may well be that even though the highest and best use of a property is for a
residential subdivision, if no meaningful steps have been taken in that direction,
19. Dashv.State,491 P.2d 1069, 1075 CAk.1971).
20. United States v. 4Z3096 Acres, 583 F.2d 270, 271 (6th
Cir. 1978).
21. State v. Maplewood Heights Corp., 302 N.E.2d 782, 785
(Ind. 1973).
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24. UniteG
1060,

22. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. v. Riley, 299 N.E.2d
173 (Ind. 1973).
23. City of Lafayette v. Beeler, 381 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind.
1978).
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viz., construction expenses and actual lot sales, then a "lot method" appraisal or a
"developer's residual" approach, as it is also known, would be inappropriate. But
that is not the situation here. The status of the subdivision and its availability for
sale within the reasonably foreseeable future was an actual and real one, certainly
not hypothetical, remote or speculative. Someone about to purchase the property
on ... the date of condemnation, would have to regard it as having a highest and
best use as a subdivision and, in determining what purchase price he would be
willing to pay, would have to consider all factors, including sales price for individual lots and additional expense of development, in arriving at,his decision ....
This is not a case where a landowner dreamily contemplates the use to which his
property may be put at some undefined future time but rather one where the
property is geographically suited for development; is located in a booming developmental area; has been subdivided into lots according to a duly certified map;
has been cleared and graded and improved with the creation of a spring-fed lake,
the construction of access roads, and the digging of a deep well sufficient to supply water to 150 homes; and where actual sales of lots as identified on the map
have taken place, the deeds of which contain building restrictions co~patible
only with a residential real estate development. 24

According to another source,
The First, Sixth and Ninth [federal] Circuits have indicated that [the development
approach] is a permissible approach to valuation, but only if the costs of subdivision are taken into account; the rationale is that the potential value of land if
subdivided could be considered by a willing buyer and a willing seller where
subdivision is a reasonable possibility and the costs of subdivision are not speculative or uncertain.25

Nichols' also addresses the admissibility of the development approach:
It is well settled that if land is so situated that it is actually available for building
purposes, its value for such purposes may be considered, even if it is used as a farm
or is covered with brush and boulders.
In some easels], however, condemnees have attempted to go so far as to show
the number of lots into which a tract is divisible, estimate sales prices per lot and
sales prices of comparable sales in t.l-1.e viciPity. In most cases, however, t_he courts
have adopted the approach that raw land as such, with little or no improvements or
preparation for subdivision may not be valued as if the land were in fact a subdivision. Thus, the "lot method" approach to valuation may not be used.
In the case ofland that has actually been fully subdivided, or nearly so, the courts
are in agreement that the "lot method" or" developer's residual approach" valuation is
proper. The problems involved in the partially developed subdivision have evaporated. The costs to the developer are no longer speculative, the value of the individual
lots in the market may be ascertained with as much certainty as in any other condemnation proceeding, and the possibility of such a use is no longer remote.26
24. United States v. 147.47 Acres of Land, 352 F.Supp. 1055,
1060 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
25. Jacques B. Gelin and David W. Miller, "The Federal Law of Eminent Domain" (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1982), §42, p. 344,
citing United States v. 125.07 Acres of Land, 667

F.2d 243, 245, 246, 251 (1st Cir. I 981); United States
v. 47.3096 Acres, 583 F.2d 270, 272 (6th Cir. I 978);
United States v. 100 Acres, 468 F2d 1261, 1266, 1267
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822, 864 (I 973).
26. Nichols, vol. 4, §12B.14[1][a] and [dl (! 990).
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Thus, the admissibility of the development approach is not questioned in
most jurisdictions when the property being appraised is either raw land or fully
subdivided land. In the latter circumstance, the appraiser should carefully analyze the determination of the larger parcel (see Chapter 5). If the lots affected by
the taking are fully developed and salable as separate entities, it is possible that
each individual lot represents a separate larger parcel and each should be appraised independently.
A problem arises when the land being appraised is neither raw acreage nor a
fully developed subdivision, but falls somewhere in between. There is no clear-cut
rule applicable to such properties. For one property, a legal plat may have been
filed, while on another a portion of the property may have been physically and
legally subdivided. There is simply no uniform rule as to what point the development process must reach before the development approach is admissibie.27
The weight of authority, however, appears to favor starting with raw acreage
value and adding incremental upward adjustments for subdivision potential as
well as the legal and physical steps taken towards actual subdivision development.
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The actual market value of the lots insofar as that value is presently enhanced by
the property's availability for subdivision may be shown, but the possible future
value if subdivision were made may not be shown.28
There being no dispute that the most advantageous use of claimants' property at
the time of taking was as a potential residential subdivision, the correct rule to be
applied "was to treat the premises not as raw acreage nor as part of the completed
development but as a potential subdivision site giving the acreage an increment
in value because of that potential use:'29 [Citations omitted]
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Whenever such an increment must be added to the raw acreage value to reflect a
property's subdivision potential, then the specific increment which is selected
and applied must be based upon sufficient evidence and be satisfactorily explained.30

If a comparable sale has subdivision potential equal to that of the property under
appraisal, no additional adjustment for that factor is required.
There is conflicting case law as to the admissibility of the actual costs of
subdivision development such as the engineering and platting fees incurred by
the owner of the property. Some jurisdictions allow the admission of such evidence, but only to better estimate the incremental value present in the property
under appraisal, not as a separate value or damage item.3 1 In other words, only
the contributory value, not the actual cost of such items, may be considered.

27. Dover Housing Authority v. George, 220 A2d 156 (N.H.
1966).
28. Santa O.ara County Flood Con!roL etc., IP.st. v. Freitas, 2
Cal Rep. 129, 131 (Cal. 1960).
29. County of Suffolk v. Firesle:r, 339 N.E.2d 154, 156 (N.Y.
1975).
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30. Ridgeway Associates, Inc. v. Stale, 300 N.Y.S2d 944, 946947 CN.Y. 1969).
31. State ,,. Chang, 436 P.2d 3 (Haw·. 1967).

32. City
197
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The courts' resistance to admitting the development approach stems from a
fear that testimony in regard to the approach may mislead the trier of fact into
determining just compensation based on a fully developed subdivision, rather
than the land as it existed on the date of taking. Before attempting to present a
case or testify to a value based on the development approach, extensive review of
applicable law in the jurisdiction is required. This review must consider the specific circumstances surrounding the property under appraisal.
Extensive pretrial conferences between the attorney and the appraiser will be
required. The admissibility of the development approach may tum on a single
question put to the appraiser by the attorney or on the appraiser's response to
that question. Because the courts' views on this issue vary, it is difficult to predict
the admissibility of development approach evidence. Even the courts can find the
absence of definite rules on this issue confusing.
The line of demarcation between those circumstances in which testimony of specific intended use and lot by lot evaluation is admissible, and those circumstances
under which it is not, is too finely drawn for us to follow. We remain uninstructed
as to the appropriate method for "properly guarding" such evidence so as to allow
its admission. 32

THE

PARTIALLY DEVELOPED
PROPERTY

As noted previously, the admissibility of the development approach is less questionable when the property being appraised is either raw acreage or fully subdivided land. Divergent rulings are more prevalent when the property being
appraised falls somewhere between these extremes. Factual circumstances, applicable case law, and/or the condemnor's appraisal reporting requirements may
necessitate some modification of the traditional development approach to value.
Only the written and/ or verbal presentation of the approach may be modified, or
the factual situation may require modification of the application of the approach.
To illustrate the application of the development approach in a before and
after situation, consider the following set of circumstances. The tract of land depicted in Figure 12.2 contains 25 acres and was acquired iO years ago by a broker/
developer. A preliminary plat, or master development plan, of the land was submitted to the planning commission three years ago. This plan is shown in Figure
12.3. While the planning commission was considering the master plan, it was
learned that the state planned to widen the freeway right-of-way to the north,
which would have a direct effect on the property. For this reason, the property
owner requested only preliminary approval of the master plan (Figure 12.3) and
final approval of the development of the northerly portion of the property (the 14
lots depicted in Figure 12.4). The preliminary master plan (Figure 12.3) and the final
plat of the northerly portion of the property (Figure 12.4) were both approved.
32. City of Lafayette v. Beeler, 381 N.E.2d 1287, 1294 Und.
1978).
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The property is located in a rural area, about 10 miles from a small city with
a population of 40,000. There are no public water or sanitary sewer facilities in the
area. Consequently, in developing the 14 northerly lots, the property owner drilled
a well and constructed a community water system adequate to supply domestic
water to all 32 lots proposed in the original master plan. Then the 14 northerly
lots were developed and sold. About one year later, the state's right-of-way plans
were made public and the owner made no attempt to develop the tract further.
The state's right-of-way plan is superimposed over the original master plan in
Figure 12.5. Because the original 14 lots were sold, the larger parcel is the unplatted
portion of the tract, which consists of 15.21 acres.
FIGURE 12.2 PLOT PLAN • RAW LAND
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FIGURE 12.4 FINAL PLAT
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,

In the before situation, the tract is quite unique for several reasons:
• It abuts a successful existing subdivision.

Gross sal
Direct cm
Final~
clearir
Subtotal
Indirect c
Sales
Manar
Taxes
Total indir
Net incorr

A community water system is available to it.
• It is suitable for development with septic tanks.
• It has "preliminary master plan" approval.

• Preliminary engineering on the tract is complete.
• Proposed streets have been roughed in.

Due to the unique features of the tract, a market search uncovered no comparable
sales. Analysis of the site indicates that the highest and best use of the tract in the
before situation is completion of the subdivision improvements in conformity
with the original master plan. Based on the foregoing factors, the development
approach to value is deemed appropriate.
The appraiser's research indicates that all lots in the original subdivision sold
for $12,500, regardless of their size, and that lot prices at a more recently completed subdivision across the freeway were $12,750, regardless of size. Based upon
these data, a developed lot price of $12,750 is considered reasonable. With information from an engineering consultant, cost indexes, an analysis of comparable
subdivisions, and the appraiser's data files, the following development costs were
estimated.
Direct costs:
(Final plat and construction
engineering, grading, clearing,
streets and water lines)
Indirect costs:
Overhead and sales expense
Management and supervision
Taxes during sellout

Discount
($133,
Less profi
Indicated
($92,9

* Present,

• All pl

oflitt
• The a
• The t
interi
The r

$55,000
150/o of gross sales
100/o of direct costs
$1,000

A two-year.sellout period has been estimated based on the historical experience
of the subdivision across the freeway.
From these data, the estimated before value of the property can be computed. These calculations are shown in Table 12.3. Analyzing the remainder in the
after situation leads to the conclusion that the highest and best use of the remainder tract is for a residential subdivision and that the best method of development would follow the plan shown in Figure 12.6. To analyze the property in
the after situation, the following factors must be considered:
• Only nine lots can be developed, so nine lots have been lost.
• The property contains 9.85 acres in the after situation.
• The community water system becomes an overimprovement.
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TABLE 12.3 BEFORE SITUATION - VALUE COMPUTATIONS
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Gross sales (18 lots@ $12,750)
Direct costs:
Final platting and engineering, grading,
clearing, street improvements, water lines
Subtotal
Indirect costs:
Sales and overhead ($229,500 x 0.15)
Management and supeNision ($55,000 x 0.10)
Taxes
Total indirect costs
Net income before return on capital and profit

$229,500

55,000
$174,500
$34,425
5,500
1 000
$ 40,925
$133,575

Discount income stream for two years @ 10%
($133,575 + 2) X 1.735537*
Less profit ($229,500 x 0.10)
Indicated value of land "as is"
($92,962 + 15.21 acres) $6,111.90 per acre, say, $6,100 per acre

$115,912
22.950
$ 92,962

* Present worth of $1 per year for two years @ 100/o

• All previous master plan approvals are void and all historical engineering data are
of little or no value.
• The average lot size will be larger than it was in the before situation.
• The tract will have 1,300 linear feet of frontage on the new frontage road and few
interior streets will need to be constructed.
• The new frontage road will cany a fairly high volume of traffic.
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FIGURE 12.6 PLOT PLAN-AFTER SITUATION
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Investigation indicates that lots fronting on arterial streets or frontage roads
are typically larger than interior lots, but this advantage is offset by the disadvantage of fronting on a highly traveled street.
Based on these data, discussions with a consulting engineer, reference to cost
indexes, and the actual costs of comparable subdivisions, an indication of the
after value of the property could be computed (see Table 12.4). In the after situation, the cost of street improvements per linear foot increased because part of the
new street had not previously been roughed in. Also, water costs per linear foot
increased because the water line could not be extended across the street. Engineering expenses per lot increased because preliminary engineering plans were
invalidated by the taking.
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TABLE 12.4 AFTER SITUATION-VALUE COMPUTATIONS

Gross sales (9 lots@ $12,750)
Less direct costs:
Engineering, grading, street improvements, water lines
Subtotal
Less indirect costs:
Sales and overhead ($114,750 x 0.15)
$17,213
Management and supervision ($40,900 x 0.10)
4,090
Taxes
----100
Total indirect costs
Net income before profit
Less profit ($114,750 x 0.10)
Indicated land value
or ($40,672 + 9.85 acres) $4,129 per acre, say $4,100 per acre

$114,750
40,900
$ 73,850

21,703
$ 52,147
11 475
$ 40,672

Size
Numb,
Sale p
Less c
Less ir
Net be
DiSCOl

$4,
$7,
Less i::
lndica
Lots p
lndica
$3,
$5,
lndica
well, p
develc

Under the federal (before and after) rule the appraiser's conclusion would be:
Before value (15.21 acres @ $6,100)
After value (9.85 acres @ $4,100)
Difference

$ 92,800*
40.400*
$ 52.400

* Rounded

Under the state (taking plus damages) rule, the appraiser's conclusion would be:
Value before taking
Less value of part taken (5.36 acres
Remainder (before)
Less remainder(after taking
Damage
Less special benefits
Net damage
Plus value of part taken
Total difference

$ 92,800*
@ $6,100)

32.696
Comp.
Comp.
Adjust
lndica

$60,104
~*

$19,704

__o
$19,704
32.696

* Cost
Rou

t

$ 52.400

• Rounded
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The foregoing example demonstrates a relatively simple application of the
traditional development approach to value in a partial taking case. As the complexity of the application increases, the chances of the approach being approved
by either the court or the condemnor's review appraiser decrease. As mentioned
earlier, it may be necessary to modify the development approach or its presentation to ensure its acceptance.
For example, in analyzing the before situation of the tract (Figure 12.3), the
appraiser must first investigate and verify sales of vacant land comparable to the
parcel under appraisal but without development improvements. The costs to develop each comparable are then estimated just as the costs to develop the property under appraisal were estimated. For comparison purposes, it is often convenient
to convert these cost factors into a cost per lot or a cost per acre. This process is
demonstrated in Table 12.5 using the 15.21-acre larger parcel as the subject and a
hypothetical comparable sale of 20.2 acres which sold for $79,000. In actual practice, the appraiser may want to break this adjustment down for individual items
of dissimilarity such as "comparable's lack of water system," or "comparable's
lack of preliminary engineering'.'

TABLE 12.5 DEVELOPMENT LAND-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Comparable

21 703
52,147
11 475
40,672

ould be:
$ 92,800*
40.400*
$52,400

·ould be:
$ 92,800*

Size
Number of potential lots
Sale price per lot
Less direct costs per lot*
Less indirect costs per lot*
Net before capital and profit
Discount
$4,940/2 X 1.735537
$7,420/2 X 1.735537
Less profit 10%
Indicated value per lot "as is"
Lots per acre
Indicated value per acre "as is"
$3,012 X 1.287
$5,164 X 1.183
Indicated per-acre adjustment for subject's
well, physical developments, and greater
development potential ($6,109 - $3,876)

32,696
$60,104
40.400*
$19,704
__
O

Comparable price
Comparable price per acre ($79,000/20.2)
Adjustment for subject's lesser development cost
Indicated value for subject per acre

20.2 acres
26
$12,750
5,079
2,731
$ 4 940

Subject

15.21 acres
18
$12,750
3,056
2 274
$ 7,420

$ 4,287
1 275
$ 3,012
1.287

$ 6,439
1,275
$ 5,164
1.183

$ 3,876
$ 6,109

$ 2,233
$ 2 2oot
$79,000
$ 3,911
2 200
$ 6,111
$ 6,100t

$19,704
32,696
$52,400

* Cost figures from Table 12.3

t

Rounded
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From an appraisal standpoint, the comparative analysis shown in Table 12.5
is nothing more than a slightly modified application of the development approach to value. However, in this case the development approach has not been
used to estimate the value of the property under appraisal; rather, it has been
used to help the appraiser estimate and· support a proper adjustment for the
physical and economic differences between the comparable property and the
property under appraisal. This adjustment factor is subsequently used in the sales
comparison approach to value.
Although this methodology may seem a bit devious (and perhaps it is), appraisers must sometimes resort to such procedures to ensure the acceptance of
standard appraisal practices, which are widely recognized in the industry as valuable appraisal tools. This process is much like giving your dog his medication
rolled up in a piece of hamburger; it's good for him - he just doesn't know it. The
use of this methodology is valid and can mean the difference between the acceptance or rejection of an appraisal report by the condemnor's review appraiser. It
can also mean the difference between the admissibility or inadmissibility of valuation testimony.
If an adjustment methodology has been used, the appraiser may want to
meet with legal counsel to consider how much detail about the specific elements
of the adjustment factor counsel will want or be allowed to present under direct
examination. The appraiser may choose only to testify about the differences between the comparable and the property under appraisal or about the gross adjustment called for. The appraiser may state:
I considered the fact that the sale property has no water system and the property
under appraisal has a water system. I also considered the fact that the preliminary
master plan has been approved for the subject, but none exists for the comparable. After considering these differences, the indicated adjustment factor would
be +$2,200 per acre, which would indicate a value for the property being appraised in the before situation of $6,100 per acre, or approximately $92,800.

Further explanation of the adjustment factor could meet with objection and
be ruled inadmissible. If in cross-examination, however, opposing counsel is so
bold as to ask, ''.And how, Mr. Appraiser, can you justify this outrageous adjustment of $2,200 per acre?" the appraiser should be prepared to explain the adjustment down to the smallest detail.
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At one time an appraiser or engineer could walk into a local planning office,
pick up a copy of the local zoning ordinance and subdivision ordinance, and
deterroine from tl1ese documents ho~-v many lots a tract could be subdivided into
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and the amount of time required to obtain the necessary approvals. This is no
longer possible. Zoning and subdivision ordinances are now written in such a
way that the local government agency can alter development requirements on a
project-by-project basis, which places unique, and sometimes outrageous,
demands on developers.33 Two common demands are development fees and exactions of land or easements for public use. Dedications of road rights-of-way or
access easements are common, as are exactions of land for parks, schools, and
other public purposes.
In addition to zoning and subdivision land use controls, >there are a myriad
of new land use regulations. Wetlands, open space, shoreline, water detention (or
run-off), and low-income housing ordinances are just a few of these additional
ordinances. (See Chapter 7 for more information on land use regulations.) A regulation that required a developer to comply with a city-established wage rate to
obtain a building permit was ruled not to be a taking.34
The flexibility of land use regulations, the introduction of new regulations,
and the practice of exacting money and land from developers have substantially
increased the risks of land development. The participation of citizen and environmental groups in the development approval process has also increased the risks,
as has the time required to obtain development permits. "Resistance from local
residents and the general public has stopped many real estate developments'.'35
For these reasons, most sales of land acquired for development purposes are
subject to the condition that the purchaser obtain necessary development permits prior to closing. This takes considerable risk out of the development process.
If the development approach is applied to a tract of land and development permits have not been issued for its development on the date of valuation, the risks
and time lag associated with procuring such permits remain present.
The appraiser must take these factors into consideration in projecting the
sellout period for a development and in estimating the appropriate entrepreneurial profit factor to be applied in the development approach to value. It is not
unusual for two or three years to be spent obtaining all the permits necessary for
the subdivision of land, especially if development approvals are appealed.
The sample application illustrated in Table 12.1 assumed no delay was involved in obtaining permit approvals. If there had been a two-year delay in
obtaining such approvals, and the lot prices and costs remained constant, the
indicated value of the land would have been reduced from $14,819 per acre to
$11,813 per acre. The equation is
([3.604776 - L690051)*

x $122,777) + 19.90 acres

• Present worth of $1 per period factor for 5 years discounted at 12% (3.604776) minus present
worth of $1 per period factor for 2 years discounted 120/o (l.690051) = present worth of $1 per
period factor for three years, deferred for two years.

1g office,
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This reduction in the indicated value of the property by more than 200/o highlights the importance of considering permit processing time. It is also probable
that a developer who anticipates a delay of two years before development can
33. When these demands become outrageous, the

courts have, on occasion, found them to be takings, requiring the payment of just compensation. See Chapter 17.

34. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Baca, 769 F.Supp.
1537 (N.D. Cal. I 991).
35. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 281.
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begin would want a higher percentage of profit than is shown in Table 12.1.
Moreover, the cost of holding the land for two years while permits are processed
would have to be accounted for, further reducing the present value of the land.
The increased speculation brought about by new development ordinances
and more land use regulations will probably make the courts even more reluctant to accept development approach evidence, especially in the appraisal of raw
land when no meaningful steps toward development have actually been made.
DEVELOPMENT

APPROACH

AND

DCF

ANALYSIS

The development approach lends itself to discounted cash flow analysis and some
form of DCF analysis is often employed by market participants in making various
development decisions. From a practical standpoint, a development seldom produces level cash flows over its development and sellout period. Returning to the
example shown in Table 12.1, such a development would probably not produce
level cash flows of $122,777 per year. Because the development is small, all the
development costs would probably be incurred during the first year. To attempt
to develop this land in three phases would likely increase actual construction
costs beyond the amount that could be saved by not incurring all of the direct
costs in the first year of development. A more accurate picture of the actual cash
flows of such a development is shown in the DCF analysis in Table 12.6.

TABI

Lot in
Sale~
Less:

Profit
Less
Nett
PresE
PresE

TABLE 12.6 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH-DEVELOPMENT COSTS IN YEAR 1

Lot inventory-beginning of year
Sales (20 lots @$17,500)
Less: Direct costs
Overhead and sales costs
Management and supervision
Taxes and insurance
Profit and raw land value
Less profit
Net before cost of capital
Times present value factor at 12%
Present value of income streams

Year1

Year2

Year3

60
$350,000
318,169
35,000
12,000
6,250
($21,419)
- 70 000
($91,419)
0.892857
($81,624)

40
$350,000
0
35,000
12,000
__ilgfi
$298,834
- 70 000
$228,834
0.797194
$182,425

20
$350,000
0
35,000
12,000
2083
$300,917
- 70,000
$230,917
0.711780
$164,362

lndic
lndic
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applie<
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DCFfr
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terly r,
prices
compl
increa:
admis:

Indicated raw land value: $265,163
Indicated value per acre: $13,325

The projected cash flows in Table 12.6 show that all of the development costs
are anticipated to be incurred during the first year. The only other difference in
the computations made in Tables 12.1 and 12.6 is the assumption that taxes and
insurance costs will decrease each year as the lot inventory is reduced. By com-
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paring the tables, it can be seen that the indicated value of the land under appraisal has been reduced from $14,819 per acre in Table 12.1 to $13,325 per acre in
Table 12.6. This 10% reduction was computed after the income stream was revised
to reflect more realistic expectations.
An appraiser who applies the development approach using DCF analysis has
the advantage of being able to test various development schemes to determine
which one will produce the highest residual value to the land. For instance, assume that direct development costs of the subject tract would increase by 15% if
the physical development of the land were accomplished over three years rather
than one. As demonstrated in Table 12.7, the indicated value of the property under appraisal would then be $12,880 per acre. Thus the optimum development
plan would be to complete the development in a single year.

TABLE 12.7 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH-3-YEAR DEVELOPMENT COSTS

Lot inventory-beginning of year
Sales (20 lots@ $17,500)
Less: Direct costs (per Table 12.1)
Overhead and sales costs
Management and supervision
Taxes and insurance
Profit and raw land value
Less profit
Net before cost of capital
Present value factor at 12%
Present value of income streams

Year 1

Year2

Year3

60
$350,000
121,965
35,000
12,000

40
$350,000
121,965
35,000
12,000
__A,j_QQ
$176,869
- 70,000
$106,869
0.797194
$85,195

20
$350,000
121,965
35,000
12,000
2083
$178,952
- 70,000
$108,952
0.711780
$77,550

~

$174,785
- 70 000
$104,785
0.892857
$93,558

Indicated raw land value: $256,303
Indicated value per acre: $12,880

DCF analysis is particularly useful when the development approach is being
applied to a relatively large development that will take several years to sell out. It
also is helpful when development financing is being contemplated. Within the
DCF framework, appraisers can project different numbers of lot sales in the various years of the development process, use different projection periods (e.g., quarterly rather than annual), and build in anticipated increases or decreases in lot
prices and/or expenses. However, appraisers should keep in mind that as the
complexity of the development approach and the number of different projections
increase, it becomes less likely that the court will find the approach to value
admissible and that the trier of fact will understand it.
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SUMMARY
The development approach to value can be used to estimate the market value of
a tract of land that has a highest and best use for subdivision purposes. The
approach is simply the land residual technique applied to undeveloped land.
There are many ways to apply the development approach and selecting the correct methodology often depends on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the property under appraisal. Various applications of the development
approach are discussed in detail in other publications.36
The best evidence of the value of raw subdivision land is derived from comparable sales. Although the use of comparable sales, when available, is the preferred approach to value, the development approach can, and often should, be
used to support the value of the property indicated by the sales comparison
approach. If an appraiser testifies that the highest and best use of a property is for
subdivision purposes and estimates its value using comparable sales only, with
no reference to the development approach on direct examination, the appraiser
may still be subject to cross-examination concerning development cost factors.
An Illinois court stated,

As a
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The appellants' theory was that the highest and best use for the tract was for
subdivision. This being a question in issue, there was no error, based on the
record in this case, in allowing cross-examination of their witnesses regarding the
cost of improving the property for the sale of lots for dwelling purposes.
The same reasoning applied to the rebuttal testimony offered by the appellee.
It being proper to examine the appellants' witnesses as to the basis of their opinions on costs of subdividing, it was proper for the appellee to introduce evidence
on its side as to such costs. 37

The procedural steps in applying the development approach to value are:
l. Prepare a subdivision layout to determine the number, typical size, and shape

of aU potential lots.
2. Estimate retail value of the lots.

3. Estimate direct development costs.
4. Estimate indirect development costs.
5. Compute the income residual attributable to developer's profit and land value
(Step 2 minus Steps 3 and 4).
6. Deduct developer's profit.
7. Estimate th1e amount of time required to develop and sell out the subdivision.

8. Discount the anticipated income stream into an indication of the current raw
land value.

The most difficult items for an appraiser to support with market data are the
estimated sellout, or absorption, rate (including the time required to procure nee-

36. Subdivision Analysis (1978).

38. TheAp1
fessional
Apprais

37. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Krol, 145 N.E.2d
599, 603 (Ill. 1957).
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CH

essary development permits) and the appropriate amount of developer's profit to
be deducted from the retail sale price of the lots.
In estimating developer's profit, the appraiser must remember that this amount
should reflect what a developer would consider a reasonable profit going into a
proposed development project, not the amount of profit that a particular developer actually received at the conclusion of a similar project. Analyzing the actual
profits received by various developers on completed subdivision projects can
help the appraiser select an appropriate profit factor to use in the development
approach, but it is not a conclusive test The appraiser must l;>e certain that the
estimate of developer's profit reflects the risk, time, and costs associated with
obtaining all necessary development permits as well as the risks associated with
the physical development and sellout of the lots.
As a general rule, the courts will not allow the development approach to be
admitted into evidence when it is applied to raw subdivision land On the other
hand, when the land under appraisal is fully developed, or nearly so, most jurisdictions will allow use of the development approach and admit evidence in this
regard. Case law pertaining to the admissibility of the development approach
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, primarily because circumstances differ in
each specific case. Some courts are reluctant to admit development approach
testimony because they fear it will be misconstrued or misused by the trier of fact.
It is imperative that case law in the applicable jurisdiction be extensively investigated before any attempt is made to use or testify to the development approach
to value.
The development approach to value is most often applied to tracts that fall
between the two extremes of raw acreage and fully subdivided land. Therefore,
modification of the procedural steps in the development approach is sometimes
warranted. Complex applications of the development approach are less likely to
be approved by the condemnor' s review appraiser or by the court. Although use
of DCF analysis tends to increase the complexity of the development approach,
market conditions and the nature of the anticipated cash flows sometimes require the flexibility DCF analysis offers. If the appraiser chooses to apply DCF
analysis, care must be taken to ensure that the analysis undertaken conforms
with the The Appraisal Foundation's requirements with regard to DCF analysis. 38
The methodology of the development approac..h to value can help the appraiser in analyzing the differences between a property in the before situation
and the after situation. The methodology can also be modified and applied to the
· comparative analysis of sales in the sales comparison approach to value.
Because the development approach to value is complex and case law concerning its admissibility is conflicting, the appraiser should not attempt to use
this approach, or testify to it, without the assistance of legal counsel, a consulting
engineer, and other technical advisors. It follows, therefore, that an uninitiated
appraiser should not attempt to apply this unless he or she is associated with an
appraiser who has had experience in its use. Similarly, an attorney with little
38. The Appraisal Foundation, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 1994 ed., Statement on
Appraisal Standards No. 2, p. 55-57.
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eminent domain trial experience should not attempt to undertake a condemnation case involving the development approach to value without obtaining the
assistance of an individual experienced in, and thoroughly familiar with, the legal and appraisal intricacies of this approach.
Applying the development approach to value is generally quite time-consuming and expensive. Preparation for trial and the trial itself are lengthy procedures for both the appraiser and the attorney, and thus expensive for their client.
As a general rule, no other type of condemnation case requires as much pretrial
conferences and pretrial preparation as a case involving the development approach to value. For these reasons, such a case should not be undertaken by an
appraiser or attorney unless the client is fully aware of the potential cost involved
and is prepared to pay the price. Under no circumstance should an appraiser or
attorney go to trial in a case involving the development approach to value without extensive pretrial preparation.
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11

ftl,e acquisition of a parrel ofland is
a total taking, as opposed to a partial acquisition, the proposed use of the land
taken is of no consequence to the appraiser, nor is it of consequence to the attorney once the question of public use and necessity has been adjudicated by the
court. At least theoretically, the proposed use of the land taken in a total taking is
of no significance to the trier of fact and should have no bearing on the determination of just compensation. Only in the case of a partial acquisition 9-oes the
proposed use of the land taken need to be considered.
Although some may argue that not all public construction constitutes the
construction of a public improvemmt, discussion of this question is beyond the
scope of this work. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that all public
construction constitutes public improvements. Historically, the value of a remainder
property in a partjal taking case was estimated assuming the public improvement
was complete and operational on the date ofvaluation. 1 Because the size of public projects and the cost of money have increased, as has the amount of time
between land acquisition and the completion of many public projects, it is now
more common to estimate the value of a remainder property in its physical condition as it exists on the date of valuation, giving consideration to the proposed
public construction and its anticipated effect. "The 'after value' is based on the
value of the remainder property assuming that the actual construction of the
proposed project will not be completed until an estimated future date'.'2 In estimating the remainder property's value, the appraiser must exclude from consideration any diminution in the value of the remainder property attributable to
I. Joseph M. Montano, &cognition of Benefits to Remainder Property in Highway Valuation Cases, National Research Program Report No. 88 (Washington, D.C.:
Highway Research Board, 1970), 8.

2. Washington State Dept. of Transportation, Right of
Way Manual (revised August 1991), Chapter 4-1, Part
I, §A3, p. 1-1.

27i
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any temporary inconvenience during or caused by the actual construction of the
public improvement. Thus one hypothetical condition (i.e., that the public improvement was complete on the date of value) has been replaced with another
hypothetical condition (i.e., that disruption of the remainder property during construction of the public improvement will have no impact on its market value).
The significance of this change will be discussed in the next chapter.
Although the appraiser is to view the remainder property as it physically
existed on the date of value, he or she must consider the impact of the pending
construction on the remainder property. Therefore, the appraiser must be able to
visualize the remainder property after the proposed public project is complete to
estimate its value and reflect the damages and/ or special benefits that will accrue
to it.
The appraiser demonstrates a full and accurate understanding of the after
situation by describing it in writing, in an appraisal report, and verbally, on the
witness stand. The appraiser must understand not only the portion of the public
project that will abut the remainder property, but also the entire public improvement.
There is considerable case law indicating that damage to the remainder property is limited to the damage caused by only that portion of the public project that
occupies the area taken from the original larger parcel.3 This theory is based on the
fact that "... the just compensation assured by the Fifth Amendment [of the U.S.
Constitution] to an owner, a part of whose land is taken for public use, does not
include the diminution in value of the remainder caused by the acquisition and
use of adjoining lands of others for the same undertaking:'4 This concept, and the
difficulty of attempting to apply it in the real world, is discussed in Chapter 14.

ENGINEERING,
STAKING,

AND

PROPERTY
INSPECTION

The first thing the appraiser must do is become familiar with the property being
appraised. This is accomplished by performing a site inspection, examining the
title to the property, and making a preliminary investigation of the zoning, neighborhood trends, and general economic conditions. Then the appraiser should
meet with the condemnor's engineer to learn about the proposed construction. If
the appraiser has been employed by the condemnee, it is often necessary for the
condemnee's attorney to make arrangements for such a meeting. If the condemnor's
attorney or engineer is uncooperative, the required information may be elicited
through interrogatories or by deposition.
The amount ahd quality of information concerning construction plans and
specifications that is available for review by the appraiser will generally depend
on the specific condemnor and the type of public project proposed. Whenever
possible, the site should be inspected by the appraiser and the engineer together.
If the appraiser does not understand the proposed construction perfectly, he must
3. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 45 (9th. Cir.
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construct a small retaining wall west of the proposed taking line and move the
take line enough west to avoid the underground septic tank drain field.
In analyzing the value of a property after a taking, the appraiser must consider the proposed use to which the condemnor will put the land taken. 6 However, the appraiser must remember that the condemnor is generally not limited to
the use proposed at the time of the taking unless the condemnor limited or restricted itself to specific plans and specifications submitted at that time. If such a
limitation is made by the condemnor, and the condemnor subsequently expands
or changes the use of the land, the condemnee may be entitled to additional
compensation.7 If no such limitation is made, however, the condemnor is not
restricted in its use of the land taken and the appraiser must consider what the
condemnor is acquiring a right to do, not what the condemnor plans to do as of the'
date of trial. The appraiser must assume that the condemnor will use the land
taken to the fullest legal extent possible.8
On the other hand, the appraiser cannot assume that the condemnor will put
the land taken to the use that, in the appraiser's opinion, would be the most
injurious to the remainder. 9 Any potential uses must be so reasonably probable
as to have a detrimental effect on the current market value of the remainder. As
one court stated:
While it is true that a condemnation award must "once and for all" fix the damages, present and prospective, that will accrue reasonably froin the construction
of the improvement, and in this connection must consider the most injurious use
of the property reasonably possible, that does not mean that the jury may speculate on the possibility of damage from some future abandonment of the improve6. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
7. McCubbin v. Village of Gretna, 116 N.W,2d 287 (Neb,
1962).

8, Western Union TeL Co. v. Polhemus, 178 F. 904 (3rd Cir.
1910).
9. Andrews v. Cox, 17 A2d 507 (Conn. 194 ll.

1225 of 1617

•

295
DAMAGES IN PARTIAL TAKINt.. _:ASES

tould be
-proteced to be
point is

:TION

'!VER

)CONTROL
IPERVISE

~

-u:l/

· a levee.
ying fee
i. When
ent area
ppraisal
exercise
a would
te adopasement
Lt would
~ issued.
asement
t the elasement
Vfor the
:thin the
1rovided
thin the

first easement area would require a permit from the condemnor and that the
appraiser was to assume that such a permit would be denied. The appraiser refused to accept the legal instruction and, after a review of the appraiser's appraisal report for the first easement taking (which included the drawing of
"allowable construction" and the written assumption and limiting condition that
such construction would be permitted), the legal instrnction was withdrawn. If
the appraiser had not insisted upon written clarification of the rights retained by
the owner of the land when the first easement was taken and included a comprehensive description of these rights, the owner of the property might well have
received substantially less than that to which he was due.
In many jurisdictions appraisers are not technically required to identify specifically or estimate the dollar amount of damages for condemnation trial purposes. They need only estimate the market value of the property before the partial
acquisition and the market value of the remainder property immediately after
the proposed acquisition. "Notwithstanding the foregoing, appraisals should contain an allocation between the value of the property being acquired and damages
to the remainder.' 17 Many condemning agencies require this allocation. 18 One reason for this requirement is that payment for the taking and payment for damages
to the remainder property are treated differently for income tax purposes. Also,
from a practical standpoint, the appraiser must attempt to isolate and identify all
elements of damage present in the remainder property. This is not to say that the
appraiser must, or even should, estimate a specific dollar amount for each item of
damage, only that each should be acknowledged and considered.
Whether the appraiser is working under the federal mle or state mle of measuring just compensation, the procedural steps of valuation are the same. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of these two measures of just compensation,) The estimate of
damages should be no more conjectural or speculative than the appraiser's estimates of market value before and after the acquisition. Damage estimates must
exclude highly improbable damages, but reflect those damages that would be
considered significant by prudent buyers and sellers. "[Sltrict proof of the loss in
market value to the remaining parcel is obligatory.' 19 "[T]he extent to which the
utility of the property has been destroyed and its market value diminished must
necessarily be established by factual data having a rational foundation in support
of such a claim'.'20
The appraiser measures damages, not as an end in itself, but to assist in
estimating the value of the remainder tract "Under the Federal rule, compensation is paid for 'takings' not 'damages'."21 In other words, the estimate of damages
is the basis for arriving at an adjustment that will be applied to various market
data in valuing the property in the after situation. One of the most commonly
used and reliable methods of estimating damage is by analyzing comparable
sales using the matched pairs, or paired data analysis, technique.22 Damages can
also be estimated by capitalizing the net rent loss resulting from the damage.
17. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi·
lions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), §A-11, p. 34.
18. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. The Appraisal Guidt (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 9.
19. United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172,
179 (9th Cir. 1950), cert, denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).

20, United States v. 26.07 Acres of Land in Hempstead, 126
F.Supp. 374,377 CE.D.N.Y, 1954).
21. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi·
lions, §A-11, p. 31.
22. For a description of this analytical technique, see
The Appraisal of Real &tale, 10th ed. (Chicago: Appraisal Institute, 1992), 394-397.
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A third method applied to estimate a proper adjustment for damage is known
as the cost to cure. This method can be used when the property being appraised has
suffered damage that can be physically and economically corrected,23 e.g., through
correction of drainage, replacement of fencing, reestablishment of physical access, or replacement of sewage or water systems. Under no circumstances can the
cost to cure measure of damage be applied if the cost to cure exceeds the diminution in value that would result if such a cure were not undertaken.24 However, if
the cost to cure is less than the diminution in the value of the remainder, the cost
to cure measure of damage must be used.25
Although Nichols' suggests that the cost to cure measure of damage is an
exception to the before and after method of valuation and determination of compensation,26 this measure of damage actually ensures conformance with the rule.
If a property with a deficiency is placed on the market, both the buyer and seller
will consider the cost to cure the deficiency, if it is physically and economically
curable. The price at which the property will sell is the value of the property as
deficient or the value of the property without the deficiency minus the cost to
cure the deficiency, whichever is higher. If a remainder property lacks a connecting road approach, or driveway, to an abutting road, it would be illogical to
estimate the market value of the remainder property as if it would be landlocked
in perpetuity. If a road approach could physically and legally be constructed, the
value of the property would be its market value with access minus the cost of
constructing the access, unless the cost to construct the access exceeded the difference between the value of the property with access less the value of the property as landlocked.
The measure of damages cannot be based on an assumption that adjacent
land can be acquired,27 but the appraiser can consider the general availability of
suitable replacement property. This is particularly true when the property in question is a noncontiguous larger parcel.28 Figure 14.5 illustrates the misuse of such
an assumption. In this situation it would be improper to estimate the damage to
the remainder of Parcel A as the cost of acquiring Parcel B.
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23. State Highway Comm. v. Speck, 324 S.W.2d 796 CArk.
1959).
24. Arkansas State Hway. Comm. v. Ptak, 364 S.W.2d 794
<Ark 1963).
25. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 Cl 947).

A
N

26. Nichols', vol. BA, §16.01[2] (1992).
27. Utah Depl of Trans. v. Rayco, 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979);
Jefferyv. Osborne, 129 N.W. 931 (Wis. 1911).
28. International Paper Company v. United States, 227 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1955).

29. Ibid., 2C
30. Ibid.

31. Even "
entrepr
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For instance, if legal counsel instructed the appraiser who is appraising the
remainder depicted in Figure 14.2 that, as a matter of law, the noise damage
resulting from cars using the portion of the highway located in the area taken
must be separated from the noise damage resulting from cars using the rest of the
highway, the appraiser would undoubtedly have to inform legal counsel that
such separation is impossible. The law does not require appraisers to guess. If the
condemnor thinks it can find an appraiser who is capable of making the separation and convincing a trier of fact of the logic and reasonableness of the separation, the condemnor is free to retain that individual. However, \tis the appraiser's
professional reputation that is on the line on the witness stand, not the condemnor's.
In the federal courts, it is for the district judge "to decide 'all issues' other than
the precise issue of the amount of compensation to be awarded:'44 Therefore, if it
is unclear whether the Campbell rule applies to a specific set of circumstances or
the Pope & Talbott exception is applicable, the best course of action may well be to
obtain a court ruling on this matter prior to trial.
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VALUATION

PROCEDURE.

Regardless of the methodology used or the specific rules applied, the estimation
of compensable damage in the appraisal must be done thoroughly and in logical
steps.
The appraiser's first step is to determine the larger parcel or parcels in the
before situation. (See Chapter 5 for more discussion on identifying the larger
parcel.) It is important that the appraiser's determination of the larger parcel
reflect unity of use, unity of ownership, and physical contiguity. The second step
is to estimate the highest and best use of the property in the before situation.
(Highest and best use is covered in Chapter 6.) In estimating highest and best use,
the appraiser must try to overlook the fact that he will later be considering an
after situation. The appraiser should adhere to the principle of reasonable probability
in estimating both highest and best use and the larger parcel. As a third step in
the valuation process, the market value of the property being appraised must be
estimated in the before situation, utilizing all applicable approaches to value. In
most circumstances, all three approaches will have some applicability. If an approach to value is not applicable, the appraiser must explain why. 45 A client's
request or instruction that one or more of the standard approaches to value be
excluded is not an acceptable reason to exclude an otherwise applicable approach.
The fourth step starts this procedure all over again, but this time the after
situation is studied. The appraiser begins by identifying the larger parcel in the
after situation. A property may consist of one larger parcel in the before situation
and two in the after situation, or vice versa. As stated by one court:
It is unfortunate that no witness on either side was asked to express an opinion as

to the market value of the two remainder tracts if sold separately .... [I]n the ab44. United States v. &ynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 20 (1970); Fed.
R. Evid. 71 A(h).
45. The Appraisal Foundation, Unifonn Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), 1994 ed., Stan-

dards Rule 2-2(j), p. 16; Unifonn Appraisal Standards
for Federal Land Acquisitions, §B-1-8, p. 67.
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sence of evidence to the contrary it may be assumed that the highest and best use
of a farm cut in two by a condemnation remains the same after the taking as
before, and that its highest value is still as a single unit, [but] this case is different .... The case presents a classic instance in which the remainder tracts should
have been evaluated separately.46

In the fifth step the appraiser estimates the remainder parcel's highest and
best use. In making such a determination in the after situation, the appraiser
should specifically consider several factors, including the proximity of the new
public improvement to the remainder parcel and the possible existence of special
or general benefits resulting from the project. (See Chapter 15 for more information on special and general benefits.) The reduced land area and the change in the
shape of the remainder parcel are also important considerations, as are changes
in access to the remainder property and the nature of the public improvements to
be constructed. The appraiser must not only consider changes in the highest and
best use of the property between the before and after situations, but also, "in
fairness to the condemnee, consideration should be given to any material change
in the intensity of use within a highest and best use:'47 The final step in the valuation process is to estimate the value of the remainder property, again using all
applicable approaches to value.
In ·estimating the value of the remainder tract, it is important that the appraiser consider all observations made in determining the highest and best use of
the tract in the after situation and the effect, if any, of the proposed public improvement. It is also important to look beyond the immediate boundaries of the
remainder property to identify other forces that could affect the property's after

value.
Figure 14.9 illustrates the before and after situations of a single-family dwelling affected by the widening of an interstate highway. In the before situation, the
property could be accessed via the frontage road and the interstate or the frontage road and County Roads 1 and 2. In the after situation, the depth of the remainder parcel was only nominally reduced and the traveled lanes of the frontage
road were no closer to the dwelling than they were before. However, the highway
project called for: 1) the closure of the intersection of the interstate and County
Road 1; 2) the closure of the intersection of the interstate and County Road 2; and
3) the construction of a new roadway extending County Road 2 to connect with a
new interchange on the interstate. The remainder parcel did suffer from some
circuity of travel due to the closure of the two intersections, but this item of
damage was ruled noncompensable before the trial.
Based on these facts alone, it would appear that the property in question
suffered little, if any, diminution in value by reason of the taking and that there
was no compensable damage. However, the appraiser for the property owner
testified during the trial that, in the preceding 15 years, County Road 1 had flooded
an average of 45 days per year at a point two miles from the remainder property
and that during future flooding the only access to the remainder property would
46. Commonwealth, Dq,'t of Highways v. Rowland, 420
S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ky. 1967).
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As directed by the Court, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"),

files its response to the post trial brief filed by Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol").

I.
A.

SUMMARY OF ITD,S RESPONSE

LARGERPARCEL.
1.

At the close of trial, the Court directed Grathol to cite Idaho law that would

support the larger parcel opinion of its appraiser, Mr. Skip Sherwood. Grathol did not cite any
Idaho statutes, case law, or jury instructions that support Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel.
2.

Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is contrary to Idaho law. See ITD's Post

Trial Brief, at 3-11 .(filed March 23, 2012).
3.

Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that the western 30

acres has a higher value than the other 26.8 acres. "Higher value" is not a factor in detennining
the larger parcel under either Idaho law or the field of real estate appraisal. The three elements
are unity of title, unity of use, and contiguity. If higher value were the test, then every property
owner could use the comer or frontage of its property to set the unit value for the condemned
property and the before and after value of the remainder. This is not allowed Ullder Idaho law.
4.

Sherwood testified that the Grathol property is all contiguous and is all owned by

Gtathol, thus conceding two of the three elements making the larger parcel the 56.8 acres owned
by Grathol.
5.

No legal subdivision or physical barrier separates Sherwood's hypothetical

30-acre parcel from the rest of the Orathol property.
6.

Sherwood based his opinion of the'larger parcel on bis unsubstantiated belief that

commercial real estate developers and end-users do not buy parcels larger than 30 acres for
commercial development. This is refuted by the fact that Otathol bought this 56.8 acre parcel for
commercial development and had the entire property rezoned for commercial development.
PLAJNTIF,F ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S POST TRIAL BRIEF-2
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His opinion is also refuted by his own comparable sales, which show commercial properties
ranging in size from 9 acres to 235 acres.

7.

Sherwood did not perform any study or provide any documentation to support his

ciaim that commercial real estate developments do not exceed 30 acres. He also did not offer
any eXplanation for why Grathol bought a 56.8 acre paxcel and rezoned the entire property for
commercial use.
8.

Sherwood claimed that the western 30 acres has a different use than the eastern

26.8 acres. However, he did not testify as to what the use of the 26.8 acres might be. He did not
testify or provide any study or documentation to show that the eastern 26.8 acres would have a
different "highest and best use" than his hypothetical 30-acre paxcel. All other witnesses agreed
that the highest and best use of the entire property is for commercial development.
9.

Site plans prepared by Grathol show commercial development on the eastern

26.8 acres in the before condition (without the new freeway). Therefore, Grathol's own site
plans refute Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel.
10.

Sherwood testified that Grathol would need part of the eastern 26. 8 acres for the

waste water treatment system for development on his hypothetical 30-acre paxcel. Grathol's
witness, Jaines Coleman, testified that Orathol would need between 13 and 16 acres for the waste
water treatment system and land application for the treated water. Coleman speculated that
Grathol might be allowed to pipe its waste water onto someone else's property, but he did not
testify that any such arrangexnent had been made. ITD witness George Hedley testified that

Grathol would need 19 to 25 acres of land application for its waste water based on detailed
analyses by senior engineers with David Evans and Associates. Thus, both Orathol witness
Coleman and ITD witness Hedley testified that a substantial portion of the eastern portion of the
Grathol property would be needed to support commercial development on Sherwood's
PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S POST TRIAL BRIEF- 3
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hypothetical 30-acre parcel. All witnesses, including Sherwood, agreed that the waste water
treatment system would be located on the eastern 26.8 acres, making its use necessary for
commercial development on Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre pazcel. These facts negate
Sherwood's argmnent1:hat the eastern portion will not be used for commercial development.
11.

In its brief, Gtathol suggests that ITD failed to provide evidence to establish that

the western 30 acres needs the eastern 26.8 acres to develop. In fact, both Coleman and Hedley
testified that a substantial part of the 26.8 acres would be used for the waster water treatment
system and land application of waste water for commercial development on the Grathol property.

Moreover, under Idwi.o law, C'1'athol has the burden of proving ju.st compensation. Therefore,
Orathol has the burden of proving Sherwood's theory. Sherwood did not testify or prove that the
eastern acreage would not be used for commercial development. All testimony at trial was that
the highest and best use of the Grathol property is for commercial development. Grathol' s own
site plans for the "before" condition show commercial development on the eastern part of the
property.
12.

None of Grathol's witnesses testified at trial that the 26.8 acres would be rezoned

to a different highest and best use, such as industrial or residential. Moreover, without a rezone,
the 26.8 acres cannot be used for industrial or residential uses.
13.

Orathol has cited cases from outside Idaho to attempt to support Sheiwood's

theory of the larger parcel in this case. However, the cases cited by Grathol either reinforce the
conclusion that Sherwood's larger parcel is contrary to law or are so different factually that they
have no application to this case. In some instances, Grathol has mischaracterized or omitted the

key facts or holding of the cases.
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"SEVERANCE" DAMAGES.
1.

Sherwood testified at trial that the property did not suffer any severance damages.

His testimony was consistent with his opinion that the remainder property has a value of $2.25
per square foot-be/or-e-thetaking and $2.25 per square foot (,lj'ter the takin_g..Und~~ Idaho law,

the formula for determining severance damages is to subtract the fair market value of the
remaining property after the talcing from the fair market value of the remaining property before
the talcing. Using that formula, and Sherwood's testimony that the remaining property is worth
$2.25 before and after the taking, his opinion of severance damages is $0.00.

,,,.,,

Grathol freely admits that the discounting by Sherwood is a calculation based on

the future value of the property 1.5 to 2.5 years after the date of taking, to account for the time
needed to complete the US-95 Project. Sherwood did not testify to any reason for the
discounting other than the time needed to complete the US-95 Project. The Comt has already
dismissed Gtathol's construction delay claim.

3.

Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of taking,

including "damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement
in the manner proposed by the plaintifft,]" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the property to be

valued in the after condition as ifthe public project has been built as of the date of taking,
Sherwood did not do this. He used future dates of 1.5 and 2.5 years after the date of taking and
then added $280,757 and $176,757, respectively, to his opinion of the value of the condemned
property. Sherwood's additional swns for delay are not 1'severanee" damages. It is a claim for
compensation for the time it takes to complete the us.95 Project, and that claim has been
dismissed by the Court.
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In its post trial brief, Grathol suggests that Sherwood's construction delay claim is

some variant or component of an "income approach" to the valuation of real estate. However,
Sherwood testified that he did not use the income approach, and only used the sales comparison
itpproach. He alstnestified that the income approach only-applies to improved prQperty that is
producing income. The Grathol property is bare land and is not producing income. In addition,
Sherwood's appraisal report makes no mention of the income approach or discounting future
income.
5.

In its post trial brief. Gtathol also suggests that Sherwood's future value

discounted back to the date of taking is the sa.--ne thlng as the ~~Justm.ents for "date of sale" that
appraisers make to comparable sales used in the sales comparison approach. This argument
demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of appraisal principles and the sales
comparison approach. Suffice it to say that adjustments to comparable sales as part of the sales
comparison approach to real estate valuation are completely different from. Sherwood's claim for
additional compensation in the amounts of $176,757 and $280,757 based on construction delay.
Sherwood certainly did not testify that his discounting for delay had anything to do with
adjustments made to comparable sales in the comparable sales approach.

6.

In its post trial brief, Grathol made no attempt to explain or justify the

"severance" damage claim by Mr. Alan Johnson. ITO has previously shown that Johnson's
"severance" damage claim mirrors his construction delay claim before it was dismissed by the
Court. This thinly disguised construction delay claim should be dismissed again.
II.

THE GRATHOL PROPERTY AND THE TAKING

Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property located at the comer ofUS-95 and
State Highway 51 near Athol, Idaho. ITO is condemning 16.3 acres of the property, leaving a
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remainder of 40.5 acres. The Gtathol property and the land taken by ITD are illustrated in Trial
Exhibit 166.
A small but contiguous parcel of0.4 acres is located at the southwest comer of the
· property. Some-apptaisers included the 0.4 acres in the l~ger parcel, others-did not. All agreed,
however, that whether the 0.4 acres was included in the larger parcel or not bad no bearing on the
issue of just compensation. Accordingly, for ease of discussion, this brief will refer to the entire

Grathol property, the "larger parcel," as 56.8 acres.

m.

SHERWOOD'S OPINION OF THE LARGER PARCEL IS CONTRARY TO
IDAHO LAW AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE

Sherwood did not value the larger parcel owned by Grathol. Rather, he used an
imaginary 30-acre parcel bounded by US-95 on the west and an imaginary line on the east.
Grathol bought the 56.8 acres in one transaction. All of the property is contiguous. The property
has not been subdivided. No legal division or physical barrier separates Sherwood's hypothetical
30-acre parcel from the rest of the 56.8-acre larger parcel. Grathol sought and obtained a rezone

for the entire property in 2008. All of the property is now zoned commercial. The property is all
owned by Gtathol. All witnesses agree that the highest and best use of the property is for

commercial development. Thus, the larger parcel is unquestionably 56.8 acres.
Sherwood testified that the Grathol property was all contiguous and under the same
ownership, thus concedmg two of the three elements demonstrate that the larger parcel is the
56.8 acres owned by Orathol. See Trial Transcript ("Tr.'1 at S01:7-21. It is undisputed that no
legal subdivision and no physical barrier exist creating the 30-acre parcel. The 30-acre parcel
only exists in the opinion offered by Sherwood.
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Sherwood's Opinion Of The Larger Parcel Is Contrary To Idaho Law.

At the close of trial, the Court directed Gtathol to cite Idaho law that would support the
larger parcel opinion of Sherwood. Grathol did not cite any Idaho statutes, case law, or jury
·· ~instructions that-support Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel. Sherwopd's. opiniOJl of the
larger parcel in this case is contrary to Idaho statutes and jury instructions. See ITD Post Trial
Brief at 3-5 (filed March 23, 2012). It is also contrary to holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court.
In State ex rel. Symms v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387, 390

(1972), the Idaho Supreme Court held that 1'[i]f, as a matter of fact, the parcel t.aken is part of a
larger tract heJd by the same owner, it is error to cora.sider such parcel a.s if it constituted an

entire tract separate and apart from other property in the possession ofthe same owner.,. Id. at
S21, 493 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added). This principle is controlling in the case at hand.
Moreover, in the present case, no 30-acre tract exists. It is not the product of any legal division
or any physical separation from the other Orathol property.
In City ofCoeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006), the Idaho
Supreme Court noted that "Courts typically reject the so-called 'conceptual severance' theorythe notion that whole units of property may be divided for the pmpose of a takings claim." Id.

at

848, 136 P.3d at 319. This is precisely the situation here. Grathol is attempting to divide the
whole for the purpose of enhancing its recoveiy in a takings case.
In City o[Caldwel/ v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 101, 437 P.2d 615, 617 (1968), the City of
Caldwell condemned a portion of the Roark property for the expansion of the Caldwell airport.

Id at 100,437 P.2d at 616. The Roarlcs had previously platted their property for residential
development and the plat had been accepted and approved by the city. Additionally, the Roatks

had marked the proposed streets and alleys for their development and utility services had been
made available to the property. Id.
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At trial, the Roarks sought just compensati~n based upon the value of individual lots in
their development plan. On appeal, the Roarks challenged the trial court's instructions requiring
the jury to determine the fair market value of the property as one parcel and instructing the jury
·., that the values-·given·to hypothetical parcels in the Roark-s'· development.plans. were not to be .

considered. Id The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Roarlcs' argument and upheld the trial
court's instructions. Id at 101-102, 437 P.2d at 617-18.
These and other Idaho Supreme Court decisions, as well as Idaho's eminent doinain
statutes and jury instructions bar consideration of Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel.

B.

"High~r Value" Is Not A Criterion For Determining The Larger Parcel,

Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that the western 30 acres is
more valuable than the other 26.8 acres. "Higher value'' is not one of the criteria for determining
the larger parcel under either Idaho law or professional real estate appraisal. The undisputed
criteria are· unity of title, unity of use, and contiguity. If higher value were the test, then every
property owner could use the comer or frontage of its property to set the unit value for the
condemned property and the "before" and "after" value of the remainder. This is not allowed
under Idaho law.

C.

The Basis Offered By Sherwood For His Opinion Of The Larger Parcel
Being 30 Acres Is Refuted By His Own Comparable Sales And Gratbol's
Own Rezone of The Property.

Sherwood based his opinion of the larger parcel on his belief that commercial real estate
developers and end-users do not buy parcels larger than 30 acres for commercial development.
This is refuted by the fact that Grathol bought this 56.8 acre parcel for commercial development,
and had the entire property rezoned for commercial development

Sherwood's belief is also refuted by his own comparable sales, which consist of
commercial properties ranging in size from 9 acres to 235 acres. See Ex. 154 (pp. 7-9 of tie
PLAJNTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S POST TRIAL BRIEF-9

1238 of 1617

APR. 6. 2012 4:23PM

NO.4514

P. 11/36

Sherwood restricted appraisal report). His comparable sale No. 2 was 235 acres. In his
discussion of that sale, Sherwood notes that Cabela's committed to 40 acres alone, which refutes
his claim that no end·users want anything larger than 30 acres, He also notes that a Wal-Mart is

· ·going in atthanite~ ·which again demonstrates that a mixed use development like the one

~,•

proposed by Grathol needs more than 30 acres, which Sherwood suggests is the largest size
sought by commercial developers. Grathol has proposed one to two motels, an undefined
"major" tenant, a travel plaza, and multiple pad sites for 1estaurants and other smaller users.
In addition, the development will need land for setbacks, landscaping, roads, parking lots, storm
drainage, waste water treatment facilities, and land application of treated waste water.
Sherwood's opinion that 30 acres is the universal size for commercial development or
end-users is not reflected in his other comparable sales. Comparable sale No. 1 is 9 acres; No. 2
is 23S acres; No. 3 is 13.S acres; No. 4 is 50,44 acres; No. 5 is 4.41 acres; No. 6 is 17 acres; No.
7 is 29 acres; No. 8 is 18.71 acres; No.9 is 18.98 acres; and No. 10 is 22.98 acres. In short, his
arbitrary 30-acre parcel is not reflected in the market
Sherwood did not perform any market based study or analysis to support his personal
belief that commercial real estate developments do not exceed 30 acres. He also did not offer
any explanation for why Grathol bought a 56.8 acre parcel and had the entire property rezoned
for commercial use.
D.

Sherwood Offered No Testimony Of A Different Highest And Best Use For
The Eastern 26.8 Acres.

Sherwood claimed that the western 30 acres and the eastern 26,8 acres have different
uses. He admitted that in the "before" condition the entire 56.8 acres is vacant and is not being
put to any use. Tr. at 502:1-8. He did not testify as to what the use of the 26.8 acres would be or
how it would be different, He also did not testify that the eastern 26.8 acres has a different
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"highest and best use," or that Grathol intends to rezone the property to some other use such as
industrial or residential.
Sherwood's appraisal report contains no analysis of the three criteria for determining the
· larger parcel.-Thereport also does not do an analysis·ofhighest and best1..1£eor give a
conclusion of highest and best use. The report speculates that residential or light industrial uses
might occur on the 26.8 acres. Exhibit 154 (p. 4 of Sherwood appraisal report). However,
neither residential nor industrial uses are permitted in a commercial zone. Specifically,
residential uses are only allowed in a commercial zone if located on the second or third floors of

a commercial building or in a separate st..ructure provided that it is accessory to the commercial

use of the site. Kootenai County Ordinance No. 401, Chapter 9-Commercial Zone,§ 9-9-4,
Item I. Likewise, industrial uses are not allowed. Processing and manufacturing are not allowed
unless they are part of the operation of a business or services specifically permitted in a
commercial zone. Kootenai County Ordinance No. 401, Chapter 9-Commercial Zone,§ 9-9-7,
Item B. Neither Sherwood nor the two Gtathol representatives testified that Grathol intends to
rezone the property to industrial or residential.
The witnesses at trial unifonnly testified that the highest and best use of the entire
property is for commercial development The site plans prepared by Grathol for both the before
condition (without the new freeway) and the after condition (with the new freeway) show
commercial development on the 26, 8 acres. Below is a "before" site plan prepared by Grathol
(without any change to US-95), which shows commercial development (a Travel Plaza) east of
Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel. Specifically, the eastern edge of the hypothetical
Sherwood parcel is the edge of where Gratb.ol expects to construct Sylvan Road running from
State Highway 54 on the south.em edge of the property due north (shown by a yellow line).
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Defendant's Ex. H, at p. S.
At trial, Geoffrey Reeslund, Grathol's vice president for project development, testified

that Grathol is proceeding with the development as planned. Tr. at 432:12-18. Reeslund did not
testify that Grathol will not develop the eastern portion with commercial uses. Therefore,
Sherwood's larger parcel determination is contrary to the stated intention of his client.
E.

Shenvood Testified That Some Of The 26.8 Acres To The East Would Be
Used In The Development Of His 30-Acre Parcel,

Sherwood testified that Grathol would need part of the eastern. 26.8 acres for the waste
water treatment system for development on the western 30 acres. Tr. at 504: 15-24. He also
testified that he believed the waste water treatment facility and land need for treated water
application would be located on the eastern portion of the property. Id. and Tr. at 505:15 to
506:20.
Orathol's witness, James Coleman, testified that Grathol would need between 13 and 16
acres of land for the waste water treatment system and land application of the treated water.
Tr. at 657:10-14. Coleman speculated that Grathol might be able to pipe its waste water and put

it on someone else's property, but his testimony was only speculation. He did not testify that
1241 of 1617
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Gtathol had made any arrangements to treat its waste water or dispose of the treated waste water
elsewhere. ITD witness George Hedley testified that Grathol would need from 19 to 25 acres for
the waste water treatment system and land application for its treated waste water based on
· analyses by senior engineers with David Evans and Associates. Tr. at687:9·24 .. All witnesses,
including Sherwood, agreed that the land needed for waste water application would be on the
eastern 26. 8 acres, making its use necessary for commercial development on the Grathol
property. See Tr. at 504:20-24 (where Sherwood testified that waste water treatment and land
application would be located on the eastern 26.8 acres).
Grathoi clearly needs more than just the west 30 acres to do a mixed use development on
the scale shown on their site plans and for which the whole property has long range potential.
The trial testimony is that Grathol needs as much as 25 acres for land application of treated waste
water to support Orathol's development plans. Speculation about the possibility of piping the
treated water onto someone else's land or into ITD right-of-way (which certainly would not be
allowed) is not sufficient to support a finding that the 26.8 acres described by Sherwood as the
"eastern" portion of the property has a different highest and best use than commercial
development.

F.

Grathol Has The Burden Of Proving Sherwood's Theory Of The Larger
Parcel

In its brief, Gratbol suggests that ITD failed to provide evidence to establish that the

western 30 acres needs the eastern 26.8 acres to develop. In Idaho, Orathol has the burden of
proving just compensation. See IDJI2d § 7.03; and Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen,_ Idaho
_, _

PJd _

2012 WL 231254, *S (Idaho Jan. 26, 2012) ("The burden of proving just

compensation is bome by the landowner.'). Therefore, Grathol has the burden of proving
Sherwood's theory that the large mixed-use commercial development planned by Grathol can be
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developed exclusively on his hypothetical 30.acre parcel. He certainly failed to do that since
Grathol' s own development plans show commercial development on the eastern portion.
In addition, Sheiwood did not testify that the eastern 26.8 acres would not be used for
' commercial development. It-is certainly clear from Grothol' s succeesful rezoning- and its site
plans that Grathol intends to use all of the property for commercial development. All other
witnesses testified that the highest and best use of the property is for commercial development.
Sherwood did not offer any proof, study, or market analysis to support his theory of a 30-acre
larger parcel.
G.

The Cases Cited By Grathol From Ouwide Idaho Do Not S!!pport

Sherwood's Opinion Of The Larger Parcel.
Otathol has failed to cite any Idaho cases in support of Sherwood's theory of the larger
parcel in this case-as instructed by the Court-and instead has cited cases from outside Idaho in
an attempt to

support Sherwood's contentions, The cases cited by Grathol either reinforce the

conclusion that Sherwood's larger parcel is contrary to law or me so different factually that they
have no application to this case. In some instances, Grathol has mischaracterized the facts or
holding of the cases.
Grathol first cites City ofPhoenix v, Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (Ariz. 2001).
The Wilsons owned 23. 34 acres of land. The city sought to condemn 1.4 acres at the comer of
the property. Id. at 390. At the time of the taking, the entire property was zoned as low density
residential development. Id. However, the ''General Plan for the City of Phoenix" classified the
area as one that should be rezoned for high-density residential use, such as apartments. Id
On that basis, the Wilsons' appraiser testified that the highest and best use of a 5-acre portion of
the 23 .34 acres was for "a school, place of worship, or other commercial but residentially

compatible uses such as professional offices, dependent care facility, hotel, or mini-storage." Id.
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The appraiser also testified that it was '\rery likely" that the S acres would be rezoned. Id.
Thus, the appraiser concluded that the 5-acre parcel had a different highest and best use than the
remaining portion of the Wilson property. Id.
Inruling on-the propriety of the appraiser's opinion of the larger, pare.el, .the S:upreme.
Court of Arizona held:
Unlike the strip-takinwstreet-widening cases on which the court of
appeals relied, the subject property could clearly be so divisible.
The jury concluded that a 5-aere intersection comer, which could
probably be rezoned for different and higher use than the rest of
the tract, would have a different and higher value than the
remainder of the property. Once that is accepted, the owner is
entitled to that highei value when the property is taken, whether
the taking is of all or only a part of the more valuable portion.

Id at 8, 21 P.3d at 394.
In this case, neither Sherwood nor any other witness testified that the 30-acre parcel
identified by Sherwood could or would be rezoned to a higher and better use than commercial
development. Nor was there any testimony that the eastern acreage not valued by Sherwood
would be rezoned to a lower or different highest and best use other than commercial. Grathol
had all of the 56.8 acres rezoned to commercial soon after it bought the property in 2008. Its
plans call for commercial development on property outside of Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre
parcel. All of the witnesses agreed that the highest and best use of the property is for
·commercial development.
In Wilson) the premise of the appraiser was that a rezone was "very likely." The holding
of the court was further premised on the fact that the rezone would lead to a "different and higher
use than the rest of the tract." Id. In this case, the property has already been rezoned. In the
absence of testimony of another "very likely" re2oning, or even a different highest and best use
than commercial development, the holding in Wilson has no bearing on this case.
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Grathol next cites People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Corp. ofLatter-Day Saints, 13
Cal.App.3d 371 (Cal.App, 1970), In Latter-Day Saints, the defendant owned 264 acres adjacent
to a major roadway, Id. at 373. The state condemned a strip of land 240 feet deep along the
· length of the--ptoperty 1s front.age on the roadway. Id. The defendant'.s ex.perts .testified that the.

property taken had a highest and best use as commercial development near the intersection and
"multiple residential" along the remainder of the frontage. Id. at 374. They also testified that the

remaining property not taken had a highest and best use of single-family residential. Id.
The issue before the court was not whether the appraiser could pick an arbitrary portion
of the property and value it separately from the rest. Ratner, the issue was if the property raken
could be valued separately from the whole. Under the circumstances of that case, the California
Court of Appeals held that it could.
Where the property taken is not of a size and shape which renders
it independently usable, it cannot be valued on the basis of the
amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the land
taken, for by definition there could not be a willing buyer and
seller of unusable land. The property must be valued as a part of a
larger whole. In that situation, says Allen, the whole of which the
condemned property is a part cannot arbitrarily be separated into
zones of value where the possibility of those zones is unaffected by
the t.aking. Where, however, the property condemned is of a size
and shape that renders it independently usable, it is appropriate to
determine what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the
parcel taken.

Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
In the case at hand1 Sherwood did not designate the 16.3 acres condemned by ITD as the
larger parcel, nor did he testify that the 16.3 acres was "of a size and shape that renders it
independently usable." Rather, he arbitrarily chose a 30-acre parcel. In addition, Sherwood did
not testify that the 30·acre parcel had a different highest and best use than the other 26.8· acres,
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whieh was critical to the decision in Latter-Day Saints. Consequently, LatterrDay Saints has no
bearing on the case at hand.
Grathol also cites Latter.Day Saints for the principle that a condemning authority cannot
offset special benefits against the value of the properr1-taken, and spee.iaLbenefits can only be
used to offset a severance damage claim. Grathol Post Trial Br. at 8-9. Although ITO does not
believe that Grathol has asserted a lawful claim for severance damages, ITD has not argued that
the claim should be offset by special benefits. Nor has ITD argued or offered testimony that the
value of the property taken should be offset by special benefits.
Gtathol next cites State v. Lacey, 8 Wash.App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (Wash.App. 1973),
and argues that where there is no unity of use between separate parcels those separate parcels
cannot constitute a larger parcel. Grathol Post Trial Br. at 9-10. Grathol fails to cite the key
facts in Lacey. When those facts are considered, Lacey clearly supports the views of Mr. Moe,
Mr. Pynes, and Mr. Johnson {vice president of Grathol), who all valued the entire 56.8 acres of

the Grathol property.
In Lacey, the State of Washington sought to acquire approximately 31 acres from a

237-acre tract known as the Lacey Farm. Id. at S43, 507 P.2d at 1208. The state argued that the
entire 237 acres was the larger parcel. Id at 544,507 P.2d at 1208. The 237 acres were divided
into five separate parcels and four of the parcels were separated by streets. Id. The Washington
Court of Appeals analyzed whether the five separate parcels constituted a larger parcel by
applying the larger parcel test:
In determining that an entire tract of land constitutes a separate or
independent parcel of land for the purpose of determining just
compensation (sometimes termed the larger parcel test) there :must
be established (1) unity of ownership, (2) unity of use, and
(3) contiguity.
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Id. at 546, 507 P.2d at 1209. The court further held that "[e]ach of these three elements must be
present to find an independent unit or larger parcel to exist," Id. In this case, Sherwood is not
seeking to establish that a larger parcel exists. Rather, he wants to value an artificial segment of
.•

•a ;

a la1ger parcel.- ..·" -· .
The facts of Lacey highlight how no reasonable minds could differ that the S6.8-acre
parcel in Grathol is the larger parcel. In Lacey, there were five separate parcels designated
parcels A, B, C, D, and E. Id at 544, 507 P.2d at 1208. Four of these parcels were physically
separated by roads. Id. The five parcels all had different uses. Parcel A had a welding shop and
a dairy pasture, Id at 545, 507 P.2d at 1209. Pa."Ce! B had a gas station, a store. and a portion
leased for growing raspberries. Id. Parcel C had a tavern, an airport hanger, an air school, and a
rhubarb patch. Id. Parcel D had a fruit stand and crops, Id. Parcel E was leased for advertising
signs. Id Over the entire 237 acres there were 15 separate leases. Id
Based on these facts, the Washington Court of Appeals held that there was no unity of
use and no contiguity between parcels A, B, C, D, and E. Id. Therefore, the court held that, as a
matter of law, the five parcels should be valued separately. Id.
The facts in Lacey contrast sharply with the case at hand, Here, the 56.8 acres of the
Grathol property are contiguous. The 56.8 acres are not divided by any streets. Nor have the
56.8 acres been divided into separate parcels, Nor do the 56.8 acres have different uses as in the

Lacey case. Lacey aptly illustrates when separate parcels should be valued separately. The facts
and holding in Lacey do not support Sherwood's separate valuation of an arbitrary portion of the
Grathol property.
Grathol next cites M&R Inv. Co., Inc. v. State ex rel. Dept. o/Transp., 103 Nev. 445,
744 P.2d 531 (Nev. 1987), for the proposition that its 56.8 acres can be divided into parcels if

one part of the 56.8 acres is not dependent on the other. Grathol Post Trial Br. at i0-12.
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In M&R, the State of Nevada sought to condemn 14 acres ofM&R's 27-acre parcel located on

the west side of Interstate 15. Id. at 447, 744 P.2d at 533. M&R also owned the Dunes Hotel
located on the east side ofl-15 directly across from the 27-acre parcel. Id The issue before the
court was whether the Dunes Hotel could be considered part of a larger parcel. Id Thus, the
holding of the Nevada Supreme Court inM&R deals with the issue of assemblage, which is
irrelevant to the Grathol case.
Assemblage involves joining separate parcels for purposes of valuation. Id. at 451, 744

P.2d at 535. Under the theory of assemblage, if separate parcels have the same use then they
may be joined for the purpose of valuation. Id.
If the highest and best use of separate parcels would involve a
prospective, integrated, unitary use, then such prospective use may
be considered in fixing the value of the property condemned
providing joinder of the parcels is reasonably practicable.

Id (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Nothing in the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court stands for the proposition that a
single, unified parcel such as the Gtathol property can be arbitrarily separated into different
parts. Nor does Sherwood argue that property beyond the 56.8 acres of contiguous property
owned by Grathol should be included in the larger parcel.
Grathol next cites State v. Wandermere, 89 Wash.App. 369, 949 P.2d 392 (Wash.App.
1997). In that case, the state argued that the larger parcel was 24.45 acres of land that the owners
leased to a third party mining company as a gravel pit. The landowner argued that the larger
parcel should include an additional 37 acres they owned that had not yet been leased or mined.

Id. at 394-95. Thus, the case is factually distinguishable because in this case Orathol is arguing
that only part of a piece of property should be deemed the larger parcel, whereas the property
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owners in Wandermere argued that additional property should be added to an existing parcel, for
a combined larger parcel.
In addressing the larger parcel issue, the Washington Court of Appeals held that "[t]he

larger parcel test requires that the landowner establish that the parcel ~nd~mned is part of a
single tract." Id. at 397. Sherwood's analysis in the Grathol case is exactly the opposite. He is
attempting to establish that a single tract of land should be valued as if it were two tracts. The
decision in Wandermere in no way sanctions the opinion offered by Sherwood in this case.
The court in Wandermere also held that ''in eminent domain cases: Parcels must have a

present unified use before they are part of a si.'1gle, larger parcel for conderri..nation. pu..TPoses."

Id. at 398 (emphasis added). In this case, thepresentuse of all of the 56.8 acres ofthe Grathol
property is the same. It is all unimproved bare land (except for an old building at the southwest
corner). The 30 acres identified by Sherwood are not presently being put to a use that is different
than the rest of the property that would permit the hypothetical 30-acre parcel to be valued

separately from the rest of the Grathol property. Therefore, rather than supporting Grathol, the
decision in Wandermere precludes the property from being valued ~ suggested by Sherwood in
this case.
Grathol's argument that Sherwood used the same methodology in the Wandermere case
as in this case is contrary to the facts. In Wandermere, Mr. Sherwood calculated the value of
anticipated royalties from a gravel mining operation. Id. at 382,949 P.2d at 399-400. The
Grathol property is not a mining property and Sherwood has not done any estimates of the
income to be produced by the Gtathol property.

Grathol next cites State Through Dept. ofHighways v. Landry, 171 So.2d 779, 780
(La.App. 1965). In Landry, the Louisiana Highway Department condemned 1.3 acres from
25 acres owned by the defendant. Id. at 779. The sole issue in Landry was whether the 1.3 acres
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were properly valued under Louisiana law. Id. "The sole issue on appeal is whether this is the
proper method of arriving at the market value of the highway frontage taken.'' Id. Landry does
not address, analyze, or mention the "larger parcel." The case also does not say whether the
entire 25-a~te·parcel was zoned the same, or whethedt was divided-into-parcels. Landry only
involved interpretation of a Louisiana statute regarding the methods of valuation used by the

parties. Id. at 780-81. Therefore, Landry does not support Sherwood's "larger parcer• opinion
in this case.
Grathol then cites State Through Dept. of Highways v. LeDoux, 184 So.2d 604
(La.App.1966). In LeDoux, the Louisiana Department of Highways condemned 2.914 acres of
LeDoux's approximately 41 acres in order to expand a highway. Id. at 606. LeDoux's experts
determined that land 300 feet deep along the front of the highway was best suited for commercial
development and the remainder was best suited for either a residential subdivision or agricultural
uses. Id. The appraisers then gave a high value to the commercial property. Id The Louisiana
Court of Appeals held that Louisiana law pennitted this method of valuation. Id at 609-10.

LeDoux does not support Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel in this case. It did not
analyze or address the larger parcel issue or the criteria for detennining the larger parcel.

LeDoux's appraisers testified that different parts of the property had different highest and best
uses. Id at 606. LeDoux held that the determination of highest and best use drives the market
value of the property. Id. at 607. Sherwood did not testify that the 26.8 acres east of his
hypothetical parcel has a different highest and best use. Neither Sherwood nor any other GTathol
witness testified that Grathol intends to rezone the property to permit residential or agricultural
uses. In fact, Grathol's representatives testified at length of their efforts to have the entire
property rezoned to commercial after Grathol bought the property.
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Lastly, Grathol cites State Through Dept. ofHighways v. Stegemann, 269 So.2d 480
(La.App. 1973), and characterizes a quote from the case as one of the ''best descriptions" of
valuing one part of a property higher than a different part of the same property. Grathol Post
Trial Br: att5-i"6. However, Orathol stops the quote one sentence short. ·
The very next sentence after Grathol' s quote makes it clear that the method of valuing
one portion of a property higher than another portion is only applicable when there is a different
highest and best use between the different portions of the same property. ''This jurisdiction has
long recognized that different portions of an ownership tract [may] have different highest and
best uses and, thus, different per unit values." Stegemann, 269 So. at 482 (brackets added),
It is understandable why Grathol would omit this part of the Stegemann quote. No
evidence was offered that one portion of Grathol's 56.8 acres has a different highest and best use
from another portion. Consequently, the quote from Stegemann does not apply to Grathol.

Stegemann also does not apply because it did not address the larger parcel issue or apply the
criteria involved in determining the larger parcel.

In summary, none of the cases cited by Grathol in its post trial brief provide a legal or
factual basis to allow Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel to be used in determining just
compensation in this case. Moreover, as discussed in section III.A above, numerous Idaho
Supreme Court decisions, as well as Idaho's eminent domain statutes and jury instructions, bar
consideration of Sherwood's opinion of the laraer parcel.
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SHERWOOD TESTIFIED THAT HE DID NOT FIND ANY SEVERANCE
DAMAGES. HE ALSO TESTIFIED THAT BE ADDED AMOUNTS TO HIS
OPINION OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND TAKEN
FOR DELAY IN COMPLETION OF THE US-95 PROJECT
Sherwood Testified That The Remainder Suffered No Severance Damages,

Sherwood testified at trial that the property did not suffer any severance damages. Both
his trial testimony and his appraisal report states that the remainder property has a value of
$2.2S per square foot before the taking and $2.25 per square foot after the taking.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

Q. All right. Where you used the same per unit
value in all of your calculations, you used it -- in
the before value, you used $2.25 a square foot, you
used the after value of $2.25 a square foot -- excuse
me -- that was the part taken at $2.25 a square foot,
and the after value at $2.25 a square foot. Would it
be fair to say that you conclude there's zero severance
damages?
A. There's zero severance, correct.
Q. So I'm going to put a circle around .zero.
A. Okay.

Tr. at 523:8-18.

Idaho's jury instructions establish the method for calculating severance damages.
"Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the remainder
immediately before the talcing, and deducting from this value the fair market value which results

after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the project in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff." IDJI2d 7.16.S.

Stated as a formula, the method fot determining severance damage in Idaho is:
Value of Remainder Before Takinm
-Value of Remainder After Taking
a
Severance Damages
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Using the Idaho formula, Sherwood's opinion that the remainder is worth $2.25 before
the taking, minus his opinion that the remainder is worth $2.25 after the taking, equals $0.00
severance damages.

B. - The Additional Amount Added B'; Sherwood To His Determination Of
The Fair Market Value Of The Condemned Property Is A Claim For
Construction Delay.
Sherwood determined that the fair market value of his "larger parcel" was $2,940,300.
He reached this figure by multiplying his 30-acre parcel by $2.25 per square (30 acres x $2.25 per
square foot'"" $2,940,300). ITD condemned t 6.31 acres. Although the basis for it was unclear,
Sherwood testified that the remainder of his 30-acre parcel is 13.14 acres. Tr. at S21:1-3. He
detennined that both the before and after value of the 13.14-acre remainder is $1,341,757
(13.14 acres x $2.25 per square foot= $1,341,757). (The figure originally cited by Sherwood was
$1,344,757, but a math error revealed that the correct figure is $1,341,757) (Tr. at 522).
Sherwood next determined the present value of$1,341,757, assuming that construction
of the US-95 Project will not be completed until 1.5 to 2.5 years from the date oft.aking in
November of 2010. He testified that the present value of $1,341,757 based on the Project being
completed in 1.5 years is $1,060,000, and the present value of $1,341,757 based on the Project
being completed in 2.5 years is $1,165,000. Using these discounted present values, he restated
his opinion of just compensation (the value of the property taken) to be either $1,880,000 or
$1,755,000 depending on whether he uses 1.S years of delay or2.5 years of delay.
Sherwood testified at trial that for his discounting to take into account the time needed to
complete the project, he adds either $280,757 to his opinion of just compensation using l.S years
to complete the project, or $176,757 using 2.5 years to complete the project, Tr. at 618:13 to
619: 13. Sherwood is thus asking for compensation for the length of time it will take to construct .
the project. That claim has been dismissed by the Court.
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Putting these figures into mathematical form shows the following calculations.
Sherwood Opinion Of Just Compensation Using 1.5 Years Of Delay:
Value of Sherwood's 30-acre "larger" parcel, at $2.25 s.ft.:
-Before And After Value of Sheiwood's 13.14 remainder at $2.2S sg. ft.:
Sherwoodealculation of just compensation using no delay:
· · --- · · -

$2,940,300
$1.341.7S7
$1,598,543

Value of Sherwood's 30-acre "larger" parcel, at $2.25 s.ft.:
-Discounted value of $1,341;7S7 using 1.5 years of delay
Sherwood determination ofjust compensation using 1.5 years of delay:

$2,940,300
$1,060,000
$1,880,300

Sherwood's calculation of just compensation using 1.5 years of delay:
-Sherwood's calculation of just comP.ensation using no delay:
AmoUDt added for 1,5 years of delay:

$1,880,300
$1,598,543
$ 281,757

Sherwood Opinion Of Just Compensation Using 2.5 Years Of Delay:
Value of Sherwood's 3Q.acre "larger" parcel, at $2.2S s.ft.:
-Before And After Value of Sherwood's 13.14 remainder at $2.2S sg. ft.:
Sherwood calculation of just compensation using no delay:

$2,940,300
$1,341,757
$1,598,543

Value of Sherwood's 30-acre 11larger'' parcel, at $2.25 s.ft.:
-Discounted value of$ 1,341,757 using 2.5 years of delay
Sherwood detennination of just compensation using 2.S years of delay:

$2,940,300
$1.165,000
$1,775,300

Sherwood's calculation of just compensation using 2. S years of delay:
-Sherwood's calculation of just compensation using no delay:
Amount added for 2.5 years of delay:

$1,775,300
$1,598,543
$ 176,757

C.

Sherwood's Opinion Of Just Compensation Should Be Stricken Because
He Added A Construction Delay Claim That Has Been Dismissed And
He Did Not Use The Correct Date Of Valuation.

Sherwood testified that he added the above amounts to his opinion of the fair market

value of the condemned property based on anticipated dates in the future for completion of the
US-95 Project. Tr. at 603:1 to 606:9.
Sherwood also testified that the amounts he was adding to his opinion of just

compensation had nothing to do with the fair market value of $2.2S per square foot that he
assigned to the condemned property. Tr. at 606: 19-22,
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Sherwood also testified that he used two dates of valuation for his opinion of just
compensation. He used dates of valuation of the spring of2012 and the spring of2013 in his
opinion, despite the fact that the date of value in this case is November 17, 2010.
· 23 Q. Okay. Now, when you did rhis calculation,
24 you actually had to use two different valuation dates
25 for your after analysis; is that co"ect1
1
A. That's correct.
2
Q. And so in one of those analyses, you used an
3 after date of valuation of the spring of 2012, correct?
4
A. I believe that's correct.
5
Q. All right. And in the second scenario, you
6 used a different after valuation date of value of
7 spring of2013, co"ect?
8
A. Co"ect.
9
Q. So you used a different date ofvaluation
10 from your before analysis, which you said was
11 September 2010, which was pretty close to the date of
12 taking in this case, and then as compared to the after
13 date of valuation, which is either spring of 2012 or
14 spring of 2013; is that correct?
15
A. Correct.
Tr. at 606:23 to 607:15 (emphasis added).
Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of taking, including
"damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in
the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.)" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the property to be valued
in the after condition as if the public project has been built as of the date of taking. Sherwood

did not do this. He used future dates of 1.5 and 2.5 years after the date of taking and then added
$280,757 and $176,757, respectively, to his opinion of the value of the condemned property.
Sherwood's additional S\ll11S for delay are not "severance" damages. It is a claim for
compensation for his estimate of the time it will take Im to complete the US-95 Project, and
that claim has been dismissed by the Court.
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Sherwood Testified That Be Found No Dama=es To The Remainder
Propeny Due To Severance Of The Condemned Property. .

Sherwood testified that he did not assess any severance damages for loss of access. Tr. at
524:17-19. He also testified that he did not assess any severance damages for loss of visibility.
Tr. at S27: 16-18. And he testified that he did not assess any damages based on utilities. Tr. at
524:S-8. He offered no testimony of damages to the remainder property due to the severance of
the condemned property from the remainder.

Under Idaho law, "severance" damages are "damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned,
and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" I.C. § 7711(2), Based on the statutory definition and Sherwood's own testimony, the additional sum he

added to his determination of the fair market value of the property taken is rl()f severance

damage.
E.

Sherwood Did Not Use An Income Approaeh,

In its post trial brief, Orathol uses yet another disguise for its construction delay claim.
Specifically, Grathol now refers to Sherwood's calculation ·of construction delay as some variant
or component of an "income approach" to real estate valuation. However, Sherwood's appraisal
report (Exhibit 154) makes no mention of the income approach to real estate appraisal. In

addition, he testified at trial as follows:
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9

Q. What process did you use to conduct that
evaluation?
A. Well, we're dealing with vacant land. There
are three recognized approaches: The value and income

approach, which is not applicable unless you have
improved property; cost approach is another method, but
applicable only when you're dealing with the cost to
build something; and the third method is the market
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10 data comparable data approach to value, and that's the
11 methodfor appraising vacant land.
Tr. at 447:2-11 (emphasis added).
Thus, as stated by Sherwood at trial, the income approach is only used in cases involving

improved property. The Grathol property is bare land, and is not producing any income.
Sherwood testified that the sales comparison approach is used to value vacant land. Therefore,
Grathol' s post trial attempt to justify the discounting by Sherwood as an income approach is.
simply untrue and contrary to the fact that the income approach only applies to improved

property.
For all of these reasons, Sherwood's inclusion of construction delay damages should be
dismissed, again.

V.

SHERWOOD'S OPINION OF VALUE SHOULD BE STRICKEN BASED
ON HIS ABUSES OF THE SALES COMPARISON APPROACH
A,

Shenvood's Appraisal Report Placed Primary Emphasis On A Transaction
That Occurred Under Threat Of Condemnation,

Sherwood's comparable sale No. S was a transaction that occurred under threat of
condemnation. In his report, Sherwood states: "I understand this sale was negotiated under
threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not represent true market
value for this reason." Ex. 154 (Sherwood restricted appraisal report at 8). At trial~ Sherwood
testified that ''I've been in a condemnation case before where the purchase by a government
entity was disallowed for that reason [does not represent market value)." Tr. at 5S6:22~24
(brackets added). Sherwood is correct in his understanding of the law. The clear weight of
authority shows that courts exclude such sales. See ITD Brief In Support Of Motion In Limine
at 17-18 (filed Jan. 6, 2012).
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Nevertheless, in his report, Sherwood states that HJ considered the values of the
comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 ...." Id. at 9 (emphasis
added). By his own admission, Sherwood's appraisal places primary emphasis on a transaction

that does not represent fair market value. For this ieason, his opinion of value should be
stricken. Since he placed primary emphasis on a transaction that does not represent market
value, his opinion cannot serve as the basis for an award of just compensation which, by law, is
based on the fair market value of the condemned property. See, e.g., IDJI2d 7.05.

B.

Shenvood Did Not Use "Comparable" Sales.

Sherwood's testimony at trial demonstrated that he used sales in far superior locations in
Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, and Post Falls that were not in any way "comparable.,, The sales he
used from Spokane had as much as a 2700% difference in market support than from the GTathol
property in Athol. Since the Grathol property is being appraised as undeveloped commercial
property, this factor is critical. His sales from Coeur d'Alene had as much as 1800% difference
in market support. Having to adjust a sale by more than 100% typically means it is not a

"comparable" sale and should not be used to value the subject property. At a minimum, his use
of sales requiring adjustments of 2700% and 1800% reflects extreme bias on his part, making his
appraisal a piece of advocacy for his client rather than an objective evaluation of the fair market
value of the property.
Sherwood also used comparable sales that had all utilities in place or available to the site.
The testimony at trial showed that it will be very expensive to construct water and waste water
treatment systems for the Grathol development. However, Sherwood did not make any
adjustments to his sales to reflect these major differences. It is inherently unfair for Sherwood to
use developed parcels with utilities in place to set the value of Grathol' s raw land.
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Sherwood also used sales that occurred at the top of the real estate market before the
recession and before the sharp drop in real estate values. However, he failed to make any
adjustments to these sales to take that critical factor into account.
· ·She-rwood also used sales that were subst&ntially smaller in·size1han the Grathol
property. For example, his sale No. 1 was 9 acres, and sale No. 5 was 4.41 acres, However, he
made no adjustment for the great disparity in size, even when compared to Sherwood's
hypothetical 30Macre subdivision as opposed to the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol.
. Despite extensive questioning on cross-examination, Sherwood could not identify,
explain, or quantify any adjUS1ments that he made to the sales he used. This 5'"..ands in sharp
contrast to appraisers Stan Moe and Larry Pynes who identified all adjustments to their
comparable sales, and explained and quantified all of their adjustments.
In short, Sherwood's work for Grathol is sheer advocacy. It is in no sense an objective
analysis of the fair market value of the condemned property, and should be disregarded by the
Court.
VI.
A.

JOHNSON ALSO INCLUDED A CLAIM FOR CONSTRUCTION DELAY
AND ATTEMPTED TO VALOE THE LAND AS IF DEVELOPED.
Construction Delay.

In his expert disclosures, Alan Johnson stated, in part, as follows:
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining
property on the assumption of at least an additional three year
delay in the ability to sell by reason ofconstruction.
*

*

*

To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000
for construction materials + a reduction in value for the remaining
property waiting/or completion ofconstruction of $947,000 =
$4,779,578.
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Trial Ex. 156 (Orathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Disc., p. 7) (emphasis added). Johnson reached his
$947,000 figure by estimating the value of the 40 acres remaining after the taking, assuming that
Grathol's development were completed ($3,669,300). Johnson then used this figure
($3,669;300)·and discounted it to the net present value of the remainder ($2;722,000). Id. The
difference between these two numbers is $947,000, which was Johnson's initial amount for
construction delay damages ($3,669,300 ~ $2,722,000""" $947,000 (rounded)). Id.
After hearings on ITD's motion for summary judgment and motions in limine, the Court
directed Grathol to supplement its expert disclosures to provide a "before and after" valuation of
the Grathol property. On February 10, 2012, Grathol served its Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosure. Trial Ex. 158. In that disclosure, Johnson rounded up his calculation for
construction delay to $948,000 and relabeled it as a "downward time and impact adjustment"

Id. at 3. The figure of $948,000 is derived by taking the difference between his opinion of the
value of the remainder after the taking ($3,670,000 (which is the $3,669,300 figure noted above
rounded up to $3,670,000)) and subtracting the figute given after his time adjustment
($2,722,000), which is $948,000. In other words: $3,670,000-$2,722,000 = $948,000 for
construction delay.

This calculation is reflected in Defendant's Trial Exhibit J. In Exhibit J, Johnson again
concluded that the total value of the remainder after the take is $3,670,140, which he discounted
to $2,722,000. He again calls this adjustment a "Downward Time Value and Impact
Adjustment." The amount of that adjustment is equal to his two previous calculations for

construction delay. Specifically, $3,670,000- $2,722,000""" $948,000.
Then, 1ohnson calculates his "severance'' damages by using the discounted figure of
$2,722,000, which is his opinion of the value of the take minus $948,000 for construction delay.
To calculate, what he calls, severance damages, he uses two values of the remainder before the
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taking ($3,060,133 and $3,519,648) and subtracts his value of the remainder after the taking
($3,670,140) reduced by his amount for construction delay ($948,000) to reach his figure for
severance damages of either $338,000 or $798,000.

·- "' ·

-- _.,_Toe-most important thing to be noted about Johnson's opinicnofjust compensation is

his conclusion that the value of the remainder after the taldng is greater than the value of the
remainder before the taldng. Compare Johnson's $3,670,140 value for the remainder after the
taldng to either $3,010,133 or $3,519,648 before the taking,
The Idaho fonnula for severance damages is:
Value of Remainder Before Taking
- Value of Reroainder After Taking
=

Severance Damages

Since Johnson believes that the remaining property is worth more after the taking,
then no claim for severance damages can be sustained. Although Jobnson cites a figure of
"severance" damages, it is based entirely on the $948,000 for construction delay, which he said

in his expert disclosures represented a period of at least three years after the date of talcing.

B.

Johnson's "As Developed" Valuation.

Johnson's opinion of just compensation was based on ''developed" land values. This
violates Idaho law, and his opinion should be disregarded as a matter oflaw. See ITD's Post
Trial Brief at 25-29 (filed March 23, 2012).

VII.

THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS RULED THAT IT IS ERROR TO ADMIT
TESTIMONY OF VALUE BASED ON ANY DATE OTHER THAN THE DATE
OF TAKING. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE REVERSmLE ERROR TO BASE
JlJST COMPENSATION ON SHERWOOD AND JOHNSON'S OPINIONS,
WHICH USE FUTURE DATES YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF TAIONG,
In Spokane & Palouse Ry Co.~ the Idaho Supreme Court held that the disttict court erred

lzy even allowing a witness to testify as to a date of valuation other than the date mandated by the

statute.
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[O]ne of the witnesses for defendant, upon his cross-examination,
testified that he based his estimate of damages upon the present
value ofthe property, while the statute fixes the value of the
property at the time it was t.aken as the rule. We think the court
erred in allowing this testimony to stand against the plaintiffs
motion to strike it out, but we think such error was rendered
· ·· · .harmless by the reiterated charge of the court to ·the jury that they
were to find from the evidence the value of the property on
September 27, 1890, the time of the taking.

i·

2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. at 854 (emphasis added). In its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of
the Idaho Revised Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code
§ 7-712, requiring compensation and damages to be determined as of the date of summons. Id

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is error to allow testimony of an opLnion of
value based on a date other than the date of the taking. Therefore, it would certainly be

reversible error to base a determination of just compensation on the opinions of either Sherwood
or Johnson, who use dates of value years after the date of taking in fonnulating their opinions of
just compensation.

Because they did not value the property as of the date of taking, and instead used dates
years after that date in order to inflate their opinions, these opinions cannot, as a matter of law,
be considered in determining just compensation in this matter.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is contrary to law. Despite the Court's request at
the close of trial, Grathol failed to cite any Idaho law to support Sherwood's opinion.
Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel also has no basis in fact. The 56.8 acres owned by
Grathol are contiguous, under common ownership, and have the same highest and best use as
commercial development. Grathol purchased the 56.8 acres for commercial development and
had the property rezoned to commercial. Their site plans show commercial development to the

east of Sherwood's imaginary 30-acre larger parcel. No witness testified at trial that the 26.8
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acres east of Sherwood's imaginary parcel had a different highest and best use. Nor did any
witness testify that Grathol intends to rezone the 26.8 acres for industrial, residential, or use other
than commercial use. Sherwood's own "compaiable" sales refute his claim that developers and

end~users-only purchase 30 acre parcels for coul.illercial development:~ His "Sales show developers
and end-users buying commercial property for development ranging in size from 4.41 to 235
acres.
Sherwood testified that he found no damages to the remaining Grathol property caused
by the severance of the condemned property. He also testified that his before and after value of
the remainder were the same. He freely admitted that the figures of $280,757 and $176,757 that
he added to his opinion of the market value of the taking were an additional sum to compensate
Grathol for delay in completion of the US-95 Project of 1.5 to 2.S years. This claim for
construction delay is barred by Idaho law and was previously dismissed by the Court.
Johnson also included additional compensation for construction delay in his opinion
of just compensation. The construction delay in his calculations is the sole source of the
"severance" damage figure given compensation. Johnson's claim for "severance" damage
cannot be sustained because bis opinion of just compensation showed that the value of the
remainder after the taking is higher than the value of the remainder before the taking. This

conclusion by Johnson bars any claim for severance damage.
In swnmary, Sherwood and Johnson's opinions were fonnulated in violation ofldaho
law, have no basis in fact, and are inherently biased and unreliable. Accordingly, their opinions
should not be used in detenniningjust compensation in this case.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T:mr
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

) CASE NO. CV-10-10095
)
)
) POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
) DECISION AND ORDER FOR

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES l through 5,
Defendants.

JUlJUM.ENT

)
)
)
)
)

I. Statement of the Case

This case is an eminent domain action brought by Plaintiff the State of Idaho, Idaho
Transportation Board ("ITD") seeking to condemn a portion of real property owned by
Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") as part of ITD's project to widen and improve US Highway
95 from Garwood to Sagle, Idaho (the "Project'). Grathol's property is located in Kootenai
County, near the City of Athol, and situated by the intersections of US Highway 95 and State
Highway 54.
A. Pre-Trial History

On November 19, 2010, ITD filed its Complaint in this matter, and the court issued the
Grathol summons. On December 21, 2010, ITD filed its Motion for Order Granting Possession

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment
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of Real Property, wherein ITD moved this Court to issue an order granting ITD possession of a
portion of Grathol's property pursuant to I.C. § 7-721 (known as the "quick-take" process).
On December 22, 2010, ITD filed its Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Sterling Savings
Bank. On December 23, 2010, Grathol filed its Answer, wherein Grathol admitted that ITD has
the lawful power to acquire land necessary to locate, design, construct and maintain state
highways; however, Grathol asserted affirmative defenses that ITD failed to comply with the
eminent domain statutes and that the quick take procedure was unconstitutional.
On January 21, 2011, ITD's Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property
came on for hearing before the Honorable Lansing Haynes, District Judge, and ITD and Grathol
made argument in support of and in opposition to the motion and sworn testimony was heard. At
the conclusion of the hearing, District Judge Haynes entered his oral ruling that the taking was
necessary and Complaint complied with the statutory requirements. Additionally, the Court
ruled that the taking did not include an expansion of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road, and that ITD
had offered fair market value for the portion of the property being taken plus an additional ten
percent (10%), but Grathol refused the offer. Also, at the conclusion of the hearing, District
Judge Haynes signed the Order Granting Possession of Real Property, which was entered on
January 27, 2011. The Order provides that the amount of just compensation to be paid by ITD
for possession of Grathol's property is $571,000.00, which was to be tendered to the court as a
deposit toward the eventual just compensation award. Further, the Order provided that upon the
entry of the Order, ITD could take possession of and use the portion of Grathol's property that
was taken. 1

Also at the conclusion of the January 21, 2011, hearing, Grathol requested that the Court issue an l.R.C.P. 54(b)
Certificate, to allow Grathol to appeal the talcing order. ITD opposed the certification request, and the Court
certified the Order. The Rule 54(b) Certification was signed on January 25, 2011, and entered on January 27, 2011.
The record shows that Grathol appealed the Order on February 1, 2011, but because the Clerk of the Supreme Court
1
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On February 9, 2011, ITD filed its Notice of Tender of Funds and deposited $571,000.00
with the court. On February 23, 2011, Grathol filed its Application to Partially Withdraw Funds,
wherein Grathol requested that the court disperse to Grathol $456,800.00, representing eighty
percent (80%) of ITD's deposit. On March 3, 2011, ITD filed its non-opposition to Grathol's
application. On March 4, 2011, District Judge Haynes entered his Order Approving Application
to Partially Withdraw Funds, wherein the Court directed the Clerk of the Court to disperse
$456,800.00 to Grathol and to retain $114,200.00 pending the final determination of just
compensation.
On January 6, 2012, ITD filed a Motion in Limine and a Motion for Summary Judgment.
In the Motion in Limine, ITD argued that the valuation opinions of Grathol's experts Sherwood
and Johnson failed to meet admissibility standards pertaining to an eminent domain proceeding.
In the Motion for Summary Judgment, ITD sought to dismiss Grathol's seven claims for just
compensation.
The seven claims ITD sought to dismiss included a claim for the alleged taking of land
for the future construction of a proposed road known as Sylvan Road, and six claims for money
damages for what is referred to herein as items of special damages claimed as severance
damages: (1) construction delay; (2) loss of visibility; (3) loss of access; (4) loss of profits; (5)
loss of the value of an alleged gravel deposit; and (6) loss due to adverse impacts on Grathol's
development plan.
On February 2, 2012, ITD's motions came on for hearing, and during the hearing
Grathol's counsel conceded that three of Grathol's claims for items of special damages claimed

found the Order and Certification in non-compliance with the civil and appellate rules, this Court entered a Final
Judgment as to the Order, along with another certification on March 4, 2011. Grathol's appellate oral argument was
recently heard by the Idaho Supreme Court.
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as severance damages could be dismissed, to wit: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3)
loss of an alleged gravel deposit. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court took the Motions
for Summary Judgment under advisement. In its oral pronouncement, the Court found that the
disclosures, in the record before it of Grathol's expert witness testimony, did not disclose any
opinions as to fair market value of the remaining property before and after the take occurs. In
addition, there were no disclosures of any opinion regarding any amount of damage Grathol was
seeking as special damages claimed as severance damages.
On February 3, 2012, this Court entered two separate orders as to ITD's motions. In the
Order Re:

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine this Court ordered Grathol to file and serve a

supplemental expert witness disclosure that provided expert witness opinions and the basis
therefore of a fair market value for the remainder of Grathol's property before and after the take,
and also provided the nature and amount of any items of special damages claimed as severance
damage. In the Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment this Court granted the
motion in part and dismissed the three conceded items of special damages claimed as severance
damages and dismissed the alleged Sylvan Road taking damages claim. The Court denied the
ITD Summary Judgment motion as to Grathol's claims for severance damages arising out of
alleged adverse impacts of the ITD project upon visibility, access, and the impact on a proposed
development plan.
On February 10, 2012, Grathol filed its Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, as
ordered by this Court's February 3, 2012, Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine. Grathol did
not set forth any opinions as to the amount of money damages for any of the items of special
damages Grathol was claiming as severance damages.

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment

Page 4 of34
1268 of 1617

On February 13, 2012, an additional hearing was held in regards to ITD's Motion in
Limine and Grathol's expert witnesses. At the hearing, Grathol's counsel conceded that no
money damages were being sought for loss of visibility, loss of access, or loss due to adverse
impact on Grathol's proposed development. Grathol's claims for severance damages to the
remainder were limited to its expert witness disclosures that provided opinion testimony as to the
amount of severance damages claimed for the remainder parcel, based upon the difference
between the fair market values for the remainder parcel before and after the take. Grathol's
counsel affirmatively stated that Grathol's claims for damages to the remainder, i.e., based upon
adverse impact upon visibility, access, and development plan (the claims that survived ITD's
Motion for Summary Judgment), were not claims for additional compensable amounts of
damages. Any loss based upon those claims was incorporated within the amount of severance
damages established by the difference in fair market value of the remainder before and after the
take, as those values were set forth in Grathol's supplementary expert witness disclosures.
On February 16, 2012, this Court entered its Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's
Severance Damages wherein this Court granted ITD' s Motion in Limine prohibiting any
testimony as to an amount of severance damages sought for any specific alleged adverse impact
of the ITD project on the remainder, and dismissed all of Grathol's claims for money damages
for any items of special damages claimed as severance damage, leaving only the severance
damage claim based upon the amount of the difference in the fair market value of the remainder
before and after the taking. Grathol was barred from seeking any separate discreet amounts for
specific items of severance damages for loss of visibility, loss of access and development.
However, Grathol would be allowed to present fact testimony on these issues as evidence
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relevant to the expert witness opinion testimony as to the amount of severance damage, based
upon the difference in the fair market value of the remainder before and after the taking.
The matter proceeded to trial with this Court having continued to reserve its ruling on
ITD's Motion in Limine as to Grathol's evidence relevant to the alleged loss of visibility, loss of
access, the impact of the ITD project on Grathol's proposed development project. Grathol argued
that even though it was not seeking specific dollar amounts for these alleged losses, the evidence
of the adverse impact was still relevant to support the testimony of Grathol's expert witnesses,
who would be testifying to opinions of an amount of severance damages to the remainder, based
upon their opinion as to the difference in the fair market value of the remainder before and after
the taking.
B. Trial and Post-Trial History

On March 5, 2012, a five-day court trial commenced. On the first day of trial, the parties
informed the Court that they had stipulated to the admission of several exhibits, reserving
objections as to relevance only. 2 At the conclusion of the trial, the parties were ordered to
submit post-trial briefing in regards to two issues: the larger parcel and valuation methodology.
On March 23, 2012, the parties filed their post-trial briefs. On April 6, 2012, the parties filed
their reply briefs and proposed findings and conclusions.
The Court has carefully reviewed and considered the pleadings, post-trial briefing, and
the previous orders entered in the record and the Court now enters its Memorandum Decision
and Order, which shall constitute its findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to I.R.C.P.
52(a). Any of the following findings of fact that should be denominated as a conclusion of law

Defendants Exhibits: A, B, Hand I. Plaintiffs Exhibits: 1-20; 25-34; 36-37; 40-42; 44-46; 48-49; 51-59; 61-64;
67-72; 74-76; 78-93; 96; 112; 130-136; 142; 151-163; and 173.
2
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shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. Any of the following conclusions of law that should
be denominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a finding of fact.
II. Statement of the Facts

In 2002, ITD initiated a comprehensive study of US-95 between Garwood and Sagle.
The study determined that US-95 should be redesigned and expanded to improve public safety
and enable the highway to accommodate increasing traffic volumes. Based upon the study, ITD
is now engaged in a project to widen and improve a section of US-95 between the communities
of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the Project"). Complaint at p. 2,

,r 3.

Due to the size of

the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into seven segments. The Grathol
property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, ITD Project No. A009(791), Key No.
9791. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 1.8 miles of US-95 from a two-lane,
unrestricted access highway to a four-lane divided and access-controlled highway. The Athol
Segment will also construct an interchange with State Highway 54 just outside the town of
Athol. Plaintiff's Ex. 3.
In order to construct the Project, ITD must take and condemn a portion of Grathol's
property. Therefore, this is a partial taking case. Order Granting Possession of Real Property,
entered January 27, 2011. ITD filed this action and had the summons issued on November 17,

2010. As such, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-712, the date of taking and the date of valuation in
this case are November 17, 2010.
On May 28, 2008, Grathol purchased its property for the sum of $1,450,000. Plaintiff's
Ex. 36; Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 675. The property consists of 56.8 acres located in Kootenai County,

Idaho, just outside the town of Athol, near the northeast corner of present US-95 and State
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Highway 54. 3 More specifically, the property is also bounded by US-95 on the west, State
Highway 54 on the south, Howard Road on the east, and the Farragut Trail on the north. The
property is bare, undeveloped land, except for an old building located at the southwest comer of
the property. Upon completion of the US-95 Project, a small portion of the Grathol property will
be west of the project's new four-lane freeway and will continue to have frontage on the former
US-95. The remaining property will be adjacent to the new interchange with State Highway 54,
at the northeast quadrant of the interchange lying to the east of the Project as constructed.

Plaintiff's Ex. 3.
ITD is condemning 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.486 acres after the taking. A
metes and bounds legal description of the 16.314 acres condemned in the Complaint is attached
as Exhibit A to the Complaint. 4
Grathol is a California general partnership owned by Hughes Investments ("Hughes").

Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 716; Plaintiff's Ex. 25. Hughes is a commercial property developer specializing
in the acquisition, ownership and development of retail shopping centers. Tr. Vol. 1 at p. 332;

Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 725. Before Grathol purchased the property on May 28, 2008, Grathol began
work on an application to Kootenai County to change the zoning of the property from Rural to
Commercial and submitted its application on May 30, 2008. Plaintiff's Ex. 130. Grathol's
rezone application referred to the US-95 Project and cited the Project as one of the reasons why a
zoning change to Commercial was warranted for the property. Id On November 20, 2008, the
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners issued an Order of Decision granting Grathol's

56.39 acres lies outside of Athol's town limits, while .419 lies in the town limits. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 136-137. The
total is 56.8 acres.
3

4

This Court found the following depictions helpful in visualizing Grathol's property, the area of the take, and the
future US-95 improvement: Plaintiff's Exhibits 4-8 and 166 at pp. 2-4.
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requested zoning change, and the property was rezoned from Rural to Commercial. Plaintiff's
Ex. 135.

III. Discussion
There are three main issues presented for discussion and analysis. First, there is a dispute
over what constitutes the larger parcel for purposes of valuing the partial taking of the 16.314
acres. Second, there is the issue of valuing the partial taking of the 16.314 acres. Third, there is
the issue of severance damages and just compensation.
A. The Larger Parcel

The Grathol property is a 56.8 acre parcel. ITD is taking a 16.314 acres parcel. There is
no dispute that this is a partial taking. The dispute is what constitutes the larger parcel. ITD
claims that the larger parcel is either the entire 56.8 parent tract, or 56.39 acres that does not
include the small .419 acre parcel at the southwest comer of the parent tract. Grathol claims the
larger parcel is the westerly thirty (30) acres of the 56.8 acre parent tract.
All parties agree that the entire 56.8 acre parent tract has a highest and best use of
commercial/retail development.

There is no significant disagreement over the type of

commercial/retail development for which the property is suited. Grathol's property is located on
the northeast comer of the intersection between US-95 running north-south and State Highway
54 running east-west. The town of Athol is at the same intersection. The intersection of State
Highway 54 and US-95 will be a major intersection between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint once
the freeway project between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint is completed. The evidence, and
common sense, dictates that Grathol' s property has a highest and best use of a commercial/retail
development serving freeway traffic and the general Athol area.
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At trial, ITD argued that Grathol needed the entire 56.8 acres for its commercial/retail
development; however, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence, if any evidence at all,
in support of ITD's argument. Grathol's expert witness and appraiser Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood
("Sherwood") testified repeatedly that he used 30 acres because he could not find any instances
where a commercial/retail development, that was comparable to the type of project he believed
to be appropriate for the property, had needed more than 30 acres. Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 464.
Sherwood also testified that he assumed the wastewater system for the particular project
Grathol had designed for the property would use the easterly 26 acres; however, because
Sherwood's whole theory of valuation was based upon developing a commercial/retail project on
the westerly 30 acres as the larger parcel, this Court finds his testimony incomprehensible.
Certainly, any comparable commercial/retail developments that Sherwood had in mind would
have had to include wastewater disposal capability. Furthermore, Grathol put in evidence that
wastewater for its proposed project could be disposed of on-site in a number of different ways.
Therefore, this Court rejects the suggestion that Grathol's proposed project required the
easterly 26 acres in order to dispose of waste, because Grathol's theory of the larger parcel for
this case was that it would not need more than the 30 acres to develop its commercial/retail
project.
The larger parcel dispute arises out of the premise that, everything else being equal, a
larger parcel will appraise for less on a square foot basis than will a smaller parcel. There is no
evidence in the record as to what ITD's appraised value for the 16.314 acres would be if the
larger parcel was found to be only 30 acres. This is because ITD staunchly rejected Grathol's 30
acres larger parcel theory before and during trial. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record of
what Grathol' s appraised value would be for the 16.314 acres if the larger parcel is found to be
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56.8 (or 56.4) acres because Grathol only put into evidence appraisals as to the 30 acre larger
parcel theory. Nonetheless, this Court, as the trier-of-fact, accepts the parties premise that a
larger parcel of 56.8 acres would typically decrease the square foot value as compared to the
square foot value if the larger parcel were found to be only 30 acres. Put another way, this Court
finds and concludes that a larger parcel typically appraises at a lower square foot value and a
smaller parcel appraises at a higher square foot value.
Additionally, Sherwood testified that the location of the westerly 30 acres was better
suited for commercial development than the easterly 26 acres, because the westerly 30 acres was
located at the existing intersection of Hwy 95 and State Highway 54. The westerly boundary of
the 30 acres fronts on existing Hwy 95 and the southerly boundary fronts on State Highway 54.
As stated above, 30 acres was selected by Sherwood because all comparable projects of which he
was aware were 30 acres or less. The easterly 26 acres is basically "surplus," in Sherwood's
opinion, and is unnecessary to the contemplated commercial/retail development. The 26 acres is
of less value according to Sherwood, and is therefore excluded.
Grathol conceded at the pre-trial hearings and at trial that there is no controlling Idaho
case law supporting Sherwood's approach, for defining the larger parcel by utilizing a proposed
future development to create a hypothetical 30 acre parcel, as an appropriate methodology for
defining a larger parcel. ITD argues that Sherwood's methodology is barred under existing
Idaho law.
This Court finds that Grathol has made convincing arguments that the larger parcel for a
partial taking does not necessarily have to include the entire parent tract as a matter of law.
Indeed, ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe ("Moe"), testified at trial that an appraiser exercises his
discretion in making a determination as to what constitutes the larger parcel. Tr. Vol. 2 at p. 287.
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This testimony is supported by the fact that at trial Larry Pynes ("Pynes"), another ITD
appraiser, determined the larger parcel to be the entire 56.8 acre parent tract, while Moe testified
that he found the larger parcel to be 56.4 acres.
On the other hand, this Court is persuaded that ITD' s argument that creating a
hypothetical parcel within the parent tract to constitute the larger parcel for valuing the part taken
(that is, where the part taken is only a portion of the hypothetical parcel) is not recognized in
existing Idaho case law.

In fact, the existing case law appears to be to the contrary. For

example, if Blackacre is a four acre tract of bare land, with a highest and best use of one acre
residential, and the taking is of a portion within one of the four acres (say, the southwest quarter
of the acre which is the southwest quarter of Blackacre), then the partial taking analysis would
use Blackacre's entire four acres as the larger parcel for purposes of valuation. It would be
improper to use the one acre that is the southwest quarter acre of Blackacre as the larger parcel,
even if Blackacre were zoned for one acre residential. See State ex. rel. Symms v. City of

Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 531, 493 P.2d 387, 390 (1972); City of Coeur d'Alene v.
Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006).
Both parties have done an excellent job briefing the issues.

As Grathol repeatedly

pointed out in its arguments, each condemnation case is fact specific, and it is often the case that
a great deal of confusion can arise from citing perfectly good law on an issue in one case that
does not fit the same issue in another case because of factual differences.
To support Sherwood's 30 acre appraisal theory, Grathol heavily relies upon City of

Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (2001), which it argues is "spot on." This Court has
carefully reviewed Wilson and understands the Arizona Supreme Court's holding to be that an
appraiser can create a hypothetical parcel within the parent tract, and then use that hypothetical
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parcel as the larger parcel for valuing the part taken, consisting of only a portion of the
hypothetical parcel. In reviewing the appellate history of Wilson, the Arizona Court of Appeals
thought the appraisal methodology described above was precluded by Arizona law. The Arizona
Supreme Court thought otherwise. The problem for Grathol is that our Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue. Grathol invites this Court to adopt Wilson and create new law for Idaho.
This Court finds that trying to guess whether our Supreme Court will adopt the Wilson
holding will not solve the issue at this stage in the proceedings. Wilson is distinguishable from
the facts in the present case. In Wilson, the landowner's appraiser was allowed to testify as to a
probable zone change which would give a five acre comer of the parent tract a different highest
and best use from the parent tract. The taking in Wilson was a partial taking of a portion within
the 5 acre comer. In this case, there is no different highest and best use for any portion of the
56.8 acre parent tract. The undisputed highest and best use for the entire 56.8 acre Grathol
property is, and will be, commercial/retail development. Even if Wilson were controlling
authority, it does not resolve this case, where the larger hypothetical parcel is based upon a
theory that it has a higher value than the rest of the ground within the parent tract which is
outside the hypothetical parcel. Even though the hypothetical parcel has the same highest and
best use as the rest of the parent tract, Sherwood creates a larger parcel within the parent tract
based on value.
The analysis that this Court must perform in determining the larger parcel involves the
elements of (1) unity of title, (2) unity of use and (3) contiguity. State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574,581,468 P.2d 306, 313 (1970). In Idaho, determination of

the larger parcel is for the trier-of-fact. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho
528,532,493 P.2d 387,391; I.C. § 7-711.
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As to the unity of title, it is undisputed that the entire 56.8 acre parent tract of the Grathol
property is in one ownership, to wit: Grathol. The evidence presented is that Grathol purchased
the entire property in 2008, and owns the property. There was no evidence the Grathol property
had ever been other that one ownership. No evidence suggests more than one owner in the future.
No one presented any evidence to the contrary. This Court finds that there is a unity of title for
the 56.8 acres.
Contiguity is a more complicated issue.

The northeast comer of the .4 acre parcel

touches the southwest comer of the 56.4 acres.

So, there is a point of contact by legal

description, but there is no physical access between the .4 acre parcel and the rest of the property.
The trial evidence shows that historically the owner accessed the rest of the property from the .4
acres, as if it was contiguous, but there is no legal easement.
As to unity of use, the evidence shows that prior to Grathol's ownership, the zoning was
rural, except for the .4 acres, which was commercial.

The entire 56.8 acres has been

undeveloped property, except for the .4 acre parcel. The .4 acre parcel is located in the town
limits of Athol and presently has a building that has been used for a commercial purpose;
however, the evidence shows that the use of the building has apparently been sporadic and it has
been vacant for quite some period of time. Additionally, when the .4 acre parcel was zoned
commercial, and the 56.4 acres was zoned rural, the previous owners used the .4 acre parcel as
the entrance to the rest of the property, notwithstanding lack of legal access and different zoning.
Grathol has zoned the entire 56.8 acres commercial. Grathol, and previous owners, have used the
56.8 acres as one integral unit. Therefore, this Court finds that the 56.8 acres has been used as an
integral unit.
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The difference in use and the lack of contiguity might raise an issue about the .4 acre
parcel being within the larger parcel in different circumstances. But, considering the unity of use
and the current commercial zoning, the .4 acre parcel should be included with the rest of the
property. Sherwood included the .4 acre within his hypothetical 30 acre larger parcel. This is not
substantively contradicted by Moe's trial testimony. Moe, who excluded the .4 acre parcel in his
larger parcel determination, testified that it would not have made any difference in his appraisal
if his larger parcel determination included the .4 acre parcel.
The issue for this Court is whether the larger parcel should be the 56.8 acres as claimed
by ITD or the 30 acres claimed by Grathol. Grathol's reason for separating the 30 acres out of
the 58.6 is based upon Sherwood's opinion of increased value of the thirty acres, due to the
suitability of its location for Grathol's proposed commercial/retail development within the 56.8
acre parent tract.
The dispute over using a proposed future development as a valid basis for creating a
hypothetical parcel within the parent tract for purposes of defining the larger parcel illustrates an
underlying dispute that runs throughout this litigation.

Grathol has designed a proposed

commercial project for the Grathol property, and focuses on the impact the taking has on this
proposed project.

ITD has consistently and continuously argued that this Court exclude

Grathol' s evidence because Idaho law focuses on the difference to the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the taking.

ITD argues Grathol is really seeking damages to its

proposed project, and that damage to a proposed development is not evidence of fair market
value of the real property. Indeed, Grathol often concedes that its evidence as to its proposed
project is not evidence of fair market value, but argues that the evidence would be relevant for an
expert witness to consider in reaching an opinion as to fair market value. At trial, this Court has
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largely addressed this dispute as it came up by ruling that ITD's objection to a witness'
testimony about loss of visibility, loss of access, and adverse impact on Grathol's proposed
project went to the weight, and allowed the evidence.
At the pre-trial Motion in Limine hearing, this Court cautioned Grathol that if this were a
jury trial, the law was not clear as to whether this Court should allow the jury to consider
Sherwood's use of the 30 acre hypothetical parcel as the larger parcel. Even if the Court were to
consider adopting Wilson, that case does not hold that the jury, as fact finder, could consider
Sherwood's methodology, because the highest and best use in this case is the same for the entire
56.8 acres. The fact that there is no existing Idaho law similar to Wilson would raise this Court's
concern over allowing a jury to consider Sherwood's 30 acres as the larger parcel. It is even
more problematic where the basis for defining the larger is based not upon a different highest and
best use, but solely upon a greater dollar value for the hypothetical parcel than for the rest of the
parent tract. No case law on point has been submitted which this Court has found to address this
issue. However, because this is a court trial, this Court has not needed to rule as a matter of law
on the admissibility of Sherwood's larger parcel, although ITD has continuously requested such
a ruling.
Assuming Sherwood's methodology is permitted under Idaho law, as finder of fact, this
Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence favors finding that the appropriate larger
parcel for this partial taking, as of the date of the taking, is the entire 56.8 acres. The history of
unity of title, contiguity and unity of use for the 56.8 acres, and the evidence of potential future
use, supports a common sense, logical finding, based upon the factual record, that the 56.8 acres
is one integral unit. Even Grathol's evidence of the future use for the 56.8 acres is the same, to
wit: commercial development. Grathol's proposed future project had design plans, admitted into
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evidence, showing an encroachment into Sherwood's "surplus" easterly 26 acres. Defendant's

Exs. Hand I
There is no persuasive evidence that would lead this Court to believe that an owner
would divide the 56.8 acres in developing the tract in its highest and best use of
commercial/retail. The fact that the current owner would have developed the 30 westerly acres
first if there were no freeway project is simply unconvincing under the Idaho test of unity of title,
unity of use, and contiguity that the larger parcel should be the westerly 30 acres. Sherwood's
opinion that a proposed 30 acre development could be built on the 56.8 acres, and, if there were
no freeway, the development would have been located on the westerly 30 acres, is both credible
and logical. But assigning a higher value to the 30 acres does not change the fact that the
preponderance of the evidence establishes that the larger parcel on this record is the entire 56.8
acre parent tract. Sherwood's methodology of creating a larger parcel based on its value to a
proposed future commercial development is factually unpersuasive when considered in light of
all the other evidence in the record.
The Court finds it is unnecessary to decide whether unpersuasive facts are inadmissible.
B. The Valuation of the Partial Taking

Now having determined as the trier of fact that the larger parcel is 56.8 acres, and that the
highest and best use of the 56.8 acres, both before and after the taking, is commercial
development, the Court must now determine the valuation of the 16.314 acres partial take.
Idaho Code§ 7-711 governs the assessment of just compensation in Idaho condemnation
cases. It requires the finder of fact to "ascertain and assess" the "value of the property sought to
be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty[.]" I.C. § 7-711(1).
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Grathol's first expert that testified was Sherwood. Sherwood had prepared an appraisal
report and testified that in his opinion the fair market value of the 16.314 acres condemned by
ITD is $1,598,543.00 ($2.25 per sq. ft.). Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 484; Plaintiff's Ex. 163A.
This Court has several issues with Sherwood's valuation. The threshold problem with
Sherwood's appraisal is that it provides an appraisal based upon the 30 acre larger parcel only.
While the Court understands the logic of Sherwood's reason to use 30 acres, the Court has found
the logic to be unpersuasive in its determination of the larger parcel. This Court has found the
larger parcel to be 56.8 acres. Sherwood concedes that his 30 acre larger parcel necessarily
results in an increased per square foot price. Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 499-501. Sherwood testified at trial
that he gave no consideration to the eastern 26 acres in his appraisal. Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 464-65. If
he had, the square foot values presumably would have been less than $2.25/sq. ft.
A second issue is the format of Sherwood's appraisal. Sherwood's appraisal report states
that his appraisal "is limited in scope ... presented in a restricted appraisal format . . . and the
restricted report is the most abbreviated of the report formats and as such may be difficult to
clearly understand by a third party." Plaintiff's Ex. 154, as attached to Grathol's Second
Supplemental Discovery Responses (Sherwood's Report at p. 1). The Court finds itself in the

position of that ''third party."
The report has several comparative sales comps, but several of those were based upon the
cities of Spokane, Washington; Coeur d'Alene and Post Falls, Idaho. Those cities are quite a bit
larger in size than the town of Athol, and those cities are situated around an interstate (I-90), not
highways. Sherwood agreed they were not good comps, but, in the absence of other data, were
the best available. Just how the comps supported the $2.25 per square foot was unclear to this
trier-of-fact.

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment

Page 18 of34

1282 of 1617

Sherwood's comparative sales included properties with utilities and other improvements
m place, while Grathol's property, as stated above, essentially is vacant land with no
improvements. Many of Sherwood's comparative sales are somewhat dated and show property
values before the real estate bubble burst, rather than sales that occurred closer to the November
17, 2010, date of taking in this case. One sale in particular (No. 5) was a transaction that
occurred under the threat of condemnation. IDJI 7.09 clearly explains that fair market value is
the cash price at which a willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the property in
an open marketplace. There is also a presumption that the seller is desirous of selling. None of
those can truly be applied to a condemnation sale.
Sherwood made no attempt to explain why the square foot fair market value for the 16.3
acre parcel would increase from 58 cents a square foot to $2.25 a square foot in a little over two
years during a stagnant, or even declining, market for commercial properties. Sherwood agreed
his comparative sales were not very reliable, and, justified using them because there was so little
market activity. Some of the increase from 58 cents to $2.25 would presumably be due to
Sherwood's decision to use 30 acres as the larger, rather than the entire 56.8 acres. But even
putting that aside, Sherwood provides no convincing testimony that the market supported his
opinion of a sharply increasing fair market value during Grathol's ownership. While Grathol did
rezone this property, the rezone was pretty much a done deal before Grathol's purchase. An
appraiser could have legitimately assigned a highest and best use of commercial zoning to the
entire 56.8 acres even before Grathol's purchase. The Court finds Sherwood opinion as to fair
market value is based more upon Grathol's proposed development of the westerly 30 acres than
it is upon comparative sales and market data establishing fair market value of the 56.8 acres as of
the date of the taking.

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment

Page 19 of34
1283 of 1617

This Court does not find Sherwood's testimony or report persuasive, for the above
reasoning, in determining the value of the partial taking. When an appraiser is presenting an
opinion, utilizing the methodology of a hypothetical parcel based upon its value to a proposed
future development, and created by the appraiser for his own use in preparing his opinion as to
value, the appraiser would be well served by presenting a full appraisal report, in its most
complete fashion, and made easy to understand. Instead, Sherwood did not explain how the
market data supported Sherwood's $2.25 per square foot. Therefore, this Court finds that
Sherwood's report, calculations and trial testimony were all difficult to understand and provided
little assistance to the trier-of-fact in attempting to determine the value of the partial take.
Alan Johnson ("Johnson"), Grathol's vice president and partial owner, also testified as to
the value of the partial taking.

Johnson testified that the value of the 16.314 acres is

$2,295,360.00 ($3.23 per square foot), based upon his review of the comparables with his own
adjustments. Tr. Vol. 4 at pp. 764. Johnson also testified that based upon his beliefs as owner of
the property that the 30 acres larger parcel, which contains the 16.314 partial take, was worth
$4.00 per square foot. Tr. Vol. 4 at pp. 765 and 767. Johnson, like Sherwood, also relied on the
larger parcel being 30 acres. Plaintiff's Ex. 162; Defendant's Ex. J Unlike Sherwood, Johnson
testified that the value of the easterly 26 acres had a $1.00 per square foot value, both before and
after the partial take. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 746; Defendant's Ex. J
Although Johnson is not a real estate appraiser he did provide testimony as to one
comparative sale (also Sherwood's No. 7), a property located in nearby Sagle, Idaho, which is a
growing community near Sandpoint. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 735. This Court finds that relying solely
upon this one comparable not particularly helpful due to the comparable's smaller size,
improvements (including available water and sewer/septic) and pre-real estate bust sale date
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(March 4, 2008), which provided no valuation adjustment to the time of the condemnation date.
Further, although Johnson testified that the Sagle sale was the most comparable property to
Grathol's property, Johnson also testified that the Sagle comparable was inferior to Grathol's
property. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 749.
Johnson testified that Hughes was involved in other commercial developments and the
Grathol property would make an ideal location for Grathol's proposed commercial development.
While Johnson's opinion about the anticipated success of Grathol's proposed development was
no doubt in good faith, the record does not support any finding that the development would in
fact occur when and where as Johnson testified. For example, the admitted evidence shows that
Johnson had met with Super 1 Foods regarding the property, but that Super 1 Foods did not show
much interest because it already had grocery stores in nearby Hayden and Rathdrum and was
concerned about oversaturation. Plaintiff's Exs. 29 and 32. There is little or no other evidence
of any third party with a specific, immediate interest in becoming part of Grathol's proposed
development.
Johnson's testimony as to Grathol's proposed development and its anticipated success is
not persuasive as having much probative value as to the fair market value of the 56.8 acres as of
the date of the taking. To the degree the Court could follow Johnson's methodology of valuation,
and assuming its admissibility, the Court found Johnson's opinion of fair market value for the
16.3 acres parcel of little or no probative value, particularly since his own appraiser (who created
the 30 acre larger parcel) testified to a value substantially lower than Johnson's.
While Grathol's proposed development looked good on paper, there is little evidence that
Grathol had lined up businesses as tenants. Grathol has designed these types of projects before
that have not been built out. Tr. Vol. II at p. 336. How much of the project would be built, and
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when, rests upon what the Court finds to be more speculative than probative. Furthermore,
Grathol did not show how the fair market value of the property as of the date of the taking was
dependent upon Grathol's anticipated success of its proposed future development.
Although Sherwood and Johnson were not able to find good comparables, the ITD
appraisers had their difficulties as well. All the appraisers used some of the same comparables.
The difficulty arose from the fact that there was very little sales activity. The Court finds that for
the relevant period of Grathol's ownership, the real estate market for comparable properties
showed declining values, and was, at best, stagnant.
As stated earlier, ITD presented two appraisers at trial, Moe and Pynes. Both testified
that they had prepared complete before and after appraisal reports.
Moe testified that the value of the 16.314 acres partial take was $570,990.00 (rounded up
to $571,000.00, which is approximately $0.80 per square foot). Tr. Vol. 1 at p. 87; Plaintiff's Ex.
13. In his appraisal report, Moe determined the larger parcel was 56.39 acres. He arrived at this

number by taking Parcel 1's acreage of 46.390 and adding Parcel 3's acreage of 10.000. He did
not include Parcel 2's acreage of .419 acres. Plaintiff's Ex. 12 (Moe's Appraisal Report). Moe
explains in his report that he did not consider the .419 acres in the larger parcel because the .419
lies within the Athol town limits and the other parcels are outside the town limits. Further, Moe
explains that in his opinion, "the .419-acre comer parcel will not be negatively impacted by the
proposed acquisition. It may even be positively impacted by the fact it will be the only private
ownership between the new freeway off-ramp and existing Highway 95." Id. at p. 3.
Moe's adjusted values for the comparable land sales ranged from $24,408.00 to
$69,172.00 per acre. Moe further adjusted the comparables downward in his reconciliation to
reach the $0.80 per sq. ft. Plaintiff's Ex. 18.
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The determination of the larger parcel in a condemnation valuation analysis is significant
because it can materially alter the applicability of size adjustments to comparable land sales and
the calculation of severance damages to the remainder of the larger parcel.
This Court finds that while Moe utilized a recognized appraisal methodology
(comparative market approach), Moe's appraisal was based upon the larger parcel being 56.39
acres, not 56.8 acres.

Further, the evidence adduced at trial established that Moe made

significant adjustments to the comparable land sales and then further adjusted those values
downward through a "reconciliation" to arrive at a value conclusion for the Grathol property. As
such, this Court did not find Moe's valuation as persuasive as Pynes.
Pynes testified that the value of the partial take was $675,000.00 ($0.95 per square foot).
Tr. Vol. 5 at 793. Pynes' valuation was based upon the larger parcel being the entire 56.8 acres,

for both the before and after values, and he also used the sales comparison approach in
establishing his appraisal. Plaintiffs Ex. 141A. Pynes used sales that had similar characteristics
to the Grathol property, and explained and quantified the adjustments he made to the comparable
sales in order to provide accurate and reliable indications of the market value of the Grathol
property at the time of the taking. Pynes' comparables range from $0.46 to $1.19 per square
foot. Plaintiff's Exs. 139 and 145. Pynes' appraisal report is easy to read and understand. See
Plaintiffs Ex. 139 (Pynes' Appraisal Report). Pynes trial testimony was also persuasive in that

Pynes provided detailed testimony as to how he came to his valuations. Further, his valuation of
the partial take is easy to calculate, he took the before value and subtracted the after value.
Therefore, this Court found Pynes' valuation as to the partial taking to be very persuasive and
credible.
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The testimony at trial shows that when Grathol bought the property in early 2008, for
$1,450,000.00, the square foot value was approximately $0.58 a square foot. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 675,
ll. 20-22. The persuasive testimony was to the effect that between 2008 and 2010 commercial

real estate was, at best, in a lull. There was evidence of declining real estate values in that time
period. Tr. Vol. 4 at pp. 678-679. Although Grathol's testimony was that they had satisfied
themselves that the rezone to commercial would be approved prior to purchase, Grathol did
rezone the entire 56.8 acres to commercial. Even considering the benefit of accomplishing the
rezone, the value by Pynes of $0.95 a square foot reflects an increase in value of over 60% in a
two-year period of declining or stagnant real estate values. Sherwood's figure of $2.25 a square
foot is an increase unsupported by persuasive market data. Johnson's figure of $3.23 a square
foot is no doubt Grathol's asking price if someone wanted to buy it, but the Court finds
Johnson's opinion, as to his selling price, offers little probative value to finding the fair market
value of the 56.8 acres in November 2010.
Therefore, this Court, as trier-of-fact, finds based upon all of the above provided
reasoning that Pynes' testimony is the most persuasive testimony provided as to valuing the
partial take. As such, this Court determines that the fair market value of the 16.314 acres partial
take is $675,000.00 ($0.95 per square foot).
C. Severance Damages, Damages to Remainder and Just Compensation

Under Idaho Code§ 7-711, "[i]fthe property sought to be condemned constitutes only a
part of a larger parcel," then the finder of fact must also "ascertain and assess" "(a) the damages
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner
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proposed by the plaintiff; and (b) the damages to any business qualifying under this
subsection[.]" LC.§ 7-711(2)(a), (b).
As this Court has determined, the Grathol property consists of 56.8 acres of contiguous
land. Therefore, the condemned property of 16.314 acres is part of a larger parcel owned by
Grathol. Accordingly, Grathol is entitled to recover damages, if any, to the remaining 40.486
acres by reason of the severance of the 16.314 acres from the remaining property. LC. § 7711(2)(a). Grathol did not have an existing business on the property, so there are no business
damages.
In Sherwood's appraisal, Sherwood's fair market value of Grathol's property (the 30
acres only) before the take is $2,940,300.00. Sherwood assigned the value of $1,598,543.00 to
the take of what Sherwood identified as a 16.41 parcel. The after take value of Sherwood's
remainder parcel was $1,344,457.00. Plaintiff's Ex. 163; Plaintiff's Ex. 154, as attached to

Grathol's Second Supplemental Discovery Responses (Sherwood's Appraisal Report at p. 10).
Sherwood's testimony as to what he calls his remainder is not precise. In his report, Sherwood
identifies the remainder as consisting of 3 parcels of 8.85, 3.87 and .419 (total of 13.139 acres).
The report also refers to a larger parcel of 30 acres with a taking of 16.41 acres, leaving a
remainder of 13.59 acres. At trial, Sherwood, testifying to Plaintiff's Exhibit 163A, identified a
13 .4 acre remainder.
While Sherwood's differences in size are not great, the fact that Sherwood cannot be
consistent as to the size of his remainder demonstrates why his testimony as to severance
damages is unpersuasive. The factual situation is that Sherwood's remainder parcel should be the
56.8 acres Grathol property less the 16.41 acres taking, as he defines the partial taking in his
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report, or 40.39 acres. 5 Therefore, Sherwood's approximate 13.4 acres remainder is factually
incorrect by at least 27 acres. 6
As provided above, Sherwood's square foot value for his 30 acres larger parcel was $2.25
per square foot. At trial, Sherwood testified that the valuation for his remainder parcel, whatever
size that actually was, remained at $2.25 per square foot for both the before and after take. When
he was asked if there were any severance damages he testified, "[t]here's zero severance,
correct." Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 523, 1. 16; Plaintiff's Ex. 163A.
As fact finder, the Court is extremely impressed that Sherwood never actually testified to
any value of severance damage other than "zero." 7 In his report, Sherwood computed the value
of the take at $1,598,543. The value of Sherwood's remainder is therefore $1,344,457.
Plaintiff's Ex. 154, Sherwood's Report at p. 10. Sherwood then runs through two versions of a

discounted-to-present value analysis, one based upon a 1.5 year period, the other based upon a
2.5 year period. Sherwood's report implies that Grathol's loss is the difference between the
$1,344,457 value of the remainder and the discounted to present value figures of either
$1,165,354 for 1.5 years or of $1,059,413 for 2.5 years. Id. at p. 11.

The actual partial take is 16.314 acres, not 16.41, which leaves a remainder of 40.48 acres. It was never explained
why Sherwood's report does not use the correct figure for the partial take.
5

Sherwood's uncertainty as to size and the irrelevancy of Sherwood's remainder relates to the 30 acre parcel created
for the purpose of valuing the partial take. The approximate 13 .4 acres remainder parcel never existed, and there is
no evidence that it ever will exist. As such, this Court finds Sherwood's remainder has no foundation in fact.

6

This impression is because when this Court granted ITD's Motion in Limine, based upon Grathol's concession, as
to any expert witness testimony to dollar amounts for damages claimed as severance damage for specific items of
loss, i.e., visibility, access, or impact upon Grathol's proposed development project, Grathol's counsel affirmatively
stated Sherwood would present his opinion as to the amount of severance damages to the remainder post-taking,
which would be based upon Sherwood's opinion regarding a difference in the fair market values of the remainder
parcel before and after the take. An expert's credibility is irretrievably damaged when that expert, who is supposed
to provide a number other than "zero," does not do so.
7
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Sherwood testified at trial that the value of the remainder after the partial take was less
than the before take value because of certain market factors relating to what a future purchaser
would pay for the remainder. Specifically, Sherwood testified:
I cannot see anybody having a use for [the remainder] until that
they [sic] can visualize and see the actual project, those roads
completed by. Therefore, I forecast from that date forward about
one and a half to two and a half years into the future, took the
difference between the before and after and discounted that
amount.

Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 486, ll. 20-25; p. 487, l. 1.

Sherwood went on to testify that he assigned a ten percent (10%) discount to the two
dates that he believed the Project would be completed. Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 490, l. 24. In his report,
Sherwood states that he used the 10% discount of the future value "due to all the unknowns
concern this condemnation including the unknown timing of the project being finished, issues
with regard to access, Sylvan Road being built, the cost of who will be responsible for the cost of
Sylvan Road, and the pending condemnation of the right of way for Sylvan Road." Plaintiff's
Ex. 154, Sherwood's Reportatp. 11.
Sherwood never refers to severance damages in his report, nor does the math, but the
Court, doing Sherwood's subtraction for him and assuming that Sherwood's position is that the
Court as trier-of-fact should label that number as "severance damage" for him, comes up with a
loss of either $179,457.00 based upon 1.5 years or $284,457.00 based upon 2.5 years.
Further, in his report, Sherwood gives a range of values for something Sherwood calls
"Difference Rounded." These values are from $1,775,000 to $1,880,000. Id. at p. 12. If one
then subtracts Sherwood's fair market value of the partial take ($1,598,543), one arrives at the
amount of loss to the remainder that Sherwood refers to in his present value analysis. Doing the
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math, Sherwood's report then should show a loss with a range of values of $176,457 to
$281,457. The problem for the fact finder is that the report does not contain those numbers,
much less label these figures as "severance damages" and Sherwood did not proffer these
numbers in his trial testimony. 8
At trial, ITD objected to the "Difference Rounded" testimony, arguing that Sherwood's
present values for 1.5 and 2.5 years were nothing more than construction delay damages. In its
post-trial briefing, ITD argues that Sherwood, and Johnson, both used dates of value years after
the date of taking. As such, ITD argues that this Court is barred by Idaho case law from relying
on Sherwood and Johnson's just compensation opinions. In its post-trial briefing, Grathol argues
that Sherwood used an income approach in arriving at just compensation, and the 1.5 and 2.5
years are not construction delay damages. Grathol argues that Sherwood applied his 10% per
annum discount rate to 1.5 and 2.5 years and arrived at the present value of the remainder, which
he then subtracted from the before-take value of the 30 acres arriving at a just compensation
value of either $1,775,000.00 or $1,880,000.00.

Again, the dollar value that Sherwood

presumably wants the fact finder to find as an amount of severance damage is never mentioned
by Sherwood, and it is up to the fact finder to do the math.
This Court allowed Sherwood to testify to the discounted present values and stated that it
would give Sherwood's valuation and his methodology in arriving at those values the weight it
deserved.
While the Court does not find an income approach probative of fair market value in this
case, the larger problem with Sherwood is that he has carefully avoided stating that he has
A more direct computation would be to subtract the discounted values of$1,165,000 for 1.5 years and $1,060,000
for 2.5 years from Sherwood's fair market value of$1,344,457 for his remainder. That subtraction provides a range
ofnumbers from $179,457 to $284,457; however, pursuant to a present value analysis, and under the rubric of
"Difference Rounded," Sherwood sets this range from $176,457 to $281,457.
8
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computed a difference between the fair market value of his remainder before and after the take.
Indeed, his testimony has been that there is no severance damage to the remainder; that the fair
market value of the remainder is $2.25 both before and after the take; and has indeed avoided
identifying any amount as severance damage. Coming up with a computation entitled
"Difference Rounded" is no substitute for that opinion testimony. The Court understands the
logic of Grathol's argument that inferences can be drawn, but this Court is quite unconvinced.
Overall, the nature and manner of Sherwood's testimony leads the Court to find that
Sherwood was more comfortable with indirect, confusing, opaque and brief testimony than with
clear and direct testimony. As mentioned before, Sherwood's report expressly states that it is
"restricted," "abbreviated," and "difficult to clearly understand." The Court makes no attempt to
question the reasons this was done, but the down side for Sherwood is that the Court finds his
testimony, particularly on the severance damage claim, unpersuasive and of little probative value
for the trier-of-fact, other than his stated opinion under oath that the severance damage was
"zero."9
Similarly, this Court finds Johnson's severance damage conclusions unpersuasive, and
even more confusing than Sherwood's. Johnson's testimony as to the remainder was
contradictory at best.

For example, at no point has Sherwood provided any testimony stating the specific amount of severance damage he
would want a jury to place in the blank on a special verdict for the amount of severance damage to be awarded. In
Grathol's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, no number for severance damage is provided. The
values are only as to the value of the partial take and Sherwood's "Difference Rounded," which Grathol argues is
Sherwood's term for ''just compensation." In reviewing the trial transcript, Sherwood never actually used the words
''just compensation" directly; rather, when Grathol's counsel presented Sherwood with a leading question as to
whether Sherwood's term of "Difference Rounded" was Sherwood's opinion of ''just compensation," Sherwood
responded with "[t]hat's correct." Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 597, I. 8. It is hard to imagine a less convincing manner in which
an expert witness could give an opinion.
9

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment

Page 29 of34

1293 of 1617

Although Johnson had used a 30 acre parcel as the larger parcel for purposes of valuing
I

the 16.3 partial take, when it came to severance damages, Johnson used a 40.48 acre parcel as the
remainder. Johnson testified that he then assigned two values to the remainder before take, to
wit: $3,060,133 (at $3.23/ sq. ft.) and $3,519,648 (at $4.00/sq. ft.). Defendant's Ex. J. This
Court finds that using different sizes for the remainder for purposes of valuing the take and also
for valuing the remainder in the same taking is novel but ultimately unpersuasive.
Additionally, Johnson's after take remainder is split up into various parcels with assigned
values ranging from $4.50, $4.00, and $1.00/sq. ft., which is what he considered the remainder to
be worth after the ITD project was completed and Grathol's commercial/retail development
project was completed, arriving at a after take value for the remainder of $3,670,140. Tr. Vol. 4

at p. 768, ll. 11-18; Defendant's Ex. J. Where this methodology came from was unexplained,
but, interestingly enough, resulted in a higher value for Johnson's remainder of 40.48 acres after
the taking than before.

It is only after launching into a "time adjustment" discount does

Johnson's after take value for the 40.48 remainder become worth less than the before take value.
As to the discount, Johnson testified that he created a downward time discounted value
for the remainder of $2,722,000.00, which was his opinion of the reminder's value calculated as
of the date of taking if ITD's project was completed and Grathol's development project had not
been completed. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 769, ll. 2-13. Johnson then calculated severance damages by
taking the value of the remainder before take less the discounted after take value and arrived at
severance damages between $338,000 (at $3.23/sq. ft.) or $798,000 (at $4.00/sq. ft.). He then
arrived at a just compensation value of between $2,633,360.00 to $3,093,360.00, by adding the
value of the partial take to the severance damages. Defendant's Ex. J.
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This Court doesn't find Johnson's op1mon as to severance damages persuasive.
Johnson's valuation as to the remainder before take utilizes the same $3.23 and $4.00 per square
foot values that this Court found unpersuasive as applied to the valuation of the partial take.
Again, those values are a result of Johnson's reliance on the larger parcel being 30 acres.
Additionally, Johnson's valuation as to the remainder after take is contingent on Grathol
having completed its commercial/retail development on the remainder, but that has not occurred.
Johnson did not explain how he came up with $4.00 and $4.50 per square foot. He only testified
that if both ITD's and Grathol's projects were completed, then the value of the remainder of the
30 acres would increase, but the remaining 26 acres would not. He doesn't support that with any
market data or other evidence. Indeed, Johnson's range of values for severance damages, where
the higher value is twice that of the lesser based upon an unexplained and mysterious
methodology incorporating an assumed completion of Grathol's proposed development, is totally
unpersuasive in proving fair market value as of the date of the taking. If the Court understood
what Johnson was trying to establish, the Court suspects the testimony was probably
inadmissible, but its complete absence of any probative value for the fact finder renders the
question of its admissibility moot.
As to the approximately one million dollar discount, Grathol's counsel asked Johnson
how he arrived at the downward/discounted value and Johnson's only explanation was "[t]he
impact to the project because of the freeway."

Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 773, fl. 12-13. This is

contradictory because Johnson had testified earlier that the discount was based upon Grathol not
having completed its project. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 769, fl. 2-13. Further, Johnson did not support his
assertion with any market data or other evidence. The Court finds that Johnson's testimony may
have been relevant if Grathol was seeking damages due to the alleged adverse impact of the ITD
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project upon Grathol's proposed commercial development, but, before trial, Grathol had agreed
that it was not seeking damages for development plan damages. The measure of severance
damages in this case, as agreed to by Grathol, was to be based upon opinion testimony as to the
differences in the fair market value of the remainder before and after the taking. As such, as trierof-fact, the Court found Johnson's testimony was of no relevance to the measure of damages
Grathol was seeking to recover.
ITD's experts Moe and Pynes both testified that the remaining property did not suffer any
severance damages. Further, they each testified that they had found no basis for concluding that
Grathol's ability to proceed with commercial development of the remainder was in any way
impaired or damaged due to the taking for ITD's project. There was little, if any, evidence to the
contrary. Sherwood testified that commercial developments comparable to Grathol's proposed
development plan did not exceed 30 acres. After the 16.3 partial take, the Grathol property
consists of a remainder of 40.48 acres (with over 30 acres east of the freeway).
Out of all of the witnesses, this Court finds that the most persuasive testimony and
evidence as to the before-take value and the after-take value was provided by Pynes. Pynes'
valuation for the 56.8 acres before the partial taking was $2,350,000.00 and his after-take
valuation as to the remaining 40 acres was $1,675,000.00.

Pynes' square foot valuation

($0.95/sq. ft.) remained the same for all calculations. His valuation as to the remainder before
and after the take remained at $1,675,000.00.
Grathol's evidence attempting to establish a decrease in the fair market value of the
remainder after take was unpersuasive. This Court finds that there was insufficient evidence to
establish any difference in the fair market value of the remainder before and after the take, and
that was the only measure of severance damage for which Grathol was making a claim.
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Therefore, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court finds the amount of severance damage
is zero.
IV. Conclusion and Order

Grathol's property totals 56.8 acres, which is the larger parcel in this matter. The fair
market value of the 16.314 partial taking is $675,000.00. There is no severance damage to the
remainder. Therefore, just compensation in this matter is $675,000.00.
ITD has deposited $571,000.00 with the Court, and Grathol has removed $456,800.00 of
that amount. Therefore, subtracting the $456,800.00 already tendered to Grathol and the
$114,200.00 that the Clerk of the Court will release to Grathol, there is an additional
$104,000.00 to be tendered to Grathol for just compensation.
ITD shall provide this Court with the appropriate judgment and a final order of
condemnation that complies with this decision and the statutory requirements, to include LC. §
7-716.

Dated this

c!J3/

day of May, 2012.

04)~--,-

CHARLES W. HOSACK
Senior District Judge
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POBOX2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

o US Mail
o Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
Via Fax: 208-343-8869

'ji

Douglas Marfice, Esq.
Christopher Gabbert, Esq.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 N.W. Blvd.
PO BOX 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

o USMail
o Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
~ Via Fax: 208-664-5884

J. Tim Thomas, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General, ITD
PO BOX 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

o US Mail
o Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
'} Via Fax: 208-334-4498

9o</')
Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk of the District Court

Uz-~, ~

By
Deputy Clerk

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8803
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefsen (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVI0-10095

JUDGMENT

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT- I
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This matter came on regularly for a bench trial commencing on the 5th day of March,
2012, before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, Senior District Judge of the First Judicial
District of the State ofldaho. The above-named Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") appeared and
was represented by its counsel ofrecord, Douglas S. Marfice and Christopher D. Gabbert of
Ramsden & Lyons,

LLP,

and the above-named Plaintiff ("ITD") appeared through its counsel of

record, Mary V. York and Steven C. Bowman of Holland & Hart LLP. After hearing the evidence
and the arguments of counsel, and after considering the parties' post-trial briefing, proposed
findings of fact and conclusion of law, and the previous orders entered in the record, the Court
issued its Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment awarding the Defendant the
sum of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 DOLLARS
($675,000) as the amount of just compensation owed to Grathol in this case.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Grathol is the owner in fee simple of the real property, which is the subject of this

condemnation action.
2.

Defendant Sterling Savings Bank was dismissed as a party to this action on

December 22, 2010.
3.

In this action, ITD seeks to condemn and acquire a portion of Grathol' s real

property as part ofITD's project to widen and improve Highway 95. The particular segment of
the Project for which Grathol's property is required is U.S. 95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage,
Project No. A009(791) Key No. 9791.
4.

As part of its US-95 Project, ITD requires 16.314 acres ofGrathol's 56.8 acre

parcel. A legal description of the portion of Grathol' s property to be condemned and acquired by
ITD is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A.

JUDGMENT-2
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5.

The taking of a portion of Grathol' s property is for a public use, authorized by

law, and the property sought to be condemned is necessary for the public use as a right-of-way
for public highway, which has been and is located in a manner most compatible with the greatest
public good and the least private injury.
6.

ITD has sought in good faith to purchase from Grathol the necessary and required

real property and improvements located on that real property for the Project.
7.

Grathol shall recover Judgment against ITO in the sum of SIX HUNDRED

SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($675,000), together with
accrued interest on this sum in the amount of $36,813.58, less the sum of $571,000 previously
paid by ITO to the Court, making a net Judgment in the amount of $140,813.58.
8.

On February 9, 2011, ITD tendered to the Court the sum of$571,000 as just

compensation in this matter, of which Grathol has removed $456,800. Accordingly, there is an
additional $114,200 to be tendered from the Court to Grathol, which is the difference between
the $571,000 previously tendered by ITD and the $456,800 removed by Grathol.
9.

J.

The remaining balance of the just compensation owed by ITD to Grathol is

$104,000, which represents the difference between the amount of just compensation determined
by the Court and the $571,000 previously tendered by ITD to the Court.
10.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-712, Grathol is entitled to interest in the amount of

$36,813.58, which was calculated at the legal rate per annum of 12%. The sum represents
$18,419.36 of interest on the entire amount of just compensation of $675,000 calculated from the
date of the Summons ofNovember 19, 2010 until February 9, 2011 when ITD deposited
$571,000 with the Court. The sum further represents $18,394.22 of interest on $104,000 (the
difference between the total amount of just compensation owed to Grathol and the $571,000
previously tendered by ITD) from February 9, 2011 until July 31, 2012.
JUDGMENT-3
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11.

Thus, the total amount due to Grathol on the Judgment is $140,813.58.

12.

ITD shall tender to the Court the remaining sums due on the Judgment, in the

amount of $140,813.58. The sum shall be deposited in the existing account with the funds
previously deposited by ITD in this matter. The funds on deposit will then be disbursed to
Grathol by the Clerk of the Court.
13.

The total amount to be paid, combined with the sums previously paid by ITD in

this matter, constitutes "Just Compensation" to Grathol within the meaning of Article I, Section
14 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho and includes payment for the value of the property
taken by ITD, the value of any resulting damages to Grathol's property, and any and all claims
by Grathol for the taking of a portion of its property by ITD.
14.

In consideration of the aforementioned payment and other consideration by ITD

to Grathol, and upon payment to Grathol of the sum of $140,813.58, ITD shall be entitled to a
Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation that will convey to ITD:
(a)

15.

All right, title, interest and fee title in approximately16.314 acres of
property more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and
incorporated herein by this reference.

Payment of the above-described sum to Grathol shall constitute a full and

complete satisfaction and settlement of all claims between ITD and Grathol in this matter,
including all claims for just compensation, damages and interes_; t:<--;/1-i AMY_ c/.-f,M f'o-at11/ltJti-/1.i._y f~s ,.._,,,..,.f co,;;fr -fo /o.,_ d-e,l~"llU •N-ed' / ' tv-S Lcct.,4'(,f 'f-e
f?~ S '1
SU ORDERED this
day of June, 2012.
'

--f

~

/i\-

H~~hWe~~t

r.«.<.f

-

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4

I hereby certify that on this
day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 ~

D
D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Mary V. York, Esq.
Ted S. Tollefson, Esq.
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Fax: (208) 343-8869 ~-tj-

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-maii
Overnight UPS

J. Tim Thomas, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
Fax: (208) 334-4498 ~

D
D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

D

Clerk of the Court

5618160_1.DOC
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Idaho Transportation Department
US-95, Garwood to Sagle - Athol Segment
Project No. A009(791}
Key No. 09791

August 2, 2010
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000
And 53N03W-10-6100
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres)
Page I of3

PARCEL19
ITD PID 0044775
FEE ACQUISITION
A tract ofland being a portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (SW4

SW4) of Section 10, Township 53 North. Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootemu County,
Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
COMMENCING at the Southwest Comer of said Section 10, marked by a found railroad
spike as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 207654000; thence along
the west line of said Section 10, North 1°27'15" East, a distance of2652.41 feet to the West
Quarter Corner of said Section 10, monumented by a found 2-1 /2 inch diameter aluminum
cap marked "E 1/4 Sect. 9 T53N R3W'', as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing
Record No. 1213669; thence South 1°27' 15n West, a distance of 1431.97 feet; thence South
89°43'43" East, a distance of23.30 feet to the intersection of the south line of that parcel of
land taken by the United States of America by Decree of Condemnation. recorded in Book 20
of Miscellaneous Records, Page 436, records of Kootenai County, Idaho with the east right
of way line of State Highway 95, Project No. FAP I 0OD(2); thence along the southerly
boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, South 89°43'43" East, a
distance of256-.23 feet to a point being 206.83 feet left of Station 983+30.84 ofUS-9S,
Proj~t No. A009(791) Highway Survey said point being the TRUE POINT OF
BEGINNING;
thence continuing along the southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of
Condemnation, South 89°43'43" East) a distance of 471.67 feet to a point being 255.32 feet
right of Station 982+37.0l ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) Highway Survey;
thence South 21 °05'02" East, a distance of 177.16 feet to a point 165.00 feet south of the
southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, said point
being 291.85 feet right of Station 980+76.27 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) Highway
Survey;
thence South 21°05'02" East, a distance of537.93 feet to a point on a 1173.00 foot radius
curve to the right, concave to the southwest, the center of which bears South 68°54'58" West,
said point being 449.91 feet right of Station 976+11.17 ofUS-95, P~oject No. A009(791)
Highway Survey;
thence southerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 17°47'36,., an arc distance of
364.28 feet, a chord bearing of South 12°11 '14° East, and a chord distance of 362.81 feet to
a point on the north line of that strip conveyed to the State ofidaho in Deed recorded January

EXHIBIT
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Idaho Transportation Department
US-95, Garwood to Sagle - Athol Segment
Project No. _A009(791)

August 2, 2010
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-SOOO
And 53N03W-10-6100
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres)
Key No. 09791
Page2 of3
31, 1967 as Instrument No. 504394, said point being 532.67 feet right of Station 972+69.12
ofUS-95, Project No. A0O9(791) Highway Survey;

thence along the north boundary of said strip North 89°43'25,, West, a distance of923.35
feet to a point 165.00 feet (10 rods) east of the east right of way line of said State Highway
95, Project No. FAP 100D(2) and from which a 5/8" rebar with plastic cap, as shown per
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears South 89°48'01" East, 1.88 feet, more or
less, said point being 390.57 feet left of Station 972+54.46 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791)
Highway Survey;
thence pa.ra!!el with and 165.00 feet east of said east right of way line, North 1°29'39" East, a
distance of 429.85 feet to a point 528.00 feet (32 rods) north of the north right of way line of
State Highway 54, Project No. FAP ANFAS 61 and from which al" steel pin, as shown per
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears North 62°05'52" East, 3.13 feet, more or
less, said point being 384.24 feet left of Station 977+03.96 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791)
Highway Survey;
thence South 89°43'25" East, a distance of 115.52 feet, to a point on a 1738.51 foot radius
non-tangent curve to the left, concave to the west, the center of which bears North 81 °05'00"
West. said point being 268.78 feet left of Station 976+99.56 ofUS-95, Project No.
A009(791) Highway Survey;

thence northerly, 011 said curve, through a central angle of 14°03 '44", an arc distance of
426.69 feet, a chord bearing of North 1°53'08° East, and a chord distance of 425.62 feet to a
point being 165.00 feet south of the south line of that parcel described by said Decree of
Condemnation; said point being 214.69 feet left Station 981 +53.58 ofUS-95, Project No.
A009(791) Highway Survey;

thence continuing northerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 5°29'44", an arc
distance of 166.75 feet, a chord bearing of North 7°53'36" West, and a chord distance of
166.69 feet, to the POINT OF BEGINNING..
Said Tract contains 710t634 square feet or 16,314 acres, more or less.
Located between Project Centerline Stations 972+54.46 Left and 983+30.84 Left.
Together with and subject to covenantsi easements and restrictions of record.
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Idaho Transportation Department
US-95, Garwood to Sagle - Athol Segment
Project No. A009(791)

August 2, 201 O
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000
And 53N03W-10-6100
Key No. 09791
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres)
Page 3 of3
Basis of bearing is North I 0 27' 15" East, a distance of 2652.41 feet, between· a fourid railroad
spike, per Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 207654000 marking the Southwest
comer of Section 10, and the found 2-1/2 inch diameter aluminum cap monument, per Comer
Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 1213669, marking the West Quarter corner of Section
10, both in Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian.
Prepared by David Evans and Associates, Inc August 2, 2010
End of Description

Duane L Zimmennan, P.L.S.

License No. 8655
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 38511
2012 JUN
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff.Respondent,
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CLERK DISTRICT COURT
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Coeur d'Alene, May 2012 Term

)
) 2012 Opinion No. 85
)
) Filed: June 1, 2012
)
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
)
)
)

t,v I0- l(X)qS

v.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
STERLiNG SAViNGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through 5,
Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)
)

Appeal from the district court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing Haynes, District Judge.

The decision of the district court is filf!nned. Neither party is awarded
attorney's fees. Costs on appeal are awarded to Respondent.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for Appellant. Christopher D.
Gabbert argued.
Holland & Hart, Boise, for Respondent. Mary V. York argued.
W. JONES, Justice

I. NATURE OF THE CASE
HJ Grathol ("Grathol") is a California general partnership that owns real estate in
Kootenai County, Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for commercial real estate development,

which is located at or near the northeast comer of US Highway 95 and State Highway 54 in
Kootenai County (hereinafter referred to as "Grathol's parcel" or "the parcel").

'The Idaho

Transportation Board ("the Board") later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel
(hereinafter the portion of Grathol's parcel that is subject to condemnation shall be referred to as

1307 of 1617

··the subject property") in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with
State Highway 54. Grathol contends that the Board failed to negotiate for the subject property in
good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts
Road ("the Sylvan/Roberts Extension"), which Grathol contends would front the subject property
and significantly increase its value.

Grathol further asserts that the Board failed to file its

Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707 before moving for early
possession of the subject property pursuant to the "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Grathol engages in the business of commercial real estate development in Idaho. It has
taken significant steps to commercially develop the parcel, which it originally purchased as a
commercial real estate investment venture. To further the development of its parcel, Grathol
filed site plans, submitted a traffic impact study, and successfully secured commercial rezoning
from Kootenai County. Moreover, C'.Jfathol has marketed the parcel and engaged in negotiations
with potential tenants.
As it currently exists, US Highway 95 is primarily a two-lane highway. In 2002, the
Board initiated a comprehensive study of US Highway 95 between the communities of Garwood
and Sagle to determine the feasibility of improvLr1g the highway to a four-lane divided highway
with Type V Access Control. The study concluded that the highway should be improved in
order to increase safety and accommodate present and future traffic demands. The study was
eventually incorporated into the Garwood to Sagle Project, which primarily sought to realign US
Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. The Board approved the
Garwood to Sagle Project through its annual approval of the federally funded State
Transportation Improvement Plan ("the STIP"), which incorporated the Garwood to Sagle
Project.

Due to the size of the Garwood to Sagle Projec~ the Board divided it into seven

segments. Grathol 's parcel is located within the Athol Segment.
The Board has the power of eminent domain pursuant to LC. § 40-311(1). The Board
contends that the subject property is needed for the Garwood to Sagle Project, Athol Segment,
and that it authorized the condemnation of the subject property through its annual approval of the

STIP. According to MAI appraiser Stanley Moe, the fair market value of the subject property is
$571,000. In an effort to avoid a condemnation action, the Board offered Grathol an additional
ten percent above the appraised fair market value for a total offer of $628,100.

Grathol
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countered the Board's offer with a demand for $3 million to $3.5 million on June 28, 2010,
contending that the appraisal does not account for the subject property's frontage, which would
result from the Sylvan/Roberts Extension.
The Board contends that it is not seeking to condemn any portion of the parcel in order to
construct the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. It points out that neither the Complaint nor the Order of
Condemnation references the condemnation of any portion of the parcel for construction of the
Sylvan/Roberts Extension. In this regard, Jason Minzghor, Project Development Engineer with
the Board, contends that Grathol is under the mistaken belief that the Board intends to condemn
a portion of its parcel for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension because of a meeting held on August 1,
2010. During that meeting, two property owners, Jameson Mortgage and Frederick Krasnick,
approached the Board with a proposal to extend Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through their
respective properties.

Minzghor asserts that the proposal was contingent upon Mortgage,

Krasnick and Grathol dedicating a portion of their properties for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension in
exchange for the resulting frontages that would run through their properties. Minzghor claims
that after Grathol rejected the proposal, there have been no further plans in this regard.
On November 19, 2010, the Board filed its Complaint with an attached Order of
Condemnation, which was dated November 17, 2010, and was signed by the Director of the
Idaho Transportation Department ("the Director") on behalf of the Board. On December 21,
2010, the Board filed its Motion for an Order Granting Possession of Real Property pursuant to
the "quick-take" provisions of LC.§ 7-721. Grathol filed its Response to the Board's Motion for
an Order Grdilting Possession of Real Property on January 10, 2011, contending, among other
things, that the Complaint and the Order of Condemnation failed to meet the statutory
requirements of I.C. § 7-707 and that the Board failed to negotiate in good faith. The district
court filed its Order Granting Possession of Real Property on January 27, 2011, holding that the
requirements of LC. § 7-721 were satisfied and that the amount of just compensation was
$571,000. The district court then filed a Rule 54(b) Certificate on January 27, 2011, holding that
there was no just reason for delay of the entry of final judgment because the Board established
the "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721. On February l, 2011, Grathol timely filed its Notice
of Appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered Final Judgment on March 4, 2011.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

3
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1.

Whether the Complaint and Order of Condemnation were filed in accordance with LC.§
7-707?

2.

Whether the Board failed to negotiate in good faith pursuant to I.C. § 7-721(2)(d)?

3.

Whether Grathol is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to l.C. § 12-117?

4.

Whether the Board is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to J.C.§ 12-121?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721(2) allow state entities that possess the power
of eminent domain to "obtain property ... for a public purpose without the delay of a lengthy

trial." Payette Lakes Water and Sewer Dist. v. Hays. 103 Idaho 717,718,653 P.2d 438,439
(1982). After commencing an action for condemnation, the state entity may deposit with the
court the amount initially detennined as "just compensation" for the property.

Id

After a

hearing is held, the court can then enter an order enabling the state entity to take possession of
and use the property pending a fuil triai. id. Subsection (2) of LC. § 7-721 states that the court
"shall first determine whether or not plaintiff (a) has the right of eminent domain,
(b) whether or not the use to which the property is to be applied is a use
auth01ized by law, (c) whether or not the taking is necessary to such use, and {d)
whether or not plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to

be taken ...."
A.

The Complaint and the Order of Condemnation Were Filed in Accordance with I.C.
§ 7-707
Grathol contends that the Order of Condemnation was not filed in accordance with I.C. §

7-707(6) because the Director signed the Order of Condemnation and the Board never approved
the condemnation of the subject property through a fonnal board meeting, which Grathol asserts

is contrary to a strict construction of I.C. §§ 40-308, 40-311 (1 ), and 40-505, among others.
Grathol further asserts that because the Order of Condemnation, which Grathol claims contains
an expr~s& declaration that the Board is extending Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through
Grathol' s parcel, conflicts with the Complaint, which Grathol asserts does not address the

Sylvan/Roberts Extension, both are invalid pursuant to I.C. § 7~ 707(6) because they do not
provide a clear description of the property rights acquired.
1. The Director May Sign the Order o/Condemnalion on Behalf of the Board
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review." Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). Judicial
interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v.
4
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Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214. 219 (1999).

"This Court interprets statutes

according to their plain, express meaning and resorts to judicial construction only if the statute is
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enter.,

Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008).
Idaho Code section 7-707(6) states:

An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding document
entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all property rights to
be acquired including rights to and from the public way, and permanent and
temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning
authority.
According to the plain language of the statute, an order of condemnation must be "entered" by
the Board. Pursuant to I.C. § 40-505, the Director possesses "necessary incidental powers" of
administration on behalf of the Board. Black's Law dictionary defines an "incidental power" as

"[a] power that, although not expressly granted, must exist because it is necessary to the
accomplishment of an express purpose."

Black's Law Dictionary 1288 (9th ed. 2009).

Therefore, according to LC. § 40-505, the Director possesses broad powers to carry out the

express actions of the Board. In this regard, the plain language of I.C. § 40-505 states that the
Director acts as the administrative arm of the Board. The power of eminent domain is one of the
powers exclusively vested by law in the Board. See LC.§ 40-311(1). As the record establishes,
the Director did not unilaterally condemn the subject property without the authority of the Board.
Instead, the Board approved of the condemnation of the subject property through its annual
approval of the STIP. See I.C. § 40-310. Although the Order of Condemnation was signed by
the Director, it was filed in the name of the Board, not the Director, and expressly invoked the
Board's power of condemnation pursuant to LC.§ 40-311(1). It is the Board, not the Director,
who is exercising the power of eminent domain in the Order of Condemnation. The Director is
merely acting in an administrative capacity on behalf of the Board pursuant to LC. § 40-314(3)
and Board Policy B-03-01 in order to carry out the Board's express power of condemnation.
Grathol's assertion that the Board must hold a board meeting every time it condemns
private property for a public purpose is unsupported by the plain language of the statutes that
Grathol cites in its opening brief and impractical due to the sheer size of public roads projects
and the relative infrequency of board meetings. It is for these reasons that the Director typically
signs orders of condemnation on behalf of the Board. Furthermore, the cases that Grathol cites
in its opening brief are irrelevant and unconvincing because the Board never ceded its power to

5
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condemn private property for public purposes to the Director. Grathol's assertion that the Board
violated Idaho's Open Meeting Act because it did not hold a formal board meeting to condemn
the subject property is similarly unconvincing.

2. The Complaint and Order of Condemnation Do Not Express Any Intention to
Condemn Any Portion of Grathol 's land for the Purpose of lhe Sylvan/Roberts
Extension
Although the Order of Condemnation refers to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section
deals with rights of access to and from the remaining non-condemned portions of Grathol's
parcel to various roads and highways. Furthermore, the Order of Condemnation specifically
identifies the subject property as being such "property [as] has been designated and shown as the
above parcel number on the plans of said project now on file in the office of the Idaho
Transportation Department." The plans refer to the US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, and

Sylvan/Roberts Extension.

The Complaint makes reference to those plans as well when it

identifies the subject property, but it also makes no reference to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension.
Instead, it states that the Board seeks to condemn the subject property in order to "widen[] and
improv[e] ... U.S. Highway 95 south of State Highway 52 to north of the community of Sagle ..
. ." The Complaint further elaborates that "[t]he particular segment of the Project for which
Defendants' property is required is U.S. 95 Garwood to Sagle - Athol Stage, Kootenai County,
Idaho, ITD Project No. A009(791 ), Key No. 9791.''
Thus, there is no basis for Grathol' s assertion that the Order of Condemnation conflicts

with the Complaint. Grathol would like this Court to consider the possible extension of Sylvan
Road to Roberts Road through Grathol's property in the future in detennining just compensation
and whether the Complaint conflicts with the Order of Condemnation.

If Sylvan Road is

extended to Roberts Road through Grathol' s property in the future, then, at that time, the Board
will be required to determine the just compensation due for that portion of Grathol's property
that is necessary for the project. At this time, this Court refuses to engage in such speculative
contemplation.

B.

The Board Negotiated in Good Faith for the Subjeet Property Pursuant to I.C. § 7721(2)(d)
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Grathol contends that the Board did not negotiate in good faith to purchase the subject
property pursuant to LC. § 7-721(2)(d) because the appraisal did not include any consideration
for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road across Grathol's parcel.
Idaho Code section 7-721 states that "[i]n any proceeding under the provisions of this

chapter for the acquisition of real property, the plaintiff may take possession of and use such
property at any time after just compensation has been judicially determined and payment thereof
made into court." Judicial determination of just compensation is satisfied when the court
determines, among other requirements, that the
plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to be taken and the
court shall enter an order thereon which shall be a final order as to these issues
and an appeal may be taken therefrom; provided, however, no appeal therefrom
shall stay further proceedings.

I.C. § 7-721(2){d). Just compensation is based on fair market value, which is the price for which
the property that is taken could be sold by an owner willing to sell to a willing purchaser on the
date of the taking. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. A1agwire, 104 Idaho 656, 65&--59, 662 P.2d 237,
239-40 (1983).
Neither the Order of Condemnation nor the Complaint proposes condemnation of any
portion of Grathol's parcel for the purpose of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. Though the Order
of Condemnation briefly mentions the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section describes right of
access to and from the remaining property belonging to Grathol to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension.
The Affidavit of Jason Minzghor asserts that the Board has no intention of condemning any
portion of Grathol's parcel for the construction of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. As mentioned
before, Grathol elected not to dedicate its property for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, causing the
~ard
to
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not the prevailing party on appeal, it is not entitled to attorney's fees.

D.

The Board Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121
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The Board contends that it is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12121 because Grathol acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in filing this appeal.
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, the prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees "when this Court
is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,

unreasonably, or without foundation/' Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428,438
(2004). This Court denies the Board's request because I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for
awarding attorney's fees for actions involving state entities. See Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch

Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010).
VI. CONCLUSION

Because the Board negotiated in good faith for the su~ject property and filed its

Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707, this Court affoms the
district court's decision holding that the "quick-take" provisions of I.C. § 7-721(2) were
satisfied. Neither party is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Costs are awarded to the Board.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.
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Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of
record, Holland & Hart LLP, respectfully move this Court for an Order awarding ITD its
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in this matter, totaling $724,136.00 in attorney fees,
$13,079.06 in costs as a matter of right and $169,103.59 in discretionary costs. ITD is the
prevailing party in the present lawsuit, and properly entitled to an award of their reasonable costs
and fees pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho case law governing the award
of costs and fees in condemnation cases.
After a five day trial, the Court awarded HJ Grathol $675,000.00 for just compensation.
In doing so, the Court adopted the conclusion ofIID's expert and rejected HJ Grathol's expert.s

and conclusions. HJ Grathol had initially sought over $7 million in just compensation, but that
number was reduced before trial through motions filed by ITD. At trial, HJ Grathol sought over
$3 million. In addition to being substantially less than the amounts sought by HJ Grathol, the
final award was less than the $1.1 million settlement offer made by ITD before trial.
ITD's Motion is based upon and supported by the records and files in this case, as well as
ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, and the Affidavit of Mary V.
York in Support oflTD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed with this motion.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2012.

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
ITD'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

D
D
D
D
t8]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5645368_1

ITD'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-3

1317 of 1617

LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HARTLLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVl0-10095

ITO'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS.

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

ITO'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1
1318 of 1617

Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") files this brief in support of
its Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs. The amount of the attorney fees, costs as a matter of
right, and discretionary costs sought by ITD in this motion are set forth in detail in the Affidavit
Of Mary V. York In Support Of ITD's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs (hereinafter the
"June 18, 2012 York Affidavit").

I.

INTRODUCTION

As happens all too often, Defendant HJ Grathol attempted to tum the condemnation of a
portion of its property into the equivalent of winning the state lottery. Grathol bought the entire
56.8-acre parcel for $1.4 million in May of 2008. The real estate market only went down,
dramatically, from May of2008 to November 17, 2010, the date of taking. Yet Grathol made
demands and sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking of 16.314 acres of the
56.8-acre parcel (see Grathol's Third Supp. Resps. to Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. Feb. 29,
2012 York Aff.), and at trial sought as much as $3,093,360.00 (see Grathol Tr. Ex. J).
Grathol' s outlandish demands for compensation had no connection with fair market value
and were not based on sound principles or reasoning. They fought aggressively to avoid
answering discovery and disclosing expert opinions and made every effort to prevent their claims
from being subjected to scrutiny and evaluation. Grathol engaged in improper and abusive
tactics throughout the case, which made it substantially and needlessly more expensive.
After a five-day trial, the Court awarded Grathol just compensation in the amount of
$675,000.00 for the taking. See Post Trial Memorandum Decision And Order For Judgment, at
33 (filed May 24, 2012). The award was far below the amounts sought by Grathol in the case.
The award was also far below the pretrial offer of settlement by ITD in the amount of $1.1
million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. Accordingly, ITD is clearly the prevailing
party in this case.

ITO'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-2
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As the prevailing party, ITD is entitled by law to recover its reasonable attorney fees and
costs. In addition, this case was extremely costly and vexatious due entirely to abuses and
improper tactics by Grathol in an effort to obtain a wholly unjustified and unfair windfall, not
just compensation. These abuses and tactics included:
•

opposing the motion for possession on meritless grounds;

•

At the Status Conference for Scheduling and Planning on March 31, 2011,
counsel for Grathol rejected the Court's suggestion for a Court-ordered mediation,
indicating the unwillingness of Grathol to try to resolve this matter;

•

repeatedly failing and refusing to answer discovery;

•

repeatedly failing and refusing to disclose expert opinions;

•

hiding expert opinions behind an inapplicable and improper assertion of the
federal "actor-viewer" exception, which only applies in federal court and only
applies to the drafting of expert reports; even in federal court, the exception does
not excuse the duty to disclose expert opinions and does not circumvent written
discovery asking for expert opinions;

•

making repeated and continuing demands for compensation based on an alleged
taking for Sylvan Road - despite having no factual basis for the claims and
despite repeated rulings from the Court denying and dismissing the claims;

•

presenting improper valuations that had no "before and after" analysis, no
understandable explanation, and numerous violations of law and deviations from
accepted appraisal standards;

•

making claims for damages that were clearly barred by Idaho law;

•

dropping claims for damages barred by law only after forcing ITD to engage in
expensive briefing and preparation for oral argument on a motion for summary to
dismiss these claims; and

•

making outlandish demands for compensation that were not supported by the
market, had no relation to "fair market value," and were soundly rejected by the
Court.

For these reasons, and as discussed in more detail below, ITD should be awarded its
reasonable costs and attorney fees in this case.

ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3
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II.

LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS IN IDAHO CONDEMNATION CASES

Generally, the award of costs and attorney fees is governed by Idaho Code § 12-121 and
Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Under those provisions, costs and attorney fees
may be awarded to the prevailing party, with the restriction that an award of fees under section
12-121 may only be granted upon a finding that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. LC.§ 12-121; I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l), 54(e)(l). The
determination of which party is the prevailing party requires the trial court to "in its sound
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties, ... , and the extent to which each party prevaiied upon each of such issue or
claims." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B).
As with other issues unique to the law of eminent domain, the award of costs and
attorney fees in Idaho condemnation cases has developed its own set of rules and applications.
The award of costs and attorney fees in a condemnation case involves a two part analysis: First,
a determination must be made as to who the prevailing party is under Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and
guidelines established in Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067
(1983) and its progeny. Second, once the prevailing party has been identified, the amount of
costs and attorney fees to be awarded shall be determined based on the provisions of Rules
54(d)(l) and 54(e)(3). The trilogy ofldaho cases that set forth these rules are: Ada County
Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, supra; State ex rel Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825,

820 P.2d 695 (1991); and State of Idaho v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318,940 P.2d 1137 (1997).

In Acarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court first announced the rules that govern the award of
costs and attorney fees in condemnation cases. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 875,673 P.2d at 1069
(holding that "we deem it necessary to adopt a new standard governing an award of both
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attorneys' fees and costs, only as it relates to a condemnation proceeding."). In establishing the
new costs and fee rules that would apply in condemnation actions, the Acarrequi Court
distinguished an award of just compensation from an award of costs and attorney fees. The
Court was careful to make clear that costs and attorney fees are not required to be awarded as
part of just compensation. Id. at 876,673 P.2d at 1070. The Court rejected the landowner's
argument and the trial court's holding to the contrary, and specifically disagreed with "the trial
court's conclusion that such fees and costs are mandatory as within the definition of just
compensation." Id.
Under rules set forth in Acarrequi, awards of costs and attorney fees in a condemnation
proceeding lie within the discretion of the trial court and an award of costs and fees do not

require a finding by the trial court that the case was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. at 876-77, 673 P.2d at 1070-71. Additionally,

Acarrequi established factors and guidelines to assist the trial court in making its determination
of the prevailing party and whether an award of costs and fees should be made in a
condemnation action. Id at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Those guidelines are:
(1)

whether the condemner reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at
least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict;

(2)

whether the offer was timely and not made "on the courthouse steps an hour
prior to trial";

(3)

whether the offer was made within a reasonable period after the institution of
action.

(4)

whether the condemnee contested the allegations of public use and necessity;

(5)

the outcome of any hearing on such a challenge;

(6)

whether the condemnor made any modifications in the plans or designs of
the project that resulted from the landowner's challenge; and

(7)

whether the condemnee voluntarily granted possession of the property
pending the resolution of the just compensation issue.

ITO'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 5
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Id.
In State v. Ivan H Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 829, 820 P.2d 695, 699 (1991),
the Idaho Supreme Court gave additional guidance on how the trial court is to determine the
prevailing party. In Talbot, the State made a settlement offer to the landowner approximately 15
(fifteen) months after the complaint was filed. While the offer was considerably less than the
amount of the jury's verdict, the trial court determined that the State, and not the landowner, was
the prevailing party in the action and denied the landowner's request for attorney fees. The
landowner appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to award them
attorney fees.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Talbot held that "in addition to considering the Acarrequi
guidelines the trial court must apply I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) to determine the prevailing party." Id
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the landowner's arguments, upholding the trial court's
determination that the State was the prevailing party and that the landowner should be denied its
attorney fees. Id. This ruling is significant in that it expanded application of the Acarrequi cost
and fee rules to apply to both the landowner and the State.
The third in the trilogy of Idaho cases on costs and fees in condemnation cases is State ex

rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318,940 P.2d 1137 (1997). In Jardine, the Court reaffirmed the
Acarrequi and Talbot rules, and established a hierarchy between the Acarrequi guidelines and
Rule 54(d)(l)(B). After Jardine, the Acarrequi guidelines and Rule 54(d)(l)(B) are still to be
applied to determine the prevailing party, but the provisions of the Rule only apply to the extent
that they do not conflict with theAcarrequi guidelines. Jardine, at 321,940 P.2d at 1140. The
Court in Jardine also held that the issue of whether a reasonable offer of settlement was timely
made is a case-specific determination. "[E]ach case will depend on its own circumstances." Id
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When the Idaho Supreme Court first announced the rules to be applied in determining
awards of costs and fees in condemnation actions, they appeared to apply only to condemnees
and not to the condemnor. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876,673 P.2d at 1070 (stating that I.C. § 7718, which provides for costs to be allowed and apportioned to either the condemnor or the
condemnee, requires the condemnor to pay all costs and referencing the attorney fee rules for
awards to condemnees). However, in Talbot, a unanimous Court announced that the State could
be determined to be the prevailing party such that the landowner was not entitled to attorney
fees, which are considered to be costs under Rule 54(e)(5). Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829, 820 P.2d at
699. In Jardine, the Court, again in a unanimous decision, reviewed the Talbot decision at length
and did not change or limit the extension of the cost and fee rules to condemners. Based on these
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, the award of costs and fees to condemners is permitted under
Idaho condemnation law. As such, ITD is entitled to its costs and attorney fees in this case as set
forth in the June 18, 2102 York Affidavit filed with this brief.
After reaching a determination of the prevailing party using the above rules, a
determination is then to be made as to the amount of costs and attorney fees to be awarded. In
making this determination, the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) are applied, as they would in any
other civil case. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072.

III.

ITD IS THE PREVAILING PARTY

Based upon the criteria set by the Idaho Supreme Court in Acarrequi, I 05 Idaho at 878,
673 P .2d at 1072, ITD is the prevailing party in this action:

A.

ITD Made A Timely Offer Of Settlement Of At Least 90% Of The Verdict.

On December 15, 2011, ITD made an offer of settlement to Grathol in the amount of $1.1
million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. The just compensation award was
$675,000.00. Thus, ITD clearly made an "offer of settlement of at least 90 percent of the
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ultimate jury verdict," and satisfied this element of the prevailing party analysis. Acarrequi, 105
Idaho at 878, 673 P .2d at 1072.

B.

ITD's Settlement Offer Of $1.1 Million Was Timely Made.

ITD's made its offer of settlement on December 15, 2011. Trial began on March 5, 2102.
Therefore, the offer was not made "on the court house steps an hour prior to trial." Jardine, 130
Idaho at 320, 940 P.2d at 1139. In addition, the parties expressly agreed to extend the deadline
for making an Acarrequi offer to December 16, 2011. See Ex. C to the June 18, 201~ York Aff.
Therefore, the offer of December 15, 2011 was timely made.

C.

Grathol Did Not Voluntarily Grant Possession Of The Property Pending
Resolution Of The Just Compensation Issue.

Grathol had known since ITD sent its right-of way acquisition packet in June of2010 that
ITD was seeking possession of the property in order to move forward with the US 95 Project.
ITD counsel contacted Grathol's attorney in October of2010 to ask that Grathol agree to
possession. At the time, Grathol' s counsel acknowledged that possession stipulations were
common, and indicated that an agreement was likely.
On November 2, 2010 counsel for ITD sent a proposed stipulation for possession to
Grathol's counsel. Over the next 2 months, counsel for ITD repeatedly contacted Grathol's
counsel seeking a response to the November 2, 2010 stipulation for possession. Despite
assurances from Grathol's counsel that a response would be forthcoming, Grathol failed to
respond to the proposed stipulation.
Because of Grathol's delay, ITD began to be pressed by funding and construction
deadlines on the US 95 Project. ITD had no choice but to file a Motion for Possession on
December 21, 2010.
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1.

Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on meritless grounds.

In opposing the motion for possession of the condemned property, Grathol did not
challenge the statutory requirements for possession: (1) that ITD has the power of eminent
domain; (2) that the US 95 Project is a public use; (3) that the condemned property was
necessary for that use, or (4) that ITD had negotiated in good faith to purchase the property to be
condemned. See LC.§ 7-721(2). Instead, Grathol made two baseless arguments.
First, Grathol argued that only the ITD Board, and not the Director, could sign the
administrative order of condemnation. This argument had no merit because the Director has
both statutory and administrative authority to execute administrative orders of condemnation
once public highway projects are approved by the Board. See Idaho Code§ 40-505 (the Director
is the administrative officer of the Board and shall exercise all necessary administrative powers);
and Aff. of Karl D. Vogt (filed Jan. 18, 2011) (describing express delegation of authority by the
Board to the Director to execute administrative orders of condemnation). After losing this
argument before the District Court, Grathol appealed the Order Granting Possession ofReal

Property (filed Jan. 27, 2011) to the Idaho Supreme Court. Grathol's argument was soundly
rejected by unanimous decision of the Idaho Supreme Court on June 1, 2012. See Decision in
Supreme Court Docket No. 38511, at 4-6 (attached as Ex. E to the June 18, 2012 York Aff.).
Second, Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on the grounds that ITD did not
negotiate in good faith to purchase a portion of the Grathol property to construct Sylvan Road
across the Grathol property. This argument was also baseless because ITD is not constructing an
extension of Sylvan Road on the Grathol property, and ITD did not acquire or condemn any
portion of the Grathol property for that purpose. Therefore, ITD was not under any obligation to
negotiate for the purchase of land for Sylvan Road.
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After evidentiary hearing, the District Court ruled that ITD was not condemning land for
Sylvan Road and was not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Grathol appealed
this ruling also, and the Supreme Court rejected all claims and arguments by Grathol relating to
Sylvan Road. See id. at 6-7.
In short, Grathol took the routine issue of possession of the condemned property and
turned it into a prolonged legal battle that had no factual or legal merit whatsoever. This
needless battle cost ITD substantial amounts in attorney fees and costs.

D.

Conclusion.

Based on the factors established in Acarrequi, ITD is clearly the prevailing party in this
action.
IV. AS THE PREVAILING PARTY, ITD IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
ITS REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES.

As the prevailing party, ITD is entitled to recover its reasonable costs and fees in this
matter. As noted above, once the determination of the prevailing party is made, the amount of
attorney fees and costs is governed by the factors under Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Those factors are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

(12)

the time and labor required;
the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law;
the prevailing charges for like work;
whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;
the amount involved and the results obtained;
the undesirability of the case;
the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
awards in similar cases;
the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the Court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a
party's case;
any other factors, which the Court deems, appropriate in the particular case.
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I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).

V.

DISCUSSION OF FACTORS UNDER RULE 54(e)(3) RELATING TO THE AMOUNT
OF FEES AND COSTS.
A.

The Amount Involved And The Results Obtained.

The just compensation award in this case was $675,000.00. Grathol made demands and
sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking. See Grathol's Third Supp. Resps. to
Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff.). At trial, Grathol sought as much as
$3,093,360.00. See Grathol Tr. Ex. J. Therefore, the amounts involved and the results obtained
more than justified the fees and costs incurred by ITD in this case.

B.

'Whether The Fee Is Fixed Or Contingent.

ITD agreed to pay attorney fees on an hourly basis. Hourly fee agreements are an
appropriate basis for attorney fees under Acarrequi, supra.

C.

The Skill Requisite To Perform The Legal Service Properly And The
Experience And Ability Of The Attorney In The Particular Field Of Law.

Mary York and Steve Bowman are experienced litigators with extensive advocacy
records. Ms. York and Mr. Bowman have been lead counsel on more than 50 condemnation
cases for state and local agencies. Ted Tollefson also has several years of experience as a
litigator. Paralegal Barbara Feraci has worked on dozens of condemnation cases. All of the
unique skills possessed by these practitioners contributed to the successful outcome for ITD in
this case.

D.

The Prevailing Charges For Like Work.

Mary York, Steve Bowman, Ted Tollefson, Katherine Georger, Matthew Gunn, Barbara
Feraci, and Stephanie Omsberg are all experienced, efficient, knowledgeable practitioners whose
billable rates are commensurate with prevailing local rates for attorneys of similar levels of
experience and areas of practice. Ms. York, with an hourly rate of $325-$340, has 18 years of
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experience. Mr. Bowman, with an hourly rate of $335-$350, has 21 years of experience. Mr.
Tollefson, with an hourly rate of $245-$255, has 9 years of experience. Ms. Georger, with an
hourly rate of $200, has 3 years of experience. Mr. Gunn, with an hourly rate of $195-$210, has
4 years of experience. Ms. Feraci, with an hourly rate of $160-$165, has 36 years of experience.
Ms. Omsberg, with an hourly rate of $160, has 14 years of experience. Additionally, ITD relied
upon the technical experience of David Carter and Nick Bouck to assist in the preparation of trial
exhibits and to provide technical support at trial. Mr. Carter's hourly rate is $185 and Mr.
Bouck's hourly rate is $145.
Court decisions confirm the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by Holland &
Hart practitioners. See, e.g., LaPeter v. Canada Life, 2007 WL 4287489, at *2 and *2, n. l. (D.
Idaho May 11, 2007); Restoration Industry Ass 'n v. Certified Restorers Consulting Group, 2008
WL 821078, at *1 (D. Idaho March 24, 2008).
Additionally, in 2009 in the case of AVP Restaurant Group v. Godzilla, et al., CVOC0711663, the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the
County of Ada approved the hourly rates of Mary V. York ($270 per hour) and Ted S. Tollefson
($215 per hour). No reason exists to value the services of these attorneys at an hourly rate below
that established by the market. See, e.g., Christensen v. Stevedoring Services ofAmerica, 557
F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2009) (once the prevailing attorney offers evidence of a market
rate, there is a presumption of reasonableness, and the court may not reduce that rate without
explaining the basis for its decision).

E.

The Nature And Length Of The Professional Relationship With The Client.

Holland & Hart has represented ITD for over 11 years. Holland & Hart represents ITD in
condemnation, construction, contract, environmental, and employment matters. Holland & Hart
also became the designated counsel for ITD's GARVEE/Connecting Idaho Partners Program on
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November 2, 2006. Holland & Hart was the successful applicant for ITD's open-bid "Request
for Proposal" for the GARVEE work. A true and correct copy of the November 2, 2006
appointment by the Idaho Attorney General is attached as Ex. A to the June 18, 2012 York Aff.

VI.

DISCUSSION OF FACTORS UNDER RULE 54(E)(3) RELATING TO THE CAUSE
OF THE AMOUNT OF FEES AND COSTS
Numerous factors under Rule 54(e)(3) relate to the cause of the amount of attorney fees

and costs incurred in the case. These factors include the time and labor required; the difficulty of
the case; the undesirability of the case; time limitations imposed by the circumstances of the
case; and any other factors deemed appropriate by the Court in the particular case.
In this case, the attorney fees and costs were substantiaiiy increased by deiays, abuses,
and unnecessary and meritless claims and side battles by Grathol. These circumstances are
discussed below.

A.

Grathol's Persistent Attempt To Recover Compensation For Sylvan Road.

On January 21, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion for
possession. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court held that ITD was not condemning any
land for Sylvan Road and was not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Hearing
Transcript ("Tr."), at 61 :2-25 (Ex. 1 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.). The Court further concluded that
"[t]he complaint itself, the controlling portions of that complaint, does not show a taking of
defendant's property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into Roberts Road or the expansion of
Sylvan Road through the Grathol property[.]" Tr. at 61:18-25.
The Court's ruling was fully supported by the record. Of particular note for purposes of
the present motion, Grathol never offered any contrary facts to support its Sylvan Road claim.
The Court later entered a written order granting possession that barred Grathol's claims
based on Sylvan Road. See Order Granting Possession ofProperty (filed Jan. 27, 2011). The
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Idaho Supreme Court also rejected Grathol's claims based on Sylvan Road. See Idaho Supreme
Court Decision of June 1, 2012, at 6-7 (Ex. E to the June 18, 2012 York Aft).
Despite the prior oral and written rulings of the Court, Grathol persisted in its pursuit of
compensation based on Sylvan Road. Long after the Court's ruling barring the claim, Grathol
submitted expert disclosures that included claims for compensation based on a taking of land for
Sylvan Road. Specifically, the valuation by Mr. Alan Johnson of Grathol included claims for
compensation for taking land for Sylvan Road, and damage claims based on construction of
Sylvan Road across the Grathol Property. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16; 93:16-94:2; 94:8-10;
102:14-103:3 (Ex. 3 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.); Grathol Third Suppl. Discovery Resp., at 6 (Ex.
6 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.).
After the Court's prior rulings, Grathol also served discovery seeking information and
documents relating to Sylvan Road. When ITD refused to respond to discovery on a claim that
had been rejected by the Court and dismissed from the case, Grathol filed a Motion to Compel on
September 13, 2011.
Finally, because Grathol's experts and attorneys continued to press claims for
compensation and damages based on Sylvan Road, ITD was forced to file a motion for summary
judgment on any and all claims relating to Sylvan Road. See Motion for Summary Judgment,
Brief, and Affidavit filed Jan. 6, 2012. ITD moved for an order that ITD was not acquiring any
land from Grathol for Sylvan Road, based on undisputed facts in the record and the prior rulings
of the Court that the taking in this case does not include any land for Sylvan Road. ITD Brief, at
6-12 (filed Jan. 6, 2012).
ITD was also forced to file a Motion in Limine to preclude testimony and argument at
trial based on an alleged taking of land for Sylvan Road and damages based on the alleged
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taking. See ITD Motion in Limine, and Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, at 15-16, (filed
Jan. 6, 2012).
On February 3, 2012, the Court granted ITD's motion for summary judgment: "ITD's
Motion for Summary Judgment re: a taking claim for Sylvan Road and damages for such alleged
taking is granted, and this claim is hereby stricken." Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion For Summary

Judgment, at 2 (filed Feb. 3, 2012).
Despite clear rulings from the Court barring the claims early in the case, Grathol
continued to press its claims for compensation based on Sylvan Road. In doing so, Grathol
needlessly forced ITD to incur substantial attorney fees and costs in the continuing fight over
Sylvan Road. As the prevailing party, both on this claim and the entire case, ITD should now be
allowed to recover its attorney fees and costs.

B.

Grathol's Refusals And Delays In Answering Written Discovery.

Throughout this litigation, Grathol failed and refused to comply with ITD's discovery
requests and refused to provide disclosures of expert opinions. For example, the following is a
chronology ofITD'sfirst set of discovery served on Grathol, which typifies Grathol's conduct
toward discovery in this case.
February 2, 2011 - ITD served its First Set of Discovery Requests
on Grathol with a due date of March 7, 2011. (Sept. 23, 2011 York
Aff. ,I 3, Ex. A).
March 15, 2011 -No discovery responses and no request for
extension of time have been received from Grathol. Counsel for
ITD and counsel Grathol discuss the fact that Grathol has failed to
answer the February 2, 2011 Discovery Requests. ITD grants an
extension to March 25, 2011 for Grathol to respond. (Sept. 23,
2011 York Aff. ,I 4, Ex. B).
March 22, 2011 - Counsel for Grathol requests an additional
extension of time and counsel for ITD agrees to extend the
discovery due date to April 5, 2011. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,r 4,
Ex. B).
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April 13, 2011 - ITD still has not received discovery responses
from Grathol. ITD sends a letter to counsel for Grathol. (Sept. 23,
2011 York Affi! 6, Ex. C).
April 15, 2011-Grathol finally serves its responses to the
February 2, 2011 discovery requests, however Grathol does not
send copies of the documents with its discovery requests. (Sept.
23, 2011 York Aff. iii! 7-8, Ex. D).
May 16, 2011 - Grathol serves its Supplementary Responses to the
February 2, 2011 discovery requests which consists of a single
page. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 9, Ex. E).
July 22, 2011 - ITD sends a letter to counsel for Grathol detailing
the substantial deficiencies in Grathol's responses to the February
2, 2011 discovery requests. ITD provides specific explanations
why Grathol's responses are deficient as to Interrogatories No. 2,
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ITD requests complete responses by August 5, 2011. (Sept. 23,
2011 York Aff. ,r 10, Ex. G).
n~~
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August 24, 2011 - ITD has not received any response from
Grathol. ITD sends yet another letter to counsel for Grathol, again
requesting that Grathol respond to the discovery deficiencies by
August 31, 2011. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 13, Ex. I).
August 29, 2011 - Grathol responds to ITD's letters of July 22,
2011 and August 24, 2011 letter by focusing on the issue of
disclosure of expert opinions, and refuses to provide the opinions
of Grathol's experts. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 14, Ex. J).
September 9, 2011 -Counsel for ITD speaks with counsel for
Grathol via telephone regarding Grathol's expert and discovery
deficiencies. Counsel for Grathol assures ITD that it will follow
up on the issues identified by ITD. However no response is
received. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 16).
Grathol's steadfast refusal to comply with discovery substantially increased the costs and
fees in this case. These circumstances warrant an award of costs and attorney fees to ITD.

C.

Grathol's Repeated Refusals To Disclose Expert Opinions.

The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established pretrial deadlines in this case,
including the deadlines for disclosure for expert witnesses. Pretrial Order, at ,i 2. Under the
terms of the Order, ITD was required to disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011. Id.
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Grathol was then required to disclose responsive experts on August 19, 2011. Id. The parties
were then to file any rebuttal expert disclosures on October 19, 2011. Id. The Order did not
place any limitations on which experts were required to be disclosed and, with respect to the
substance of the information to be provided for each parties' respective experts, the expert
disclosures were to "consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Id.
On August 19, 2011, Grathol filed its Expert Witness Disclosure in which it identified
three expert witnesses who were expected to be called to testify at the trial of this matter: Dewitt
Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund, and Alan Johnson. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. H). With
respect to Mr. Sherwood's expert testimony, Grathol stated that "[h]e will testify in accordance
with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon completion." Id. at Ex.Hat 2;
Despite the specific reference to Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report, Grathol did not produce Mr.
Sherwood's appraisal report as required by the deadline imposed by the Court for expert
disclosures.
With respect to Grathol's expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol
outlined in broad terms only the general subject matter of the anticipated testimony. Grathol's
disclosures did not provide any information as to the "opinions to be expressed and the basis and
reasons therefore," as required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it
"consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)," as
required by the Court's Pretrial Order. Grathol's expert disclosure as to Mr. Reeslund stated
that:

Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the
development plans for the Property, testimony as to its potential
uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations
on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land
use planning/entitlement, construction planning activities; efforts
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and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and
development of the Property; planning and design work associated
with the property; and the effects of the condemnation on the
development of the remaining property.
(Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. 1111-18, Ex. H). Grathol's expert disclosure as to Mr. Johnson stated
that:
Mr. Johnson will give opinion testimony as to the
acquisition, ownership and development plans for the Property,
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the
condemnation), the values of the Property remaining after
condemnation and before and after construction and
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses
associated with the purchase, holding and development of the
Property; planning and design work associated with the property;
marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation;
and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property.

Id. Grathol failed to provide any actual opinions or any information underlying the opinions of
either expert. Grathol gave no detail as to the experts' value opinions, opinions on the impacts of
the condemnation, or opinions on damages. Furthermore, Grathol gave no information about the
basis, reasons or support for the experts' opinions.
On August 24, 2012, counsel for ITD notified Grathol's counsel that its expert
disclosures were deficient in that they did not comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, the
disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, or with ITD's discovery requests
and the corresponding supplementation requirements of the Rules. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff.,
Ex. I). ITD's August 24th letter requested that Grathol provide full and complete disclosures.

Id.
Counsel for Grathol responded to ITD's August 24th letter by stating that it believed that
the disclosures did in fact comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and contained all of the
information required by Rule 26(b)(4). (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. J ). Grathol claimed that
its disclosure complied with the Court's Pretrial Order and Rule 26(b)(4) because it believed that
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Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were "actor-viewer" experts and, therefore, were not subject to
the requirements of Rule 26(6)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of its
assertion, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but
provided no argument or analysis to support its cited references. Grathol had made a similar
statement in its original responses to ITD's First Set oflnterrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. D, at 5-6).
On September 9, 2011, counsel for ITD held a conference call with counsel for Grathol
as a formal "meet and confer" conference on the issue of Grathol' s deficient expert disclosure, as
well as its refusal to answer written discovery. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., at ,-i,-i 18-19). During
the conference, counsel for ITD attempted to reach an agreement with counsel for Grathol on the
issue of Grathol's refusal to disclose opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. Id. At the
close of conference, counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the expert issues the
following week. Id.
Grathol's counsel did not respond within the agreed time frame, but a week later, on
September 19, 2011, Grathol's counsel sent a letter once again refusing to disclose the expert
opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., at ,-i 19 and Ex. M). In its
September 19th letter, Grathol reiterated its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were
"actor-viewer" experts and therefore not subject to the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order
or Rule 26(6)(4). Id. Notably, Grathol's letter did not explain why it refused to produce the
experts' opinions and supporting information in response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2, which
asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons
therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions,
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based."
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ITD's counsel responded on September 20, 2011 and stated its express disagreement with
Grathol's argument and conclusion. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. N). The September 20th
letter from ITD's counsel also notified Grathol that it would be filing a motion to exclude expert
testimony by Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson or, alternatively, to compel the disclosure of their
opinions and supporting information. Id.

1.

ITD Is Forced To File A Motion To Exclude Experts Or Compel
Expert Disclosures.

Finally, after all of the efforts outlined above had failed, ITD was forced to file a Motion
To Exclude Expert Testimony Or, Alternatively, To Compel Expert Disclosures on September
23, 2011. ITD set this motion for hearing on October 19, 2011.

2.

Grathol's "actor-viewer" argument was contrary to the Pretrial
Order.

The Court's Pretrial Order required that all expert disclosures "shall consist of at least

the information required to be disclosed pursuant to IR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Pretrial Order, at 2.

3.

Grathol's argument defied its duty to respond to discovery seeking
disclosure of expert opinions.

ITD propounded discovery requests in which it sought "a complete statement of all
opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert
witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon
which those opinions are based," as well as all information referenced in and required by Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. A).
Grathol's explanation of why it refused to produce the expert opinions of Mr. Reeslund
and Mr. Johnson was that these experts "are not 'expert witnesses' in the traditional sense of a
Rule 26(b)(A)(i) disclosure." Id. at Ex. M. According to Grathol, these individuals "fall within
the 'actor/viewer exception' possessing information not acquired in preparation for litigation but

instead are actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject matter of
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this litigation." Id. In support of its argument, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Subdivision (b)(4).
Grathol' s argument was completely baseless because both Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson
clearly intended (and did in fact) offer expert testimony that was obtained or created in
anticipation of this condemnation litigation. In particular, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were
both identified as offering expert testimony on specific issues relating to the condemnation
action. Mr. Reeslund was identified as providing expert testimony on the issue of the value of
the subject property before and after the condemnation, the limitations on uses of the Property
remaining after condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the development of the
remaining Property. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. H). Similarly, Mr. Johnson was identified as
providing expert testimony as to ITD's acquisition of a portion of the subject Property, the value
of the Property before and after the condemnation, the values of the Property remaining after
condemnation, construction and entitlement activities prior to and after the condemnation, and
the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property. Id. Each of these identified areas of
expert testimony was directly related to the condemnation suit and could not have been created
prior to the condemnation action or independent of this action. These subject areas of expert
testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson fell directly within the bounds of Rule 26(b)(4) and
should have been disclosed by Grathol on August 19, 2011. Grathol's failure to do so violated
the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

4.

The "actor-viewer" exception does not permit a party to refuse to
disclose expert opinions.

The actor-viewer exception only exists in the Committee Notes of Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. No counterpart exists in the Idaho Rules.
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The exception noted in the Committee Notes only excuses preparation of a formal expert
report by "actor-viewer" experts. It does riot allow a party to refuse to disclose the opinions of
such experts. Rather, the federal rule requires the party advancing the expert to disclose the
subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence and provide "a summary of
the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(b).
See also ITD Brief, at 14-15 (filed Sept. 23, 2011).
The federal exception in no way excuses compliance with discovery requests seeking the
opinions of such experts. See ITD Brief, at 12-13 (filed Sept. 23, 2011). Identical arguments
made by Grathol in this case were flatly rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Clark v. Raty,
137 Idaho 343, 344-45, 48 P.3d 672, 673-74 (Ct. App. 2002).
The decision in Clark makes clear that Grathol was required to disclose the opinions of
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson and was certainly required to provide the opinions and the bases
for the opinions in response to ITD's discovery requests. Grathol's argument to the contrary was
baseless and violated Idaho law.
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Clark v. Klien,

In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a
prohibition against discovery of information held by expert
witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that discovery has
been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert
witness requires advance preparation.... Similarly, effective
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the
narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery
normally produces are frustrated.
137 Idaho 154, 157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, Rule
26, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.). "The purpose of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient
pretrial fact gathering." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). "It
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follows, therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to encourage or reward those whose
conduct is inconsistent with that purpose." Id.
Grathol' s continuous and egregious efforts to hide the opinions of its experts throughout
this case violated the very purpose of the discovery rules. As the prevailing party, ITD should
now be awarded its attorney fees and costs, in light of Grathol's conduct in the case.

5.

When Finally Faced With A Court Hearing, Grathol Disclosed Expert
Opinions.

ITD set a hearing date of October 19, 2011 for its Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony
Or, Alternatively, To Compel Expert Disclosures. On October 16, 2011, three days before the
hearing, Grathol reversed course and served expert disclosures for Mr. Johnson, Mr. Reeslund,
and Mr. Sherwood. Grathol dropped its "actor-viewer" argument as to Johnson and Reeslund,
and finally produced the appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood, which showed that it had been
completed back in August, 2011.
The entire dispute over expert disclosures was unnecessary and based on an argument
that was contrary to both Idaho and federal law. Grathol' s abuses and improper tactics in
refusing to comply with discovery and refusing to disclose expert opinions needlessly and
substantially increased the costs and attorney fees in this case.

D.

Grathol Continued To Abuse The "Actor-Viewer" Exception.

Two weeks before the March 2012 trial, Grathol identified two additional expert
witnesses for trial, Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom Vandervert. Despite having disclosed these
individuals as fact witnesses and after the depositions of these witnesses, Grathol served
supplemental discovery responses identifying Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert as expert

witnesses late on Friday, February 17, 2012. (Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff., Ex. Q). Counsel for ITD
did not see these disclosures until Monday, February 20, 2012, two weeks before triai.
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This disclosure was clearly untimely, coming many months after the deadline for Grathol
to disclose experts and expert opinions. Even worse, Grathol failed and refused to disclose any

of the opinions that would be offered at trial or the basis of any opinions. (Feb. 29, 2012 York
Aff., Ex. Q). Grathol once again invoked the "actor/viewer" exception to try to hide the
opinions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert, and refused to comply with the requirements of Rule
26 and ITD's long-standing discovery requesting the opinions of Grathol's experts and the basis
of the opinions. Id.
Under the circumstances, ITD was forced to file a motion to exclude Mr. Terrell and Mr.
Vandervert from testifying at trial. See Motion To Exclude Expert Witnesses (filed Feb. 29,
2012). Had these experts been allowed to testify, the Court's Pretrial Orders, the Stipulation
between the parties (resolving the long running dispute over expert disclosures), and the Idaho
rules governing discovery would all have been rendered meaningless.
At the start of the trial, the Court ruled that these witnesses would not be permitted to
testify as to opinions, but could testify as to facts within their knowledge. Based on this ruling,
Grathol elected not to call either expert.
Once again, this entire fight was unnecessary and should never have happened. The
additional costs and attorney fees incurred in this side battle were caused solely by Grathol's
continuing refusal to comply with the rules of discovery and obey the Court's pretrial orders.

E.

Grathol Asserted Numerous Claims For Compensation And Damages That
Were Barred By Law.

During the course of the case, Grathol asserted numerous claims for compensation and
damages that were barred by law. Ultimately, ITD was forced to file a motion for summary
judgment on January 6, 2012 to dismiss these improper claims. The following is a summary of
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the improper claims by Grathol and the legal principles that barred them. (The Sylvan Road
claim, dismissed again on summary judgment, has already been addressed).

1.

Construction Delay.

Grathol sought to recover money damages based on what it characterized as "delay" on
the part of ITD in constructing the US-95 Project. The law is clear that a condemnee may not
recover damages for alleged delay in the construction of a public project. Moreover, Grathol had
no factual basis to claim that ITO had failed to meet a construction schedule constituting
"construction delay" that would support this claim.

2.

Visibility.

Grathol sought to recover severance damages based, in part, on a claim that its proposed
commercial development would be less visible by cars traveling on US-95 after the Project.
Idaho does not recognize claims for "loss of visibility." Idaho law holds that no property owner
is entitled to a particular pattern or flow of traffic past its property. Therefore, no property owner
is entitled to a particular level of visibility by passing automobile traffic. This claim is also
uniformly rejected in other states.

3.

Access.

Grathol sought compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of access to its property
after construction of the US-95 Project. The Grathol property is bare land. Grathol is planning a
commercial development on the property. It was undisputed that Grathol did not have any
commercial access or any permits for commercial access to the property before the US-95
Project. Therefore, ITO had not "taken" any commercial access to the property. Moreover,
Idaho law does not permit compensation for a taking of access unless all access to the public
road system has been lost or "destroyed." The record showed that Grathol will be permitted
accesses in the "after" condition.
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4.

Lost Profits.

Grathol sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 in this case, based on a lost profits
analysis by Mr. Alan Johnson. Idaho law bars recovery of lost profits except when made under
Idaho's eminent domain statute authorizing "business damages." Idaho Code § 7-711 (2).
Grathol did not qualify under § 7-711 (2) because it had not operated a business on the site for 5
years. No business exists on the site. It is bare land. Lastly, Idaho law bars claims for lost
profits based on new businesses because such claims are inherently speculative.

5.

Gravel.

Grathol sought to recover compensation for the value of gravel it believed to be located
on the property and which Grathol alleged ITD could use for the US-95 Project. This claim
failed as a matter of law because ITD is paying for the condemned property in its entirety including any gravel or anything else of value that may or may not be under the property.
Grathol could not recover the fair market value of the property and an additional amount for
gravel. Grathol also had no idea whether there was any usable gravel under the property or not,
how much there was, or what it was worth. It had simply made a demand for $300,000.00 for
gravel. Lastly, ITD showed that it could not remove the substructure on the property and then
construct a freeway overpass on it. If any substructure were removed, it would have to be
replaced with like material or better, and then re-compacted. Consequently, it would have been
far more expensive to remove gravel, then buy new gravel, truck the new gravel to the site, fill,
and then compact the new gravel to restore the site, than it would be to simply use gravel from a
supplier.

6.

Severance Damages For Impacts On Development Plan.

Grathol' s attempt to seek separate and specific damages for impacts on a proposed
development plan was likewise barred by Idaho law. The Grathol property was bare land and no
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development of any kind had occurred at either the date of taking or the trial in this case.
Development plans may only be used to illustrate potential uses on the property. Specifically,
IDJI2d 7 .14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's particular plan for development
and use of the property only for the purposes of determining uses for which the property is
adaptable." Id. In other words, Grathol could not seek or recover damages by pointing to an unbuilt site plan and claiming "we cannot build this here now," or "this building will have to be
smaller," and ask that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such alleged "losses" or
"severance" damages. Grathol' s attempts to use a development plan for specific damages to
specific parts of the property were barred by Idaho law.
7.

Results Of ITD's Motion For Summary Judgment.
a)

Construction Delay, Lost Profits, and Gravel.

At the hearing February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's motion for summary judgment,
Grathol conceded that the claims for construction delay, lost profits, and gravel could be
dismissed. Id. The Court therefore dismissed these claims on summary judgment. Id.
Under these circumstances, ITD should be awarded its attorney fees and costs. These
claims should never have been asserted, as clearly demonstrated by Grathol's dropping the
claims when confronted before the Court on a motion for summary judgment.
It should also be noted that ITD was forced to retain an expert, Mr. Dennis Reinstein,
CPA, to prepare a rebuttal report responding to the lost profits claim by Grathol. The costs and
legal fees associated with the defense of this claim were made necessary only by Grathol's
assertion of a claim clearly barred by Idaho law.

It should also be noted that, despite dismissal of the construction delay claim, Grathol's
two valuation witnesses, Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson, continued to seek compensation for
construction delay at trial. This resulted in continued litigation over a claim that had been
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dropped by Grathol at the hearing on summary judgment, and dismissed by the Court. The
additional attorney fees in the continued litigation of this claim should not have had to be
incurred, and ITD should be awarded its attorney fees as the prevailing party.

b)

Visibility, Access, and Impacts on Development Plan.

After the hearing on ITD's motion for summary judgment, Grathol submitted revised
expert disclosures for Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson. These disclosures showed that Grathol
had given up any claim for separate severance damages for loss of visibility, access, or impacts
on its development plan. Thus, in its Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages,
the Court held as follows:
Grathol is hereby barred from seeking any separate discreet
severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated
in Grathol' s expert witness disclosures as to the before and after
fair market values for the remainder parcel.

Id. at 2 (filed Feb. 16, 2012).
Up to that time, Grathol' s expert disclosures and the depositions of Grathol 's experts
showed that they intended to seek separate and discreet damage awards for alleged loss of
visibility, access, and impacts on its proposed development plan. Because these claims should
never have been asserted as separate claims, and should only have been offered as factors
affecting fair market value before and after the taking, ITD should not have had to file a motion
for summary judgment to resolve these claims. ITD should not have had to expend attorney fees
and costs in defending against these claims for compensation and damages.

F.

Improper Methods And Tactics By Grathol's Valuation Experts.

Grathol's two valuation experts employed improper appraisal methods and tactics that
initiated a host of battles that were unnecessary and involved fights over issues clearly barred by

ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- 28
1345 of 1617

law or wholly unsupported by the facts in the case. Grathol's tactics substantially and
unnecessarily increased the attorney fees and costs in this case.
The improper methods and tactics included the following:

G.

•

Failure to use the date of taking as the date of value, as required by Idaho statute.

•

The use of multiple dates of value.

•

Failure to do a "before and after" analysis of the value of the property.

•

Failure to use the entire Grathol property as the "larger parcel" for purposes of
determining the "before and after" value.

•

Using sales as alleged "comparable sales" that were in far superior locations, with
substantially greater demand for commercial development, and substantially
better situated for the installation of utilities or with utilities already installed.

•

Sherwood's use of a negotiated settlement of a condemnation as one of his
primary "comparable sales," despite his testimony that such a transaction is not an
indication of "market value."

•

Failure to identify, quantify, or explain any adjustments to sales as part of the
"comparable sales approach" to real estate appraisal.

•

Producing only a limited, restricted appraisal report that expressly noted that third
parties would have difficulty understanding the report.

•

Repeatedly changing valuation conclusions and the explanations for the
conclusions reached.

•

Continuing to assert claims for compensation based on the time needed for
construction of the US-95 Project (i.e., "construction delay").

•

Johnson based his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical development
were completed. This approach is barred by law.

Sherwood's Larger Parcel Was An Artificial Construct That Was Contrary
To Law, Not Supported By The Facts, And Created A Prolonged, Expensive,
And Unnecessary Fight Over Proper Valuation Of The Grathol Property.

At the close of trial, the Court directed Grathol to cite Idaho law that would support the
larger parcel opinion of its appraiser, Mr. Sherwood. Grathol did not cite any Idaho statutes,
case law, or jury instructions that supported Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel. In fact,
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Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel was contrary to Idaho law. See ITD's Post Trial Brief,
at 3-11 (filed March 23, 2012).
As found by the Court, Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel was contrary to the facts
of the case. See Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment, at 9-17. Of
particular note, all evidence and testimony at trial was uniform that the entire 56.8-acre parcel
had the same "highest and best use" as land for commercial development.

H.

"Severance" Damages.

At the close of trial, the Court allowed Grathol another opportunity to explain and
quantify its claims for severance damages, if any. The parties had engaged in a long battle over
the issue of severance damages throughor1;t the case. The primary difficulty in resolving the issue
was Grathol's refusal to quantify its claims for severance damages and explain the cause of the
alleged damages. Even after trial, this never happened. As noted by the Court,
Grathol's counsel affirmatively stated Sherwood would present his
opinion as to the amount of severance damages to the remainder
post-taking, which would be based upon Sherwood's opinion
regarding a difference in the fair market values of the remainder
parcel before and after the take. An expert's credibility is
irretrievably damaged when that expert, who is supposed to
provide a number other than "zero," does not do so.

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment, at 26, n. 7.
In its post trial brief, Grathol made no attempt to explain or justify the "severance"
damage claim by Mr. Alan Johnson. ITD had previously shown that Johnson's "severance"
damage claim mirrored his construction delay claim before it was dismissed by the Court.
Although the claim had been dismissed, Grathol forced ITD to continue to incur legal fees and
costs fighting it.
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For all of the above reasons, the abuses and tactics by Grathol and its valuation experts
justify an award of attorney fees and costs to ITD, particularly where ITD is so clearly the
prevailing party in the case.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2012.

MaryV. Yor
Ted S. Toll s n
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-31

1348 of 1617

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D
D
D

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CVl0-10095
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vs.

FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA )

Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am

duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.
2.

I one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation

Board ("ITD") in the above-captioned matter. I am familiar with the firm's billing and recordkeeping practices, and I have personal knowledge of the facts regarding the legal representation
provided to ITD by Holland & Hart and of the attorney fees and other costs incurred by ITD in
this case.
3.

Holland & Hart is designated counsel and I am a Special Deputy Attorney

General appointed to represent ITD in the GARVEE/Connecting Idaho Partners Program. The
designation and appointment is the result of Holland & Hart being the successful applicant for
ITD's open-bid RFP for the GARVEE work. A true and correct copy of the November 2, 2006
letter of appointment as Special Deputy Attorney General from the Idaho Attorney General is
attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A.
4.

The summary of costs and attorney fees listed in this affidavit are true and correct

to the best of my knowledge and belief and reflect actual costs and fees incurred by and billed to
ITD. The costs and attorney fees have been reasonably and necessarily incurred in this action,
are in compliance with Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and should be
awarded under Idaho Code§ 7-718 and Rules 54(d)(l)(C), 54(d)(l)(D) and 54(e)(l) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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5.

In this case, ITD sought to acquire a portion of property belonging to Defendant

HJ Grathol ("Grathol") as part ofITD's project to reconstruct and improve US-95 from Garwood
to Sagle. ITD filed the present condemnation action on November 19, 2010. On December 15,
2010; ITD made a settlement offer to Grathol in the a.mount of $1,100,000. The settlement offer
was timely made pursuant to the requirements of Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105
Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and its progeny, State ex rel. Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 120
Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991) and State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137
(1997) (referred to as the "Acarrequi offer"). A true and correct copy oflTD'sAcarrequi offer is
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6.

Counsel for Grathol granted ITD an extension to submit its Acarrequi offer until

December 16, 2010 in order to allow sufficient time to have the Idaho Transportation Board
consider the Acarrequi offer. A true and correct copy of counsel for Grathol' s grant of an
extension to submit its Acarrequi offer is attached hereto as Exhibit C. ITD made its offer on
December 15, 20 I 0-one day prior to the extended deadline granted by Grathol' s counsel.
7.

The matter was tried in a five-day bench trial before the Honorable Charles

Hosack, District Judge on March 5, 2012. After post-trial briefing and proposed findings of fact
and conclusions oflaw were submitted by the parties, on May 25, 2012, the Court issued its
Post-trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment in which it concluded that the total
amount of just compensation to be awarded to Grathol in this matter was $675,000.
8.

On June 4, 2012, the Court entered Judgment on the $675,000 just compensation

award and stated that "any claim for attorney fees and costs [would be] determined pursuant to
Rule 54, I.R.C.P." (Judgment, at 4.)
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9.

The amount offered to Grathol by ITD as just compensation was $425,000 more

than the award of just compensation as determined by the Court and was well-beyond the 90%
rule for determining an award of costs and attorney fees in a condemnation action, as established
by the Ida.Ito Supreme Cou..rt in Ada County HighiA;ay Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d
1067 (1983) and its progeny.
10.

Additionally, the award of just compensation in this matter is the same amount

offered by ITD at trial and is well below the $7,000,000 originally sought by Grathol and the
range of $1,775,000 to $3,000,000 sought by Grathol at trial.

EXPLANATION OF COSTS INCURRED BY THE STATE
11.

In this lawsuit, ITD reasonably and necessarily incurred considerable costs and

attorney fees in this matter to defend against the multi-million dollar damage claims sought by
Grathol. ITD is not seeking to recover all of the costs and attorney fees it incurred in this action.
Rather, the sums sought in the present motion are less than the actual total costs incurred in this
matter, which ITD has reduced for purposes of this motion.
12.

ITD is seeking $182,182.65 of the costs incurred by ITD in this matter.

13.

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT: ITD claims the following costs as a

matter of right pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l )(C) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
a.

Court itling fees:

$

0.00

$

0.00

No filing fees were incurred in this matter.

b.

Fees for service pleadings

No fees for the service of pleadings were incurred in this matter.

c.

Witness Fees:

$

0.00

No witness fees for the testimony of non-expert or non-party
witnesses were incurred in this matter.
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d.

Travel expenses of testifying witnesses:

Herron Companies
($0.30/mile x 1269 miles)
Hedley Construction & Development
($0.30/mile x 1279 miles)
e.

$
$

7.00
9.00

Preparation of exhibits:

Trial Exhibits

$ 295.46

g.

Cost of all bond premiums:

$

h.

Expert witness fees:
Columbia Valuation Group
Herron Companies
Hedley Construction & Development

i.

j.

0.00

$2,000.00
$2,000.00
$2,000.00

Charges for reporting and transcribing:

M&M Court Reporting M&M Court Reporting M&M Court Reporting M&M Court Reporting M&M Court Reporting -

Johnson Deposition
Reeslund Deposition
Sherwood Deposition
Terrell Deposition
V andervert Deposition

$1,070.10
$1,238.65
$1,561.85
$ 917.25
$ 896.25

Charges for one copy of Deposition:

M&M Court Reporting - Minzghor Deposition
M&M Court Reporting - Moe Deposition
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:

14.

$ 383.70

Expenses for certified copies of documents:

Certified Copy Lis Pendens
Certified Copy Possession Order
f.

$ 380.70

155.05
$ 164.05
$

$13,079.06

DISCRETIONARY COSTS: For its discretionary costs claimed pursuant to

Rule S4(d)(l)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, ITD is only seeking to recover the
expert costs incurred in the defense of this matter.
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a.

Expert Fees:

The primary disputes in this matter were the valuation of the subject property and the
damage caused to the property and Grathol's proposed development as a result of the ITD's
taking of a portion of t.i.e prope&J. At the out-set of ITD' s process of acquiring Grathol' s

property for the US-95 Project, the State hired the appraisal firm of Columbia Valuation Group
to appraise the property and determine an estimate of fair compensation that should be paid to
Grathol as a result of the taking and any damage that might occur as a result of the taking.
During the course of the litigation, it became evident that Grathol would seek to raise various
issues regarding its proposed development, lost profits, access, visibility, and sewer treatment
issues, as well as issues relating to the larger parcel, comparable sales, and the market value of
the property. Grathol identified numerous individuals as possible witnesses to provide testimony
on these various issues. That number was ultimately narrowed now and included the land owner,
the architect who designed the proposed development, an appraiser, a sewer treatment engineer,
a broker, and a land planner. As a result, !TD was required to hire several individuals and firms
to confirm the validity or invalidity of the issues raised and to rebut the expertise and testimony
expected to be presented by Defendant on the various issues.
The services rendered by each expert retained by the State in this matter, as well as the
amount charged by each expert follows:
I. Columbia Valuation Group, Inc. : Stan Moe

$18,975.00

The appraisal finn of Columbia Valuation Group was hired to perfonn a complete,
narrative before and after appraisal report for the Grathol property to detennine the amount of
compensation owed to Grathol. The testimony of Mr. Stan Moe, an MAI appraiser, was required
to establish ITD's position on the amount of just compensation.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK IN SUPPORT OF ITD'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
- WES-AND--COS'.JS----6 -- ------------ -- --- -- ----------------------------------------------- ------------1355
-----------of 1617

In establishing his opinions of value, Mr. Moe visited the subject property, researched the
real estate market and comparable sales in and around Athol, assessed the market and made
adjustments for the differences between the comparable properties and the subject property and

made a reasoned deterrnination of the value of the subject property botl-i before and after the
highway project to reach his conclusion of fair compensation. Mr. Moe testified to his methods,
opinions and conclusions at the trial of this matter.
In addition to performing the appraisal and report, Mr. Moe also reviewed the appraisal
report and depositions of Grathol's appraiser, Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood and Grathol's owner,
Alan Johnson, and discovered several weaknesses, errors and omissions in the analysis and
opinions of both individuals. These weaknesses, errors and omissions were brought out during
cross-examination. Mr. Moe was present during Mr. Sherwood's testimony at trial and was
available throughout the trial to be informed and available to provide information to counsel
during trial. Additionally, Mr. Moe testified during ITD's rebuttal case to respond to the
testimony presented by Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson.
ITD requests that $18,975.00 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule
54(d)(l )(D).
2. Herron Companies: Jeffrey Key & Larry Pynes

$40,249.30

The appraisal firm of Herron Companies was hired to perform an independent analysis of
the case after it became apparent that there was such a wide spread in values between the
valuation experts. As part of the Herron Companies' assignment, they were asked to complete,
narrative before and after appraisal report for the Grathol property to determine the amount of
compensation owed to Grathol and also to provide a rebuttal report of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal
and Mr. Johnson's valuation opinions.
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In establishing his opinions of value, Mr. Larry Pynes, who holds a J.D. and an ASA
designation, visited the subject property and the surrounding area, researched the real estate
market and comparable sales in and around Athol, assessed the market and made adjustments for
the differences be't'.-i1een the comparable properties and the subject propelt'J and made a reasoned

determination of the value of the subject property both before and after the highway project to
reach his conclusion of fair compensation. Mr. Pynes testified to his methods, opinions and
conclusions at the trial of this matter.
In addition to performing the appraisal and report, Mr. Pynes also reviewed the appraisal
report and depositions of Grathol' s appraiser, Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood and Grathol' s owner,
Alan Johnson, and discovered several weaknesses, errors and omissions in the analysis and
opinions of both individuals. These weaknesses, errors and omissions were brought out during
cross-examination. Mr. Pynes was present during Mr. Sherwood's testimony at trial and was
available throughout the trial to be informed and available to provide information to counsel
during trial. Additionally, Mr. Pynes testified during ITD's rebuttal case to respond to the
testimony presented by Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson.
ITO requests that $40,249.30 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule

54(d)(l )(D).
3. Hedley Construction and Development, Inc.: George Hedley
$28,893.56

ITO retained the services of Hedley Construction and Development, Inc. to address and
refute several issues ITD retained the services of Mr. George Hedley of Hedley Construction and
Development, Inc. to address and refute several issues raised by Grathol in this case, including
claims relating to the feasibility of Grathol's proposed development project. Grathol claimed
damages relating to its proposed commercial development on the subject property, which
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Grathol contended could be constructed and completed in 2011. Mr. Hedley reviewed all
aspects of the Grathol development plan including the site, the zoning, the economic conditions
and the financials.

Mr. Hediey testified at trial Grathol's proposed commercial development was not
financially feasible and would not be developed in the foreseeable future. Further, Mr. Hedley
provided testimony regarding Grathol' s failure to do proper due diligence before they purchased
the property and the multitude of problems with Grathol's proposed commercial development.
Mr. Hedley's report and testimony was necessary to refute Grathol's claims that the proposed
commercial development was a viable and valuable project that could be constructed in the
immediate future.
ITD requests that $28,893.56 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule
54(d)(l )(D).

4. Dave Evans and Associates, Inc.: Carole Richardson,
Ken Geibel, Kevin Picanco

$68,174.48

ITD retained the services of Dave Evans and Associates, Inc. to address and refute
Grathol's claims regarding several issues raised by Grathol in this case, including claims relating
to the sewer treatment facility that Grathol intended to build on the property, issues relating to
access to the property both before and after the project, and issues relating to Grathol's claims of
loss of visibility.
Ms. Richardson, Mr. Geibel and Mr. Picanco were requested to review the claims and
issues raised by Grathol and provide a rebuttal report responding to those claims and issues.
The rebuttal report was prepared and produced as part oflID's expert rebuttal disclosures.
Ms. Richardson, Mr. Geibel and Mr. Picanco did not testify at trial because either ITD
was able to exclude the testimony to which these individuals were prepared to respond or
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Grathol decided not to raise the issues at trial. Nevertheless, the review, analysis and report by
Ms. Richardson, Mr. Geibel and Mr. Picanco were necessary to refute Grathol's claims in this
case.
ITD requests that $68,i74.48 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule
54(d)(l )(D).
5. Hooper Cornell, PLLC: Dennis Reinstein

$12,811.25

ITD retained the services of Hooper Cornell, PLLC to address and refute Grathol's claims
regarding lost profits in this case. Mr. Dennis Reinstein is a CPA and was requested to review
and analyze Grathol's claims oflost profits. Mr. Reinstein was also requested to prepare a
rebuttal report, which was produced as part ofITD's expert rebuttal disclosures.
Ms. Reinstein did not testify at trial because ITD was able to exclude the evidence of
claimed lost profits. Nevertheless, the review, analysis report by Mr. Reinstein were necessary
to refute Grathol's claims in this case.
ITD requests that $12,811.25 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule
54(d)(l)(D).
15.

In summary, the total amount of discretionary costs requested, which are the

expert costs reasonably and necessarily incurred by ITD in this matter, less the $2,000 per expert
claimed above as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l )(C)(8):
Columbia Valuation Group, Inc.:
David Evans and Associates, Inc.:
Hooper Cornell, PLLC:
Herron Companies:
Hedley Construction & Development, Inc.:

TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS:

$18,975.00
$68,174.48
$12,811.25
$40,249.30
$28,893.56

$169,103.59
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EXPLANATION OF ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED BY THE STATE
16.

The attorney fees requested by ITD are only those incurred by Holland & Hart in

this matter. ITD is not seeking an award of the attorney fees of Deputy Attorney General J. Tim
Thomas in this matter.
17.

The attorney fees requested are based upon a total of 2,720 hours billed by the

attorneys and paralegals at the hourly rates listed below. These sums are less than the actual total
fees incurred in this matter, which ITD has reduced for purposed of this motion.

Timekeeper

Position

Hourly Rate

Hours

Total Fees

MaryV. York
Steven C. Bowman
Ted S. Tollefson
Katherine Georger
Matthew G. Gunn
Barbara K. Feraci
Stephanie M. Omsberg
David Carter
Nick Bouck

Partner
Of. Counsel
Associate
Associate
Associate
Paralegal
Paralegal
Tech Support
Tech Support

$305-$325
$325-$335
$230-$245
$200
$195
$160-$165
$160
$185
$145

839.5
542.5
575.1
155.6
45.1
408.7
29.2
37.6
86.7

$272,235.50
$181,701.50
$140,686.50
$ 31,120.00
$ 8,794.50
$ 65,375.00
$ 4,695.50
$ 6,956.00
$ 12,571.50

2,720.0

$724,136.00

TOTAL HOURS & FEES
18.

In sum, the ITD has incurred total attorney fees and costs, for purposes of this

motion, in the amount of $906,318.65.
19.

Attached as Exhibit D is a detailed statement of the fees incurred ITD in this

matter, in compliance with I.RC.P. 54(e).
20.

Attached as Exhibit E is the decision issued by the Idaho Supreme Court decision

on Grathol's appeal in the present case entitled State ofIdaho, Department o/Transportation v.

HJ Grathol, et al., 2012 Opinion No. 85 (June 1, 2012).
21.

Attached as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of the United States District

Court ofldaho caseLaPeter v. Canada Life Ins., No. CV-06-121-S-BLW, 2007 WL 2608837
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(Dec. 4, 2007), in which the Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief U.S. District Judge held that the
rates charged by Holland & Hart are reasonable.
Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the United States

22.

District Court of Idaho case Restoration Industry Ass 'n v. Certified Restorers Consulting Group,
2008 WL 821078 (D. Idaho March 24, 2008), in which the Court also held attorneys in Boise
with approximately 23-24 years of experience "charge somewhere between $250.00 and $350.00
per hour," and that attorneys with 3-4 years of experience "charge somewhere between $100.00
and $180.00 per hour." Id. at *l.
Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum

23.

Decision inAVP Restaurant Group, LLC v. Godzilla, LLC, et al., CV OC 07-11663 entered
January 16, 2009 by the Honorable District Judge Michael McLaughlin holding that the rates
charged by Holland &Hart were reasonable. (Ex. G. at 5.)
24.

All costs and attorney fees identified in this Affidavit are true and correct and

reflect the actual costs and fees incurred by and billed to ITD. The costs and attorney fees
required to prosecute this lawsuit and obtain a Judgment in favor of ITD were necessary and
reasonably incurred, and the information contained herein is in compliance with Rule 54 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2012.

........... ,,,

SUBSCRIBED and,, SWORN to before me this 18th day of June, 2012 .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D
D
IZ!
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Emaii
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax) (208) 664-5884

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5641515_1
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

November 2, 2006

SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL APPOINTMENT

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Mary V. York of the firm of Holland & Hart, LLP, P. 0. Box 2527, Boise, Idaho
83701-2527, is hereby appointed Special Deputy Attorney General for the
purpose of researching, analyzing legal issues, and advising the Idaho
Transportation . Department (Department), as well as representing the
Department in administrative and/or judicial proceedings, related to the
Connecting Idaho Program.
The appointment is effective for the duration of the above-stated matter.
Any courtesies you can extend to Ms. York in her conduct of business for the
State of Idaho, as my delegate, will be appreciated.
Sincerely,

r ,

A.

~

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
LGW:blm

P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 334-2530
Located at 700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 21 O
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HOLLAND&HART.e

"J

MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869

myork@hollandhart.com

December 15, 2011

OFFER OF SETTLEMENT PROTECTED BY RULE
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE

408

Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and
E-mail: dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com and
U.S. Mail
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
Re:

!TD v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CVl 0-10095, First Judicial District
Court, State of Idaho, County of Kootenai

Dear Doug:
I have been authorized by the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD")
to make an offer of settlement to your clients in the case of ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.,
Case No. CVl0-10095, First Judicial District Court, State ofldaho, County of Kootenai.
Specifically, in accordance with Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho
873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983), the succeeding cases, and other relevant provisions ofldaho
law, ITD hereby offers to pay your clients the sum of$1,100,000.00 as settlement of all
claims in this case.
This offer is made for settlement purposes only. This settlement offer shall remain
open and available for acceptance by your clients until end of business on December 30,
2011.
Please convey ITD's offer to your clients, and we will await a response from you.
In the meantime, if you have any questions or if I can be of any assistance, please do not
hesitate to contact me.

MVY:ntp
S343328_1

Holland &Hart UP
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869

www.hollandhart.com

10·1 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise,ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O.Box2527 Boi~,1O 83701-2527
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From: Doug Marfice [mailto:dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com]
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2011 2:57 PM
To: Mary York
Subject: RE: H.J. Grathol
Mary;
We're ok with the extension to Dec. 16.
I will also be sending you some information on the utility sleeve needs that were discussed at the depositions. Those
issues might need to be part of your discussions with the Board.

Douglas S. Marfice
Ramsden & Lyons LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d Alene, ID 83816
(208) 664-5818 - phone
(208) 664-5884 - fax

www.ramsdenlyons.com
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged.
If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail
information is strictly prohibited. If you have received the e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original
message.

From: Mary York [mailto:MYork@hollandhart.com]
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2011 9:29 AM
To: 'Doug Marfice'
Subject: RE: H.J. Grathol
Doug,
I left you message yesterday evening, but just to follow up to your email as well -yes the reason for the request is for
the board to consider the Accarrequi offer.
Please let me know if the extension until Dec. 16th is acceptable.
Regards,

MVY

Mary V. York
Holland & Hart LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building
101 S. Capitol Blvd.
1
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Boise, ID 83702
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869
E-mail: myork@hollandhart.com

HQl,_tA.ND& HAR"r:UJI'
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message is confidential and may be privileged. If you believe that this email has been sent to you in
error, please reply to the sender that you received the message in error; then please delete this e-mail. Thank you.

Disclaimer of Electronic Transaction: This communication does not reflect an intention by the sender or the sender's client to conduct a
transaction or make any agreement by electronic means. Nothing contained herein shall constitute an electronic signature or a contract
under any law, rule or regulation applicable to electronic transactions.

From: Doug Marfice [mailto:dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com]

Sent: Thursday, December 01, 2011 10:38 AM
To: Mary York
Subject: H.J. Grathol
Mary;
I got your voice mail yesterday. Question: is your request for additional time for making the Accarequi offer because the
offer will be discussed at the Dec.14-15 Transportation Board meeting? Please advise. Thanks

Douglas S. Marfice
Ramsden & Lyons LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d Alene, ID 83816
(208) 664-5818 - phone
(208) 664-5884 - fax
www.ramsdenlyons.com
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged.
If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail
information is strictly prohibited. If you have received the e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original
message.
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

10/07/2010

York, Mary V.

$

1,037.00

3.4

Review and analyze condemnation file from ITD; work on case summary and outline of important
facts and issues and work on complaint, summons and lis pendens;

10/08/2010

York, Mary V.

$

91.50

0.3

Several rounds of email correspondence with client regarding details for case, coordination of
meeting, and obtaining documents from ITD;

10/14/2010

York, Mary V.

$

61.00

0.2

10/15/2010

York, Mary V.

$

579.50

1.9

10/19/2010

York, Mary V.

$

30.50

0.1

Hours

Narrative

10/20/2010

York, Mary V.

$

1,281.00

4.2

10/21/2010

York, Mary V.

$

457.50

1.5

10/22/2010

York, Mary V.

$

152.50

0.5

10/25/2010

York, Mary V.

$

183.00

0.6

10/26/2010

York, Mary V.

$

122.00

0.4

10/28/2010

York, Mary V.

$

61.00

0.2

10/29/2010

York, Mary V.

$

335.50

1.1

11/01/2010

York, Mary V.

$

335.50

1.1

11/02/2010

York, Mary V.

$

701.50

2.3

11/02/2010

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

62.00

0.4

Conference with ITD to discuss case;
Work on Summons, Complaint and Lis Pendens; conferences with client regarding coordination of
case management, documents and files;
Telephone call to Doug Marfice regarding case;
Work on complaint; review case files and title documents to confirm information received from
counsel for HJ Grathol; conference with TSTollefson regarding case; work on lis pendens and notice
of special deputy attorney general appointment; work on summons, confirming statutory
requirements of Idaho's eminent domain statutes; research secretary of state website to confirm
details of Sterling Bank as party in case and incorporate information into pleadings; finalize
pleadings; draft memo to client regarding condemnation action;
Correspondence with client; confirm details of access issues for remainder property and revise order
of condemnation; finalize pleadings for filing;
Research information regarding landowner's appraiser and determine title; correspondence with
client;
Correspondence with client; telephone conference with client; telephone conference with Kootenai
Title and follow up regarding title of parcel;
Correspondence with Kootenai County Title Company regarding confirmation of title information;
finalize language of Order of Condemnation and correspondence with client regarding same;
Review and analyze correspondence from client and respond to same;
Review and analyze lengthy correspondence from Doug Marfice regarding HJ Grathol parcel,
comparing information referenced with appraisal report; draft memo to client;
Research information on Skip Sherwood and his disciplinary record with the bureau of occupational
licenses; correspondence with client; telephone conference with client;
Review and analyze comp sales used by experts; telephone conference with client; work on
possession agreement; confer with TSTollefson regarding case and issues presented; telephone
conference with Doug Marfice regarding possession agreement, comparable sales, and record owner
of property;
Set up key electronic folders for case materials;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

11/03/2010

York, Mary V.

$

1,189.50

3.9

Telephone conference with expert regarding Grathol property and comps from Skip Sherwood; work
on assessment of case and identify key issues and bases for Grathol's compensation claims;
correspondence with client; review language on order of condemnation; identify potential categories
of expert witnesses based upon claims by Grathol and development plans; research Kootenai County
information for details of zoning change applications and development proposals; draft public
records request to Kootenai County; telephone conference with client;

11/04/2010

York, Mary V.

$

488.00

1.6

Review notes from conference call with client; draft correspondence to client and follow up with call
to client; brief conference with client;
Review correspondence and information regarding Grathol property from ITD, including Kootenai
County Commissioner's re-zone decision and ITD's administrative policy on access control; research
ITD's access policies (IDAPA) referenced in ITD's Access Control Administrative Policies; revise draft
order of condemnation per comments from client; draft correspondence to client;

11/08/2010

York, Mary V.

$

579.50

1.9

11/08/2010

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

62.00

0.4

11/09/2010

York, Mary V.

$

305.00

1.0

11/11/2010

York, Mary V.

$

884.50

2.9

11/12/2010

York, Mary V.

$

335.50

1.1

11/12/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

368.00

1.6

11/15/2010

York, Mary V.

$

518.50

1.7

11/15/2010
11/16/2010
11/16/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.
Feraci, Barbara K.

$
$
$

299.00
549.00
46.50

1.8
0.3

11/17/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

322.00

1.4

11/17/2010

York, Mary V.

$

213.50

0.7

11/17/2010

Bowman, Steve C.

$

325.00

1.0

11/17/2010

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

62.00

0.4

1.3

Review recent case communications and update and create additional key electronic folders for
access control policy and zoning issues;
Email correspondence with client; review Kootenai County's response to public records request and
draft response; telephone conference with expert;
Review, edit and finalize letter to Kootenai County; review comp sales used by expert versus those
referenced by counsel for HJ Grathol in preparation for conference call; conference call with expert;
telephone conference with Steve Bowman regarding case and strategies issues for moving forward;
Telephone conferences with client; draft email to client;
Research regarding discovery requests for case; analyze appraisal report; prepare draft discovery
request;
Review and analyze correspondence from counsel for Grathol; correspondence with client;
telephone conference with clients;
Continue to revise and prepare discovery requests;
Telephone conference with client; draft response to Doug Marfice's letter;
Update electronic folders with key information and documents;
Research regarding public records request documents; prepare draft outline regarding same; edit
and revise draft discovery requests;
Finalize correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding settlement offer, stipulation for possession and
other matters; send copy of correspondence to client;
Work on response to correspondence received from counsel for property owner;
Review recent case communications and continue to monitor and update key documents onto
external network;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

11/18/2010

York, Mary V.

$

213.50

0.7

11/18/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

92.00

0.4

11/22/2010

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

124.00

0.8

11/22/2010

Bowman, Steve C.

$

260.00

0.8

11/23/2010
11/30/2010

Bowman, Steve C.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

97.50
92.00

0.3
0.4

12/02/2010

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

93.00

0.6

12/03/2010
12/06/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.
Feraci, Barbara K.

$
$

92.00
31.00

0.4
0.2

12/15/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

92.00

0.4

Finalize pleadings to initiate condemnation action and coordinate details for filing; draft
correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding acceptance of service;
Analyze documents and prepare email memorandum regarding same;
Run Secretary of State searches in Washington and Idaho for Agent for Service of Process for serving
of complaint on Sterling Savings Bank; update electronic folders;
Draft acceptance of service form; draft letter to opposing counsel regarding potential acceptance of
service and stipulation for possession;
Review and edit documents and letter to be sent to opposing counsel;
Research regarding possession and service;
Review correspondence and other communications in case forwarded and/or received during past
week; follow up on status of acceptance of service of Complaint and Summons for the HJ Grathol
parcel; update case electronic folders;
Correspondence and telephone conference with opposing counsel;
Review Acceptance of Service of Complaint and forward to client;
Review documents and correspondence regarding possession; telephone calls to opposing counsel
and court regarding possession;
Telephone conference with opposing counsel regarding possession; telephone conference with court
regarding scheduling; correspondence regarding same; legal research for possession hearing;
prepare draft motion for possession; prepare draft memorandum in support of motion for
possession;
Prepare motion for possession; draft memorandum in support of motion for possession;
correspondence and telephone conference with client; finalize motion and memorandum and notice
for filing;
Brief review of pleadings filed with court; update electronic folders;
Work on motion for possession and supporting pleadings;
Telephone conference with opposing counsel regarding hearing; correspondence regarding same;
telephone conference with appraiser; prepare and file draft motion for voluntary dismissal;
correspondence regarding same;

12/20/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

667.00

2.9

12/21/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

414.00

1.8

12/21/2010
12/21/2010

Feraci, Barbara K.
Bowman, Steve C.

$
$

46.50
325.00

0.3
1.0

12/22/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

322.00

1.4

12/23/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

230.00

1.0

12/23/2010

Bowman, Steve C.

$

162.50

0.5

12/27/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

161.00

0.7

Review letter from opposing counsel and his proposed stipulation for possession; confer with
T5Tollefson regarding continued pursuit of hearing on motion for possession;
Correspondence with clients; telephone conference with court regarding hearing;

12/29/2010

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

115.00

0.5

Correspondence regarding hearing; telephone conference with appraiser regarding hearing;

01/03/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

Conference with MVYork regarding possession hearing, stipulation and status;

Correspondence regarding hearing date; analyze and compare opposing counsel's draft stipulation
for possession; email memorandum regarding opposing counsel's proposed changes;

1373 of 1617

- - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - · · - · · - .. _________________

,.

______ ......

Date

Name

Billed Amt

01/03/2011

York, Mary V.

$

227.50

0.7

01/03/2011
01/04/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

134.00
98.00

0.4
0.4

Hours

Narrative

01/04/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,267.50

3.9

01/04/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

435.50

1.3

01/05/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

441.00

1.8

01/05/2011

York, Mary V.

$

715.00

2.2

01/05/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

402.00

1.2

01/06/2011

York, Mary V.

$

325.00

1.0

01/06/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

134.00

0.4

01/06/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

637.00

2.6

01/07/2011

01/07/2011

York, Mary V.

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

$

877.50

931.00

Review and analyze correspondence and information regarding case and conference with
TSTollefson regarding status of proceedings and possession of property;
Review defendant's answer to complaint and note admissions;
Telephone conference with opposing counsel;
Work on developing strategies for case and begin identifying experts to respond to issues raised by
Grathol; conference with SCBowman to discuss possession hearing and make assignments; review
and analyze correspondence from counsel for Grathol regarding Possession Agreement and
proposed changes to Agreement; review ITD's motion and brief in support of order for possession;
confer with TSTollefson regarding Grathol's position on Possession Agreement, assess arguments
presented by Grathol, and determine response; telephone conference with client; analyze Grathol's
answer and affirmative defenses, research Idaho statutes referenced by Grathol and prepare
responses to issues raised by Grathol; telephone conference with client; telephone call to client;
Work on arguments for hearing on motion to obtain possession of Grathol property;
Work on preparations for possession hearing, including prep for witnesses; telephone conference
with expert; continue to prepare for possession hearing;
Outline issues for possession hearing and discussion with TSTollefson to prepare for hearing;
extended conference with TSTollefson and SCBowman to strategize for possession hearing, identify
issues and responses for hearing, and to prepare for hearing; telephone conference with client;
Assist with preparations for hearing on motion for possession;
Review correspondence from counsel for Grathol; confirm details of issues raised in correspondence
and draft response; further correspondence with opposing counsel;
Review correspondence from opposing counsel regarding negotiations for possession of property;
work on negotiations;
Legal research regarding scope of taking and relationship between complaint and order of
condemnation; correspondence with opposing counsel regarding possession hearing;
correspondence and preparation for possession hearing;

2.7

Review additional correspondence from counsel for Grathol and determine appropriate response;
telephone conference with client; work on prep for witnesses for possession hearing; conference call
with client; follow up and prepare argument responsive to counsel's proposed amendments;
conference with TSTollefson regarding possession hearing and issues that may arise;

3.8

Prepare for witness prep and examinations; telephone conference with appraiser; telephone
conference with clients; work on preparing for possession hearing and conference with MVYork
regarding same;
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Date

Hours

Narrative

Name

Billed Amt

01/07/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

80.00

0.5

01/10/2011

York, Mary V.

$

357.50

1.1

01/10/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

563.50

2.3

01/10/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

201.00

0.6

Review recent case communications; update documents on external network;
Review and analyze pleadings filed by counsel for Grathol and determine appropriate response to
pleadings; telephone conference with client; conference with SCBowman regarding ITD's response to
Grathol's motion to shorten time to file brief; review draft response to Grathol's argument and
provide edits and comments to same;
Review pleadings from opposing counsel; correspondence with client regarding maps and exhibits;
research and conference regarding response to motion to shorten time; research and prepare draft
response to motion to shorten; conference with client;
Review defendant's court filings to obtain an extension of time to respond to motion for possession;
work on response to motion;
Analyze and review opposing counsel's response to motion for possession; prepare response to
motion to shorten time; conference with MVYork regarding court clerk and client; telephone

01/11/2011

01/11/2011

01/11/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

Bowman, Steve C.

York, Mary V.

$

$

$

1,249.50

502.50

877.50

5.1

1.5

2.7

conferences with client; telephone conference with expert; prepare draft outline for affidavit for
possession motion reply; research regarding minutes and authority for taking; continue to prepare
reply and outline;
Review brief and affidavits opposing ITD's motion for possession; work on developing approach to
reply brief; work on identifying additional affidavits needed to support motion for possession and
outline content of affidavits;
Review and analyze responsive pleadings from Grathol on ITD's motion for possession; assess
appropriate response and confer with SCBowman regarding same; research information to respond
to Grathol's argument; telephone conferences with client; telephone conferences with clerk for
Judge Haynes regarding hearing; review and analyze information regarding delegation of authority to
Director for issuance of orders of condemnation;

01/11/2011

01/12/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

$

352.00

1,984.50

2.2

Review HJ Grathol's response to motion for possession, along with affidavits of Alan Johnson and
Christopher Gabbert; research regarding Board; compile references pulled and provide to MVYork;

8.1

Continue legal research regarding legal authority of board to delegate condemnation authority to
director; continue legal research regarding board actions and minutes regarding project; work on
draft reply in support of motion for possession; prepare draft reply affidavit in support of motion for
possession; telephone conference with client regarding authority of director; correspondence
regarding research and reply;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Legal research regarding history and authority of Board's delegation to director the authority to
condemn property; legal research regarding administrative order of condemnations and complaint;

01/13/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

2,401.00

9.8

research regarding opposing counsel's cases and citations; continue to draft reply in support of
motion for possession; telephone conference with client; continue research regarding history of
Board and approval of project; revise draft affidavit; prepare exhibits for affidavit;

01/14/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

569.50

1.7

01/14/2011

York, Mary V.

$

715.00

2.2

Work on reply brief and affidavits to be filed in support of motion for possession;
Conference with client; review and edit draft brief in response to Grathol's motion for possession;
review draft affidavit;
Revise and edit draft reply brief; revise and edit draft affidavit; continue research regarding nature

01/14/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,960.00

8.0

01/15/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

01/16/2011

York, Mary V.

$

227.50

0.7

01/16/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,474.00

4.4

01/17/2011

York, Mary V.

$

877.50

2.7

01/17/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

759.50

3.1

01/17/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,239.50

3.7

01/18/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

710.50

2.9

01/18/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,007.50

3.1

01/18/2011
01/19/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

1,172.50
49.00

3.5
0.2

and scope of project; continue research regarding history of project and board authorization and
minute entries; research regarding negotiations between the parties; prepare additional arguments
and sections for reply brief; prepare additional affidavit section; prepare additional affidavit exhibits;
Correspondence regarding affidavit and reply brief; research regarding affidavit for reply; prepare
draft reply affidavit;
Work on reply to motion for possession; review and edit affidavit;
Review exhibits to be attached to affidavits; work on affidavits; work on reply brief in support of
motion for possession;
Review and edit draft final version of affidavits; conference with TSTollefson regarding affidavits and
briefs for reply on motion for possession; research Idaho Code for provisions relating to delegation of
authority from ITD Board to Director; forward draft affidavit and exhibits to client; telephone
conference with client; meet with client; follow up with AKerby, notary for client;
Revise and draft reply affidavits and exhibits; conference with regarding affidavit; telephone
conferences with client regarding affidavit and exhibits; revise exhibits; correspondence regarding
reply brief and affidavits;
Complete work on affidavits; work on reply brief in support of motion for possession;
Edit and revise draft reply brief; telephone conferences with client regarding filing and finalization of
brief; correspondence regarding reply brief and affidavits; continue to prepare for possession
hearing;
Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with Judge Haynes' clerk; coordinate details
for filing of brief and affidavit; edit proposed order for condemnation; conduct final review and edit
of brief and affidavits and finalize documents for reply to motion for possession for filing; follow up
conference with Judge Haynes' clerk;
Complete work on reply brief and reply affidavits in support of motion for possession;
Correspondence regarding possession hearing and negotiation;
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Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

01/19/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

100.50

0.3

01/20/2011

York, Mary V.

$

227.50

0.7

01/20/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,641.50

6.7

01/21/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,592.50

6.5

01/22/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

Return travel from Coeur d'Alene reviewing documents and notes from hearing in route;
Conference with TSTollefson regarding hearing on motion for possession, arguments made, evidence
presented and Court's decision; review Court's order, with delineations; review proposed 54(b)

01/24/2011

York, Mary V.

$

682.50

2.1

certification and research significance of scope of proposed order; confer with TSTollefson regarding
proposed 54(b) certification; review and edit proposed letter to Court; telephone conference with

01/25/2011

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

01/25/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

147.00

0.6

01/26/2011

York, Mary V.

$

390.00

1.2

01/26/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

220.50

0.9

01/26/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

134.00

0.4

Review final draft of letter to Court regarding defendant's request for Rule 54(b) certificate; discuss
approach to upcoming scheduling conference with MVYork TSTollefson;

01/27/2011

York, Mary V.

$

32.50

0.1

Telephone conference with client;

01/27/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

98.00

0.4

Telephone conference with court regarding order; correspondence with client regarding orders;

01/28/2011

York, Mary V.

$

390.00

1.2

01/28/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

Assist with preparations for hearing on motion for possession and assessing most recent arguments
by counsel for Grathol;
Meet with TSTollefson in preparation for possession hearing; telephone conference with Doug
Marfice;
Continue preparation for possession hearing; correspondence with witnesses regarding meetings;
travel; preparation with appraiser;
Meeting with client for trial preparation and site visit; final research and preparation for hearing;
possession hearing; correspondence and telephone conference regarding outcome of hearing;

client;
Telephone conference with client;
Research regarding draft letter to court and counsel; conference with MVYork regarding draft letter;
revise and finalize letter;
Conference with TSTollefson regarding discovery requests for Grathol; review and analyze Court's
notice of hearing for scheduling conference;
Correspondence regarding hearing and scheduling; prepare draft discovery requests;
correspondence regarding court's scheduling order and status;

Review Court's order granting possession and entry of rule 54(b) certification; draft correspondence
to clients regarding orders and request payment for possession; assess issues being raised by Grathol
and identify areas of research needed; conference with TSTollefson to discuss research assignment
and discuss potential expert witnesses and issues needing to be addressed by each; conference with
client;
Correspondence regarding court order and certification;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

01/31/2011

York, Mary V.

$

292.50

0.9

01/31/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

234.50

0.7

02/01/2011

York, Mary V.

$

162.50

0.5

Telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss potential experts needed for case and identify
possible individuals for experts; telephone message and conference with Chris Gabbart regarding
payment for possession, potential appeal, stipulation for scheduling order; correspondence with
client;
Work on identifying potential expert witnesses for case; review correspondence and pleadings
related to landowner's request for Rule 54(b) certificate;
Telephone conference with client;

02/02/2011

York, Mary V.

$

422.50

1.3

Review and edit draft discovery responses to HJ Grathol; draft stipulation for scheduling order;

02/02/2011
02/03/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
York, Mary V.

$
$

134.00
65.00

0.4
0.2

Review first set of discovery to be served on defendant;
Work on stipulation for scheduling order;

02/03/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

128.00

0.8

Locate appraisal information requested by SCBowman and forward same to him; do search on Mr.
Sherwood and forward background information to SCBowman, along with disciplinary action
Stipulation and Consent Order issued from the Court on Mr. Sherwood;

3.5

Conference call with SCBowman and TSTollefson to discuss Grathol notice of appeal, identify issues
to be researched, make assignments for brief and research projects; draft scheduling order, confirm
potential dates for trial, expert disclosures, etc., and confirm request for jury setting; finalize draft
scheduling order and incorporated noted edits from SCBowman and forward same to client; review
correspondence from Chris Gabbert and respond to same; review proposed stipulation for release of
funds, confirming details of requirements contained in IC 7-721; correspondence with client; follow
up with client;

2.1

Review appraisal prepared for ITD; review correspondence from opposing counsel regarding value of
land and damages; draft memorandum regarding experts needed for case; review Grathol's
proposed stipulation for release of funds, and confer with team regarding response to stipulation;
work on stipulation for scheduling, with particular attention to expert disclosures, requested number
of trial days, jury trial vs. bench trial, and order of proof;

02/04/2011

02/04/2011

York, Mary V.

Bowman, Steve C.

$

$

1,137.50

703.50

02/07/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

Finalize ITD's Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning; correspondence with Chris Gabbert regarding
stipulation for scheduling order, for withdrawal of funds and woodcutting operations; conference
with client; review warrant and confirm information; review and edit draft notice of tender of funds
and transmittal letter to Clerk;

02/08/2011

York, Mary V.

$

162.50

0.5

Coordinate filing of notice of tender of funds, including confirming with clerk of court details of filing
and delivery of check to court civil case supervisor; work on outline of experts needed for case;
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Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

02/09/2011

York, Mary V.

$

162.50

0.5

02/11/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

122.50

0.5

02/17/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,007.50

3.1

02/18/2011

York, Mary V.

$

877.50

2.7

02/18/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

96.00

0.6

Review website links pertaining to Hughes Investment and print out biographical information on
principals and project work done by company and compile for MVYork's review;

02/22/2011

York, Mary V.

$

357.50

1.1

Review recent S.Ct. decision relating to Hughes development efforts in Coeur d'Alene; telephone
conference with Ron Harvey; research potential experts for case; telephone conference with
SCBowman to discuss potential experts for case,in particular mix-use development experts;

02/22/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

48.00

0.3

02/23/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

02/23/2011
02/24/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

32.00
49.00

0.2
0.2

02/24/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

167.50

0.5

02/24/2011

York, Mary V.

$

715.00

2.2

02/25/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

416.50

1.7

02/25/2011

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

Finalize memo on expert witnesses;
Telephone conference with opposing counsel and MVYork regarding dispersal of funds, sureties,
experts and scheduling stipulation;
Research possible development expert for case; review public records information for experts
retained by Grathol; conduct research on Grathol's experts;
Research potential experts for case; correspondence with SCBowman regarding same; investigate
information regarding Hughes Development and North Alpine Development; conference call with
expert;

Follow-up with Kootenai County hearing transcript assignment;
Review and edit draft agreement for experts; forward document to ITD for review and approval;
conduct research for potential experts for case;
Set up electronic expert files for experts retained to date;
Correspondence regarding litigation and scheduling;
Review proposed judgment on order for possession; review proposed stipulation for release of
funds; follow up on preparations for status conference and determine status of joint stipulation for
scheduling;
Review and analyze motion to withdraw funds from Grathol and proposed judgment; telephone
conference with Chris Gabbert, counsel for Grathol; draft memo to file outline conversation with Mr.
Gabbert; revise stipulation for scheduling order to ITD's proposed schedule; telephone conference
with client; draft notice of non-opposition to withdrawal;
Analyze and review opposing counsels scheduling motion and motion for jury trial; legal research
regarding motion for jury trial; prepare draft outline regarding same;
Review and analyze Grathol's proposed pre-trial schedule and motion for jury trial;
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Complete Public Records Request for Kootenai County Building & Planning office for obtaining copies
of various hearing records and records related to Hughes Investments Zoning Application and
forward back to Kootenai with transmittal memo; review Plaintiff's Response to Court's Notice of
02/25/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

384.00

2.4

02/28/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,249.50

5.1

02/28/2011

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

02/28/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

128.00

0.8

Status Conference for Scheduling and Planning; begin to compile documents needed for upcoming
status conference for MVYork and set up same into notebook for conference; prepare index to
notebook documents; review HJ Grathol's Response to Status Conference Notice and their Motion
for Jury Trial; update electronic files; review additional case communications;
Continue legal research regarding motion for jury trial; telephone conference with judge's clerk; legal
research regarding court trial in eminent domain proceedings; continue to draft response to motion
for jury trial; correspondence regarding same;
Telephone conference with client; review correspondence from Doug Marfice and determine
appropriate response;
Review materials received from Kootenai County Building & Planning Department per our public
records request, including agendas and DVD, and prepare e-mail to team regarding general contents
of what was received and need for further review of actual public hearings, etc.;

03/01/2011

York, Mary V.

$

617.50

1.9

03/01/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,127.00

4.6

03/02/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

03/02/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

208.00

1.3

03/03/2011

York, Mary V.

$

227.50

0.7

03/04/2011

York, Mary V.

$

65.00

0.2

03/07/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,430.00

4.4

Draft response to email from Doug Marfice; correspondence and follow up conference with client;
research Idaho case law regarding jury trials in Idaho; telephone conference with Doug Marfice to
discuss motion for jury trial and scheduling conference; review and analyze information from Court
regarding scheduling of motion for jury trial and scheduling conference; conference with TSTollefon
regarding arguments in response to Grathol's motion for jury trial;
Continue legal research regarding right to a jury trial and effect of rule 38 waiver and discretion of
court; conference with MVYork; revise and edit draft response to motion; correspondence regarding
motion and status;
Correspondence and documents regarding scheduling conference and notice of hearing;
Listen to recording of Hearing Examiner's public hearing of 08/21/2008 and presentation made by
representative from Hughes Investments, taking notes regarding the same; obtain check and prepare
letter to Ms. Sandi Gilbertson at Kootenai County Building and Planning Office with transmittal of
check for DVD of public hearings; review amended Notice of Hearing and Status Conference and
update electronic folders;
Review notice of hearing from Grathol and correspondence with client; draft letter to Doug Marfice
regarding hearing date for motion for jury trial;
Review and respond to email correspondence from Doug Marfice;
Confirm status of expert's reports and analysis; review signed version of judgment and order to
partially withdraw funds; work on draft of ITD's response to motion for jury trial;
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Name

Billed Amt

03/07/2011
03/08/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.

$
$

49.00
1,170.00

0.2
3.6

03/09/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,722.50

5.3

03/14/2011
03/14/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
York, Mary V.

$
$

268.00
130.00

0.8
0.4

03/15/2011

York, Mary V.

$

130.00

0.4

Review correspondence and signed retainer agreement from expert; correspondence with client;

03/15/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

98.00

0.4

03/18/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

03/18/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,072.00

3.2

03/21/2011

York, Mary V.

$

357.50

1.1

03/21/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

128.00

0.8

Prepare draft letter to opposing counsel and conference with MVYork regarding same;
Finalize brief in support of jury trial and forward same to client; review information regarding Hughes
Investments developments and respond to correspondence;
Work on brief in opposition to defendant's motion for jury trial;
Work on affidavit in support of response to Grathol's motion for jury trial; amend response brief so is
consistent with affidavit; finalize response brief for filing;
Locate and compile exhibits for MVYork's affidavit for filing with ITD's brief in opposition to Grathol's
motion for jury trial; draft Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of ITD's Brief in Opposition to
Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial; prepare external folder for exhibits to affidavit and

Hours

Narrative

Research and review public hearing regarding zoning change;
Work on response to motion for jury trial;
Work on SharePoint update with case information; work on response brief to motion for jury trial;
telephone conference with client;
Work on identifying expert witnesses; telephone calls to potential experts;
Work on identifying and retaining expert witnesses;

forward same for filing;

03/22/2011

York, Mary V.

$

552.50

1.7

Review correspondence from Doug Marfice; research information regarding issues referenced in
correspondence and draft response email to Mr. Marfice; finalize documents relating to motion to
dismiss appeal and execute documents for filing; review newspaper article on Grathol development;
receive voicemail from client and follow up with conference with WGMyers and phone calls to client;
Telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss hearing and procedural issues relating to Grathol's
motion; telephone call to clerk of the Court regarding hearing on Grathol's motion for jury trial;
telephone conference with Chris Gabbert regarding motion for jury trial;follow up with client;

03/30/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

03/31/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,950.00

6.0

04/01/2011

York, Mary V.

$

292.50

0.9

Travel to North Idaho for hearing on motion for jury trial and scheduling conference; site visit to
inspect subject property; attend status conference with Court;
Telephone conference with SCBowman, TSTollefson and BKFeraci to discuss status conference and
trial setting at yesterday's hearing and to discuss pending issues in case, status of expert witnesses

04/01/2011
04/04/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.

$
$

98.00
325.00

0.4
1.0

and discovery;
Prepare litigation response to Grathol's litigation strategy;
Meeting with expert;

04/04/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

496.00

3.1

Review notes from conference call and begin preparing bullet point of issues after review of case
communications and pleadings; meet briefly with MVYork to discuss case issues;
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Billed Amt

04/06/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

288.00

1.8

04/11/2011

York, Mary V.

$

65.00

0.2

04/12/2011

York, Mary V.

$

325.00

1.0

04/12/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

335.00

1.0

04/13/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

16.00

0.1

04/13/2011

York, Mary V.

$

195.00

0.6

04/13/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

122.50

0.5

04/15/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

368.50

1.1

04/15/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

Hours

Narrative

Make additions to summary memo regarding issues and locate additional information related to
particular issue;
Follow up on status of discovery responses from Grathol;
Research correspondence with opposing counsel and prepare timeline of events in preparation of
motion to compel; correspondence with SCBowman regarding same; review and edit
correspondence to counsel for Grathol regarding discovery responses;
Review correspondence and emails relating to ITD's first set of discovery and extensions of time to
respond granted to defendant; work on final letter to opposing counsel demanding discovery
responses;
Review finalized letter to Mr. Douglas Marfice from MVYork;
Confirm information for letter to counsel for Grathol regarding late discovery and research additional
information; revise draft of letter to Grathol and finalize same;
Research regarding deficiency letters, motion to compel and related documents; correspondence
regarding same;
Review defendant's responses to first set of discovery; work on outline of follow up letter regarding
deficiencies in responses;
Review and analyze discovery responses from Grathol;
Research list of names and companies referenced by Defendant HJ Grathol (Answers and Responses
to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents) as possible
experts and/or consultants, and run searches on each to obtain background information; print our
large amount of materials and start preparation of summary memo to litigation team;

04/18/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

768.00

4.8

04/19/2011

York, Mary V.

$

130.00

0.4

04/19/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

512.00

3.2

04/20/2011

York, Mary V.

$

32.50

0.1

Telephone call and email correspondence with client;

04/20/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

256.00

1.6

Locate documents received by way of Public Records Request and arrange for CD to be burned of
same for expert; prepare letter to expert with CD; compile documents downloaded from Internet on
Grathol's experts and consultants and compile into master notebook for MVYork;

04/29/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

64.00

0.4

05/02/2011

York, Mary V.

$

130.00

0.4

Conference with expert regarding Grathol's request for zoning change and follow up to obtain
information for expert;
Complete searches on additional company entities and individuals identified as experts and/or
consultants by Grathol and prepare/complete summary memo to litigation team;

Go through Planning and Zoning documents and other case materials to locate information
requested by MVYork and SCBowman;
Review and analyze expert witness designations by Grathol and determine appropriate response to
Grathol regarding same;
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05/02/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

05/02/2011

05/02/2011

Hours

Narrative

$

710.50

2.9

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

32.00

0.2

Bowman, Steve C.

$

268.00

0.8

Research Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and waiver of objections and discovery responses; research
regarding opposing party's discovery responses; continue to prepare draft letter regarding trial,
witnesses, objections and deficiencies; correspondence regarding same;
Review various e-mail communications regarding discovery issues, potential trial witnesses offered
by opposing side, and compelling production of documents;
Review memorandum by BKFeraci giving background information on experts identified by Grathol in
discovery responses; confer with MVYork and TSTollefson regarding long list of experts identified by
Grathol and impact on trial preparation and scheduling order, and discuss letter to be sent to
opposing counsel;

05/03/2011

York, Mary V.

$

520.00

1.6

Review Grathol's discovery responses in preparation for conference call with counsel for Grathol;
conference call with Chris Gabbert regarding documents for production, number of identified
witnesses, and responses to discovery requests; follow up conference with TSTollefson regarding
draft of letter to Mr. Gabbert confirming details of conference call; review and analyze memorandum
regarding development uses of Grathol property and possible development experts;

05/03/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

220.50

0.9

Telephone conference with opposing counsel; continue to prepare draft letter to opposing counsel;

05/03/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

272.00

1.7

Complete review of P&Z files for information needed by SCBowman and MVYork; locate developer
and box chain experts used in previous cases; prepare memo to SCBowman and MVYork regarding
findings from review of P&Z files and provide names of potential experts;

05/04/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

98.00

0.4

05/04/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

971.50

2.9

05/06/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

05/06/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

100.50

0.3

05/09/2011
05/10/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
Bowman, Steve C.

$

$

134.00
569.50

0.4
1.7

05/16/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

196.00

0.8

05/16/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

301.50

0.9

Continue research regarding discovery responses and draft letter;
Work on identifying types of uses and tenants being proposed by property owner for development of
property; work on identifying experts to address development issues and impacts on development
by US 95 Project;
Work on draft letter to opposing counsel regarding expert witnesses, discovery deficiencies and trial
schedule; research documents regarding same; edit letter;
Review and edit draft letter to opposing counsel regarding deficiencies in discovery responses and
issue of number of potential expert witnesses identified;
Telephone conference with potential expert witness;
Conduct research and interviews of potential expert witnesses;
Analyze and research opposing party's discovery request; prepare email memorandum regarding
response;
Review first set of discovery served by defendant on ITD and make notes for responses; review
memorandum by TSTollefson analyzing first set of discovery served by defendant;

1383 of 1617

Date

Name
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05/18/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

Review opposing party's supplemental interrogatory answers;

05/18/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

469.00

1.4

Review correspondence from opposing counsel regarding supplemental discovery responses; review
supplemental discovery responses by HJ Grathol; compile notes for follow up discovery;

05/19/2011
05/19/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.

$
$

710.50
97.50

2.9
0.3

Research and review Grathol's discovery response; prepare draft outline regarding same;
Conference with client;

05/20/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

Review key documents from Grathol's discovery responses and determine next steps for case;

05/20/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

05/23/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

588.00

2.4

05/24/2011
05/25/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

804.00
196.00

2.4
0.8

Research potential expert witnesses for case; telephone calls with potential experts;
Continue to research discovery responses and outline regarding same;

05/25/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

48.00

0.3

Set up electronic folder for Grathol document production and arrange for project assistant to save
production documents to external folder for further review by TSTollefson, etc.;

05/27/2011
06/02/2011
06/02/2011
06/03/2011
06/04/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.
Tollefson, Ted S.
Bowman, Steve C.
Bowman, Steve C.

$
$
$
$
$

147.00
390.00
367.50
100.50
402.00

0.6
1.2
1.5
0.3
1.2

06/06/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$ 1,053.50

4.3

06/07/2011

York, Mary V.

$

292.50

0.9

06/07/2011
06/09/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
Bowman, Steve C.

$
$

703.50
737.00

2.1
2.2

06/13/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

147.00

0.6

06/14/2011

York, Mary V.

$

422.50

1.3

06/14/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

06/14/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

569.50

1.7

06/15/2011

York, Mary V.

$

130.00

0.4

Hours

Narrative

Conference with MVYork regarding discovery; continue to research Grathol discovery responses and
prepare outline regarding discovery responses;
Work on research discovery responses and prepare outline regarding same; research regarding
litigation plan and outline regarding same;

Continue discovery research and outline regarding same;
Work on responses to Grathol's discovery;
Continue to prepare response to request for discovery;
Confer with expert regarding initial work to be done on Grathol case;
Draft memorandum with recommendations for experts to be retained to work on case;
Continue research regarding response to request for discovery; continue to prepare draft response
to request for discovery;
Work on expert witness issues; telephone conference with Doug Marfice regarding discovery
requests; email exchanges with client;
Review correspondence regarding expert; work on identifying experts;
Work on retaining experts for case; research commercial real estate experts;
Continue to prepare responses to discovery; telephone conference with client regarding discovery;
telephone conference with appraiser regarding discovery;
Correspondence with client; follow up on request to obtain photograph of subject property, edit
exhibits of property to identify subject property; coordinate expert disclosures and discovery
responses with SCBowman;
Correspondence regarding discovery;
Telephone conference with expert to discuss case background and outline work to be done; work on
compiling documents to be sent to experts;
Work on details of retaining experts for case; correspondence with client;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

06/15/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

171.50

0.7

06/16/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

343.00

1.4

06/16/2011

York, Mary V.

$

227.50

0.7

06/16/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

288.00

1.8

06/16/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

636.50

1.9

06/16/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

268.00

0.8

06/17/2011

York, Mary V.

$

162.50

0.5

06/17/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

496.00

3.1

06/17/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

134.00

0.4

06/21/2011
06/22/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.
York, Mary V.

$
$

96.00
357.50

0.6
1.1

Hours

Narrative

Continue to prepare discovery responses; telephone conference with appraiser regarding same;
correspondence with appraiser;
Research regarding documents to experts and correspondence regarding same; continue to prepare
documents for discovery;
Work on compiling and assembling documents to be sent to experts and ensuring completeness of
document sets; telephone conference with client;
Various communications with regarding documents needed for experts; complete compiling
documents for expert review; locate additional documents for production and update materials to
be sent;
Telephone conference with experts; coordinate retention of experts and execution of engagement
agreements;
Identify and compile documents to be sent to experts in case;
Review proposed engagement letter from experts and follow up with SCBowman regarding issues
relating to retaining experts; forward letter to client;
Create electronic folder for storing documents for production in responding to Grathol's First Set of
Discovery to ITD; update deadlines chart; draft detailed transmittal letter; update and add electronic
folders; work oncompiling another group of documents to be sent; prepare letter with transmittal of
CD and other hard copy documents;
Review and edit letters to be sent to experts with documents; review engagement letter received
from expert and forward to MVYork;
Work on compiling key documents for case notebook for MVYork;
Work on expert disclosures for ITD; confer with SCBowman regarding same;

06/23/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

882.00

3.6

Research regarding expert disclosure requirements; prepare draft letter to opposing counsel
regarding appeal documents; analyze and review potential documents for discovery responses;
telephone conference with client regarding expert exhibits; research regarding affidavits, notices and
project goals and plans and correspondence regarding same;

06/24/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

171.50

0.7

Correspondence regarding expert exhibits; continue to prepare discovery response and documents;

06/24/2011

York, Mary V.

$

65.00

0.2

Correspondence with client;

06/27/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

171.50

0.7

Research regarding status of discovery responses and requests; continue to prepare litigation plan;

06/28/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,172.50

3.5

06/30/2011

York, Mary V.

$

195.00

0.6

06/30/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

171.50

0.7

Work on identifying qualified experts; telephone calls to potential experts;
Correspondence with Doug Marfice regarding pending discovery requests; work on expert
disclosures and review of exhibit materials;
Continue to prepare discovery responses; continue to prepare and review documents regarding
discovery responses;
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Date

07/05/2011

Name

Billed Amt

York, Mary V.

$

130.00

Hours

Narrative

0.4

Work on discovery responses to Grathol's requests and confer with TSTollefson regarding same;
Review documents to be produced in discovery; discuss in-house vs. vendor processing and

07/05/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

144.00

0.9

numbering of data with MVYork and TSTollefson; meet with project assistant AGreen to go over
documents to be converted into pdf files, and numbering of documents for production, etc.;

07/05/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

514.50

2.1

Continue to research and prepare documents and exhibits for discovery; revise and edit discovery
responses and correspondence regarding same;
Complete finalization of documents to be produced, including overseeing the Bates numbering and

07/06/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

336.00

2.1

07/06/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,239.50

3.7

07/06/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

269.50

1.1

07/07/2011

York, Mary V.

$

390.00

1.2

final burning of documents to CDs, reviewing final product and making slight changes to document
identification, etc.; review recent case e-mails and communications, and update case electronic
folders; meet briefly with TSTollefson to give him update on discovery status, etc.;
Telephone conference with client to discuss their site visit and analysis of issues; work on expert
witness disclosures;
Continue to prepare documents for production; revise and edit draft discovery responses;
Review and edit ITD's responses and production of documents in response to Grathol's discovery
requests;
Make additions to document production, and meet with project assistant AGreen to discuss

07/07/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

160.00

1.0

additional numbering of photographs and burning of new CDs; add photo exhibits and documents to
be produced in attorney notebooks on condemnation matters; locate additional key case documents
for attorney notebooks;

07/08/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

167.50

0.5

07/08/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

367.50

1.5

07/09/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

171.50

0.7

regarding discovery; finalize discovery for service;
Research regarding discovery responses and revise demand letter regarding same;

07/11/2011
07/12/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
York, Mary V.

Work on expert disclosures to be served by July 15, 2011;
Finalize letter responding to settlement offer; draft email memorandum to client;

Bowman, Steve C.

402.00
357.50
201.00

1.2
1.1

07/13/2011

$
$
$

0.6

Work on expert witness disclosures;

07/14/2011

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

Work on expert witness issues and confer with SCBowman regarding expert witness disclosure;

07/14/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

569.50

1.7

07/15/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,139.00

3.4

Review draft responses to discovery served by Grathol and begin work on edits to responses;
Correspondence regarding discovery; revise and edit discovery responses; prepare draft letter

Work on expert witness disclosures for ITD case in chief; confer with MVYork regarding remaining
expert witnesses needed for case;
Continue working on identify potential expert witnesses on case; work on opening round of expert
witness disclosures;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

07/15/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

220.50

0.9

07/18/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,105.50

3.3

07/20/2011

York, Mary V.

$

162.50

0.5

Review and edit expert disclosures; correspondence with client;

07/20/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

588.00

2.4

Analyze and edit draft expert disclosures; correspondence regarding same; telephone conference
with client; continue to research key documents in preparationfor summary judgment and trial;

07/21/2011

York, Mary V.

$

520.00

1.6

07/21/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

416.50

1.7

Conduct final review and edits of expert disclosures; correspondence with client; finalize pleadings
and exhibits and coordinate filing of same; review correspondence from Chris Gabbert regarding
ITD's discovery responses;
Telephone conference with client; edit and finalize expert disclosures and exhibits regarding same;
edit and revise draft letter; analyze and review opposing counsel's demand letter; correspondence

07/21/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

871.00

2.6

regarding same;
Work on disclosure of advancing experts on behalf of ITD; revised and edit disclosures;

07/22/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,494.50

6.1

07/22/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

469.00

1.4

07/25/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

514.50

2.1

07/25/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

368.50

1.1

07/27/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

Hours

Narrative

Continue to prepare and organize relevant documents produced by both parties; revise draft
discovery letter;
Work on summary of status of retaining experts and work done by experts to date; research
potential experts in Idaho and neighboring states; work on first round of expert witness disclosures;

Revise letter regarding discovery; continue to separate and analyze opposing party's discovery
response and correspondence; prepare outline regarding same; correspondence regarding same;
Telephone conference with expert; complete work on expert disclosures; draft notice of service of
expert disclosures;
Continue to analyze and organize documents; continue to prepare outline regarding same;
correspondence regarding demand letter;
Review correspondence from opposing counsel on discovery issues, and confer with TSTollefson
regarding response; work on letter to opposing counsel responding to deficiencies in Grathol's
discovery responses;
Research regarding correspondence file and discovery; continue research regarding opposing party's
deficiency letter and related pleadings; correspondence regarding same; telephone conference with
court regarding scheduling and correspondence regarding same; telephone conference with client
regarding discovery documents;

07/28/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

343.00

1.4

07/29/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

147.00

0.6

Correspondence regarding summary judgment scheduling and response to demand letter; continue
research regarding response to discovery letter; prepare draft response letter;
Edit and revise draft letter to opposing counsel; correspondence regarding construction plans;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

07/29/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,206.00

3.6

Work on letter to opposing counsel in response to letter requesting supplementation of discovery
responses by ITD; work on narrative and exhibits to illustrate issues relating to Sylvan Road
extension; work on retaining commercial development expert; telephone conference with expert;

08/01/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

710.50

2.9

Correspondence regarding frontage road; continue to analyze relevant, key and non-essential
documents produced by ITD;

08/02/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,005.00

3.0

Telephone conferences with potential experts; follow up telephone conference call with expert to
discuss case and outline work to be done on case; compile documents to be sent to expert;

08/03/2011

Tollefson, Ted 5.

$

1,200.50

4.9

Continue to analyze and prioritize discovery documents for litigation and trial; prepare outline
regarding same; prepare letter and documents for experts;

08/03/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

569.50

1.7

Revise and edit chart of deadlines in case; draft correspondence to each expert retained on behalf of
ITD explaining case deadlines, order of proof at trial, and order of submission of expert reports;

08/04/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

367.50

1.5

Document analysis, review and organization; legal research regarding public records request and
correspondence regarding same;

1.3

Send ITD's disclosures of opening experts to all lTD experts on case; work on compiling documents to
be sent to expert; telephone conference with expert regarding personnel additions and discuss
progress of their work on case; review public records request served by one of the members of the
Grathol partnership, and confer with MVYork and TSTollefson regarding response to request;

08/04/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

435.50

Hours

Narrative

08/05/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

544.00

3.4

Review supplemental CD of documents to be sent to expert; prepare letter to expert with additional
documents for review; send e-mail to litigation team updating all on status of materials sent to
expert; complete review of recent communications, correspondence and pleadings recently
received; complete updating all expert files and compiling materials forwarded to each expert;
review public records request letter from HJ Grathol to ITD and various e-mail communications
regarding improper use of public records request and legal authority backing the same;

08/05/2011

York, Mary V.

$

195.00

0.6

Research issues relating to public records requests and draft response to client; follow up
correspondence with client;

08/05/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

220.50

0.9

Research and organize documents for litigation and trial; prepare outline regarding same;

08/05/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

268.00

0.8

08/08/2011
08/09/2011
08/09/2011

York, Mary V.
Feraci, Barbara K.
Bowman, Steve C.

$
$
$

97.50
80.00
837.50

0.3
0.5
2.5

Draft correspondence to expert outlining case deadlines and initial work on case; review CV and
proposed contract received from expert and forward contract to MVYork;
Work on engagement agreement and retainer payment for expert;
Review correspondence from SCBowman to experts; update expert folders;
Telephone conferences with experts;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

08/10/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

208.00

1.3

08/10/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

703.50

2.1

08/11/2011
08/11/2011

York, Mary V.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

65.00
49.00

0.2
0.2

08/11/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

502.50

1.5

08/18/2011
08/19/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
Bowman, Steve C.

$
$

134.00
402.00

0.4
1.2

08/22/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

514.50

2.1

Analyze and research opposing party's expert disclosures; legal research regarding compliance with
rules and pre-trial orders; draft email memorandum and correspondence regarding same;

08/22/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

402.00

1.2

Review HJ Grathol's expert witness disclosures; send disclosures to all experts retained on behalf of
ITD, with explanatory note;

08/22/2011

York, Mary V.

$

65.00

0.2

Review and edit draft correspondence to experts;
Analyze and research expert disclosures; legal research regarding actor/viewer expert exception;

08/23/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,078.00

4.4

legal research regarding rules of procedure and affect on court order; prepare draft expert disclosure
deficiency letter;

08/23/2011

York, Mary V.

$

325.00

1.0

Coordinate site visit with expert and telephone conference with expert; review and analysis of
Grathol's expert disclosures;
Correspondence regarding expert disclosures; edit and finalize expert deficiency letter; research
regarding appellate extension; prepare draft motion and affidavit for extension; correspondence
regarding same; prepare draft supplemental discovery responses and edits regarding same;

Hours

Narrative

08/24/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

490.00

2.0

08/25/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

08/25/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

48.00

0.3

Search for and locate document requested by expert and forward the same; review and respond to
various case e-mails; update expert files with additional CVs and contract agreements;
Telephone conferences with experts; compile additional documents to be sent to experts; work on
outlines of expert reports;
Confirm details regarding Sterling Saving's interest in the Grathol property;
Research and correspondence regarding dismissal of bank;
Telephone conference with consultants with expert to discuss their site visit and their review of
documents provided, and outline work to be done by them on case;
Work on coordinating site visits and area tours by experts;
Work on coordinating site inspection and vicinity tour by experts;

Edit draft discovery requests and correspondence regarding same;
Review recent correspondence to Mr. Doug Marfice regarding deficiencies in their Expert Witness
Disclosures and request for a response to our earlier demand for further responses to discovery;
update case files;
Telephone conference with expert regarding site tour and discuss preliminary valuation opinion in

08/25/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

536.00

1.6

expert disclosures by defendant HJ Grathol; work on supplemental discovery to be served on
defendant; work on letter to opposing counsel addressing deficiencies in HJ Grathol's expert
disclosures;

08/25/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

Review and edit draft discovery to Grathol; review correspondence to opposing counsel regarding
meet and confer for expert disclosures; edit motion for extension of time for supreme court brief;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

08/26/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

245.00

1.0

Research regarding URM studies and correspondence; prepare additional discovery requests
regarding same; correspondence regarding discovery;

08/29/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

147.00

0.6

Research regarding Kootenai county district court decision; finalize second discovery request;

08/29/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

335.00

1.0

Review and edit additional set of discovery to be served on defendant; review correspondence from
opposing counsel responding to most recent deficiency letter sent to defendant; confer with MVYork
regarding reply to letter from opposing counsel;

08/29/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

08/30/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

938.00

2.8

08/30/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

122.50

0.5

Correspondence regarding expert witnesses; prepare draft deposition notices for experts;

09/01/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

171.50

0.7

Edit draft deposition notices; correspondence regarding same; finalize deposition notices and draft
letter to opposing counsel;

09/06/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

Opposing counsel correspondence regarding depositions and correspondence regarding same;

09/06/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

16.00

0.1

09/06/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

603.00

1.8

Hours

Narrative

Review draft correspondence and discovery requests to Gratho; review lengthy correspondence from
opposing counsel;
Draft letter to opposing counsel regarding motion to compel and litigation deadlines; review and
respond to correspondence received from opposing counsel; conference with experts as part of site
tour; review document prepared by expert;

Review letter from Mr. Christopher Gabbert regarding unavailability of Mr. Johnson and Mr.
Reeslund for their depositions, etc.;
Telephone conferences with experts to discuss their progress on work assignments and discuss
content and approach to rebuttal reports;
Review and analysis of correspondence from opposing counsel and assess response to same; work

09/07/2011

York, Mary V.

$

877.50

2.7

09/07/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

752.00

4.7

Work on compiling documents needed by MVYork for upcoming trip to Northern Idaho; run Google
map searches on all comparable property sales set forth in HJ Grathol's expert disclosures and
correspondence, as well as all properties listed by expert; update case file materials;

09/07/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

301.50

0.9

Work on addressing defendant's failure to disclose expert witnesses, and impacts on deposition
scheduling, disclosure of rebuttal experts, and other litigation deadlines;

09/08/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,007.50

3.1

Review appraisal reports and expert disclosures in preparation for site visit and tour; telephone
conference with expert; work on motion to compel; review expert disclosures and deficiency letters
and outline arguments for meet andconfer; correspondence with opposing counsel;

on motion to compel; review prior insufficient disclosures from Grathol and outline arguments for
motion; confer with TSTollefson regarding meet and confer with opposing counsel;
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Date

09/08/2011

Name

Feraci, Barbara K.

Billed Amt

$

576.00

Hours

Narrative

3.6

Complete locating and compiling materials needed by MVYork related to land valuation reports and
communications, and comparable sales data on properties in area of HJ Grathol property; prepare
detailed index to notebook of documents collected; locate additional Google maps for No. Idaho trip
for MVYork; finalize compilation of materials into master notebook;

09/09/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,105.00

3.4

Telephone conference with expert regarding site visit to view subject property and comps; prepare
for site visit, reviewing comparable sales and information provided by Grathol; prepare for meet and
confer conference, reviewing discovery responses, expert disclosures and correspondence between
counsel and conduct research relating to discovery requirements under the rule; extended meet and
confer conference with Chris Gabbert;

09/12/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,145.00

6.6

Draft memo to file regarding meet and confer conference with Chris Gabbert; travel to Coeur d'Alene
for site visit with experts, review expert reports and information in transit; prepare for site visit and
meeting with experts; site visit to view and inspect comp sale in Mullen used by opposing expert;

09/13/2011

York, Mary V.

$

3,087.50

9.5

Meet with experts and tour of Garwood to Sagle Project and comp sales used by expert Grathol's
valuation expert, Skip Sherwood; return travel to Boise, review notes and case documents in transit;

09/14/2011

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

Conference with TSTollefson to discuss site visit and issues relating to comp sales used by opposing
expert and assign research project;

6.6

Continue to prepare annotated statement of facts; research regarding statement of facts; revise
statement of facts; correspondence regarding statements of facts; prepare draft motion to compel
and exclude; research regarding motion to compel and exclude; prepare draft brief in support of
motion to compel and exclude; opposing counsel's motion to compel;

2.4

Research information about Mr. Dewitt ("Skip") Sherwood, confirming real estate appraiser licenses
in Washington and Idaho, checking for disciplinary actions, and locating cases he testified in, etc.;
prepare summary memo for MVYork and distribute to team; review HJ Grathol's Motion to Compel
and accompanying affidavit; update summary memo with recent case developments;

09/15/2011

09/15/2011

09/16/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

Feraci, Barbara K.

York, Mary V.

$

$

$

1,617.00

384.00

1,852.50

5.7

Draft letter to opposing counsel regarding motion to compel; work on affidavit regarding motion to
compel and motion to exclude, including review of case file and documents; research case law
regarding sanctions available under motion to compel; work on exhibits for affidavit in support of
motion to compel; research timelines for Accarequi offer and conference with expert; work on brief
insupport of motion to exclude;
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Date

09/16/2011

Name

Tollefson, Ted S.

Billed Amt

$

1,298.50

Hours

Narrative

5.3

Continue research regarding motion to compel and documents regarding same; edit draft motion to
compel; continue to prepare draft brief in support of motion to exclude and/or compel expert
reports and discovery responses;
Continue to prepare draft statement of facts for appellate brief; research documents regarding
motion to compel and exclude; continue to prepare brief in support of motion to exclude and
compel; edit draft affidavit in support of motion to compel and exclude;
Work on motion to compel; research Idaho and federal case law regarding actor/viewer exceptions
to expert disclosure requirements; revise affidavit in support of motion to compel and add additional
information; correspondence to client regarding soils testing information; receive information from
client and review documents provided; research information regarding ITD's processes for approving
projects;

09/18/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

563.50

2.3

09/19/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,917.50

5.9

09/20/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

514.50

2.1

Research regarding supplemental discovery responses and motion to compel; prepare draft
supplemental discovery response; correspondence regarding motion to extend briefing schedule;

5.7

Work on motion to exclude; telephone conference with Doug Marfice regarding extension of time
and regarding expert disclosures; research Idaho and federal case law regarding actor-viewer
exceptions to expert disclosure rules; additional review of case file and incorporate additional
information into affidavit and motion to exclude; confer with SCBowman regarding arguments in
motion to exclude;

5.4

Confer with experts regarding site inspections and tour of surrounding areas; confer with experts
regarding deadlines and content of expert reports; review ITD documents relating to approval of
road projects and individual administrative orders of condemnation; review and edit letter to
opposing counsel regarding ongoing discovery disputes; review concept plans prepared by expert
team and prepare for upcoming meeting with experts; review and analyze invoice from expert;

09/20/2011

09/20/2011

09/21/2011

York, Mary V.

Bowman, Steve C.

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

$

$

1,852.50

1,809.00

686.00

2.8

Conference with MVYork and SCBowman regarding litigation; research regarding discovery and
expert standards under Idaho rules and correspondence regarding same; edit and review affidavit
and exhibits in support of motion to compel and or exclude; continue to prepare supplemental
response to discovery request;
Research case law regarding court authority to waive disclosure rules; review information provided

09/21/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,145.00

6.6

09/21/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

64.00

0.4

by client; finalize motion for extension of time and coordinating filing of same; review andanalyze
proposed site plan from Carole Richardson and provide comment to same; review and edit motion to
exclude; review and edit motion and affidavit in support of motion to exclude and finalize same for
filing; review, edit and finalize brief;
Review various case e-mail communications and information needed to supplement discovery;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

09/22/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

318.50

1.3

09/23/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

122.50

0.5

Work on edits to draft supplemental discovery response; correspondence regarding same motions;

09/27/2011
09/29/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.

$
$

73.50
195.00

0.3
0.6

09/29/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

192.00

1.2

Edit draft supplemental discovery response and correspondence regarding same;
Review and edit draft supplemental discovery responses;
Review recent case e-mails, pleadings and other communications of past two weeks and update
electronic files; review Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production;

09/30/2011

York, Mary V.

$

455.00

1.4

Review and analyze appraisal report of Skip Sherwood and draft additional discovery requests
relating to same;

09/30/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

268.00

0.8

Review defendant's responses to ITD's second set of discovery, and documents produced by
defendants;

09/30/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

784.00

Hours

Narrative

4.9

Edit and review motion, brief and affidavit for motion to compel and exclude; correspondence
regarding same; finalize the same for service and filing;

Compile pleadings needed by MVYork for upcoming October hearing on HJ Grathol's Motion to
Compel and ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony/Compel Expert Disclosures; prepare index of
pleadings collected and set up in notebook; review Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses
to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, and do a brief review of
documents produced, arranging them for scanning; set up electronic folder for documents to be
scanned, and meet with project assistant to arrange for scanning of production documents; update
case electronic materials; compile additional materials to send to experts and prepare transmittals to
experts and client; e-mail to SCBowman regarding questions about experts; update expert files;

10/03/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

588.00

2.4

10/03/2011

York, Mary V.

$

617.50

1.9

10/03/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

192.00

1.2

Research discovery responses; edit and finalize supplemental discovery responses, notice and letter
to opposing counsel; analyze and review opposing party's appraisal;
Review Grathol's motion to compel and work on response to motion; additional analysis of appraisal
report from Skip Sherwood; work on third set of discovery requests to include additional information
referenced in Grathol's appraiser's report;
Follow up with MVYork regarding numbering issues with documents produced by HJ Grathol; review
scanning project done by project assistant and discuss additional numbering of same; telephone call
to Mr. Shane Sawyer at Ascensio regarding need for getting scanned copies of two oversized
engineering plans produced by HJ Grathol; meet with Mr. Sawyer briefly to provide him with plans
and instructions; locate information requested by TSTollefson and bring him up to date on discovery
issues; review in-house status communications;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Telephone conference with client and SCBowman regarding condemnation approval processes;

10/05/2011

York, Mary V.

$

520.00

1.6

10/05/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

318.50

1.3

Research regarding Grathol's motion to compel; prepare draft outline regarding response to motion
to compel;

10/05/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

134.00

0.4

Review and send Idaho jury instructions on fair market value and just compensation to expert;

10/05/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

176.00

1.1

Send out e-mail to team regarding recent documents produced by HJ Grathol and issues regarding
the same; e-mail to Mr. Shane Sawyer regarding enlarged plans; set up additional case files; locate
Idaho jury instruction requested by SCBowman and forward copy to expert;

10/06/2011

York, Mary V.

$

552.50

1.7

10/06/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

833.00

3.4

10/09/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

980.00

4.0

review and edit correspondence to opposing counsel; research Idaho jury instructions; provide
information to experts;

Correspondence with expert and follow up to obtain information requested by expert; research case
law in support of arguments for response to motion to compel;
Continue legal research regarding motion to compel and scope of condemnation trial and discovery;
continue drafting response to motion to compel;
Continue to prepare draft response to motion to compel; continue to research public records
request, scope of discovery and meet and confer;

10/10/2011

York, Mary V.

$

845.00

2.6

Work on response to motion to compel and confer with TSTollefson regarding same; confirm status
of expert reports; conduct initial review of Grathol's third supplemental discovery response and
assess effect of disclosure on ITD's motion to exclude; correspondence with SCBowman regarding
scheduling of expert depositions and issues relating to motion to exclude Grathol's experts; review
and edit draft response to motion to compel;

10/10/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,568.00

6.4

Continue to prepare draft response to motion to compel; continue research regarding same;
correspondence regarding expert disclosures and Grathol supplements; research Grathol's
supplementary expert disclosure; prepare draft affidavit in support of response to compel motion;

10/10/2011

Bowman, Steve C:.

$

502.50

1.5

Work with experts on rebuttal reports; review Grathol's supplemental disclosures of expert opinions;
confer with MVYork regarding impact of Grathol's supplemental disclosures on ITD's motion to
compel;

4.4

Review and edit draft response to motion to compel and conference with TSTollefson regarding
additional arguments for response; conference with SCBowman to discuss expert reports,
depositions of Grathol's experts and coordination of depositions of ITD's experts, Grathol reply brief,
and in limine motions; telephone conference with expert regarding scheduling of deposition;
telephone conference with client; review and edit revised version of response to motion to compel;
work on scheduling for depositions; outline issues for phone conference with opposing counsel;

10/11/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,430.00

1394 of 1617

Date

Name

Billed Amt

10/11/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,617.00

6.6

Conference with MVYork regarding legal research and revisions and structure of response brief; legal
research regarding public records requests, compel standards, and law of the case; revise and edit
response brief;

10/11/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,273.00

3.8

Work on rebuttal reports by experts retained on behalf of ITD; telephone conference with expert to
discuss appraisal and his rebuttal report; draft correspondence to experts to accompany Grathol's
supplemental disclosure of expert opinions, and work on rescheduling meetings with experts;

Hours

Narrative

10/12/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,249.50

5.1

Revise draft affidavit in support of response to motion to compel; prepare exhibits regarding same;
revise draft response to motion to compel; correspondence with opposing counsel; edit and finalize
response to motion to compel; review response to motion to exclude experts;

10/12/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

112.00

0.7

Review additional case communications and e-mail among litigation team; update case status on
case summary memo; additional updating of expert files; review Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures;

10/12/2011

Bowman, Steve C:.

$

502.50

1.5

10/12/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,430.00

4.4

10/13/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

269.50

1.1

10/13/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

144.00

0.9

10/13/2011

York, Mary V.

$

520.00

1.6

10/14/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

245.00

1.0

10/14/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

167.50

0.5

Work on brief in opposition to Grathol's motion to compel; review Grathol's brief in opposition to
ITD's motion to compel;
Work on draft response to motion to compel; work on affidavit in support of motion to compel and
finalize for filing; finalize pleadings for filing;
Conference regarding filing; correspondence regarding same; research regarding stipulation; revise
draft stipulation and correspondence regarding same;
Review ITD's Response to Motion to Compel and Affidavit of MVYork; update electronic folders;
review memo from MVYork following telephone conference with Mr. Douglas Marfice; update case
status memo with new information; review e-mail transmittals between MVYork and Mr. Marfice
regarding tentative dates for upcoming depositions;
Telephone conference with Doug Marfice regarding ITD's motion to exclude experts and scheduling
of depositions; correspondence with client and follow up correspondence with Mr. Marfice; edit and
revise draft deposition notices for Grathol's experts; draft stipulation for extension and conference
with TSTollefson regarding same;
Correspondence regarding stipulation; edit draft stipulation; prepare draft order;
Revise and edit stipulation regarding disclosure of rebuttal experts and reports; revised and edit
proposed order extending time for disclosure of rebuttal experts;
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Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Telephone conferences with client; telephone conference with opposing counsel to confirm

10/17/2011

York, Mary V.

$

650.00

2.0

10/17/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

144.00

0.9

10/17/2011

Bowman, Steve C:.

$

100.50

0.3

10/18/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

147.00

0.6

10/18/2011

York, Mary V.

$

455.00

1.4

10/19/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

73.50

0.3

10/19/2011

York, Mary V.

$

3,802.50

11.7

10/19/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

48.00

0.3

10/19/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

402.00

1.2

10/20/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

416.50

1.7

10/20/2011

York, Mary V.

$

780.00

2.4

deposition dates and stipulation re: motion to exclude; finalize deposition notices for filing; review
and analysis of draft exhibits from experts regarding development of Grathol property; review
proposed edits to stipulation for extension of time and respond to same; revise stipulation for
extension; additional correspondence with opposing counsel and new revisions to stipulation and
proposed order;
Print out most recently filed pleadings and update MVYork notebook for upcoming hearing, including
updating of index to hearing materials; discuss upcoming depositions in matter with MVYork and
preparation needs for depositions; update case materials in external folders;
Work on stipulation between the parties addressing deadlines for expert disclosures and resolving
ITD's motion to compel;
Analyze and review new appraisal and correspondence regarding same;
Review and analysis of expert invoices and time; draft notice of withdrawal of motion to exclude;
telephone conference with Judge Haynes' clerk; prepare for hearing on motion to compel;
Research regarding fees and motion to compel and correspondence regarding same;
Travel to Coeur d'Alene for hearing, reviewing documents and case files en route; prepare for
hearing; argument ITD's opposition to Grathol's motion to compel and follow up discussion with
client; return travel to Boise;
Update case tracking index with updated case status, including new dates for expert rebuttal
disclosure, Acarrequi offer, and upcoming depositions, etc.;
Work on follow up interrogatories and requests for production to be served on Grathol;
Research regarding compel order compliance; legal research regarding administrative use of eminent
domain powers; legal research regarding delegation of eminent domain powers;
Conference with expert's office to confirm details of deposition; review notes from hearing on
motion to compel and outline next steps for case; confer with TSTollefson to make assignments
regarding depositions, and in Ii mine motions; review court reporters estimate for transcript of
hearing and place order for same; work on outline for deposition of Grathol's experts; review case
files and documents in preparation for depositions;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Assist with deposition preparation; prepare electronic folders for deposition preparation for each
deponent; review list of questions from SCBowman regarding past interrogatories and requests for

10/20/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

640.00

4.0

production propounded by ITD and HJ Grathols' responses thereto; review all propounded discovery
and responses provided by HJ Grathol, along with various referenced documents, and prepare
lengthy response to SCBowman, attaching key documents;

10/20/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

268.00

0.8

Work on additional discovery requests to be served on Grathol;

10/21/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

710.50

2.9

Telephone conference with client; correspondence regarding documents and expert disclosures;
continue legal research regarding administrative issues and delegation; continue research regarding
new appraisal;

10/21/2011

York, Mary V.

$

552.50

1.7

Telephone conference with client and follow up with TSTollefson regarding information; telephone
call to Chris Gabbert to confirm timeline for production of documents; finalize discovery requests for
filing; review appraisal report from expert; confirm availability for status conference and calendar
same; correspondence with client;

10/21/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

832.00

5.2

Work on reviewing HJ Grathol production documents for SCBowman for discovery purposes, and for
TSTollefson in preparation for upcoming depositions; review various case e-mails and case related
communications; follow-up with SCBowman regarding status of document review;

10/24/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

73.50

0.3

Research regarding depositions;

10/24/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

544.00

3.4

Review e-mail communications regarding obtaining better exhibit which shows the taking on the
Grathol property; continue reviewing and pulling key documents for upcoming depositions and for
SCBowman to use in drafting additional discovery requests;

10/24/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

971.50

2.9

Telephone calls with experts to discuss their progress on reports; review appraisal experts;

10/25/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

Prepare for conference with client regarding discovery responses; conference with client regarding
discovery responses; continue to prepare draft supplemental discovery responses;

10/25/2011

York, Mary V.

$

195.00

0.6

Review deposition notices; draft messages and forward same to ITD's deponents;

10/25/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

544.00

3.4

Assist with deposition preparation and exhibits; review notices of deposition from opposing council,
update electronic files, and update status of case on case status memo; continue to pull documents
for upcoming depositions and for review by SCBowman;

10/26/2011

York, Mary V.

$

357.50

1.1

Prepare for and participate in status conference with Court; follow up conference with SCBowman
and TSTollefson to discuss issues presented by Court and strategies for case; telephone conference
with client;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

10/26/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

336.00

2.1

10/27/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

608.00

3.8

10/28/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

784.00

3.2

Correspondence with client; continue research regarding compel documents and correspondence;
correspondence regarding same compel order; continue to prepare draft discovery responses;

Hours

Narrative

Set up additional external folders for potential trial exhibits; review pleadings and Order regarding
Motion to compel filed by HJ Grathol; continue review and pulling of documents for upcoming
depositions and use by SCBowman;
Continue reviewing and pulling documents for upcoming depositions;

10/28/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

608.00

3.8

Complete review and pulling of documents for SCBowman and for upcoming depositions of Mr. Alan
Johnson and Mr. Geoff Reeslund; prepare status memo with link to all documents pulled for their
review; meeting with TSTollefson to discuss documents needed to be produced in response to
Motion to Compel and additional work to be done in responding to discovery; review documents
forwarded from TSTollefson and specific interrogatories and requests for production which need to
be supplemented, etc.; set up additional electronic folders for documents to be produced;

10/31/2011

York, Mary V.

$

390.00

1.2

Review and analysis of documents provided by ITD in response to Grathol's discovery, determine
privileged documents and which may be produced; telephone conference with client;

10/31/2011
11/02/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.

$
$

49.00
325.00

0.2
1.0

11/02/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

402.00

1.2

11/03/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,372.00

5.6

11/03/2011

York, Mary V.

$

487.50

1.5

11/03/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

528.00

3.3

11/03/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

670.00

2.0

Correspondence regarding documents responsive to Grathol's discovery request;
Review and analysis of documents to be produced in response to discovery requests;
Review draft rebuttal report by expert; work on outline of additional work and areas to be addressed
by expert;
Correspondence with opposing counsel regarding order to compel; telephone conference with client
regarding documents; research documents regarding response to compel order; continue to prepare
draft discovery responses regarding compel order;
Work on discovery responses and review documents to be produced; conference call with client;
Telephone call from client; follow up with client; review, update and finalize materials in folders for
production; meet with TSTollefson to go over documents to be produced; telephone call to client;
meet with project assistant to provide instructionsfor numbering of documents and burning to CD
for production; complete compiling documents previously produced by HJ Grathol related to
lntermountain Transportation Solutions and prepare memo to MVYork regarding findings and
attaching all pertinent documents located; additional telephone calls and e-mail communications
with client;
Telephone conference with expert to discuss progress of his work on case and assistance he needs to
complete his report; review expert disclosures by Grathol and second telephone conference with
expert to answer questions raised in first call and clarify work he needs to do and issues he should
address;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

11/04/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,078.00

4.4

11/04/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

11/04/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

368.00

2.3

11/04/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

402.00

1.2

Telephone conference with expert to discuss additional work to be done and address questions;

11/07/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

98.00

0.4

Research plan sheet documents regarding supplemental production and conference regarding same;

11/07/2011

York, Mary V.

$

587.50

1.5

11/08/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,950.00

6.0

same; telephone conference with expert to discuss deposition preparation; work on preparations for
depositions;
Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood; review and analysis of case files and documents; draft
outline of deposition questions; review case law with references to Skip Sherwood; telephone
conference with expert regarding deposition preparation;
Review Amended Notice of Hearing and update case status summary; forward information to

11/08/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

112.00

0.7

SCBowman related to Mr. Skip Sherwood; oversee getting additional colored photographs printed in
large size for use as exhibits at upcoming deposition;

11/08/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

268.00

0.8

Telephone calls with experts to request questions for upcoming depositions of Grathol's experts;

11/08/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

931.00

3.8

Continue research regarding deposition and exhibit documents; continue deposition preparation;

11/09/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,145.00

6.6

Prepare for deposition of Grathol's experts, including extensive document review, outlining of
arguments and questions, and conferences with client and expert;

11/09/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

2,229.50

9.1

Analyze client and expert reports and supporting documentation; analyze and prepare exhibits for
depositions; conferences with MVYork regarding coordination of deposition topics and deposition
strategies; continue to prepare deposition outline; prepare deposition questions, exhibits and topics;

11/10/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,015.00

6.2

Work on preparations for depositions; review documents and draft outline for deposition; telephone
conference and correspondence with client; prepare for and participate in status conference with
Judge Hosack;

Hours

Narrative

Revise and edit draft discovery responses; telephone conferences with client; correspondence
regarding discovery responses and exhibits; analyze documents to be produced; revise and add
exhibits and documents; finalize discovery and exhibits for production;
Review and edit supplemental discovery responses and disclosures;
Follow-up further with client; review Bates-numbered documents prior to burning to CD; work on
compiling additional documents for upcoming deposition of Mr. Alan Johnson and Mr. Geoff
Reeslund; finalize production (Second Supplemental) and provide final CDs to TSTollefson for
production;

Confirm details for status conference with new judge, Judge Hosack and outline discussion points for
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Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Meet with MVYork to discuss items needed for upcoming depositions; begin pulling together
additional documents to be printed out as potential deposition exhibits; set up exhibit folder for
project assistant to begin printing out of deposition exhibits and discuss project with her; meet with
MVYork and TSTollefson following telephonic status conference with Judge; prepare e-mail
correspondence to experts to inform them of new trial date, new deadline for expert rebuttal
reports, and upcoming depositions of HJ Grathol's experts, etc.; begin work on preparing labels for all
potential exhibit folders for expert depositions; telephone call from client; review documents
forwarded by client; e-mail communication to MVYork regarding additional Sherwood materials;
locate additional documents needed for exhibits;

11/10/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

768.00

4.8

11/10/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,053.50

4.3

Analyze and breakdown actor/viewer expert proposed testimony and supporting documents;
continue to prepare draft deposition outline; continue to prepare deposition questions and topics;

11/11/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

608.00

3.8

Complete preparation of labels for deposition exhibits and compiling of all documents into folders;
calculate new Acarraqui offer for matter based on new March 5th trial date and provide information
to MVYork; add additional exhibits and set up drop files/labels, etc.;

11/11/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,405.00

7.4

Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood and defense of deposition of Stan Moe and Jason Minzghor;

11/11/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,274.00

5.2

11/13/2011

York, Mary V.

$

682.50

2.1

11/14/2011

York, Mary V.

$

3,900.00

12.0

11/14/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

128.00

0.8

Oversee adding more exhibits to files of deposition files; add materials regarding Mr. Skip Sherwood
to electronic case folder; review additional discovery propounded by HJGrathol;

11/14/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,421.00

5.8

Research regarding comparable sales and opposing party's claim for damages; research opposing
party's appraiser's complaint files, depositions and disciplinary actions; correspondence regarding
same; continue to prepare depositions questions;

11/15/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

740.00

3.7

Research Idaho Rule of Procedure 26 as it pertains to expert disclosures; research scope of Rule 26 as
it pertains to expert reports; draft up research findings and submit for review and comment;

11/15/2011

York, Mary V.

$

3,965.00

12.2

Research regarding development plans and access issues for depositions; continue to prepare outline
for depositions of opposing party principals; continue to prepare draft questions and exhibits
regarding depositions;
Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood;
Travel to Coeur d'Alene, reviewing documents and preparing for depositions en route; depo prep
meeting with client; depo prep meeting with expert;

Prepare for and defend depositions of Stan Moe and Jason Minzghor; post-deposition conference
with client; prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood;
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Date

11/15/2011

Name

Tollefson, Ted S.

Billed Amt

$

1,151.50

Hours

Narrative

4.7

Research deposition questions regarding development potential of property and impact of project;
prepare deposition exhibits and documents; prepare deposition outline; research regarding damage
calculations and elements of damages; correspondence regarding depositions; prepare depositions
questions and topics;

11/16/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,421.00

5.8

Continue deposition question preparation; conference with MVYork regarding deposition and
deposition preparation; research regarding zoning and comparable; continue to prepare outline;

11/16/2011

York, Mary V.

$

3,96S.00

12.2

Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood; take deposition of Mr. Sherwood; conferences with client
and expert during and after deposition; meeting with TSTollefson to discuss depositions of Jason
Minzghor, Stan Moe and Skip Sherwood and assist in prep for deposition of Geoff Reeslund;

11/17/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,990.00

9.2

Assist in preparations for deposition of Geoff Reeslund; attend Mr. Reeslund's deposition;
conference with TSTollefson after Mr. Reeslund's deposition and assist in preparations of deposition
of Mr. Johnson;

11/17/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,764.00

7.2

11/17/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

100.50

0.3

11/17/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

440.00

2.2

11/18/2011

York, Mary V.

$

3,185.00

9.8

Meeting with client; assist in prep for deposition of Alan Johnson; attend deposition of Mr. Johnson;
return travel to Boise, reviewing notes from depositions and case documentsen route;

11/18/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,911.00

7.8

Continue and finalize deposition preparation for Mr. Johnson; deposition of Mr. Johnson;
correspondence regarding depositions;

11/19/2011

York, Mary V.

$

162.50

0.5

Review correspondence from counsel for Grathol regarding Acarraqui offer; draft response to same;

Continue and finalize deposition preparation for Mr. Reeslund; deposition of Mr. Reeslund; continue
deposition preparation for Mr. Johnson;
Review public records requests to Panhandle Health District and DEQ;
Review documents to obtain legal property description; draft public records request letters and
proper documentation and submit to DEQ, PHD and local DEQ agency;

11/21/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,495.00

4.6

Review and organize notes and files from week of depositions and confirm upcoming deadlines for
case; conference with TSTollefson to discuss depositions; draft correspondence to client;
correspondence with Doug Marfice; telephone conference with client; work on calculations and
strategies for Acarraqui offer; meeting/conference with SCBowman, TSTollefson, KLGeorger and
BKFeraci to discuss depositions, rebuttal expert disclosures and upcoming pretrial deadlines and
assign tasks; review and analysis of updated appraisal report from expert;

11/22/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

122.50

0.5

Telephone conference with clients and MVYork regarding extension of road and project plans;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

11/22/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,007.50

3.1

11/23/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

220.50

0.9

11/23/2011

York, Mary V.

$

325.00

1.0

11/23/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

300.00

1.5

11/28/2011

York, Mary V.

$

455.00

1.4

Work on issues relating to Sylvan Road/Roberts Road; conference calls with clients; confirm status of
negotiations on parcels adjacent and review additional documents provided; confirm timeline for
receipt of depositions and coordinate sending transcripts to experts; telephone conference with
client; review deposition transcript;
Continue research regarding opposing party's discovery requests and referenced documents;
telephone conference with client; correspondence with client;
Correspondence with client; telephone conference with expert regarding depositions, rebuttal report
and fact witnesses;
Review documents pertaining to title of property; submit addendum public records request
supplementing initial request;
Telephone message from expert and follow up calls to coordinate conference call with experts;
review and analysis of deposition; follow up conference with expert; telephone conference with
expert regarding appraisal report and depositions in case;

11/28/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

528.00

3.3

Update case status on case tracking chart; brief review of deposition transcripts of Mr. Stan Moe, Mr.
Jason Minzghor, Mr. Geoffrey Reeslund and Mr. Alan Johnson, covert them to pdf files, and save
word indices to pdf files and add to electronic folders; prepare e-mails to experts with copies of all
electronic deposition transcripts; update expert electronic folders; review e-mail correspondence
from SCBowman regarding items needed to be sent to expert; forward Complaint and copies of
various Internet website information on Hughes Investment to expert; locate and compile additional
documents for review by expert and have project assistant burn to a CD; prepare cover letter to
expert with transmittal of CD of documents and arrange for hand-delivery of same; review and
respond to e-mail regarding question as to opposing counsel;

11/28/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

201.00

0.6

Telephone conference with expert; select documents to provide to expert;

11/29/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,177.50

6.7

Correspondence with client; meeting with KLGeorger to discuss pretrial motions and make research
assignments on several issues for anticipated motions; review and analysis of comments on
appraisal; conference(s) with client; conference with TSTollefson to discuss issues relating to Roberts
Road/Sylvan Road; work on analysis of appraisal reports and of Acarraqui offer;

11/29/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

147.00

0.6

Analyze review appraiser's review of appraisal; continue to prepare draft expert summaries;

11/29/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

340.00

1.7

11/29/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$ 1,641.50

4.9

Meet with MVYork to review motion in limine case law and research issues related to summary
judgment and Daubert motions pertaining to lost profits, methodology, lost visibility, severance
damages and valuation;
Review transcripts of depositions of Mr. Minzghor and Mr. Moe on behalf of ITD; review transcript of
deposition of Mr. Sherwood; work on assessing settlement offer in preparation for upcoming
deadline under Acarraqui;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

11/30/2011

York, Mary V.

$

877.50

2.7

Work on obtaining extension of time for Acarraqui offer; extended telephone conference with
experts;

11/30/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

48.00

0.3

Confer with MVYork regarding additional documents needed by expert for his review, and begin
compiling the same;

11/30/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

637.00

2.6

Continue research regarding depositions and expert testimony; continue to prepare outline and
summary of expert testimony;

6.8

Work on issues relating to extension and access issues; conference with TSTollefson regarding
deposition summaries and rebuttal expert reports; telephone conference with client; review
deposition transcript regarding discussion of extension; confirm deadline and status of Grathol's
discovery responses and coordinate follow up of same; follow up and provide additional information
to appraiser and correspondence relating to same; work on presentation materials for meeting with
ITD and prepare for same; meet with ITD;

12/01/2011

York, Mary V.

$

2,210.00

Hours

Narrative

Complete compiling documents to send to expert and forward same to him with e-mail transmittal;
review case communications; follow up on status of discovery responses from HJ Grathol; compile
deposition transcripts; look for exhibit needed by MVYork and TSTollefson and forward results to
them for their review; pull exhibits to all depositions taken to date from court reporter's depository
site and download to folder; arrange for project assistant to create separate pdf files for each
deposition exhibit; e-mail to client; locate additional deed needed by expert;

12/01/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

432.00

2.7

12/01/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

98.00

0.4

12/02/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

12/02/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,072.00

3.2

12/02/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

686.00

2.8

12/04/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

49.00

0.2

12/05/2011

York, Mary V.

$

455.00

1.4

Review and edit draft correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding discovery responses; additional
email correspondence with Mr. Marfice regarding extension for Acarrequi offer and correspondence
with client; telephone conference with client; review appraisal report from expert;

12/05/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

Research regarding potential discovery response documents; telephone conferences with client;
work on discovery responses;

Research and correspondence regarding deeds, expert documents and exhibits;
Correspondence with client and expert regarding engagement of expert; conference with SCBowman
regarding Acarrequi offer; correspondence with Doug Marfice;
Research case law and statutes for motion for summary judgment on improper damage claims by
Grathol and to bar introduction of improper and irrelevant evidence by Grathol; work on outline of
brief in support of motion for summary judgment;
Prepare draft letter to opposing counsel; continue to research regarding expert depositions; continue
to prepare summary and outline of expert testimony;
Correspondence regarding discovery responses;
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Date

12/06/2011

12/06/2011

Name

Billed Amt

York, Mary V.

$

Bowman, Steve C.

$

390.00

2,077.00

Hours

Narrative

1.2

6.2

Review and analysis of revised draft of appraisal; telephone conference with expert; meeting with
KLGeorger to discuss status of research on pre-trial briefs; review correspondence to Doug Marfice
regarding last discovery responses;
Research case law prohibiting a landowner from purchasing property subject to impending
condemnation and then claiming business losses and other severance damages based on a partial
taking of the property; research case law and statutes for motion for summary judgment on
Grathol's "business loss" and construction delay claims; telephone conference with experts; review
deposition transcript of Alan Johnson;

12/07/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

288.00

1.8

12/07/2011

York, Mary V.

$

682.50

2.1

Arrange for colored copy of report to be printed and save new version on external network; load all
deposition transcripts, exhibits and indices to transcripts to external folder; review various
correspondence to client with case materials; review HJ Grathol's Responses to Third Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production, briefly review CD of documents produced for contents
of same,and prepare brief e-mail summary to team regarding latest production; update case status
on case summary chart/memo; review e-mail with additional assignment from SCBowman; prepare e
mail to expert with copy of HJ Grathol's latest discovery responses; prepare letter to expert with copy
of CD containing HJ Grathol's additional discovery responses;
Review expert report; correspondence with client; telephone conference with client regarding
discovery responses, expert testimony, and potential factwitnesses; review information and
documents provided by client;

12/08/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,943.00

5.8

12/08/2011

York, Mary V.

$

227.50

0.7

12/09/2011

York, Mary V.

$

650.00

2.0

12/09/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,249.50

5.1

12/12/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,000.00

5.0

12/12/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

64.00

0.4

12/12/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,267.50

3.9

Work on reports by ITD rebuttal experts; research case law and statutes for summary judgment
motion against damage claims and improper evidence being asserted by Grathol;
Review information provided by client; work on rebuttal report;
Work on exhibits for client; review documents received from DEQ in response to public records
request; review Skip Sherwood's file produced by Grathol;
Telephone conference with client; continue to prepare discovery responses and legal research
regarding same; continue to research expert disclosures, depositions and synopsis;
Commence researching damage issues stemming from severance damages, visibility and right of
way; commence drafting research findings in anticipation of larger memorandum for summary
judgment;
Pull together hourly rates for experts retained by ITD; upload Mr. Jason Mingzhor's deposition
transcript from Jameson matter to external folder;
Work on rebuttal expert disclosure statement; work on rebuttal disclosures;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

12/12/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,077.00

6.2

Review and work on reports to be produced; telephone conference with expert; compile research for
motion for summary judgment to be filed against improper damage claims by Grathol in case;

12/12/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,274.00

5.2

Research and analysis of documents responsive to discovery requests and preparation of the same;
continue to prepare draft discovery response;

12/13/2011

York, Mary V.

$

487.50

1.5

Hours

Narrative

Conference with TSTollefson to discuss discovery responses and issues relating to same;
correspondence with Doug Marfice; research and review Idaho statutes and information relating to
STIP; review rebuttal expert statement and follow up with client regarding same;

12/13/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

64.00

0.4

Review of Plaintiff's Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts; insert hourly wages for each rebuttal witness into
pleading;

12/13/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

392.00

1.6

Work on discovery responses; correspondence regarding experts; edit and revise discovery exhibits
and correspondence regarding same;

12/14/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,202.50

3.7

Prepare for client meeting and attend the same; review and edit ITD's discovery responses; follow up
conference with TSTollefson regarding discovery; confirm extension of time for discovery responses
and review correspondence from Doug Marfice;

12/14/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

304.00

1..9

Review documents to be produced for production, meet with project assistant to provide
instructions for Bates numbering and burning to CD, and oversee numbering of same; review and
respond to various case e-mails;

12/14/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,110.50

6.3

Research case law and statutes for motions for summary judgment to strike improper evidence and
damage claims to be presented by Grathol at trial; work on responses to most recent set of discovery
served by Grathol; telephone conference with expert regarding status of his work on expert report;

12/14/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,445.50

5.9

12/15/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

128.00

0.8

Prepare draft discovery responses; edit and revise draft discovery responses; telephone conferences
with client; correspondence with client; correspondence with opposing counsel; continue to research
expert witness testimony and depositions; continue to prepare expert synopsis; prepare draft offer
letter and correspondence regarding same;
Discuss client meeting with MVYork; review correspondence; update case status on case summary
chart; review additional e-mails and communications with team regarding upcoming rebuttal reports
and follow up with additional items needed to be done;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

12/15/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,560.00

4.8

12/lS/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,412.00

7.2

12/15/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,200.50

4.9

12/16/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

80.00

0.4

12/16/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

465.S0

1.9

12/16/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,110.50

6.3

12/16/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

848.00

5.3

Bowman, Steve C.
Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,909.50

5.7

12/18/2011

$

1,038.50

3.1

12/19/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

12/19/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,077.00

6.2

12/17/2011

12/19/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,053.50

4.3

Conference with TSTollefson regarding ITD's responses to Grathol's discovery and Acarrequi offer;
telephone conference with client; email correspondence with client; review and edit draft Acarrequi
offer letter to Grathol; review Acarrequi case and other Idaho case law governing attorney fee
awards in condemnation; review information provided by Grathol regarding request for utility
conduits and forward same; email correspondence with and phone message for expert; review and
analyze rebuttal reports; telephone conference with client; telephone conference with expert;
Work on upcoming disclosure of rebuttal experts; work on responses to Grathol's second set of
interrogatories and requests for production; telephone conference with expert;
Continue research regarding expert testimony, depositions and documents; continue to prepare
draft summary and analysis of expert testimony; correspondence regarding expert rebuttals;
research regarding prior Sylvan road testimony and issues; correspondence regarding offer and
utilities;
Review documents contained in public records request response from DEQ; draft summary of
documents and submit to team for review and comment;
Continue to research expert opinions and testimony; continue to prepare draft synopsis and facts for
expert witnesses;
Work with experts on rebuttal reports; review and edit draft rebuttal reports;
Review list of various documents, exhibits, and HJ Grathol production documents needed for expert
review and begin to compile and forward to expert; various communications to/from client; prepare
detailed listing of all materials forwarded and reviewed by each of ITD's experts for our disclosure
pleading;
Work on ITD's disclosure of rebuttal experts; work on expert reports;
Work on ITD's disclosures of rebuttal experts;
Review and edit draft expert rebuttal disclosures and correspondence with SCBowman regarding
same;
Telephone conferences with experts; work on rebuttal expert reports; review and edit final draft
disclosures;
Continue to prepare expert disclosure; research regarding disclosure and expert qualifications and
background; edit and revise draft expert disclosures; correspondence regarding same; finalize expert
disclosures; research regarding public records request and correspondence regarding same; continue
to prepare expert summary and research regarding same;

12/19/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

704.00

4.4

Work with SCBowman in finalizing rebuttal documents for production, including locating CVs for all
experts, reviewing finalized reports, uploading finalized reports, communications with various
experts, adding further attachments to documents, overseeing burning of CD of documents; and
obtaining information still needed;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

12/20/2011

York, Mary V.

$

260.00

0.8

12/20/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,420.00

7.1

12/21/2011

York, Mary V.

$

650.00

2.0

12/21/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

140.00

0.7

12/21/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,708.50

5.1

Hours

Narrative

Confirm details of filing of expert rebuttal reports; conference with BFeraci regarding distribution of
rebuttal disclosures and reports and coordinate same; confirm details of public records request and
telephone conference with client;
Review deposition transcripts and expert reports and supporting documents; research Idaho case
law on standards to disqualify or strike portions of expert's testimony that rely upon flawed
methodology to generate opinions; draft section of draft memorandum moving to exclude expert
opinion testimony premised on flawed methodology;
Conference with SCBowman and KLGeorger regarding status of research for pre-trial motions; review
ITD's rebuttal expert reports;
Draft brief containing summary judgment issues and separate brief containing evidentiary issues;
research case law in support of summary judgment issues;
Research case law for motion for summary judgment on improper damage claims by Grathol and
motions in Ii mine to exclude certain evidence sought to be used by Grathol at trial; work on outline
for summary judgment motion and motion in limine;
Follow up with status of ITD's extension for responding to second set of HJ Grathol's discovery
requests and possible re-numbering of production documents; discuss status of numbering project
with project assistant MTualaulelei; various communications to/from SCBowman regarding discovery
status;
Review and analysis of Grathol's correspondence relating to public records request; correspondence
with TSTollefson regarding same;
Research and draft supporting summary judgment memorandum;
Analysis and correspondence regarding public records request; correspondence regarding
depositions; edit and revise draft expert summary and synopsis; work on outline of Sylvan Road
issues;

12/21/2011

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

64.00

0.4

12/22/2011

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

12/22/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,000.00

5.0

12/22/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

416.50

1.7

12/22/2011
12/22/2011

Bowman, Steve C.
Feraci, Barbara K.

$
$

569.50
32.00

0.2

12/23/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

300.00

1.5

12/23/2011

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,641.50

4.9

12/23/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

661.50

2.7

Edit draft expert summary; edit and revise draft discovery responses and responsive documents;

12/24/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

360.00

1..8

Research Idaho case law on issue of non-recoverable construction delay damages; draft legal section
of summary judgment memorandum and incorporating deposition transcript and expert report

1.7

Work on responses to Grathol's second set of discovery served on ITD;
Correspondence regarding receipt of CD of expert reports;
Research Idaho case law on issue of non-recovery of construction delay damages in condemnation
proceedings;
Work on motion in Ii mine to exclude claims by Grathol based on Sylvan Road, improper use of
"comparable" sales, claims for lost profits, and flawed appraisal; research case law for motion in
limine;

content on issue of construction delay damages;
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Date

12/26/2011

Name

Billed Amt

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,273.00

Hours

Narrative

3.8

12/27/2011

York, Mary V.

$

1,527.50

4.7

12/27/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,040.00

5.2

12/27/2011

12/28/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

York, Mary V.

$

$

1,127.00

780.00

4.6

Research case law for motion for summary judgment on Grathol claims for severance damages and
lost profits; research case law for brief in support of motion in Ii mine;
Review and edit draft responses to Grathol's 2nd set of discovery to ITD and documents to be
produced; review deposition correction sheet from Stan Moe; work on fact section of pre-trial
motions; review Skip Sherwood's appraisal file; review of ITD's rebuttal expert reports for use in pretrial motions; work on pretrial motions;
Research Idaho case law pertaining to Grathol's gravel loss damage claim made in its expert reports
and expert deposition testimony; draft section of supporting memorandum draft rejecting gravel loss
claim; research Idaho case law on issue of lost profits and non-recovery of such damages in
condemnation cases;
Continue to prepare discovery response; finalize documents and exhibits regarding discovery
response; correspondence with opposing counsel regarding same; continue research regarding
Sylvan road claim; continue to prepare memorandum regarding same;

2.4

Review correspondence regarding Grathol's renewed public records request; telephone conference
with client; work on fact section for in Ii mine motion on exclusion of damages where purchased with
knowledge of project; research deposition transcripts and exhibits in support of in Ii mine motion and
incorporate information into memorandum;
Review deposition transcripts and expert reports to obtain arguments made by Grathol supporting
its purported loss of business, lost profit and lost opp_ortunity cost claims; research Idaho statute on
business damages and "qualifying" business standard that must be met as threshold matter before
being eligible to recover statutory lost business damages in partial taking; draft lost profit section of
brief including attacks on speculative nature of claims, lack of support in Idaho common law and
failure to comport with Idaho's business damages statute;

12/28/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,120.00

5.6

12/28/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,396.50

5.7

12/29/2011

Georger, Katherine L.

$

540.00

2.7

12/29/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

931.00

3.8

12/30/2011

York, Mary V.

$

715.00

2.2

Telephone conference with client; continue research regarding expert opinions and testimony;
continue to prepare draft synopsis and expert opinions; continue to prepare draft memorandum
regarding Sylvan Road claim;
Research Idaho and ninth circuit case law supporting argument that severance damages are not
recoverable as a matter of law;
Continue research regarding expert opinions and deposition transcripts; continue to prepare draft
synopsis and factual section for summary judgment and in limine briefs;
Draft motion in Ii mine to exclude expert testimony; work on brief in support of motion in Ii mine;
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Date

12/30/2011

Name

Billed Amt

Georger, Katherine L.

$

740.00

Hours

Narrative

3.7

Continue researching case law outside of Idaho pertaining to a landowner's prior knowledge of scope
and nature of project as being grounds to dismiss severance damages claim; commence drafting
section of summary judgment brief challenging Grathol's claims for severance damages;

12/30/2011

12/31/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

Georger, Katherine L.

$

$

1,788.50

640.00

7.3

3.2

Continue research regarding depositions, expert rebuttals and reports regarding motions in limine
and factual section; continue to prepare draft factual brief sections regarding same; correspondence
regarding same;
Continue researching additional state jurisdiction for support to proposition that severance damages
are not recoverable where landowner has prior knowledge of project before purchasing property;
revise section of brief on severance damages; submit draft of summary judgment brief and summary
of analysis, structure and overall organizational components;

12/31/2011

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

514.50

2.1

01/02/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,080.00

6.4

01/03/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,323.00

5.4

01/03/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,320.00

6.6

01/03/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,502.50

7.7

Research lost profit claims and related documents; prepare draft factual section regarding same;
Confirm pretrial deadlines for case and calendar same; work on brief in support of summary
judgment motion regarding Sylvan Road, damages for loss of access and damages for loss of
visibility; work of statement of facts for summary judgment motion;
Analyze counter offer and correspondence regarding same; research regarding opposing counsel's
discovery response to letter; legal research regarding standards for challenging expert methodology;
prepare draft section regarding same; legal research regarding legal standards for larger parcel;
prepare draft section regarding same; legal research regarding date of valuation; prepare draft
section regarding same;
Research additional cases on lost profit argument made by Grathol for summary judgment brief;
draft additional section for lost profit argument; research Idaho case law on issue of new business
being denied recovery of lost profits as a matter of law; draft additional brief insert and submit for
review and comment;
Several exchanges of email correspondence with client; review and analysis of Grathol's counter
offer and of options for responding; draft correspondence to client; work on brief in support of
motion in limine;

01/03/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

288.00

1.8

Follow up with expert; review case e-mails and other communications of past week; review ITD's
Response to Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents, and documents produced in connection with same; review communications regarding
public records request and response thereto; update case status on case tracking summary chart;
review letter from Mr. Douglas Marfice in response to offer of settlement; discuss trial preparation
and accommodations needed with SCBowman; follow up with additional trial needs with team;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

01/03/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,445.50

7.3

01/04/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,592.50

6.5

Hours

Narrative

01/04/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,520.00

7.6

01/04/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,307.50

7.1

01/04/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

112.00

0.7

01/04/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,613.00

7.8

01/05/2012

01/05/2012

01/05/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

Georger, Katherine L.

York, Mary V.

$

$

$

1,837.50

1,620.00

2,730.00

Research case law in to support motion for summary judgment; work on brief in support of motion
for summary judgment; review correspondence from opposing counsel rejected Acarrequi offer and
making counteroffer;
Legal research regarding striking appraisal for failure to quantify adjustments to comparable sales;
prepare draft argument regarding same; prepare draft factual citations regarding same; legal
research regarding failure to appraise on date of taking; legal research regarding appraisal of only
portion acquired;
Research Idaho case law supporting policy reasons behind rejecting an award of construction delay
damages to a prospective business; research additional authority from other jurisdictions and
reputable treatises supporting denial of construction delay damages, and more specifically denial of
business damages alleged to be attributed to construction delay; draft additional brief insert with
additional supporting authority and submit for review;
Review project plans for information relating to elevations of interchange on Grathol property;
telephone conference with client; work on motions in limine;
Locate dates and documents needed by SCBowman; review electronic files for early construction
plans, etc.;
Work on brief in support of motion for summary judgment; research case law for brief;

7.5

Continue legal research regarding larger parcel; continue legal research regarding date of valuation;
email memorandum regarding same; continue to prepare draft affidavit; continue legal research
regarding striking appraisals; research regarding transcript and deposition citations; legal research
regarding appellate stay and correspondence regarding same; continue to revise and edit draft
summary judgment brief and motion in limine brief;

8.1

Conduct additional research of state and federal jurisdictions on implications of a land owner's
knowledge of a governmental condemnation and/or project prior to purchasing property as
preventing land owner to recover severance damages in such a situation; draft up research findings
and additional cases and submit; revise and edit memorandum in support of motions in limine,
including revisions submitted by TSTollefson, and submit revisions to MVYork;

8.4

Work on brief in support of motions in limine, including research of case law, drafting of brief,
obtaining documents in support of motion; review and analysis of documents relating to
construction schedule; review and edit motion and brief for overlength filing and research First
Judicial District local rules for page limits on briefs; research case law regarding larger parcel analysis;
work on summary judgment motion and brief;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

01/05/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,328.00

8.3

01/05/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,881.00

8.6

01/06/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,176.00

4.8

01/06/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

900.00

4.5

01/06/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,502.50

7.7

01/06/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

784.00

4.9

01/06/2012
01/09/2012

Bowman, Steve C.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

1,507.50
49.00

4.5
0.2

01/09/2012

York, Mary V.

$

650.00

2.0

01/09/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

100.00

0.5

01/09/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

268.00

0.8

01/10/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

240.00

1.5

01/11/2012

York, Mary V.

$

715.00

2.2

01/11/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

98.00

0.4

Follow up on outstanding discovery issues with Mr. Douglas Marfice and prepare summary e-mail to
litigation team; assist with finalizing of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions in Limine
documents, including pulling all citations, deposition excerpts, exhibits to depositions cited, expert
reports, discovery, etc. and electronically highlighting relevant pages and references cited, along with
adding exhibit numbers to Affidavit of MVYork;
Research additional case law for brief in support of motion for summary judgment; work on brief in
support of motion for summary judgment;
Revise and edit draft affidavit; edit and research citations to record in motion in Ii mine brief; edit and
revise exhibits; edit and research citations to record to summary judgment brief; continue to edit
and revise briefs for filing;
Edit and revise memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment; review memorandum in
support of motions in limine;
Work on summary judgment brief and in limine brief;
Meet with MVYork to confer as to status of exhibits and items needed to be added; add further
deposition citations, excerpts from expert reports, deposition exhibits, etc. to exhibits to Motion in
Limine and Motion for Summary Judgment, and proof both briefs to confirm that all citations have
been included as exhibits, etc.; meet with project assistant to oversee printing of final exhibits,
compilation of same, etc.;
Work on brief in support of motion for summary judgment;
Research regarding hearing and status and correspondence regarding same;
Correspondence with client; outline pre-trial deadlines and strategies for preparing for trial; draft
response to Grathol's settlement offer; telephone conference with client; review, edit and finalize
notice of hearing;
Draft notice of hearing and submit to MVYork and SCBowman and TSTollefson for review and
comment;
Review discovery deficiency letter sent by opposing counsel; work on response to deficiency letter;
Prepare letters to experts; review case communications, including MVYork letter to Mr. Douglas
Marfice rejecting his client's counter-offer, ITD's Notice of Hearing, etc. and update status of matter
on case tracking memo;
Review and analysis of deficiency letter from opposing counsel and work on response to same;
conference call with client; review and edit draft letter to opposing counsel requesting extension of
time for discovery responses; draft motion to compel;
Telephone conference regarding discovery and supplement issues; prepare draft letter to opposing
counsel regarding same;

1411 of 1617

Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

01/12/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

736.00

4.6

01/12/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

465.50

1.9

01/13/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,307.50

7.1

01/13/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

661.50

2.7

01/13/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,646.50

7.9

01/16/2012

York, Mary V.

$

390.00

1.2

01/16/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

01/16/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

Work on compiling data needed for upcoming trial preparation meeting, including pulling all expert
reports, opinions included in discovery responses, appraisals, rebuttal reports, etc. and compile lists
of potential lay and expert witnesses for both parties, etc.; review recent communications from Mr.
Marfice's office and team e-mails regarding discovery issues; pull document needed by SCBowman
for his review; discuss trial witnesses briefly with SCBowman and make additions/revisions to trial
witness list; print out case deadlines and attend to other minor items for upcoming team trial
meeting;
Continue preparation for meeting and presentation; prepare draft overview of appraisals;
correspondence regarding discovery;
Prepare for pretrial meeting with litigation team and clients; draft correspondence to Chris Gabbert,
researching issues raised by Mr. Gabbert in prior correspondence and responding to same; review,
edit and finalize correspondence to Mr. Gabbert;
Research discovery regarding public notices and negotiations regarding neighboring parcels; prepare
email memorandum regarding same; conference regarding discovery responses; continue to prepare
draft supplemental discovery responses;
Work on trial preparations; review documents and work on response to deficiency letter regarding
ITD responses to Grathol's second set of discovery; work on letter to opposing counsel responding to
recent letter from him refusing to grant extension of time to compile additional documents in
response to defendant's discovery requests;
Review correspondence from client; confirm whether new information has been produced to Grathol
and incorporate same into supplemental discovery responses; review Grathol's list of witnesses and
research information regarding listed individuals; draft correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding
scheduling depositions;

$

304.00

1.9

Follow-up with client; review MVYork's response e-mail to Mr. Christopher Gabbert regarding no
relationship between documents requested in Grathol's second set of discovery requests and
necessity for responding to ITD's motion in limine and motion for summary judgment; update case
electronic folders; review draft of our supplemental response to HJ Grathol's Second Discovery
requests and make minor revisions to same as to Bates numbering references, etc.; review case
materials; begin preparation of list of trial assignments;

$

882.00

3.6

Continue research regarding supplemental response to second discovery request; continue to
prepare supplemental responses to second discovery request and documents regarding same; edit
draft supplemental discovery response and correspondence regarding same;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

01/16/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

760.00_

3.8

Research Idaho legislative history and case law pertaining to recent amendment to Idaho Code 7707(6); commence drafting reply arguments to Grathol's summary judgment response;

01/16/2012

Bowman, Steve C:.

$

502.50

1.5

Work on letter to opposing counsel regarding their need to identify fact witnesses to be called at trial
and available dates for deposition; work on supplemental responses to second set of discovery
requests by Grathol;

01/17/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

857.50

3.5

Continue to edit draft discovery responses; prepare draft notice regarding discovery responses;
telephone conference with client; research documents regarding test pits and correspondence
regarding same; telephone conference with client regarding notice and public hearing;

Hours

Narrative

Review and edit discovery responses; telephone conferences with client; incorporate information
into discovery responses; draft letter to Gabbert regarding discovery responses; email
correspondence with client; finalize discovery; review and analysis of information and documents
regarding test pits for Athol Segment;
Continue researching issues pertaining to Grathol's summary judgment response; continue drafting
summary judgment response and submit draft for review;

01/17/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,202.50

3.7

01/17/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

900.00

4.5

01/17/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

904.50

2.7

Work on supplemental responses to Grathol's second set of discovery responses; work on
preparation of demonstrative exhibits to be used at trial; telephone conference with client;

1.5

Review recent case communications and e-mails; review materials provided by ITD on test pits issue;
discuss case status with MVYork; update case tracking memo with information from recent
correspondence and filings; review notes from recent team meeting and begin to prepare chart of
key trial issues and assignments to be completed for trial;
Review documents previously produced in discovery responses to confirm that various
environmental impact documents were produced to opposing counsel, etc.; load Garwood to Sagle
Administrative Record to external network for easy accessibility by litigation team; follow-up with
TSTollefson and MVYork regarding various items needed for trial and demonstrative exhibits needed
for trial; telephone call to Mr. Dave Carter in Denver to discuss availability to work on electronic trial
exhibits, etc.; additional meeting with MVYork and TSTollefson to discuss graphics, etc.;
communications with client; attend to other miscellaneous trial matters;

01/17/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

240.00

01/18/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

400.00

2.5

01/19/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

637.00

2.6

01/19/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,105.00

3.4

Conferences with MVYork and BKFeraci regarding trial and trial exhibits; telephone conference with
client regarding exhibits; continue to prepare and research potential trial exhibits and trial
preparation;
Work on trial preparations, including assessment of pre-trial deadlines, planning of strategies for
preparing for trial, and working on exhibits for trial;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

01/19/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

208.00

1.3

Update electronic folders with information from CDs provided by ITD; e-mail to team regarding
access to various ITD information; meet briefly with TSTollefson to discuss trial exhibits; locate
additional deposition exhibits off court reporter's website and add to electronic folders;

01/20/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

300.00

1.5

Review defendant's response to summary judgment, motion in limine response and supporting
affidavit in anticipation of drafting reply;

01/20/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

80.00

0.4

Meet with MVYork to discuss response motion for summary judgment and motion in Ii mine;

01/20/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

465.50

1.9

Hours

Narrative

Analyze and review response to summary judgment motion; analyze and review response to motion

01/20/2012

York, Mary V.

$

682.50

2.1

01/20/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

304.00

l..9

01/21/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

880.00

4.4

01/21/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

253.50

l.3

01/21/2012

Bowman, Steve C:.

$

1,072.00

3.2

01/21/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

490.00

2.0

01/21/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,430.00

4.4

01/22/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,020.00

5.1

01/22/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

273.00

1.4

in Ii mine; correspondence regarding same; prepare draft letter to opposing counsel regarding
witnesses;
Telephone conference with Doug Marfice to discuss depositions of fact witnesses and scheduling of
hearing on pre-trial motions; telephone conference with client and follow up with expert;
preliminary review of Grathol's response to ITD's pretrial motions and conference with SCBowman to
strategize response to same;
Follow up with recording of additional court deadlines; begin pulling potential demonstrative
exhibits for trial; prepare e-mail to PVolkman in Denver regarding possible electronic demonstrative
exhibit needs of trial team; update status on case tracking memo; compile documents requested by
SCBowman for additional briefing; start reviewing Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment;
Research cases cited by Grathol in their response brief; draft brief insert on loss of visibility
distinguishing case law on basis of distinct constitutions in other jurisdictions, including Utah,
Louisiana, California, and Alaska;
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding inclusion of gravel in just compensation
calculations;
Work on reply briefs in support of motion for summary judgment and motion in Ii mine;
Prepare draft outline for reply brief in support of motion in limine; continue to prepare draft
narrative time line of purchase of property;
Review and analysis of Grathol's response to ITD's pretrial motions and outline issues and
assignments to respond to same; extended meeting with litigation team to discuss Grathol's
pleadings, issues for research, strategies for responses, and make assignments; research information
relating to Grathol's argument relating to project knowledge;
Continue drafting brief insert on visibility and submit draft to SCBowman for review and comment;
commence researching issue pertaining to lost profits, including review prior briefing; commence
drafting reply on issue of lost profits;
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding inclusion of gravel in just compensation
calculations;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

01/22/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

128.00

0.8

01/23/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

1,560.00

8.0

01/23/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

2,156.00

8.8

Continue legal research regarding reply to motion in Ii mine regarding date of valuation and
standards for expert witnesses; continue to prepare draft outline regarding reply in support of
motion in limine; continue to prepare draft reply in support of motion in limine;

01/23/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,320.00

6.6

Continue drafting brief inserts on lost profits and Sylvan Road issue;
Review and edit correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding fact witnesses; work on prep for
deposition of Jim Coleman and correspondence regarding same; work on response to construction
delay portion of brief; review research memorandum regarding response to Grathol's argument
regarding damages for gravel; research information regarding gravel claims;

Narrative

Set up Real Legal Binder for running searches for upcoming depositions and trial, and add all
deposition transcripts taken to date and begin running preliminary searches;
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding inclusion of gravel in just compensation
calculations; draft reply brief inserts regarding same; research relevant case law regarding
recoverable damages for construction delay after announcement of intent to condemn private
property;

01/23/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,300.00

4.0

01/24/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

604.50

3.1

01/24/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,935.50

7.9

01/24/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,640.00

8.2

Research case law on issue of severance damages and quick-take statute; continuing drafting section
of brief on Sylvan Road, including severance damages section; review possession hearing transcript,
depositions and prior briefing to weave into argument sections of brief;

4.3

Confer with BKFeraci regarding logistics and preparations for trial; review correspondence and
information from client; draft portion of reply brief regarding Grathol's claim for gravel damages;
review correspondence from Doug Marfice, assess issues regarding depositions, and respond to
same;

01/24/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,397.50

Research and analyze relevant case law regarding damages for construction delays related to
condemned property; research and analyze case law regarding highest and best use and inability of
owner of condemned land to aggregate uses;
Continue to prepare draft reply in support of motion in limine; continue to research deposition
regarding same; continue regarding date of valuations and indicia of reliability for experts;
conferences with MVYork regarding depositions and trial; research and correspondence regarding
non testifying experts;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

01/24/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

928.00

5.8

Meet with project assistant to go over all documents needed to be printed for notebooks for
upcoming hearing on ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Li mine; send e-mail and
issues memo to client; continue working on compiling discovery documents for upcoming
depositions; send copies of Defendant's Responses to ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion in Li mine, along with Affidavit of Christopher Gabbert to experts; update expert files;
telephone call from client; run additional searches and review additional productions of documents
by HJ Grathol, pulling and printing documents for possible exhibits for depositions;

01/25/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,911.00

7.8

Edit and revise draft section regarding lost profits and sylvan road; research and correspondence
regarding change in project plans; continue to revise and edit draft reply brief in support of motion in
limine; research regarding consequential damages;

01/25/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

429.00

2.2

Research and analyze case law relevant to construction delay damages and draft reply brief insert
regarding same; draft brief insert regarding construction delay as inverse condemnation;
Continue researching issues pertaining to lost business profits and Sylvan Road, including reviewing
prior briefing and examining case law on issue of recovery of damages under theory of severance
damages; continue drafting lost profits and Sylvan Road brief inserts and submit drafts for review
and comment; review, edit and revise reply brief in support of motion in limine and submit revisions
and edits;
Work on sections of reply brief relating to damage claims for gravel and for construction delays,
researching case law and factual information, making assignments for research projects, and
incorporating information and argument into brief;

01/25/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,920.00

9.6

01/25/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,347.50

10.3

01/25/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

737.00

2.2

Review response brief by Grathol on summary judgment in detail; review cases cited by Grathol in
response brief; work on reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment;

6.6

Complete compiling and finalizing packet of documents for upcoming depositions; work on
compiling packet of documents and compiling written responses to discovery and documents
produced by way of discovery, including pulling of pertinent deposition testimony previously taken
in case; confer with KLGeorger on status of briefing; work on preparing PowerPoint Presentation for
upcoming hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Li mine; locate additional
documents needed for PowerPointand make additions and revisions to PowerPoint; various
communications to/from SCBowman regarding getting ready for the deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman
and additional documents to expert; re-organize electronic folders of Coleman materials for better
usage and printing; follow-up on status of briefing and documents needed to be pulled, etc.;

01/25/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,056.00
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Date

Hours

Narrative

Name

Billed Amt

01/26/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

507.00

2.6

01/26/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,580.00

7.9

01/26/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,788.50

7.3

01/26/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,022.50

9.3

01/26/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,445.50

7.3

01/26/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

896.00

5.6

01/27/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

940.00

4.7

01/27/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,102.50

4.5

Cite and source check ITD's reply brief in support of motion in Ii mine; research relevant case law and
analyze issues related to construction delay;
Research Idaho case law and other jurisdictions on issue of consequential damages; draft brief insert
on consequential damages and submit for review, comment and insertion into reply brief; research
cases cited by Grathol in their brief regarding consequential damages and "cost to cure" method of
calculating severance damages; commence drafting brief in insert distinguishing case law on "cost to
cure" issue raised;
Continue research regarding motion in Ii mine; continue research regarding exhibits and depositions;
continue to revise and draft reply in support of motion in limine;
Review and edit draft reply to motions in Ii mine, meeting with MGGunn to discuss case law regarding
construction delay damages and arguments to respond to Grathol's arguments; review and edit reply
brief in support of motion in limine; conference with TSTollefson to discuss edits; draft section of
reply brief on construction delay damages and finalize section on gravel damages; research case law
regarding consequential damages in condemnation cases;
Research case law for reply brief in support of ITD's motion for summary judgment; work on reply
brief;
Prepare index to pleadings for hearing notebooks for next week's hearing; meet with project
assistant to go over printing of Mr. Jim Coleman's file materials; telephone call to Judge Hosack's
clerk regarding questions about court room technology for next week's hearing; organize two sets of
Jim Coleman's file materials for sending overnight to expert and SCBowman; telephone call with
client; prepare letter to expert; follow-up with KLGeorger regarding information as to exhibits and
status of writing her portion of brief, etc.; locate information for additional Power Point slide and
create another slide for Power Point presentation; review various case communications, both
internal and from Mr. Marfice; update expert files; proof read draftof reply brief in support of ITD's
Motion in Limine, and make minor changes related to grammar and punctuation, etc.; follow up on
additional items needed for briefing with TSTollefson and MVYork; do one additional review of reply
proof to confirm that all documents have been pulled/referenced;
Continue drafting insert distinguishing Grathol's case law and submit draft insert for insertion into
brief; review and edit summary judgment brief in anticipation of filing;
Edit and revise draft reply in support of motion in limine; research regarding exhibits and references
and correspondence regarding same; research citations and edits regarding construction delay
damages and correspondence regarding same;
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Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

01/27/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,185.00

9.8

01/27/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,546.00

7.6

Coordinate deposition schedules and correspond with Doug Marfice regarding same; work on
summary judgment brief and motion in Ii mine, draft arguments, review and edit and finalize
pleadings for filing;
Work on reply brief in support of ITD's motion for summary judgment, review and edit brief, and
prepare brief for filing;

01/27/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,040.00

6.5

Follow up with upcoming depositions, gathering additional items needed, including running
Real Legal search on Tom Vandervert; additional assistance with finalizing of reply briefs, including
additional proof-reading and checking of all references to affidavit exhibits and deposition pages,
etc.; various communications with MVYork, SCBowman, TSTollefson regarding case needs and
briefing status; send SCBowman items needed for his reply brief; forward materials to client
regarding re-zoning application of Hughes Investments; update electronic files; final proofing of
Motion in Li mine; start working on demonstrative exhibits for trial; telephone call from court clerk
regarding trial needs in court room; discuss additional case needs with MVYork;

01/29/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

64.00

0.4

Complete review of final reply brief in support of ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment;

01/30/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,820.00

.5.6

Work on prep for hearing on motion for summary judgment; telephone conference with client;

01/30/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

563.50

2.3

01/30/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

603.00

1.8

01/30/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,024.00

6.4

01/31/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,242.50

6.9

Continue to prepare for oral argument; research regarding exhibits in record for hearing; continue
research regarding potential trial exhibits;
Review materials for upcoming deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman; begin work on outline for deposition
of Mr. Coleman;
Work on pulling call key cases cited in both parties' briefing related to ITD's Motion for Summary
Judgment and save as pdf files; meet with project assistant to arrange for printing of all cases pulled;
organize all pulled cases alphabetically and prepare index of all cases and set up into binders;
telephone call to M&M Court Reports (Ms. Debby Roden) to discuss "LiveDeposition and to get
details regarding same; review e-mail from Ms. Roden with further details regarding the possibility of
using LiveDeposition for deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman and report information back to MVYork;
send response e-mail to Ms. Roden; pull together rezone application and County of Kootenai's
decision materials for MVYork meeting with Mr. Scott Clark; review various case communications;
update case status on case tracking chart; additional communications to/from Ms. Roden; update
Powerpoint slide; finalize hearing notebooks for MVYork and TSTollefson and attend to
miscellaneous assignments;
Work on prep for summary judgment hearing, drafting outline of argument, reviewing and analyzing
arguments and preparing response arguments; conference call with client; correspondence with
Doug Marfice;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

Hours

Narrative

Correspondence with client; continue research regarding motion in Ii mine and summary judgment
01/31/2012

1,568.00

6.4

hearing; continue to prepare for motion in limine and summary judgment hearing; research and
prepare draft exhibits for trial;
Review various e-mail communications regarding case assignments and needs; work on adding
additional power point slides for upcoming hearing; forward materials for demonstrative exhibits for
trial with commentary to TSTollefson for his review; arrange for thumb drive of case pleadings to be
made for MVYork for hearing, and compile additional items for trip; make additions and revisions to

01/31/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

944.00

5.9

existing slides for PowerPoint presentation, and locate better copies of several exhibits and re-build
PowerPoint slides; compile additional documents in preparation for deposition and forward copies
of the same, highlighting pertinent portions thereof; attendance at team meeting to discuss various
key issues; send ITD's recent reply briefs to experts; load expert disclosures to thumb drive for
MVYork and finalize materials to be taken to hearing; discuss demonstrative exhibits with
TSTollefson and format needed to be compiled for each comparable for use by Denver graphics
team; update experts folders with additional materials sent to each; follow-up with miscellaneous
assignments;

02/01/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,298.50

5.3

02/01/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,867.50

11.9

Research regarding hearing exhibits; continue to prepare for oral argument; legal research regarding
same;
Prepare for hearing on motion for summary judgment; travel to Coeur d'Alene, reviewing documents
and preparing for hearing en route; prepare for hearing on motion for summary judgment; meeting
with Mel Palmer from Kootenai County Community Planning Department and client;
Prepare two additional power point slides for hearing for MVYork; locate information requested by
TSTollefson needed for his oral argument; meet with project assistant to have summary judgement

02/01/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

864.00

5.4

binders and expert disclosures/report binders made; telephone calls (2) to Judge Hosack's clerk
regarding courtroom availability prior to hearing and communicate message to MVYork and
TSTollefson; work on compiling data sheets for each comparable sale by all four appraisers to be
used as demonstrative exhibits to send to Denver Graphics for trial purposes;

02/02/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,911.00

7.8

02/02/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,965.00

12.2

02/02/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

140.00

0.7

Continue to prepare for oral argument and outline regarding same; oral argument;
Prepare for hearing on summary judgment; oral argument on motion summary judgment and
motion in limine; meet with client; return travel to Boise;
Research Idaho case law on issue of cost-to-cure damages and recovery of severance damages in
partial takings case and submit research findings to MVYork for summary judgment arguments;
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Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

02/02/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

800.00

5.0

Prepare issue list for MVYork and TSTollefson related to trial exhibits for afternoon conference with
the Judge; proof information provided on each comparable sales sheet to be used for trial
demonstratives prior to sending to DCarter in Denverand make minor revisions; prepare detailed
memo/e-mail to DCarter with transmittal of materials for demonstrative exhibits and instructions
regarding the same; complete compiling materials for client; telephone call to client; review and
respond to various case e-mail communications; confer with KLGeorger on case issues; telephone
call from MVYork regarding hearing and follow-up on assignments;

02/03/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

318.50

1.3

Telephone conference with MVYork and SCBowman regarding oral argument and litigation; analyze
and review written ruling; correspondence regarding same;

4.2

Review notes from summary judgment hearing and from meeting with Kootenai County; identify
new issues and action items as a result from hearing, including identifying exhibits, additional
research, and potential motions; meeting with BKFeraci to discuss exhibits for trial; conference call
with SCBowman to discuss summary judgment hearing and court's rulings, effects of rulings on case,
and also discuss deposition of Jim Coleman; make assignments for research projects; work on prep
for Coleman deposition and correspondence with opposing counsel regarding same;

3.1

Telephone call to Kootenai County Courthouse to request a copy of the transcript from the motion
for summary and motion in Ii mine hearings; review Planning and Zoning materials received pursuant
to ITD's public record request and begin to pull potential exhibits for trial to be used with witness Ms.
Mel Palmer from Kootenai County Community Development Office; telephone call with Mr. Shane
Sawyer to discuss preparation of enlarged copy of Kootenai County Zoning District Map for use at
trial, and meet briefly with him to go over details regarding same; forward additional information to
DCarter in Denver for trial graphics; review Order from Court and follow up with team regarding
same; review and respond to various case communications; begin compiling materials for trial
notebook;
Review deposition transcripts and deposition exhibits; work on outline for deposition of Mr.
Coleman; prepare outline of demonstrative exhibits needed for trial showing Grathol property and
vicinity, and comparable sales used by all valuation witnesses; work on obtaining Mr. Coleman's
work files; review site plans faxed by Mr. Coleman and compare with site plans produced by Grathol
in discovery; review orders on summary judgment motion and motion in Ii mine; confer with team
about steps going forward based on new court orders;

02/03/2012

02/03/2012

York, Mary V.

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

$

1,365.00

496.00

02/03/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,445.50

7.3

02/06/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

637.00

2.6

Research regarding site plans and correspondence regarding same; research regarding appraisals and
basis for opposing party's claims;
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Date

02/06/2012

Name

York, Mary V.

Billed Amt

$

2,047.50

Hours

Narrative

6.3

Confirm and calendar new pretrial deadlines and outline action items for trial prep; review and
analysis of court order and outline discussion points; telephone conference with client; review site
plans used by Jim Coleman and compare to plans used by ITD's experts; work on prep for Jim
Coleman's deposition; conference with TSTollefson regarding research to respond to Grathol's
supplemental expert disclosures; review documents for fact witness depositions and prepare for
meeting; meeting with client;

02/06/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,424.00

8.9

Telephone call with DCarter regarding graphics; arrange for access rights for DCarter to case
documents on external drive; compile additional documents for MVYork for upcoming depositions
and print out new sets of documents for each deponent; telephone call to Ms. Debby Roden at M&M
Court Reporters to discuss using Realtime at deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman; review link forward by
Ms. Roden and test for connection; additional telephone calls with Ms. Roden to confirm changes
needed; compile additional information for Mr. Carter and forward the same to him; telephone call
to Mr. Jim Coleman to discuss need for obtaining his file on the HJ Grathol project; review and
respond to various case e-mails regarding various pre-trial assignments, etc.; additional telephone
call to Mr. Coleman's office regarding confirmation of overnight delivery for sending of Mr.
Coleman's file; add exhibits to potential trial exhibit electronic folder; send e-mails to experts with
copies of Court's Orders from recent hearing; attendance at meeting with MVYork and client; update
external folders; update folders of experts; various communications to/from SCBowman regarding
trial needs; return e-mail to expert; review additional e-mail from SCBowman to expert;

02/06/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,541.00

4.6

Research Idaho Code provisions regarding conflicts of interests by appointed public officials; prepare
for upcoming deposition of Mr. Coleman; telephone conference with Mr. Coleman to discuss
deposition;

02/07/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

546.00

2.8

Research relevant case law, statutes, and secondary sources regarding a recused board member's
ability to testify for a party in opposition to the board; draft research memorandum regarding same;

02/07/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

931.00

3.8

Telephone conference regarding trial exhibits; continue research regarding appraisal claims and
scope of summary judgment order; continue to prepare outline regarding same; continue to prepare
time line;

02/07/2012

York, Mary V.

$

422.50

1.3

Telephone conference with expert; analyze issues relating to fact witness depositions and work on
preparations for same; telephone conference with client; email correspondence with client;

02/07/2012

Carter, David E.

$

740.00

4.0

Work out programing directions, save out images and work out basic programing structure;
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Date

02/07/2012

Name

Feraci, Barbara K.

Billed Amt

$

1,072.00

Hours

Narrative

6.7

Telephone call from Ms. Debby Roden to discuss upcoming depositions in Northern Idaho and
RealTime Deposition needs for Mr. Jim Coleman's upcoming deposition; follow-up with IT
department regarding needs presented by Ms. Roden and respond further to Ms. Roden; telephone
call from Mr. Bryl Cinnamon, first court reporter who covered Motion for Summary Judgment
hearing, regarding estimate for preparing his portion of the transcript; telephone calls (2) with Ms.
JoAnn Schaller, second court reporter at hearing, regarding timing for turnaround for transcript, cost,
etc.; prepare memo to MVYork and trial team regarding conversations with both court reporters,
estimated fees, and estimated turn-around times, etc.; additional telephone calls with both
reporters; telephone call with DCarter in Denver regarding issues related to demonstratives for trial;
review documents received from Mr. Jim Coleman prior to his deposition, organize same, and meet
with project assistant to scan, number and print out copies; prepare e-mail to SCBowman regarding
status of Mr. Coleman's records; make revisions to demonstrative comparable sales sheets; forward
copies with memo to DCarter in Denver; review Bates-numbered set of documents for Ms. expert
and prepare transmittal letter to her with the same, with copy to SCBowman; pull additional
materials needed by SCBowman;

Prepare correspondence to experts regarding recent summary judgment filings and court orders on
summary judgment motion and motions in limine, and alert experts to be prepared to address new
valuations by Grathol's experts pursuant to the court's recent orders; assist with preparations for
upcoming depositions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert; work on addressing ongoing issue of
Defendant's refusal to identify experts and to continue to hide experts either as "fact" witnesses or
use of "actor-viewer" exception under federal rule; work on computer graphics to be used at trial;

02/07/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,407.00

4.2

02/08/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

292.50

1.5

02/08/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

196.00

0.8

02/08/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,332.50

4.1

Research relevant case law, statutes, and secondary sources regarding a recused board member's
ability to testify for a party in opposition to the board;
Correspondence and research regarding exhibits and comparable sales; correspondence and exhibits
regarding taking and project;
Confer with client; work on trial exhibits; outline issues for conference with Court; telephone
conference with law clerk for Judge Hosack; review and analysis of file documents from Jim Coleman;
work on outline of cross examination for Skip Sherwood;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Compile Mr. Coleman's file documents for Mr. Doug Marfice for upcoming deposition; update case
electronic folders; various e-mail communications with SCBowman regarding upcoming Jim Coleman
deposition and various related needs; reviewdraft demonstratives from DCarter in Denver office;
obtain oversized demonstrative exhibit showing Kootenai County Zoning Department Map; review
and respond to various case communications; follow up with SCBowman regarding his recent
telephone conversation with Mr. Jim Coleman, issues relating to same, and need to possibly vacate
deposition; attend to various other trial needs and re-organize materials in electronic files, etc.;

02/08/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

480.00

3.0

02/08/2012

Carter, David E.

$

1,110.00

6.0

02/08/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,876.00

5.6

02/09/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

245.00

1.0

Correspondence regarding exhibits and preparation for meeting regarding same; continue research
regarding damages and time line;

Review comp information, enter data of comp and construct buttons and navigation for interactive
exhibit;
Prepare for deposition of Mr. Coleman; review documents and compile exhibits to be used in
deposition of Mr. Coleman; confer with MVYork regarding approach to deposition of Mr. Coleman;
telephone conference with Mr. Coleman regarding his analyses of work done by experts retained by
ITD on case;

02/09/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,242.50

6.9

Review and analyze correspondence from SCBowman and follow up conference call with him; work
on issues relating to Jim Coleman's deposition; telephone conference with client; meeting with
MGGunn to discuss research findings on conflicts of interest; prepare for conference with Court,
reviewing and confirming details of Grathol's witness disclosures; review case law cited by Court at
summary judgment hearing; finalize correspondence to Mr. Marfice; work on trial exhibits;

02/09/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

136.50

0.7

Research relevant case law, statutes, and secondary sources regarding a recused board member's
ability to testify for a party in opposition to the board; draft research memorandum regarding same;

02/09/2012

Carter, David E.

$

222.00

1.2

Continue work on trial exhibits including adding info to comp and programing;
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Date

02/09/2012

02/09/2012

Name

Feraci, Barbara K.

Bowman, Steve C.

Billed Amt

$

$

1,136.00

1,407.00

Hours

Narrative

7.1

Follow up on status of Mr. Jim Coleman and anticipated deposition testimony, etc.; telephone call to
Ms. Debby Roden at M&M Court Reporting to cancel deposition; telephone call from Mr. Bryl
Cinnamon regarding completion of part one of hearing transcript; brief review of transcript
forwarded from Mr. Cinnamon, forward to litigation team and saved to electronic file; review and
respond to various case communications; prepare letter to Mr. Douglas Marfice with transmittalof
Mr. Coleman's work file; meet briefly with MVYork to discuss case status and recent issues; compile a
single pdf document from all of Grathol's Responses and Supplemental Responses to ITD's
Interrogatories #1 and #2 which seek the identity of all persons Grathol expects to call as a lay or
expert witness at trial and the subject matter upon which each expert witness is expected to testify,
etc. for SCBowman; review e-mail from client; begin compiling documents relating to HJ Grathol's
disclosure of Mr. Skip Sherwood's report and their expert disclosures for MYYork for upcoming court
hearing, compiling and highlighting HJ Grathol's original disclosures, our follow up deficiency letters,
their production of Mr. Sherwood's report, all follow up letters, etc. motion to compel/exclude
pleadings, stipulation, amended order; follow-up with other trial needs including various comm

4.2

Evaluate whether to depose Mr. Coleman; confer with MVYork regarding recommendation; confer
with client and MVYork; review expert report; confer with DEA personnel regarding trial testimony
in response to testimony from Mr. Coleman; review transcript of hearings on summary judgment
motion and motion in Ii mine; telephone conference with opposing counsel; work on letter to
opposing counsel regarding ongoing disputes over expert witnesses and discussion of fact witnesses
who should have been disclosed as experts;

02/10/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,837.50

7.5

02/10/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,112.50

6.5

Conference with litigation team regarding trial exhibits; continue research regarding exhibits;
continue research regarding damages; continue to prepare exhibits regarding appraisals and
remainder valuations; analyze and review supplemental expert disclosure; prepare draft outline
regarding same;
Prepare for and attend meeting to review trial exhibits and discuss trial prep; telephone conference
with client; research case law regarding issues addressed by Court at pretrial hearing; work on trial

02/10/2012

Carter, David E.

$

407.00

2.2

exhibits and trial prep;
Work on trial exhibits, inputting info for comps and programming;
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Date

02/10/2012

Name

Feraci, Barbara K.

Billed Amt

$

1,248.00

Hours

Narrative

7.8

Telephone call with DCarter to briefly review demonstratives created thus far; attendance at team
meeting to go over trial graphics and other trial issues; lengthy conference call with DCarter to relay
changes to demonstratives requested by SCBowman and MVYork; work on completing project for
MVYork regarding compiling of materials related to HJ Grathol's disclosure of Mr. Skip Sherwood's
report and disclosures, compile same into notebook, and prepare table of contents to documents
compiled; additional telephone call from DCarter; review letter from MVYork to Mr. Doug Marfice
relating to Mr. Winger and Mr. Coleman and print for trial notebook; work on preparing various
demonstrative charts comparing comparable sales of appraiser; confer with MVYork on charts and
other case assignments; review and respond to e-mail requests from SCBowman; prepare list of
questions for MVYork for upcoming hearing based on e-mails with questions raised by team
members; send additional corrections to be made by DCarter to him; additional telephone call with
DCarter; save pleadings and deposition transcripts to thumb drive for MVYork for upcoming hearing;
telephone call with client; attend to other miscellaneous assignments, including setting up Excel
format for preparing draft exhibit list;

02/10/2012
02/10/2012
02/11/2012

Carter, David E.
Bowman, Steve C.
Carter, David E.

$
$
$

980.50
402.00
407.00

5.3
1.2
2.2

Work on trial exhibits and incorporate edits from SCBowman;
Meeting to review preliminary demonstrative exhibits for use at trial;
Made changes to code and document for trial exhibits;

02/12/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

367.50

1.5

Continue to research and analyze supplemental expert disclosure; prepare email memorandum
regarding same; research and correspondence regarding exhibits and charts;

02/12/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,567.50

7.9

Review and analysis of supplemental expert disclosures from Grathol; travel to Coeur d'Alene,
reviewing case documents and preparing for hearing en route; continue prep for hearing upon arrival
in Coeur d'Alene, comparing prior expert disclosures and outlining arguments for hearing;
Complete preparation of comparison charts of comparable sales using numbers of Mr. Stan Moe, Mr.
Skip Sherwood, Mr. Alan Johnson, and Mr. Larry Pynes; prepare sales information sheet for subject
HJ Grathol property, and pull various photographs for possible usage for trial overlays; various

02/12/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

944.00

5.9

communications to/from team members; review all of Kootenai County Planning and Zoning
documents and mark potential documents for exhibits, compiling various pdf documents for
potential trial exhibits; e-mail to MVYork regarding need to review planning and zoning documents
for using as potential exhibits with Ms. Mel Palmer at trial; work on drafting initial trial exhibit list
and pulling additional potential documents for exhibits;
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Date

02/13/2012

Name

Tollefson, Ted S.

Billed Amt

$

906.50

Hours

Narrative

3.7

02/13/2012

York, Mary V.

$

4,030.00

12.4

02/13/2012

Carter, David E.

$

592.00

3.2

Research regarding supplemental damages claim; prepare draft response to supplemental disclosure
and correspondence and edits regarding same; prepare email memorandums regarding
supplemental disclosures; correspondence regarding supplemental filings and deposition; edit draft
public records request letter and correspondence regarding same; continue to prepare exhibits for
trial;
Review and analysis of Grathol's supplemental expert disclosures and prior disclosures and prepare
for hearing; conference calls and email correspondence with experts; deposition of Tom Vandevert;
hearing on Grathol's supplemental expert disclosures; conference with client; resume deposition of
Mr. Vandevert; work on cross examination for Alan Johnson; work on prep for deposition of Brett
Terrell and confer with client;
Make changes to project and coding for trial exhibits;
Continue with trial preparation and needs, including forwarding information requested by MVYork
for upcoming hearing; telephone calls with expert; review communications from Mr. Douglas Marfice

02/13/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

912.00

5.7

02/13/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,144.00

6.4

02/14/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

269.50

1.1

regarding Grathol's attorney's fees and provide findings to MVYork; review public records requests
previously prepared by KLGeorger and check on status of production; prepare additional public
records request to DEQ regarding updating their search of records, and in particular, requesting any
letters of approval issued to HJ Grathol by DEQ related to their wastewater sewer system, and pulling
form request form off their websiteto include with written letter; review/respond to team e-mail
communications; go through discovery responses for SCBowman and highlight all references to Mr.
Geoff Reeslund; compile exhibits from Mr. Reeslund's deposition and have notebook compiled for
SCBowman with exhibits, deposition transcript, and discovery documents compiled; prepare memo
to SCBowman regarding the same; meet briefly with TSTollefson to discuss case issues and public
records request; continue pulling potential deposition exhibits; review additional status update
communication from MVYork and respond to same;
Compile and review materials on witnesses expected to testify at trial; work on exhibits to be used
with each witness; work on outlines of direct and cross examinations;
Continue to research appraisals and damages calculations; continue to prepare draft chart regarding
same;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

02/14/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,088.00

6.8

Convert draft ptx. copies [2] of draft deposition transcript of Mr. Tom Vandervert into pdf format and
send copies, with e-mail message, to experts; telephone call to court reporter in Coeur d'Alene to
order copy of transcript from hearing of 1/13/2012 before Judge Hosack; confer with KLGeorger
regarding earlier public records request to Panhandle District Health, etc.; telephone call with
DCarter in Denver to go over revisions to demonstratives; various additional communications with
experts; review all new demonstratives prepared by DCarter, and make list of punctuation, spelling
and factual information that needs correcting and send list to DCarter; meet with TSTollefson to
discuss trial witness order, testimony and exhibits; additional communications with DCarter; locate
additional aerial photographs for possible usage and forward to TSTollefson with comments and
questions; update experts files; finalize additional potential demonstratives for sending to DCarter;
draft witness list by responsible attorney; work on compiling additional trial exhibits; additional call
to court regarding request for transcript; have project assist print out potential exhibits to be used
with Ms. Mel Palmer and arrange in file for MVYork's review;

02/14/2012

Carter, David E.

$

536.50

2.9

Make changes to comps and programing for trial exhibits;

02/14/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,990.00

9.2

Review and analysis of deposition transcript of Tom Vandervert; deposition of Brett Terrell; meeting
with client; return travel to Boise, reviewing case files and documents en route;

6.6

Review notes from hearing with Court and identify next steps for case; conference with SCBowman,
TSTollefson, BKFeraci to discuss hearing and next steps for case; work on preparations for trial,
including working on exhibits, coordinating pretrial details, and identifying trial issues requiring
pocket briefs; telephone conferences with client; analyze issues relating to Sylvan Road and east
Frontage Road;

02/15/2012

02/15/2012

York, Mary V.

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

$

2,145.00

640.00

4.0

Follow up on miscellaneous trial assignments; convert draft deposition transcript of Mr. Brett Terrell
to pdf document and forward copy of draft deposition transcript; review revisions to demonstrative
exhibits made by DCarter in Denver and print out for TSTollefson and forward to SCBowman; forward
SCBowman additional documents for his review; confer with DCarter on demonstratives and set up
meeting with him and SCBowman; review additional charts created by TSTollefson with fair market
values used by all appraisers, etc. and for possible usage at trial;

02/15/2012

Carter, David E.

$

666.00

3.6

02/15/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

931.00

3.8

02/15/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$ 1,172.50

3.5

Continue adding info to comps for trial exhibits and work on programming; make corrections to
information on trial exhibits; same;
Continue research regarding exhibits and trail; continue to prepare chart regarding appraisers and
compensation; correspondence and edits regarding exhibits and charts;
Work on creating demonstrative exhibits for trial; work on trial brief and exhibit list;
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Date

02/16/2012

02/16/2012

Name

Tollefson, Ted S.

Feraci, Barbara K.

Billed Amt

$

$

1,494.S0

1,024.00

Hours

Narrative

6.1

6.4

Research and edits regarding comparable sales and demonstrative exhibits; research and edits
regarding comparable sale locations and exhibits; correspondence regarding overlays and maps;
analyze and review court order regarding severance damages; research and correspondence
regarding severance damages claimed;
Review/respond to various case e-mail communications; locate additional graphic needed by
TSTollefson; telephonic conference call with DCarter and SCBowman regarding case graphics; follow
up with status of transcript from 2/13/2012 hearing, sending e-mails to Ms. Jamie Johnson, Assistant
to Trial Court Administrator, and court reporter, Ms. Anne MacManus; meet with TSTollefson to
discuss comparable sales demonstratives, and prepare additional detailed e-mail to DCarter; update
witness list for trial based on discussions at 2/15/2012 team meeting; additional telephone call from
DCarter with questions on changes to be made; prepare chart of all comparable sales used by all
appraisers; confer further with TSTollefson regarding placement of locations of comparable sales,
and follow up further with DCarter; work on gathering additional documents for potential exhibits;
confer with MVYork regarding exchange of trial exhibits, witness preparation meetings, and other
potential trial exhibits; review demonstratives made by DCarter and additional telephone call with
him; follow-up in responding to e-mails from client, expert and court reporter;

02/16/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

469.00

l.4

Work on computer graphics for trial;
Review and analysis of correspondence from Doug Marfice; analyze public records request from Alan
Johnson and correspondence with client; conference with SCBowman regarding recent information
from Doug Marfice and strategize next steps for case; research prior offers from Grathol and analyze
same in light of recent discussions with Mr. Marfice; telephone conference with client; review and
edit direct examination outline for Jason Minzghor; telephone conference with Doug Marfice; draft
memo to client; review and analyze Court order on severance damages; identify issues for trial brief
and for trial and draft outline of same; coordinate prep session for Jason Minzghor and prepare for
same; telephone conference with expert;

02/16/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,535.00

7.8

02/16/2012

Carter, David E.

$

425.50

2.3

02/17/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

272.00

1.7

Work on images for HJGrathol comp on trial exhibits and work on programing for same;
Update trial file folders; confer with MVYork re: status update and print out various materials for
upcoming meeting with ITD; review additions/revisions made by DCarter to further demonstratives
for trial; telephone call with DCarter regarding demonstratives; provide MVYork with potential
exhibits for trial witness Ms. Mel Palmer and get update on trial status; begin to compile key
documents for trial notebook;
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Date

02/17/2012

Name

York, Mary V.

Billed Amt

$

2,177.50

Hours

Narrative

6.7

Review and analysis of correspondence from Doug Marfice and follow up correspondence with
client; telephone conferences with client; work on prep for trial, including coordinating logistics for
trial and working on trial exhibits; analyze issues relating to Sylvan Road and prepare for meeting
with client; attend meeting at ITD; draft email correspondence to Mr. Marfice;

02/17/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

770.50

2.3

02/18/2012

York, Mary V.

$

195.00

0.6

02/19/2012

York, Mary V.

$

812.50

2.5

Work with experts to prepare for testimony at trial;
Correspondence with client; telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss recent developments
in case and analysis strategies for case;
Review and analyze certificate of changes for Alan Johnson's deposition; research and obtain
information requested by expert; work on exhibits for trial and work on direct examination of Jason
Minzghor;
Correspondence with court reporter regarding transcript from hearing of 2/13/2011, and respond to
same; confer with MVYork regarding trial exhibits; telephone call to DCarter with additional changes
to be made to interactive map, etc.; confer with MVYork regarding various trial needs and issues;
telephone calls to AmeriTel regarding changes in arrival times and rooms, etc.; follow up with

02/20/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

480.00

3.0

02/20/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

938.00

2.8

02/20/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,827.50

8.7

MVYork and SCBowman on changes in rooms; work on compiling additional materials for trial
notebook; review changes made by DCarter to interactive map; additional communications with
DCarter regarding the same; review files of Mr. George Hedley for information requested by
SCBowman and forward information to him; review additional exhibits forwarded by MVYork for use
with Mr. Stan Moe;
Work on outline for trial brief; work on exhibit list; review and comment on computer graphics for
trial;
Work on outline for direct and rebuttal testimony and on trial exhibits for Stan Moe; several
extended telephone conferences with client; draft correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding
settlement discussions; telephone conference with Stan Moe; email exchanges and conferences with
SCBowman regarding trial preparations, exhibits, and witnesses; email correspondence with client;
review and analyze supplemental discovery responses from Grathol and determine response to
same; meet with MGGunn and assign motion and brief to exclude witnesses; work on direct
examination outline for Jason Minzghor;

02/20/2012

Carter, David E.

$

222.00

1.2

Make revisions to HJGrathol comp on trial exhibits, work on programming;
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Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Review additional work of DCarter and make minor changes/additions thereto; meet with MVYork

02/21/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,136.00

7.1

02/21/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

1,306.50

6.7

02/21/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,474.00

4.4

02/21/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,892.50

8.9

02/21/2012

Carter, David E.

$

55.50

0.3

02/22/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,168.00

7.3

02/22/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

526,50

2.7

02/22/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,541.00

4.6

regarding trial exhibits to be used with Mr. Jason Minzghor; print out additional key materials for
trial notebook; upload transcript from 2/13/2012 hearing and circulate to team; various
communications to/from M&M Court Reporting regarding exhibits to depositions of Mr. Vanderwert
and Mr. Terrell and upload transcripts received; work on drafting Plaintiff's Exhibit List, locating
information needed on various witnesses, and sending out draft to team to review; work on entering
exhibits to exhibit list on Excel spreadsheet and pulling potential documents needed at trial;
Research relevant case law and pleadings regarding exclusion of untimely disclosed expert witnesses;
draft motion to exclude expert testimony; draft affidavit in support of motion to exclude expert
testimony; draft brief in support of motion to exclude expert testimony;
Review transcript from 2/13/12 hearing; work with experts to prepare for trial;
Work on trial exhibits for Jason Minzghor and work on direct testimony for Mr. Minzghor; telephone
conference with client; work on trial exhibits for Larry Pynes and correspondence with expert; draft
outline for direct examination for Stan Moe and work on trial exhibits for Mr. Moe; telephone
conference with expert; correspondence with client; correspondence and telephone conference with
expert;
Revise trial exhibits per BFeraci;
Forward finalized deposition transcripts of Mr. Tom Vandervert and Mr. Brett Terrell to experts;
meet with MVYork to discuss changes to exhibits; forward photos of Grathol property to DCarter in
Denver for making property boundary lines thicker; run search of all hearing transcripts for
references to witnesses for MGGunn; create key contact list of experts, court personnel, and other
key names and numbers for trial notebooks for team members; update experts' electronic files; email to SCBowman with trial information; follow up on various miscellaneous assignments; work on
pulling exhibits identified by attorneys and adding them to Excel Exhibit list; telephone call to expert
regarding appraisal questions; confer with MVYork regarding call to Mr. Marfice regarding exhibit
exchange and other trial issues; update external folder; work with MVYork in identifying and locating
additional documents for exhibits and start adding exhibits to be used by Tim Thomas to electronic
folders;
Revise brief in support of motion to exclude expert testimony;
Review transcripts of depositions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert; work on trial brief; review
documents and identify trial exhibits;
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Date

02/22/2012

Name

York, Mary V.

Billed Amt

$

Hours

Narrative

2,892.50

8.9

Work on expert's direct examination and preparation of exhibits; review and edit revised trial
exhibits from graphics department; review information for public records request and conference
with client; draft statement regarding Grathol case; work on outline for direct examination; work on
trial exhibits;
E-mail communication regarding need for better copy of potential trial exhibit; prepare e-mail
transmittals to all experts to obtain personal cell phone numbers for contact information for trial
team while in trial, etc.; continue working on pulling trial exhibits and preparing draft trial exhibit list;
additional communications with Mr. Dennis Reinstein; telephone call from expert; review exhibit;
review box of documents sent from Mr. Doug Marfice regarding documents produced pursuant to
deposition duces tecum for Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom Vandervert; review documents produced
pursuant to public records request from DEQ and discuss the same with MVYork and SCBowman and
distribute to team;

02/23/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,264.00

7.9

02/23/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,827.50

8.7

02/23/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,876.00

5.6

02/24/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,990.00

9.2

Work on trial exhibits for cross examination of Alan Johnson, trial logistics, and general trial prep;

02/24/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,574.50

4.7

Complete work on identifying exhibits and pairing with witnessed to be called at trial; work on trial
brief;

02/24/2012

Omsberg, Stephanie M.

$

1,008.00

6.3

Detailed edits to plaintiff's trial exhibit list in Excel; rename and hyperlink exhibits into spreadsheet;

Work on trial exhibits for witnesses and cross examinations for Skip Sherwood and Alan Johnson;
telephone conference with client; telephone conference with expert;
Review documents and work on narrowing list of trial exhibits; prepare list of exhibits tied to each
witness; work on trial brief;

02/24/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,296.00

8.1

Meeting with MVYork to discuss trial logistics and assignments; meet briefly with CRMontgomery
and SOmsberg to discuss additional help with exhibits; telephone call to AmeriTel regarding changes
in hotel accommodations; work on pulling rest of SCBowman's trial exhibits; confer with TKillian
regarding technology in court room; work on finalizing balance of exhibits to be pulled and adding to
external folder; work with SOmsberg to transfer groupings of exhibits to Excel spreadsheet; arrange
for linking of exhibits by SOmsberg; arrange for project assistant to upload additional deposition
exhibits to folder on external network; telephone call to arrange for two additional exhibits to be
enlarged for trial; telephone calls with DCarter in Denver to discuss demonstratives; locate and
forward documents needed by SCBowman; update key trial contact information sheet; follow-up
with MVYork on various trial issues; begin work on cleaning up descriptions to exhibits in Excel;

02/25/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,077.00

6.2

Work on trial brief; prepare for direct and cross examinations;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

02/25/2012

York, Mary V.

$

2,470.00

7.6

02/26/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,876.00

5.6

Review exhibit list and confirm all exhibits for witnesses are included in exhibit list; work on cross
examination; draft portion of trial brief relating to deficiencies in Grathol's valuation opinions;
research and obtain information for trial brief; research case law and draft section of brief relating to
insufficient and untimely expert disclosures;
Work on trial brief and exhibit list;

02/26/2012

Omsberg, Stephanie M.

$

64.00

0.4

Assist with additional edits to trial exhibit list;

02/26/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,456.00

9.1

02/27/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

175.50

0.9

Pull exhibits needed by SCBowman for trial brief and send to him; work on finalizing exhibits and
exhibit list; additional communications to/from SCBowman regarding trial brief exhibits and changes
to demonstratives of DCarter;
Research relevant case law regarding use of deposition testimony when witness is unavailable to
testify due to work-related hardship;

02/27/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,217.50

9.9

Review status of exhibits and exhibit list; work on cross examination; create trial exhibits for
valuations of Johnson and Sherwood; telephone conference with client; several exchanges of email
correspondence with client; review and edit trial brief, exhibit list and witness list; telephone
conference with client; conduct initial review of pretrial filings from Grathol;

02/27/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,445.50

7.3

Work on trial brief, witness list, and exhibit list for filing today;
Continue with trial preparation: telephone conference call regarding equipment needs; various
communications to/from DCarter with additions and revisions to interactive map slides; make
revisions to ITD's witness list; complete pulling and finalizing photos of subject property to be used
as exhibits to trial brief; add further exhibits to exhibit list, make changes to various descriptions of
exhibits, pull up various excerpts from expert reports and convert to pdf documents for adding as
exhibits, and update draft list various times with changes and additions; arrange for additional
exhibits to be enlarged and various communications to/from Mr. ShaneSawyer regarding the same;
prepare pleading for exhibit list and arrange for finalized version of exhibit list to be incorporated
into list; various discussions with MVYork regarding minor changes to both witness and exhibit lists;
telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss pleadings filed and witness preparation; update
trial notebook materials; review fillings of Defendants;

02/27/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,280.00

8.0

02/27/2012

Carter, David E.

$

111.00

0.6

$

1,053.00

5.4

02/28/20121 Gunn, Matthew G

Make changes to trial exhibits including changes to comps, changes to comp title name, exported
and make screen grabs of camps and make PDF of comps;
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding admissibility of affidavits of unavailable
witnesses at trial; draft research memorandum regarding same;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

02/28/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,120.00

9.6

Review and analyze Grathol's trial brief and analyze strategies for case; correspondence with Judge
Hosack's clerk; correspondence and telephone conference with expert; various correspondence with
client and trial team; review and edit direct examination outline; review and edit affidavit; edit and
update cross examination outline in light of Grathol's pretrial filings; work on rebuttal examination
outline; review and analyze information provided expert; work on fact section for motion to exclude;
telephone conference with Doug Marfice; review research memo regarding admissibility of affidavit
from unavailable witness and conference with MGGunn regarding same;

02/28/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,110.50

6.3

Work on motion and brief to exclude untimely experts disclosed by Grathol; work on direct and cross
examinations for trial;

02/28/2012

Omsberg, Stephanie M.

$

1,104.00

6.9

Load trial exhibits into Trial Director and begin marking exhibits;

02/28/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,472.00

9.2

Meet briefly with MVYork to discuss status of various assignments; meet with project assistant to
discuss printing out of exhibits and setting up trial notebooks; locate document needed by MVYork;
send trial brief, exhibit list and witness list to all our experts, along with trial pleadings filed by
opposing counsel; meet with SOmsberg to discuss making of exhibit stickers on Trial Director;
telephone call with DCarter regarding interactive map and sending of lap top to Boise; work on
arranging to get equipment needed for trial; convert deposition transcripts into full pdf files to use
with Trial Director; telephone call to Mr. Shane Sawyer regarding enlarged trial exhibits; review
enlarged trial exhibits with MVYork; telephone call to court clerk in Coeur d'Alene regarding trial
notebooks, internet access, etc; telephone call to bailiff regarding getting early access to courtroom;
telephone call with jury commissioner regarding courtroom for trial and other arrangements, etc.;
additional telephone calls with DCarter for additional trial needs; follow up with status of exhibit
stickers with SOmsberg; contact experts with trial information and hotel arrangements, etc.; pdate
various trial materials and continue with additional trial preparation tasks;

02/28/2012

Carter, David E.

$

259.00

1.4

02/29/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,625.00

5.0

02/29/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,273.00

3.8

02/29/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

897.00

4.6

Modified comps after talking to BKFeraci and work with SOmsberg to solve exhibit problems for trial
director;
Review correspondence from Judge Hosack's clerk and follow up on issues raised; meeting with
BFeraci regarding trial logistics and exhibits; review and edit revised versions of exhibits; work on
general trial prep, including cross examination outlines, direct examination outlines, motion to
exclude, and preparing experts for trial;
Work on motion and brief to exclude expert witnesses not timely disclosed;
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding admissibility of affidavits of unavailable
witnesses at trial; revise research memorandum regarding same;
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Name

Billed Amt

02/29/2012

Omsberg, Stephanie M.

$

1,744.00

10.9

02/29/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

720.00

3.6

02/29/2012
02/29/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.
Carter, David E.

$
$

1,792.00
148.00

11.2
0.8

03/01/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,412.50

10.5

03/01/2012

Omsberg, Stephanie M.

$

775.50

4.7

03/01/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

1,320.00

6.6

03/01/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

1,696.00

10.6

03/02/2012

York, Mary V.

$

4,875.00

15.0

03/02/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

780.00

3.9

03/02/2012

Carter, David E.

$

37.00

0.2

03/02/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,747.00

8.2

03/03/2012

York, Mary V.

$

3,672.50

11.3

03/03/2012

Bouck, Nick A.

$

1,856.00

12.8

03/03/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

Hours

Narrative

704.00

4.4

Finalize electronic marked trial exhibits; download relevant N drive folder to external drive;
Trial Director training with BFeraci;
Research case law pertaining to "developer's approach" in anticipation of drafting pocket brief
regarding inadmissibility of land owner's appraisal valuation;
Trial preparation and intensive work on exhibits for submittal to court;
Make corrections to trial exhibits;
Coordinate and assemble materials, exhibits, and supplies for trial; travel to Coeur d'Alene,
discussing trial strategies and depositions of Grathol's witnesses en route;
Final trial exhibit prep; draft letter to Mr. Gabbert enclosing CD of marked trial exhibits;
Research evidentiary issues related to public records requests and curing foundational and hearsay
issues; research issues pertaining to developer's approach of valuing property and commence
drafting pocket brief of the same;
Complete packing up for trial, meet with TKillian to get computer items, projector, printer, etc. and
travel with MVYork to Couer d'Alene for trial;
Work on outlines for direct and cross examinations; witness prep session with client; visit court room
for trial; witness prep session with expert; work on cross examination and rebuttal outlines;
Revise memorandum on developer's approach to valuation and submit to MVYork for review;
research evidentiary issues pertaining to self authentication and exceptions to hearsay and draft
research findings into electronic memorandum to MVYork for comment and review;
Review and revise interactive map with NBouck;
Meetings with experts to go over anticipated testimony and exhibits to be used with their testimony;
work on outlines for direct and cross examinations;
Revise direct examination outline; trial prep with expert; meet with client; work with BFeraci and
tech support on exhibits; work on cross examination for Skip Sherwood, reviewing deposition and
outlining examination;
Travel to Coeur d'Alene for trial and trial support;
Compile materials for continued meeting with expert; telephone call to TKillian regarding assistance
on various items; meet with NBouck to go over issues with Trial Director; update all sets of trial
exhibit notebooks with replacement exhibits for various exhibits along with addition of new exhibit;
review all Trial Director exhibits; update ITD's trial exhibit list with new exhibit and documents
stipulated by opposing counsel; assist with miscellaneous needs of trial team;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

03/03/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,613.00

7.8

Meeting with expert regarding trial; review expert disclosures, discovery responses, and deposition
transcripts in preparation for cross examinations; work on outlines for direct and cross examinations;

03/04/2012

York, Mary V.

$

4,550.00

14.0

Work on revisions to Stan Moe direct; work on cross examination outline for Skip Sherwood; pre-trial
strategy meeting with trial team; draft outline for opening statement and prepare for presentation;

03/04/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

420.00

2.1

03/04/2012

Bouck, Nick A.

$

1,450.00

10.0

03/04/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

1,008.00

6.3

Meet with NBouck to add new exhibits to Trial Director and to go over Trial Director operation, etc.;
set up file of new exhibits and amended trial exhibit list for giving to Mr. Douglas Marfice; organize
case materials and pack up supplies and materials for court room for first day of trial;

03/04/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,479.00

7.4

Work with tech support to prepare exhibits for demonstration at trial; strategy meeting with trial
team; work on preparations for direct and cross examinations;

03/05/2012

York, Mary V.

$

4,387.50

13.5

Prepare for opening statement and argument for motions in Ii mine; first day of trial, including pre
trial meeting; meeting with litigation team, expert and client; meeting with expert;

Hours

Narrative

Draft motion and supporting memorandum to strike expert witness testimony of Grathol's vice
president; submit draft of motion and supporting memorandum for review and comment;
Work on trial preparation and provide ITD Trial Support;

03/05/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

500.00

2.5

Contact DEQ officials in Coeur d'Alene to discuss acquisition of certification for public records
request; contact DEQ officials in Boise to discuss the same; draft up proposed certification to include
all applicable information; contact DEQ officials in Coeur d'Alene and transmit proposed certification
and discuss finalization of certification;

03/05/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

944.00

5.9

Arrive at courthouse early to assist with setting up for 8-day trial; de-briefing meeting following trial
day; locate additional documents needed by MVYork and SCBowman, mark additional exhibits;
update exhibit list, review and respond to various case email, and organize materials for next day;

03/05/2012
03/05/2012

Bouck, Nick A.
Carter, David E.

1,450.00
37.00

10.0
0.2

Trial support in Coeur d'Alene;
Gather equipment to ship to NBouck and ship equipment;

03/05/2012
03/06/2012

Bowman, Steve C.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$
$
$

3,718.50
73.50

11.1
0.3

03/06/2012

York, Mary V.

$

4,550.00

14.0

03/06/2012

Georger, Katherine L.

$

140.00

0.7

Prepare for and attend first day of trial; prepare for second day of trial;
Research and correspondence regarding zones of value;
Prepare for final direct examination and re-direct of expert and cross examination of Skip Sherwood;
second day of trial, including pre-trial meetings; work with expert on Direct examination;
continuework on prep for cross examinations;
Teleconference with DEQ representative regarding public records request certification; review and

03/06/2012

Bouck, Nick A.

$

1,261.50

8.7

revise email on business damages;
Trial support Coeur d'Alene;
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Name

Billed Amt

03/06/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

432.00

2.7

03/06/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$ 4,154.00

12.4

03/07/2012

York, Mary V.

$ 4,712.50

14.5

03/07/2012

Bouck, Nick A.

$

12.0

1,740.00

Hours

Narrative

Early morning trial preparation, including printing out of attorney outlines, etc. and set up at court;
various e-mail communications to/from MVYork and SCBowman regarding other trial needs; provide
SCBowman with information needed for outline for Mr. Reeslund;
Prepare for and attend second day of trial; prepare for third day of trial;
Prepare for cross examination; third day of trial, including pretrial meetings; revise and update cross
examination; work with expert;
Trial support Coeur d'Alene;
Pre-trial day preparation, including printing out of attorney outlines, organizing new exhibits and

03/07/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

928.00

5.8

materials for court day, and setting up at court; work on compiling additional exhibits needed for
next day, updating exhibit list, and printing out new documents at Staples; review and follow up with
various case related e-mail communications;

03/07/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$ 4,422.00

13.2

Prepare for and attend third day of trial; prepare for next day of trial;

03/08/2012

York, Mary V.

$ 4,875.00

15.0

Prepare for cross examination of Alan Johnson; fourth day of trial, including pretrial meetings;
meeting with Larry Pynes and work on direct examination of Mr. Pynes;

03/08/2012
03/08/2012
03/08/2012

Bouck, Nick A.
Feraci, Barbara K.
Bowman, Steve C.

$ 2,059.00
352.00
$
$ 4,623.00

14.2
2.2
13.8

03/09/2012

York, Mary V.

$ 3,087.50

9.5

03/09/2012
03/09/2012
03/09/2012
03/10/2012
03/10/2012
03/10/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.
Bouck, Nick A.
Bowman, Steve C.
York, Mary V.
Bouck, Nick A.
Feraci, Barbara K.

$
$
$
$
$
$

288.00
1,377.50
3,182.50
2,437.50
1,377.50
1,280.00

1.8
9.5
9.5
7.5
9.5
8.0

03/12/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

368.00

2.3

03/13/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

441.00

1.8

03/13/2012

York, Mary V.

$

487.50

1.5

Trial support Coeur d'Alene;
Pre-trial day preparation;
Prepare for and attend fourth day of trial, and prepare for fifth day of trial;
Prepare for direct examination; fifth day of trial, including pretrial meetings; post trial meeting and
de-briefing with client and experts and trial team;
Pre-trial preparation and set-up for the day;
Trial support Coeur d'Alene (pack and ship equipment, book return travel);
Prepare for and attend fifth day of trial;
Return trip to Boise from CDA trial;
Trial support in Coeur d'Alene and return travel;
Return trip from Couer d'Alene to Boise;
Unpack various trial materials; prepare final exhibit list based on conference with Court clerk and Mr.
Chris Gabbert to go over all documents admitted; arrange for documents to be picked up from ITD;
follow-up on miscellaneous matters;
Research regarding construction damages testimony and reports; research regarding post trial
briefing issues; outline regarding same;
Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss post-trial brief
and research needing to be done; make research assignments and begin work on outline for
severance damage issues for post-trial brief;
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Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Unpack other trial materials and re-organize case materials; e-mail and telephone call to court
reporter at M&M who covered trial to discuss getting post trial discussion with Judge Hosack, etc.;
follow up on several matters for MVYork;
Continue legal research regarding changes in valuation testimony and theories; continue to prepare
outline regarding same; continue research regarding appraisal issues;
Telephone conference with client;

03/13/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

256.00

1.6

03/14/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

955.50

3.9

03/14/2012

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

03/14/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

128.00

0.8

Follow up on miscellaneous post trial assignments, including arranging to download complete copy
of IDJl2d jury instructions to a CD for SCBowman;

03/15/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

144.00

0.9

Prepare transmittal memo to SCBowman with CD of Idaho Jury Instructions; review draft transcript
received from court reporter of concluding remarks of Judge Hosack; convert transcript to pdf
document and circulate to team; forward copy of Defendant's Just Compensation exhibit to Mr. Stan
Moe;

03/15/2012

York, Mary V.

$

422.50

1.3

Telephone conference with expert regarding information needed for post-trial briefing; work on
severance damage issue on post trial brief and review expert information;

03/15/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,764.00

7.2

Continue legal research regarding post trial briefing; continue research regarding expert disclosures
and facts; continue to prepare draft factual and expert background brief;

03/15/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,144.00

6.4

03/16/2012

York, Mary V.

$

357.50

1.1

03/16/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,249.50

5.1

03/19/2012

York, Mary V.

$

357.50

1.1

03/19/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

759.50

3.1

03/20/2012

York, Mary V.

$

942.50

2.9

03/20/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

833.00

3.4

03/20/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,909.50

5.7

Review transcript regarding post trial briefing; research case law for post trial brief; work on outline
for post trial brief; work on post trial brief;
Review and analysis of Court's closing instructions; work on chart to support post trial argument on
severance damages;
Continue post trial briefing research; continue to draft and revise draft expert and valuation section;
correspondence regarding same;
Work on severance damage piece of post trial brief, including review and analysis of information
provided by expert; review and edit draft fact section for construction delay section of post trial
brief;
Continue legal research regarding post trial issues; edit and revise draft factual section regarding
construction delays
Review and analysis of settlement offer from Grathol; correspondence with client; conferences with
client; work on severance damage portion of post-trial brief, including correspondence with experts
regarding arguments to be made by Grathol;
Continue research regarding expert opinions; continue to draft valuation section and expert analysis;
correspondence regarding post trial brief and changes;
Review research and case analyses from TSTollefson; review trial exhibits to be referred to in post
trial brief and pull excerpts for brief; work on post trial brief;
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03/21/2012

York, Mary V.

$ 1,722.50

5.3

Edit and revise demonstratives for severance damage portion of post-trial brief; telephone
conferences and email correspondence with client; correspondence with opposing counsel regarding
settlement offer; correspondence with expert regarding post-trial brief; telephone conference with
client; research information and review appraisal report used as impeachment during trial; draft
analysis regarding construction delay damages;

03/21/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$ 1,053.50

4.3

Continue research regarding larger parcel issue and opposing expert reports and testimony; continue
legal research regarding divisible property for valuation; correspondence regarding research;

03/21/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$ 1,742.00

5.2

Research case law and work on post trial brief;

03/21/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

144.00

0.9

Telephone phone call to court reporter in Couer d'Alene to check on status of transcripts from trial;
pull various items and information needed by SCBowman for post trial brief;

03/22/2012

Gunn, Matthew G

$

234.00

1.2

Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding the termination of the litigation
exception to public records request; draft research email regarding same;

03/22/2012

York, Mary V.

$

1,755.00

5.4

Correspondence with client; draft portions of post-trial brief regarding severance damages; research
case law regarding interpretation of public records laws;

03/22/2012
03/22/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.
Bowman, Steve C.

$
$

318.50
2,077.00

1.3
6.2

Continue research regarding post trial brief;
Research case law for post-trial brief; work on post trial brief;

$

3,055.00

9.4

Research case law regarding use of developed land to value undeveloped property; draft portion of
post-trial brief regarding inadmissibility of development approach; conference with client; prepare
for presentation to client; meetings with client; review, edit and finalize post-trial brief; conference
with SCBowman regarding meeting, post-trial brief and preparations for response brief; draft letter
to opposing counsel responding to settlement offer;

03/23/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,494.50

6.1

Edit and review draft brief; analyze and review opposing counsel post trial brief; legal research
regarding cases cited by opposing counsel; prepare draft outline regarding opposing counsel's post
trial brief;

03/23/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

256.00

1.6

Confer with MVYork re: various case issues and status; telephone calls with court clerk regarding
possession of enlarged trial exhibit and handling of same; assist with proof reading of post trial brief;
follow-up with MVYork on status of enlarged exhibit and briefing issues, etc.;

03/23/2012
03/23/2012

Bowman, Steve C.
Georger, Katherine L.

$
$

2,445.50
100.00

7.3
0.5

03/24/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,519.00

6.2

03/23/2012

York, Mary V.

Work on post-trial brief;
Cite and source check post-trial briefing;
Analyze and prepare outline of Grathol post-trial brief; edit and revise draft outline; correspondence
regarding post trial briefing; continue legal research regarding cases relied upon by Grathol; continue
to analyze and prepare response to cited cases;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Hours

Narrative

Review Grathol post trial brief and outline arguments and case law; review case law cited by Grathol;

03/25/2012

Bowman,_Steve C.

$

1,876.00

5.6

03/26/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,715.00

7.0

03/26/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,909.50

5.7

begin review of trial transcripts to refute misstatements of testimony and omissions by Grathol in
post-trial brief;
Legal research regarding cases cited by Grathol; work on analysis and response to each case;
telephone conference with SCBowman regarding response brief and cases; edit and revise draft
analysis and response;

03/27/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

2,278.50

9.3

Review trial transcripts and work on brief responding to post trial brief filed by Grathol;
Legal research regarding cases cited; analyze and prepare response to cited cases law; research
regarding exhibits and maps and preparation for response brief regarding same; continue research
within the recordto refute claims made in post trial brief; prepare memorandum regarding citations
to the record regarding same;
Review trial transcripts for brief in response to Grathol post trial brief; review case law cited by

03/27/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

03/28/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

2,780.50

8.3

$

980.00

4.0

Grathol in post trial brief and make notes for ITD response brief; work on ITD brief in response to
Gratholposttrial briet
Research regarding transcript and excerpts and correspondences regarding same; continue research
regarding severance damages and correspondence regarding same; continue to prepare draft
demonstrative exhibits for brief;

03/28/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,546.00

7.6

03/29/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

1,519.00

6.2

03/29/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,144.00

6.4

03/30/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

122.50

0.5

Review trial transcripts, review case law, and work on brief in response to Grathol post trial brief;
Research regarding exhibits, testimony and citations; correspondence regarding same; revise,
comment and edit draft response brief;
Work on brief in response to post-trial brief by Grathol; start work on proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law;
Research regarding Idaho and larger parcel issues; correspondence regarding deadlines;
Work on response to Grathol post trial brief; work on proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

03/30/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

1,474.00

4.4

04/02/2012

York, Mary V.

$

422.50

1.3

Review recent correspondence relating to post-trial briefing; conference with client;

04/02/2012

Feraci, Barbara I<.

$

80.00

0.5

Review case communications and pleadings of past week and respond to various e-mails;

04/02/2012
04/03/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.
York, Mary V.

$
$

514.50
195.00

2.1
0.6

04/04/2012

York, Mary V.

$

520.00

1.6

Conduct research regarding post trial brief issues;
Review and edit draft response to Grathol's post-trial brief;
Work on proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; conference with SCBowman regarding
additional information needed for post trial brief;

04/04/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,646.50

7.9

04/05/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

147.00

0.6

Law;

Work on brief in response to Grathol post-trial brief; work on proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law;
Research regarding transcript and testimony; correspondence regarding same;
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Date

Name

Billed Amt

Narrative

04/05/2012

York, Mary V.

$

455.00

1.4

Conduct final review and edit of post-trial response brief; correspondence regarding same;

04/05/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

288.00

1.8

Assist SCBowman with pulling of documents, exhibits and providing him with information needed for
completing drafting of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

04/05/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$ 3,115.50

9.3

Research case law for brief to be filed in response to Grathol post-trial brief; work on brief
responding to Grathol post-trial brief; work on proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law;

04/06/2012

York, Mary V.

$

455.00

1.4

04/06/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

2,747.00

8.2

04/07/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

98.00

0.4

04/09/2012

York, Mary V.

$

227.50

0.7

04/09/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

171.50

0.7

04/11/2012
04/16/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.
Tollefson, Ted S.

$
$

32.00
171.50

0.2
0.7

04/17/2012

Feraci, Barbara K.

$

304.00

1.9

04/18/2012

York, Mary V.

$

292.50

0.9

05/25/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

514.50

2.1

05/25/2012

York, Mary V.

$

487.50

1.5

Receive Memorandum Decision and Order from Grathol trial and review and analysis of same;
forward decision to clients and email correspondence and telephone conferences with clients;

05/28/2012

York, Mary V.

$

975.00

3.0

Research civil rules of procedure to confirm timeline for appeal; draft proposed judgment and order
of condemnation; research rate of interest to be awarded in condemnation cases and review Idaho
case law regarding same;

05/28/2012

Bowman, Steve C.

$

134.00

0.4

Review draft order of condemnation and judgment, and check calculations of interest due;

05/29/2012

York, Mary V.

$

97.50

0.3

Work on proposed judgment for Grathol case;

05/29/2012.

Bowman, Steve C.

$

971.50

2.9

Meeting to discuss potential application by ITD for attorney fees and costs; work on outline of brief
in support of motion for attorney fees and costs; legal research for motion for attorney fees;

05/29/2012

Tollefson, Ted S.

$

514.50

2.1

Research regarding judgement and interest calculation; review and edit draft judgment;
correspondence regarding same;

Hours

Review, edit and finalize findings of fact and conclusions of law; coordinate filing of response posttrial brief and findings and conclusions;
Work on proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and prepare for filing; complete work on
brief to be filed in response to Grathol post-trial brief;
Analyze and review response brief and findings of fact;
Review and analysis of Grathol's post-trial response brief and proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law;
Continue to analyze and review reply brief and proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law;
legal research regarding same;
Follow up with TSTollefson regarding HJ Grathol briefing and other related matters;
Analyze and review supplemental pleading in appeal; research regarding same;
Continue pulling cases and code sections for upcoming appeal; compilation of materials into binder
with project assistant;
Review draft response to Grathol's public records request and draft proposed revisions to same;
correspondence client;
Analyze and review memorandum decision on trial;
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Date

05/30/2012

Name

Billed Amt

York, Mary V.

130.00
$
$ 724,136.00

TOTAL

Hours

0.4
2720.0

Narrative

Correspondence with client; edit and revise draft judgment;
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 38511
ST ATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Piaintiff·Respondent,

v.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership,
Defendant-Appellant,
and

STERLING SAVIN GS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1
through S,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

Coeur d'Alene, May 2012 Term

) 2012 Opinion No. 85
)
) Filed: June 1, 2012
)
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appeal from the district court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing Haynes, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed. Neither party is awarded
attorney's fees. Costs on appeal are awarded to Respondent.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for Appellant. Christopher D.
Gabbert argued.
Holland & Hart, Boise, for Respondent. Mary V. York argued.
W. JONES, Justice
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
HJ Grathol ("Grathol") is a California general partnership that owns real estate in
Kootenai County, Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for commercial real estate development,
which is located at or near the northeast comer of US Highway 95 and State Highway 54 in
Kootenai County (hereinafter referred to as "Grathol's parcel" or "the parcel").

The Idaho

Transportation Board ("the Board") later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel
(hereinafter the portion of Grathol's parcel that is subject to condemnation shall be referred to as
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"'the subject property") in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with
State Highway 54. Grathol contends that the Board failed to negotiate for the subject property in
good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts
Road ("the Sylvan/Roberts Extension"), which Grathol contends would front the subject property
and significantly increase its value.

Grathol further asserts that the Board failed to file its

Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707 before moving for early
possession of the subject property pursuant to the "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Grathol engages in the business of commercial real estate development in Idaho. It has
taken significant steps to commercially develop the parcel, which it originally purchased as a
commercial real estate investment venture. To further the development of its parcel, Grathol
filed site plans, submitted a traffic impact study, and successfully secured commercial rezoning
from Kootenai County. Moreover, Grathol has marketed the parcel and engaged in negotiations
with potential tenants.
As it currently exists, US Highway 95 is primarily a two-lane highway. In 2002, the
Board initiated a comprehensive study of US Highway 95 between the communities of Garwood
and Sagle to determine the feasibility of improving the highway to a four-lane divided highway
with Type V Access Control. The study concluded that the highway should be improved in
order to increase safety and accommodate present and future traffic demands. The study was
eventually incorporated into the Garwood to Sagle Project, which primarily sought to realign US
Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. The Board approved the
Garwood to Sagle Project through its annual approval of the federally funded State
Transportation Improvement Plan ("the STIP"), which incorporated the Garwood to Sagle
Project. Due to the size of the Garwood to Sagle Project, the Board divided it into seven
segments. Grathol' s parcel is located within the Athol Segment.
The Board has the power of eminent domain pursuant to LC. § 40-311(1). The Board
contends that the subject property is needed for the Garwood to Sagle Project, Athol Segment,
and that it authorized the condemnation of the subject property through its annual approval of the
STIP. According to MAI appraiser Stanley Moe, the fair market value of the subject property is
$571,000. In an effort to avoid a condemnation action, the Board offered Grathol an additional
ten percent above the appraised fair market value for a total offer of $628,100.

Grathol
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countered the Board's offer with a demand for $3 million to $3.5 million on JW1e 28, 2010,
contending that the appraisal does not account for the subject property's frontage, which would
result from the Sylvan/Roberts Extension.
The Board contends that it is not seeking to condemn any portion of the parcel in order to
construct the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. It points out that neither the Complaint nor the Order of
Condemnation references the condemnation of any portion of the parcel for construction of the
Sylvan/Roberts Extension. In this regard, Jason Minzghor, Project Development Engineer with
the Board, contends that Grathol is under the mistaken belief that the Board intends to condemn
a portion of its parcel for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension because of a meeting held on August 1,
2010. During that meeting, two property owners, Jameson Mortgage and Frederick Krasnick,
approached the Board with a proposal to extend Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through their
respective properties.

Minzghor asserts that the proposal was contingent upon Mortgage,

Krasnick and Grathol dedicating a portion of their properties for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension in
exchange for the resulting frontages that would run through their properties. Minzghor claims
that after Grathol rejected the proposal, there have been no further plans in this regard.
On November 19, 2010, the Board filed its Complaint with an attached Order of
Condemnation, which was dated November 17, 2010, and was signed by the Director of the
Idaho Transportation Department ("the Director") on behalf of the Board. On December 21,
2010, the Board filed its Motion for an Order Granting Possession of Real Property pursuant to
the "quick-take" provisions of LC. § 7-721. Grathol filed its Response to the Board's Motion for
an Order Granting Possession of Real Property on January I 0, 2011, contending, among other
things, that the Complaint and the Order of Condemnation failed to meet the statutory
requirements of J.C. § 7-707 and that the Board failed to negotiate in good faith. The district
court filed its Order Granting Possession of Real Property on January 27, 2011, holding that the
requirements of LC. § 7-721 were satisfied and that the amount of just compensation was
$571,000. The district court then filed a Rule 54(b) Certificate on January 27, 2011, holding that
there was no just reason for delay of the entry of final judgment because the Board established
the "quick-take" provisions of 1.C. § 7-721. On February l, 2011, Grathol timely filed its Notice
of Appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered Final Judgment on March 4, 2011.

Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL
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1.

Whether the Complaint and Order of Condemnation were filed in accordance with LC. §
7-707?

2.

Whether the Board failed to negotiate in good faith pursuant to I.C. § 7-721 (2)(d)?

3.

Whether Grathol is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I. C. § 12-117?

4.

Whether the Board is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-121?

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721(2) allow state entities that possess the power
of eminent domain to "obtain property ... for a public purpose without the delay of a lengthy
trial." Payette Lakes Water and Sewer Dist. v. Hays, 103 Idaho 717, 718, 653 P.2d 438, 439
(1982). After commencing an action for condemnation, the state entity may deposit with the
court the amount initially determined as ~~just compensation" for the property. Id.

After a

hearing is held, the court can then enter an order enabling the state entity to take possession of
and use the property pending a full trial. Id. Subsection (2) of I.C. § 7-721 states that the court
"shall first determine whether or not plaintiff (a) has the right of eminent domain,
(b) whether or not the use to which the property is to be applied is a use
authorized by law, (c) whether or not the taking is necessary to such use, and (d}
whether or not plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to

be taken ...."
A.

The Complaint and the Order of Condemnation Were Filed in Accordance with J.C.
§ 7-707
Grathol contends that the Order of Condemnation was not filed in accordance with LC. §

7-707( 6) because the Director signed the Order of Condemnation and the Board never approved
the condemnation of the subject property through a fonnal board meeting, which Grathol asserts
is contrary to a strict construction of LC. §§ 40-308, 40-311(1), and 40-505, among others.
Grathol further asserts that because the Order of Condemnation, which Grathol claims contains
an exprl.!s& declaration that the Board is extending Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through
Grathol's parcel, conflicts with the Complaint, which Grathol asserts does not address the
Sylvan/Roberts Extension, both are invalid pursuant to I.C. § 7-707(6) because they do not
provide a clear description of the property rigltts acquired.

1. The Director May Sign the Order of Condemnation on Behalf ofthe Board
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review." Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). Judicial
interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v.
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Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999).

"This Court interprets statutes

according to their plain, express meaning and resorts to judicial construction only if the statute is
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enter.,

Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008).
Idaho Code section 7-707(6) states:
An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding document
entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all property rights to
be acquired including rights to and from the public way, and pennanent and
temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning
authority.
According to the plain language of the statute, an order of condemnation must be "entered" by
the Board. Pursuant to LC. § 40-505, the Director possesses "necessary incidental powers" of
administration on behalf of the Board. Black's Law dictionary defines an "incidental power" as
"[a] power that, although not expressly granted, must exist because it is necessary to the
accomplishment of an express purpose."

Black's Law Dictionary 1288 (9th ed. 2009).

Therefore, according to LC. § 40-505, the Director possesses broad powers to carry out the
express actions of the Board. In this regard, the plain language of LC. § 40-505 states that the
Director acts as the administrative arm of the Board. The power of eminent domain is one of the
powers exclusively vested by law in the Board. See I.C. § 40-311 (1 ). As the record establishes,
the Director did not unilaterally condemn the subject property without the authority of the Board.
Instead, the Board approved of the condemnation of the subject property through its annual
approval of the STIP. See I .C. § 40-310. Although the Order of Condemnation was signed by
the Director, it was filed in the name of the Board, not the Director, and expressly invoked the
Board's power of condemnation pursuant to LC. § 40-311(1). It is the Board, not the Director,
who is exercising the power of eminent domain in the Order of Condemnation. The Director is
merely acting in an administrative capacity on behalf of the Board pursuant to LC. § 40-314(3)
and Board Policy B--03-01 in order to carry out the Board's express power of condemnation.

Grathol's assertion that the Board must hold a board meeting every time it condemns
private property for a public purpose is unsupported by the plain language of the statutes that
Grathol cites in its opening brief and impractical due to the sheer size of public roads projects
and the relative infrequency of board meetings. It is for these reasons that the Director typically
signs orders of condemnation on behalf of the Board. Furthermore, the cases that Grathol cites
in its opening brief are irrelevant and unconvincing because the Board never ceded its power to
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condemn private property for public purposes to the Director. Grathol's assertion that the Board
violated Idaho's Open Meeting Act because it did not hold a formal board meeting to condemn
the subject property is similarly unconvincing.

2. The Complaint and Order of Condemnation Do Not Express Any Intention to
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Although the Order of Condemnation refers to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section
deals with rights of access to and from the remaining non-condemned portions of Grathol's
parcel to various roads and highways. Furthermore, the Order of Condemnation specifically
identifies the subject property as being such "property [as] has been designated and shown as the
above parcel number on the plans of said project now on file in the office of the Idaho
Transportation Department." The plans refer to the US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, and
map out the 16.314 acres of the subject property, but they make no reference to the
Sylvan/Roberts Extension.

The Complaint makes reference to those plans as well when it

identifies the subject property, but it also makes no reference to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension.
Instead, it states that the Board seeks to condemn the subject property in order to ''widen[] and
improv[e] ... U.S. Highway 95 south of State Highway 52 to north of the community of Sagle ..
. ." The Complaint further elaborates that "[t]he particular segment of the Project for which
Defendants' property is required is U.S. 95 Garwood to Sagle - Athol Stage, Kootenai County,
Idaho, ITD Project No. A009(791 ), Key No. 9791.''
Thus, there is no basis for Grathol' s assertion that the Order of Condemnation conflicts
with the Complaint. Grathol would like this Court to consider the possible extension of Sylvan
Road to Roberts Road through Grathol's property in the future in determining just compensation
and whether the Complaint conflicts with the Order of Condemnation.

If Sylvan Road is

extended to Roberts Road through Grathol's property in the future, then, at that time, the Board
will be required to determine the just compensation due for that portion of Grathol's property
that is necessary for the project. At this time, this Court refuses to engage in such speculative
contemplation.

B.

The Board Negotiated in Good Faith for the Subject Property Pursuant to I.C. § 7721(2)(d)
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Grathol contends that the Board did not negotiate in good faith to purchase the subject
property pursuant to LC. § 7-721 (2)(d) because the appraisal did not include any consideration
for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road across Grathol's parcel.
Idaho Code section 7-721 states that "[i]n any proceeding under the provisions of this
chapter for the acquisition of real property, the plaintiff may take possession of and use such
property at any time after just compensation has been judicially determined and payment thereof
made into court." Judicia] determination of just compensation is satisfied when the court
determines, among other requirements, that the
plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to be taken and the
court shall enter an order thereon which shall be a final order as to these issues
and an appeal may be taken therefrom; provided, however, no appeal therefrom
shall stay further proceedings.
I.C. § 7-721(2)(d). Just compensation is based on fair market value, which is the price for which
the property that is taken could be sold by an owner willing to sell to a willing purchaser on the
date of the taking. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 658-59, 662 P.2d 237,
239-40 (I 983).
Neither the Order of Condemnation nor the Complaint proposes condemnation of any
portion of Grathol's parcel for the purpose of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. Though the Order
of Condemnation briefly mentions the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section describes right of
access to and from the remaining property belonging to Grathol to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension.
The Affidavit of Jason Minzghor asserts that the Board has no intention of condemning any
portion of Grathol's parcel for the construction of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. As mentioned
before, Grathol elected not to dedicate its property for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, causing the
Board to abandon that proposal. Because the basis of Grathol's argument relies entirely on its
assertion that the Board's offer does not account for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, this Court
holds that the Board negotiated in good faith for the subject property pursuant to LC. § 7-

721(2)(d).
C.

Gratbol Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal Pursuant to J.C. § 12-117
Grathol requests attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. Because Grathol is

not the prevailing party on appeal, it is not entitled to attorney's fees.

D.

The Board Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121

""f

l
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The Board contends that it is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to J.C. § 12121 because Grathol acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in filing this appeal.
Pursuant to LC.§ 12-121, the prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees "when this Court
is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
W1reasonably, or without foundation." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428,438
(2004). This Court denies the Board's request because LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for
awarding attorney's fees for actions involving state entities. See Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch

Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010).
VI. CONCLUSION

Because the Board negotiated in good faith for the subject property and filed its
Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707, this Court affinns the
district court's decision holding that the "quick-take" provisions of I.C. § 7-721(2) were
satisfied. Neither party is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Costs are awarded to the Board.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.
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Westlaw
Page 1
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 4287489 (D.ldaho)
(Cite as: 2007 WL 4287489 (D.Idaho))

H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Idaho.
Alfred R. LaPETER and Sharon R. LaPeter, as
Trustees of the LaPeter 1985 Living Trust,
Plaintiffs,
V.

CANADA LIFE INSURANCE OF AMERICA, Defendant.
No. CV-06-121-S-BLW.
Dec. 4, 2007.
William A. Morrow, Jill S. Holinka, Kevin Eugene
Dinius, White Peterson, Nampa, ID, for Plaintiffs.
Robert A. Faucher, B. Newal Squyres, Kevin C.
Braley, Holland & Hart LLP, Boise, ID, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
*1 The Court has before it Canada Life Insurance Company of America's ("Canada Life") Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Docket No. 94),
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Second Declaration of
Robert A. Faucher (Docket No. 105), and Plaintiffs'
Motion to Consolidate Cases (Docket No. 108).
ANALYSIS
I. Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
Idaho law governs the award of attorney fees in
this matter because federal courts follow state law
as to attorney fee awards in diversity actions. See
Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1280 (9th
Cir.1978) (applying Idaho law). Pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3), the prevailing party is entitled to
an award of attorney fees when a commercial transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. See Erickson
v. Flynn. 64 P.3d 959 (Idaho Ct.App.2002).

"The determination of whether a litigant is the
prevailing party is committed to the discretion of
the trial court." Sanders v. Lanl((ord, 1 P.3d 823,
826 (Idaho Ct.App.2000); see also I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(B). In Idaho, governing legal standards on
the prevailing party issue are provided by LRCP
54(d)(l )(B). "[T]here are three principal factors the
trial court must consider when determining which
party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final judgment or
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2)
whether there were multiple claims or issues
between the parties; and (3) the extent to which
each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims
or issues." Id.
There is no dispute that this case involved a
commercial transaction for purposes of Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3). Moreover, based on the Court's final
Judgment in this matter, Canada Life is clearly the
prevailing party. In litigation, avoiding liability is
as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff. See Eighteen Mile Ranch,
LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d
130, 133 ([daho 2005). Canada Life avoided liability in this matter when the Court granted summary
judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiffs' remaining
claims.
A. Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs
Plaintiffs contend that Canada Life's requested
attorney fees should be reduced because their
hourly rates are too high and the time expended was
excessive.
1. Hourly Rates
The Court must determine a reasonable hourly
rate by considering the experience, skill and reputation of the attorneys requesting fees. See Schwarz v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 73 F.3d
895, 906 (9th Cir.1995). "A district court should
calculate this reasonable hourly rate according to
the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, which typically is the community in which
the district court sits." Id. (internal quotations and
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citations omitted). The relevant community in this
case is Boise, Idaho, where this Court sits.
Here, Plaintiffs specifically object to the rates
charged by Newal Squyres and Bob Foucher, who
charged $350.00 and $335.00/$355 .00 respectively
for their time. This Court is intimately familiar with
the hourly rates charged in the Boise market because the Court deals with motions for attorney fees
on a constant basis. Canada Life correctly points
Ol.\t that this Court recently awarded fees to a party
based on typical hourly rates charged by Canada
Life's attorneys at Holland & Hart. Canada Life has
also provided the Court with Mr. Faucher's declaration, which establishes the credentials and billing
rates for the Holland & Hart professionals who
worked on this matter. (See Faucher Declaration,
pp. 2-3). It has also been this Court's experience
that attorneys at regional firms, such as Holland &
Hart, charge hourly rates at or near, but not above,
the high end of acceptable rates for the Boise area.
*2 Based· on the Court's knowledge of typical
attorney rates in the Boise area, coupled with Mr.
Faucher's affidavit, the Court finds that the rates
charged by Canada Life's professionals are within
the Boise community standard, with the exception
of Mr. Faucher's rate. Mr. Faucher's hourly rate is
near, and even exceeds for some tasks, Mr. Squyres'
hourly rate, even though Mr. Squyres has practiced
for over 30 years, but Mr. Faucher has practiced for
less than 20 years. (See Faucher Declaration, pp.
2-3). Although Mr. Faucher indicates that he represents lending institutions throughout the country,
he has not persuaded the Court that his rate should
exceed that of his colleague who has practiced for
over 30 years. Accordingly, the Court will reduce
FNl
Mr. Faucher's rate to $300.00 per hour.
FN 1. Mr. Faucher's declaration lists the
following attorneys, their experience level
and billing rates: (1) Mr. Bithell-nearly 40
years-$405.00 per hour; (2) Mr. Squyersover 30 years-$350.00 per hour; (3) Mr.
Braley-9 years-$235.00 per hour; (4) Mr.
Goergen-5 years-$185.00; (5) Mr. Fisc-

henich-3 years-$185.00; and (6) Ms. Davis-2 years-$175.00. Considering the experience and billing rates of Mr. Faucher's colleagues, $300.00 per hour is the reasonable
rate for Mr. Faucher in this matter.

2. Number of Hours Charged
Plaintiffs also contend that the number of hours
claimed by Canada Life are excessive. Plaintiffs essentially contend that Canada Life's attorneys spent
too much time researching, drafting, editing and finalizing briefs, and too much time preparing for oral argument. Plaintiffs contend that any fee award
should be reduced by at least 30 percent.
The Court recalls that the briefs were well organized and well researched, and that counsel's oral
argument was persuasive. It has been the Court's
experience that the more concise briefs, and more
persuasive arguments, require the most preparation.
The high quality of the work, coupled with the
Court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Canada Life, and against Plaintiffs, reveals
that the significant effort spent on the briefs and
preparation for oral argument in this case was warranted. Additionally, the high quality work done at
the front end of this case saved the parties the additional expense of trying this matter.
Moreover, Canada Life's attorneys sufficiently
itemized their fees by describing the services performed. (Faucher Declaration, Ex. A). Accordingly,
the Court does not find that the number of hours
charged by Canada Life's attorneys were excessive.

3. Declaration Related to Mr. LaPeter's Conviction
Plaintiffs argue that Canada Life's attorney fees
should be reduced as a sanction for Canada Life's
filing of a declaration attaching documentation of
Mr. LaPeter's felony convictions. Plaintiffs suggest
that Canada Life introduced Mr. LaPeter's criminal
convictions into the record as an attempt to intimidate Mr. LaPeter and blacken Mr. LaPeter's reputation in they eyes of the Court. Plaintiffs also ask the
Court to strike that declaration.
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Based on the record, it is clear that Plaintiffs,
not Canada Life, introduced Mr. LaPeter's criminal
history into this litigation. Plaintiffs first disclosed
Mr. LaPeter's criminal record to the Court in Mr.
LaPeter's affidavit filed in December 2006 in support of Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order.
(See Docket nos. 21-22). Thus, it was not improper
for Canada Life to address the issue or to file the
records with the Court. Accordingly, there is no
reason to sanction Canada Life. Likewise, there is
no reason to strike Mr. Faucher's declaration.

4. Non-Taxable Costs
*3 Canada Life requests its non-taxable costs
pursuant to lRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Plaintiffs do not dispute application of IRCP 54(d)(l)(D), but argue
that Canada Life has not fulfilled the rule's requirement that the costs were necessary and exceptional.
Rule 54(d)(l)(D) states that additional, non-taxable,
costs "may be allowed upon a showing that said
costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice
be assessed against the adverse party." IRCP
54( d)(l )(D). Discretionary costs may include costs
related to long distance telephone calls, photocopying, faxes, travel expenses, and expert witnesses.
See Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn,
109 P.3d 161, 168 (Idaho 2005). The Court must
make express findings as to why a party's discretionary costs should or should not be allowed. Id.;
see also I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The Court need not
evaluate the requested costs item by item. Instead,
"express findings as to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary,
reasonable, exceptional, and in the interests of
justice is sufficient to comply with this requirement." Puckett v. /lerska, 158 P.3d 937, 945-946
(Idaho 2007).
Here, the Court finds that although Canada
Life's discretionary costs were for the most part
reasonable and necessary, they were not exceptional. The nature of this case, essentially a breach of
contract case, was not exceptional. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently construed the require-

ment that costs be "exceptional" under IRCP
54( d)(1 )(D) "to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional."
The Idaho Supreme Court has also stated that
"[c]ertain cases, such as personal injury cases generally involve copy, travel and expert witness fees
such that these costs are considered ordinary rather
than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)." Id.
(citing Inama v. Brewer, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (Idaho
l 999). This case is more akin to the ordinary personal injury case. Canada Life's discretionary costs
were "routine costs associated with modern litigation overhead" in commercial litigation. City of McCall v. Seubert, 130 P.3d 1118, II 26-27 (Idaho
2006). Accordingly, the Court will deny Canada
Life's request for non-taxable costs.

5. Idaho Code§§ 45-15-3 and 45-1512
Idaho's anti-deficiency statute provides that in
order to recover a deficiency from a grantor personally after foreclosure, the beneficiary must sue the
grantor within three months after the trustee's sale.
Additionally, the beneficiary can recover only the
difference between the debt and the fair market
value of the property at the date of sale or the sale
amount, whichever is greater. I.C. § 45-1512.
Idaho's single action statute provides that a beneficiary under a deed of trust cannot sue the grantor on
the debt except under certain limited circumstances.
J.C. § 45-1503. The statute's purpose is to compel a
creditor who is secured by real property to recover
from the grantor's pledged real estate before recovering from the grantor's other assets. Plaintiffs contend that these statutes prevent Canada Life from
recovering its attorney fees and costs.
*4 Plaintiffs' argument is based on a contention
that Canada Life, for all intents and purposes, is the
beneficiary of the deed of trust that secures the
ParkCenter Mall. However, Canada Life is not the
beneficiary of that deed of trust. Through assignment, Canada Life Assurance Company is the beneficiary of the deed of trust. (See Schwartz Aff., ~
7-10, Exs. 1-3, Docket No. 57). Plaintiffs admit as
much, but contend that because Canada Life and
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Canada Life Assurance Company are both subsidiaries of Great West Insurance, the Court should regard the two companies as the same entity.
Plaintiffs cite no case law or ru.les explaining \.vhy

the Court should not treat the separate entities as
separate entities. Accordingly, the Court will not
treat them as the same entity.
The anti-deficiency and single action statutes
do not apply to parties, like Canada Life, who are
not beneficiaries of a deed of trust securing indebtedness owed by the grantor. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the statutes do not preclude recovery of attorney fees and costs in this case.
6. Total Fees and Costs
Based on the above analysis, Canada Life is entitled to $437,742.50 in attorney fees. The Court
reached this amount by reducing Mr. Faucher's
hourly rate from $335.00/355.00 to $300.00 per
hour, which reduced Mr. Faucher's bill by
$51,498.50. The Court then subtracted that amount
from the total amount outlined and claimed in
Canada Life's fee bill ($491,310.00-$51,498.50 =
$439,811.50). The Court then subtracted an additional $2,069.00 based on Canada Life's concession
that it mistakenly included $2,069 .00 in fees for
work pertaining to the receivership litigation (See
Canada Life Reply Brief, p. 8, n. 18). The Court
will not award any non-taxable costs.

ORDERED that Canada Life's Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs (Docket No. 94) shall be, and the
same is hereby, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART. Plaintiffs shall pay Canada Life
$437,742.50 in attorney fees.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike Second Declaration of Robert A.
Faucher (Docket No. 105) shall be, and the same is
hereby, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs'
Motion to Consolidate Cases (Docket No. 108)
shall be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
D .Idaho,2007.
LaPeter v. Canada Life Ins. of America
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 4287489
(D.Idaho)
END OF DOCUMENT

II. Motion to Consolidate
Months ago, the Court suggested that, at least
for purposes of appeal, the parties should consider
whether it would be in the interest of judicial economy to consolidate this case with the other two related matters-Case Nos. 07-254 and 07-228.
However, because Plaintiffs have already separately appealed all three cases, the Court finds no
reason to consolidate them at this point. Based on
the outcome of the appeals, the Court may revisit
this issue. However, at this point, the Court will
deny the Motion to Consolidate.

ORDER

NOW

THEREFORE

IT

IS

HEREBY
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H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Idaho.
RESTORATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,
INC., 9810 Patuxent Woods Drive, Suite K,
Columbia, MD 21046, Plaintiff,
V.

CERTIFIED RESTORERS CONSULTING
GROUP, LLC, 1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2,
Boise, ID 83702, Disaster Restoration, Inc. 4725
Forest Street, Denver, CO 80216, Michael Griggs,
4275 Forest Street, Denver, CO 80216, RSR2,
LLC, d/b/a Ree-Construction 66 Willow Creek,
Hailey, ID 83333, Onald K. Reese, 66 Willow
Creek Hailey, ID 83333, Thomas C. Geoffroy,
24932 Avenue Kearny, Unit# 6, Valencia, CA
91355, Michael Cosley, 24932 Avenue Kearny,
Unit# 6, Valencia, CA 91355, Americraft Constructors, Inc. d/b/a American Craftsman, Restoration, a Disaster Kleenup International (DKI) Company 24932 Avenue Kearny, Unit# 6, Valencia,
CA 91355, Brian Boone, 27309 Blueberry Hill
Drive, Oak Ridge North, TX 77385, Boones Restoration, Inc., 11943 Scarlet Oaks Trail, Conroe,
TX 77385, Michael Eggman, 6521 Sky Creek
Drive, Suite G, Sacramento, CA 95828, Certified
Restoration & Construction Inc., 6251 Sky Creek
Drive, Suite G, Sacremento, CA 95828, Defendants.
No. CV-07-227 SBLW.
March 24, 2008.
Jason D. Scott, Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley,
Boise, ID, Jordan S. Weinstein, Richard Thomas
Matthews, Obion, Spivak, Mcclelland, Maier &
Neustadt, P.C., Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.
Stephen A. Spataro, Spataro & Associates, Ringgold, GA, Steven B. Andersen, Holland & Hart,
Boise, ID, Robert G. Wing, Prince Yeates &
Geldzahler, Salt Lake City, UT, David P. Hersh,

Sarah Van Arsdale Beny, Burg Simpson Eldredge
Hersh & Jardine, PC, Englewood, CO, Robyn Maddox Brody, Hepworth Lezamiz & Janis, Twin Falls,
ID, Neil D. Mcfeeley, Richard W. Stover, Stanley
J. Tharp, Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered, Boise, ID, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B. LYNN WJNMILL, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
*1 The Court has before it Plaintiffs Motion
for Attorney Fees (Docket No. 56) and Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend (Docket No. 69). The Court has
determined that the decisional process on these motions would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, the Court will address the motions
without a hearing.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion for Attorney Fees
The Court conditionally granted Defendants
Boone and BRI, Inc. 's Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Default. The condition required Defendants Boone
and BRI, Inc. to pay RIA for all of its costs and fees
associated with the Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Default. To that end, the Court required RIA to submit a cost bill. The Court has now reviewed the cost
bill, as well as Boone and BRl's response brief.
Defendants take issue with the hourly rates
charged by Plaintiffs lead counsel, Obion, Spivak,
McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, P.C, a Washington
D.C. firm. Specifically, Defendants dispute Mr.
Weinstein's $400.00 hourly rate and Mr. Matthews'
$260.00 hourly rate.
The Court must determine a reasonable hourly
rate by considering the experience, skill and reputation of the attorneys requesting fees. Schwarz v.
Secretmy of Health and Human Services, 73 F.3d
895, 906 (9th Cir.1995). "A district court should
calculate this reasonable hourly rate according to
the prevailing market rates in the relevant com-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF TH
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2

By---',:::::;;AL-~~~q,,c:.__ _

3

4

AVP RESTAURANT GROUP, a limited
liability company,

Case No. CVOC0711663

5

6

Plaintiff,

7

vs.

a GODZILLA, LLC, a limited liability
9

company, and CHEERLEADERS SPORTS
BAR & GRILL, INC., an Idaho corporation,

·10

3) BUICHES' MOTION FOR RULE
54(8) CERTIFICATION

Defendants.

11

12

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
1) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISALLOW FEES AND COSTS
2) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS;

DAVE BUICH and KAREN BUICH, a
married couple,

13

Plaintiffs,
14
15
16

vs.

17

ROBERT E. GODSILL, an individual,
GODZILLA, LLC, a limited liability
company, and CHEERLEADERS SPORTS

1a

BAR & GRILL, INC., an Idaho corporation,

19

Defendants,

20
21

APPEARANCES

22
23

24
25

26

For Plaintiff AVP Restaurant Group: Dennis M. Charney and Jacob D.
Deaton of Charney and Associates, PLLC
For Plaintiffs David and Karen Buich: Mary York and Ted Tollefson of
Holland and Hart

For Defendants: Matthew J. Ryden, Wyatt Johnson, and T.J. Angstman
of Angstman, Johnson & Associates, PLLC
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PROCEEDINGS

This matter came before the Court on December 4, 2008 upon 1) the
2
3

Defendants' Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs relating to Rule 11 sanctions; 2) the

4

Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs; and 3) the Buiches' Motion for Rule

5

54(b) Certification. After oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.

6

BACKGROUND

7

This litigation arises from a dispute over contracts to buy rent property,

8

AVP

Restaurant Group contracted to purchase from the Defendants real property for use as

9

a restaurant.

Based upon a belief that their contract with AVP had expired, the

10

Defendants entered into an agreement to sell the same restaurant property to Dave and
11

12

Karen Buich.

In the meantime, AVP filed suit for specific periormance, breach of

j3

contract and other related claims. AVP also filed a lis pendens on the property, and at

14

one point obtained a preliminary injunction.

15

counsel to attempt to remove the lis pendens to allow the Defendants to sell the

16

property to the Buiches, no sale occurred and the Buiches recelved their earnest money

i7
18

Despite the Defendants hiring legal

back. Consequently, the Buiches also sued the Defendants for breach of contract. The
Buiches' action was consolidated with AVP's action.

19

On September 25, 2008, the Court granted summary judgment against the
20

Buiches and dismissed their claims because their contract with the Defendants limited
21

22
23
24

buyer's damages to return of earnest money, The motions addressed in this decision
involve disputes between the Defendants and the Bulches.
DISCUSSION

25

1. Defendants' Motion ta Disallow Fees and Costs

26

Prior to the grant of summary Judgment on September 11, 2008, the 6uiches
MEMORANDUM DECISION •CASE NO. CVOC11663 • PAGE2
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filed a Motion for Sanctions against the Defendants under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
11 (a)(1 ), arguing that the Defendants filed and pursued a frivolous Motion in Umine to
2
3

exclude the Buiches' expert witnesses. The Defendants filed their Motion in Limine on

4

grounds that the Buiches' July 28, 2008 expert disclosures were untimely based on the

5

Court's March 13, 2008 written scheduling order, which stated that the deadline for

6

expert disclosures was June 23, 2008. However, the Court had previously stated at the

7

scheduling conference on March 10, 2008 that the deadline for the Buiches' expert

8

disclosures would be July 28, 2008. After receiving the Defendants' Motion in Limine,

9

the Buiches reminded the Defendants on more than one occasion that the deadline
10

provided by the Court was July 28th.

After looking into the matter, the Defendants

11

acknowledged that the Court did state at the scheduling conference that tho deadline
12

13

would be July 28th.

Still, the Defendants continued to prosecute their motion on

14

grounds trial ihe Buiches did not comply with the disclosure deadline.

15

The Court granted the Buiches' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on the ground that

,e

the Defendants "continu[ed] to pursue their Motion in Umine even though they knew the

17

disclosure deadline given by tl1e Court was July 28, 2008." The Court then requested

18

from the Buiches an affidavit detailing the expenses and fees incurred in responding to

19

the Motion in Limine and pursuing the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. The Buiches filed
20

the requested affidavit, which reported attorney fees in the amount of $10,626.50
21

22
23

24

incurred from 4.8 hours in conferences, 4.7 hours researching legal issues, 25 hours
preparing pleadings and letters, and 8.5 hours attending hearings on the two motions,
The Defendants request that the Court disallow the fees as being excessive for

2s

the time and effort required to respond to the Motion in Limine.

Specifically, the

26

Defendants assert that it was not until September 2, 2008 that the Court clarified its
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statements regarding the expert witness disclosure deadline, and therefore, the fees
should be calculated from September 2, thereby reducing the amount of fees incurred
2
3

by at least $2,500.50.

4

pursuing the Motion in Limine and defending the Rule 11 sanctions after September 2

5

was about 18 hours for $3 1330 in fees, significantly less than the amount claimed by the

6

Buiches. Defendants further argue that the fees charged by Holland and Hart ($245

7

and $275 for Mary York and $195 and $215 for Ted Tollefson) are not reasonable

8
9

The Defendants also assert that the total time they spent

compared to attorney fees in Boise and those charged by Angstman, Johnson, &
Associates ($225 for T J Angstman 1 $195 for Wyatt Johnson I and $150-$175 for

10

others). Considering all this, the Defendants contend that a reasonable award of fees
11

12
13

and costs would not be more than $3,500.
The imposition of attorney fee sanctions for litigative misconduct

is governed by

14

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(1). Lester v. Salvino, 141 ldaho 937, 939, 120 P.3d

15

755 (Ct. App. 2005). That rule provides in relevant part:

10
17
18

"If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule 1 the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." LR.C.P.
11(a)(1).

20

This rule gives the Court discretion to determine the appropriate sanction for a violation
21

22

of the rule. Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640, 650-51, 115 P.3d 731 (2005). It also

23

dictates that the amount of attorney fees and costs Incurred by the aggrieved party

24

"may serve as a guide for determining an amount of sanctions." Id. (citing McKay v.

25

Owens, 130 Idaho 1481 159, 937 P.2d 1222, 1233 (1997)).

26

In addition, the Intent behind Rule 11 Is to give courts 11 a management tool ... to
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weed out, punish, and deter specific frivolous and other misguided filings." Id. (citing
1

Curzon v. Hansen, 137 Idaho 420, 421~22, 49 P.3d 1270, 1272-73 (Ct. App. 2002)
2

3
4

(citation omitted)).

Accordingly, "Ru!e 11 sanctions must be sufficient to deter the

misuse of the judicial process." Id.

5

In this case, tile Court will find that an award of attorney fees and costs incurred

6

by the Buiches in defending against the Defendants' motion to exclude expert

7

witnesses and in obtaining Rule 11 sanctions serve the intent behind Rule 11 and are

0

an appropriate sanction. The Buiches' attorneys have stated in an affidavit under oath

9

triat they incurred over $10,000 in fees as a result of the Defendant's Rule 11 violation.
10

The expenses U1e Buiches were forced to incur as a result of this violation appropriately
11
12

13
14

deters the Defendants and others from "misguided filings" and appropriately
compensates the Buiches.
Furthermore, there is no basis to limit the attorney fees and costs to those

15

incurred by the Buiches after September 2, 2008.

16

Defendants because they pursued the Motion in Limine after September 2. The Court

17

ordered sanctions because "the Buiches were forced to respond to and defend against

18

The Court did not sanction the

a baseless argument." that the Defendants reasonably should have known was not

19

based in fact. In addition, the fees charged in this case were reasonable. In the United
20

States District Court of Idaho case of LaPeter v. Canada Life lnsurance 1 No. CV-0621

22

121-S-BLW, 2007 WL 2608837 (Sept. 5, 2007), the court found tees of over $300 to be

23

reasonable in Boise. Accordingly, the sanctions Imposed upon the Defendants in the

24

amount of attorney fees and costs incurred should be awarded to the Buiches.

25

26

The Court will enter an award of fees In the amount of $10,626.50 in favor of the
Buiches.

However, the Court wlll defer signing a judgment for the amount awarded
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By

entering the award without issuing a judgment, the Court allows all parties the equal

3

opportunity to appeal any issue in this matter without forcing the payment of attorney

4

fee awards in the interim, while at the same time preventing the increase of the award

5

due to accruing interest while the AVP case is still pending.

6

2. Buiches' Objection to Defendants~ Request for Fees and Costs

7

The Defendants ree:iuest an award of attorney fees and costs under Rule

8

54(d)(1), Rule 54(e)(1), and Idaho Code 12"120(3) in the amount of $49,892.29

9

incurred ln defending the Buiches' claims.

The Buiches tiled an objection to the

10

Defendants' request for attorney fees and costs on November 20, 2008, arguing that
11

12

the Defendants wrongfully included in their request fees incurred in pursuing the Motion

13

in Limlne to exclude expert witnesses, for which the Defendants were sanctioned under

14

Rule 11, and fees incurred in defending against the Bulches' successful Motion for Rule

15

11 Sanctions. The Buiches also argue that seeking fees tor seven different lawyers

16

who worked on this case Is unreasonable and excessive. Finally, the Buiches argue

17

that the Defendants have claimed costs relating to an expert witness that do not meet

16

the criteria for Costs as a Matter of Right under Rule 54(d)(1 )(C).

19

Rule 54{e)(1) provides that "[i]n any civil action the court may award reasonable
20

attorney tees, ... , to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when
21

22

provided for by any statute or contract." Idaho Code§ 12-120(3} states that the Court

23

may award attorney fees in any civil action involving a commercial transaction. The

24

determination of the amount of attorney fees to award is left to the discretion of the trial

2s

court.

26

determining the amount of attorney fees, the Court must consider twelve factors listed

Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986).

In
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in Rule 54( e )(3). Some of these -factors include 1) the time and labor required; 2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; and 3) the skill requisite to perform the legal
2

~e~·1·c~
IV
C:: P""P'"'rl\/
IV
v, Y·

U

I

Or-

p

1.1 t . U . 1

•

t:::4(0)/-=l\
,u,.

Y

>.J

4

In this case, the Defendants prevailed and ace entitled to an award of attorney

5

fees because this litlgation involved a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-

6

120(3). In addition, the contract between the Buiches and the Defendants contains a

7

provision entitling the prevailing party to attorney fees.

8

However, the Defendants are

not entitled to the total amount of costs and fees requested.

9

The Defendants included in their Memorandum of Costs and Fees $4,368
iO

related to the Motion in Limine regarding the Buiches' expert witnesses and the
11
12
13

Buiches' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.

The Defendants recognize that the Court

ordered sanctions pertaining to these motions, but argue that "the pursuit and defense

14

of these two motions was directly related to defending Defendants in this matter, and

15

dealt with maUers of significant substance to the Defendants' case. The sanctions were

16

imposed based solely on the Buiches' timing argument.

17

Defendants are entitled to compensation for these fees as well."

18

Accordingly . . . the

The Court will find that fees incurred in pursuing the Motion in Limine and in

19

defending the Motion for Sanctions should not have been included in the Defendants'
20

total request for fees and costs. If the Defendants are allowed to recover this expense,
21

22

23
24

25
26

it would effectively reward the Defendants' counsel for their misconduct and render the
Court's sanction meaningless. Therefore, $4,368 wlll be deducted from Defendants1

request of $49,892.2$.
The Bu!ches also argue the Defendants' requested fees are excessive because
Defendants'

counsel

overstaffed this case with seven attorneys resulting in
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unnecessary meetings 1 duplicative work, and excessive fees.
2

The Buiches cite

Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005) in arguing that an

3

award of attorney fees can be vacated where a case is overstaffed. ln Lettunich, the

4

Court vacated an award of attorney fees in part because:

5
6
7

B
9

Over the span of one and a half months, Mike's attorneys spent 267 hours
drafting or discussing briefs. Much of this time involved two attorneys
working on the· same project, according to the billing statements. Further,
two of Mike's three attorneys were partners in their firm and well seasoned
litigators. Some consideration should have given as to the necessity of
this legal firepower. While the time and labor expended is certainly a
factor to consider, it is to be considered under a standard of
reasonableness.

10

Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 435, 111 P.3d at 120.

11

additional reasons for its decision to vacate the award, including excessive hours spent

12

13

The court in that case provided

in preparation for trial and the fact that the trial court did not consider all 54(e)(3)
criteria. Ultimately, the question of awardable attorney fees is one of reasonableness.

14

After review of the Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees and supporting
15

affidavit, the Court cannot find that use of seven attorneys was excessive or repetitive.
16
17

At any given stage of the proceedings of this case, only 2 or 3 of the Defendants'

18 ·

attorneys did the majority of the work. This is no different than the division of work

19

among the Plaintiffs' 'counsel. The mere fact that multiple attorneys performed work on

20

one case does not by itself mean that the work performed and fees incurred were

21

excessive. After considering all factors under Rule 54(e)(3), the Court will find that the

22

amount of fees incurred by tl1e Defendants' counsel was reasonable.

23

I

The Buichas also claim that the $100 expert consulting fee tor Glen Olson, CPA

24

is not awardable because he did not testify. Under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) 1 reasonable expert
20

witness fees for an expert who "testifies" at a deposition or at trial are allowed. The
26

Court will agree with the Buiches and decline to award $10~ for Mr. Olson as a cost of
MEMORANDUM DECISION• CASE NO. CVOC11663 • PAGE 8
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right because Mr. Olson did not testify.
2

In sum, the Court will reduce the Defendants requested aitorney fees by $4,468

3

($4,368 + $100) and enter an award of $45,424.29 in favor of the Defendants.

4

Moreover, at the request of the Defendants, the Court will offset the $10,626.50

s

sanction awarded to· the Buiches from the $45,424.29 awarded to the Defendants.

6

Thus, the Buiches will owe to the Defendants a total of $34,797.79 for attorney fees

7
8

and costs.

.

Again, however, the Court will defer signing a judgment for the amount

awarded pending the ·litigation and finalization of AVP's claims against the Defendants.

9

3. Rule 54(b} Certification
10

On September 28, 2008, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary
12

Judgment, dismissing all claims made by the Buiches against the Defendants.

On

13

November 5, 2008, the Buiches filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification. The Buiches

14

seek a 54(b) certificate directing the entry of final judgment on the Buiches' claims to

15

allow the Buiches to proceed with an appeal.

16
17 ·
18

For the reasons below, the Court will deny 54(b) certification.

Rule 54(b)(1)

'

provides in relevant part-

20

[T]he court may direct the entry of final judgment upon one or more but
less than all of the claims or parties only upon the express determination
that there is n9 just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of the judgment.

21

If a court grants 54(b) certification and an appeal is filed, the court loses jurisdiction

19

22

23

over the entire cas~, except as provided in Rule 13 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I.R.C.P. 54(b)(2). Idaho Appellate Rule 13.4 states that when an appeal is taken from a

24

54(b) certification, the Idaho Supreme Court 11can delegate jurisdiction to the District
25

Court to take specific actions and rule upon specific matters, which may include
26

jurisdiction to conduct a trial of issues." I.A.R. 13.4.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has cautioned that Rule 54(b) certification "should not
be granted routinely, or as a matter of course; it should be reserved only tor 'the
2
3

infrequent harsh case."' Ko/fn v. Saint Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 328, 940

4

P.2d 1142, 1147 (1997) (citation omitted).

s

show that it will suffer some hardship or injustice, or provide some other compelling

6

reason

7

except where an injustice would result from denial of an immediate appeal, .Rule 54-(b)

a
9

"The party requesting certification must

why the certlf~cation should be granted." Id. (citation omitted). In other words,

was not intended to abrogate the general rule against piecemeal appeals. Robertson v.
Richards, 118 Idaho 791, 793, BOO P.2d 678, 680 (1990). Mere delay Is not a hardship

10

in and of itself.

Kolln, 130 Idaho at 328, 940 P.2d at 1147 (citation omitted). The

11

12

13

decision to grant or deny a Rule 54(b) certificate is left to the discretion of the trial court.
See Id.

14

In this case, the Court can find no hardship, injustice, or compelling reason to

1s

grant a Rule 54-{b) certification. The Buiches have expressed concern over having to

16

wait to appeal until after March 2009 when the AVP trial has ended, but such an

17

inconvenience does not amount to the hardship required for a Rule 54(b) certification.

18

19

The Buiches also argue that the fact there is no Interrelation between the Buiches' case

and AV P's case is a ·compelling reason to direct the entry of final judgment. However, if

20

the Court were to grant 54(b) certification and the Buiches were to appeal, this Court
21

22

would lose jurisdictiqn over the AVP case. Even though the Idaho Supreme Court "can

23

delegate jurisdiction" to this Court, the Idaho Appellate Rules are permissive in that

24

regard. Thus, there is a real possibility the Idaho Supreme Court would not delegate

2s

jurisdiction; adjudication of the remaining issues would be delayed and a piecemeal

26

appeal would a possible threat.

The prejudice to AVP and

the remaining claims is
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greater than any prejudice the Buiches would suffer by having to wait to file an appeal
2
3

4

until after the AVP case is adjudicated. Therefore, there is a just reason for delaying

the entry of finai judgment as to the Buiches' claims, and the Court will deny 54(b)
certification.

CONCLUSION

5

6

The Court will DENY Defendants' Motion to Disallow Fees, GRANT in part

7

Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs, and DENY the Buiches' Motion for Rule 54(b)

8

Certification.
9

DATED this

J{g__ day of January 2009.

10

11
12

13

·----..

CHAEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

14

,s
16

17
18

19
20
21

22
23

24

25
26
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and correct copy of the within instrument to:

5
6

7
8

9
10
11

Thomas J. Angstman
ANGSTMAN, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
3649 N Lakeharbor Ln
Boise, ID 83703
Fax: 853-0117

Denhis M. Charney
CHARNEY LAW OFFICE
1191 E Iron Eagle Dr
Eagle, ID 83616
Fax: 938-9504

12

13

Mary V. York
HOLLAND & HART LLP
101 S Capitol Blvd,Ste 1400

14

PO Box2527

15

Boise, ID 83701-2527
Fax: 343-8869

16

J. DAVfD NAVARRO

_
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17
18
19
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ORIGINAL
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-10095

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND NOTICE
OF TENDER OF FUNDS AND
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND NOTICE OF TENDER OF FUNDS AND SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT -1
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...

Pursuant to the Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment filed May 25,
2012 and the Court's Judgment filed June 4, 2012, Plaintiff State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation
Board ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby tenders
payment to the Court by way of the State's Warrant No. 125506469 in amount of $140,813.58
made payable to the Kootenai County, Clerk.
The attached payment by ITD constitutes satisfaction in full of the Judgment entered in
this case and payment of just compensation to Grathol pursuant to the May 25th Post-Trial
Memorandum Decision and Order and the June 4th Judgment.
DATED this 19th day of June, 2012.

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND NOTICE OF TENDER OF FUNDS AND SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT -2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884

D
D
~

D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
IO I South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-I 0-10095

SECOND JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF CONDEMNATION

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES I through 5,
Defendants.
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THIS COURT on the 4th day of June, 2012, entered a Judgment adjudging that
Defendants are entitled to recover from the Plaintiff the sum of $140,813.58. Plaintiff has now
fully satisfied said Judgment. Therefore, pursuant to the Judgment and Idaho Code§ 7-716,
THIS COURT now enters this Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation:
NOW THEREFORE, IT rs HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Grathol is the owner in fee simple of the real property, which is the subject of this

condemnation action.
2.

Defendant Sterling Savings Bank was dismissed as a party to this action on

December 22, 2010.
3.

In this action, ITD has condemned and acquired a portion of Grathol' s real

property as part ofITD's project to widen and improve Highway 95. The particular segment of
the Project for which Grathol's property is required is U.S. 95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage,
Project No. A009(791) Key No. 9791.
4.

As part of its US-95 Project, ITD requires 16.314 acres ofGrathol's 56.8 acre

parcel. A legal description of the portion of Grathol's property condemned and acquired by ITD
is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A.
5.

The taking of the property and property rights condemned herein, and hereinafter

described is for a public use, authorized by law, and is necessary for the public use as a right-ofway for a public highway known as U.S. 95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, Project No.
A009(791) Key No. 9791, which has been and is located in a manner most compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury.
6.

ITD has sought in good faith to purchase from Grathol the necessary and required

real property and improvements located on that real property for the Project.

SECOND JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF CONDEMNATION - 2
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7.

Grathol has recovered Judgment against ITD in the sum of SIX HUNDRED

SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($675,000), together with
accrued interest on this sum in the amount of $36,813.58, less the sum of $571,000 previously
paid by ITD to the Cou..rt, making a net Judgment in the amou.11t of $140,813.58.

8.

Pursuant to the Notice of Tender of Funds and Satisfaction of Judgment filed by

ITD on June 19, 2012, ITD has tendered to the Court all sums due in on the Judgment in the
amount of $140,813.58 and thereby satisfied in full the Judgment entered in this case. This sum
has been deposited with the Court. The funds on deposit will be disbursed to Grathol by the
Clerk of the Court.
9.

This total amount paid, combined with the sums previously paid by ITD in this

matter, constitutes "Just Compensation" to Grathol within the meaning of Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of the State of Idaho and includes payment for the value of the property taken by
ITD, the value of any resulting damages to Grathol's property, and any and all claims by Grathol
for the taking of a portion of its property by ITD.
10.

The described property and property rights are hereby condemned and taken for

the use of the State ofldaho.
11.

The property condemned and taken herein is situated in Kootenai County, State of

Idaho, and is more particularly described as follows:
a)

12.

All right, title, interest and fee title in approximatelyl6.314 acres of
property more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and
incorporated herein by this reference.

In consideration of the aforementioned payment and other consideration by ITD

to Grathol, all right, title, interest and fee title to the requirement described in Exhibit A is hereby
vested in and conveyed to the State of Idaho.
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DATED thisdl_ day of June, 2012.

Hon. Charles W. Hosack
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

--
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I hereby certify that on this
day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Fax: 208-664-5884
MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Fax: 208-343-8869

~D
D
D

~

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS
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Idaho Transportation Department
US-95, Garwood to Sagle - Athol Segment
Project No. A009(791)
Key No. 09791

August 2, 2010
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000
And 53N03W-10-6100
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres)
Page I of 3

PARCEL19
ITD PID 0044775
FEE ACQUISITION
A tract ofland being a portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (SW4
SW4) of Section 10, Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County,
Idaho, more particularly described as folJows:

COMMENCING at the Southwest Comer of said Section 10, marked by a found railroad
spike as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 207654000; thence along
the west line of said Section 10, North 1°27'15" East, a distance of2652.41 feet to the West
Quarter Corner of said Section 10, monumented by a found 2-1 /2 inch diameter aluminum
cap marked "E 1/4 Sect. 9 T53N R3W", as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing
Record No. 1213669; thence South 1°27' 15'' West, a distance of 1431.97 feet; thence South
89°43'43" East, a distance of23.30 feet to the intersection of the south line of that parcel of
land taken by the United States of America by Decree of Condemnation, recorded in Book 20
of Miscellaneous Records, Page 436, records of Kootenai County, Idaho with the east right
of way line of State Highway 95, Project No. FAP 100D(2); thence along the southerly
boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, South 89°43 '43" East, a
distance of256.23 feet to a point being 206.83 feet left of Station 983+30.84 ofUS-95,
Proj~t No. A009(791) Highway Survey said point being the TRUE POINT OF
BEGINNING;
thence continuing along the southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of
Condemnation, South 89°43'43" East, a distance of 471.67 feet to a point being 255.32 feet
right of Station 982+37.0l ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) Highway Survey;
thence South 21°05'02" East, a distance of 177.16 feet to a point 165.00 feet south of the
southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, said point
being 291.85 feet right of Station 980+76.27 ofUS~95, Project No. A009(791) Highway
Survey;
thence South 21°05'02" East, a distance of537.93 feet to a point on a 1173.00 foot radius
curve to the right, concave to the southwest, the center of which bears South 68°54'58" West,
said point being449.91 feet right of Station 976+1 l.17 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(79i)
Highway Survey;
thence southerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 17°47'36", an arc distance of
364.28 feet, a chord bearing of South 12°11 '14" East, and a chord distance of362.81 feet to
a point on the north line of that st.rip conveyed to the State ofidaho in Deed recorded January

EXHIBIT

I

A
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Idaho Transportation Department
US-95, Garwood to Sagle - Athol Segment
Project No. _A009(791)

August 2, 2010
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000
And 53N03W-10-6100
Key No. 09791
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres)
Page 2 of3
31, 1967 as Instrument No. 504394, said point being 532.67 feet right of Station 972+69.12
ofUS-95; Project No. A0O9(791) Highway Survey;

thence along the north boundary of said strip North 89°43'25,. West, a distance of923.35
feet to a point 165.00 feet (10 rods) east of the east right of way line of said State Highway
95, Project No. FAP 100D(2) and from which a 5/8" rebar with plastic cap, as shown per
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears South 89°48'01" East, 1.88 fee4 more or
less, said point being 390.57 feet left of Station 972+54.46 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791)
Highway Survey;
thence parallel with and 165.00 feet east of said east right of way line, North 1°29'39" East, a
distance of 429.85 feet to a point 528.00 feet (32 rods) north of the north right of way line of
State Highway 54, Project No. FAP ANFAS 61 and from which a 1" steel pin, as shown per
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears North 62°05'52" East, 3.13 feet, more or
less, said point being 384.24 feet left of Station 977+03.96 ofUS-95, Project No. A009{791)
Highway Survey;
thence South 89°43'25" East, a distance of 115.52 feet, to a point on a 1738.51 foot radius
non-tangent curve to the left, concave to the west, the center of which bears North 81 °05 '00"
West, said point being 268.78 feet left of Station 976+99.56 of US-95, Project No.
A009{791) Highway Survey;
thence northerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 14°03'44", an arc distance of
426.69 feet, a chord bearing of North 1°53 '08" East, and a chord distance of 425.62 feet to a
point being i65.00 feet south of the south line of that parcel described by said Decree of
Condemnation; said point being 214.69 feet left Station 981+53.58 ofUS-95, Project No.
A009(791) Highway Survey;
thence continuing northerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 5°29'44'', an arc
distance of 166. 75 feet, a chord bearing of North 7°53 '36'' West, and a chord distance of
166.69 feet, to the POINT OF BEGINNING..
Said Tract contains 710,634 square feet or 16.314 acres, more or less.
Located between Project Centerline Stations 972+54.46 Left and 983+30.84 Left.
Together with and subject to covenants, easements and restrictions of record.
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Idaho Transportation Department
US-95, Garwood to Sagle- Athol Segment
Project No. A009(791)

August 2, 2010
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000
And 53N03W-10-6100
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres)
Key No. 09791
_
Page3 of3
Basis of bearing is North 1°27' 15" East, a distance of 2652.41 feet, between a fourid railroad
spike, per Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 2076S4000 marking the Southwest
comer of Section 10, and the found 2-1/2 inch diameter aluminum cap monument, per Comer
Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 1213669, marking the West Quarter comer of Section
10, both in Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian.
Prepared by David Evans and Associates, Inc August 2, 2010
End of Description

Duane L Zimrnennan, P.L.S.

License No. 865S
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In the Supreme Court of the g\ite of Idaho
2012 JUL -2 AH 9: IJ6
STATE OF IDAHO,
TRANSPORTATION,

DEPARTMENT

Plaintiff-Respondent,

OF)
)
)
)
)

V.

)

)
)
)
Defendant-Appellant,
)
)
and
)
)
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington)
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
)
)
Defendants.
)

REMITTITUR
Supreme Court Docket No. 38511
Kootenai County Court No. 201010095

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership,

TO:

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI.

The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause June 1, 2012, which has
now become final; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required, and;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent IDT's costs on appeal in the
amount of$463.40 be, and herew are, allowed.
DATED this

05

day of June, 2012.

Clerk of t h e ~ Court
STATE OF IDAHO
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge
Publisher(s)
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STATE-OF tOAHO

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Dougias S, Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPART1\1ENT, by and through THE IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

Defendants.

CO1\1ES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through their counsel of record, Ramsden
& Lyons, LLP, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) and (e)(6), and hereby objects and moves to
disallow the claimed costs and attorney's fees of the Plaintiff set forth in the memorandum filed
by Plaintiff on June 18, 2012. Defendant's objection to the claimed costs and attorney's fees is
made on the following basis:
(a)

I

COUNTY OF KOOTENAtf SS
FILED:

Plaintiff has failed to identify the statutory basis for an award of fees to a
government entity ;
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(b)

Plaintiff fails to argue that the Defendant acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law;

( c)

The Acarrequi factors only provide for an award of attorney fees to a condemnee
in the event such condemnee is found to be a prevaiiing party;

(d)

Plaintiffs December 15, 2011 offer was not made within a reasonable time after
the institution of the action for condemnation;

(e)

The Judgment entered by the Court exceeded Plaintiffs pre-litigation offer by
$104,000 (18%);

(f)

The application for costs and fees fails to comport to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3); and

(g)

The costs and attorney's fees claimed are unreasonable and excessive.

This objection is further supported by Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Disallow and Objection to Plaintiffs Application for Attorneys Fees and Costs and the
supporting Affidavits filed concurrently herewith.

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2012.

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

~,,~~·~.opher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

/4

J. Ti.in Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

!vfail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~SMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Case No. CV-10-10095

Plaintiff,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS

Defendants.

COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden
& Lyons, LLP, and hereby submits Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Fees and

Costs.
INTRODUCTION

This case involved the condemnation of private property for a highway improvement
project. As condemnation cases go, it was more complicated than some, but nothing about this
case merits ITD's claimed expenditures (of costs and attorney fees) totaling over $906,000.00,

__,

and nothing about this case merits ITD trying to impose those costs and fees upon HJ Grathol

<(
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-2

-

as the condemnee.
ARGUMENT
1.

ITD is not entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121.

In order to be awarded attorney fees, a part'y must actually assert the specific statute or
common law rule on which the award is based. It is incumbent on the moving party to assert the
grounds upon which it seeks an award of attorney fees. The district court is not empowered to
award fees on a basis not asserted by the moving party. Bingham v. Montane Resource

Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999). Further, the support for the request for fees
must be garnered by the court and counsel at the time the request is made. Fournier v. Fournier,
125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600,602 (Ct.App.1994).

In support of its claim for attorney's fees, ITD has only argued it is entitled to fees under
one authority: Idaho Code § 12-121. ITD has not argued any other authority in support of its
request for fees and costs. Because ITD has failed to cite any other statutory basis in its request
for fees, and because §12-121 is inapplicable, ITD's claim for fees must be denied.
Section § 12-121 of the Idaho Code is inapplicable to ITD as demonstrated through prior
case law and specifically the "law of the case;" - that is the law of this case.

On

June

1,

2012, two weeks prior to ITD's filing of its Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, the Idaho
Supreme Court issued its decision on Grathol's appeal (of the grant of early possession taken
during these condemnation proceedings).

1

On appeal (as here), ITD sought attorneys fees

citing Idaho Code § 12-121. ITD argued that HJ Grathol acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law in contesting the scope of the take.

The Idaho Supreme Court rejected ITD's

1 A copy of that decision is even attached as Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Mary York in Support of ITD' s Motion
for Fees.
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argument for fees and expressly held that Idaho Code § 12-121 is inapplicable to ITD. The
Court's ruling could not be clearer:
This Court denies the Board's request because LC. § 12-117 is the
exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees for actions
involving state entities. See Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch Sch.
Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010).
See, State v. HJGrathol, Docket No. 38511, June 1, 2012 at p. 8. (emphasis added)

The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a
case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho,
NA., 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985) (quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 180 Mont. 434, 435, 591 P.2d 196, 197 (1979); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201

P.3d 1282, 1286, 2009 WL 213074 (2009).
Here, the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly ruled only four weeks ago that§ 12-121 does
not allow for fees to ITD, yet ITD now again requests an award under that code section,
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision.

ITD makes no effort to explain any basis for

differentiating this fee application from the one that the Supreme Court just rejected and ITD
offers no argument for the modification of that "law of the case."

If any action is worthy of

§12-121 sanctions (or I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l)) in this case, it is ITD's filing of this motion in direct
contravention of the Supreme Court's clear directive in this very case.

2.

ITD is not entitled to attorneys' fees or costs under Acarrequi.
Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) does

not provide any authority for the notion that the condemning party may recover attorney fees
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from the condemnee. In Acarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the appeal of the trial
court's automatic award of fees to the landowner in a condemnation proceeding. In that case
the landowner moved for costs/fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5). The
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the district court's automatic award of attorney's fees and
adopted a new standard governing the award of attorney's fees to condemnees.
The Acarrequi Court recognized that the requirements of demonstrating frivolity,
unreasonableness or lack of foundation by the State to award a condemnee attorneys fees
(under Idaho Code § 12-121) presented too great a burden on the landowner since it is "seldom
that that a government entity can be shown to have initiated a condemnation action frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. at 876-877, 673 P.2d 1070-1071. Thus the Court
found that "any opportunity to seek attorney's fees by the condemnee would lie only in the
condemnor's failure to make a reasonable offer of settlement, which inaction forces the
condemnee to trial with the resultant expenses for attorneys' fees." Id. at 877, 673 P.2d 1071.
(emphasis added) The Acarrequi Court recognized that a condemnee has done nothing to bring
an action upon himself except by having owned property the State has chosen to appropriate.
Id. Therefore, holding the condemnee to a standard of proof that the State acted unreasonably
or frivolously would all but deprive the condemnee of a basis to recoup his legal costs for
having been sued in the first place.
The Acarrequi Court noted that under prior case law, condemnors were required to pay
all costs incurred in the condemnation proceedings. Id. at 876, 673 P.2d 1070, citing Idaho
Code§ 7-717; Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931); Rawson-Works Lumber
Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914). Based on these holdings, the Acarrequi
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Court carved out a new "rule" that would allow for an award of attorney's fees to the
condemnee, guided by the court's discretion and the condemnee's costs could be awarded

under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). Id. at 877,673 P.2d at 1071.
Acarrequi then laid out some guiding principles for the trial court to consider m
exercising its discretion to award fees and costs to a condemnee. In doing so, the Court
emphasized that those principles were not rigid guidelines within which a trial court is required
to operate but instead were factors to be considered in evaluating a condemnee's fee request. Id.
at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072. Nowhere did the Acarrequi court hold that its guiding principles
should ever inure to the benefit of the condemnor.

In fact, Acarrequi holds that "except in the most extreme and unlikely situation, we
cannot envision an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor." Id. at 878, 673 P.2d

1072. ( emphasis added) The Court then observed that, while a ultimate verdict is far from a
perfect point of departure in gauging the reasonableness of the positions of the parties prior to
trial, the Court would assume that a jury verdict would approximate the true just compensation
owed. Id. Because a verdict should be more reliable than the "highly divergent evidence of
values," the Court held that such verdict would approximate true "just compensation" within a
margin of error of 10% ±- Thus, was created the "Acarrequi rule," holding that "in considering
whether to award attorneys' fees to a condemnee, a condemnor must have reasonably made a
timely offer of settlement of at least 90% of the ultimate [award]." Id. at 878, 1172. (emphasis

added)
Clarifying what is meant by way of a "timely" offer of settlement, the Court stated:
An offer should be made within a reasonable period after the
initiation of the action, to relieve the condemnee not only of the
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expense but of the time, inconvenience and apprehension
involved in such litigation, and also to eliminate the cloud which
may hang over the condemnee's title to the property.
Id. at 878, 1172.

Subsequently, in State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318 (1997), the Idaho
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's award of attorneys' fees to the condemnee who did not
"beat" the State's "Acarrequi offer." The Jardine Court found that the lower court did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to consider the State's "Acarrequi offer" because the offer
was not made within a "reasonable period after the institution of the action." In Jardine, the
condemnor's offer was made more than eight months after it filed the condemnation action, and
by the time the offer was made, Jardine had already incurred substantial costs and the net result
of any of such offers would have "netted" the condemnee little benefit. Id. at 322, 940 P.2d
1141.
Here, ITD claims that it should be entitled to attorneys' fees and costs solely by reason
that the ultimate award of $675,000 was less than ITD's "Acarrequi offer" of December 15,
2011. However, ITD initially offered Grathol only $571,000 as total just compensation for the
subject property. This was ITD's offer at the time the Complaint was filed on November 19,
2010, and no subsequent offer was made by ITD until thirteen months after the Complaint was
filed.

Moreover, by the time ITD's subsequent "Acarrequi offer" was made, Grathol had

already retained lawyers, experts, defended extensive motion practice, attended depositions,
engaged in extensive discovery and had incurred significant costs. It was not until over a year
of litigation had taken place that ITD finally offered something greater than what the court
ultimately awarded.
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3. Idaho case law has never held that a condemnor is entitled to attorneys' fees or
costs in a condemnation proceeding.

There is not a single published Idaho case in which attorneys' fees have been awarded to
a condemnor. In fact, Defendant's counsel has been unable to locate a single case anywhere which supports ITD's claim for fees. Presumably, if any such case existed, ITD would have
cited to it.
Instead, to support its motion, ITD flatly misrepresents the holding in State v. Ivan H.
Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 699 (1991). ITD claims (erroneously) that
Talbot extended the application of the Acarrequi cost and fees analysis to apply to both the

landowner and the State. Not so. The Supreme Court in Talbot simply clarified the construction
of the Acarrequi factors for a condemnee so as to reconcile those factors with I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(B). Id. at 829, 820 P.2d 699. The Talbot Court never extended those factors for an
award of fees to a condemnor. Instead, Talbot simply reaffirmed the lower court's ruling that
the landowner in that case was not the 'prevailing party' for an award of attorneys' fees. This
holding is dramatically different from what ITD claims Talbot says.

ITD asserts that Talbot

says a condemning agency was found to be a prevailing party for purposes of a fee award.
Nonsense. No such finding was made in Talbot. Indeed the State was even denied attorneys'
fees on appeal in that case. Id. ITD misrepresents Talbot to support its arguments. Grathol
implores this Court to simply read Talbot to see the truth.
4. ITD is not the prevailing party for purposes of assessing costs.

The application of the Acarrequi factors are to be applied as part of the discretionary
function of the court in determining whether to award a condemnee not just fees, but also costs.
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In the conclusions of the Jardine opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court summarized the
intent, rationale and application of Acarrequi:
Acarrequi created a basis for the discretionary award of attorney
fees "to the condemnee without a showing and finding that the
action was brought and pursued 'frivolously, unreasonable or
without foundation,' as required under LC. § 12-121 and
LR.C.P.54(e)(l). 105 Idaho at 876-77, 673 P.2d 1070-71. The
Court said that one of the rationales for this approach is to relieve
the condemnee of the expense of defending against the
condemnation where the condemnee is determined to be the
prevailing party. Id. at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072. Otherwise a
condemnee who is determined to be a prevailing party will be
deprived of part of the just compensation to which the condemnee
is entitled. Idaho Const. art. I, § 14; LC. § 7-717. See also
Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 46, 141
P. 74, 76 (1914) ("It has been established by the decisions of this
court and is well supported by the principles of justice and the
constitution that the condemnor must pay just compensation for
the property taken and must pay all costs necessarily incurred in
the condemnation proceedings.")
Jardine at 322-23, 940 P.2d 1141-42.

The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly defined the

discretionary parameters for an award of attorneys' costs to a condemnee. It has never applied
such factors to a request for fees or costs by a condemnor as it "could not envision" an award of
fees and costs to a condemnor. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1072.
ITD's interpretation of Acarrequi and Jardine is legally unsupported.

The factors

enunciated in those cases do not apply in the reverse to allow a condemnor to claim fees and
costs. ITD's argument fails factually as well as procedurally. As stated in Acarrequi and as
reaffirmed in Jardine, in order to constitute a reasonable offer of settlement, a condemnor must
make the offer within a reasonable period of time after initiation of the action in order to
relieve the condemnee of the expenses involved in such litigation. Acarrequi at 878, 673 P .2d at
1072. Jardine at 322-23, 940 P.2d 1141-42. In Jardine, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
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court's discretionary finding that an offer made eight months after the suit was filed would not
be taken into account in determining whether the condemnee was entitled to fees. Instead, the
trial court only considered the State's initial offer and compared that with the verdict; finding
that the condemnee prevailed when compared to the initial offer.
In this case, on June 17, 2010, four months before the Complaint was filed, ITD
presented an offer to Grathol in the amount of $571,000.00 - based on the appraisal of Stan
Moe. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit C.
On June 28, 2010, Grathol rejected ITD's offer, indicating what its review of
comparable properties would yield. Grathol did not present a demand, merely an assessment of
its view of values. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit D.
On October 27, 2010 (prior to the Complaint), Grathol informed ITD's counsel that it
valued the take in the area of $3.5M. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees,
Exhibit E. Further discussions led to Grathol offering to settle for $2.8M.
On November 17, 2010, ITD rejected Grathol's offer of $2.8M but did not make a
counter proposal for settlement. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees,
Exhibit F. {Of note in this communication is that ITD impresses on Grathol the importance of
granting early possession of the property as an element for the Court to consider in awarding a
property owner attorney fees in a condemnation case. ITD never once claimed that it would be
entitled to attorneys' fees under the same grounds until it filed this specious motion.}
On that same date, November 17, 2010, ITD filed its Complaint. On December 21, 2010
ITD moved for possession of the Subject Property and tendered the amount of $571,000.00 as
just compensation to the Court pending the ultimate resolution on the issue of just
compensation.
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On November 17, 2011, Grathol communicated with ITD questioning the status of
Grathol's prior offer of settlement. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees,
Exhibit G. Grathol suggested to ITD that it should avoid the risks associated with trial and
possibly an appeal and advised ITD that even if the Court did not award any additional
amounts, ITD would not be entitled to attorneys fees and costs.
On December 15, 2011, ITD submitted its purported "Acarrequi" offer in the amount of
$1.lM, which Grathol rejected after determining that the offer included the amount already
deposited with the Court. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit
H. On December 19, 2011, ITD disclosed its "rebuttal experts" and produced a copy of the
Pynes appraisal which set forth an estimate of"just compensation of $625,000.00." Affidavit of
Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit I.

On December 29, 2011, Grathol presented a counter offer in the amount of
$2,450,000.00 together with payment of either all of Grathol's attorney's fees to date or 80% of
ITD's attorneys' fees, whichever was less. Affidavit a/Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to
Fees, Exhibit J. On January 10, 2012, ITD rejected Grathol's offer of settlement. Affidavit of
Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit K.

More than a year after making its only "timely" offer of $571,000, ITD produced a
"rebuttal" appraisal report of Pynes, which provided a value of just compensation in the amount
of $675,000. Pynes' opinion of value was $104,000 higher than ITD's initial offer. The Court
ultimately adopted Pynes' value opinion and awarded Grathol $675,000.00. This amount is in
addition to over $906,000.00 ITD claims it spent in fees and costs to achieve the outcome. Yet,
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ITD now claims that it is the "prevailing party." Spending nearly $1.58 million2 to condemn a
parcel supposedly worth $571,000.00 does not sound like a "prevailing party. Even if
Acarrequi and its progeny allowed the condemnor to be awarded fees and costs (which they do

not), ITD never submitted a qualifying "Acarrequi offer" within a reasonabie period of time
after the action was initiated. Waiting thirteen months to submit an offer, while burning

through hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs and fees is unreasonable.
A condemnation "is not a market overt situation ... there is no room for the condemnor to
offer less than the ascertained value, and thereafter bargain and haggle. The condemnor ... must
fairly and openly deal with the landowner." Acarrequi at 879 (Bistline, dissenting).

ITD's

best "offer" was only made after Grathol had incurred substantial costs and fees defending the
litigation. Because ITD delayed the submission of its "Acarrequi offer" until well into the
litigation, and Grathol had already been forced to incur substantial costs; the December 15,
2011 communication was not a qualifying "Acarrequi offer" and the Court should rightly
compare the ultimate award to the only timely offer made. The only offer that was timely
submitted by ITD was its initial offer of $571,000. The ultimate award was $104,000.00
greater than that offer, an increase in favor of Grathol of 18% ($104,000/$571,000). That
makes Grathol the prevailing party. By reason of its efforts in defending the litigation, Grathol
received 18% more than was ever timely offered by ITD.
5. ITD's attorneys repeatedly misrepresent Grathol's position
compensation" in order to justify their excessive attorneys' fees.

on

"just

There is a quote widely attributed to Germany's infamous Propaganda Minister Joseph
Goebbels that is apropos here:

"If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people
2

will

$675,000.00 plus ITD's claimed costs and fees of$906,000.00 = $1,581,000.00.
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eventually come to believe it.*** The truth is the mortal enemy of the
lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy ofthe State. "

Here the "State" (or perhaps more accurately the attorneys for the State) repeatedly
misrepresent what Grathol sought as just compensation. In fact, in the motion papers filed in
support of its request for fees and costs, ITD states no less than five times that Grathol allegedly
demanded over $7 million as just compensation. 3 For ITD to make such a claim on five
separate occasions, it must be of significant importance to that party and must be supported by
facts. However, as with much of the arguments for its outrageous fee request, the truth behind
ITD's hyperbole is non-existent.
Grathol never demanded $7,369,500.00 in just compensation in this case. Never - and
ITD's counsel knows it. 4 Normally such misrepresentations could be chalked up to overly
exuberant advocacy. However, given the context in which this argument is raised, and raised
again and again, it is apparent that ITD's counsel is trying to mislead this Court, and perhaps
others, in order to try to justify the enormous fees it claims and the lavish costs it expended.
Such actions cannot be countenanced and such misrepresentations should not be tolerated by
this, or any, Court.

ITD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 2. ("HJ Grathol had initially sought over $7 million in just
compensation.")
ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, pp. 2, 11, 26. ("Yet Grathol made demands and
sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking of J6.314 acres of the 56.8-acre parcel.") ("Grathol
made demands and sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking.") ("Grathol sought to recover as
much as $7,369,500.00 in this case ... ")
Affidavit of Mary York in Support ofITD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 4. (" ... $7,000.000 originally
sought by Grathol. .. ")
4 Hrg. on Feb. 22. 2011, M. York preliminary remarks: " ... Grathol has asserted more than $7 million in
damages ... " Hrg. Tr. p.5.
D. Marfice: Regarding York's representation to the court that Grathol seeks: " ... $7 million - it has never been the
defendant's position that that's the measure of compensation that is appropriate here." Hrg. Tr. P. 656.
3
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ITD's brief repeatedly claims that Grathol "made demands" and "sought to recover" as
much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking. As support, ITD cites as follows: "(see Grathol's Third
Supp. Resps. To Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. 29, 2012 York Affidavit.)" ITD's Brief at pp.
2, 11. However, the discovery responses cited to by ITD don't say anything of the sort. The
specific response provides, in pertinent part:
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remammg
property on the assumption of at least an additional three year
delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also, it
should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer
system to significantly fewer users will greatly decrease the
value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of 10% per
annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a
reduced value of $947,000. To summarize $2,532,578 in the
land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials
+ a reduction in value for the remaining property waiting
for completion of construction of $947,000 = $3,779,578. This
is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just
compensation for the take.
(See, Grathol's Third Supplemental Responses to Discovery at 7-8), Affidavit of Christopher D.
Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, at Exhibit A. It is important to note that the information
provided above was in response to ITD's broad, all-encompassing interrogatory requesting the
subject matter and every nuance upon which all experts were expected to testify. The
information provided in response above was about Alan Johnson's potential testimony. The
interrogatory cited does not, in any reasonable interpretation, support the position asserted by
ITD that Grathol "demanded" or even "sought" $7M. The response to interrogatories was not a
demand for just compensation.

It was an explanation by Johnson of the potential profit

expected by Grathol. ITD knows this, and the offers of settlement confirm it.
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None of the Grathol's offers of settlement described in Section 4 above even come close
to the $7.4 million dollar number being repeatedly, and disingenuously, thrown around by ITD.
The simple truth of the matter is this: The highest settlement demand/request ever made by
Grathol was $2.8 million. ITD rejected that and then proceeded to spend a minion doHars
litigating.
In fact, the only talk of any numbers even approximating the amounts ITD is alleging as
"demands" was during the deposition of Alan Johnson on November 18, 2011 when Johnson
was asked (by ITD's counsel) to explain what Johnson described as an "alternative analysis"
which was intended to "give a different perspective as to if we were to develop the property
what the anticipated value would be of the site if it was developed as it exists today without the
take." Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support ofDefendant's Objection to Fees, Exhibit
B, Depa. Johnson at p. 104, 11. 15-18. This was Johnson's analysis as to why the development
of the Grathol parcel made economic sense to him. It was not a "demand."
Johnson testified that the potential profit to be realized from the development of the
property with and without the take:
Q.
And that, I have written down as $1,493,000. So we'll say
according to this alternative theory, in the after condition, or after
the project's completed --- let me rephrase that. How would you
characterize the 1.493 million dollars?
A.
I would characterize that as the potential profit after the
take.
Q.
Potential profit after the take. And the potential profit
without the take is $8,670,000. Correct?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
To get what you believe --- what you'll be damaged by the
take is you would take the 8.67 number and subtract the
$1,493,000. Is that correct?
A.
That would be legitimate, yes.
Q.
Is that what you anticipate testifying to regarding this
alternative theory?
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A.
Yes.
Q.
So then if my numbers are correct, if you subtract those
two numbers, that's approximately $7,177,000 in lost profits.
I've not done the calculation, but I will agree to use your
A.
number.

Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit B, Depa. Johnson at pp.
111-112, 11. 20-2, 1-17. Again, in this response to ITD' s attorney's questioning, Johnson talked
about the fact that, in his opinion, the condemnation could affect the profitability of the
development. Is this the support for ITD's claims that Grathol "demanded" $7.4M in just
compensation for the taking? Johnson never said that. Grathol never demanded that.
ITD's counsel is fully aware of the scope and extent of Grathol's settlement demands
and are acutely aware that Grathol never demanded anything even close to $7 million.
Unfortunately it appears that ITD ( or more accurately ITD's counsel) are purposely
misrepresenting Grathol's settlement communications to the Court in order to justify the
exorbitant amounts of attorney's fees and costs being claimed. While ITD's attorneys may have
been able to justify spending nearly $IM in fees and costs to avoid a fictional $7.4M claim,
such justifications are eroded when one acknowledges the demands by Grathol were far less.
ITD's representations to the Court as to the nature of these settlement discussions is
especially troubling in light of the legally unsupported position it is taking with respect to the
authority to award a condemnor attorneys' fees in the first instance. These assertions are both
factually and legally unsupported and calls into question ITD's obligations toward truthfulness
in its representations to the Court. ITD's Motion accuses Grathol of "costly ... abuses and
tactics" but ITD misrepresents legitimate discovery disagreement and arguments for damages
as somehow being "vexatious." ITD even claims that Grathol's declination of court-ordered
mediation indicated "the unwillingness of Grathol to try to resolve this matter." See, ITD's
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Brief in Support, p. 3. This is also directly misleading in that it was Grathol which proposed

mediation (more than once) and ITD declined!
6.

An award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor would be unconstitutional.
The just compensation clause of the Fifth A.i11endn1ent of the United States Constitution

provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
United States Constitution 5th Amendment.

The Idaho Constitution also guarantees its citizens the right of due process if private
property is taken for a public use, pursuant to Article I, § 13, and provides for just
compensation for such a taking, pursuant to Article I,§ 14.
The failure to award attorney's fees incurred by a condemnee when it is determined to
be prevailing under the Acarrequi factors would unconstitutionally deprive the condemnee of
part of the just compensation to which it is entitled. State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho
318,940 P.2d 1137 (1997).
While Idaho Courts appear to have moved away from the premise that a condemnee is
automatically entitled to its costs and fees in a condemnation action, there is no authority for

ITD's proposition that a condemnor should ever be awarded fees. Such holding would not only
reduce the actual just compensation owed for the taking as found by the court or jury, but could
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result in the perverse outcome of a landowner being forced to pay the condemnor more than the
landowner's just compensation. In fact, that is precisely the result ITD seeks here.
In this case, ITD seeks $906,318.65 in fees and costs to be off-set against the award of
$675,000.00 determined as just compensation. Tne obvious impact of this request is that, if

granted, Grathol would be liable to ITD for $231,318.65 5 above and beyond the amount of just
compensation Grathol received for 16 acres of its prime development property. At the end of
the day, not only would the condemnee have its property taken but it would end up paying for
the privilege simply because it opposed the State's assertion of what the property is worth. This
result is even more perverse when you consider that as a result of Grathol's efforts at litigation,
it increased the ultimate award by 18% over ITD's only timely offer.
While Idaho case law has placed some constraints on the ability of a property owner to
recover its own fees and costs, no courts in Idaho, nor anywhere else, have suggested that the
amount of constitutionally required just compensation could ever be reduced by the
condemnor's costs. Indeed, Idaho courts even recognize that interest must be paid on amounts
offered by the condemnor to avoid failing to fully compensate the property owner for the loss of
use of the property before just compensation is determined at trial. The failure to include such
interest violates the intent of Article 1, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution. Coeur d'Alene

Garbage Serv. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 114 Idaho 588, 593, 759 P.2d 879, 884 (1988).
Idaho case law has recognized for over a century that condemnations are special actions
where the condemnor should be required to pay for all costs of the proceeding. Rawson-Works

Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914), citing PortneufMarch Irr. Co. v.

5

This amount does not include Grathol's attorneys' fees. See, Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert.
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Portneuf Irr. Co., 19 Idaho 483, 114 P. 19 (1911). These cases have not been overturned or

abrogated and no other case has ever held that a condemnee's right just compensation could be
reduced by an award of attorneys' fees back to the condemnor. Because such a reduction
would be constitutionally infirm under both Idaho's Constitution and the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment; IID's request for costs and fees must be denied on that basis as well.
7.

ITD's Claim to costs must be denied.

Rule 54(d)( 1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure deals with costs and the items allowed.
Costs are allowed to the prevailing party unless otherwise ordered by the court; the court
determines who the prevailing party is, and whether a party prevailed in part and did not
prevail in part and apportions costs accordingly. Some costs are allowed as a matter of right,
while others are discretionary and allowed when " ... they were necessary and exceptional
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the
adverse party." (Emphasis added.)

However, in condemnation actions, Idaho case law

provides that a condemnor is liable for all costs of the proceeding. Rawson-Works Lumber
Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914), citing Portneuf-March Irr. Co. v. Portneuf
Irr. Co., 19 Idaho 483, 114 P. 19 (1911). Further, even if there were legal support on which

the court could award costs to the condemnor, ITD was not a "prevailing party" under the
traditional interpretation of Rule 54(d)(l) since it ended up paying more than the amount of
its own initial appraisal/offer for the Grathol property. ITD's December 15, 2011 offer was
not presented within a reasonable time after the initiation of the litigation and was only made
after Grathol had incurred substantial costs and fees in defending the condemnation action.
As such, ITD cannot claim it is the prevailing party for an award of costs. Further objections
to ITD's claimed costs "as a matter of right" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) are as follows:
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d. Travel expenses of witness - ITD's claim of travel expenses for Hedley
Construction at $386.70 is unreasonable. Hedley's testimony added nothing to further ITD's
position as demonstrated by the fact that Hedley wasn't even mentioned in the court's
1

1

•

•

memoranaum aec1s1on.

6

e. Expenses for certified copies of documents (Lis Pendens and Possession Order) IRCP 54(d)(l)(C)(5) allows this cost to a prevailing party if the certified copies were admitted
as evidence in a hearing or the trial of an action. ITD fails to identify when such certified copies
were admitted into evidence or for what purpose.
f. Preparation of exhibits - ITD fails to provide any information to support the claim of
$295.46 for the preparation of trial exhibits.
h. Expert witness fees -ITD request $6,000.00 for expert witness fees for its experts to
testify at trial. Grathol objects that some of these expert fees were not reasonably incurred. Stan
Moe's testimony was severely impeached by inconsistencies in his reporting practices and
subscribing different values to appraisals of the same property at the same time and the trial
court apparently disregarded his testimony. Additionally, ITD's claim of expert witness fees for
George Hedley is not reasonably incurred in the sense that Hedley's testimony added nothing to
further ITD's position and instead only supported Grathol's claim of severance damage.
i. Charges for reporting and transcribing - ITD seeks $5,684.10 for charges of

reporting and transcribing depositions of Johnson, Reeslund, Sherwood, Terrell and
Vandervert. The costs of these depositions are not reasonable, and are objected to by reason of
the fact that they were unnecessary for the preparation of the case for trial. Not one of the

6

Additionally, Grathol maintains that Hedley actually proved greater severance damages than Grathol was seeking.
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depositions was entered into evidence or read to a witness at trial.
j. Charges for copy of Deposition - ITD also seeks to recover $319.10 for copies of
depositions of its own appraiser. These costs were unnecessary to prepare for the trial on the
vaiuation of the Subject Property and as with all costs, are those to be borne by the condemn.or
in condemnation proceedings.
Last, ITD requests $196,103.59 as "discretionary costs" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).
These costs are mostly attributed to the expert fees of five different experts retained by ITD and
are in addition to the expert fees claimed under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(c). Under this provision of the
rule, a court may allow such costs "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and
exceptional costs reasonably incurred." ITD has presented zero argument to demonstrate how
any of these costs were necessary or exceptional.

There is nothing exceptional about a

condemnation of commercially zoned ground that would justify these costs as a discretionary
award. Condemnation proceedings require expert opinion on valuation, and the fact that ITD
hired two appraisers does not make this case unique, especially where one of the appraiser's
opinions was rejected. Further, ITD is requesting expert fees for witnesses who never even
testified at trial (Evans and Associates and Hooper Cornell). Idaho courts have rejected such
claims for fees of non-testifying experts as discretionary costs. See, Swallow v. Emergency Med.
ofIdaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003).

Because ITD has failed to present any argument or explanation as to why such costs
were necessary, exceptional or reasonable, ITD's request should be rejected.
8.

ITD"s requested attorney fees are unreasonable and unwarranted.
Finally, ITD requests an award of fees incurred in the prosecution of its case for
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attorneys, associates, paralegals and technical support personnel with rates rangmg from
$145/hour up to $335/hour under I.R.C.P. 54(e). Again, an award of attorneys' fees under this
rule is permissible only if provided for by statute or contract. ITD has failed to identify any
statute from which its claim for fees originates. Tnus the Court does not even need to get to the
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees request under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), because it has not been
provided any legal basis from which to make an award.
However, if this Court were to consider the fees requested, a consideration of the factors
ofl.R.C.P 54(e)(3) shows that the fees claimed are extravagant and unreasonable.
First, the judgment entered by the Court on June 26, 2012 did two things; it confirmed
title in the Grathol property to ITD and it acknowledged receipt of payment (into the court)
for the judicially determined amount of just compensation.
As to the final resolution of these issues, both parties are prevailing in the sense that a)
ITD successfully prosecuted its claim for acquiring title to the Grathol property and b)
Grathol successfully increased the amount of just compensation for the taking above and
beyond ITD's initial offer by $104,000.00 (18%). However, as this case is a condemnation
proceeding, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the traditional rules of attorney's
fees and costs awards do not apply, since a condemnee could never really "prevail." Idaho
courts have also recognized that in these proceedings the condemnor is required to pay all
costs, and a condemnee would be entitled to fees (as well) if it is determined to be a
prevailing party under the Acarrequi factors.
In this respect, even if this Court found that ITD was a prevailing party and somehow
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees; ITD has included in its request fees incurred on
matters which it could not be found the prevailing party. (See Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion
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for Summary Judgment, February 3, 2012, denying summary judgment on issues of visibility,
access and impacts on development plans; Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel,
dated October 26, 2011). York's Affidavit in support of fees and costs dated June 18, 2012,
reveais Holland & Hart requests fees even reiated to issues where ITD clearly did not prevail,
including the motions for summary judgment and their opposition to Grathol's Motion to
Compel. For example, Holland & Hart's detailed fee report, shows that between September
15, 2011 and October 19, 2011, ITD's attorneys billed over 90 hours related solely to
Grathol' s Motion to Compel. Grathol prevailed on that motion by decision of the Court and
ITD was compelled to respond to the outstanding discovery. Grathol did not move for costs
and fees as a result of that motion, but ITD now claims an entitlement to its fees related to
that issue.
Also, ITD's fee report is replete with references to research regarding the authority of
ITD's director to authorize and execute administrative orders of condemnation. Those issues
were appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court and were not part of this proceeding after they
were appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court denied ITD's claim of attorney's fees on appeal,
yet those fees have now reappeared in this matter.
Next, the attorney's fees charged by Grathol's lawyers for defense of the case differ
dramatically from the fees applied for by ITD's legal team for prosecution of the action. The
variance is astounding. The Grathol total attorney hours are 930.6 compared to ITD's
counsel's total claimed hours of 2,720. Remember, this entire litigation spanned only 14
months, start to finish. The dollar amounts are $212,699.00 for Grathol compared to
$724,136.00 for ITD. The time records submitted by ITD are replete with duplicate internal
entities for conferences and discussions involving multiple attorneys at the same time.
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Frankly, the number of hours claimed in this case is simply unreasonable by any stretch of
imagination.
For example Holland & Hart billed more than 24 hours per day in the following
entries:
•
•
•
•
•
•

2/21/12 - 27.4 hours;
2/24/12 - 28.3 hours;
2/27/12 - 26.7 hours;
2/28/12 - 38.8 hours;
2/29/12 - 39.9 hours;
3/4/12 - 39.8 hours;

In fact for just the four and a half days of the court trial, ITD's attorneys and staff billed a
total of 203 hours.
The amount oftime and fees claimed by ITD's lawyers in this case is absurd. First, it
tells the public that there is no limit to the amount of taxpayer dollars or resources that the
State will pledge to get its way. A greater chilling effect on property owners resisting a
condemnation could hardly be imagined. Second, ITD seems to be oblivious to the fact that
the case could have probably been resolved without trial for less than the combined award,
fees and costs it incurred. However, neither of these conclusions informs the Court on the
question of the reasonableness of the hours and fees claimed. Objectively, they are excessive
and exorbitant and were incurred simply by the reason that the State's lawyers had nearly
inexhaustible resources and apparently little accountability.
Finally, Grathol's position that Holland & Hart's hourly rates are too high (especially
for State work) and the number of hours billed are too many, is confirmed by the Affidavits
of Magnuson and Hazel, both experienced and reputable lawyers practicing in Idaho,
including Kootenai County. They testify that the hours and rates for defense should not differ
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substantially from the hours and rates of the Grathol lawyers who worked on the defense of
the action. "What is a reasonable attorneys' fee is a question for the determination of the
court ... it is proper that the court may have before it the opinion of experts." Smith v. Great
Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 281, 561 P.2d 1299, 1314 (1977). See, Affidavits of John
Magnuson and Joel Hazel.

There is nothing about this case that was so unique or complicated to justify such
expenses by the condemnor. ITD's explanation of such costs is deficient and unavailing and
instead simply seeks to rehash old discovery disputes and arguments long since resolved by
the Court.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein above, ITD's Motion for Costs and Fees must be denied
and Grathol should be declared the prevailing party under Acarrequi and Jardine and awarded
its costs and fees.
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2012.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By:~~/~

>

Douglas.Marfice,OfeFirm

Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

~

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Mail
_ _ OverrJ.ght tv1ail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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STATE Of IOAHO
l .
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlf SS
FILED:
..

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone:
(208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. l'.-farfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT, by and through THE
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER D.
GABBERT RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

vs.

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS
BANK, a Washington corporation; and
DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Kootenai )
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
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:

1.

I am an attorney of record for the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and

therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of pp. 7 and 8 of

Grathol's Third Supplemental Discovery Responses, dated October 6, 2011.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of p. 104 and pp. 111-

112 of the Deposition of Alan Johnson, dated November 18, 2011.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of correspondence

received on or about June 17, 2010, from ITD to Grathol.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of correspondence

dated June 28, 2010, from Grathol to ITD rejecting ITD's offer.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of correspondence

dated October 27, 2010, from Grathol to ITD proposing a settlement amount of $3.5M.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of correspondence

dated November 17, 2010, from ITD to Grathol rejecting ITD's settlement offer in the
amount of $2.8M.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of correspondence

dated November 17, 2011, from Grathol to ITD requesting information on the status of any
offers for settlement.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of correspondence

dated December 15, 2011, from ITD to Grathol submitting a settlement offer in the amount
of$1.1M.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT IN OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES - 2
1511 of 1617

10.

On or about December 19, 2011, ITD disclosed its Rebuttal Experts and first

provided Grathol a copy of the Pynes appraisal. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and
correct copy ofITD's Notice of Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of correspondence

dated December 29, 2011, from Grathol to ITD rejecting ITD;s offer and proposing a
settlement amount of$2,450,000, and the payment of either all of Grathol's attorney's fees to
date or 80% ofITD's attorneys' fees, whichever was less.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of correspondence

dated January 10, 2012, from ITD to Grathol rejecting the offer of settlement.
13.

The total hours that Grathol's counsel spent on the defense of this condemnation

action were 930.6 hours at an average hourly rate of$230 at a total cost of$212,699.00.
14.

Grathol incurred court filing fees of $58.00 and expert witness fees for Sherwood

in the amount of$15,000.00.
15.

The attorneys' fees are based upon a total of 930.6 hours billed by the attorneys

at their respective hourly rates.
16.

The costs and attorney fees described above are true and correct to the best of my

knowledge and belief and reflect actual costs and fees and billed to Grathol. The costs and fees
were reasonably and necessarily incurred in this action and are in compliance with I.R.C.P.
54(d)(5) and should be awarded to Grathol under LC. § 7-718 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C),
54(d)(l)(D) and 54(e)(l).
17.

By comparison, Holland & Hart seeks attorney's fees and paralegal fees which

total $724,136.00 for 2,720 hours of work.
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18.

I have an opinion that the Holland & Hart charges for attorney's and paralegal

fees. My opinion are:
a.

Excessive and unreasonable and not in keeping with the prevailing

charges for like work in Idaho, or at the least, in the First Judicial District.
b.

Unreasonable because the hourly rates of the lawyers involved are too

high; and
c.

Unreasonable because too much time was spent by the lawyers working

on the case; the time is excessive.
19.

I have an opinion as to what reasonable attorney's and paralegal fees ought to

be for this case. My opinion is: The fees for prosecution of the suit brought by ITD ought to
be similar to the fees for defense of the case, because the time spent by the lawyers for the
plaintiff and for the defendant ought to be approximately the same; and, there is no reason
that the Holland & Hart hourly rate should be substantially higher than the prevailing hourly
rate for like work in this geographic area. Doug Marfice and myself charge $250 and $230,
respectively. Mr. Marfice's rate is the same charged by most similarly qualified and similarly
experienced attorneys in this region, as is my rate.
20.

This case was not overly complex and the mere fact that it involved a

condemnation does not make the case exceptionally novel or difficult; the law involving
takings and just compensation in this case is not hard to understand even through there were
some issues which would not be typical in a condemnation case.
21.

There was not anything about this case in terms of the issues or the

circumstances that justifies the prosecution with six different lawyers, two paralegals and
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two "tech support," with a total of at least 2,720 hours of work. The case was not so unique
as to be either desirable or undesirable and we handled the case on an hourly fee basis in
furtherance of a long-standing relationship with the defendant.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this day ,2:~f July, 2012.
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I hereby certify that on the
day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

~

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

~Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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It is estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for road construction materials
located underneath Hughes Investments property is approximately $300,000. However, the
most important component to the determination of the value of the take is the time period still
needed to complete construction.
It is Mr. Johnson's op1nion that the remainder property, after the take, would be worth
$3,669,300 (at the time of completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as
follows:
(1)

3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300 (value is reduced due
to the inability to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's ROW;

(2)

3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a value of$625,300;

(3) · Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and
(4)

Remaining 26.42 acres with limited commercial viability priced at $1,150,000.

Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property on the assumption
of at least an additional three year delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also,

it should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer system to significantly
fewer users will greatly decrease the value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of l 0%
per annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a reduced value of $947,000.
To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials

+ a reduction in value· for the remaining property waiting for completion qf construction of
$947,000

= $3,779,578.

This is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just

compensation for the tak~.

In the alternative, looking at the development potential before the take for the
property's "highest and best use" the value is significantly higher. The potential profit, as is
DEFENDANT HJ GRATI:IOL'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAfNT!FF'S FIRST SET OF'
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 7
.
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shown in the pre-take budget, is estimated at just over $8,670,000. This approach provides
Hughes Investments with the investment strategy required in our projects, developing and
holding of at least a portion of the asset.

The expected value after the take is: ITD

condemnation $571,000 + NPV of the remainder property $2,722,000 = $3,293,000.
Subtract the land and expenses to date of approximately $1,800,000 and the potential profit is
only about 15% of that of the "highest and best use".
GeoffReeslund anticipates testifying in the following areas:
•

Retail/commercial site planning and design, including building orientation,

sight line and visibility criteria: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the proposed elevated
freeway, as it traverses the site, will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant
buildings and signage in the development. Without at-grade pass-by visibility and identity,
many potential customers may simply speed by the site without stopping. Conversely, the
current at-grade highway with its signalized intersection provides superior visibility to the
traveling public and also provides better access and an opportunity for encouraging
customers to pull off the highway and patronize the project.
•

Division of property/parcel configurations: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that

the land taken for the freeway construction bifurcates the most usable portion of the property
into two pieces, one of which is very small with limited use applications, poor access and ·
visibility; the other with poor visibility and very poor access opportunities: A third parcel will
be created when right-of-say is acquired for the Sylvan frontage road_ use, further isolating a
large portion of the property from the remainder and limiting the amoupt of property that
could be developed for (highest and best-use) retail/commercial tenants.

DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS • 8
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVl0-10095

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California
general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation;
and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

DEPOSITION OF ALAN JOHNSON
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF
AT 816 SHERMAN AVENUE, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO
NOVEMBER 18, 2011, AT 9:30 A.M.

REPORTED BY:
JULIE MCCAUGHAN, C.S.R. NO. 684
Notary Public
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Page 104

1

A.

Right.

1

is no value to the gravel. You know, obviously we can't

2

Q.

So then the difference between that,

2

ask for that and we won't ask for that. But those are
the numbers that are the most accurate as of this date.

3

between the $3,669,000 number and the $2,722,000 is the

3

4

$974,000. Correct?

4

5
6

A.

Correct. If I can use your calculator, I

can confirm that.

Q.

And other than the factors you've just

5

listed, what other factors would cause you to change

6

your anticipated testimony as to value?

7

Q.

That's okay for now.

7

A.

I don't know.

8

A.

Okay.

8

Q.

The next -- and you'll have to bear with

9

Q.

And so this $947,000, those are damages

9

me here. It says in the alternative you provide this

10

that you believe you're entitled to because of the

10

alternative analysis here, the next paragraph. Do you

11

length it'll take -- the time it'll take ITD to complete

11

see that?

12

the construction of the project?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

What was the purpose of providing that

13

A.

That's correct.

12
13

14

Q.

And then you went back and added numbers

14

15

altogether, the $2,532,000, which was for the 18 acres

15

16

which is for the 16.34 acres plus Sylvan Road. Correct?

16

we were to develop the property what the anticipated

alternative analysis?

A.

To give a different perspective as to if

17

A.

Please state that again.

17

value would be of the site if it was developed as it

18

Q.

I apologize. Right now I'm going to run

18

exists today without the take.

19

through -- you had a calculation here at the end. I

19

20

just want to run through that really quick so we've got

20

21

all those numbers worked out.

21

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Let's go through It then. It says,

22

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

You said, to summarize, you added the

Q.

And just to save us some time, are you

anticipating testifying to this alternative theory?

23

"In the alternative, looking at the development

24

$2,532,578, which you got from -- which was calculated

24

potential before the take for the property's 'highest

25

on page 61 which included the 16.34 acres being acquired

25

and best use' the value is significantly higher. The

23
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1

plus Sylvan Road.
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1

potential profit, as is shown in the pre-take budget, is
estimated at just over $8,670,000." Is that correct?

2

A.

Right.

2

3

Q.

Correct?

3

A.

That's correct.

4

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

And where did that $8,670,000 number come

Q,

And then you added the $300,000 for the

5

from?

6

construction materials, which would be the gravel.

6

A.

Bates sheet 1416 has a project budget.

7

Correct?

7

Q.

Okay. I think that's also been previously

5

8

A.

That is correct.

8

introduced as Deposition Exhibit 34. Can you just

9

Q,

And then you added that to the $947,000,

9

confirm that that's the same one?

10
11

which is the damages you believe you're entitled to for

10

A.

the length it'll take ITD to complete the project?

11

MR. TOLLEFSON: And Doug, if it's all right with

Yes, it is.

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q.

That's how you arrived at $3,779,578?

12
13

A.

Correct.

14

Q,

And Is that the amount you're going to

15
16

BY MR. TOLLEFSON:

17

No. 34.

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24

25

anticipate testifying to at trial?
A.

I'm not sure yet.

you, I'd like to push back for a few minutes so we can
get this section done before we break for lunch.
MR. MARFICE: Sure.

Q.

So it might be easier to look at Exhibit

Q,

Why are you not sure?

18

A.

Okay.

A.

The number could change.

19

Q,

And then flip back to page 8 of Exhibit 11

Q.

Why would the number change?

20

so we've got those two in the same place. That might be

A.
Q.

If ITD delayed construction of the road.

21

the easiest way to go about doing this.

What other reasons would cause you to

22
23

change your anticipated testimony?

MR. MARFICE: Just for my edification, is Exhibit
34 the same as Bates --

If the size of the take increased or

24

MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes.

decreased for that matter. If we determine that there

25

MR. MARFICE: Okay. Thank you.

A.

www.mmcourt.com
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1

2
3

Q.

Okay. How does that number relate to the

A.

In its highest and best use as it is

4

today, the potential profit, we have the potential of

5

$8,671,994.

6
7
8

9

Q.

How does the $3,293,000 number relate to

the $8,671,000 number?
A.

That is our -- after the take, that's the

anticipated value of what we think the potential profit

10

would be.

11

Q.

l

profit after the take.
Q.

2

$8.6 potential profit number?

3

potential profit without the take is $8,570,000.

4

Correct?

5

A.

That's correct.

6

Q.

So to get what you believe -- what you'll

7

be damaged by the take is you would take the 8.57 number

8

and subtract the $1,493,000. Is that correct?

9

10
11

So if I'm understanding you correctly,

Potential profit after the take. And the

A.

That would be legitimate, yes.

Q.

Is that what you anticipate testifying to

regarding this alternative theory?

12

A.

Yes.

Q.

So then if my numbers are correct, If you

12

what you're saying is that this $3,293,000 number,

13

that's, you believe, what the potential profit will be

13

14

after the take?

14

subtract those two numbers, that's approximately

15

$7,177,000 In lost profits.

15

A.

The potential profit, but you've got to

16

subtract $1.8 million for the value of the property when

16

17

we bought it and our costs to date.

17

And where does that 1.8 million dollars

18

Q.

19

come from?

20

21

A.

The value of the property, 1,450,000, and

the budget soft costs that we've discussed earlier. And

A.

I've not done the calculation, but I will

agree to use your number.

18

Q.

Okay. So do you anticipate testifying

19

that this project -- or excuse me -- that ITD's

20

condemnation and construction will cost you

21

approximately $7,177,000 In profits?

22

it's rounded down. It's probably closer to two million

22

A.

Yes.

23

dollars now.

23

Q.

And that number Is based upon lost

24

Q.

25

24

So even just -- we'll use the numbers

profits, not based upon the value of the land. Correct?
A.

25

you've got listed here. That If you take the

That ls correct.
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1

$3,293,000, and then you would subtract the 1.8 million

1

2

from that. Correct?

2

correctly is that you'll be testifying to both a
$3,779,000 number and a $7,177,000 number?

3

A.

That's correct.

3

Q.

And then you would get -- your potential

Q,

So if I understand your proposed testimony

4

A.

Correct.

5

profit after the take you believe would be approximately

5

Q.

And you believe that both of those should

6

$1,493,000?

6

be compensated -- excuse me. Would you add those two

4

7

A.

That's correct.

7

numbers together to get your ultimate just compensation

8

Q.

And so then if I'm understanding this

8

or are those two separate valuations?

9

testimony correctly, then, in order to get under this

9

A.

They're two separate valuations.

Q.

So you believe that -- is it fair to say

10

alternative -- what we're calling alternative theory

10

11

here -- is that you would subtract or you would take the

11

that your anticipated testimony will be that HJ Grathol

12

8.6 million and then you would subtract the 1.493

12

should be compensated somewhere between 3.7 million and

13

million, and that would be the number that you would be

13

7.1 million dollars In damages?

14

testifying to. Is that correct?

15

16

A.

Q.

14

A.

Please state that again.

15

Q.

Is that not accurate?

Sure. No problem. All right. So we've

16

A.

It is accurate. That ls my testimony.

Q.

Do you believe that that's how much HJ

17

got what we'll call your after-take profits, which Is

17

18

the 3.293 minus 1.88?

18

19

A.

Correct.

19

Q,

That would be my testimony.

Grathol has been damaged?
A.

I believe we have potential to be damaged

And that, I have written down as

20

21

$1,493,000. So we'll say, according to this alternative

21

22

theory, In the after condition, or after the project's

22

much, what do you mean by potential?

23

completed -- let me rephrase that. How would you

24

characterize that 1.493 million dollars?

23
24

freeway, Is the take going to be larger/smaller, access

25

off of 54, those sorts of things, I mean, just even as

20

25

A.

I would characterize that as the potential

www.mmcourt.com

that much, yes.
Q,

A.

JOHNSON, ALAN

When you say potential to be damaged that
Again, It depends on, again, timing of the

11/18/2011
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IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

600 W. Prairie Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815-8764

(208) 772-1200
itd.idaho.gov

July 17, 2010
Project Number.
Key Number:
Parcel Id:
Parcel Number:
Project Name:

A009(791)

9791
0044775

19
US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage

HJ Grathol
P.O. Box 8700
Newport Beach, CA 92658

The above project has been programmed for construction by the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT A portion of your property is required for construction. The property needed has been
appraised to determine the fair market value payable to you. A qualified review appraiser has established
the just compensation. As a Right of Way Agent for the State, I have been authorized to purchase the
portion of your property that is required for this project.
Our offer includes consideration for control of access and:
14.46 acres land

$57tOOO.OO

JUST COMPENSATION

$571,000.00

Incentive
(contract must be accepted within 45 days)
Total offer

$57,100.00

$628,100.00

The above amount includes an incentive payment. The contract must be signed within 45 days of receipt of
this offer to collect the incentive payment
Enclosed is an acquisition packet containing the following items:
Right of Way Contract (2 each)
Warranty deed
Project Plan Sheet(s)
Acquisition Brochure
Copy of Appraisal
Advice of Rights Form
Claim for Payment form
Claim for Incidental Expenses DH-2041(1)
Authorization Letter
IRS Form W-9
Memorandum of Contract of Sale

1523 of 1617

The deed and legal description identify the property being acquired and the interests therein. The Right of
Way Contract shows the breakdown of the just compensation being offered. If this offer is satisfactory,
please sign and complete the original documents and forms accordingly. Also, sign the copy of the Right of
Way Contract, which will be executed and returned to you for your records. Return these items to this office
and I will process them for the payment.
Normal processing takes about 45 days. If there are other parties of interest (liens, mortgages etc.) on your
property, the necessary clearances will have to be obtained prior to making the acquisition payment This
can cause some delay, but generally does not present a problem. The State will obtain the clearances, title
insurance and pay closing and recording fees.
If I do not hear from you within 10 days, I will contact you by phone to answer any questions you may have or
to set up a meeting date with you. If you wish to contact me, please call me at (208) 772~ 1200 and I should
be able to answer any questions you might have.
Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely,

Ronald A. Harvey
District 1 Right of Way Supervisor
Idaho Transportation Department

Enclosures
CC:

R/W Manager
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATfORNEYS AI LAW
MICIIAEL E RAMSDEN•
MARC A l-YDNS•

Po

DOUGL-AS S MARl'ICE•

aox 1336

STREET ADDRESS:

COEUR o·At ENE. ID 83816·1336

700 NORTIIWESJ BL.VD

MICHAEL- A EALY•

COEUR o·ALENE. ID 83814

I El\llANCE R HARRIS"
C!IR!STOPHER D GA!!BE!I T

IELEPIIONE: (208) 664-5818

VIRGINIA McNUllY RODINSON
I HERON J DE SM El

AU- A lTORNllYS LICENSED IN IDAIIO

FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884
E-MAI l: flrm@ra111sdonlyo11s com

• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON

WEBSITE: www ramsdenlyons com
WILLIAM I' DOYD. OF COUNSEL

June 28, 2010
Ronald A. Harvey
District 1 Right of Way Supervisor
Idaho Transportation Department
600 West Prairie Ave .
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Re:

Project Number:
Key Number:
Parcel Id:
Parcel Number:
Project Name:

A009(791)
9791
0044775
19
US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage

Dear Mr. Harvey:
We've now had an opportunity to review the packet of materials which you dropped
off last week concerning the proposed right of way acquisition of property on the northeast
comer of US 95 and Hwy 54 owned and being developed by our client, HJ Grathol, a
California general partnership, an affiliate of Hughes Investments, {collectively "Hughes").
This property has been approved by the Federal Highway Transportation Administration
("FHTA") for a protective acquisition by ITD even though final environmental approvals are
pending.. When this protective acquisition approval was granted several months ago, we
were optimistic that ITD and FHTA were desirous of making a meaningful effort to acquire,
at a fair price, property that will ultimately have to be acquired for the prqject to be
completed. Based on the purchase offer you presented, it does not appear that the same
desire exists from ITD's perspective.
Hughes purchased this property and pursued the requisite zone change entitlements to
do what they are in the business of doing - developing the property for profit. Various site
plans have been formulated and discussion with prospective purchasers, tenants and
commercial end-users have been underway for some time. Hughes has every intention of
proceeding with its development plans. It will not, however, do so in a manner which takes
into account the portion of the property which you need, knowing the unce1iainty of whether
that acquisition ever actually takes place. In other words, if this acquisition cannot be
negotiated and completed forthwith, my clients intend to forge ahead with their development
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Ronald A. Harvey
June 28, 2010

Pagel

plans on the current highway aligument and you will be faced with ultimately having to
condemn (and pay compensation for), improved commercial property. Perhaps this would
include a hotel, travel plaza, grocery store, or myriad of other facilities based upon interested
parties with whom our clients have been in negotiations for some time. While this property
is vacant at this time, it will not remain so for long. Hughes is in the enviable position of not
having to service debt on this parcel and has the wherewithal to develop and subdivide it,
utilizing its own resources.
I point these factors out not as threats, but as simple, factual statements justifying why
it is in the best interest of ITD to promptly complete this acquisition at a fair price. Unless
the Department is prepared to realign the highway corridor and abandon the interchange at
this location, it seems inevitable that the subject portion of this property will have to be
acquired. We can assure you it will be far more affordable to do so now while the property is
vacant, than later. Having said that, this is all about price; and the price you have offered is
not nearly enough.
We have carefully reviewed the acquisition appraisal which you commissioned .
Suffice to say, we believe that the value opinion reached in that appraisal is woefully
deficient Indeed, if Hughes Investments was not a sophisticated property owner with a keen
understanding of the vagaries of the appraisal "arts," it could have easily have been insulted
by the offer. Rather than spend an inordinate amount of time and effort critiquing the
numerous apparent deficiencies in your appraisal, I would prefer to simply get to the bottom
line as quickly as possible. Rest assured though, if it becomes necessary to do so, we are
prepared to dissect your valuation analysis in excruciating detail. In the meantime, a11ow me
to just point out the obvious: based on a comparative market valuation approach, there is no
legitimate argument that the portion of Hughes' property you seek to acquire is not the
"prime" piece of commercially developable property on that segment of highway, and is
worth much more than your appraisal implies.
According to your appraisal, of the three general1y accepted methods of evaluating
property value, only the sales comparison approach appears to be apropos here. We concur.
Your appraisal also correctly notes that when sufficient sales data of good comparable
quality is available, this can be the most reliable indicator of market value. It is the
utilization of "good comparable quality" sales data within your appraisal that is sorely
lacking. Of the four "comparable" land sales selected in your valuation, only one seems to
be a legitimate comparable. That is land sale No. 1 on the northeast corner of US Hwy 41
and Prairie Avenue. Without critiquing the physical qualitative adjustments made to that sale
by your appraiser, I would point out that it is at least highway frontage/corner property with
commercial zoning in the same county as the subject parcel. It sold in October 2007 for
approximately $3.00/sq. ft.
By contrast, the remaining three comparables, one in
Smelterville (Shoshone County), one in Sagle (Bonner County), and one light industrial
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Ronald A. Harve;'
June 28, 2010
Page3

without highway frontage are not remotely on par with the Hughes propertJ and thus are not
comparable, in the slightest Yet, utilizing these (not very) comparable properties and some
creative adjustments, your valuation comes to the apparent conclusion that the comparable
market value of the 16 acres of prime, commercial, highway frontage property is roughly .84
cents per square foot!
Our cursory research indicates at least four legitimate comparables which are far
superior in tem1s of their similarity, utility, location, etc.; these comparables range anywhere
from $4,50/sq, ft. to $10.50/sq. ft. with the mean falling somewhere around $4.75 - $5.25/sq.
ft for similar quality highway frontage/interchange property suitable for commercial
development.
Anecdotally, I would note that ($4.75 - $5.25) value range roughly equates to the
price recently paid by your department for the acquisition of a parcel at the intersection of
Hwy 95 and Garwood Road in July of 2008 ($5.30/sq. ft.). Therefore, our belief that the
Hughes property is similarly valued, should come as no great surprise. Based on this range
of values, the 16.34 acres you propose to acquire is realistically worth between 3 and 3 .5
million dollars, taking into account only the land value and no ancillary impacts. If you can
find examples of commercially zoned, highway frontage (on two highways), development
ready land at the intersection of two highways for .84 cents per square foot, we would like to
buy it.
My clients are ready, willing and able to negotiate in good faith on the protective
acquisition, but they have no interest whatsoever in considering a voluntary disposition of a
significant piece of its property at a "fire sale" price. Likewise, my clients do not see any
good purpose that will be served by engaging in some long, attenuated negotiation to sell this
property to ITD when similar efforts could be directed toward its development to much better
purposes.
We believe at this juncture, the ball is in your court. Please tell us how you wish to
proceed,

::0;~~1 -.
~~c-~

Douglas S. Martice
DSM/sj
Cc: Clients
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT L-AW
MICHAEi.. E RAMSDEN'

M,\RC A I. YONS"

PO llOX 1336

DOUGLASS MAllFICE'

COEUR D'AlENE, ID 83016-1336

MICl!Aol A EAi y•

COF.UH D'J\lf.NF., ID 831114

TEIUlANCF. R llt\llHlS'
CiiiliSTOPiiEll ii

srnEEr ADDRESS:
700 NORTIIWEST Bl-VD

GAUUEiil

Hl El'IION£: (208) 664-SIJIO

VIRGINIA McNUl.. f\' llOIIINSON
1 lll(RON J DE SM EI

E·MAll:

WIJ.l-lAM F BOYD OF COUNSEL

J\[.[. A110RNF.YS LICENSF.U IN IDAIIO

l',\CSIMJI.E: (200) 66•l·S08·1

WEBS!l'E:

firm@ra1nsdenlyons com

'l-lCF.NSED IN W/\SIIINGION

www ramsdenlyo11s com

October 27, 2010
Mary V. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

US - 95 Condemnation,- "Grathol" (Now "Hughes") Parcel No. I 9

Dear Mary:
Thank you for your call the other day. I know ITD, is anxious to get closure on this.
As we discussed, the points of contenti"on here are, the value of the property ITD proposes to
take and the delays, past and future.
In the interest of brevity, I won't rehash all of our initial criticisms ofITD's valuation
of the property. I will however, attach a copy of a letter I sent to Ron Harvey (dated June 28,
2010) which summarized our position at that time. Since then, we met with Ron and Jason
Minzghor to discuss the project in further detail. Additionally, we conferred with several
brokers and retained an appraiser, Skip Sherwood, who has generated a considerable amount
of additional research data for us which is pertinent to the property valuation. Based upon
this data, the value range ($4.75 - $5.25/sq. ft.) set forth in my June 28 th letter was perhaps
somewhat high, but it ,:vas far closer to the real value of the property than the .84¢/sq. ft.
value placed on it by ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe.
Hughes, which is in the business of acquiring, entitling and developing large
commercial sites, acquired this property at a virtual fire-sale price of $1,450,000.00 in the
spring of 2008. The property at that time was encumbered by debts significantly higher than
the price paid by Hughes" It sits at the major signalized intersection of Highway 95 and
Highway 54 and is ideally situated for any number of commercial or mixed use
opportunities. Since then, Hughes has expended can-ying costs of around $390,000.00
positioning the property for development. This includes engineering and traffic studies,
valuation work, marketing to end users/tenants, securing a zone change (to commercial) for
the entire parcel and related expenses. Futhermore Jill's delays have resulted in Hughes'
inability to develop the property for its intended use and in fact stalled negotiations that
Hughes and a grocer were in for a potential super market deal. Hughes has developed site
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pian alternatives for submission of a subdivision proposal to Kootenai County based upon
the current highway alignment and, at this juncture, they are fully prepared to go forward
with development of the property, either based on the existing Highway 95 alignment or on
the post-take alignment, whichever the case may be.
In tem1s of development and marketability of the property, my clients feel that access
and visibility will be impacted by replacing the existing signal and access points with a
freeway off ramp. Frankly, my clients do not care whether the new interchange is built, or
not. They are ready and able to develop the property either way. Assuming that ITD gets on
with acquiring the property and building out the prqject in due course, my client is well
positioned to move forward with development at that time, but it is not willing to "give
away" 16+ acres of prime frontage just to get there.
Mary, I know you have seen a lot of condemnation appraisals, as have L There is
ample room for variability in the comparative market approach for a property like this.
However, some of the comps and the adjustment to the comps in Stan Moe's appraisal
simply don't hold water. (See, June 28, 2010 letter) We believe that the following eight
sales comps are much more "fitting" to this parcel and, collectively, justify a considerably
higher valuation.
1.

Northwest corner Ramsey and Appleway - Coeur d'Alene (11/07)
Buyer:
Coeur d'Alene Tribe
Size:
17± Acres
Price:
Approx. $10.53/SF
Comments: Superior demographic/location; Spec purchase
Adjustment: -65% $3.68/SF

2.

Northeast corner Ramsey and Appleway - Coeur d'Alene (8/09)
Buyer:
Win co
Size:
9± Acres
Price:
$8/SF
Comments: Superior location demographic; Owner/Seller retains pad
sites; Inferior Access
Adjustment: -60% $3.60/SF

3.

Southeast corner Hwy. 41 and Prairie- Post Falls (11/06)
Buyer:
Parkwood Business Properties
Size:
13.48 Acres
Plice:
$5/SF, no sewer, CCS zoning
Comments: Superior location; Similar access/traffic flow
Adjustment: -25% $3.75/SF
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4.

Northeast comer Hwy. 41 and Prairie -Kootenai County (10/07)
Buyer:
Phillips Edison
Size:
50 Acres
Price:
$3/SF, no utilities, AG zoning
Comments: Similar size; Inferior zoning; No infrastructure available
Adjustment: None

5.

East of the Southeast corner Hwy. 41 and Prairie-Kootenai County (6/09)
Buyer:
Unknown
Size:
20.5 Acres
Price:
$2.75/SF, off the corner, Prairie frontage, CCS zoning
Comments: Inferior tratlic/access/frontage (off corner); Similar
zoning, size
Adjustment: +10% $3.02/SF

6.

Northeast comer Larch and Boyer - Sandpoint (2009)
Buyer:
Super 1
Size:
5 Acres
Price:
$7.30/SF Effective rate with impact fee's $11.89
Comments: Buyer is to pay significant impact fees; Inferior
size/access; Superior demographic
Adjustment: -70% $3.60/SF

7.

Garwood and Hwy.
Buyer:
Size:
Price:
Comments:
Aqjustment:

8.

95 (7/08)

ITO
$5.30/SF
Condemnation value; Inferior location; Superior size
-35% $3A4/SF

Sagle and Hwy. 95 (3/08)
Buyer:
Size:
Price:
$2.69/SF
Comments: Inferior access/traffic; Similar demographic & size
Adjustment: +10% $2.96/SF

When we met with Ron Harvey back on September 1, 2010, he asked that we provide
support for our contention that ITD's valuation was too low. I believe that the above eight
examples provide that support, and then some.
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The above comparables aiso have to be considered in iight of the post-take condition
that will exist. Hughes' property will potentially be bifurcated both by the new Highway 95
alignment and by an extension of Sylvan Road through the property on the east side of the
current alignment. When we met with Mr. Harvey and Mr. Minzghor it was brought up for
the first time that ITD contemplates Sylvan Road extending through the Hughes property as a
frontage road, even though that is not technically pmt of this take. Further conversations
with Mr. Minzghor and Mr. Wuest of ITD confirm the desire to take an additional 1.9 acres
to extend Sylvan road through the Property. Assuming that does occur, the property will
effectively be chopped into three pieces with just over 29 acres directly affected. ITD will
take 16,3 acres plus an additional L9 acres for Sylvan Road leaving an 8.0 acre parcel east of
the new alignment and a 3.8 acre parcel sandwiched between existing and new alignments.
My clients understand that the strategic location of this property on the intersection of n:vo
busy highways means it will be more affected than most properties, but ITD's valuation does
not seem to take that into account. Frankly, I could go on and on, but unless you want more
information/argument, I will refrain for the time being. I think if ITD objectively considers
our comparables and takes into consideration the costs associated with a contested
condemnation it will see that a jury will easily place the value of this property in the area of
$3,500,000.00, if not more. With that in mind, my clients would ask ITD to review the the
above and revise its offer. However if that offer is going to be a reiteration of the amount
previously offered, it would be best for you to just file the Complaint and we will carry on
accordingly.
In conjunction with the taking, my client will also seek to have ITD provide utility
and conduit infrastructure and associated easements under the new freeway (when built),
appropriate commercial width accesses at locations to be determined, and approval of a postconstruction transportation plan appropriate to their project. This communication is made
pursuant to Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in contemplation of avoiding the
condemnation litigation and is not intended to be admissible in any subsequent proceedings
related thereto.
I look fo1ward to hearing your thoughts,.
Yours very truly,

Douglas S. Marfice
DSM/sj
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Phone (208} 342-sooo
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myork@hollandhart.com

November 17, 2010

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

Re;

U.S.- 95 Condemnation; "Grathol" Parcel No. 19

Dear Doug:
I am writing in response to your email message from Friday, November 12, 2010.
I appreciate the information you provided and will endeavor to respond to each of the
issues you raised. For ease of reference, I will respond to your comments in the order
set forth in your message-.

I appreciate the clarification on the status of the current title holder of the
property. ITD has held off filing the condemnation action w1til we heard back from you
on this issue. Now that we have confirmation that the current title holder is HJ Grathol,
we will be filing the condemnation this week. I have attached for your- reference a copy
of the complaint that will be filed. We discussed a couple of weeks ago that you would
be willing to accept service on behalf of HJ Grathol. Please let me know as soon as
possible if that is not the case, and we will have service made by a process server.
The next issue raised is your clients' apparent dissatisfaction with the length
of time involved in the Project and their perception that ITD has been less than
sttaightforward with them in negotiations. To be clear, ITD has not engaged in any
·improper delay as to the Project and has not given your clients "the run around." With
your experience in condemnation matters, you c~rtainly understand the work and detail
involved in planning and designing a project of this size and scope. The time involved
here is a direct result of the complicated nature, and the size and scope of the Project.
ITD has been diligent in its efforts and has taken its responsibility to the public and
landowners ·very seriously. ITD disagrees with the contention that the. acquisition of the
Grat.ho! property is a "moving target." To the contrary, the property required for the
Project (16.314 acres) and the design of the Project as it relates to the Orathol property
have remained unchanged since ITD's initial negotiation contacts with your clients and
ITD's appraisal of the property.

Holland&Hartut
Phone (208) 342-SOOO Fax [208) 343·8869 www.hollandhart,com

101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Bo;se,ID 83702 Malllng Addres$ P.O.Box2S27 Bolse,ID 83701-2527
Aspen Boulder CarsonCity Colq,adoSpdngs Denw1 Deffie/TediCen\tf Bi:llngs

8Qlse
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As support for the. claim that ITD's U.S. 95 Project is a "moving target," you
reforence the extension of Sylvan Road. For purposes of clarification, the extep_sion of
Sylvan Road.is a separate project by the Lakes Highway District and is not part of
ITD's U.S. 95 Project. While the Sylvan Road extension could benefit the traveling
pubJic as a frontage road to U.S. 95, it is not part of ITD's Project, and the property that
could be used for the extension road is not part of this condemnation nor is i.t on the
Project plans.

The issue over the extension of Sylvan Road has o_nly been raised because the
Lakes Highway District wants the roadway extended, and ITO has agreed to construct
the extension road for property owners who agree to dedicate 1he property to the
Highway District. If a landowner decides not to dedicate lands needed. for the roadway,
then it will not be constructed. Based on your email, it appears that your clients do not
desire to have the Sylvan Road extension built. Therefore, we will consider the issue
closed. However, in response to the comment t11at your clients cannot see how the
Sylvan Road extension would help them, .it is worth noting that they relied on the
extension of Sylvan Road in their development plan submitted to the County as part of
their rezone application.
The next issue raised in your email is the prospect that one of your clients may
seek to «force a realignment" of U.S. 95. Given the amount of time and money spent in
the planning, design, and location of the Project, that effort by your clients would be
futile. You also acknowledge that such a result "is unlikely." [ am sure you are aware
that courts give substantial deference to an agency's design and site selection of a
public project. This is .particularly true with respect to the present Project> given the
extensive and detailed planning and design for the location of this Project, and the
substantial review, public comment, and environmental permitting process that this
Project has gone through.
For these reasons, we again request that your clients stipulate to possession.
While ITD will eventually acquire fee title to the portions of the property required for
the Project, it does not need fee title at this point in time for the "land swap" referenced
in your message, Possession will suffice for the time b·eing. Additionally, as you
know, the grant of posscssio11 by a landowner is one of the elements that a court will
consider in its determining whether attorney fees should be awarded to the property
owner in a condemnation action. In addition, no reason exists for the court to deny
possession in. this case, particularly given the amount of detailed planning, money, and
effort that ITO has invested in this Project to date.
As to your clients' concern about this process dragging on in the event they grant
possession, I can assure you that ITD is c_ommitted to moving forward with the
condemnation expeditiously. As evidence ofITD's commitment to moving this matter
forward, we intend to file ITD's complaint this week.
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Lastly, your message conveys a settlement offer in the amount of $2.8 million,
with the caveats described. I have presented the offer to my clients and have been
instructed to decline· the offer. A~ we und_erstnnd the offer, it is a discounted proposal
from the $3,5 million value that your clients believe is due as a result of the taking of a
portion of their property and damages caused to the remainder. The $3 .5 million figure
is based primarily on the sales identified in your letter of October 27, 2010 and the
alleged damages that may be caused to the remainder, including potential damages
resulting from the extension of Sylvan Road. As explained above, the Sylvan Road
extension is not part of the acquisition and, based upon your representation that your
clients will not be dedicating any land to the Lakes Highway District, will not be
constructed by ITO. we:have reviewed the sales referenced in your October 27th letter,
and respectfully disagree that the sales support the valuation figure advocated by your
clients. The sales include properties located within the cities of Coeur d'Alene and
Sandpoint, properties in far superior locations, sales with incotrect information, and a
sale that was actually a settlement that included amounts for improvements in addition
to the land value. While we have yet to see any specific analysis of these sales by your
clients' appraiser, Skip Sherwood, at this point, we do not agree that the referenced
sales support the valuation advocated by your clients.
Despite the present disagreement over values, which is typical in condemnation
cases, we hope that the parties can continue to work toward a resolution of this matter.
To that end, please feel free to contact me with any concerns your clients may have
during the construction process or any other matter.
Additionally, please-let me know as soon as possible whether you will accept
service and whether your clients will stipulate to possession. If not, we will move
forward with service of process and the setting of a possession hearing. In the
meantime, if you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues in more
detail, please do not hesitate to contact me.
V

~7i,.
t ly yours,

,{~ t··t _/

../_ .ti.AAA ,.(/

)

'/if{

Mary Y,,: · ork ,,,
of HQlla & Ha' LLP
I,

MVY:st
Attachment
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TERRANCE R. HARRIS'
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT
THERON
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DE SMBT
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MEGAN S, O'DOWD
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• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON
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WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL

November 17, 2011

MaryV. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol, et al.
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095

Dear Mary:
I assume that you are in the process, or at least close to, preparing an Acarrequi offer.
Therefore, I thought I would take the opportunity to convey what I think are a few salient
points for ITD to consider in formulating its offer.
First, I think we have given ITD ample information concerning our view of the raw
land value of the take. ITD's appraisal puts that figure at only $571,000.00 which equates to
about .80¢ per square foot; this, for a prime, commercially zoned, 16 acre site on a controlled
intersection of two main highways. There is considerable evidence that the more appropriate
per square foot value should be somewhere north of $2.50. Simply put, I believe ITD's
valuation cherry-picked the lowest available comparable and ignored better, more
appropriate comparables. Obviously, that is the nature of things, but I think it will ultimately
reflect poorly on ITD's credibility. I understand that I1D will strenuously argue that my
client's valuation is equally non-credible and you will no doubt exert considerable effort to
impeach or even exclude our appraiser's opinions. However, at the end of the day, an
appraisal (in whatever form) is really one person's educated opinion as to value. The Judge
in this case will be the final voice on the issue and whether he decides to accept, reject or
partially accept/reject the appraisers' respective opinions will simply be a function of how
the Judge views those opinions in relation to the world he operates in.
Recognizing that evidence is going to come in through both ITD's witness and
Grathol's witness of other comparable sales ranging from $2.50 up to nearly $10.00 per
square foot, the .80¢ per square foot value conclusion that ITD will push for simply isn't
very believable. We both know that in matters such as this where there is competent,
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admissible evidence of a range of values the Court is likely to use some Solomon-esque
approach and effectively average the numbers. If that happens, compensation for just the
raw land portion of property taken could easily wind up somewhere in the 1.9 to 2.3 million
dollar range. It might be lower; but it might also be significantly higher.

Second, ITD's valuation concludes that there are no damages to the remainder
property. This position, taken in conjunction with the bottom-of-the-scale square foot
valuation undercuts the ~redibility ofITD even further. Simply put, to claim that carving out
a 16 acre prime, commercial intersection property leaving a remnant parcel on the west side,
a larger remnant on the east side and a highly probable, if not inevitable, additional bisection
of the property by the frontage road, will cause no damages to the remainder is patently
unbelievable. The evidence is going to demonstrate that from the standpoint of a
commercially developable parcel, an elevated freeway type interchange will substantially
hinder the use and desirability of the remaining property. That is just a fact. Instead of an atgrade, high visibility, signalized intersection, which any developer would find desirable; the
post project corridor will be a fly-by with exit ramps. This is fine for some commercial uses,
but far less than desirable for many others. For those uses that are now effectively negated
by the project, Grathol is entitled to severance damage consideration.
Third, although the frontage (Sylvan Road) corridor remains a bone of contention, for
purposes of its Acarrequi offer, the State would be remiss if it did not factor this in. With
respect to the damage case only, we are confident that the Court is going to consider the fact
that Sylvan Road was always contemplated as part of this project or at least ancillary to it. fu
fact, we think the evidence of this indisputable. Regardless of whether Sylvan Road is part
of the physically defined ''take," it is a factor that is going to directly impact the value and
usability of the remaining property. While ITD may believe it can simply wrest control of
the Sylvan Road corridor from Grathol as a future development concession, we believe that
constitutes a de facto take and we intend to argue strenuously for it. Obviously, Judge
Hosack may disagree as I know you do, but ITD should nevertheless recognize that there is a
very real risk associated with this. Likewise, ITD should recognize in making its Acarrequi
offer the value of achieving closure on this case which would also eliminate the pending
appeal before the Supreme Court. You have read our briefing on the Appeal and know our
position. As an advocate, you certainly don't have to agree with a single word of our
argument, but you do have to recognize that ifwe prevail on that argument, the consequences
to ITD would be grievous. Consider, just for example, the ramifications of the Supreme
Court agreeing that ITO' s process for issuance of condemnation Orders has been flawed and
not in conformity with the statute. The reverberations that such a ruling would send through
the Department are almost impossible to overstate.
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I acknowledge that these arguments may be perceived by ITD as academic or
fanciful, but they do merit consideration and, in my opinion, concern. ITD would be wise to
recognize that institutional hubris can sometimes be very, very dangerous. Does ITD really
want to risk the possibility (however remote it thinks that possibility may be) that the
Supreme Court could effectively rule that every pending and past condemnation order issued
by the Department is/was legally deficient? In every settlement mediation I have ever
attended, I am reminded by the mediator that resolving difficult cases should be about
measuring risk. How much does one stand to gain versus how much they might potentially
lose. In this case, Grathol's "risk" is low. While it's incurred significant litigation costs thus
far, being in the development field that is something Grathol is pretty well accustomed to;
sort of the "cost of doing business." Other than its litigation costs, Grathol really only stands
to gain by proceeding to trial and through the appeal. If we just convince the Judge that
ITD's valuation number is too low (and I am confident that we can do so), Grathol is going
to recover additional compensation and reimbursement of its litigation costs. Same thing
with severance damages. If we prove up any of them, Grathol will recover yet even more
compensation, as well as the costs and fees of getting there. Last, if Grathol prevails on its
appeal, the outcome of the trial probably becomes irrelevant because ITD will have to start
with a clean slate in terms of the take. Meantime, Grathol can sit back and watch while ITD
tries to deal with the domino effect of such a decision. Conversely, the ''upside" to your
client in this case is almost non-existent. Frankly, the best ITD can hope to achieve is a
ruling from the District Court that it owes no more money to Grathol than what has been
offered. Even if it does so, ITD will not be awarded its litigation costs or fees, and it will
still be whatever it has had to pay your firm and the various witnesses and consultants.
Based on the proceedings to date, I surmise those expenses are considerable. Clearly, its
downside risk is far and away greater than any potential upside and even prevailing for ITD
is probably a zero-sum gain.
As I stated as the outset, I think that all of these considerations are germane to ITD's
calculation of an appropriate Acarrequi offer. You are certainly free to accept or reject any
of the contentions I put forth, but ITD would be wise to think through the entire constellation
of potential outcomes in this case and to make Grathol an offer that it has to give very serious
consideration to.

Yours very truly,

~
~~=
DSM/sj
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December 15, 2011

OFFER OF SETTLEMENT PROTECTED BY RULE
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE

408

Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and
E-mail: dmarflce@ramsdenlyo11s.com and
U.S. Mail
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CV 10-10095, First Judicial District
Comt, State of Idaho, County of Kootenai

Dear Doug:
I have been authorized by the State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Board {"ITD")
to make an offer of settlement to your clients in the case of ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al.,
Case No. CVI0-10095, First Judicial District Court, State ofldaho, County of Kootenai.
Specifically, in accordance with Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho
873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983), the succeeding cases, and other relevant provisions ofldaho
law, ITD hereby offers to pay your clients the sum of $1,100,000.00 as settlement of all
claims in this case.
This offer is made for settlement purposes only. This settlement offer shall remain
open and available for acceptance by your clients until end of business on December 30,

2011.
Please convey ITD's offer to your clients, and we will await a response from you.

In the meantime, if you have any questions or if I can be of any assistance, please do not
hesitate to contact me.

MVY:ntp
5343328_1
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129

Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Steve C. Bowman (ISB #4404)
Ted S. Tollefaon (fSB #6813)
Special Deputy Attorneys General

HOLLAND"& HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
IO 1 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box' 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701~2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CVto-10095

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF
DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL
EXPERTS

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,

Defendants-.

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS- I
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Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Department hereby gives notice that it has disclosed its

rebuttal expert witnesses Jason Minzghor, Stan Moe, Carole Richardson, Ken Geibel, Kevin

Picanco, Jeff Key, Larry Pynes, George Hedley, and Denni$ Reinstein ort the date set forth
below, in accordance with the Court's scheduling orders of April 5, 2011 and November 161

20661, and Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure..
DATED this 19th day of December, 2011.

HOLLAND & HART LLP

B

S.
efso
r the firm
Mary V. y· , of the firm

T-

Special Deputy Attorneys General

Attorneys for Plaintiff
idaho Transportation Department
J. Tim Thomas

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of December 2011, I caused to be s_erved a true apd
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below! and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert) Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

{J.S. MaiJ
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail

Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

5347520_1
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAEL. E. RAMSDEN•
MARC A. l.YONS•

P.O. BOX 1336

DOUGLASS. MARFICE•

STREET ADDRESS:

COEUR D"ALENE, ID 83816-1336

700 NORTHWEST BLVD.

MICHAEL A. EALY•

COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

TERRANCE R. HARRIS•
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT
THERON

J.

TELEPHONE: (208) 664-5818

DE SMET

ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO

FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884

MEGAN S. O'DOWD

E-MAIL: firm@ramsdenlyons.com
WEBSITE:

'LICENSED IN WASHINGTON

www.ramsdenlyons.com

WILLIAM F. BOYD, 01' COUNSEL,

December 29,2011

Mary V. York
Holland & Hart, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

The State ofIdaho v. HJ Grathol, et al.

Dear Mary:
Reference is made to your letter of December 15, 2011 containing an offer of
settlement in_ the total sum of $1,100,000.00. My clients have reviewed the settlement
proposal and have instructed me to reject the same. I have, however, been authorized to
convey a counter proposal. This counteroffer is, of course, subject to Rule 408 of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence.

HJ Grathol will agree to settle all claims arising from, and related to, the case of The
State ofldalw v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CV-10-10095, Kootenai County, including the
pending appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court in exchange for the total sum of
$2,450,000.00 (which amount includes the amount previously paid into court and/or
distributed to HJ Grathol), together with reimbursement of HJ Grathol's actual attorneys fees
incurred to date or 80% ofITD's attorneys fees paid to date, whichever is less.
Additionally, HJ Grathol will convey, as part of the above recited consideration, an
80' right of way for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road provided that ITD agrees
to the non·monetary concessions set forth in the table attached hereto.
This offer will remain open for 10 days from the date of this letter.
Yours very truly,

~

Douglas S. Mar ce
DSM/sj
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1

2

Grant of utility easements across all
ITD R.O.W. on US 95 and Hwy 54,
and Sylvan Rd. serving all of HJ
Grathol parcels.

With exec. of
purch. agrmnt;
recorded by
May 2012

ITD to HJ Grathol

Installation of utility stubs, sleeves or
conduits within granted easements.

By May 2012

ITD, with sizes and
locations per HJ
Grathol

Grant access points from Hwy. 54
With exec. of
purch. agrmnt;
and existing US 95 to HJ Grathol.
recorded by
ITD to grant access for two drive
May 2012
approaches off of US 95, two off of
Hwy. 54, and one off either US 95 or
Hwy. 54 for corner parcel.

ITD to HJ Grathol

Grant thre~ access points off of
Sylvan Road, each side, to HJ
Grathol property.

With exec. of
purch. agrmnt;
recorded by
May 2012

ITD to HJ Grathol

Completion by
December 2012

ITD

5

Construction of Sylvan Road to
County standards within an 80'
R.O.W

With exec. of
purch. agrmnt;
recorded by
May 2012

ITD to HJ Grathol

6

Grant of easements for use of ITD
R.O.W. on US 95 and Hwy. 54 for
stormwater retention and land
application of water re-use
purposes.

Wrth execution
of purchase
agreement

ITD

7

Agreement not to impose any
project sign restrictions on HJ
Grathol project; all signs to be in
conformance with County
ordinances.

With execution

ITD

8

Agreement that any required or
desired signalization of Sylvan Rd.
and Hwy 54 intersection will be
entirely by ITD or others, and not HJ
Grathol.

3

4

of purchase
agreement
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HOLLAND&HART-~

MaryV. York
Phone (208) 342-5000
Fax (208) 343-8869
myork@hollandhart.com

Januaiy 10, 2012
OFFER OF SETTLEMENT PROTECTED BY RULE
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE

408

Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and
E-mail: dmmfice@ramsde11lyons.co111 and
U.S.Mail
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Nmthwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Re:

ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CVl0-10095, First Judicial District
Court, State of Idaho, County of Kootenai

Dear Doug:
This letter is in response to your letter of December 29, 2011, in which you
conveyed yom client's counter offer for a proposed resolution of this case. My clients have
reviewed the proposed settlement and do not see any justifiable or legally permissible basis
for the dollar amounts your client has demanded in this case. Accordingly, my clients have
instructed me to reject the proposed offer.

If you have any questions or if I can be of any assistance, please do not hesitate to
contact me.

MVY:ntp
S365134_1.DOC

Holland &Hart LlP
Phone (208) 342·5000 Fax (208) 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O. Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701·2527
Aspen Boulder Carson City Colorado Springs Denver Oenverlech Center Billings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole Las Vegas Reno Salt Lake Clty Santa Fe Washinqton,D.C . .:i
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT, by and through THE
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F.
MAGNUSON IN OPPOSITION TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES

vs.

HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS
BANK, a Washington corporation; and
DOES 1 through 5,

Defendants
STATE OF IDAHO )

) ss.
County of Kootenai )
JOHN F. MAGNUSON being duly sworn on his oath deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON IN OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES - 1
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2.

I am engaged in the general practice of law in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. I have

practiced law since the year 1988, or 24 years. During that time I have prosecuted and
defended civil actions of various kinds and involving numerous different legal and factual
issues.
3.

Sometimes the cases in which I am involved are legally complex and

sometimes they are not; my experience has covered a wide range of complexity. I know a
complex case when I see one; it is one that has new or novel legal issues which are
complicated and difficult to learn or one where it is hard to find what the law is.
4.

I have appeared in State of Idaho trial courts and appellate courts, as well as

federal trial and appellate courts.
5.

My experience includes familiarity with and work on cases involving real

estate and commercial transactions. In addition I have experience with condemnation cases
involving the taking of private property by state, municipal, and other governmental
agencies.
6.

In the course of my practice over the years, I have participated in cases where

one or both sides have moved for summary judgment, and where the court has granted
summary judgment.
7.

My hourly rate during the year 2011 and fo date in 2012 is $250. (There are

rare occasions when I may charge $275; if the case is very complex or if it is not particularly
desirable for one reason or another.) It is my observation, from talking to other lawyers and
from seeing applications for fees, that the current prevailing hourly rate in Idaho for
attorneys with 20 years of experience or more is $250. (I accept that there may be a few

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON IN OPPOSITION TO ATIORNEY'S FEES - 2
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lawyers in the State with specialized skills and somewhat higher rates, but those examples
are not usual and customary for Idaho.)
8.

I read the Complaint and Answer filed by the parties in the above entitled

action, along with the written decision of the Court that is dated May 25, 2012. I read the
York Affidavit of June 18, 2012 in support of the motion for fees and costs.
9.

In my opinion the above entitled case involved issues which were not

especially or unusually novel or difficult, and the skill requisite to provide the legal services
required were not so advanced as to necessitate exceptional legal practitioners or
involvement of multiple lawyers with specialized experiences in a unique or esoteric area of
law.
10.

I understand that Holland & Hart seeks attorney's fees and paralegal fees

which total $724,136.00 for 2,720 hours of work. This compares to Ramsden & Lyons fees
in the amount of $212,000.00 and 930 hours.
11.

I have an opinion as to the reasonableness of the Holland & Hart charges for

attorney's and paralegal fees. My opinion is:
a.

The charges are excessive and unreasonable and not in keeping with the

prevailing charges for like work in Idaho, or at the least, in the First Judicial
District.
b.

One reason the charges are unreasonable is because the hourly rates of

the lawyers involved are too high;
c.

Another reason the charges are unreasonable is because too much time

was spent by the lawyers working on the case; the time is excessive.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON IN OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES· 3
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12.

I have an opinion as to what reasonable attorney's and paralegal fees ought to

be for this case. My opinion is: The fees for prosecution of the suit brought by ITD ought to
be substantially similar to the fees for defense of the case, because the time spent by the
lawyers for the plaintiff and for the defendant ought to be approximately the same; and, there
is no reason that the Holland & Hart hourly rate should be substantially higher than the
prevailing hourly rate for like work in this geographic area. I am informed that Marfice and
Gabbert charge $250 and $230, respectively. Mr. Marfice's rate is the same charged by me
and by most similarly qualified and similarly experienced attorneys in this region.

It is my opinion that this case is not overly complex; that the mere fact that it

13.

involved a condemnation does not make the case exceptionally novel or difficult; and that the
law involving takings and just compensation in this case is not hard to understand even
through there were some issues which would not be typical in a condemnation case.

14.

There does not appear to be anything about this case in terms of the issues or

the circumstances that justifies the prosecution with five lawyers, two paralegals and two
"tech support," with a total of at least 2,720 hours of work. The case is not so unique as to be
either desirable or undesirable. An award of attorney's fees in the amount sought by Holland

& Hart would be unprecedented in comparison to fee awards in any case with which I have
been involved.

15.

Also, it is my opinion that Marfice's and Gabbert's legal skill are such as to

call tie Plaintiff's requested fees into question. I can say this because I have worked with
them and against both of them and know their skills, compared to all other lawyers I have
worked with and against in Idaho. Moreover, their experience is commensurate with their ·
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opponents'. Marfice has 23 years and Gabbert has 9 years. ITD's lawyers' experience ranges
from 21 years to 3 years. Therefore, Grathol's lawyers' rates of $230-250 should not be
exceeded by the Holland & Hart lawyers.

ih
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this day~ of June, 2012.

JUDYE. SCOTT

STATE 0.F WASHINGTON

NOTARY PUBLIC
MY COMMISSION EXPl~S
10-14-14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.1__

~1o

I hereby certify that on the
day of
12, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

/us

Mail
__ O~ght Mail
_
,H'and Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

/4Mail

_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _J;laria Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869
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(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nIDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT, by and through THE
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-10-10095
AFFIDAVIT OF JOEL P. HAZEL IN
OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES

vs.
HJ ORATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS
BANK, a Washington corporation; and
DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Kootenai )
JOEL P. HAZEL being duly sworn on his oath deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein.

2.

I am engaged in the general practice of law in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. I have

practiced law since the year 1994, or 18 years. During that time I have prosecuted and
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defended civil actions of various kinds and involving numerous different legal and factual
issues.
3.

My experience includes familiarity with and work on cases involving real

estate and commercial transactions. In addition I have experience with condemnation cases
involving the taking of private property by state, municipal, and other governmental
agencies.
4.

Sometimes the cases in which I am involved are legally complex and

sometimes they are not; my experience has covered a wide range of complexity.
5.

I have appeared in State of Idaho trial courts and appellate courts, as well as

federal trial and appellate courts.
6.

My hourly rate for the year 2011 was $240 and my 2012 rate is $255. It is my

observation, from talking to other lawyers and from seeing applications for fees, that the
current prevailing hourly rate in Idaho for attorneys with about 20 years of experience is
approximately $250. (I accept that there may be a few lawyers in the State with specialized
skills and somewhat higher rates, but those examples are not usual and customary for Idaho.)
7.

I read the Complaint and Answer filed by the parties in the above entitled

action, along with the written decision of the Court that is dated May 25, 2012. I read the
York Affidavit of June 18, 2012 in support of the motion for fees and costs.
8.

In my opinion the above entitled case involved issues which were not

especially or unusually novel or difficult, and the skill requisite to provide the legal services
required were not so advanced as to necessitate exceptional legal practitioners or
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involvement of multiple lawyers with specialized experiences in a unique or esoteric area of
law.
9.

I understand that Holland & Hart seeks attorney's fees and paralegal fees

which total $724,136.00 for 2,720 hours of work. This compares to Ramsden & Lyons fees
in the amount of $212,000.00 and 930 hours.
10.

I have an opinion as to the reasonableness of the Holland & Hart charges for

attorney's and paralegal fees. My opinion is:
a.

The charges are excessive and unreasonable and not in keeping with the

prevailing charges for like work in Idaho, or at the least, in the First Judicial
District.
b.

One reason the charges are unreasonable is because the hourly rates of

the lawyers involved are quite high;
c.

Another reason the charges are unreasonable is because too much time

was spent by the lawyers working on the case; the time is excessive.
11.

I have an opinion as to what reasonable attorney's and paralegal fees ought to

be for this case. My opinion is: The fees for prosecution of the suit brought by ITD ought to
be substantially similar to the fees for defense of the case, because the time spent by the
lawyers for the plaintiff and for the defendant ought to be approximately the same; and, there
is no reason that the Holland & Hart hourly rate should be substantially higher than the
prevailing hourly rate for like work in this geographic area. I am informed that Marfice and
Gabbert charge $250 and $230, respectively. Mr. Marfice's rate is very close to the same

AFFIDAVIT OF JOEL P. HAZEL IN OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES - 3
1560 of 1617

charged by me and by most similarly qualified and similarly experienced attorneys in this
region.
12.

It is my opinion that this case is not exceptionally complex; that the mere fact

that it involved a condemnation does not make the case exceptionally novel or difficult; and
that the law involving takings and just compensation in this case is not hard to understand
even through there were some issues which would not be typical in a condemnation case.
13.

There does not appear to be anything about this case in terms of the issues or

the circumstances that justifies using five lawyers, two paralegals and two "tech support,"
with a total of at least 2,720 hours of work. The case is not so unique as to be either desirable
or undesirable. In my experience, an award of attorney's fees in the amount sought by
Holland & Hart would be unprecedented in comparison to fee awards in any case with which
I have been involved.
14.

Also, it is my opinion that Marfice's and Gabbert's legal skill are such as to

call the Plaintiffs requested fees into question. I can say this because I have worked with
them and against both of them and know their skills, compared to all other lawyers I have
worked with and against in Idaho. Moreover, their experience is commensurate with their
opponents'. Marfice has 23 years and Gabbert has 9 years. ITD's lawyers' experience ranges
from 21 years to 3 years. Therefore, Grathol's lawyers' rates of $230-250 should not be
exceeded by the Holland & Hart lawyers.
II
II
II
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this daytit1-J of July, 2012.

Notary for the ~te 9f Idaho
Residing at: ct:dtif
Commission Expires:
7,-,;l/- ~/~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L

I hereby certify that on the
day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addres~o the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

Vus Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

~Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ /acsimile (208) 343-8869
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,

Case No. CV-10-10095

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category: L.4.
Fee: $101.00

Defendants/Appellants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, an executive department of
state government and its board.

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol appeals against the above-named

Plaintiff to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation,
entered in the above-entitled action on the 26 th day of June, 2012, Honorable Judge Charles
Hosack presiding and such judgment is final pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-716.
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2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment or order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to
Rule 1 l(a)(l) I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of issues on appeal.
(A)

Did the trial court err in concluding that the "larger parcel" must

encompass the entirety of Defendant's land for purposes of identifying
comparable sales, determining "highest and best" use, and for condemnation
valuation purposes?
(B)

Did the trial court err m disregarding un-contradicted testimony on

severance damages?
(C)

Did the trial court err in treating Defendant's testimony as to impacts of

the condemnation on Grathol's proposed commercial development as irrelevant
for purposes of establishing severance damages?
(D)

Did the trial court err in its treatment of the impact of the eventual

development of a frontage road (Sylvan) across Grathol's property?
4.

An order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5(a).

A reporter's transcript is requested.

5(b). The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the Reporter's
Transcript in electronic format:
•

Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, February 2, 2012
(previously transcribed);

•

Hearing on Status Conference, February 13, 2012; and

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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.,

•
6.

Transcript of Trial, March 5-9, 2012 (previously transcribed).
The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

Record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. The preparation of
this record is requested to be scanned pursuant to I.A.R. 2 7(b):
(a)

Plaintiff's Disclosure of Advancing Experts;

(b)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure;

(c)

Plaintiff's Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts;

(d)

Order Re: Plainitff's Motion for Summary Judgment;

(e)

Order Re: Plainitff's Motion in Limine;

(f)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure;

(g)

Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages;

(h)

Defendant's Trial Bench Brief;

(i)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Post Trial Brief;

G)

PlaintiffITD's Post Trial Brief;

(k)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Reply to Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief w/
Appendix;

7.

(1)

PlaintiffITD's Response to Defendant's Post Trial Brief;

(m)

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment;

(n)

Judgment-dated June 4, 2012; and

(o)

Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation.

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
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•
8.

All admitted trial exhibits.
I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
Name and Address: Byrl Cinnamon and Joann Schaller, Official Court Reporters, P.O.
Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/2/12-previously transcribed)
Name and Address: Anne Brownell (MacManus-Browning), Official Court Reporter,
P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/13/12- not yet transcribed)
Name and Address: Anita Self, M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., 816 Sherman,
Ave, Ste. 7, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814; (Court trial-previously transcribed)
(b)

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the Reporter's Transcript;
(c)

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's Record has been

paid;
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to 1.A.R. 20.
DATED this 13 th day of July, 2012.
RAMSDEN &_LYONS, LLP'

/

,/

,.,.--~ /
_.,/

opher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13 th day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

,X

USMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498

.,<' US Mail

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

E. Don Copple
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

-r:' USMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 386-9428

Byrl Cinnamon
Joann Schaller
Court Reporter
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

)<' US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Anne Brownell
Court Reporter
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Anita Self
M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc.
816 Sherman, Ave, Ste. 7
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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STATE OF iDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)

V.

)

HJ ORATHOL, a California general
partnership,

)
)
)

L\ j}j,UJ)1\/l
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 40168-2012
Kootenai County Docket No. 20 I 0-10095

).

Defendant-Appellant,
and
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation, and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed July 5, 2011, in appeal No.
38511, Dept of Transportation v. HJ Grathol; therefore, good cause appearing,

·

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be
AUGMENTED to include the Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior
appeal No. 38511.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 38511.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court, which shall
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings
included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 38511. The LIMITED CLERK'S
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement.
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DATED this

j

l.fr)day of July, 2012.

Stephen W.
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter

.,

.

enyon. Clerk

u
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. CV-10-10095
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
HJ ORATHOL, a California general
partnership; STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through
5,
Defendants/Appellants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, an executive department of
state government and its board.

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol appeals against the above-named

Plaintiff to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation,
entered in the above-entitled action on the 26th day of June, 2012, Honorable Judge Charles
Hosack presiding and such judgment is final pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-716.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

ORIGINAL
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2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment or order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to
Rule 1 l(a)(l) I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of issues on appeal.
(A)

Did the trial court err in concluding that the "larger parcel" must
encompass the entirety of Defendant's land for purposes of identifying
comparable sales, determining "highest and best" use, and for
condemnation valuation purposes?

(B)

Did the trial court err in disregarding un-contradicted testimony on
severance damages?

(C)

Did the trial court err in treating Defendant's testimony as to impacts of
the condemnation on Grathol's proposed commercial development as
irrelevant for purposes of establishing severance damages?

(D)

Did the trial court err in its treatment of the impact of the eventual
development of a frontage road (Sylvan) across Grathol's property?

4.

An order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5(a).

A reporter's transcript is requested.

5(b). The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the Reporter's
Transcript in electronic format:

6.

•

Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, February 2, 2012
(previously transcribed);

•

Hearing on Status Conference, February 13, 2012; and

•

Transcript of Trial, March 5-9, 2012 (previously transcribed).
The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

Record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1.A.R. The preparation of
this record is requested to be scanned pursuant to I.A.R. 27(b):

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

1571 of 1617

7.

(a)

Plaintiffs Disclosure of Advancing Experts -dated July 21, 2011;

(b)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure - dated August 19,
2011;

(c)

Plaintiffs Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts - dated December 19, 2011;

(d)

Order Re: Plainitffs Motion for Summary Judgment- dated February 3,
2012;

(e)

Order Re: Plainitffs Motion in Limine- dated February 3, 2012;

(f)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure - dated
February 10, 2012;

(g)

Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages - February 16,
2012;

(h)

Defendant's Trial Bench Brief- dated February 27, 2012;

(i)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Post Trial Brief- dated March 23, 2012;

G)

PlaintiffITD's Post Trial Brief- dated March 23, 2012;

(k)

Defendant HJ Grathol's Reply to Plaintiffs Post Trial Briefw/ Appendix
- dated April 6, 2012;

(1)

Plaintiff ITD's Response to Defendant's Post Trial Brief - dated April 6,
2012;

(m)

Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment - dated May
25, 2012;

(n)

Judgment - dated June 4, 2012; and

(o)

Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation - dated June 26, 2012.

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
•

All admitted trial exhibits.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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8.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
Name and Address: Byrl Cinnamon and Joann Schaller, Official Court Reporters, P.O.
Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/2/12 - previously transcribed)
Name and Address: Anne Brownell (MacManus-Browning), Official Court Reporter,
P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/13/12-not yet transcribed)
Name and Address: Anita Self, M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., 816 Sherman,
Ave, Ste. 7, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814; (Court trial-previously transcribed)
(b)

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the Reporter's Transcript;
(c)

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's Record has been

paid;
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to I.A.R. 20.
DATED this 26 th day of July, 2012.
RAMSDEN & L ~ ,---

istopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 26 th day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
_,,Hand Delivered
-~- Fiacsimile
F
(208) 334-4498

MaryV. York
Ted S. Tollefson
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
~ d Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869

E. Don Copple
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
~ d Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 386-9428

Byrl Cinnamon
Joann Schaller
Court Reporter
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

/4'Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Anne Brownell
Court Reporter
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

~Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Anita Self
M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc.
816 Sherman, Ave, Ste. 7
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

~Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
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NO. 5142

JUJ. 27. 2012 12:08PM
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STATE OF IO\HO
}
COUNTY OF KOOTEN.AJ SS

~dd-9*~
tmfJuLf? AH r, : II+

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division.

J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Steven C. Bowman (ISB # 4404)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.0. Box 2S27
Boise, Idaho 83701-2S27
Telephone: (208) 342-S000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869

Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE O(JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. CV-10-10095
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD ON

APPEAL

vs.
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINOS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through S,

Defendants/A ellants.
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TO:

NO. 5142

P. 3/5

APPELLANT HJ GRATHOL AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT the Respondent in the above-entitled proceeding

hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.AR., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's
record in addition to that required to be included by the I.AR. and requested to be included by
Appellant in itsAmendedNotice of Appeal dated July 26, 2012.

1. Clerk's Record:
a. The entire Clerk's Record on Appeal from the first appeal in this case, Idaho
Supreme Court Docket No. 38511-2011, State ofIdaho, Department of

Transportation v. HjGrathol, Kootenai County District Court #2010-10095.
b. The entire clerk's record on file with the Kootenai County District Court from
March 3~ 2011 to the date of the filing of Appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal.
Respondent requests that the additional documents to be included in the Clerk's Record
be scanned pursuant to Rule 27(b), I.A.R.

2. I certify that:
a. As Special Deputy Attorney General for the State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation
Board ("trD") in this case, that !TD is exempt from any filing feei-and costs
associated with the preparation of the Clerk's Record on Appeal; and
b. This request has been served upon the clerk of the district court and upon all
parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

I II
Ill
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DATED this 27th day of July, 2012.

1. Tim Thomas

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTfflCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of July, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
,...bri---1..-T'\ .,....~1..1..--- "C',..A
\,,
l5~Upllti1 JJ, \.li:I.IJUti1", =~·
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816~1336

D
r,

[8'.I

1--1

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 664-5884

D

E-mail

D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 446-1188
E-mail
Overnight UPS

D

Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, HJ Grathol
Clerk of the Court - Appeals
First Judicial District Court
Kootenai County
324 W. Garden Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

~

D
D

S6979S3_1.00CX
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STA1E: OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
FILED

LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

}ss

2012 AUG -3 AM 9: 0 I
CLERK DlSTRICT COURT

!Rlr(pfior')

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civii Litigation Division

J, TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83 707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Mary V, York (ISB #5020)
Steven C, Bowman (ISB #4404)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HARTLLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: {208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV-10-10095

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.

AMENDED REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND
RECORD ON APPEAL

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,

Defendants/A ellants.

AMENDED REQUEST F.OR ADDmONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD ON APPEAL- 1

1579 of 1617

AUG. 3. 2012 9:36AM

TO:

N0.5185

P. 3/8

APPELLANT HJ GRATHOL AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ..
ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT the Respondent in the above-entitled proceeding

hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.AR, the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's
record in addition to that required to be included by the I.AR. and requested to be included by
Appellant in its Amended Notice of Appeal dated July 26, 2012.
1. Clerk's Record:
a

The entire Clerk's Record on Appeal from the first appeal in this case, Idaho Supreme
Court Docket No. 38511-2011, State of Idaho, Department of Transportation v. HJ

Grathol, Kootenai County District Court #2010-10095.
b. Respondent requests the following documents be included in the Clerk's Record, in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R:

TITLE

DATE

(1)

ITD's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury
Trial

3/24/11

(2)

Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support ofITD's Brief in Opposition
to Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial

3/24/11

(3)

Notice of Trial

4/5/11

(4)

Notice of Service of Discovery Responses

(5)

Notice of Service of Discovery Requests

5/13/11

(6)

Notice of Service of Discovery Responses

5/17/11

(7)

Notice of Service of Discovery

7/8/11

(8)

Plaintiff !TD' s Notice of Disclosure of Advancing Experts

7/21/11

(9)

Notice of Compliance

8/22/11

~""

4/lS/11

(10) Notice of Service

8/29/11

(11) HJ Grathol's Motion to Compel

9/14/11

(12) Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Compel

9/14/11

AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDmONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD ON APPEAL- 2
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(35) Notice of Service

11/4/11

(36) Amended Notice of Hearing

11/7/11

(37) Notice of Service of Discovery Requests

11/14/11

(38) Amended Pretrial Order

11/16/11

(39) Notice of Hearing

11/16/11

(40) Notice of Service of Discovery Responses

12/6/11

(41) Plaintiff ITD's Notice of Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts

12/19/11

(42) Notice of Service

12/27/11

(43) PlaintiffITD's Motion for Summary Judgment

1/6/2012

(44) PlaintiffITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

1/6/12

(45) Plaintiff ITD's Motion in Limine

1/6/12

(46) PlaintiffITD's Brief in Support of Motion in Limine

1/6/12

(47)

Affidavit of Mary York in Support of PlaintiffITD's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine

1/6/12

(48) Notice of Hearing

1/10/12

(49) Notice of Service

1/17/12

(50) Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

1/20/12

(51)

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

1/20/12

(52) Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Defendant's
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

1/20/12

Amended Notice of Hearing
(53)
.,

1/24/12

4!'""'

(54) PlaintiffITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

1/27/12

(55) ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion in Limine

1/27/12

(56) Notice of Hearing

2/2/12

(57) Notice ofHearini

2/2/12

(58) Amended Notice of Hearing

2/3/12

(59) Administrative assignment of Judge Charles W. Hosack

2/8/12

(60) Order Assigning District Judge Hosack

2/8/12

(61)

Lodging of Transcript

(62) Notice of Piling Original Transcript

P. 5/8

2/C)/12
2/10/12
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(63) Notice of Transcript Lodged

2/13/12

(64) Notice of Transcript Delivery-Certificate of Witness-Deponent

2/15/12

P. 6/8

Alan Johnson
(6S) Notice of Service of Discovery Responses

2/21/12

(66) Defendant HJ Grathol 's Witness List

2/27/i2

(67)

Defendant HJ Grathol' s List of Exhibits

2/27/12

(68)

PlaintifflTD's Trial Witness List

2/27/12

(69) Plaintiff ITD' s Trial Exhibit List

2/27/12

(70) Plaintiff ITD's Trial Brief

2/27/12

(71) ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed

2/29/12

(72)

Brief in Support ofITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses Not
Timely Disclosed

(73) Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support ofITD's Motion to Exclude
Expert Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed

2/29/12
3/1/12

(74)

Trial Subpoena (Jason Minzghor)

3/5/12

(7S)

Order re PlaintifflTD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses Not
Timely Disclosed

3/6/12

(70) Motion to Enlarge Time
(77)

Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Motion to
Enlarge Time

3/29/12
3/29/12

(78) Order to Enlarge Time

3/30/12

(79) Plaintiff ITD' s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

4/6/12

(86) Defendant's (Proposed) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

4/6/12

(81) MVYork Letter to Judge Hosack enclosing proposed form
Judgment

S/31/12

(82) Opinion filed

6/6/12

(83) ITD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

6/18/12

(84) ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

6/18/12

(85) Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees
and Costs

6/18/12

(86)

Plaintiff's Second Notice of Tender of Funds and Satisfaction of

6/20/12

Judgment
(87) Remittitur

7/2/12

AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD ON APPEAL- S
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(88)

Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Objection to Plaintiffs
Application for Attorney Fees and Costs

7/2/12

(89)

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs
and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

7/2/12

(C)O'\
... ..,,,,,

,

Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert Re: Attorney Fees a.nd Costs

7/2/12

(91)

Affidavit of John F. Magnuson in Opposition to Attorney's Fees

7/2/12

(92)

Affidavit of Joel P. Hazel in Opposition to Attorney's Fees

7/2/12
7/13/12

(93) Notice of Appeal
(94)

P. 7/8

7/26/12

A.mended Notice of Appeal

Respondent requests that the additional documents to be included in the Clerk's Record
be scanned pursuant to Rule 27(b), I.A.R.
2. I certify that:

a. As Special Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation
Board ("ITO") in this case, that ITD is exempt from any filing fees and costs
associated with the preparation of the Clerk's Record on Appeal; and
b. This request has been served upon the clerk of the district court and upon all parties
required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2012.

HOLLAND & HART LLP

ofthe
Steven C. o an, r the firm
Special eputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Idaho Transportation Department
1. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of August, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

D
D

Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

[8J

D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Deiivered
Fax (208) 664-S884
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant HJ Grathol
1

Clerk of the Court-Appeals
First Judicial District Court
Kootenai County
324 W. Garden Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

D
D

IZI

D
D

U.S.Mail

Hand Delivered
Fax (208) 446· 1188

E-mail
Overnight UPS

5704625_1.DOCX
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Phone: {208} 446-1136
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TO:

Clerk of the Courts
Idaho Supreme Court Building
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0101

DOCKET NO.

40168

KOOTENAI CV-2010-10095

STATE OF IDAHO,

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington corporation;
and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants-Appellants.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on August 14, 2012, I
lodged the original Transcript on Appeal in the
above-referenced case, totalling 47 pages, and
two hard copies and one electronic copy, with the
District Court Clerk of the County of Kootenai in
the First Judicial District.
Both an electronic
PDF file of the transcript and a PDF file of this
Notice of Transcript Lodged with designation of
proceedings contained within the transcript are
attached to e-mail and sent to the Idaho Supreme
Court at sctfilings@idcourts.net.
Proceedings:
February 2, 2012 SUMMARY JUfGMENT MOTION

~JJ~------u:::n~ ~ ~ ~

~AA

Q ,..., h

yV\.J.LJ.~

1..1

1 1

i...J\....,J..LO...L..LC::.L

au_~ __J1_7__a,a~-----lodgt;gd~te
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NO.5310
t,l/XfE OF 10AHO

LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

P. 2

\ SS

COUNTY e,:: KOOTrni\l f
FILED

i·

I

STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586)
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498

Mary V. York (ISB #5020)
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404)
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869

-- I

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY Of. KOOTENAI
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CaseNo. CVl0-10095

ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.
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After prevailing at trial, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("!TD")

filed a Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs on June 18, 2012. The amount of the attorney fees,
costs as a matter of right, and discretionary costs sought by ITO are set forth in detail in the
Affidavit Of Mary V. York filed on June 18, 2012 (the "June 18, 2012 York Aff.'').
In opposition to ITD's motion, Defendant HJ Grathol, a California general partnership
("Grathol"), filed a Motion and Memorandum To Disallow Costs And Objection To Plaintiff's
Application For Attorney Fees And Costs. Accordingly, ITD now files this Reply Brief in
support of its motion.
I.

SUMMARY OF REPLY BRIEF

Grathol argues that no statutory basis exists for the award of attorney fees and costs to a
condemnor. In fact, Idaho Code § 7-718 expressly authorizes the award of costs, including
attorney fees, to either side in a condemnation case.
Grathol contends that ITD did not make a timely offer of settlement in compliance with
the Acarrequi decision and subsequent cases. In fact, Grathol expressly agreed to an extension
of time for ITD to make an Acarrequi offer and agreed not to make any argument that ITD' s

Acarrequi offer was untimely.
Grath~l argues that ITD is not the prevailing party because it dld not make a timely

Acarrequi offer. However, ITD did make a timely Acarrequi offer of $1.1 million. Since ITD's
offer was $1.1 million and the just compensation award was $675,000.00, ITD is the prevailing
party.
Omthol argues that it never sought over $7 million in just compensation in this case.
This argument is directly refuted by its own expert disclosures and the deposition testimony of

its principal, Mr. Alan Johnson. Both made clear that Gratbol intended to present testimony and
evidence at trial that it suffered damages and lost profits in excess of $7 million. The only thing
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that prevented Grathol from presenting this claim at trial was ITO' s motion for summary
judgment to dismiss the claim, which the Court granted.
Grathol argues that Holland & Hart's hourly rates are excessive because they are higher
than the rates charged by attorneys in the Coeur d'Alene area. This argument fails to account for
the fact that ITD is a statewide agency and needs legal services throughout the state. ITD has
relied on Holland & Hart's extensive experience in condemnation cases, construction claims, and
environment.al matters for more than a decade. Grathol's argument also fails to account for the
fact that Holland & Hart is a regional law firm with offices throughout the Rocky Mountain
states and Washington, D.C. Its rates are in line with other regional law firms with offices in
Idaho. Moreover, the remedy for a claim that hourly rates are too high is not to deny the claim
for attorney fees but to lower the amount of fees awarded.
Grathol argues that ITD's attorneys spent too much time on the case. This argument is
refuted by the fact that ITD prevailed on all issues and claims in this case. The argument is also
refuted by the fact that it was much easier and less ex.pensive for Grathol to make large,
unfounded claims for compensation-many of which were contrary to law-than it was for ITD
to defend against those claims and to do the work necessary to have the unlawful and unfounded
•

r

claims dismissed. The difficulty and expense faced by ITD were exacerbated by Orathol's
constant changing of both the amount and alleged factual bases for its claims. Grathol started
changing its claims at the outset of the case and continued to change them through trial. It was

very expensive for ITD to deal with Grathol' s constantly shifting claims, coupled with its refusai
to disclose expert opinions and the continual changing of those opinions once disclosed. The
time spent by ITD attorneys was also increased significantly by the many instances of
malfeasance and impropriety by Grathol and its attorneys and experts as discussed in detail in
ITD's opening brief.
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Grathol argues that certain costs as a matter of right sought by ITD were not necessary.
Grathol bases its argument on self-serving observations about what is and is not necessary for
proper trial preparation, which should be disregarded given that Grathol failed to prepare and
present an effective case at trial
Il.

IDAHO CODE§ 7-718 GOVERNS THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS IN CONDEMNATION CASES.
The award of costs and attorney fees in Idaho is typically governed by Idaho Code § 12-

121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However, as noted in ITD's opening
brief, the award of costs and attorney fees in Idaho condemnation cases has developed its own
set of rules and applications.
The statutory provisions governing condemnation cases are found in Title 7, Chapter 7 of
the Idaho Code. Section 7-718 expressly authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to both
condemnors and condemnees. "Costs may be allowed or not, and, if allowed, may be
apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides in the discretion of the court."
Idaho Code § 7•718. Thus, the Idaho Code expressly authorizes the award of costs to either side
in a condemnation case.

The "gosts" authorized under§ 7-718 include attorney fees. Sef.Ada County Highway

Dist.

V.

Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 876-77, 673 P.2d 1067, 1070w71 (1983) (holclingthatcosts

under§ 7-718 include attorney fees); State ex rel Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, i20 Idaho 825,

8311 820 P.2d 695, 701 (1991) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (same).
As explained in more detail in ITD's opening brief, Idaho case law has established a
two-part analysis for the award of costs and attorney fees in condemnation cases: First, a
determination must be made as to who is the prevailing pai-t"; under Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and
guidelines established inAcarrequi and its progeny. Second, once the prevailing party has been
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ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-4

AUG.22.2012 4:36PM

N0.5310

P. 6

identified, the amount of costs and attorney fees to be awarded shall be determined based on the
provisions of Rules 54(d)(l) and S4(e)(3). The trilogy of Idaho cases that set forth these rules
are: Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, supra; State ex rel Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust,

supra; and State ofIdaho v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 (1997).
Grathol' s argument that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive provision governing the
award of attorney fees in condemnation cases is incorrect. It is directly refuted by § 7-718.
Grathol also mistakenly argues that Talbot did not extend the analysis of who is the
prevailing party in condemnation cases to condemnors. In fact, the Court in Talbot found the
State to be the prevailing party under theAcarrequi guidelines and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Talbot,
120 Idaho at 829-30, 699-700. The State made no motion for attorney fees to the district court in
that case, so the issue of an actual award of attorney fees to the State was not raised.

m.

THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS MAY BE AWARDED TO A CONDEMNOR.
Orathol contends that no case authority exists for an award of attorney fees to the

condemnor. This is not conect. As noted in Talbot, ''(t)his Cowt has held that in eminent
domain actions, the award of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial cowt." 120 Idaho
at 828, 698 (citing Acarrequi).

InAcarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[e]xcept in the most extreme and
unlikely situation, we cannot envision an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor."
105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Thus, the Court has acknowledged that attorney fees may be
awarded to the condemnor in certain cases. If any case qualifies as the (!extreme" and ''unlikely"
case, it is the case now before the Court. The conduct of Gtathol and its attorneys was certainly
Hextreme." In addition, G-rathol's claims for compensation and the alleged bases oft1le claims
were so exorbitant, so far removed from market value, so lacking in foundation, constantly
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shifting and changing, and contrary to Idaho law as to make this case precisely the "unlikely"
case in which attorney fees should be awarded to ITD.
The abuses and improper tactics by Gtathol included:
•

opposing the motion for possession on meritless grounds;

•

repeatedly failing and refusing to answer discovery;

•

repeatedly failing and refusing to disclose expert opinions;

•

hiding expert opinions behind an inapplicable and improper assertion of the
federal ''actor-viewer'' exception, which only applies in federal court and only
applies to the drafting of expert reports; even in federal court, the exception does
not excuse the duty to disclose expert opinions and does not circumvent written
discovery asking for expert opinions;

•

making repeated and continuing demands for compensation based on an alleged
taking for Sylvan Road - despite having no factual basis for the claims and
despite repeated rulings from the Court denying and dismissing the claims;

•

presenting improper valuations that bad no "before and after" analysis, no
understandable explanation, and numerous violations of law and deviations from
accepted appraisal standards;

•

making claims for damages that were clearly barred by Idaho law;

•

dropping claims for damages barred by law only after forcing ITD to engage in
expensive briefmg and preparation for oral argument on a motion for summary to
dismiss these claims; and

•

'making outlandish demands for compensation that were ttot supported by the
market, had relation to "fair market value," and were soundly rejected by the
Court.

no

These improper tactics and abuses were discussed in detail in ITD's opening brief, at 13-28 (filed
June 18, 2012),
In addition, Grathol's two valuation experts, Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson, employed

improper valuation methods and tactics that initiated a host of battles that should not have been
necessary and involved fights over issues clearly barred by law or whoUy unsupported by the
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facts in the case. Grathol' s tactics substantially and unnecessarily increased the attorney fees and
costs in this case.
The improper methods and tactics of Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson included the
following:
• Failure to use the date of talcing as the date of value, as required by Idaho statute;
• The use of multiple dates of value, in violation of statute;
• Failure to do a "before and after'' analysis of the value of the property;
• Failure to use the entire Grathol property as the "larger parcel" for purposes of
determining the "before and after" value;
• Using sales as alleged '"comparable sales" that were in far superior locations, with
substantially greater demand for commercial development, and substantially
better situated for the installation of utilities or with utilities already installed;
• Sherwood's use of a negotiated settlement of a condemnation as one of his
primary "comparable sales,'' despite his testimony that such a transaction is not an
indication of "market value";
• Failure to identify, quantify, or explain any of the adjustments they made to sales
as part of the "comparable sales approach" to real estate appraisal;
• Producing only a limited, restricted appraisal report that expressly noted that third
parties would have difficulty understanding the report;
• Repeatedly changing valuation conclusions and the explanations for the
"'·conclusions reached;
,..
• . Continuing to assert claims for compensation based on the time needed for
constr..1ction of the USe9S Project {i.e., Hcon.struction delay"), despite an order
from the Court bar.ring such claims; and
• Johnson based his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical development
were completed, This approach was barred by law,
As the Court knows, these abuses and tactics were the subject of many motions and a

great deal of litigation before, during, and after trial. Ultimately, the Court rejected the methods
and conclusions of Grathol' s valuation experts completely, but only after very great effort and
expense by ITD.
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For these reasons, discussed in detail in ITDis opening brief, ITO should be awarded its
reasonable costs and attorney fees in this case.
IV,

ITD MADE A TIMELY OFFER OF SETTLEMENT UNDERACARREQUL
Grathol contends that ITD did not make a timely offer of settlement in compliance with

the Acarrequi decision and subsequent cases. Grathol not.ably omits the fact that it agreed, in
writing, to an extension of time for ITO to make an offer under Acarrequi.
The Court's scheduling order required Grathol to make expert disclosures by August 19,
2011. GTathol refused to provide the required information and opinions until October 6, 2011.
Grathol only made the disclosures when confronted with a motion by ITD to compel Grathol to
disclose its experts and their opinions or to exclude any experts by Grathol. After Grathol finally
made its disclosures, the parties resolved ITD's motion by stipulation filed October 18, 2011.
In that stipulation, Grathol agreed as follows:
The parties also agree to extend by one month the date by which
ITD may submit an offer of settlement in accordance with Ada
County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d
1067 {1983) and succeeding cases and other relevant provisions of
Idaho law. Under this extension, ITD' s "Acarrequi" Offer will be
due no later than November 21, 2011 and Grathol may not assert
any argument that an "Aca"equi" offer made on or before
,.November 21, 2011 is untimely.
Stipulation For Extension Of Time For Plaintiff's Rebuttal Expert Disclosures And For

Acarrequi Offer, at 2, 12 (filed Oct. i8i 201 i). Thus, not only did Grathol agree by fomial
stipulation to extend the deadline for making anAcarrequi offer, it agreed not to make any

argument that !TD 's offer was untimely.
Grathol then agreed in writing to extend the Acarrequi offer date from November 21 to
December 16, 2011. See Ex. C to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. ITD delivered its offer under
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Acarrequi, in the amount of $1.1 million, to Grathol on December 15, 2011-within the time
agreed to by the parties. Therefore, the offer was timely made.

V.

ITD IS THE PREVAILING PARTY.

Under the rules set forth inAcarrequi, awards of costs and attorney fees in a
condemnation proceeding lie within the discretion of the trial court and an award of costs and
fees do not require a fmding by the trial court that the claims were "brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Acarrequi at 876-77, 673 P.2d at
1070~71. Additionally, Acarrequi established factors and guidelines to assist the trial court in
making its detennination of the prevailing party and whether an award of costs and fees should

be made in a condemnation action. Id at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Based on those criteria,
discussed below, ITD is the prevailing party in this action:

A,

ITD Made A Timely Offer Of Settlement Of At Least 90% Of The Verdict.

On December 15, 2011, ITO made an offer of settlement to Gtathol in the amount of
$1.1 million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. The just compensation award was
$675,000.00. Thus, ITD clearly made an "offer of settlement of at least 90 percent of the
ultimate jury verdict," and satisfied this element of the prevailing party analysis. Acarrequi,
,..

105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072.

B.

...

·ITD's Settlement Offer Of $1.1 Million Was Timely Made.

As noted above, ITD' s offer of $1.1 million was made within the time period agreed to
by the parties in writing.

C.

Grathol Did Not Voluntarily Grant Possession Of The Property Pending
Resolution Of The Just Compensation Issue.

Grathol did not volunt.arily grant possession of the property, and delayed responding to
requests for possession by ITD to the point that ITD began to be pressed by funding and
construction deadlines on the US 95 Project. ITD's Opening Brf., at 8.
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Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on meritless grounds.

As explained in detail in ITD's opening brief, Grathol opposed ITD's motion for

possession on meritless grounds. Id. at 9-10. Grathol's baseless arguments were rejected by the
District Court, and Grathol wasted time, money, and effort on a meaningless appeal. Grathol's
appeal was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Decision in Supreme Cottrt Docket No.
38511, at 4-6 (attached as Ex. E to the June 18, 2012 York Aff.).
In short, Orathol took the routine issue of possession of the condemned property and
turned it into a prolonged legal battle that had no factual or legal merit. This needless battle cost
ITD substantial amounts in attorney fees and costs.

D.

Conclusion.

Based on the factors established in Acarrequi, ITD is clearly the prevailing party in this

action.
VI.

GRATHOL'S CHALLENGE TO FACTORS UNDER RULE 54 HAVE NO MERIT.
A.

Hourly Rates.

Grathol argues that Holland & Hart's hourly rates are excessive because they are higher
than the rates charged by attorneys in the Coeur d'Alene area. This argument fails to account for
the fact that ITD is a statewide agency and needs legal services throughout the state. ITD has
relied on Holland & Hart's extensive experience in condemnation cases, construction claims, and
environmental matters for more than a decade.

Grathol' s argument also fails to account for the fact that Holland & Hart is a regional law
fum with offices throughout the Rocky Mountain states and Washington D.C. Its rates are in

line with other regional law fums with offices in Idaho.
Over the yeats, Idaho courts have found the hourly rates charged by Holland & Hart
attorneys to be reasonable. See, e.g., LaPeter v. Canada Life, 2007 WL 4287489, at *2 and *2,
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n.1. (D. Idaho May 11, 2007); Restoration Industry Ass'n v. Certified Restorers Consulting

Group, 2008 WL 821078, at *1 (D. Idaho March 24, 2008); AVP Restaurant Group v. Godzilla,
et al., CVOC-0711663 (Fourth District Court, 2009).
Lastly, the remedy for a claim that hourly rates are too hlgh is not to deny the claim for

attorney fees as suggested by Gtathol. Rather, the remedy is to lower the amount of fees
awarded.
8.

Time Spent.

Grathol argues that ITO' s attorneys spent too much time on the case. This argument is
refuted by the fact that ITD prevailed across the board in this case.

Gtathol' s argument is also refuted by the fact that it was much easier and much less
expensive for Grathol to make large, unsubstantiated claims for compensation, many of which
were based on theories barred by Idaho law, than it was for ITD to defend against those claims
and to do the work necessary to have the unlawful and unfounded claims dismissed.

The substantial fees and costs incurred by ITD in this case are directly attributable to the
improper claims and tactics by Grathol. Grathol cannot now claim that ITD spent too much time
on the case when Grathol is the reason and cause for all of this work.
~~

~

.

For example, the difficulty and the costs incurred by ITD were greatly increased by
Grathol's constant changing of both the amount of its claims for compensation and damages and

the alleged factual or causal basis for its various claims. This occurred from the outset of the

case and continued all the way through trial. ITD's fees and costs were also increased
substantially by the many instances of malfeasance and impropriety by Gtathol and its attorneys
and experts cited above and in ITD' s opening brief.
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Costs As A Matter Of Right.

Gtathol takes issue with some of the "costs as a matter of right" sought by ITD. It argues
that certain of these costs were not necessary. Grathol bases its argument on self-serving
observations about what is and is not necessary for proper trial preparation. No weight should be
given to such observations by Grathol since it failed to prepare and present an effective case at
trial.

1,

Travel expenses of Mr. George Hedley.

Mr. Hedley is a highly respected commercial real estate developer and general contractor.
His testimony was critical to countering all of Gtathol' s unfounded testimony about the property
having great development potential. Grathol called two expert witnesses who testified on the
issue of development potential: Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. Therefore, it was clearly
necessary for ITO to present testimony to put the actual development potential of the property
before the Court.
Mr. Hedley's travel expenses of $386.70 were reasonable and necessary, and ITD is
allowed to recover these costs as a matter of right.
2.

Preparation of trial exhibits.

Grathol lias objected to ITD's request to recover costs as a matter"of right for the
preparation of trial exhibits pursuant to Rule 54(C)(6). As the Court will recall, both ITO and
Grathol used ITD's demonstrative exhibits at trial. The exhibits for which ITD seeks
reimbursement were all enlargements of key documents:
Exhibit 1S: Kootenai County Zoning District Map
Exhibits 33 and 33-1: Development Site Plans proposed by Grathol
Exhibit 162 and 162-1: Alan Johnson Valuations (Model #2 and Model #3)
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Exhibit 163: Skip Sherwood Valuation (Model #1) (after cross-examination, during
which handwritten notes were added to Ex. 163, the Exhibit was marked Ex. 163a).
All of these exhibits were admitted into evidence.
ITD is entitled as a matter of right to recover the cost of preparing these exhibits for trial.
ITD notes that the amount of $295.46 listed in the June 18, 2012 York Aff. is a clerical error.

The correct amount is $514.96, paid by ITD to Ascensio Innovative Technology to enlarge the
above exhibits for use at trial.

3.

Expert witness fees,

ITD is entitled to expert witness fees as a matter of right for each testifying expert in an
amount ofup to $2,000.00 per expert. I.R.C.P. S4(C)(8). Grathol alleges that Mr. Moe was
"severely impeached" (Grathol Mem., at 19), and therefore ITD should not be allowed to recover
$2,000.00 for Mr. Moe. Grathol's argument is based on an imaginative, revisionist history of the
events at trial. More importantly, its argument is contrary to law,
Rule S4(C) provides for costs as a matter ofright. It makes no exception for experts who
are impeached at trial. Rather, the rule requires that the prevailing party "shall'' be entitled to
recover expert witness fees ofup to $2,000.00 per expert.
•

t'

Moreover, Mr. Moe was not severely impeached as now alleged by Grathol. In fact,
nearly all of his testimony went wichallenged. The Court agreed with Mr. Moe's opinion on the
"larger parcel." The Court agreed with Mr. Moe that the entire property had the same ''highest
and best use,'' both befme and after the US~9S Project Mr. Pynes used comparable sales first
identified by Mr. Moe. And Mr. Moe's opinion of just compensation in the amount of
$571,000.00 was very close to the Court's conclusion of$675,000.00, particularly when
compared to the millions of dollars testified to by Grathol' s experts and rejected by the Court.

ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-13

1598 of 1617

AUG.22.2012 4:37PM

NO. 5310

P. 15

Similarly, Grathol argues that ITD should not be allowed to recover fees paid to
Mr. Hedley, alleging that his testimony "added nothing to further ITD's position and instead only
supported Grathol's claim of severance damage." Grathol Mem. at 19. Again, this is pure
imagination and revisionist history by Gtathol. Mr. Hedley offered critical testimony on the
issue of the actual development potential of the Grathol property, rather than the claimed or
imagined potential testified to by Grathol's witnesses. Among other things, Mr. Hedley testified
that, given what it would cost to bring utilities to the site, construct a waste water system, and
install necessary infrastructure, the property had no value for development. In other words, the
land was worth nothing because the costs to develop it would be prohibitively high.
Mr. Hedley's testimony was made necessary by Grathol's ill-conceived and
unsubstantiated claims regarding the development potential of the property. If Grathol did not
think this issue was relevant, it should not have had its witnesses testify at length about the

development potential of the property.
Most importantly, however, ITD is entitled to recover Mr. Hedley's fees (up to
$2,000.00) as a matter of right, regardless of the mischaracterization of his testimony by Grathol.
4.

Deposition Costs.

Grathol ;gues that ITD should be denied its right to recover the costs for the depositions
of Grathol witnesses Mr. Johnson, Mr. Reeslund, Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Terrell, Mr. Vandervert,
and the cost of a copy of the deposition oflTD witness Mr. Moe, on the grounds that these
depositions were "unnecessary for the preparation of the case for trial," and "[n]ot one of the
depositions was entered into evidence or read to a witness at trial." Grathol Mem. at 19-20,
The second argument by Gtathol is contrary to law. Specifically, the last paragraph of
Rule 54(C) states:
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The mere fact that a deposition is not used in the trial of an action,
either as evidence read into the record or for the purposes of
impeachment, shall not indicate that the taking of such deposition
was not reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not
reasonably obtained, or that the cost of the deposition should
otherwise be disallowed[.]
I.R.C.P S4(C) (emphasis added).
As to the issue of whether the depositions were necessary, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Reeslund,
and Mr. Sherwood were all designated as experts by Grathol and all three experts testified at
trial. For Grathol to argue that ITD's deposition of Grathol's expert witnesses was not necessary

for preparation for trial has no merit and warrants no discussion. This argument is particularly
inappropriate given the long and difficult battle that ITD had in obtaining any expert disclosures
from Grathol. See ITD Brf. Supp. Mot. Exclude Experts Or Compel Expert Disclosures (filed
Sept, 23, 2011). The disclosures ITD eventually forced from Grathol were cryptic, at best.
As to Mr. Terrell and Mr, Vandervert, Grathol initially identified 35 witnesses who might
be called at trial in its responses to ITO discovery on April 15, 2011. For many months after
that, Grathol refused to narrow that list despite requests by ITD. Finally, on February 8, 2012,
Grathoi narrowed its list of fact witnesses to Jim Coleman, Brett Terrell, Tom Vandervert, and
Mike Winger. Set.Ex. 0 to Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff.
After pushing hard to force Grathol to identify the witnesses it actually intended to call at
trial, ITD ended up deposing only Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert. These depositions occurred
on February 13 and 14, 2012, The importance of the depositions of Mr. Terrell and
Mr. Vandervert became even greater when, at the deposition, ITD learned that these witnesses
were not fact witnesses at all, but were instead planning to offer expert opinions on value, land
planning, and development potential of the Grathol property.
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In fact, after the depositions, Grathol served supplemental discovery responses

identifying Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert as expert witnesses on February 17, 2012, just two
weeks before trial. Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff., Ex. Q, These expert disclosures were untimely.
Gra1hol was required to disclose all experts and the opinions of all experts by August 19, 2011.
Moreover, Grathol did not disclose the opinions these two witnesses would offer at trial or the
basis for the opinions. Id. Grathol once again invoked the ''actor/viewer" exception to hide the
opinions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert and refused to comply with the requirements of Rule
26 and ITD' s discovery requesting the opinions of Grathol' s experts and the basis of the
opinions. Id.
Under the circumstances, ITO was forced to file a motion to exclude Mr. Terrell and
Mr. Vandervert from testifying at trial. See Motion To Exclude Expert Witnesses (filed Feb. 29,
2012). Had these experts been allowed to testify, the Court's Pretrial Orders, the Stipulation
between the parties (resolving the long running dispute over expert disclosures), and the Idaho
rules governing discovery would all have been rendered meaningless.
At the start of the trial, the Court ruled that these witnesses would not be permitted to
testify as to opinions, but could testify as to facts within their knowledge. Based on this ruling,

~-

Grathol elected not to call either witness.
Under these circumstances, Grathol cannot argue that the depositions of Mr. Terrell and

Mr. Vandervert were unnecessary. IfITD had not deposed them, it would have been ambushed
at trial by smprise expert witnesses. It should also be noted that the entire fight over these
witnesses should not have happened. The additional costs and attorney fees incurred in this side
battle were caused solely by Grathol' s continuous refusal to comply with the rules of discovery
and obey the Court's pretrial orders.
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Lastly, Grathol argues that ITD should not be allowed to recover the cost of obtaining a
copy of the deposition of Mr. Stan Moe, ITD' s expert who was deposed by Grathol. Since
Grathol took the deposition, it cannot now argue that the deposition was unnecessary. ITD is
clearly entitled to recover the cost of obtaining a copy of the deposition of Mr. Moe as a matter
of right

VII.
A.

REPLY TO LESSER ARGUMENTS BY GRATHOL.

Grathol Did Seek To Recover In Excess Of $7 Million In This Case.

Grath.ol now claims that it never sought to recover in excess of $7 million as just
compensation in this case. This claim is directly refuted by its own expert disclosures and the
deposition testimony of its principal, Mr. Alan Johnson. Both made clear that Grathol intended
to present testimony and evidence

at trial to attempt to recover damages and lost profits in excess

of $7 million.
On October 6, 2011, Grathol served its third supplemental responses to discovery where
it fmally disclosed the expert opinions of Mr. Alan Johnson. In these disclosures, Grath.ol stated

th.at Mr. Johnson would t.estify that Grathol expected to make $8,670,000.00 profit from its
development before the US-9S Project, and only 15% of that amount after the Project. (See
•

r

Grathol's Third Supp. Resps. to Discovery, at 7-8, attached as Ex. K to the Feb. 29, 2012 York
Aff.). Fifteen percent of $8,670,000.00 results in a claim for $7,369,500.00.
Thus, Grathol's expert disclosures stated that Mr. Johnson would be testifying to a loss in
excess of $7 million, which it described in its disclosures as an alternative theory, Id. at 7.
When ITD received Grathol' s expert disclosures stating that an expert would testify at trial that
Orathol would suffer a loss of $7,369,500.00 because of the US-95 Project, ITO had to prepare a
defense to that claim. Grathol cannot now say that it never sought this amount or that ITD
should not have taken Grathol's expert disclosures seriously.
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On December 18, 2011, ITO deposed Mr. Johnson to questi~n him about what his
testimony would be at trial regarding the amount of just compensation that should be paid to
Gtathol. Mr. Johnson made clear in his deposition that he would be testifying that Orathol
should be paid over $7 million in compensation and damages.
Q. And so then if I'm understanding this testimony
correctly, then, in order to get under this alternative"· what we're
calling alternative theory here -- is that you would subtract or you
would take the 8.6 million and then you would subtract the 1.493
million, and that would be the number that you would be testifying
to. Is that correct?
A. Please state that again.
Q. Sure. No problem. All right. So we've got what we'll
call your after-take profits, which is the 3.293 minus 1.88?
A. Correct.

Q. And that, I have written down as $1,493,000. So we'll
say, according to this alternative theory, in the after condition, or
after the project's completed -- let me rephrase that. How would
you characterize that 1.493 million dollars?
A. I would characterize that as the potential profit after the

take.
Q. Potential profit after the take. And the potential profit
without the take is $8,670,000. Correct?
A. That's correct.

Q. So to get what you believe -- what you'll be damaged
by the take is you would take the 8.67 number and subtract the
$1,493,000. Is that correct?
A. That would be legitimate, yes.

Q. ls that what you anticipate testifying to regarding this
alternative theory?
A. Yes.
Q. So then ifmy numbers are correct, if you subtract those
two numbers, that's approximately $7,177,000 in lost profits.
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A. I've not done the calculation, but I will agree to use
your number.

Q. Okay. So do you anticipate testifying that this project~~
or excuse me •• that f/'D 's condemnation and construction will
cost you approtimately $7,177,000 in profits?
A. Yes.

Q. And that number is based upon lost profits, not based
upon the value of the land. Correct?
A. That is correct

Q. So if I understand your proposed testimony correctly is
that you'll be testifying to both a $3,779,000 number and a
$7,177,000 number?
A. Correct.

Q. And you believe that both of those should be
compensated -- excuse me. Would you add those two numbers
together to get your ultimate just compensation or are those two
separate valuations?
A. They're two separate valuations.

Q. So you believe that - is it fair to say that your
anticipated testimony will be that HJ Grathol should be
compensated somewhere between 3. 7 million and 7.1 million
dollars in damages?
A. That would be my testimony.

Q. Is that not accurate?

A. It is accurate. Thar is my testimony.

Johnson Depa. Tr., at 111 :8 to 113: 16 (Ex. 3 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.) (emphasis added).
Orathol continued to pursue this theory until ITD filed a motion for summary judgment to
dismiss Grathol's claims for compensation based on "lost profits.'' See ITD's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, at 39-43 (filed
Jan, 6, 2012). At the hearing on ITD's motion for summary judgment and in the face of
controlling Idaho law on this issue, counsel for Grathol conceded that its claims based on lost
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profits should be dismissed. See Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, at 2
(filed Feb. 3, 2012).
B.

ITD Was Forced To Retain An Expert To Rebut Mr. Johnson's Testimony
Regarding Lost Profits.

Gtathol now argues that ITD should not be permitted to recover the expert fees of

Mr. Reinstein under Rule 54(D) (discretionary costs) because Mr. Reinstein did not testify.
Grathol's argument ignores the facts that required ITD to retain Mr. Reinstein and pay him to
prepare a rebuttal report.
Until the Court dismissed the $7 million claim by Grathol based on lost profits, ITD was
forced to defend against it Since the claim was to be presented by one of Grathol' s experts,

Mr. Alan Johnson, ITD had to retain an expert to rebut the testimony. Since the claim was based
on a combination of business valuation and lost profits, ITD retained Mr. Dennis Reinstein, an
Idaho CPA with experience in these areas. Mr. Reinstein reviewed Mr. Johnson's expert
disclosures, his deposition transcript, and related documents produced by Grathol. Mr. Reinstein
then prepared a detailed rebuttal report. A copy of Mr. Reinstein's report is attached as Ex. 10 to
the Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.

Under the ,,,Court's scheduling order and amendments to the scheduijpg order, all of

Mr. Reinstein's work had to be done two months before the February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's
motion for summary judgment. Therefore, ITO had no way to avoid having to retain

Mr. Reinstein and having him prepare a report to rebut the upcoming testimony of Mr. Johnson.
The fact that the Court later dismissed the lost profits claim on summary judgment, does not
mean the work by Mr. Reinstein was not necessary. On the contrary, until the claim was
dismissed on summary judgment, ITD was forced to defend against it and do the work necessary
to prepare that defense.
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ITD Should Be Allowed To Recover The Fees Of David Evans And
Associates.

During the course of the case, Grathol alleged that it would suffer severance damages for
loss or impainnent of access, and loss or damage based adverse impacts on development plans.
Grathol fought long and hard to avoid explaining the cause of these alleged severance damages
or assigning dollar values to the cl~ed damages. Grathol also gave profit estimates based on
exceedingly low estimates of the cost of building infrastructure for its development and waste
water treatment facilities on the site.
Because of these claims, and the inability to force Grathol to explain the causes of the
alleged damages or the dollar amounts of the damages and the infrastructure costs, !TD retained
the services of a land planner, traffic engineer, and civil engineer with David Evans and
Associates. These experts analyzed Grathol's claims, which was made vecy difficult by the lack

of explanation or foundation for the claims by Orathol, and prepared a rebuttal report. Portions
of that report are attached as Exs. 11 and 12 to the Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.
In response to the David Evans and Associates report, Grathol dropped all pretense of
identifying specific impacts to access or specific impairments of access caused by the US-95

Project. It also mad;: no attempt to point to specific impacts to its proposed '!eevelopment," no
longer sought separate recovery of severance damages for these claims, and no longer tried to
establish benchmarks for losses or lost profits based on low-ball estimates of infrastructure costs
and the costs of constructing waste water treatment facilities on the site. Rather, Grathol only

spoke about such impacts and costs in general terms and only in the context of the impaet on fair
market value of the property. Therefore, the work by David Evans and Associates had a major

impact on the case, the most significant of which was eliminating separate severance damage
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claims and reducing the scope and length of the trial by forcing these issues and claims to the
periphery of the case.

D.

Discretionary Costs.

Grathol complains that ITD did not provide extensive argument in support of its request
to recover discretionary costs. The discretionary costs are self-explanatory. ITD has asked to
recover its discretionary costs to help offset the burden of defending against the excessive and
unfounded claims for compensation by Grathol.
The most important of these costs are the expert witness fees above and beyond the
$2,000.00 fee per expert recoverable as a matter of right. Condemnation cases are expert driven
cases. ITD's experts spent a great deal of time and effort combating claims by Grathol that were
largely une,cplained, unquantified, and constantly changing. The work of these experts played a
very significant role in the favorable outcome for ITD in this case, and ITD respectfully requests
that it be allowed to recover the fees and costs of its experts in full.

VIII,

CONCLUSION

Defendant HJ Grathol attempted to tum the condemnation of a portion of its property into
the equivalent of winning the state lottery, Grathol bought the entire 56.8-acre parcel for

...

.

..,

$1.4 million in May of 2008. The real estate market only went down, dramatically, from May
of 2008 to November 17, 2010) the date of taking. Yet Grathol made demands and sought to
recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking of 16.314 acres of the 56.8-acre parcel (see
Grathol's ThL1li Supp. Resps. to Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff.), and
at trial sought as much as $3,093,360.00 (see Grathol Tr. Ex. J).
Grathol' s outlandish demands for compensation had no connection with fair market value
and were not based on sound principles or reasoning. They fought aggressively to avoid
answering discovery and disclosing expert opinions and made every effort to prevent their claims
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from being subjected to scrutiny and evaluation. Orathol engaged in improper and abusive

.
tactics throughout the case, which made it substantially and needlessly more expensive.

After a five-day trial, the Court awarded Grathol just compensation in the amount of
$675,000.00 for the taking. See Post Trial Memorandum Decision And Order For Judgment, at
33 (filed May 24, 2012). The award was far below the amounts sought by Grathol in the case.
The award was also far below the pretrial offer of settlement by ITO in the amount of
$1.1 million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 YorkAff, Accordingly, ITD is clearly the
prevailing party in this case.
As the prevailing party, ITD is entitled by law to recover its reasonable attorney fees and
costs. In addition, this case was extremely costly and vexatious due entirely to abuses and
improper tactics by Grathol in an effort to obtain a wholly unjustified and unfair windfall, not
just compensation. Accordingly, ITD respectfully requests that the Court award ITD its attorney
fees and costs in this case.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of August, 2012.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

By_c.-...q,.;.......,"4---~-i'----~------MaryV. y I
Steven C. wman
Special Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IdahoTransportation Department

J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.0. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

D
D
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D
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax
E-mail
Overnight UPS

Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol
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TO:

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

DOCKET NO. 40168-2012
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
vs.
HJ GRATHOL

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on August 23, 2012, I lodged
a transcript of 90 pages in length for the above-referenced
appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of Kootenai
in the First Judicial District.

I have lodged all assigned

appellate transcript(s) requested in the Notice of Appeal.
2/2/12, Hearing on motion for summary judgment and motion in
limine

~p(!~
7

Byrl Cinnamon
August 23, 2012
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVl0-10095

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF
ITD'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

After a bench trial in the above-captioned case, the Court entered Judgment on June 4,
2012, and Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation on June 26, 2012. Plaintiff, State of
Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") then filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs on
June 18, 2012, which was construed by this Court as a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's
Fees, along with an affidavit of computation and supporting brief. After ITD's memorandum
and Defendant HJ Grathol's objection were fully briefed by the parties, the Court heard oral
argument on ITD's motion on August 29, 2012.
After considering the arguments of counsel, reviewing the briefing of the parties and the
record in this matter, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court issued an oral ruling on the

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF ITO'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1
1611 of 1617

record granting in part and denying in part ITD's motion. The Court now enters the following
written order based on its August 29, 2012, oral ruling.
Based upon and for the reasons set forth in the Court's oral ruling, and in this Court's
discretion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ITD is the prevailing party in this matter, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(d).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as the prevailing party, ITD's request for costs as a
matter of right, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C), is hereby GRANTED. Additionally, this Court
finds ITD's requested costs reasonable.

ITD is therefore awarded the full amount of its

requested costs as a matter of right, as amended by ITD to correct a clerical error of $219 .50, in
the total amount of $13,298.56, in this Court's discretion.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ITD's request for discretionary costs, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D), is hereby GRANTED in the amount of $11,000.00. These discretionary
costs satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) and are hereby awarded to ITD in this
Court's discretion.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ITD's motion for attorney's fees, in this Court's
discretion, is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant HJ Grathol is directed to pay ITD the total
sum of $24,298.56 upon the entry of a final judgment. This sum shall bear interest at the legal
rate until paid in full.
DATED this

/0 day of September, 2012.

CHARLES W. HOSACK
SR. DISTRICT JUDGE

···--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _[Q_ day of September, 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq.
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq.
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol

D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight UPS
Fax

D
D
D

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Fax

D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Fax
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J. Tim Thomas
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
Courtesy Copy

~

MaryV. York
Steven C. Bowman
Ted S. Tollefson
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation
Department

~

Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk of the Kootenai County District Court
By:

~-,

~Ac}]~

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D!SlRICT O ; ~ ~ : : ~
DEPUTY

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Case No. CVI0-10095

Plaintiff,

FINAL JUDGMENT
(Costs and Attorney's Fees)

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership;
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

For the purposes of comporting with I.R.C.P. 54(a) and 58(a), this Court now enters its
Final Judgment.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
all claims for relief, including costs and attorney's fees, asserted by or against all parties in this
action are now addressed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment is hereby
entered in favor of Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Board, in the amount of $24,298.56, as against
Defendant, HJ Grathol, and shall bear interest at the legal rate until paid in full.
ENTERED this

IQ

day of September, 2012.

l-ff)l\.T ri:..:r A.L..l.'-..L...J.L..J.._,
lH P<.! l-ln<.!
Arv
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Special Deputy Attorneys General
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Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
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Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation
Department
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION.,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

vs.
HJ GRATHOL, a California general
partnership.,
DEFENDANT - APPELLANT
And
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a
Washington corporation, and
DOES 1 through 5
DEFENDANTS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 40168-2012

I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for
the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause
was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case.
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record and
February 2, 2012 Transcripts were complete and ready to be picked up (additional requested transcripts
have already been transcribed and previously provided), or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were
mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on the 17TH day of September 2011.
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County,

.""1'.l~l:Z?.!~....

Idaho this 17 TH day September, 2011.
CLIFFORD T. HA YES
Clerk of the District Court
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And
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and February 2,
2012 Transcripts to each of the Attorneys ofrecord in this cause as follows (additional
requested transcripts have already been transcribed and previously provided)
RAMSDEN & LYONS
Christopher D Gabbert
700 Northwest Blvd
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83816-1336

LAWRENCE G WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O.Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court
September , 2011.
this 17th day of
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